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Failure of the “compensation argument” and implausibility of evolution

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Granville Sewell and Daniel Styer have a thing in common: both wrote an article with the same title “Entropy and evolution”. But they reach opposite conclusions on a fundamental question: Styer says that the evolutionist “compensation argument” (henceforth “ECA”) is ok, Sewell says it isn’t. Here I briefly explain why I fully agree with Granville. The ECA is an argument that tries to resolve the problems the 2nd law of statistical mechanics (henceforth 2nd_law_SM) posits to unguided evolution. I adopt Styer’s article as ECA archetype because he also offers calculations, which make clearer its failure.

The 2nd_law_SM as problem for evolution.

The 2nd_law_SM says that a isolated system goes toward its more probable macrostates. In this diagram the arrow represents the 2nd_law_SM rightward trend/direction:

organization … improbable_states … systems ====>>> probable_states

Sewell says:

“The second law is all about using probability at the microscopic level to predict macroscopic change. […] This statement of the second law, or at least of the fundamental principle behind the second law, is the one that should be applied to evolution.”

The physical evolution of a isolated system passes spontaneously through macrostates with increasing values of probability until arriving to equilibrium (the most probable macrostate). Since organization is highly improbable a corollary of the 2nd_law_SM is that isolated systems don’t self-organize. That is the opposite of what biological evolution pretends.

See the picture:

cs1

Styer’s ECA.

Since the 2nd_law_SM applies to isolated systems the ECA says: the Earth E is not a isolated system, then its entropy can decrease thanks to an entropy increase (compensation) in the surroundings S (wrt to the energy coming from the Sun). Unfortunately to consider open the systems is useless, because, as Sewell puts it:

“If an increase in order is extremely improbable when a system is closed, it is still extremely improbable when the system is open, unless something is entering which makes it not extremely improbable.”

Here is how Styer applies the ECA to show that “evolution is consistent with the 2nd law”.
Suppose that, due to evolution, each individual organism is 1000 times more improbable that the corresponding individual was 100 years ago (Emory Bunn says 1000 times is incorrect, it should be 10^25 times, but this is a detail). If Wi is the number of microstates consistent with the specification of an initial organism I 100 years ago, and Wf is the number of microstates consistent with the specification of today’s improved and less probable organism F, then

Wf = Wi / 1000

At this point he uses Boltzmann’s formula:

S = k * ln (W)

where S = entropy, W = number of microstates, k = 1.38 x 10^-23 joules/degrees, ln = logarithm.

Then he calculates the entropy change over 100 years, and finally the entropy decrease per second:

Sf – Si = -3.02 x 10^-30 joules/degrees

By considering all individuals of all species he gets the change in entropy of the biosphere each second: -302 joules/degrees. Since he knows that the Earth’s physical entropy throughput (due to energy from the Sun) each second is: 420 x 10^12 joules/degrees he concludes: “at a minimum the Earth is bathed in about one trillion times the amount of entropy flux required to support the rate of evolution assumed here”, then evolution is largely consistent with the 2nd law.

The problem in Styer’s argument (and in general in the ECA).

Although it could seem an innocent issue of measure units the introduction of the Boltzmann’s formula with k = 1.38 x 10^-23 joules/degrees in this context is a conceptual error. With such formula the ECA has transformed a difficult problem of probability (in connection with the arise of ultra-complex organized systems) into a simple issue of energy (“joule” is unit of energy, work, or amount of heat). This assumes a priori that energy is able to organize organisms from sparse atoms. But such assumption is totally gratuitous and unproved. That energy can do that is exactly what the ECA should prove in the first place. So Styer’s ECA begs the question.

Similarly Andy McIntosh (cited by Sewell) says:

Both Styer and Bunn calculate by slightly different routes a statistical upper bound on the total entropy reduction necessary to ‘achieve’ life on earth. This is then compared to the total entropy received by the Earth for a given period of time. However, all these authors are making the same assumption—viz. that all one needs is sufficient energy flow into a [non-isolated] system and this will be the means of increasing the probability of life developing in complexity and new machinery evolving. But as stated earlier this begs the question…

The Boltzmann’s formula in the ECA, with its introduction of joules of energy, establishes a bridge between probabilities and the joules coming from the Sun. Unfortunately this link is unsubstantiated here because no one has proved that joules cause biological organization. On the contrary, in my previous post “The illusion of organizing energy” I explained why any kind of energy per se cannot create organization in principle. To greater reason, thermal energy is unable to the task. In fact, heat is the more degraded and disordered kind of energy, the one with maximum entropy. So the ECA would contain also an internal contradiction: by importing entropy in E one decreases entropy in E!

The problem of Boltzmann’s formula, as used in the ECA, is then “to buy” probability bonus with energy “money”. Sewell expresses the same concept with different words:

The compensation argument is predicated on the idea […] that the universal currency for entropy is thermal entropy.

That conversion / compensation is not allowed if one hasn’t proved at the outset a direct causation role of energy in producing the effect, biological organization, which is in the opposite direction of the 2nd_law_SM rightward arrow (extreme left on the above diagram). In a sense the ECA conflates two different planes. This wrong conflation is like to say that a roulette placed inside a refrigerated room can easily output 1 million “black” in a row because its entropy is decreased compared to the outside.

Note that evolution doesn’t imply a single small deviation from the trend, quite differently it implies countless highly improbable processes happened continually in countless organisms during billion years. Who claims that evolution doesn’t violate the 2nd_law_SM, would doubt a violation if countless tornados always turned rubble into houses, cars and computers for billion years? Sewell asks (backward tornado is the metaphor he uses more). In conclusion Roger Caillois is right: “Clausius and Darwin cannot both be right.”

Implausibility of evolution.

Styer’s paper is also an opportunity to see the problem of evolution from a probabilistic viewpoint. You will note the huge difference of difficulty of the probabilistic scenario compared to the above enthusiastic thermal entropy scenario, with potentially 1,000,000,000,000 times evolution!
In Appendix #2 he proposes a problem for students: “How much improved and less probable would each organism be, relative to its (possibly single-celled) ancestor at the beginning of the Cambrian explosion? (Answer: 10 raised to the 1.8 x 10^22 times)”. Call this monster number “a”, Wi = the initial microstates, Wf = the final microstates, W = the total microstates. According to Styer’s answer (which is correct as calculation) we have:

Wf = Wi / a

The probability of the initial macrostate is Wi / W. The probability of the final macrostate is Wf / W. Suppose Wf = 1, then Wi is = a. W must be equal or greater a otherwise (Wi / W) would be greater than 1 (impossible). Therefore the probability to occur of the final macrostate is:

(Wf / W) equal or less (1 / a)

This is the probability of evolution of a single individual organism in the Cambrian:

1 on 10 raised to the 1.8 x 10^22

a number with more than 10^22 digits (10 trillion billion digits). This miraculous event had to occur 10^18 times, for each of other organisms.

Dembski’s “universal probability bound” is:

1 / 10^150

1 on a number with “only” 150 digits. Therefore evolution is far beyond the plausibility threshold. In conclusion: the ECA fails to prove that “evolution is consistent with the 2nd law”, and we have also a proof of the implausibility of evolution based on probability.

Some could object: “you cannot have both ways, if the ECA is wrong then Appendix #2 is wrong too, because it uses the same method, then the evolution probability is not correct”.
Answer: the method is biased toward evolution both in ECA and in Appendix #2. This means the evolution probability is even worse than that, and the implausibility of evolution holds to greater reason.

Comments
Zachriel, you are conflating what materialists say and do in daily life and what is to be hold as ultimately real under materialism. As WJM has often pointed out moral subjectivists behave as if there is an objective morality. Similarly those who hold that consciousness is an illusion behave as if it is real.
Zach: Just because someone thinks everything is material doesn’t mean that the arrangement of that material is irrelevant. A physical object is an arrangement of material.
An arrangement of matter is not something in and of itself, it ‘fully depends upon’, is ‘constituted by’, is ‘reducible to’, is ‘nothing but’ and is ‘nothing over and above’ particles in motion and their properties.Box
April 4, 2015
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Box: It sure is, but NOT under materialism! Organs are only to be understood in the context of functional submission to the whole organism; which implies downward causation, a definite ‘no no’ under materialism. Box: What's in the container. Materialist Doctor: A kidney for transplant. Box: No such thing. It just a fictional name for an arbitrary collection of quarks. Materialist Doctor: No. Really. It's a kidney. Box: When you ask a materialist: “is there actually an organism who is supported by its organs, which extend freedom of movement, vision and so forth to it?”, he would laugh at you for your implicit theistic world view. Just because someone thinks everything is material doesn't mean that the arrangement of that material is irrelevant. A physical object is an arrangement of material.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman: To the materialist a car is just a collection of plastic and steal particles that we can “treat as an entity”. There might be a materialist here and there who has trouble with the concept of an object, but most materialists would consider a car an observable object, one with definable characteristics and distinct boundaries; i.e. an entity. As Box pointed out, anything can be treated as a "whole" by materialists, a molecule, a fossilized bone fragment, pond, cat, the solar system, amoeba. Most materialists would not consider these fictions, but real objects.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Zachriel,
Box: At best it [a "whole"] means ‘arbitrarily chosen group’. Anything goes, a molecule is just as much a “whole” as a fossilized bone fragment, pond, cat, the solar system, amoebe or whatever.
Zach: The choice isn’t arbitrary, but based on definable characteristics. It is coherent to talk about organs that make up an organism.
It sure is, but NOT under materialism! Organs are only to be understood in the context of functional submission to the whole organism; which implies downward causation, a definite 'no no' under materialism. IOW under materialism there is no such thing as a ‘whole organism’. Anything – including organisms – are nothing but particles in motion.
Zach: We can treat the organs as entities, or the organism made up of organs as an entity. That doesn’t make organs an illusion.
For an materialist to think of an organism as a whole is only a figure of speech, but not an accurate description of reality. When you ask a materialist: “is there actually an organism who is supported by its organs, which extend freedom of movement, vision and so forth to it?”, he would laugh at you for your implicit theistic world view. For a materialist any rigorous description of reality is equal to a description of the stuff that happens at the fundamental level of particles in motion.
Zach: It’s incomprehensible that you think a materialist can’t coherently refer to her car keys.
Just like anyone else a materialist can look for his car keys. However when you ask him: “is there actually – in reality - a 'person' looking for his car keys because he wants to go home?” he will again laugh at you for your implicit theistic world view : "OF COURSE THERE IS NO ONE". Any rigorous description of reality is equal to a description of what happens at the fundamental level of particles in motion in the brain and elsewhere.Box
April 4, 2015
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Zac said, Materialists are known for subdividing the universe. Maybe you’re thinking of Zen Buddhists I say, Actually Zen Buddhists are hoisted on the opposite horn of the one and the many problem. Materialists have no way of getting from diversity to unity. Zen Buddhists on the other hand have no way of getting from cosmic unity to diversity. To the materialist a car is just a collection of plastic and steal particles that we can "treat as an entity". To the Zen Buddhist a car is just a particular aspect of the overall cosmic unity that we can "treat as an entity". peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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Hey Piotr. Please elaborate on the connection you see between matter and information. What is the relationship between the immaterial organization that Bach “saw” in his head and the ordered smudges of ink on paper that he used to represent that organization? Would an increase in the entropy in the ink smudges affect the composition? In what way? What do you assume are the odds we could scramble the ink smudges and come up with an equally beautiful composition? This could be fruitful. Thanks in advance. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman: Simply useful fictions. A car is not a fiction in materialism. It's an observable object. Materialists are known for subdividing the universe. Maybe you're thinking of Zen Buddhists.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Piotr says, There is no sharp distinction between “matter” and “immaterial information”. Dualism is dead. I say, Instead of concentrating on the many areas in your last post which we disagree. I choose to focus on this one statement it contains a core of agreement that we can perhaps build upon. more later peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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zac says, We can treat the organs as entities I say, There you have it once again. whole organs are a collections of particles in motion that we can treat as entities. Simply useful fictions. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman: Exactly when, given materialism does a group of molecules become a molehill. Please be specific and provide explicit physical mechanisms. http://timemanagementninja.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Molehill.jpg fifthmonarchyman: Please explain how given materialism we can determine which constituent parts belong to an actual specific individual molecule and which can be discounted as noise. Have no idea what you mean by "discounted as noise", but buckminsterfullerenes, C60, are easily isolated as individual molecules. They've even been used to isolate individual water molecules. The molecules can be broken apart into atoms, and the atoms into subatomic parts. Box: At best it means ‘arbitrarily chosen group’. Anything goes, a molecule is just as much a “whole” as a fossilized bone fragment, pond, cat, the solar system, amoebe or whatever. The choice isn't arbitrary, but based on definable characteristics. It is coherent to talk about organs that make up an organism. We can treat the organs as entities, or the organism made up of organs as an entity. That doesn't make organs an illusion. It's incomprehensible that you think a materialist can't coherently refer to her car keys. Box: “They” only exist as an arbitrary collection of particles in motion – just like a brick or a car. The collection is not arbitrary. The atoms in a brick are tightly bound into the solid structure of the brick. The brick has distinct characteristics and a distinct boundary condition. A brick constitutes an observable object.Zachriel
April 4, 2015
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Kairosfocus #273, absolutely and it's painful to watch.
Piotr: Patterns of interaction are as real as the particles which participate in them.
Nope, "patterns of interaction" are not something in and of itself, they 'fully depend upon', are 'constituted by', are 'reducible to', are 'nothing but' and are 'nothing over and above' particles in motion and their properties.Box
April 4, 2015
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Box, are we seeing a case of desperately clinging to absurdity to not fall into the abyss of utterly unwelcome truth? Or, should that be, Truth?
This is pretty ironic, coming from someone to whom "Monks don't fly" is an example of "selective hyperscepticism".Piotr
April 4, 2015
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#269 fifthmonarchyman, If reality is "ontologically reducible" to the behaviour of elementary particles, it doesn't mean that nothing else exists. Patterns of interaction are as real as the particles which participate in them. "Non-elementary" doesn't mean "unreal". To give you an example from an abstract realm, the set of natural numbers and their arithmetic are generated by a few simple axioms. Thus, 223 (or any other number) can be "ontologically reduced" to 0 and the elementary "successor" function S(x): 223 = S(S(S(S...S(0)...))). Provable true statements about 223 (for example, "223 is a prime number") can be ultimately "reduced" to the axioms. That doesn't mean that the natural number we label 223 is less real (to a mathematician) than 0, or that the reduction itself is simple. Indeed, mathematics is mostly concerned with understanding how complex patterns relate to simpler ones. It seems your vision of materialism comes from the 19th century, when "particles" were visualised as something like billiard balls: clumps of hard and tangible "matter". But today we know that particles and interactions are made from the same stuff. There is no sharp distinction between "matter" and "immaterial information". Dualism is dead.
Given materialism how do we observe/know that quark Y1 belongs to carbon molecule 1 and quark y2 is part of the environmental background noise.
The funny thing is that you can't observe free quarks at all. An atom of carbon-12 contains twelve nucleons: six protons and six neutrons. Quarks are imprisoned in them; they cannot disperse freely in the universe. The reason for that confinment is in principle our old friend, the second law of thermodynamics. The formation of structures consisting of three interacting quarks was thermodynamically favoured in the early universe. The "compensatory" entropy was carried away by photons. So you can't see a lonely quark. You can see only the structure that contains it, and your question becomes moot.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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Box, are we seeing a case of desperately clinging to absurdity to not fall into the abyss of utterly unwelcome truth? Or, should that be, Truth? KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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Kairsofocus, often, after reading Rosenberg, I find myself restlessly walking through the house while continually shaking my head - unable to express an overwhelming mixture of disgust and incomprehension to so much self referential incoherence. Good to see that I'm not alone in this.Box
April 4, 2015
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Box: Has Dr Rosenberg applied the same analysis to his own analysis . . . insofar as we can call a certain cluster of particles in flux Dr Rosenberg . . . if "we" is applicable per the above? Self referential incoherence and implication of gross general delusion of humanity including of course oneself, on steroids. Reduction to absurdity, via the problem of the one and the many. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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JWTruthInLove: Do materialists exist?
Materialism is simple: nothing over and above particles in motion exist. So no, materialists do not exist as "persons". "They" only exist as an arbitrary collection of particles in motion - just like a brick or a car. Do read what atheist philosopher Alexander Rosenberg says about this topic:
FOR SOLID EVOLUTIONARY REASONS, WE’VE BEEN tricked into looking at life from the inside. Without scientism, we look at life from the inside, from the first-person POV (OMG, you don’t know what a POV is?—a “point of view”). The first person is the subject, the audience, the viewer of subjective experience, the self in the mind. Scientism shows that the first-person POV is an illusion. Even after scientism convinces us, we’ll continue to stick with the first person. But at least we’ll know that it’s another illusion of introspection and we’ll stop taking it seriously. We’ll give up all the answers to the persistent questions about free will, the self, the soul, and the meaning of life that the illusion generates. (...) The physical facts fix all the facts. The mind is the brain. It has to be physical and it can’t be anything else, since thinking, feeling, and perceiving are physical process—in particular, input/output processes—going on in the brain. We can be sure of a great deal about how the brain works because the physical facts fix all the facts about the brain. The fact that the mind is the brain guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives. It excludes the very possibility of enduring persons, selves, or souls that exist after death or for that matter while we live. Not that there was ever much doubt about mortality anyway. The fact that these answers are so different from what life’s illusions tell us from the inside of consciousness is just more reason not to take introspection seriously. THE GRAND ILLUSION DOWN THE AGES AND UP FROM BIRTH The neural circuits in our brain manage the beautifully coordinated and smoothly appropriate behavior of our body. They also produce the entrancing introspective illusion that thoughts really are about stuff in the world. This powerful illusion has been with humanity since language kicked in, as we’ll see. It is the source of at least two other profound myths: that we have purposes that give our actions and lives meaning and that there is a person “in there” steering the body, so to speak. To see why we make these mistakes and why it’s so hard to avoid them, we need to understand the source of the illusion that thoughts are about stuff. [A.Rosenberg, The Atheist's Guide To Reality ,ch.9]
Box
April 4, 2015
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Pitor says, Please explain what’s wrong with this “materialist” definition and how it can be improved with recourse to “non-materialist” physics. I say, You are still missing the point. It's not about definitions it's about the worldview framework in which they operate. Given materialism how do we observe/know that quark Y1 belongs to molecule 1 and quark y2 is part of the environmental background noise. I'm not interested in theory I want to know about the parts of existing actual molecules that I can observe in isolation from their environment. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 4, 2015
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@Box: A group of particles doesn't exist, if it consists of several particles?! Do materialists exist?JWTruthInLove
April 4, 2015
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It’s puzzling to find myself explaining to materialists that materialism is a reductionist theory and on top of that offend them in the process. Reduction as used in philosophy expresses the idea that if an entity x reduces to an entity y then y is in a sense prior to x, is more basic than x, is such that x fully depends upon it or is constituted by it. Saying that x reduces to y typically implies that x is nothing more than y or nothing over and above y. It’s akin to unmasking illusions. Closer inspection informs us that x is nothing more than y. X is illusionary and does not exist. I thought it was a man standing in the meadow but on closer inspection “it” was nothing but a hat, straw and clothes. I thought it was a smooth surface but under the microscope it looked like a moon landscape. Similarly - under materialism – an organism does not exist: on closer inspection we find that “it” is in fact nothing but particles in motion. Like the man in the meadow and the smooth surface, the organism is unmasked as an illusion.
Fifthmonarchyman: Any collection of “particles in motion” can be treated as a whole just as well as any other. It makes no difference it’s just an arbitrary grouping we humans make.
Exactly. Used like this the term “whole” is meaningless for a materialist. At best it means ‘arbitrarily chosen group’. Anything goes, a molecule is just as much a “whole” as a fossilized bone fragment, pond, cat, the solar system, amoebe or whatever. The only true whole to a materialist is an indivisible fundamental eternal particle - what used to be the atom (the “uncuttable”). (#260) Zachriel are struggling with the problem of the one and the many in more than one way. :)Box
April 4, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman,
Please explain how given materialism we can determine which constituent parts belong to an actual specific individual molecule and which can be discounted as noise.
Well, two or more atoms can be held together at small distances by chemical bonds (which in most cases means that they interact with one another by sharing or exchanging electrons). We humans call such a group of atoms a "molecule". Please explain what's wrong with this "materialist" definition and how it can be improved with recourse to "non-materialist" physics.Piotr
April 4, 2015
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SalC: The principle of relative statistical weight of clusters of microstates and likelihood that spontaneous change is towards dominant clusters is directly connected to the statistical foundation of 2LOT. It is that statistical context that shows why deeply isolated FSCO/I rich clusters will be maximally unlikely to emerge, absent relevant mass, energy AND information flows requiring (per observation and reasonable analysis) an energy converter to gain shaft work and/or relevant controlled flows, and a related constructor executing an information-rich assembly process. For instance cf protein assembly in ribosomes using mRNA and tRNA, leading to [chaperoned . . . ] folding and functional forms. The hope that irrelevant energy flows not coupled to such would "compensate" is ill-founded. KFkairosfocus
April 4, 2015
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Salvador:
IDists should use LLN (law of large numbers) not 2LOT. Why? 2nd law deals with thermodynamic microstates and thermodynamic entropy, whereas design deals with non-thermodynamic microstates and non-thermodynamic entropy. I gave a simple illustration with coins that one should absolutely not equivocate the thermodynamic microstates with design space microstates. The same applies to the design space microstates of biological organsisms.
Salvador invents yet another term: non-thermodynamic entropy Salvador:
design deals with non-thermodynamic microstates and non-thermodynamic entropy
How so? Design doesn't deal with the real world? Is that why you are now a design denier?Mung
April 3, 2015
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Salvador Cordova:
The organization (the improbable microstates of interest to Design proponents) of systems is not the type of organization which the 2nd law deals with. The 2nd law (Clausius formulation) deals with energy microstates, it has nothing or little to do with the microstates of interest to ID.
lol.Mung
April 3, 2015
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Zachriel:
Funny thing about that. In the Universe, it turns out that matter and energy clump non-randomly so as to form what are known as physical entities, from molecules to molehills.
Funny thing about that. You wouldn't know. How could you?Mung
April 3, 2015
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Sal:
NO! J/K is dimensionless! It only indicates the method used to count the energy microstates.
convert to bits please. aren't bits just used for counting? aren't bits dimensionless? Why are J/K better than bits for counting energy microstates? Do tell, Salvador.Mung
April 3, 2015
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Box, Do you realize the profound irony of Zac defending the possibility of singular macro physical entities given materialism while he insists on referring to himself in the plural? That's funny stuff I don't care who you are ;-)fifthmonarchyman
April 3, 2015
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against my better judgement Zac says, Funny thing about that. In the Universe, it turns out that matter and energy clump non-randomly so as to form what are known as physical entities, from molecules to molehills. I say, Exactly when, given materialism does a group of molecules become a molehill. Please be specific and provide explicit physical mechanisms you say, A water molecule may be made up of constituent parts, but that doesn’t make the molecule a fiction. I say, Please explain how given materialism we can determine which constituent parts belong to an actual specific individual molecule and which can be discounted as noise. peacefifthmonarchyman
April 3, 2015
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fifthmonarchyman: according to materialism organisms are just a useful fictions. No. Physical objects are not just fictions. A water molecule may be made up of constituent parts, but that doesn't make the molecule a fiction. Similarly with oranges and orangutans. fifthmonarchyman: Any collection of “particles in motion” can be treated as a whole just as well as any other. Funny thing about that. In the Universe, it turns out that matter and energy clump non-randomly so as to form what are known as physical entities, from molecules to molehills.Zachriel
April 3, 2015
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Piotr says It’s simple. An invisible immaterial spook magically makes them genuine. I say, 1) apparently you have nothing 2) apparently you think mockery will make that fact less obvious peacefifthmonarchyman
April 3, 2015
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