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Nihilism at TSZ

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Over at The Skeptical Zone Learned Hand (who goes by “Colin” there) has been psychoanalyzing me.  I’m a wall builder don’t you know:

I think one major motivator of the “you’re a liar!” style of debate they’ve adopted is community identification. I’ve been thinking of this as building a wall. The point of the conversation is largely, not entirely, to show that “we think like this:” and “they think like that:”, or more pointedly, “look how stupid and ugly they are.” It makes it very easy to avoid questioning beliefs, because we cling particularly to those notions that separate us from them. It identifies and strengthens the community of us by redefining it in opposition to the ugliness and stupidity of them. And once that wall is built, it’s extremely hard to dismantle. Why on earth would you stop and seriously consider something a stupid and dishonest person says? And what would it say about you if you agreed with them? The wall exists to separate.

LH has been drinking deeply from the postmodern Kool-Aid, and it has led him to say some staggeringly stupid things.  Remember, this is the guy who says he does not believe that the law of identity (A=A) is infallibly true.  I pointed out to him that such a claim is absurd, self-defeating and incoherent and only an idiot or a liar would assert it.  Instead of withdrawing his idiotic claim, he doubles down and asserts that the only reason I refuse to countenance it is because I want to build a wall to insulate myself from the those who don’t think like me so that I can “cling” to the notion that A always and without exception in all possible universes equals A.

It beggars belief.  I will not bother to defend the self-evident truth of the law of identity.  Why?  Robert L. Kocher tells us why:

It is a fact of life that you cannot win an argument with someone who is not sane. Sane bystanders may come to agree with your presentation, but you have no way of convincing someone who is not sane of anything. . . suppose that I say that the red pen I happen to have in my hand at this moment is a red pen. Further suppose that someone else says it is not a red pen, but is instead a flower pot, or a suitcase or a TV set. As a practical matter, I am unable to refute the assertion that what I am holding in my hand is not a flower pot. That does not mean that I’m incorrect when I say that it is a red pen. Nor does it mean that I am intellectually weaker than the other person who is arguing that it is not a red pen. Nor does it mean that his assertion that it is not a red pen is correct.

It means that I have no stronger argument than the red pen being in my hand. There is no stronger argument possible than the simple fact of the red pen being in my hand. No stronger refutation of the other person’s arguments is possible. At some point there must be agreement on what constitutes basic reality.

Similarly to Kocher’s red pen, I have no greater argument that A=A than the self-evident fact that A=A.

No, the purpose of this post is not to refute Learned Hand, because to any reasonable observer Learned Hand’s insanity is self-refuting.  Instead, I want to consider why anyone would say such an idiotic thing.  He must know he is making a fool of himself, right?  No actually; exactly the opposite is true.  Kocher again:

It has become common for people who routinely engage in chronic psychotic levels of denial to consider themselves as being mental powerhouses, and to be considered by others as being mental powerhouses, because no one can break through their irrationality. This is often supported by a self-referencing congratulatory inner voice which says, “(guffaw) He REALLY didn’t have an answer for that one!” And they are correct. He didn’t have an answer.

Far from acknowledging the manifest folly of his statements, LH revels in it.  Only wall building rubes like Barry believe that A=A is infallibly, necessarily true; hyper-sophisticated intellectuals like myself are not so narrow minded.

So why do people like LH make such staggeringly stupid, borderline psychotic claims?  Well, LH feels free to psychoanalyze me, and I will now return the favor.  LH rejects the concept of absolute and infallible truth, because absolute and infallible truth acts as a check on his autonomous will.  If A always equals A, then maybe, just maybe, it is also always evil to kill little boys and girls, chop them into pieces and sell the pieces.  I assure you that it is no coincidence that LH rejects both assertions.  Because the rejection of any potential limit on LH’s autonomous will drives the nihilistic antinomianism at the core of his worldview.

Comments
E you have not responded to my 231. Do you have a response?Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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SB:
The difficulty here is that your subjectivism, which is likely a product of your materialism, prompts you to believe that reason’s rules are always about concepts in the mind and never about things outside of the mind.
That's what monism gets you. Incoherent dualism.Mung
September 13, 2015
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That’s correct, and is not different than would I’d understood from your previous posts. As I’ve said repeatedly,
E, you are lying. Everyone knows you are lying. Again, why? It is pointless. Do you have no shame?Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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ES said:
Yes, sure. Religion, as delusional as it may be, is not hard to account for in evolutionary terms.
One wonders what "delusional" means under the perspective that one is caused to have beliefs by agglomerations of historical and currently interacting molecules, and under the assumption that there is no such thing as an available objective means of arbiting one set of physically caused beliefs from another? Under A-Mat, organic beings simply believe what biology and physics causes them to believe with no means of objective, external arbitration - what then is a "delusion"? Perhaps he means "delusion" in the post-modern normative sense - meaning, divergent from what most other people believe. Does ES really think that most other people share his/her beliefs? It's a shame ES doesn't see the irony of the rest of his commentary, blurting out whatever his biology and physics commands as if those uterances represent truths; as if others have the autonomous free will to recognize them as such and change their own physical structure in some top-down means to accommodate those "corrections"; as if we have an objective means of determining them to be true; as if his blurting out such naturally-causes sounds was any different in nature from any religious fundamentalist, cave man or insane person blurting out sequencers of noises they think meaningful and true; as if his beliefs are not necessarily every bit as "delusional" as any other. As the man said, you cannot argue with the willfully insane.William J Murray
September 13, 2015
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@Learned Hand,
Hmmmm. Sounds like a distinction we’ve been stumbling around, between “I define this to be true” and “this is true in an external sense, independent of my own definitions.” I don’t have any sort of satisfactory answer as to the first one, as my answer to WJM shows. But I think SB and BA take these “A=A” questions to be of the latter category. I think that because they seem to think this infallible faculty they have is the foundation of their ability to infallibly detect objectively true external moral principles. No?
That's correct, and is not different than would I'd understood from your previous posts. As I've said repeatedly, Barry and Stephen are thoroughly confused on the crucial distinctions between "logical statements" and "statements about the world". Wittgenstein and others are right to point out that we do not have language or concepts with out stimuli and input from the extra-mental world, so there is a predicate for any logical system humans construct which depends on non-logical/real world experiences. Barry and StephenB and KF and now WJM's (apparently) basic error obtains in confusing a definition for physical principle, or more precisely supposing that there is a perfect isomorphism between the analytical proposition and corresponding propositions about the state of the world that the two share an identity. I understand from your latest comments here that Barry mistakes your concerns regarding fallible reason in crafting and expressing definitions with concerns about the "empirical truth" of definitions that do not depend on or interact with empirical input at all as definitions.
And going back to my question to WJM, what about that first category? We can say, “I define this to be true,” but it takes reasoning to say, “and therefore it must be true since it’s defined that way.” If we accept that human reasoning can be flawed, then isn’t error possible even in the first case?
Yes, certainly. But this is an error in reasoning where and when this happens. It's an "error in the definition". Articulating this as you have just here illustrates both the source of confusion and the absence of any substantial conflict in the concepts you are applying here with the ones I'm applying. I fully agree that our reasoning is error-prone, and that the activity of forming definitions is not exempted from this fact. As I pointed out above, definitions are problematic sometimes because they are incoherent or unintelligible. We might say this is one type of "reasoning error" to worry about in creating and articulating definitions. But this is an error that simply fails to reify a definition in the first place. There's no tautology to test or consider in error, only confusion about what was intended in its place. The reason we say a tautology is "trivially true" is because a definition is not liable to tests for error, risks of incoherent/incomprehensible articulations of the definition notwithstanding. The "trivial" descriptor obtains since it cannot be otherwise conceptual. Doesn't matter what the state of extra-mental world is, doesn't matter how challenged we are in articulating subtle concepts, etc. The tautology is just a conceptual association, and "just is", as an association. This doesn't in any way indemnify us from risks of errors in reasoning as we create and express definitions. Biut we either succeed or fail in doing so, and so either produces an association a definition that can be used in a logical framework, or not.eigenstate
September 13, 2015
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Eigenstate @ 236 This is a classic example of your fundamental dishonesty. Yesterday, you and I had a heated exchange regarding LHs views about the infallibility of A=A as a definition. We both agree that it is infallibly true as an analytic proposition. Our disagreement was in your assertion that LH agreed with us. I said he did not You said he did. This is what you said yesterday.
my understanding is that [Learned Hand’s] doubt is not (and he’d agree cannot be) aimed at a definition.
Now, let’s look at what LH said today:
if we treat A=A in the way you suggest—essentially, “I define A to be A,” for the purposes of building a logical system—I certainly can’t see how that could be in error . . . the fact that I can’t see how a definition could be in error is not logical proof that a definition can’t be in error.
You were wrong. LH does indeed believe he cannot be sure that A=A can’t be in error as an analytic proposition. When I point out you were wrong in your assessment of LH’s position, you respond by pretending LH did not say something he plainly said and that he really agrees with you after all. I ask you again E. What is the point of that? You know you are being dishonest. I know you are being dishonest. All of the onlookers know you are being dishonest. For the life of me I can’t see why you feel compelled to lie when everyone knows you are lying – and then pretending the problem is my failure to understand your superior intellect.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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Learned Hand says “I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A.” Ouch Eigy. The chemicals interacting in your head led you astray there. Ya know, that is the problem with the smug condescension that you spewed in the comments above. When you are demonstrated to be totally wrong you look not only like an idiot but also an ass. Double ouch.
We’ll let Learned Hand weigh in with clarification on this. I stand to be corrected if I’m mistaken. But my understanding of LH, having read his posts that A=A here, and any certainty being contemplated would be — must be synthetic in nature. I think you fail to account for the willful misreading that typifies your responses to critics, here. But I’ll let LH speak for himself if he wants.
It’s not a distinction that I was thinking about at the time. I cannot be perfectly certain that A=A in any sense outside my own head, because the reasoning I would use to confirm it cannot be confirmed as infallible. But I can set the definition an axiom and proceed without a second thought. I think that’s another way of describing your position; yes? I’ve read all those posts, Barry. I remain confident that LH is not insisting to you that a definition qua does not admit of doubt or certainty. It’s a category error to ascribe “doubtable-ness” to a definition. I’ve tried to make this point by saying, in many comments, that the actual solution to the quandary of whether we can know that A=A is to assume it as an axiom and move on. I read LH and nod in agreement, but do wonder why he doesn’t just directly address your problem with axioms and definitions getting sublimated into physical principles of the universe by your magical intuition. Because I don’t have your background in philosophy. I focus entirely on the practical applications; the question of whether an axiom is true in any sense other than being an axiom seems quite pointless to me. What matters is whether someone can access external truths infallibly, and/or whether they have any infallible faculties with which to do so. I think the shift BA took into analytic propositions is because he cannot support his belief in such faculties, cannot back down, and cannot sustain a conversation that requires real self-scrutiny. And he read a Wikipedia article that proposed an easy out, although unfortunately one inconsistent with his prior writing about the LOI and Jupiter. Thank you, by the way. Your writing on this has been very helpful; I’ve let the distinctions get muddled, and probably contributed to confusion by being careless in my comments. I appreciate your contribution, and the example of positive interaction you set. I suspect that you will be punished for it. Such is life.Learned Hand
September 13, 2015
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SB, The funny thing about truth is that it can be explained many ways. Error can be explained only one way because it has no substance worth probing. Fortune cookie philosophy. Eigenstate, Heh, I’m following and responding to these one at a time, which is probably not helping. Learned Hand can correct me if I’m wrong, but my understanding is that his doubt is not (and he’d agree cannot be) aimed at a definition. I actually have questions even about that. As I wrote above, I think “this is defined to be true” is a question of human reasoning, which we know can be flawed. How do you infallibly exclude that error? Of course in practice we assume there’s no error, and we take things that are defined to be true as axiomatically true—not as something that’s externally valid. I think the disagreement we have here might just be a question of definitions. It might be resolved by saying, “OK, such doubt is possible because we cannot know for a fact that any piece of reasoning is flawless, but so what? We’ll say it’s axiomatically true and move on.” That’s consistent with my position. I’m happy to take an axiom and say, “This is an axiom. I will never question its truth, because we’ve defined it to be true. There’s no deeper level of truth we can access with regards to this question.” If that’s comprehensible, would you say we agree on that point? I think we do, but obviously I’m feeling this out as we go. No, LH is free to confirm your idea that he and I disagree, but I’d be surprised to hear that he disagrees. I don’t think that we do, but there’s some tension in that you approach this from a position of better understanding. As far as I can tell. You have a terrible track record of misrepresenting what your critics are saying, and I think here again you’ve not understood LH’s focus on A=A as a proposition of synthetic knowledge. This is not hard to conclude at all if you read him, as he’s talking about doubt and fallibility — these are not traits of definitions or axioms, but epistemic factors in thinking about the extra-mental world. It’s quite clear neither your or StephenB have a working knowledge of the difference here, or your would not be using A=A to argue that “Jupiter might not be there” or “I am not Denali” (in Stephen’s case). I agree with all of this. The question of whether a definition can be in error seems like a recent invention in BA’s position. This line of discussion stems from his assertion that there are self-evident truths, which in turn sprang from his assertion that he can infallibly access external moral truths. The debate is fundamentally about perceiving an external, objective world, not creating our own definitions. LH, naively, I suspect, credits you with understanding this, and argues accordingly. I would not exempt myself from the naivety. I also did not consider the question of whether a definition can itself be flawed, except as a special case of “I think therefore I am,” prior to this afternoon. I certainly understood BA and SB to be talking about their knowledge of external reality, not definitions created by humans. LH, please feel free to correct me if I’m wrong and you DO in fact suppose that a definition can be “false” as a definition. I think the cleanest articulation of my position would be, “We cannot show that it is impossible for a definition to be false as a definition; we must assume it axiomatically.” As I said above, I don’t think we disagree about that. My focus on the first half of that formulation is probably a product of the fact that I’m backing into this question from the synthetic argument. I’ve read all of LH’s posts on this thread, and I think I’m current with him on the related threads, and I don’t see any disagreement. He’s free to confirm that he and I disagree. I think what disagreement we have is in the practical benefit of not hammering away at the elephant in the room first — your conflation problem with definitions and the dynamics of the extra-mental world. He clearly sees benefit in ignoring your difficulties in this area. I think you’re right in all of this. (Of course, the ultimate judge of what any human thinks is Barry Arrington, and/or StephenB. They’ll have to confirm what each of us really thinks.) I see your disability on this question to be pretty much a show-stopper to anything further on the subject. You’re not equipped any more than StephenB to engage on the merits of the real world if you can’t see the distinction between the LOI as analytic and a tool for thinking and reality not giving a damn what definitions we care to use — it is what it is, regardless. That’s only a show-stopper if the show is about having a meaningful discussion about the underlying concepts. Does that seem like BA’s goal?Learned Hand
September 13, 2015
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if we treat A=A in the way you suggest—essentially, “I define A to be A,” for the purposes of building a logical system—I certainly can’t see how that could be in error . . . the fact that I can’t see how a definition could be in error is not logical proof that a definition can’t be in error.
Eigenstate @ 116
A=A is infallibly true and not dubitable as an analytic proposition. That’s the nature of a tautology. It’s prescriptive, it’s true by definition, and it’s indispensable as an analytic process.
Eigenstate @ 124
my understanding is that [Learned Hand’s] doubt is not (and he’d agree cannot be) aimed at a definition.
Learned Hand, thank you for showing eigy his error.
Barry, I think you are not even trying here to understand. Let's ask LH: Learned Hand, What would "error" for a definition look like? Can you give an example of some hypothetical circumstance where a definition was in "error"? I can, but only as a function of applying some definition (an analytic proposition) to a synthetic definition. If that would be the kind of example you give, then it's time for Barry to eat crow as I expected would happen. If Barry's correct, can you give a hypothetical, or an example where the definition is itself somehow erroneous, as a definition. My claim, and my understanding (which I do suppose you share, but correct me if I'm mistaken) is that "error", like "certainty" or "doubtability" is not an attribute of a definition. Put conversely, if it can be wrong, it ain't a definition. Definitions can and do regularly run into trouble when making contact with the extra-mental world, but any error or confidence problem there obtains in the model that *applies* to the definition. Maybe an example I provide will make this easy for you to clear up. A: "The morally good is whatever God says is good". As a matter of definition, there's nothing to doubt or find in error, here. We might resist this definition or that as incoherent or unintelligible, but as a matter of "error", there's nothing to attach error to, as it's just a definition. What would I doubt about A? Well, here's an obvious doubt that this definition might prompt? "This is wrong, as there is no basis for supposing God is a thing or exists at all as the authority per this definition". But this doubt doesn't "doubt the definition" as a definition, but doubts the synthetic propositions that result if we apply this definition to our experience with the extra-mental world. The error obtains in the model that *uses* this definition. The definition can't be bothered, it's just a definition. Anyway, that's an example you might respond to. What's possibly in doubt about A in your view? Your response should indicate whether you are thinking about errors as errors that obtain from incorporating A in some model or synthetic proposition, or whether you truly do, as Barry insists, find something dubitable about A (and other definitions) as definitions -- unapplied and unattached to any synthetic propositions.eigenstate
September 13, 2015
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Eigenstate, Hmmmm. Sounds like a distinction we’ve been stumbling around, between “I define this to be true” and “this is true in an external sense, independent of my own definitions.” I don’t have any sort of satisfactory answer as to the first one, as my answer to WJM shows. But I think SB and BA take these “A=A” questions to be of the latter category. I think that because they seem to think this infallible faculty they have is the foundation of their ability to infallibly detect objectively true external moral principles. No? And going back to my question to WJM, what about that first category? We can say, “I define this to be true,” but it takes reasoning to say, “and therefore it must be true since it’s defined that way.” If we accept that human reasoning can be flawed, then isn’t error possible even in the first case?Learned Hand
September 13, 2015
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WJM, One wonders if LH considers the certainty of the statement “I exist” fallible. One might ask directly, unless one is enjoying the mental image created by phrasing questions with a metaphorical pinky in the air. (Which, to be fair, I do, so no problem.) I’ve actually answered this several times, but I try to remind myself it would be greatly unfair to charge anyone with perfect knowledge of this vast, sprawling, multi-part conversation. Cogito ergo sum is the hardest challenge to my position, because I think it’s truly self-referential in a way no other proposition is. The fact of considering it demonstrates it. I’ve had two relevant thoughts about it: (A) It might be the one thing we can say is infallibly true. That doesn’t do much except say that truths we demonstrate by questioning them can be known to be true, which doesn’t work for either “A=A” or “murder is bad,” so it’s not terribly helpful. (B) But I can’t comfortably settle on (A), because as a matter of pure logic, I still don’t have my perfect, infallible metric. Of course I cannot conceive of any way in which cogito ergo sum could be false, but an inability to demonstrate counter-examples does not prove a concept to be true. And how do I know that to demonstrate a proposition proves it to be true? I reason it out. And my reason is susceptible to errors, which I cannot infallibly detect or control. The solution is easy in practice. I take CES to be true, because I can’t imagine any way in which it could be false. As a matter of abstract reasoning, I don’t know whether I’m more persuaded by (A) or (B). I lean towards (B), because I can’t escape the logical problem of trying to establish something as infallibly true using reason, when reason itself can be in error. (And yes, that’s self-referential, because I’m using reasoning to question whether reason can be infallible. Which is one reason why I don’t say that it’s definitely true that absolute certainty is impossible.)Learned Hand
September 13, 2015
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SB, [a] Let me call on my own example. I am infallibly certain that I am not Mount Everest for thousands of reasons. I will list only four: First, Mount Everest is very big and I am very small by comparison. Big cannot also be small. Second, Mount Everest is thousands of miles away from me, so I can’t be where I am and also at that location. “There” cannot also be “here.” Third, Mount Everest is inorganic matter that cannot think; I am matter and spirit with the faculty of intellect. Non intelligence cannot also be intelligence. Fourth, and most important, I cannot be what I am and also be something else. A cannot also be B. In 1850, someone could use the same “A cannot also be B” reasoning to say that a particle cannot also be a wave. But they would have been wrong. How could they know in advance that they were wrong? I don’t think they could. Such is the nature of being limited and fallible; such are we. There are people, as I said above, who claim that all existence is an illusion, and that all existence is one. That would make you and Mount Everest the same. How do you know they’re wrong? Of course you and I agree that they are wrong, but I’m looking for a tool or principle that would make our belief infallible. Your examples here are ways in which we test whether a proposition is true. Am I small? Is a mountain big? They’re useful questions. Are they questions that cannot be answered wrongly? I don’t think so; in fact, there are people who do answer them wrongly, such as those who believe that all life is a delusion, or who are themselves deluded. How do you know, infallibly, that you are not deluded when it comes to answering these questions? “I’m obviously not” is not a very satisfying answer. It’s a useful answer, in practice, but it doesn’t answer the underlying question. How do you know, infallibly, that you aren’t deluded? [b] I am infallibly correct when I acknowledge the first principles of right reason. I thought this sentence might be followed by an explanation of why you are infallible on these questions. I was disappointed. On all other things, I am fallible. So why is there a line between these questions and those questions? And how do you know you’ve drawn it infallibly? I could not even detect my own fallibility except in the context of infallibly certain first principles, just as I could not detect my errors in reasoning except in the context of reason’s infallible rules. You’re establishing only that it’s useful to be infallible. So what? The universe doesn’t care if you can detect your own errors. Whether you can make a mistake or not is completely independent of whether it’s useful to be infallible. If there is no such thing as perfection, then there can be no such thing as a mistake. Has someone claimed there’s no such thing as perfection? I’ve tried hard to keep you and BA from redefining the question here. It’s not whether perfect abstractions exist; it’s whether we, as fallible humans, can carve out some area in which we are infallible, and do it infallibly. As such, of course we can make mistakes. If X is abstractly, perfectly true, and we assert not-X, then it doesn’t matter one whit whether we have the ability to perfectly discern whether X is true. We’ve made a mistake. If there is no such thing as a standard of truth, then there can be no such thing as an error that violates that standard. This would be an interesting thing to read in a fortune cookie; whatever does it mean here? We establish standards of truth all the time. The question is whether those standards are infallible. Assuming arguendo that they are not, a proposition can still violate the standard. “Learned Hand is always right.” That’s a standard of truth. Certainly not infallible! “Learned Hand is wrong about X” violates that standard. Sorry, you’re arguing what sounds like deep philosophy, not things that make logical sense. [c] Yes, I agree fully with Barry. Also, I hold that the Law of Identity is the ontological component of the psychological law of non-contradiction. Both are infallibly true and inseparable. The former is the logic of reality and nature, the latter is the logic of mind and thought, each perfectly corresponding to the other. Thanks, it’s interesting to hear more about your position. How do you know that you can infallibly determine the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions? It’s truly impossible for someone to answer that question wrong on a test? That seems to be the important question to me; if it’s possible in practice to answer the question wrongly, then as a matter of pure logic, it doesn’t matter if you can infallibly say that analytic propositions are true because you can’t know infallibly that you’re dealing with an analytic proposition. Of course you could in practice, but we’re considering questions of abstract logic. In other words, assume we can answer questions within set X infallibly correctly. We have a question, A. If we can infallibly place it in set X, great, we can answer it infallibly. If not, then we can’t. And then, of course, there’s the infinite regression problem. Does your ability to discern what goes in set X go in set X? What about your ability to discern whether your ability to discern what goes in set X goes in set X? A simpler way of looking at it might be this: assume you can determine analytic propositions infallibly. “Is this an analytic proposition” is not an analytic proposition. So how can the answer be infallible? And since it’s not, error is back in the equation. Again, these problems are easy for most of us to deal with. We simply say, “Oh, A=A? That’s an axiom. We define it to be true and move on.” But if you need to be able to say that you can determine external objective truths infallibly, for example to serve as the foundation of a system of supposedly infallibly-detectible moral truths, that’s not sufficient. So you have to make axioms into something that’s externally true, not just defined as true. The fact that you can’t clearly establish where your infallibility comes from is an indictment, I think, of the proposition that you can infallibly access more complex moral truths (which are in and of themselves not analytic propositions). I realize that you disagree; I’m not trying to persuade you, but rather explaining my position.Learned Hand
September 13, 2015
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E
There’s nothing magical about “cheating is bad”; it’s just a practical problem for the group if it’s unregulated
And that answers my question. The reason you feel no compunction about being dishonest in these debates is that you realize cheating is not bad; it is merely maladaptive if it gets out of hand. But you, as one who has looked behind the evolutionary curtain, so to speak, feel free to cheat away, confident in your expectation that the rest of us will feel bound by the evolutionary imperative. Thanks for clearing that up EBarry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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WJM
Under your evolutionary perspective, you might be “obligated” (meaning, under evolution, “wired to feel strongly about) to save your neighbor’s child from your neighbors abuse; yet that same evolutionary foundation entirely justifies that abuse; in fact, you can equally say he has a moral obligation to abuse his child because that is how evolution has wired him.
E
Well, if that abuse was adaptationally advantageous, then yes
So if our environment somehow changed so that torturing infants for pleasure became adaptationally advantageous, then we would have an ethical obligation to torture infants for pleasure.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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By this reasoning, humans apparently also evolved to be hardwired for belief in god and to place social contracts and empathies secondary to believed-in divine commandments and to consider such rules absolute. They also evolved into sociopaths and psychopaths. They also evolved into groups that will use and manipulate the empathies and feelings of others for their own gain.,
Yes, sure. Religion, as delusional as it may be, is not hard to account for in evolutionary terms. It provides a context for heightened social trust and collaboration, both of which are themselves beneficial to the group, no matter if the subject that anchors these bounds is completely imaginary. Religion as a social group dynamic may easily bring in more evolutionary benefits than any costs associated with its delusionary nature. Social bonding benefits may be modest, but real and effective. The real costs of the delusion are not so easily realized. There's not an immediate penalty in evolutionary terms in god-belief, or even in the long term. With little costs associated with the misconception and very real benefits, we should not be surprised to find that religion is pervasive in evolved human psychology and the culture that proceeds from it.
ES and others fail to recognize that if you’re going to play the evolutionary ethics card, then all human behavior is validated as equally ethical because it all evolved, and there is no non-evolutionary standard by which to discern which evolved psychological habits are preferable.
No, that equivocates on "ethical" -- it imports some external/supernatural concept of ethical in place of the concept of ethics as an aspect of evolved psychology. The priorities - the values that we are wired with, are not "good" or "bad" or "ethical" or "unethical" by some external-to-humans rule. There is no such rule, as you vaguely grasp. Instead, "ethical" or "valuable" obtains from the our evolved psychology, so the priorities we are wired for by evolution ARE the ethical underpinnings for humans. "Preferability" is not an external concept, but the outworking of evolved human psychology. This does not mean all behavior is equally ethical. For example, if humans are wired to identifier and resist cheaters -- individuals who violate social contracts for sharing food and contributing to the hunt, or other kinds of resource development, and simply steal -- then cheating will receive opprobrium and sanction. These priorities are not "set by God" or a function of some superstitious notion of deities and their moral dicta. Humans as a social group in real environments do not survive when cheaters proliferate. Some marginal number of cheaters can be supported in the tribe, but too many cheaters and not enough producers and the group's survival is threatened. So groups that enact social contracts and rules that punish cheater are ones that survive and reproduce. There's nothing magical about "cheating is bad"; it's just a practical problem for the group if it's unregulated, so successful human lineages (those whose progeny are living today) are conditioned by the environment to regulate cheating.
What does the term “obligation” mean when one is referring to behavior that is physically caused by the interactions of molecules?? Do you also have an “obligation” to gasp when deprived of air? An “obligation” to eat when you feel hungry? Who or what do you owe that “obligation” to, and what is the penalty for failing to live up to it?
For humans, our obligations are to humans, as members of a social group. As concerns one's basis for acting this way or that, I'm wired (like you) for empathy, greed, etc., but that wiring is not something I chose, any more than the color of my irises, or the regularity of my breathing under the signaling from my autonomic nervous system. My hunger inclines me to eat, but there's nothing magical or deontological about it, any more than I'm obligated to eat because God said so, or that I should be compassionate because God said so, or kill every last Amalekite because God said so. This is the real world, real physics, real animals and real processes we're talking about.
Under your evolutionary perspective, you might be “obligated” (meaning, under evolution, “wired to feel strongly about) to save your neighbor’s child from your neighbors abuse; yet that same evolutionarly foundation entirely justifies that abuse; in fact, you can equally say he has a moral obligation to abuse his child because that is how evolution has wired him.
Well, if that abuse was adaptationally advantageous, then yes, although the basis for calling it "abuse" would be problematic. We say it's abuse because of the priorities we are wired with, such treatment is detrimental to flourishing, non-adaptive. But if the world were otherwise, then our values would be otherwise accordingly, yes. Some species of prairie dogs, for example, are notoriously infanticidal. Mothers kill their own young, but more frequently kill the young of closely related kin in the group. When it's studied, the more infanticidal females were found to be more fecund, have healthier offspring and be physically more robust themselves than their less infanticidal counterparts. So, are they "obligated by God's law" to kill their nephews and nieces? No, it's just advantageous in evolutionary terms, in real world causes and effects. It reduces competition for resources for the young who are not killed, and in general promotes the flourishing of the group. So the impulse obtains, and Mama prairie dogs are "evolutionarily obligated" toward infanticide. It's a positive value in the "ethical algebra" of the prairie dogs.
This kind of equivocation is just more insane nonsense materialists use to aviod the truth.
There's nothing equivocal about it. Theistic notions of deontology and moral obligations just don't apply, and are not confused or conflated with the real-world dynamics that realize human psychology and behavior. Your idea that this is equivocation just implicates your commitment to your peculiar and mystical understandings about concepts like "moral obligation". Those who don't labor under those burdens don't need or accept or even bother with the notions you consider non-negotiable. So, there's no equivocation -- your sense of obligation doesn't fit in anywhere in a real model of the world, and never gets purchase in such a which where it even *could* be the basis for equivocation.eigenstate
September 13, 2015
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Aleta,
A definition, as a stipulation within a logical system, can’t be in error because we are just declaring that it is what it is.
Finally something we agree about. But just try to convince Mount Everest Boy of the truth of that proposition.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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LH
Check out the TSZ discussion; it’s (at least part of it) on a much higher level than BA is comfortable with.
Said the guy who thinks he may be Mount Everest. Yeah see, over at TSZ, they are so smart and super-duper sophisticated like Mount Everest Boy here, I can't possibly keep up. Thanks for the chuckle Mount Everest Boy (henceforth "MEB" for short).Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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A definition, as a stipulation within a logical system, can't be in error because we are just declaring that it is what it is. It might be not a very useful definition, either within the system or to applications of the system, but its "wrongness" is not something that could be proven wrong, either analytically or synthetically. So I don't think LH is right here.Aleta
September 13, 2015
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HeKs
Yes, Barry can infallibly discriminate between analytic and synthetic propositions in any case where he can understand the proposition in question, since that will allow him to determine whether or not the predicate is included in the subject. If it is, it’s an analytic proposition. If it’s not, then it’s not.
LH
Can he? If we wrote down a thousand propositions and asked him to assess each one, as either an analytic and synthetic proposition, he’d get each one right? If we gave him that test every day for ten years, he’d never make a mistake? This is an astonishing proposition to me. People make mistakes.
LH, you don’t seem to understand what HeKS is getting at. He qualified the statement with “where he can understand.” Every single time I understand the predicate is included in the subject, I will understand it is an analytic proposition. And every time I understand it is not, I will understand it is a synthetic proposition. HeKs statement is a tautology. Any time I understand the nature of a proposition, it is impossible for me to be mistaken about the nature of a proposition.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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Barry:
said the guy who is not certain he is not Mount Everest. LH, does it make you feel all super-duper sophisticated and intellectual when you say damn fool idiot things like that. It shouldn’t.
LH
If you had to list the readers here who don’t understand why you resort to insults rather than arguments, who would go on that list? Which of your readers do you think is dim enough to think that you have some cogent argument you’re just not bothering to write down?
Seriously? You want me to write down an argument for why you can be infallibly certain that you, Learned Hand, are not Mount Everest. God help us. Here is a clue, LH. When you say idiotic things like “For all I know, I may well be Mount Everest,” don’t expect anyone to argue you out of your idiocy. Expect to be called an idiot. You don’t need an argument. You need to be shamed into better conduct. And I am trying to do that, but it is hard, because you are damn near shameless.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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LH
if we treat A=A in the way you suggest—essentially, “I define A to be A,” for the purposes of building a logical system—I certainly can’t see how that could be in error . . . the fact that I can’t see how a definition could be in error is not logical proof that a definition can’t be in error.
Eigenstate @ 116
A=A is infallibly true and not dubitable as an analytic proposition. That’s the nature of a tautology. It’s prescriptive, it’s true by definition, and it’s indispensable as an analytic process.
Eigenstate @ 124
my understanding is that [Learned Hand’s] doubt is not (and he’d agree cannot be) aimed at a definition.
Learned Hand, thank you for showing eigy his error.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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LH: “If you ever feel the need to articulate a positive argument, I’d be interested in hearing it . . .” said the guy who is not certain he is not Mount Everest. LH, does it make you feel all super-duper sophisticated and intellectual when you say damn fool idiot things like that. It shouldn’t. If you had to list the readers here who don’t understand why you resort to insults rather than arguments, who would go on that list? Which of your readers do you think is dim enough to think that you have some cogent argument you’re just not bothering to write down? HeKS, Second, it’s not that anybody is saying, “Wait! Stop there! This is some complex proposition that we must believe and have faith in and it is not open to challenge.” That’s not actually true. I think BA at least has taken exactly this position in the past: that he has access to self-evident moral truths that we must believe and have faith in and are not open to challenge. What we’re saying to you and Learned Hand is that if you actually understand the Law of Identity, as represented by A=A, then you will notice that you can’t coherently challenge it without your challenge immediately descending into completely meaningless absurdity. And here I’ll explain—again—that this isn’t my position. I’m not challenging the LOI. I’m challenging the assumption that you’re capable of infallibly perceiving the LOI. Notice where you wrote, “if you actually understand the Law of Identity”? Well, I agree that this is an active question. Maybe you don’t. How can you know, when you are fallible and have no infallible tool for controlling error? An analytic proposition is one that is true BY DEFINITION. If that’s the case, then it’s another case of cogito ergo sum, or knowing one’s own beliefs: if I define A=A for the purposes of logic, is it possible my own definition is in error? I confess cogito ergo sum is the hardest case for me, but I don’t think it answers my underlying question: how do you know, without an unlimited and flawless perspective, whether you’ve misunderstood or failed to observe something? And I’m not sure this limitation is accurate here. BA will have to speak for himself, but if he really limits this to a question of definitions, it’s a recent development in his thinking. Remember when he banned critics for not kowtowing to his principles of right reason? One of the acid tests was about whether Jupiter can exist and not exist at the same time. Now we’re talking about physical objects and states, not just abstract definitions. And of course, the end goal of this presumption of infallibility is to establish the existence of objective moral truths that are infallibly known. Is that a question of definition? I don’t think so. I think BA and SB want to be able to say that it’s objectively true and unquestionable that fetuses are people from conception, for example. Not that they define fetuses as such, but that it’s true prior to any work they might do creating a definition. Having said all that, if we treat A=A in the way you suggest—essentially, “I define A to be A,” for the purposes of building a logical system—I certainly can’t see how that could be in error. Two points to bear in mind: first, now we’re back to an axiom. Axioms are things we assume to be true, not things that are proven true. I think BA and SB want these SETs to be true in some way other than “we, as human beings, define them to be such.” Second, the fact that I can’t see how a definition could be in error is not logical proof that a definition can’t be in error. Can you supply such a proof? A) Yes, Barry can infallibly know that analytic propositions are amenable to infallible knowledge, because they are true by definition, which makes it impossible for them to be false. Granted, arguendo, subject to my thoughts above. C) Yes, Barry can infallibly tell that a particular analytic proposition is true when it has been identified as such, because all analytic propositions are necessarily true by definition. I guess if we’re granting (A) arguendo, this one follows along. B) Yes, Barry can infallibly discriminate between analytic and synthetic propositions in any case where he can understand the proposition in question, since that will allow him to determine whether or not the predicate is included in the subject. If it is, it’s an analytic proposition. If it’s not, then it’s not. Can he? If we wrote down a thousand propositions and asked him to assess each one, as either an analytic and synthetic proposition, he’d get each one right? If we gave him that test every day for ten years, he’d never make a mistake? This is an astonishing proposition to me. People make mistakes. Even about questions that seem impossibly easy. I’m probably not the only person who gets the CAPTCHA questions wrong sometimes, even though 6x5 is not a hard question. Remember, the problem is not whether it’s possible to get a right answer to the question, but whether it’s impossible to get the wrong one. Such that if you gave the question to a million people of average faculties a thousand times in a row, you would have one billion correct answers, with no exceptions at all. And frankly, I don’t think that’s the case. Do you? Do you really mean to say that no one who understands the terms would ever give a wrong answer to the question, “Is this an analytic or synthetic proposition?” If the answer is no, if a mistake is possible, then we’re right back where we started from. Even if it’s possible to infallibly say that analytic propositions are infallibly true, you have to be able to discriminate between analytic and synthetic propositions. And you have to be able to do it infallibly. If it’s possible that one of those billion answers might be wrong, even if only because someone had a bad day and wasn’t thinking through the problem very clearly, then error is possible. And if error is possible at the discrimination stage, then error is possible in the final determination—because you could be wrong about whether this is truly an analytic proposition. That’s theoretical, of course. A more practical question would be, “does this person really understand what an analytic proposition is?” And that’s a harder question than I think you want it to be. Check out the TSZ discussion; it’s (at least part of it) on a much higher level than BA is comfortable with. I think there’s a valid question as to whether someone who mixes-and-matches questions about physical objects and analytic propositions is really operating with a perfect understanding of the concept.Learned Hand
September 13, 2015
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ES said:
One chunk of sentient meat” — by which you mean I human, I understand — does have moral obligations to other humans. Humans are evolved social creatures, and are hardwired with social psychologies that prioritize social contracts and and other social priorities — empathy, for example, that facilitate trust, collaboration and efficient allocation of work and resources in the community. Survival is a team sport for humans, so we are wired that way — ethics and moral codes are part of the machinery for humans.
By this reasoning, humans apparently also evolved to be hardwired for belief in god and to place social contracts and empathies secondary to believed-in divine commandments and to consider such rules absolute. They also evolved into sociopaths and psychopaths. They also evolved into groups that will use and manipulate the empathies and feelings of others for their own gain. ES and others fail to recognize that if you're going to play the evolutionary ethics card, then all human behavior is validated as equally ethical because it all evolved, and there is no non-evolutionary standard by which to discern which evolved psychological habits are preferable. What does the term "obligation" mean when one is referring to behavior that is physically caused by the interactions of molecules?? Do you also have an "obligation" to gasp when deprived of air? An "obligation" to eat when you feel hungry? Who or what do you owe that "obligation" to, and what is the penalty for failing to live up to it? Under your evolutionary perspective, you might be "obligated" (meaning, under evolution, "wired to feel strongly about) to save your neighbor's child from your neighbors abuse; yet that same evolutionarly foundation entirely justifies that abuse; in fact, you can equally say he has a moral obligation to abuse his child because that is how evolution has wired him. This kind of equivocation is just more insane nonsense materialists use to aviod the truth.William J Murray
September 13, 2015
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DS, Go to the Clapham bus stop. Ask the man you see there in ordinary clothes what addition normally means, without further specifying an unusual context. You will get 2 + 2 = 4 or the like. My point is just that, and it is quite certain that vector addition is not to be brought in without reasonable discussion of new context -- the equivocation issue. Abelian Groups with commutative operations (vs non commutative ones) is in some ways even more esoteric. One will at least meet vectors in 4th form Physics and will be taught that a vector has magnitude and direction vs a scalar with magnitude only. The "generalisation" of addition involved, in an ordinary context, is exactly an example of equivocation: unannounced and in context misleading material shifts of meaning. Finally, there is a reason why complex numbers have two components, x + iy, r angle theta, r e^i theta or the like. No prizes for guessing why it has magnitude and direction from the origin. KFkairosfocus
September 13, 2015
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KF,
Likewise, I repeat, vector addition and its requisites uses the term addition but it is generally understood that these are quite distinct things. To suggest that addition (which normally denotes reals or a subset of the reals) does not follow what we are familiar with then switch contexts without due notice is equivocation and that is less innocent as abundant cautions are given. And in case you want to bring up that one, a Complex number, strictly, is a vector. That is why you work on components and in effect unit vectors.
This is not true in my experience. The word "addition" is used in contexts much broader than simply subsets of the real numbers. It's commonly used as a name for the binary operation in an abelian group. We speak of addition of complex numbers, for example. And in fact, since the complex numbers comprise a field, every complex number is a scalar as well. I really don't see any issues with the terms and language Aleta has used; absolutely nothing misleading or equivocal about it.daveS
September 13, 2015
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Thanks for addressing the "meat" issue, ES. This is quite off-topic and irrelevant to our discussion, but Barry brought it up. Anyway, I like what you wrote here,
One chunk of sentient meat” — by which you mean I human, I understand — does have moral obligations to other humans. Humans are evolved social creatures, and are hardwired with social psychologies that prioritize social contracts and and other social priorities — empathy, for example, that facilitate trust, collaboration and efficient allocation of work and resources in the community. Survival is a team sport for humans, so we are wired that way — ethics and moral codes are part of the machinery for humans.
Aleta
September 13, 2015
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@Barry
You ignored by question at 167. I will repeat it: I am curious about one thing though. After watching you do your thing over the course of several months, it is clear to me that you will say literally anything you think you can get away with. And that brings up the issue I raised before: You think of yourself as nothing more than sentient meat. One chunk of meat has no moral obligation to another chunk of meat, including an obligation to tell the truth. It is obvious that you put this principle into practice. And the amazing thing is that when you get caught lying it never fazes you. Indeed, it just seems to invigorate you and compel you to double down on your lies. My question is this: What is the point? Obviously, it is not to get at the truth. Why do you do it?
I'm sorry I understood that to just so much posturing for the crowd on your part. "One chunk of sentient meat" -- by which you mean I human, I understand -- does have moral obligations to other humans. Humans are evolved social creatures, and are hardwired with social psychologies that prioritize social contracts and and other social priorities -- empathy, for example, that facilitate trust, collaboration and efficient allocation of work and resources in the community. Survival is a team sport for humans, so we are wired that way -- ethics and moral codes are part of the machinery for humans. So your premise is wrong. Humans have psychological and moral priorities wired into them -- this is how they are reified as "sentient meat". As for lying, maybe just a single example of what you are referring to would be a good start. Provide a quote where you claim I've offered the quote knowing that the statement I was making was false, and we will go from there. My ambivalence to these variants of your rants -- aside form my initial read that it was just so much posturing for the crowd -- is that you find ideas that oppose yours to be dishonest just by virtue of their being opposed to your invincible intuitions. So it's hard to marshal up much attention to that, as it's a pervasive reflex. You don't credit your opponents with meaning what they say, but take the low road and help yourself to the idea that they really know you're right Barry, and are just lying about it. I'm told from time to time that I really am not at atheist, and really do know God exists, and am just lying about as some sort of rebellious sin. It's not just an obnoxious way to interact with other people, it just makes for stupendously boring and banal exchanges that proceed from that position. I don't accept the premises you're offering, Barry, that's my answer. If you want to focus on a specific example of something I said which you can demonstrate I said knowing it was false, I'll be happy to take a look at it. Please provide a full quote and link, Barry, as I know better than to credit the way you recount the statements and arguments of your opponents. None of us recognize our own words or ideas in your representation of them, as a general pattern, in case you weren't aware. And that's not an inevitable fact, for example. VJTorley here is as wrong as anyone else here on the merits, in my view, but he's an example that shows one can disagree and still have some principles about understanding and engaging opposing ideas as they are offered. You don't do that, even though you could. That just makes it necessary for your to provide the quotes and links, so we avoid your problem, there in looking at an example you would provide.eigenstate
September 13, 2015
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And in which post did I “switch unannouced from a plane to a sphere." Can you point to a post where I did that.? Can you quote me something I wrote?Aleta
September 13, 2015
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Aleta,
So I suggest we talk about the subjects at hand rather than reverting to name-calling and making irrelevant comments about my morals.
Look at the title of this OP Aleta. This post is about materialist nihilism. Therefore, questions about why you attempt to mislead by holding up a map of Texas and yelping about how it does not map to Arizona are for from irrelevant. Indeed, they are right on point. So please answer my question. Why did you try to mislead everyone with an example you knew full well was not apt?
I am certain that large numbers of Christian mathematicians would agree with me . . .
Are you also certain that large numbers of Christian mathematicians would try your Texas/Arizona stunt? I am just as certain that is not the case.Barry Arrington
September 13, 2015
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Barry - a question you never answered. I accept that this is not relevant to 2 + 2 = 4. Are you or are you not familiar with the result from the theory of relativity that in the walkway example, I would not walk 20 feet in respect to the ground, but a little less.Aleta
September 13, 2015
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