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Failure of the “compensation argument” and implausibility of evolution

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Granville Sewell and Daniel Styer have a thing in common: both wrote an article with the same title “Entropy and evolution”. But they reach opposite conclusions on a fundamental question: Styer says that the evolutionist “compensation argument” (henceforth “ECA”) is ok, Sewell says it isn’t. Here I briefly explain why I fully agree with Granville. The ECA is an argument that tries to resolve the problems the 2nd law of statistical mechanics (henceforth 2nd_law_SM) posits to unguided evolution. I adopt Styer’s article as ECA archetype because he also offers calculations, which make clearer its failure.

The 2nd_law_SM as problem for evolution.

The 2nd_law_SM says that a isolated system goes toward its more probable macrostates. In this diagram the arrow represents the 2nd_law_SM rightward trend/direction:

organization … improbable_states … systems ====>>> probable_states

Sewell says:

“The second law is all about using probability at the microscopic level to predict macroscopic change. […] This statement of the second law, or at least of the fundamental principle behind the second law, is the one that should be applied to evolution.”

The physical evolution of a isolated system passes spontaneously through macrostates with increasing values of probability until arriving to equilibrium (the most probable macrostate). Since organization is highly improbable a corollary of the 2nd_law_SM is that isolated systems don’t self-organize. That is the opposite of what biological evolution pretends.

See the picture:

cs1

Styer’s ECA.

Since the 2nd_law_SM applies to isolated systems the ECA says: the Earth E is not a isolated system, then its entropy can decrease thanks to an entropy increase (compensation) in the surroundings S (wrt to the energy coming from the Sun). Unfortunately to consider open the systems is useless, because, as Sewell puts it:

“If an increase in order is extremely improbable when a system is closed, it is still extremely improbable when the system is open, unless something is entering which makes it not extremely improbable.”

Here is how Styer applies the ECA to show that “evolution is consistent with the 2nd law”.
Suppose that, due to evolution, each individual organism is 1000 times more improbable that the corresponding individual was 100 years ago (Emory Bunn says 1000 times is incorrect, it should be 10^25 times, but this is a detail). If Wi is the number of microstates consistent with the specification of an initial organism I 100 years ago, and Wf is the number of microstates consistent with the specification of today’s improved and less probable organism F, then

Wf = Wi / 1000

At this point he uses Boltzmann’s formula:

S = k * ln (W)

where S = entropy, W = number of microstates, k = 1.38 x 10^-23 joules/degrees, ln = logarithm.

Then he calculates the entropy change over 100 years, and finally the entropy decrease per second:

Sf – Si = -3.02 x 10^-30 joules/degrees

By considering all individuals of all species he gets the change in entropy of the biosphere each second: -302 joules/degrees. Since he knows that the Earth’s physical entropy throughput (due to energy from the Sun) each second is: 420 x 10^12 joules/degrees he concludes: “at a minimum the Earth is bathed in about one trillion times the amount of entropy flux required to support the rate of evolution assumed here”, then evolution is largely consistent with the 2nd law.

The problem in Styer’s argument (and in general in the ECA).

Although it could seem an innocent issue of measure units the introduction of the Boltzmann’s formula with k = 1.38 x 10^-23 joules/degrees in this context is a conceptual error. With such formula the ECA has transformed a difficult problem of probability (in connection with the arise of ultra-complex organized systems) into a simple issue of energy (“joule” is unit of energy, work, or amount of heat). This assumes a priori that energy is able to organize organisms from sparse atoms. But such assumption is totally gratuitous and unproved. That energy can do that is exactly what the ECA should prove in the first place. So Styer’s ECA begs the question.

Similarly Andy McIntosh (cited by Sewell) says:

Both Styer and Bunn calculate by slightly different routes a statistical upper bound on the total entropy reduction necessary to ‘achieve’ life on earth. This is then compared to the total entropy received by the Earth for a given period of time. However, all these authors are making the same assumption—viz. that all one needs is sufficient energy flow into a [non-isolated] system and this will be the means of increasing the probability of life developing in complexity and new machinery evolving. But as stated earlier this begs the question…

The Boltzmann’s formula in the ECA, with its introduction of joules of energy, establishes a bridge between probabilities and the joules coming from the Sun. Unfortunately this link is unsubstantiated here because no one has proved that joules cause biological organization. On the contrary, in my previous post “The illusion of organizing energy” I explained why any kind of energy per se cannot create organization in principle. To greater reason, thermal energy is unable to the task. In fact, heat is the more degraded and disordered kind of energy, the one with maximum entropy. So the ECA would contain also an internal contradiction: by importing entropy in E one decreases entropy in E!

The problem of Boltzmann’s formula, as used in the ECA, is then “to buy” probability bonus with energy “money”. Sewell expresses the same concept with different words:

The compensation argument is predicated on the idea […] that the universal currency for entropy is thermal entropy.

That conversion / compensation is not allowed if one hasn’t proved at the outset a direct causation role of energy in producing the effect, biological organization, which is in the opposite direction of the 2nd_law_SM rightward arrow (extreme left on the above diagram). In a sense the ECA conflates two different planes. This wrong conflation is like to say that a roulette placed inside a refrigerated room can easily output 1 million “black” in a row because its entropy is decreased compared to the outside.

Note that evolution doesn’t imply a single small deviation from the trend, quite differently it implies countless highly improbable processes happened continually in countless organisms during billion years. Who claims that evolution doesn’t violate the 2nd_law_SM, would doubt a violation if countless tornados always turned rubble into houses, cars and computers for billion years? Sewell asks (backward tornado is the metaphor he uses more). In conclusion Roger Caillois is right: “Clausius and Darwin cannot both be right.”

Implausibility of evolution.

Styer’s paper is also an opportunity to see the problem of evolution from a probabilistic viewpoint. You will note the huge difference of difficulty of the probabilistic scenario compared to the above enthusiastic thermal entropy scenario, with potentially 1,000,000,000,000 times evolution!
In Appendix #2 he proposes a problem for students: “How much improved and less probable would each organism be, relative to its (possibly single-celled) ancestor at the beginning of the Cambrian explosion? (Answer: 10 raised to the 1.8 x 10^22 times)”. Call this monster number “a”, Wi = the initial microstates, Wf = the final microstates, W = the total microstates. According to Styer’s answer (which is correct as calculation) we have:

Wf = Wi / a

The probability of the initial macrostate is Wi / W. The probability of the final macrostate is Wf / W. Suppose Wf = 1, then Wi is = a. W must be equal or greater a otherwise (Wi / W) would be greater than 1 (impossible). Therefore the probability to occur of the final macrostate is:

(Wf / W) equal or less (1 / a)

This is the probability of evolution of a single individual organism in the Cambrian:

1 on 10 raised to the 1.8 x 10^22

a number with more than 10^22 digits (10 trillion billion digits). This miraculous event had to occur 10^18 times, for each of other organisms.

Dembski’s “universal probability bound” is:

1 / 10^150

1 on a number with “only” 150 digits. Therefore evolution is far beyond the plausibility threshold. In conclusion: the ECA fails to prove that “evolution is consistent with the 2nd law”, and we have also a proof of the implausibility of evolution based on probability.

Some could object: “you cannot have both ways, if the ECA is wrong then Appendix #2 is wrong too, because it uses the same method, then the evolution probability is not correct”.
Answer: the method is biased toward evolution both in ECA and in Appendix #2. This means the evolution probability is even worse than that, and the implausibility of evolution holds to greater reason.

Comments
UB: If the dynamic properties of matter do not explain the origin of representationalism, then what does? Do we need a source of organization that can establish something in arrangements of matter that is independent of the minimum total potential energy state of the medium – something to explain this observed local (and lawful) independence arising from within an inanimate environment? Zach You’re still conflating physics with physicalism. Physics can’t and doesn’t explain everything, even for materialists.
puntUpright BiPed
April 4, 2015
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Upright BiPed: So Piotr and Zachriel believe that physical law acting on the innate properties of matter cannot explain all physical reality. You're still conflating physics with physicalism. Physics can't and doesn't explain everything, even for materialists.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Box: There are no “persons”, “entities” or “wholes” with any causal power or ontological status. We've provided two citations that indicate otherwise. Maybe you should just ask a couple of materialists. Box: How we resolve the question of abstraction is irrelevant to the notion that whatever we assign to matter (categorizations, function and so forth) is in fact not part of the object. Categorizations and functions are theories about the object, not properties. The object still exists even if our categorizations aren't a physical characteristic of the object. Box: Terming a rock a paperweight does not endow a rock with new causal power, it does not change a rock in any way – No, but it's still a rock.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Zachriel,
Zach: Your argument was that there were no objects at all in materialism.
I argue that – under materialism – objects are nothing but particles in motion. There are no “persons”, “entities” or “wholes” with any causal power or ontological status. Under materialism all causes flow from the bottom to the top.
Box: we – can assign functional properties to objects ( for example “this is an organ”, or “this object has the function of car” and so forth, however these assigned functional properties are not physical.
Zach: Even though the objects themselves are physical, our perspective of the objects, theories, categorizations, possible functions, may or may not be physical, depending on how we resolve the question of abstraction.
How we resolve the question of abstraction is irrelevant to the notion that whatever we assign to matter (categorizations, function and so forth) is in fact not part of the object. Terming a rock a paperweight does not endow a rock with new causal power, it does not change a rock in any way – despite all our assignments there is still not something over and above particles in motion.Box
April 4, 2015
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So Piotr and Zachriel believe that physical law acting on the innate properties of matter cannot explain all physical reality. Good to know.Upright BiPed
April 4, 2015
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BP, You've said it once. Will you just repeat it verbatim every time I disagree? Go ahead; I'll just shrug and carry on. Physics does not have to explain why GGN encodes "glycine" during translation. There may be a physical explanation of some biasses in the code, but the fundamental fact is that a "meaningful" DNA sequence does not differ physically from a "meaningless" one. UUAGACACCGGG is as "legal" as AACCAAGACCCC, and they may or may not "mean" something depending on whether they undergo translation. Any number of other codes using the same nucleobases would be perfectly compatible with the laws of physics.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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Piotr: Physics does not distinguish between ink marks that convey a meaning and those that don’t. Upright BiPed: And yet it must, under materialism. You seem to be conflating physics, a restricted area of science, and physicalism, the philosophy that everything supervenes on the physical.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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There is no equivocation Piotr. I repeat:
Physics does not distinguish between ink marks that convey a meaning and those that don’t.
And yet it must, under materialism. Temporal phenomena such as add glycine next could not occur otherwise. If such things cannot be evoked to occur by an arrangement of matter and interpreted by an arrangement of matter, such things could not happen. Yet, they did happen at the origin of the autonomous homeostatic self-replicating cell (or we would be having this conversation). If the dynamic properties of matter do not explain the origin of representationalism, then what does? Do we need a source of organization that can establish something in arrangements of matter that is independent of the minimum total potential energy state of the medium – something to explain this observed local (and lawful) independence arising from within an inanimate environment?Upright BiPed
April 4, 2015
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A[nd] yet it must, under materialism.
Only if you equivocate between (1) physics as a discipline of science studying very fundamental objects/phenomena and very general principles (which is what I mean), and (2) physics = (figuratively) all reality underlain by such objects and principles (which I suppose is what you mean). Meaningful and meaningless marks on paper are equally permitted by physical laws. The meaning of a text belongs to a level of reality far removed from the area in which physics (a science) is interested, though the material form of the text can be treated as a physical object, when it matters.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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What kind of physical property would “tree” be?
None. It isn't a physical property. Physics is interested in the most fundamental objects of which other things are composed, and in general laws which are the same across the Universe. Other disciplines deal with those "other things": chemistry with molecules and chemical reactions, biology with life and its evolution, astronomy with planets, stars and galaxies, cultural anthropology with human societies, linguistics with language, etc. If you want to learn about trees, you had better ask a botanist, not a physicist (whatever some physicists might believe). The reducibility of "other things" to physics means only that, for example, a living organism cannot violate any laws of physics, but those laws are formulated in such general terms that they can't (and aren't meant to) describe all the interesting properties of objects studied by other disciplines. In my discipline (linguistics) physics is quite important too. For example, sound, the medium of speech, is a longtudinal pressure wave travelling through the air. Linguistic "objects" such as vowels and consonants can be analysed in terms of their characteristic acoustic properties. Their production is constrained by the mechanics of speech articulation. Their acoustic spectrum can be predicted from the configuration of the vocal tract (it matters if your tongue is lowered or raised, fronted or retracted, or if the lips are rounded). Phonetics is basically applied physics. But laws of physics do not restrict the use of speech sounds as "letters" of a linguistic code. You can say CAT, CAB, COAT, BAT, COB, etc. without violating any physical principle. Similarly, any sequence of nucleotides in DNA is compatible with the laws of physics; that's why such sequences are free to encode biological information.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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Physics does not distinguish between ink marks that convey a meaning and those that don’t.
And yet it must, under materialism. Temporal phenomena such as add glycine next could not occur otherwise. If such things cannot be evoked to occur by an arrangement of matter and interpreted by an arrangement of matter, such things could not happen. Yet, they did happen at the origin of the autonomous homeostatic self-replicating cell (or we would be having this conversation). If the dynamic properties of matter do not explain the origin of representationalism, then what does? Do we need a source of organization that can establish something in arrangements of matter that is independent of the minimum to total potential energy state of the medium - something to explain this observed local (and lawful) independence arising from within an inanimate environment?Upright BiPed
April 4, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman: Over all entropy increases yes but what about on the surface of the paper? Keep in mind we are talking about quill and blotter here The ink will be absorbed somewhat by the paper, so thermodynamic entropy will increase; however, the drying is probably more important, so thermodynamic entropy of the ink will decrease. This effect is the same whether it is Shakespeare writing a sonnet, or someone making scribbles. The only difference is the amount of ink involved. fifthmonarchyman: The composition does not exist for you in reality anyway. It is only an arrangement of matter/useful fiction as far as you are concerned. Not sure why you would say that. Shakespeare's sonnets are the pinnacle of the sonnet form, and exhibit meaning and beauty at multiple levels while still conforming to the rhyme and rhythm of the form.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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zac says, Entropy increases when you make marks on the page I say, Over all entropy increases yes but what about on the surface of the paper? Keep in mind we are talking about quill and blotter here peace PS I forgot I who I was talking to. The composition does not exist for you in reality anyway. It is only an arrangement of matter/useful fiction as far as you are concerned. So of course you would see it in terms of an increase in entropy. I'll try and limit my discussions to someone who I can actually communicate with.fifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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Pitor says now Illegibility has little to do with entropy. Pitor said before [if] all material records of a composition have been destroyed, and all the people who remembered it are dead. It will be gone irreversibly and nobody will ever be able to restore it in the original form. I say. In the case of a musical composition enthropy can have a profound effect on illegibility and illegibility on the preservation of information don't you agree? peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman: The real question is. Does the increase in entropy have any effect on the composition that is represented in the ink marks? Entropy increases when you make marks on the page, even if you are Shakespeare writing a sonnet.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Box: That seems to be a big “IF”, certainly in the case of a tree. Your argument was that there were no objects at all in materialism. Box: we – can assign functional properties to objects ( for example “this is an organ”, or “this object has the function of car” and so forth, however these assigned functional properties are not physical. Even though the objects themselves are physical, our perspective of the objects, theories, categorizations, possible functions, may or may not be physical, depending on how we resolve the question of abstraction.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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pitor says As ink spontaneously disperses in water from the wet rag, entropy increases, I say So far so good. Now does the increase in entropy have any affect on the specified information contained on the surface of the sheet of paper????? you say, but its increase is not altered at all by the fact that the marks may mean something to somebody. I say Of course the 2nd law is merely a dumb "force" of nature it is oblivious of it's effects on information. Entropy always increases regardless of the information involved or lack thereof. The real question is. Does the increase in entropy have any effect on the composition that is represented in the ink marks? I hope we can agree that it does. Followup question Suppose I found an ink blob that has spilled on my desk and attempted to wipe it up. As I do so I discover that before me is the St Matthew Passion. Did the entropy of the ink on the surface of the desk increase decrease or stay the same? peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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Suppose while the ink was wet I took a rag and smudged it beyond recognition. Would the entropy of the matter on the surface of the paper increase or decrease or remain the same?
Illegibility has little to do with entropy. Physics does not distinguish between ink marks that convey a meaning and those that don't. As ink spontaneously disperses in water from the wet rag, entropy increases, but its increase is not altered at all by the fact that the marks may mean something to somebody.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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Zach,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP): “According to the object-based conception, for example IF rocks, trees, planets and so on are paradigmatic physical objects, then the property of being a rock, tree or planet is a physical property.”
That seems to be a big "IF", certainly in the case of a tree. What kind of physical property would "tree" be? SEP goes on:
It is important to note that both conceptions of the physical remain silent on the question of whether topic-neutral or functional properties should be treated as physical or not. To borrow a phrase from Jackson (1998), however, it seems best to treat these properties as onlooker properties: given any set of physical properties, one might add onlooker properties without compromising the integrity of the set. But onlooker properties should not be treated as being physical by definition.
IOW onlookers - we - can assign functional properties to objects ( for example "this is an organ", or "this object has the function of car" and so forth, however these assigned functional properties are not physical. That is, in reality they are not (objective) part of the material things we assign them too. To summarize: this object-based conception of materialism does not convince and doesn't seem to solve 'the problem of one and many' in areas where it really matters : functionality and life.Box
April 4, 2015
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Materialism: Opposed to mind-body dualism is materialism, the view that nothing exists but matter and things made of matter.
Information is neither matter nor energy. Materialism fails. Norbert Weiner:
Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.
Joe
April 4, 2015
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Piotr:
What you call “immaterial organisation” can’t exist without a material medium, be it neurons firing in a living brain or a sheet of paper with ink marks on it.
What you call "material medium" can't exist without immaterial information.Joe
April 4, 2015
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piotr says I have no idea what you mean by “an increase of entropy in the ink”. I say, OK that is a good place to start then. Suppose while the ink was wet I took a rag and smudged it beyond recognition. Would the entropy of the matter on the surface of the paper increase or decrease or remain the same? You say. What you call “immaterial organisation” can’t exist without a material medium, be it neurons firing in a living brain or a sheet of paper with ink marks on it. I say, I don't agree entirely but perhaps there is a core we can build upon here. Let's grant your claim for the sake of argument. Which is logically ultimate the sheet of paper or the information it displays? Keep in mind the same information can be stored in many many ways in a near infinite array of materiel mediums. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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Box: What do they mean by “are due to”? In type physicalism, mental states are identical to internal states. Box: If matter is all that exist what then are “things” – other than matter? Arrangements of matter. "According to the object-based conception, for example if rocks, trees, planets and so on are paradigmatic physical objects, then the property of being a rock, tree or planet is a physical property." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Zach, Okay, do tell what the ontological status is of "things" under materialism. If matter is all that exist what then are "things" - other than matter?
In type physicalism, for instance, mental states are due to specific internal states (physical arrangements) of the brain (physical object).
What do they mean by "are due to"? Why not say "are in fact" or "are nothing but" - IOW are illusions; see Rosenberg? Surely materialism cannot allow for the existence of something else than matter?Box
April 4, 2015
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Oh gee whiz. Materialism: Opposed to mind-body dualism is materialism, the view that nothing exists but matter and things made of matter. http://www.manyworldsoflogic.com/mindbody.html If you look at the various strains of materialism, they are generally based on their descriptions of entities, such as the relationship between the brain and the mind. In type physicalism, for instance, mental states are due to specific internal states (physical arrangements) of the brain (physical object).Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Zachriel: Water is more than a figure of speech.
Water is nothing but particles in motion.Box
April 4, 2015
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Box: Nope, an arrangement is not something on its own, is not something in and of itself, is not something over and above particles in motion. Of course an arrangement is something. Water is a molecular arrangement of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Water is more than a figure of speech.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Zach: As arrangements of material are observably real, so then are objects real.
I read nothing new .... Okay again: Nope, an arrangement is not something on its own, is not something in and of itself, is not something over and above particles in motion. And no, an object is not one thing or a whole, that's only a figure of speech.Box
April 4, 2015
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Box: you are conflating what materialists say and do in daily life and what is to be hold as ultimately real under materialism. Under materialism, objects are arrangements of material. As arrangements of material observably exist, objects exist. Box: An arrangement of matter is not something in and of itself, it ‘fully depends upon’, is ‘constituted by’, is ‘reducible to’, is ‘nothing but’ and is ‘nothing over and above’ particles in motion and their properties. An arrangement of material is consistent with materialism. A materialist *defines* an object as a specific arrangement of material. As arrangements of material are observably real, so then are objects real.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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What is the relationship between the immaterial organization that Bach “saw” in his head and the ordered smudges of ink on paper that he used to represent that organization?
I don't think Bach "saw immaterial organisation" in his head. More probably he "heard music". Mental images are representations, not unlike the musical notation, and they also require a physical substrate -- neurons and their activity. We can remember music "internally", just like other sensory experiences, or we can use "external" media (notation, recordings). Before notation was invented, musicians had to memorise every composition, and the only way they could transmit "musical messages" to other people was via direct acoustic signals -- that is, by playing music. One of the important functions of the mind is to model "alternative reality" (as when we make plans, imagining hypothetical situations). Impressions produced by actual music can be simulated in a composer's mind as if a physical (acoustic) stimulus were present. I have no idea what you mean by "an increase of entropy in the ink". Entropy has a precise definition in physics and only unnecessary confusion can result from using the term loosely. Let's imagine, however, that all material records of a composition have been destroyed, and all the people who remembered it are dead. It will be gone irreversibly and nobody will ever be able to restore it in the original form. What you call "immaterial organisation" can't exist without a material medium, be it neurons firing in a living brain or a sheet of paper with ink marks on it.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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