Deep Blue Never Is (Blue, That Is)

_{Barry Arrington

January 10, 2008

Intelligent Design}

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In the comment thread to my last post there was a lot of discussion about computers and their relation to intelligence. This is my understanding about computers. They are just very powerful calculators, but they do not “think” in any meaningful sense. By this I mean that computer hardware is nothing but an electro-mechanical device for operating computer software. Computer software in turn is nothing but a series of “if then” propositions. These “if then” propositions may be massively complex, but software never rises above an utterly determined “if then” level. This is a basic Turing Machine analysis.

This does not necessarily mean that the output of computer software is predictable. For example, the “then” in response to a particular”if” might be “access a random number generator and insert the number obtained in place of the variable in formula Y.” “Unpredictable” is not a synonym for “contingent.” Even if an element of randomness is introduced into the system, however, the way in which the computer will employ that random element is determined.

Now the $64,000 question is this: Is the human brain merely an organic computer that in principle operates the same way as my PC?” In other words, does the Turing Machine also describe the human brain ? If the brain is just an organic computer, even though human behavior may at some level be unpredictable, it is nevertheless determined, and free will does not exist. If, on the other hand, it is not, if there is a “mind” that is separate from though connected to, the brain, then free will does exist.

This issue has been debated endlessly, and I refer everyone to The Spiritual Brain for a much more in depth analysis of this subject. For my purposes today, I propose to approach the subject via a very simple thought experiment.

First a definition. “Qualia” are the subjective responses a person has to objective experience. Qualia are not the experiences themselves but the way we respond to the experiences. The color “red” is the classical example. When light of wavelength X comes into my eye, my brain tells me I am seeing the color red. The quale (singular of “qualia”) is my subjective experience of the “redness” of red. Maybe the “redness” of red for me is a kind of warmth. Other qualia might be the tanginess of a sour taste, the sadness of depression, etc.

Now the experiment: Consider a computer equiped with a light gathering device and a spectrograph. When light of wavelength X enters the light gathering device, the spectrograph gives a reading that the light is red. When this happens the computer is programmed to activate a printer that prints a piece of paper with the following statement on it “I am seeing red.”

I place the computer on my back porch just before sunset, and in a little while the printer is activated and prints a piece of paper that says “I am seeing red.”

Now I go outside and watch the same sunset. The reds in the sunset I associate with warmth, by which I mean my subjective reaction to the redness of the reds in the sunset is “warmth.”

1. Did the computer “see” red? Obviously yes.

2. Did I “see” red. Obviously yes.

3. Did I have a subjective experiences of the redness of red, i.e., did I experience a qualia? Obviously yes.

4. Did the computer have a subjective experience of the redness of red, i.e., did it experience a qualia? Obviously no.

Conclusion: The computer registered “red” when red light was present. My brain registered “red” when red light was present. Therefore, the computer and my brain are alike in this respect. However, and here’s the important thing, the computer’s experience of the sunset can be reduced to the functions of its light gathering device and hardware/software. But my experience of the sunset cannot be reduced to the functions of my eye and brain. Therefore, I conclude I have a mind which cannot be reduced to the electro-chemical reactions that occur in my brain.

Comments

[...] *By “subjectivity,” Hart means a person’s subjective experience of phenomena as distinct from the phenomena themselves. The discussion of subjectivity is often tied to the concept of “qualia.” See, e.g., here. [...]God's iPod - Uncommon Descent - Intelligent Design_{October 28, 2013
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As with so many other precepts of Christian faith, eventually it will be established that 'person-hood' is fundamental to intelligence, as is implicit in the definition of the soul in the Roman Catholic catechism, as the memory, will and understanding. Nota bene, 'the will'. Moreover it confirms what Christians know about God, himself, namely, that, if anything, he is not less personal than us, as some great, impassive monolith, but more personal than we can even imagine: the persons of the Most Holy Trinity being the very 'fons et origo' of our individual person-hood (in his image), evidently, with implications for the nature of our intelligence. As indeed, some of those NDE's indicate, with experiences of omniscience in the Holy spirit, (as members of the true vine, the mystical body of Christ).Axel_{October 26, 2013
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1 + 1 = 2 seemed a very apt 'gizmeter' - forget what it's called now - in relation to the point of my post, above.Axel_{October 26, 2013
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'If the brain is just an organic computer, even though human behavior may at some level be unpredictable, it is nevertheless determined, and free will does not exist. If, on the other hand, it is not, if there is a “mind” that is separate from though connected to, the brain, then free will does exist.' Well, that means that the materialists are themselves, the simplest and most obvious confirmation that humans possess free will, perversely exercised though it be/is. Given the ubiquitous, unchallenged (in any intelligent sense) evidence for ID in nature, is there any computer with a capacity for rational inference that would, that COULD, reject the evidence?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Is there any similar equipped computer that could arrive at the conclusion that something could turn itself into everything? You could go on for a while showing how they invite the derision of future generations for the way in which they choose to monkey with reason in the most obviously perverse ways, couldn't you?Axel_{October 26, 2013
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[...] *By “subjectivity,” Hart means a person’s subjective experience of phenomena as distinct from the phenomena themselves. The discussion of subjectivity is often tied to the concept of “qualia.” See, e.g., here. [...]On the Subject of Subjectivity | Uncommon Descent_{October 26, 2013
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Q: I just now spent a significant amount of time on a response to Prof Olofsson, harking back to the Padian thread. So pardon my being a bit summary, especiaslly as I see us looping back over old ground. 1] 187: the Intelligent Designer is one of your premises. This loops back to the objection of the Kantians, and is in serious error, as I long since pointed out and linked. In the current context, I am looking at a MODEL, by DS, in which what I have called an Intelligent Director is a part, the part that passes creative projected paths for a servo to the controller, whose job is to then try to keep the system on track from moment to moment thus executing the path desired. It is the possession of such an intelligent director capable of making such decisions and creative projections that makes the model in Fig 2 in the predictive form, self-directing and capable of praxis. Notice the difference in context and term,s, please. On inference to design, what the explanatory filter approach does is to refuse to rule out by begging the question the possibility of a designer at OOL OOBPLBD and OO FT LFC. Then, the strongly empirically and theoretically supported point that FSCI etc are reliable signs of agency is seen as pointing to agency on a basis of inference to best inductively anchored explanation. The price tag for rejecting this is selective hyperskepticism, as I have pointed out. 2] Start with the measurables - brain, information flow, brain-side of the mind/brain interface (or the correlaries in the DS model) - and by a process of elimination, conclude with what are the properties of mind First, one measures in a context that already implicitly addresses explanatory alternatives, i.e the models are there all the time. Second, on our own case we start from our life-experience as agents. We know from the inside what it is to be intelligent, creative etc, and that is the context in which mind as a term has been developed. We are therefore reasoning by family resemblance to known cases in point. Whatever mind is, we have an example in point that is empirical. We now set out to see what “stuff” mind is made of – what it is is different from that it is; the latter being the premise of all our intellectual activity. In that pursuit, we see that certain artificial entities are a possible model: supervised servosystems in which an intelligent director creatively sets the path and the expected observations along it to guide the controller to keep on track. We can compare two cases, one that would be hard to do in realistic cases [we have already done simpler case by making Model-referenced adaptive controllers and their descendants] but is technologically feasible, and one [Ac 27] where we see a classical account of a ship voyage under direction of a steersman in the face of decisions by the ship's company and the environment. The result is to show that information is a key intermediary between intelligent direction and control. Further by comparison with our experience we know that creative synthesis of such paths is based on understanding of configurational possibilities and dynamics, thus on going right to islands of functionality instead of being lost in vast config spaces and trying to find function through random walks that soon run out of probabilistic resources. On this, the neural network model is useful, but notice the types that speak to such self-directed learning tare also involved in serious FSCI to set them up. So we see a crucial difference between mind and chance + necessity only in design. 3] My approach makes no initial assumptions about the properties of each element of the process, expect for the assumption that a particular model is being followed, as your logical argument suggests. However, by observing the processes and boundaries of each element, we would conclude with the understanding of “that which remains only indirectly observed is left as mind (or as the Intelligent Director)”. A look at the just above will show that it reiterates that there is no assumption before the fact on the ontological nature of mind, only that we recognise that mind is – we ourselves experience it. More to the point we also infer that since mind in our case is contingent, creation of mind is possible so the trick is to identify how to do it. Thence R Daneel here we come! By observing he characteristics of the DS model andf the relevant neural networks and comparing with the observed and experienced behaviour of human minds, we then can make comparisons on boundaries and ask questions on the origins and ontology of the relevant components. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 23, 2008
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I think I see the difference in our approaches, and that it may result in different outcomes. Your approach, if I read it correctly, is to start with the Intelligent Director. Specifically, you start with "(L)et us bring to bear the relevant issues on what an intelligent director would be like and how it is set up" That is, the Intelligent Designer is one of your premises. I'm taking a different point. Start with the measurables - brain, information flow, brain-side of the mind/brain interface (or the correlaries in the DS model) - and by a process of elimination, conclude with what are the properties of mind (or of the Intelligent Designer). My approach makes no initial assumptions about the properties of each element of the process, expect for the assumption that a particular model is being followed, as your logical argument suggests. However, by observing the processes and boundaries of each element, we would conclude with the understanding of "that which remains only indirectly observed is left as mind (or as the Intelligent Director)". If the model were correct, would you expect both approaches to result in the same understanding of the Intelligent Designer, or of mind?Q_{January 22, 2008
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Q: In my context, I am making no initial distinction on whether what we experience as the mind is material or immaterial at the first instance. I am simply pointing to the DS architecture, that allows us to differentiate controller from intelligent director and to assign the locus of creative tasks – getting beyond the Crick-style confusion. Then, let us bring to bear the relevant issues on what an intelligent director would be like and how it is set up, by going back to a point in my always linked, section A and a remark by good old materialism-leaning prof Wiki on Instincts [and along the way, DV, we will make reference again to Ac 27 on governance by competing agents in a situation that exhibits tracking in the short term and navigation in the long term relative to an intended path]:
[GEM of TKI:] let us identify what intelligence is. This is fairly easy: for, we are familiar with it from the characteristic behaviour exhibited by certain known intelligent agents -- ourselves. Specifically, as we know from experience and reflection, such agents take actions and devise and implement strategies that creatively address and solve problems they encounter; a functional pattern that does not depend at all on the identity of the particular agents. In short, intelligence is as intelligence does. So, if we see evident active, intentional, creative, innovative and adaptive [as opposed to merely fixed instinctual] problem-solving behaviour similar to that of known intelligent agents, we are justified in attaching the label: intelligence. [Note how this definition by functional description is not artificially confined to HUMAN intelligent agents: it would apply to computers, robots, the alleged alien residents of Area 51, Vulcans, Klingons or Kzinti, or demons or gods, or God.] But also, in so solving their problems, intelligent agents may leave behind empirically evident signs of their activity; and -- as say archaeologists and detectives know -- functionally specific, complex information [FSCI] that would otherwise be improbable, is one of these signs. [“prof” Wiki, 1:] Instinct is the inherent disposition of a living organism toward a particular behavior. Instincts are unlearned, inherited fixed action patterns of responses or reactions to certain kinds of stimuli. Innate emotions, which can be expressed in more flexible ways and learned patterns of responses, not instincts, form a basis for majority of responses to external stimuli in evolutionary higher species, while in case of highest evolved species both of them are overridden by actions based on cognitive processes with more or less intelligence and creativity or even trans-intellectual intuition.Examples of instinctual fixed action patterns can be observed in the behavior of animals, which perform various activities (sometimes complex) that are not based upon prior experience and do not depend on emotion or learning, such as reproduction, and feeding among insects. Other examples include animal fighting, animal courtship behavior, internal escape functions, and building of nests. Instinctual actions - in contrast to actions based on learning which is served by memory and which provides individually stored successful reactions built upon experience - have no learning curve, they are hard-wired and ready to use without learning, but do depend on maturational processes to appear. [PW, 2:] Intelligence is an umbrella term used to describe a property of the mind that encompasses many related abilities, such as the capacities to reason, to plan, to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language, and to learn. There are several ways to define intelligence. In some cases, intelligence may include traits such as creativity, personality, character, knowledge, or wisdom. [PW, 3:] Creativity (or "creativeness") is a mental process involving the generation of new ideas or concepts, or new associations between existing ideas or concepts. From a scientific point of view, the products of creative thought (sometimes referred to as divergent thought) are usually considered to have both originality and appropriateness. An alternative, more everyday conception of creativity is that it is simply the act of making something new. [PW, 4:] Intuition is apparent ability to acquire knowledge without a clear inference or reasoning process. It is "the immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process" [Oxford English Dictionary]. Intuition, by definition, has no objective validity. However it is extremely widespread as an apparent phenomenon. For this reason, it has been the subject of study in Psychology, as well as a topic of interest in the supernatural. . . . In psychology, intuition can encompass the ability to know valid solutions to problems and decision making. For example, the recognition primed decision (RPD) model was described by Gary Klein in order to explain how people can make relatively fast decisions without having to compare options. Klein found that under time pressure, high stakes, and changing parameters, experts used their base of experience to identify similar situations and intuitively choose feasible solutions. Thus, the RPD model is a blend of intuition and analysis. The intuition is the pattern-matching process that quickly suggests feasible courses of action. The analysis is the mental simulation, a conscious and deliberate review of the courses of action
These -- together with the DS architecture of a complex servo-system with a controller based on input-output comparison to projected track, and with the projected track being creatively supplied by what I have called an intelligent director – will form a context for the further remarks. [Then, we can deal with subjectivity, consciousness and qualia etc as markers that point to the nature of the relevant director we possess.] 1] Directors and neural network characteristics and programming. In a sense this reworks what was dealt with under a similarish post on a parallel thread, but with adjustments to this thread. For, we know what agency is, DIRECTLY IN THE FIRST PERSON, so we experience that intuition, creativity and intelligence are features of agency that routinely act effectively into the world. This is what has to be reasonably explained. Thence, we can look at the DS framework and the relevance of an intelligent director – or of a collective of such directors [per Ac 27] — supervising and guiding the i/o processor controlling the servosystems: robot of the future, body in the present, or ship in the past of October 59 AD makes little difference. 2] Neural networks as a model . .. Wiki on neural networks:
in unsupervised learning [in a neural network] we are given some data x, and a cost function to be minimized which can be any function of x and the network’s output, f. The cost function is determined by the task formulation. [ note this — someone sets the task, sets the goal and sets up the system, i.e the ANN does not ultimately question its final-level purpose.] Most applications fall within the domain of estimation problems such as statistical modeling, compression, filtering, blind source separation and clustering . . . . In reinforcement learning, data x is usually not given, but generated by an agent’s interactions with the environment. At each point in time t, the agent performs an action yt and the environment generates an observation xt and an instantaneous cost ct, according to some (usually unknown) dynamics. The aim is to discover a policy for selecting actions that minimises some measure of a long-term cost, i.e. the expected cumulative cost. [Note the preset purpose.] The environment’s dynamics and the long-term cost for each policy are usually unknown, but can be estimated. ANNs are frequently used in reinforcement learning as part of the overall algorithm. Tasks that fall within the paradigm of reinforcement learning are control problems, games and other sequential decision making tasks.
Notice how the learning control system has to be set up to have a creative, imaginative, intelligent and even intuitive supervisory view of the world and its dynamics and conditions so that it can explore and address then model potential costs and benefits of policies then go for the goals it has, and of course monitor and adjust as it tracks across time, leaning from experience. That brings up the governance issue as competing policies vie for adoption. Thence, Acts 27 and issues of democratic governance and wisdom. But this is a bit afield. We want to go now for what agents are like in our own case. 3] Mind-brain issues -- simplified As BarryA observed in the OP:
computer hardware is nothing but an electro-mechanical device for operating computer software. Computer software in turn is nothing but a series of “if then” propositions. These “if then” propositions may be massively complex, but software never rises above an utterly determined “if then” level . . . . the $64,000 question is this: Is the human brain merely an organic computer that in principle operates the same way as my PC?” In other words, does the Turing Machine also describe the human brain ? If the brain is just an organic computer, even though human behavior may at some level be unpredictable, it is nevertheless determined, and free will does not exist. If, on the other hand, it is not, if there is a “mind” that is separate from though connected to, the brain, then free will does exist . . . . “Qualia” are the subjective responses a person has to objective experience. Qualia are not the experiences themselves but the way we respond to the experiences . . . . Consider a computer equiped with a light gathering device and a spectrograph. When light of wavelength X enters the light gathering device, the spectrograph gives a reading that the light is red. When this happens the computer is programmed to activate a printer that prints a piece of paper with the following statement on it “I am seeing red.” I place the computer on my back porch just before sunset, and in a little while the printer is activated and prints a piece of paper that says “I am seeing red.” Now I go outside and watch the same sunset. The reds in the sunset I associate with warmth, by which I mean my subjective reaction to the redness of the reds in the sunset is “warmth.” . . . . Conclusion: The computer registered “red” when red light was present. My brain registered “red” when red light was present. Therefore, the computer and my brain are alike in this respect. However, and here’s the important thing, the computer’s experience of the sunset can be reduced to the functions of its light gathering device and hardware/software. But my experience of the sunset cannot be reduced to the functions of my eye and brain. Therefore, I conclude I have a mind which cannot be reduced to the electro-chemical reactions that occur in my brain.
Actually, I am astonished that we have to go down to so many details to see the obvious. There are many current views, that (like Crick), would reduce mind to brain. But from our experience of mind – which is necessarily relied upon to think even materialistic thoughts – we do experience free will and intelligent creativity, intuition etc. Even in the case of learning artificial neural networks, they have to be set up in ways that fairly reek of organised complexity, pointing onward to agency and intelligence. And, free thinking and acting are conditions of such intelligence. Further to this, we experience ourselves as such intelligent agents. Thus, plainly, any view that contradicts the facts of intelligent agency as we experience it, are false-to-fact, and falsified. [IMHBCO, it is the institutional power of lingering evo mat that makes this hard to do, not the logic.] And, those facts plainly contradict the notion that mind is an emergence from the properties of matter as we understand them through scientific study. So, on the evidence in hand, mind is more than mater but is capable of interacting with it in interesting ways. Most notably, it is capable to provide the creative, imaginative, intuitive etc that can then guide the servostysems involved. 4] And if mind has been created . . . Then prima facie, mind can be created. So, R Daneel is in principle possible. The issue is: how! So, let's roll up our sleeves and sharpen our pencils – the adventure of design science has only just begun . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 22, 2008
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Pardon my ignorance, KF, but I miss your point in 184. I'm discussing how the computer model you present can be used used as a tool to examine the brain/mind duality. I.e., in the context of this thread, to observe the boundary between "seeing red" and "subjectively experiencing red." I'm arguing that the model you present must be correlated to the physical brain, they physical interface, and the physical information - through observation of the brain, its interaction with information, and its interaction with the interface to the mind. The model you present must not simply treated as a direct representation of the brain. For this examination, brain, information, interface, and mind, and be treated and observed as separable constructs.Q_{January 21, 2008
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Q: Re: Information can be implemented without interfacing to mind . . . Interface can be examined without information flowing across it We are speaking to a particular context and thus also the DS architecture. It is moreover the case that interfaces are designed in the context of the requisite information flows, thus the informaitonin question. Here we are interested in the predictive paths set up imaginatively, volitionally and creatively for the effecting servo-system. These serve as templates for action. What is significant is that relative tot he control part, the templates are in effect givens ands the controller can syntactically track and compare actual with projected then generate control vectors to correct deviations. The setting up of the track and of the programs to control the controller are SEMANTIC. That is, for instance a bit based processor can simply sample outputs at given times then compare to expected, generate error signals that drive actuators and monitor onward performance. But what the signals mean is not a necessary part of that -- it is in the semantics. What the controller is doing is register-based arithmetic, logic and shift operations on bit strings; it does not itself address what the strings mean. That is the job of the programmer. As people we plan then act and we monitor deviations and respond to them to get back on track. We do so intelligently - based on meanings and what makes sense, as a rule. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 21, 2008
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KF, in 180, mentions about brain, mind, interface and information "We can discuss these separately, but we can’t design, develop or put them together separately." Depends upon how one parses the problem. Information can be implemented without interfacing to mind - at least the properties of information as it resides in the brain. Interface can be examined without information flowing across it - at least the physical brain-side of the interface, such as using cadavers with no information flow. Just like any well-structured computer problem, the modules can be examined in isolation from the others.Q_{January 20, 2008
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StephenB, You're welcome but I have to thank you for the great post.jerry_{January 20, 2008
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Jerry: Thanks for @153StephenB_{January 20, 2008
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Okay: This thread is starting to interact with the one over on computer persuasion. I ask that you all look over at my remarks here at no 46 in that thread. 1] neural nets . . . You will see why I am looking at neural networks as an architecture for an intelligent director and also why I insist that information is the bridge. BTW, observe that neural networks are not locked down to being implemented biologically/chemically -- routinely, they are now done in software, i.e "infospace." 2] Comm interfaces and info flows cannot be separated . . . And, the issue of the relevant interfaces is to pass information in compatible formats through ports of one sort or another -- a biggie headache I assure you, cf my always linked Fig 1 and cf also the elaboration of the code-decode blocks, here in the ISO OSI "layer-cake" [that's what I always called it to my students, for the obvious reason] reference model! 3] Q, 178:Brain can be watched. Information flows into, through, and from the brain. This says that some properties of information can be inferred by observing the properties and behaviors of the brain. This should at least lead to an understanding of the brain-side connection between mind and brain. That is, at least part of the mind-brain interface interacts with the physical world, so at least part of the mind-brain interface can be understood with the scientific process by applying the scientific methodology. Yes. 4] I am insisting that the proper model, as being described, has four, logically separable constructs - brain, mind, information, and interface. (However, if it is argued that the interface should be discussed as being of two parts - half that is brain and half that is part mind, that could make sense too. But, that still keeps information as a separate construct from the interface.) We can discuss these separately, but we can't design, develop or put them together separately. [And that holds whatever the mind proper is and however it is made up. I just have excellent reason to infer that it is real and that it is not determined by the chemistry etc involved in brain function. Further, that its reality and credibility are necessary conditions for the praxis of science.] The purpose of an interface is to facilitate info flow, and it is the requisites of that info flow which make up the key to designing and understanding the interface. [For instance I once used a 6402 UART to transmit voice based on understanding the characteristics of the voice as an information-bearing signal and recognising how much bandwidth and signal processing were really needed. The answer is that for voice quality you can get away with a surprisingly narrow bandwidth and bit rate, even with fairly unsophisticated coding. Now, with adaptive, differential, pulse-coded modulation schemes, you can do even more . . .] Speaking of which . . . 5] Dave, 179: Smooth motion is deemed acceptable at a sample rate of 24fps. Evidently flicker is caused by the lit and unlit time periods. I was wondering why a shutter on a film projector that flashed exactly the same frame on/off two or three times the frame rate would improve anything. It certainly won’t improve smooth motion as the only way to do that is increase the sample rate and you’d have to do that with the camera not the projector. What it does is reduces eyestrain by making the lit/unlit frequency faster. And, this is also a function of the light level of the screen -- you can get away with a lower rate in a relatively dark room and with a relatively dim screen (why ther eis a fairly broad band for flicker fusion). [BTW, there are people who are sensitive to the remaining flicker in especially Euro style TVs at 50 Hz. We are dealing with populations here . . .] 6] cold cathode electron beam flat panel I seem to vaguely recall reading of such a tech, 15 - 2o years ago was it? Nice stuff -- hope you made some good money off it! Back to the 50's -- from vaguely remembered readings 25 years back -- there was an attempt to make an early avionics HUD using see-through flat panel electron beam from the side CRTs. Again, this underscores how much information is embedded in the interface's design itself. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 20, 2008
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kf Mibad. There are a few different kinds of artifacts and I was confusing flicker fusion with smooth motion. Smooth motion is deemed acceptable at a sample rate of 24fps. Evidently flicker is caused by the lit and unlit time periods. I was wondering why a shutter on a film projector that flashed exactly the same frame on/off two or three times the frame rate would improve anything. It certainly won't improve smooth motion as the only way to do that is increase the sample rate and you'd have to do that with the camera not the projector. What it does is reduces eyestrain by making the lit/unlit frequency faster. I stand corrected! On LCDs there's no good reason to use a slow raster scan in updating the display except to cheapen and simplify the video processer side (you can use a video processor made to work with analog CRTs) not to accomodate the data rate of the LCD. The serial interface on modern flat panels is so bloody fast that you can effectively get every pixel on an NTSC resolution panel changing state simultaneously. The limitation is the light shutter speed not how quickly you can change all the input voltages on all the transisters that drive the all shutters. Not all phosphors on CRTs are created equal. There are slow phosphors and fast phosphors. You need a fast phospor to display motion without blurring so TVs use fast phosphors but the tradeoff is that you get fusion-flicker at lower frame rates. The orginal IBM PC came with a slow green phosphor monitor and operated at 50hz vertical refresh without a hint of fusion-flicker or eyestrain but any motion left a fading trail behind the moving object like the trail of a meteorite crossing the sky. Early LCDs suffered from same problem as the shutter speed was slower than the vertical refresh rate at some 30 milliseconds. Nowadays the shutter speed is down to 2ms so a framerate of up to 500hz can be accomodated if there was any practical reason to use such a high framerate. By the way, I have a patent involving the use of a display technology you probably never heard of called a cold cathode electron beam flat panel. You can see the patent here. DaveScot_{January 19, 2008
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KF, in 175, mentions I have then drawn out the point that for the mind-body issues in linked phil, we are looking at the question that INFORMATION is the bridge between the different elements and major sub-sections of the enlarged control loop. I agree with the model you are presenting, and I agree it is a useful expolaration into the duality of mind and brain. I also agree that extrapolations of the model you are suggesting can lead to expectations about brain, and by inference, to expectations about the mind. It can also provide some insight into how they interact. So, I must disagree with your claim that "INFORMATION is the bridge". I much prefer your earlier claim that the interface is the bridge, but not that information is the same as the interface. I am insisting that with the model being used, information is that which flows, the brain is one module that sends and receives, the mind is another, and the interface is the medium which carries the information between the modules. Perhaps I'm using "information" differently from you, but I think not, as you already mentioned that information can't flow on its own. The purpose for maintaining such a clear conceptual difference in mind, brain, interface, and information, is that at least some of those can be theorized and studied in the material domain. Brain can be watched. Information flows into, through, and from the brain. This says that some properties of information can be inferred by observing the properties and behaviors of the brain. This should at least lead to an understanding of the brain-side connection between mind and brain. That is, at least part of the mind-brain interface interacts with the physical world, so at least part of the mind-brain interface can be understood with the scientific process by applying the scientific methodology. That part of the mind-brain interaction which cannot be studied with the scientific process can readily be understood to be on the non-physical side of the mind-brain duality. I'm not trying to "posit a fourth unknown factor", as has been said multiple times. I'm trying to understand the boundaries of each of the factors, including the physically observable factors involving the brain and mind. In this topic, however, I am insisting that the proper model, as being described, has four, logically separable constructs - brain, mind, information, and interface. (However, if it is argued that the interface should be discussed as being of two parts - half that is brain and half that is part mind, that could make sense too. But, that still keeps information as a separate construct from the interface.) --- DaveScot: Even the new flat panel displays don't display the image all at once. Not all pixels flip at the same time. Instead, they are also scanned out, with a row and column counter. Flat panels still don't match the properties of a film projector, in which one shutter controls the entire image. The main difference between CRTs and flat panels, as pertains to this discussion, is that the light coming from pixels doesn't decay once it is illuminated from a flat panel. But, the phosphor of a CRT immediately starts fading once the electron beam passes over it. So, by the time that the raster gets to the lower corner, the opposite upper corner may have faded to near black - and the after-image effect that KF mentions is why that fading isn't perceived on CRTs. This is why CRTs used as computer displays, and which are progressive, typically need to run at the much higher 72 fps to avoid the perception of flicker. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frame_rate#Flicker_fusion_frequency Also, even though film is played at 24 fps, and video at 30 fps (60 half-frames per second, as KF mentions, film-recorded movies do not play back noticeabley faster when played on TV. Instead, occasionally, fields are duplicated to keep the same average full-frame rate. Some variant of a 3-2-3-2 encoding format is used: http://www.videoccasions-nw.com/voframes.htmlQ_{January 19, 2008
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hi Dave: Good to hear from a fellow sci-tech head. I am thinking we can explore the AI side a bit as this has very interesting implications on what it means to infer to design. On NTSC -- "never twice the same colour!" [and in management, NTSS is too frequent with too may managers who think themselves clever: "never twice the same story . . ." ] -- wiki has a reasonable summary here. It reads in part:
The National Television System Committee was established in 1940 by the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to resolve the conflicts which arose between companies over the introduction of a nationwide analog television system in the United States. In March 1941, the committee issued a technical standard for black-and-white television which built upon a 1936 recommendation made by the Radio Manufacturers Association (RMA). Technical advancements of the vestigial sideband technique allowed for the opportunity to increase the image resolution broadcast to consumer televisions. The NTSC compromised between RCA's desire to keep a 441–scan line standard (which was already being used by RCA's NBC TV network) and Philco's desire to increase the number of scan lines to between 605 and 800. The committee compromised and selected a 525-line transmission standard. Other technical standards in the final recommendation were a frame rate (image rate) of 30 frames per second consisting of two interlaced fields per frame> In January 1950 the Committee was reconstituted to standardize color television. In December 1953, it unanimously approved what is now called simply the NTSC color television standard (later defined as RS-170a). The updated standard retained full backwards compatibility ("compatible color") with older black-and-white television sets. Color information was added to the black-and-white image by adding a color subcarrier of 4.5 × 455/572 MHz (approximately 3.58 MHz) to the video signal. In order to minimize interference between the chrominance signal and FM sound carrier, the addition of the color subcarrier also required a slight reduction of the frame rate from 30 frames per second to 30/1.001 (very close to 29.97) frames per second, and changing the line frequency from 15,750Hz to 15,734.26Hz.
The two fields are one frame; and that is where I got the 60 from. I will have to check back on the range for flicker fusion, but as I recall it is 30 - 45 Hz or so. The Euro standards -- keyed to their mains freq of 50 Hz -- is just over the range. The US one is also more or less keyed to its mains freq, and that gets you comfortably past t he range. (Back to the 50s it was cheaper to go with mains than to use crystal controlled oscillators. That gave the Russians BTW interesting headaches on synching across their whole country as there was no one unified grid locked to a common freq by nonlinear frequency pulling effects!) Movies from my recall did use the double-hit on light to achieve the same flicker fusion. A key point in all the above is how much complexity goes on behind the scenes of any information processing system so that its complexity is only partly captured by issues on encoding of data. That is of course telling on just how conservative the Dembski type UPB is. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 19, 2008
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kf TV and movie screens are not the same. A TV picture would be flicker free at 30hz if it wasn't for the way it is painted on the screen - called a raster scan. The TV picture is painted by an electron beam whose point hits a phosphor coating and makes it glow (or not) at that point. The beam starts at the upper left corner, sweeps horizontally across the screen to the upper right corner, shuts off, moves down one line, returns to the left side, and paints another line. It does it fast enough that the phospher lit up at the beginning is still glowing when it gets to the end. However, there is still the problem that the picture doesn't arrive all at once. On a movie screen all parts of any single frame arrive on all parts of the screen at the same instant. NTSC video is 30 frames per second. Interlacing takes each frame and presents it by first painting all the odd lines and then all the even lines of any single frame. In this fashion it minimizes the effect of the delay from the when the first part of the image is painted to when the last part gets painted. Many modern TVs don't interlace anymore as raster scanning is required by cathode ray tubes but not by LCD and other types of flat panel or projection TVs. They are called progressive scan and they work by storing the transmitted interlaced raster scan in memory until the completion of a frame then they display it all once at 30 frames per second. This in effect duplicates the way a movie projector works. There is no flicker at 30fps when complete images are displayed all at once. I happen to know this stuff because I was responsible for, among other things, the repair to the component level of television cameras and display monitors in the military back in the 1970's and attended classes on TV theory. While attending college, after I got out of the military, I supplemented my GI Bill college money by fixing TVs as well as calibrating and repairing high end NTSC video editing equipment used in television content production. DaveScot_{January 19, 2008
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Q: I: Perhaps it has not dawned on you that I am/we are now looking -- at least as a thought experiment exercise -- at the core design concept phase of what would be if played out, a project to BUILD an AI robot. (BTW, on the technical side-note the flicker effect is what leads to the use of interlaced scanning in NTSC and PAL/SECAM TV systems -- interlaced [odd and even line]half-screens are presented at 60 or 50 Hz, which is above the flicker fusion threshold, at least for most of us; there are people who find TV at 50 fps unwatchable. Film based movies, shown in theatres at 24 fps, are simply double-pulsed -- each screen is shown twice then the next frame is shown. This is also the reason why such movies run slightly faster on TV than on the silver screen -- they are speeding up the frames. The way colours get rendered using the tongue of colour model is even more interesting on how information is being processed in our sensors and processing elements. So is the stuff on sound using an array of tuned hairs tied to nerve cell chains to do a real-time Fourier transform on the sound as it comes in as time-domain vibrations. BTW, one type of old fashioned analogue frequency meter in effect had a chain of tuning forks that did the same.] II: In that context, I have used Smith's systems architecture model of an i/o controller processor tied to what I have termed an intelligent director that provides higher level, autononomously generated [i.e. self determined, planned and intelligent] trajectory information to the servo controller for "efference copy and reafference" - based control. III: I have then drawn out the point that for the mind-body issues in linked phil, we are looking at the question that INFORMATION is the bridge between the different elements and major sub-sections of the enlarged control loop. Thence, that this would speak to the idea that mind [of whatever ontology] and physical body interact through the common entity information. This last, of course, is embodied in signals and used to derive the control action, but which is not confined to any one specific material representation and its natural regularities (save that they must make room for contingency so that diverse signal states may be configured to convey meaning in messages and signals]. For instance, the information on the sheet of paper of the computer screen is at a different level from the chemistry of paper and ink or the physics of LCD based devices. We may then look at what this says to the issues of mind and body, including on monist and dualist accounts. IV: On the relevant monist account, evo mat, we are back at say Crick's incoherence, as a classic expression of the materialist's dilemma:
The Astonishing Hypothesis is that "You," your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules . . . . ... Free Will is located in or near the anterior cingulate sulcus. ... Other areas in the front of the brain may also be involved. What is needed is more experiments on animals, ...
In short, this looks very much like confusing the processor architecture and operations of a servo-system controller with the provision of the intelligent directions that give the human body its marching orders. And, even before bringing on board the specific Smith archi, I had made that point, more than once. More broadly, and as I for instance excerpted at 154, evo mat runs into the problem that if mind is the product of natural regularities plus lucky noise, it has no credibility as being able to reason seriously about serious matters thast would be required to for instance arrive at evo mat, a philosophical position. In particular, it fatally undermines the grounds for Mathematics and science. V: The dualist account starts from the empirical experience and observation of intelligent mind in action. We are not -- pace the behaviourists [cf the rise of Cognitive psychology in recent decades] -- to be reduced to mere stimulus-response arcs. Or, citing Niesser from the just linked:
...the term "cognition" refers to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images [i.e we are, inter alia, back to the Smith templates imaginatively constructed based on intuition and knowledge] and hallucinations... Given such a sweeping definition, it is apparent that cognition is involved in everything a human being might possibly do; that every [1]psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon. But although cognitive psychology is concerned with all human activity rather than some fraction of it, the concern is from a particular point of view. Other viewpoints are equally legitimate and necessary. Dynamic psychology, which begins with motives rather than with sensory input, is a case in point. Instead of asking how a man's actions and experiences result from what he saw, remembered, or believed, the dynamic psychologist asks how they follow from the subject's goals, needs, or instincts.
1 --> We know [provisionally of course, as is true of all empirically based knowledge] that FSCI is a reliably known artifact of such mind in action, as in all cases where such FSCI is encountered in directly observed process of causation, it comes from intelligent agents. 2 --> tha tmeans that we have every right to infer to agents on inference to best explanation, in further cases where we do not directly observe: the principle of uniformity of cause-effect patterns that is at the core of science. 3 --> It is of course reliably (though provisionally) long since known -- cf Plato, the Laws, Book X -- on vast experience that cause-effect chains reduce to one or more of chance, necessity and agency, e.g. the "celebrated" case of the tumbling die that shows all three in independent action. [This entails that we cannot assume or assert that agency simply reduces to chance and/or necessity.] 4 --> Onlookers, of course on the strength of much interacion in recent days, Q wishes to posit a fourth unknown factor and/or to posit that we cannot in relevant cases reliably distinguish the effects of the three factors. The first (which he evidently denied on being pressed] boils down to an IOU backed by nothing. The second is patently false once we see the point that FSCI is a reliable sign of agency. 5 -> For, not only do we observe that agents routinely produce FSCI, but we have access to the principles of statistical thermodynamics. And those tell us that once we deal with vast configuration spaces, we cannot credibly get to islands of functionality from arbitrary initial points, on the grounds of exhaustion of the probabilistic resources of the observed universe. So to infer to agency is to accept the best currently available, empirically anchored explanation. 6 --> Indeed, as I point out in the always linked Section A, that is just what we routinely do on encountering say a web page: it is functionally specified and complex beyond the UPB, so we infer to agency not lucky noise as its most credible explanation. 7 --> To suddenly turn around and reject this when we turn to cases like DNA -- a complex and functional digital data string [i.e OOL and OO BPLBD], and to reject it on seeing the organised, fine tuned complexity of the physics of the life facilitating cosmos, IMHBCO typically reflects selective hyperskepticism and worldview level question begging, too often backed up by political correctness and abuse of power. 8 --> For, we have no good logical or physical grounds for excluding he possibility of agency at the relevant points, which inter alia means that -- especially as regards models of cosmogenesis -- we should be open to the possibility of an intelligent an necessary being as the cause of the observed cosmos. [The ad hoc patchwork of multiverse alternative models is equally a set of metaphysical - not empirically anchored scientific -- models. Cf my discussion in my always linked, section D. ______________ So, having had to again summarise what I HAVE been saying all along, in the teeth of repeated distortions, I trust that from now on, we can proceed to discuss on the merits, not the strawmen. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 19, 2008
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Q re the flicker/frequency issue Remember all the hoopla about subliminal advertising? Single frames with a message of some sort inserted into a 30fps television show aren't consciously noticed but are noticed by the subconscious.DaveScot_{January 19, 2008
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edit: above "They are not about mischief - they are about arriving at a different conclusion about computer-based persuasion. See posts 1 and 169 for my argument " should be "They are not about mischief - they are about arriving at a different conclusion about computer-based issues. See posts 1 (in the persuade thread) and 169 above for my arguments." Late night gaffe.Q_{January 19, 2008
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KF, in 170, suggests [That is, are you simply playing the troll?] No. But I've been thinking about our different approaches to the issues. And, I have serious interests in the scientific aspects of ID. Your approach, I am thinking, is that you are taking an explicitly dualistic approach. In contrast, I'm not excluding dualism, but have narrowed my analysis of the issues, for a specific reason. That is, most of the claims and issues of ID in which I am interested are materialistic. They are about the real world. ID has claims that can be substantiated through the scientific method, at least the material claims. This is where I've objected to many of your claims. Even dualism has some overlaps with materialism - we aren't arguing mutually exclusive domains, as your rebuttals of "materialism" seem to be. In the context of this thread, both dualism and materialism address the material issues of the brain. Related to that, as you have asserted, and to which I agree, the philosophies of dualism and of materialism can be analyzed with a purely logical methodology, just as you indicated with regards to the thought experiments. But, and this is important, to be internally consistent, these logic-based arguments only retain their validity in their logic-based domain - namely within their philosophy. Instead, if the conclusions from the philosophy's methodology are used to describe material, observable events, then the line between philosophy and methodology has been crossed. When extended to the material world, logic is the method to provide predictions about observations. Those predictions then need to be validated through the scientific method through actual observations in order to be considered as "fact". I object to the insistence that logic - the tool of philosophy - is sufficient to make absolute claims about the material world. That is the basic premise I find faulty. It is not about "materialism". It is about proper application of the tools of pure philosophy vs applied science. I can be done with this aspect of the discussion, if you are willing. --- BTW, I read your reference to Derek's explanation about cybernetics. It is consistent with my experience in the field. And yes, I am very acquainted with the issues you mention - block transfer diagrams, frequency domains, feedback loops, Laplace, Fourier, etc. and many more. My questions to you in 169 were not based on ignorance (so please don't assume such) - they are serious questions about your claims. They are not about mischief - they are about arriving at a different conclusion about computer-based persuasion. See posts 1 and 169 for my argument - perhaps you could address the differences between my position and yours about the material issues concerning the brain. I appreciate your reply in 170 about the flow of information information in the relevant system- functional sense does not flow automatically If so - and without insisting I surf the web to get an answer to something you posted in this thread - does your claim in 166 that information is the interface still hold? ---- As a side note, when you mention to AIG "I’d love to hear from you on the issues now on the table, as an AI active practitioner", he's not necessarily the only one experienced in that field who is involved in this discussion. I just don't feel it necessary to argue based on my credentials - except when I think it appropriate - so haven't shared with you. As an aside, you mention "For vision I recall the update period is about 1/8 second so that 16 frames per second starts to look like motion." This issue is very much related to my experience. The update period is also related to the intensity of the light. Bright images are seen to flicker more at 16 fps, and dim images less so. There are even observations that it is related to the spatial frequency of the contents of the image.Q_{January 19, 2008
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PPS: Found a nice intro on transfer functions and block diagram analysis here.kairosfocus_{January 18, 2008
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Okay . . . First, Patrick et al, thanks for the help on 164 and 166. Ever mysterious are the ways of lady Akismet! BarryA, your remarks in 167 on the EXPERIENCE of being an agent with a mind of his own are ever so apt, if one would but listen. As to Q at 168 -9: 1 --> First, kindly go READ Derek Smith as a 101 on the subject, then come back back to us on his points of substance. 2 --> In particular, attend to the Fig 2 and its context, which more than adequately answer to the questions you have. There you will see the role of memory storage, information transmission and the creation of efferent copies and creative prediction of intended servosystem path by
"a higher order controller (far left [NB This is what I have termed the Intelligent Director --i.e the intended AI]) [which] replaces the external manual source of command information. This means that there is no longer any high-side system boundary, making the new layout self-controlling. That is to say, it is now capable of willed behaviour, or "praxis." "
3 --> As anyone who reads my always linked Section A and notices my general diagram of a communication system will recognise, information in the relevant system- functional sense does not flow automatically: it is created, encoded, transmitted, received, decoded and used. [All of which in our observation require intelligent action to set up.] 4 --> As to the puerile attempt at turnabout rhetoric in 168, I will waste no more time on such save to briefly point out that onlookers can see for themselves just who is playing rhetorical games with vague dismissals and who is seriously taking up the challenge on the AI issue, and sourcing, applying and putting up a serious model that provides a platform for technological and scientific development; then raising implications and issues on the worldviews core for that development. 5 --> Maybe some plain speaking will help: Q if you don't understand block diagram algebra and/or signal flow graphs, register-transfer algebra, and associated issues in the complex frequency domain view of system dynamics [one-sided [0 to + infinity] Laplace Transforms and the application of the s-variable to transfer function analysis is a start, with Z transforms a help (you can simplistically view the Z as a unit time delay element and revert to difference equations)], as well as "the assembly language instruction's view" [and register level view in general] of relevant technological systems, you are out of your league here; apart from taking time to listen and learn. 6 --> On the other hand, if you DO understand these things but insist on making the sort of objections above, you are being frankly mischievous, and not in the nice sense. [That is, are you simply playing the troll?] ++++++++++ Gentlemen, let's look at how we can map out the exploration ahead: Target R Daneel and co -- or at least his first intelligently designed evolutionary ancestors. And, while we are at it, let us use the issue of the Intelligent Director to reframe the issue of the mind and intelligent agency in terms that can become practical and at the same time open up a way for us to better understand -- or should that be, "appreciate" -- the enduring and profound mystery of mind and brain. For instance, is the Q theory indeterminacy the wedge that allows mind to insert information into brain? Or, what? Certainly, once such info is in brain (or i/o control processor more generally), we can see from the Smith model how efference copies and predictors can be used to drive the servosystems of action in the real world, starting with things like speech and typing. Sensor suites, suitably procesed and managed on a differential basis relative to expected/predicted, would then allow for intervention on management by exception. BTW,this also fits in nicely with the Weber - Fechner law on how sensor response is proportionate to fractional changes in the sensory inputs, i.e the body's nervous system response is logarithmic. [12 decades worth of compression i.e our senses can carry signals in a ration 10^12:1 as dynamic range. For vision I recall the update period is about 1/8 second so that 16 frames per second starts to look like motion. The eye and the ear are of course classic sensor arrays, and that leads to discrete fourier transforms as a useful tool for analysis. [About 3 - 6 kHz is good enough as an analogue band for recognition of speech. Video in colour classically takes about 6 - 8 MHz. Modern digital schemes are a lot better than that, allowing 1 sa/sec to take up better than a Hz. on control Astrom- Wittenmark's rule of thumb is that it is nice to have about 6 samples per significant fastest rise time in a digitally controlled system, not the 2 * max freq for classic communication systems.] And if this all looks like I am thinking of reverse engineering the human body considered as a bio-tech robot: Of course! (We know what works so let's start from there!) [Notice, I here distinguish between the FACT of mind which is a matter of empirical observation and experience, and coherent and factually adequate theories of mind -- which we do not really have. Yet.] GEM of TKI PS: AIG, where are you? I'd love to hear from you on the issues now on the table, as an AI active practitioner. (After all, I am here just beginning to get my feet wet . . .)kairosfocus_{January 18, 2008
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KF in 168, points out "In that context, it is obvious that the key interface between mind [as intelligent director] and brain [as i/o control processor] is INFORMATION." Could you add a bit more to that? In the computer engineering model, information is passed across the interface between modules. The interface is something else, like in a computer it can be a section of the stack that can receive and deliver the data/information. I was expecting that your description would be leading to "the key interface between mind [as intelligent director] and brain [as i/o control] transfers information." Could you explain the extension to the model you are suggesting so that that which is being transferred becomes the medium for transfer? I.e. how does the information simultaneously serve as the interface? When you mention "an efferent copy" of the information, are you suggesting that information has the innate capability to flow from brain to mind? Or, is a separate process/interface needed for the flow between brain and mind to occur?Q_{January 18, 2008
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KF, in 166, tossed outthe following paranthetical [Contrast the sadly defensive reactions of Q, who cannot even acknowledge that my whole phil of science is based on warrant through provisional inference to empirically anchored inference to best explanation. Nor can he even acknowledge that Galileo used thought experiments that went beyond the empirical in scientific explanation and warrant – i.e Q is indulging not only in strawmen but repeated selective hyperskepticism thereby. Both, as I have explicitly pointed out repeatedly. Then, even sadder, consider that he is a sample of the mindset of today’s Evo-Mat crippled HS science teacher! Any way, let us move on to serious stuff . . .] Talk about defensive reactions! That was totally a tangent to the point you were really making, just to poke a stick into something you don't like - like criticism. Besides, your defenisiveness has lead you to misrepresent my point. Try again, sometime later.Q_{January 18, 2008
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This morning I woke up and was lying in bed thinking about stuff before I got up. I was thinking about a particular relationship I have with a wonderful person. At the moment there are some problems, and a part of me (the baser part) was saying "time to distance yourself or terminate the relationship altogether." Another part of me said, "that thought is unworthy; reject it." When I teach, I frequently tell my students that with respect to almost every hard decision there is a conflict between what you "feel" you want to do and what you "know" is the right thing to do. When that conflict arises, as it must at some point for all of us, always go with what you "know." Feelings ebb and flow. One might have an almost overwhelming impulse today that is gone a week from now. Ethical knowledge is the only stable and reliable foundation upon which to base our decisions. Our culture says, "follow your heart." Our culture has it exactly wrong. Your heart is fickle, and it will lead you astray. To me the essence of love is always choosing the other no matter whether I "feel" like it at any given time or not. So many marriages fail for lack of understanding of this basic concept. My feelings tell me I don't like this person I'm married to right now; they also tell me that will never change. I must get a divorce. Nonsense. If I choose to stay and work on the marriage, more likely than not, a week or a month from now my feelings will follow. (Obviously there are limits to this, e.g., a physically abusive relationships). So this morning I said, "teacher, teach thyself." You know beyond the slightest doubt that this person is wonderful. Go with what you know, and not what you happen to feel at this moment, and that is what I chose to do. In other words, I chose to love. What does my internal debate have to do with this post? Everything. The fact that I can have an internal debate at all demonstrates that I have a mind that is separate from my brain. My brain sends me impulses such as "I don't feel good about what's going on in this relationship just now. End it." My mind says, "I reject that impulse. It is unworthy." The materialist will say it is just my Freudian id competing with my superego. To which I say, bunk. Freud's entire project was an attempt to explain (or explain away) in materialst terms that which is obvious to everyone with eyes to see: We have a dualistic nature. Our mind (or spirit if you like) often wars with our brain (or body). This has been known since ancient times (see Romans chapter 7). Freud is thin gruel indeed in relation to this rich tradition of spirit/body duality, and in the end Freud simply makes no sense. How can matter oppose itself within the same cranium? The very thought is absurd.BarryA_{January 18, 2008
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Folks: I suspect a word list issue, so I will try this last time: ______________ I am getting just a little excited over emerging sci-tech and worldview level possibilities in this thread . . . As I look at the responses, once the "brain as i/o control processor" version of the Derek Smith cybernetics model of autonomous, self-directing efference copy/predictive model -reafference intelligent servo-control systems [cf his Fig 2] was put on the table as a way to look at the issue, several things have jumped out at me:
I: DESIGNER'S ITCH: I – as often happens -- have a major case of “designer's itch” as I see the way that the DS model correlates very fruitfully with what I know from many of relevant fields in control -- and as far away as athletic visualisation for peak performance, muscular memory and even education on the the classic taxonomy of goals for the psychomotor domain -- tremendous possibilities. [Contrast the sadly defensive reactions of Q, who cannot even acknowledge that my whole phil of science is based on warrant through provisional inference to empirically anchored inference to best explanation. Nor can he even acknowledge that Galileo used thought experiments that went beyond the empirical in scientific explanation and warrant – i.e Q is indulging not only in strawmen but repeated selective hyperskepticism thereby. Both, as I have explicitly pointed out repeatedly. Then, even sadder, consider that he is a sample of the mindset of today's Evo-Mat crippled HS science teacher! Any way, let us move on to serious stuff . . .] II: FROM CONCEPTUAL MODEL TO DESIGN: I can see how – based on my design and analysis background and my interest in Mechatronics as a breakout, integrative, synergistic design paradigm [I once designed a B.X level Engineering degree programme around mechantronics . . .] -- to feed in detailed architectures and dynamics as well as modelling to actually design, BUILD and test one of R Daneel's early ancestors. (BTW, the first diagram at Wiki is worth the click.) It is for instance telling me that the first easiest place to do something like this in a mobile system, is probably for an aerial vehicle as the environment in the air is relatively obstacle free and easy to monitor for potential obstacles; though of course, nap of the earth stuff for say surveillance ands for agricultural purposes is also implicated. (And I have a lot of potentially interesting economic uses for autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. [Unfortunately, this potential also speaks to possibilities for cruise missile technology, and explains for instance the performance characteristics of say the Tomahawks of 1991 and 2003 etc. Thence, sadly, the homebrew version too. The world's defence systems environment has got a lot more complex, evidently . . . but we as citizens need to be aware of that and that it in turn implies a different stance on defence policy and praxis, given that, e.g., what can be brewed up in the equivalent of a home-brew beer kit. On the good side, so can biofuels if ever we get algae fuel going! (Let's not be too blue . . .)])
So much for the ID -is – a – science – stopper” NCSE etc mantra! Sci-tech development issues . . .
III: SCI-TECH STARTERS, NOT STOPPERS: In short, the DS-type model is a science and technology starter not a science stopper! That is, including the ID challenge version – [a] can we actually BUILD a self-conscious, AI based robot using the Intelligent Director-i/o processor model? [We can only try . . . i.e here we can go do some real-word experiments – though let us note that we ourselves can arguably be seen as examples of the DS class of sophisticated servo systems.] Or, [b] if not, can we at least build an autonomous one that will exhibit environmentally effective, goal directed behaviour, cost-effectively? And if so, [c] where will that take technology -- and science -- and phil -- too? IV: MODELS AND REALITIES (PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE): Thence, too, the point that a model world is potentially empirically descriptive and can be sufficiently predictive to become the basis for real-world creative action, once a system architecture is logically and dynamically valid, and compatible with known or foreseeable materials and sub-system technologies. In short, the classical sci-tech agenda is: describe, explain, predict control -- or at least, influence. V: DESCRIBE- EXPLAIN- PREDICT- CONTROL: The DS model passes this test with flying colours: (i) it describes the planning-executing functions of a certain class of known autonomous entities [us humans individually and as Ac 27 summarises, in the community of people having to deal with a potentially hostile environment using socio-technological systems and governance mechanisms . . . H'mm: a democratically governed collective Intelligent Director as systems architecture – debate the options and try the best on balance across votes . . .?], and (ii) it is potentially fruitful of innovating future tech and associated science.
That leads to emerging phil considerations . . .
VI: MINDS, BRAINS, AND INFORMATION INTERFACES: In that context, it is obvious that the key interface between mind [as intelligent director] and brain [as i/o control processor] is INFORMATION. [a] Once an efferent copy is there on the hardware, it can then drive the algorithms for effecting and for path-differential monitoring, feedback and adaptations to contingencies. In turn, [b] such an efference copy/predictive model is based on learning and generalisation from experience – suggesting [c] neural network type architectures for at least a part of the more sophisticated levels, and also that [d] the i/o processor, across time, provides key sensor data that helps construct a world-model to guide the Director. VII: PHIL/WORLDBVIEW IMPLICATIONS: The Derek Smith Intelligent Director-I/O Processor-Servosystems cybernetics model is of course compatible with a materially expressed director, but also points a way to what we think we experience: thoughts that are self-willed and act into the cause-effect chains of the material world but are independently intelligent -- not determined/ driven and wholly reducible to/ “explained” without residue by some blend of chance and necessity acting across aeons from hydrogen to humans. In short, it is independent of the ontological debate over monism/dualism, once the role of information is acknowledged. We cvan use the information-level expression of this to get on with very interesting sci-tech stuff. But also, it plainly puts the dualistic view that there is a sufficiently self-determining, actively creative and intelligent mind that interacts with the body back on the table as a seriously “discuss-able” – and remember that we don't need to commit tot he reality of an idea to discuss it fruitfully on a modelling what-if basis and to embed such in prospective technologies -- conceptual-analytical option in a sci-rtech society. That potency, of course, is why it excited the sort of dismissive remarks, strawman attacks and seen above.
So, can we look at how we can develop interesting intelligent design oriented sci-tech, while we seriously look also at the worldview-level issues? GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 18, 2008
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magnam: It seems to me we are in total agreement here. I don't understand the objection.StephenB_{January 17, 2008
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H'mm: Comment in mod -- why I know not. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{January 17, 2008
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