Naturalism’s Moral Foundations

_{William Dembski

February 17, 2010

Culture, Ethics, Intelligent Design, Religion}

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Jeffrey Dahmer: “If it all happens naturalistically, what’s the need for a God? Can’t I set my own rules? Who owns me? I own myself.” [Biography, “Jeffrey Dahmer: The Monster Within,” A&E, 1996.]

Naturalists like to stress that you don’t need God or religion to be good. Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins even suggest that leaving God out of the equation actually allows one to be more moral because then our moral acts are authentic, motivated by deep conviction rather than by having a divine gun to our heads.

Even so, Dahmer’s logic is compelling. We need some external reference point — God — to justify being good. And that justification is significant in its own right. Without it, we can still rationalize particular evils, but we cannot dispense with the category of evil entirely.

I’d like to encourage in this thread other quotes like Dahmer’s — quotes by people who understood the logic of naturalism and the destruction of moral foundations that it entails.

Comments

Seversky, I am not arguing for the simplicity doctrine. I fully agree with Plantinga against that conception. But that is not what I, or the original quote from Lewis, advocate. God is not reducible to a property, but that doesn't mean that there are no properties that anything has that actually exists. Plantinga would not argue against the scripture that God is love in John. He is not making an argument that God has no particulars, only that we cannot reduce God to His particulars. And on this head we can rule out what are category mistakes, such as was articulated by Lewis, that goodness and God are different categories, they are not.Clive Hayden_{February 28, 2010
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6] the Dilemma is not aimed specifically at Christianity but at any attempt to preclude by fiat questioning of a faith’s moral prescriptions or any consideration of alternatives. Accusatory, question-begging, unjustified, ad hominem laced assertion. One designed to distract attention form the implications of the amorality of evolutionary materialistic secularism and the import that might makes "right." (Which has been put out as a public warning ever since Plato in his 360 BC The Laws, Bk X.) In fact, the Judaeo-Christian position on morality is an intelligible, reasonable one. To wit, we are creatures made in God's image and have minds of our own, which is what renders us capable of love thus virtue. So, we should each respect that same inherent dignity in all others. Thus, immediately, the premise and summary of core morality: "love [thus, respect] thy neighbour as thyself." (And, this concept of neighbourliness implies a circle of the civil peace of justice, protected by the civil authority as his primary duty as sword-bearer in the cause of justice, under God our common creator.) Nor is this hard to find, e.g the 1776 US DOI starts from precisely this premise when it asserts that "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights . . . " Indeed, when we read in Locke's 2nd essay on civil gov't, Ch 2 we see the direct basis in Locke's cite from "The Judicious [Richard] Hooker [in the 1594+ Ecclesiastical Polity]":
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant.
--> Of course, now that many people are so ignorant on the subject, all sorts of materialistic distortions that would formerly have been instantly corrected, will seem plausible --> And now we see the long term implications of he moves to separate the biblical roots of our civilisation from our education system . . . a la Plato's Cave style materialistic shadow shows substituting for accurate knowedge. 7] if God is identical with each of his properties . . . Strawman. I am speaking of the Character of God, which leads him to act in moral ways, as opposed to any imagined/projected equating of God with his character. 8] That may be your concept of God but it is conflict with the accounts of His nature and behavior in the primary textual evidence for His existence. Multiple question-begging assertions. First, the evidence for God's existence is not primarily a matter of textual assertions; as the intellectual gymnastics imposed by the neo-magisterium to blind many people to the blatant evidence of Creation without and mind and conscience within testifies to all too eloquently. Second, you will observe my note on neighbourliness just above, which brings to bear the issue of the special duty of the Magistrate. The magistrate -- in a world in which some abuse the power of choice to act selfishly rather than lovingly, and seek to build communities of oppression on their power -- bears the sword of justice, to protect the civil peace. In that context, God is the supreme judge of the earth and wields the sword of justice in historical judgements against nations that become threats to the world. (And oh, America, please, please, please reflect soberly on where your nation -- having begun so well -- is now headed! It is not for nothing or merely envy that many across the world thought your nation received back some of what it asked for on 9/11; though of course Islamist radicals are murderers and threats to the world themselves.) You may not like the implications of magistracy, but you have no credible alternative: "might makes right" multiplied by "every man [or community] does what is right in his [its] own eyes" is an obvious recipe for disaster. 9] how else would you account for natural disasters such as in Haiti and Chile except by either divine caprice, indifference or non-existence? You obviously have not followed developments on the problem of evil in recent decades. I suggest an introductory reading here; followed by deeper readings here. On the particular issue of quakes as natural disasters, we should note that the saying is "quakes don't kill, buildings do." (This is the reason for the case where a hundreds of times stronger quake has produced orders of magnitude lower casualties. in Haiti, there was a problem of widespread corrupt building practice, not merely poverty.) Going beyond that, we live in an orderly world that follows natural laws, which is a context in which actions have predictable consequences, a foundational requirement for morality. So, high-energy potentially destructive events are a feature of a world in which we can live, move about and do good. In such a world, where virtue is possible, good outweighs the prospect for suffering and evil. And, in the Christian theology you dismiss, redemption is the across time solution that rescues good from evil and ultimately transforms the world so that good prevails without destroying the possibility of love. 10] The presumption of a material world derives not from dogma but observation. Let us correct that, to make it more accurately reflect the actual nature of the evolutionary materialist imposition discussed already:
The presumption of a material [-only] world derives ~~not~~ from dogma ~~but~~ [which is prior to and shapes our in- the - name- of- Science materialistic interpretation of] observation[s].
In short, a priori assumptions and assertions here substitute for observation and are distorting the ability of evolutionary materialists to see what would otherwise be obvious. Likewise, we need to further correct the naked assertions in the teeth of facts already in evidence:
It is [not] the explanatory success of materialism that ~~justifies~~ [is the root of] our continued commitment to it [but instead our commitment to an a priori worldview claim]. The door is ~~not~~ being held shut lest a Divine foot is wedged into the gap [between what we experience and observe as minded, en-conscienced creatures in a morally and rationally ordered world, and the chaos and amorality that materialism would lead us into].
11] I doubt that Plato or anyone else around in 360 BC knew anything about modern evolutionary materialism but it us far from clear that he would necessarily have had a problem with it if he had. Of course, Plato did not know about the details of current materialism. But he unerringly saw the premise, the core dynamics and the implications in amorality. So, immediately on seeing the a priori suppession of inference to art as a causal facto on origins -- BTW this same text is the earliest currently known intellectual record on the design inference as an argument form our observed reality of causal factors tracing to necessity [phusis], chance ["accident"] and techne [art] -- Plato would cry: FOUL. And, in light of having seen what evolutionary materialism c 430 BC did to the leading Greek state, Athens, he set out on a proposal to correct it. (We may differ in details and some principles, but the basic analysis remains accurate and astonishingly insightful.) 12] it is not radical relativism that prevents us from subscribing to unsubstantiated claims of being in possession of Absolute Truth, it is the burden of proof. Strawman, again. This time, putting caricatured words in my mouth that do not belong there. (And similarly for informed theistic thinkers in general; i.e we here see a biased, dismissive, prejudice-laced stereotype.) If onlookers will kindly examine my discussion on worldviews choice here -- or simply recall my many discussions at UD on the warranted credible truth no 1, error exists -- they will note that informed theists distinguish pure and undiluted truth from our potential for error. However, we also see that simply the point that error exists is undeniably true [on pain of immediate self-contradiction] shows that we may grasp certain truths as well warranted and credibly true, i.e. objectively true knowledge. From error exists, we therefore can see that truth exists as that which says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not, as well as that in certain cases for good reason we can claim to have grasped it. Further to this, a cluster of such WCT's then leads us to the possibility of discussing worldviews on a comparative difficulties basis, and making informed worldview choice on inference to best explanation; a type of objective warrant commonly used in the world of factual experience. Indeed, above [and in the always linked], I used just such techniques to show that evolutionary materialism stumbles coming out the starting gates and is simply not a credible worldview choice. Summing up: no-one is claiming here to be cornering the market on "absolute truth," though there are some truths that can be known beyond reasonable doubt; some of which (e.g. first principles of right reason, error exists etc)may even be undeniably true and self evident. And, if the objective and experienced truth of the gospel is the real object of attack -- and it is -- Seversky et al have already been invited to examine its warrant OBJECTIVELY (but, routinely, have ducked the challenge in favour of the rhetoric of distortion and dismissal . . . no prizes for guessing why). 13] The fact that methodological naturalism and science are amoral cannot be held against them as a criticism since they are not intended to investigate or adjudicate on questions of morality. To that extent, religion has no need to fear that science will trespass on that domain. A contraire, the very point is that triumphalistic, materialistic positivist scientism as advocated by Lewontin, Sagan, the NAS, etc etc, seeks to dismiss all claims tot truth that do not fit into their materialistic credo. So, what this is is a straight out self-deception projected out to the public as a claim or pretense that there is no war between the materialists who have seized control of science as a key institution of warrant for knowledge claims, and the vital issue of morality as a premise for civilisation. But,the actual, easily observed facts, tell a very different story. And so we have to correct yet another canard: 14] Collisions will only occur where religion sees fit to pronounce judgment on claims that also fall within the jurisdiction of science. "But, mommy, he hit BACK first!" Sorry, the plain record and on the ground reality that is reflected therein -- which Seversky et al would plainly have us forget or disregard -- inform us beyond reasonable doubt that the assertion of the devotees of materialistic scientism, is that "science [is] the ONLY begetter of knowledge," and that is in the context of an agenda to covert the public at large to that view. In a further context where "science" means in reality materialistic scientism. So, we know who the real aggressor is in the civilisational culture wars. And, worse, the assertion that science is the only beggetter of truth is a PHILOSOPHICAL claim, i.e. a non-scientific, epistemological one. That is, it is self-refuting and irrational. So, it can only be defended by tactics of distraction, distortion, demonisation and dismissal. Which easily explains what this post has had to address and refute point by point. ________________ Okay, enough for the moment. G'day GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 28, 2010
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Seversky (and participants and onlookers): It seems to be time for taking on some specific points: 1] Sev, 177: neither Sagan, Monod or Lewontin claim – or claimed – to speak on behalf of all science. They were expressing their own opinions or beliefs as was their right. There is also a big difference between personal opinion and scientific theory. Everyone has an opinion on the question of origins Actually, if you follow up my discussion and read the context of the excerpt above, you will easily see that Sagan and Lewontin DID claim to be speaking in the name of Science. Among the choicer parts:
. . . to put a correct view of the universe into people's heads we must first get an incorrect view out . . . the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth [BTW, a self contradiction as this is an epistemological, i.e. philosophical claim . .. ] . . . . Sagan's argument is straightforward. We exist as material beings in a material world, all of whose phenomena are the consequences of physical relations among material entities. The vast majority of us do not have control of the intellectual apparatus needed to explain manifest reality in material terms, so in place of scientific (i.e., correct material) explanations, we substitute demons . . . . To Sagan, as to all but a few other scientists, it is self-evident that the practices of science provide the surest method of putting us in contact with physical reality [i.e. a metaphysical assertion about he nature of reality!] , and that, in contrast, the demon-haunted world rests on a set of beliefs and behaviors that fail every reasonable test . . .
And, Monod was speaking ex cathedra as an eminent scientist and Nobel Prize winner. But more to the point, in the immediate context in my always linked note [scroll up just a little] -- and so accessible to participants in the years long exchanges at UD, I excerpted the US National Academy of Sciences as they sought to DEFINE science, in their notorious tract against the -- shudder! -- Creationists. Here is the intro to their def'n:
In science, explanations must be based on naturally occurring phenomena. Natural causes are, in principle, reproducible and therefore can be checked independently by others. If explanations are based on purported forces that are outside of nature, scientists have no way of either confirming or disproving those explanations.
Of course, as I pointed out, this is a case of putting in the loaded contrast natural vs supernatural, in a context where by 2008 -- if they had been inclined to do due diligence and fairness -- the appropriate contrast is between the material causal factors (chance + necessity) and the artificial one, design. Nature vs art in short. So, when we see the institutional powers imposing a priori materialism into the very definition of science, and so suppressing the ability of science to fairly consider all relevant candidate causal factors on matters of origins, we have every right to our own -- sadly, plainly well-warranted -- opinion that the ideology of a neo-Magisterium is corrupting science from the disinterested pursuit of the truth about or world based on empirical evidence and credible explanations in light of known forces and factors. 2] . . . but there is still no theory of origins in the sense that there are theories of evolution or relativity or quantum mechanics. First, this is quite a climb-down; though of course a deniable one. (Personal opinion, not scientific theory and all that . . . ) And, sorry, but the theory of evolution IS an origins science theory, insofar as it seeks to explain the origin of major body plans in the deep past. And insofar as origin of life has no coherent factually well warranted theory, that simply means that the tree of life has no scientifically credible root. As well, given that he fossil record and the world around us are replete with sharp body plan level discontinuities, we further see that there is no empirical warrant for body-plan level bio-diversification on the suggested main evolutionary mechanisms; esp. chance variation and probabilistic culling on differential reproductive success in ecological niches. In both cases, the failure is a failure to explain credibly the origin of functionally specific complex information. Which we do observe routinely produced by art; and, which we ONLY see produced by art in a context that the associated config spaces are so huge that islands of function are unsearchable on the quantum state resources of our observed cosmos. (Just 1,000 bits specifies a space that is 10^150 times the scope of quantum states of our observed universe across its estimated lifespan, 50 mn times the usually given 13.7 BY to date. Observed life starts in excess of 100,000 bits, and novel multicellular body plans credibly need 10 - 100+ mn bits each . . .) So, once the censoring constraint or a priori materialism is removed, design is the obviously superior explanation for observed life and for its origin. But this thread is more on moral issues . . . 3] Sev, 178: Slightly longer answer – neither methodological nor philosophical naturalism are theories of morality nor even take positions on the question of morality. Proponents are well aware that the naturalistic fallacy precludes the possibility of validly inferring any moral position from what we observe of the natural world. Summed up, Sev here concedes that evolutionary materialism as a worldview -- and recall the claim is that in the name of Science ("the only begetter of truth") we are placed in contact with "[physical] reality" -- is inherently and inescapably amoral. Case closed on the main point, by direct concession. That is, evolutionary materialism can provide no is to ground ought in any binding sense beyond the politics and power games of culture. Thus, too, Plato's warnings on the history of Alcibiades and co becomes all too relevant to our own day. As the sad history of the century just past underscores. Further, for those who on knowledge of the actual binding force of "ought" [just think about how we universally appeal to fairness and integrity when we disagree strongly], teh fact that this worldview is unable to face this basic fact of our nature is itself grounds for seeing it as empirically utterly and irretrievably refuted. So also, we have every right to scratch evolutionary materialism off the list of credible worldviews, whoever may object while shaking his lab coats threateningly. 4] Adherents of individual religions are observed to claim overriding authority for their specific moralities but the grounds for their claims are no more firmly-grounded than any others unless they are grounded in evidence that their theology has some basis in fact. H'mm, didn't I invite us to look at a first level summary on the Ac 17 offer of warrant for grounding the Judaeo-Christian tradition in fact? And, did I not also draw attention to eh millions across 20 centuries who have had their lives transformed by personally meeting God in the face of the risen Christ and in the power of his poured out Spirit, e.g. including persons such as Pascal? [In short, notice the implicit strawman misrepresentation on the warrant for a biblical worldview.] besides, I think it is about 60 years since C S Lewis has drawn our general attention as a civlisation -- through his BBC interviews and the resulting book, Mere Christianity -- to the fact that core morality (as Rom 2 discusses, and that has been around for 2,000 years or so, being the idea root for our civilisation's idea on self-evident truth) is an in-common property across even civilisations. 5] 180: The fact that the Dilemma highlights a flaw in the claim of your faith to a supreme moral authority grounded in your concept of a ‘tri-omni’ deity is not a problem from my point of view. Question begging assertion in the name of "fact," in a context of failing to address the resolution of the claimed dilemma. Again, let us note: the dilemma argument originated in the worldview context of gods who had to deal with an independent chaotic order, and so they ran up intot he problem of lacking a sugfficiently capable is to ground ought. But the good, Creator God of theism is more than adequate to ground ought in the is of his being as a morally good God. That is morality is grounded in the basic ground of being, just as is rationality, and just as is the confidence in the intelligibility and stability of the observed world that is foundational to science. (As say Newton observed in his General Scholium to what is the greatest single work of modern science. In short, this point is obvious and accessible.) [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{February 28, 2010
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kairosfocus @ 171
The basic problem with your core objection, the Euthyphro dilemma — so-called, is that it works off the idea that there is an unbridgeable is-ought gap. Thus, it is exploiting he ideas, thought habits and challenges of pagan or evolutionary materialistic worldviews to tyry to impugn the one worldview that has an IS that properly grounds oughtness.
The fact that the Dilemma highlights a flaw in the claim of your faith to a supreme moral authority grounded in your concept of a 'tri-omni' deity is not a problem from my point of view. Nor should you feel that you are being singled out for special attention since the Dilemma is not aimed specifically at Christianity but at any attempt to preclude by fiat questioning of a faith's moral prescriptions or any consideration of alternatives.
For, the God who as to inmost character IS Love Himself, is Truth Himself, is Justice Himself, and is Reason Himself, is also Creator: “without Him was not anything made that was made.”
For some reason, that type of claim - "God IS love" - always reminds me of Hollywood movie trailers: "Christopher Reeve IS Superman!" In answer, I will simply repeat Plantinga's comments quoted in another post:
In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property … In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property. (Plantinga 1980, 47)
and
No property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems to be an utter mistake. (Plantinga 1980, 47)

1 –> As already noted, God is Creator, but also the God of a certain character in which Love, reason and Truth are essential characteristics. So, the cosmos he made and sustains will reflect that: it will be orderly, intelligible and morally ordered.
That may be your concept of God but it is conflict with the accounts of His nature and behavior in the primary textual evidence for His existence. And although we observe moral behavior being advocated and even practiced in human society there is nothing in the nature of Nature to suggest any moral order, as the recent disasters in Haiti - and now Chile - would seem to testify.
2 –> Thus, morality is not either independent of God – no more than reason is independent of God — nor is it a collection of arbitrary rulings rooted only in divine caprice.
If reason and morality are properties exemplified in God but not identical with him then they are independent of Him and there is nothing to necessarily prevent them being exemplified in other intelligent beings such as ourselves. And how else would you account for natural disasters such as in Haiti and Chile except by either divine caprice, indifference or non-existence?
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [NYRB, Jan 1997]
I was going to ignore the boilerplate quote from Lewontin but this passage is worthy of comment. The presumption of a material world derives not from dogma but observation. In spite of a great number of immaterial or supernatural beliefs and narratives, the world around us has been revealed as overwhelmingly material and, moreover, one that has proven to be highly-susceptible to materialistic or naturalistic explanation. It is the explanatory success of materialism that justifies our continued commitment to it. The door is not being held shut lest a Divine foot is wedged into the gap. It is wide open. But, so far, no one has walked through it with evidence for the existence of a Divine anything that is anywhere near as compelling as the evidence for the alternative.
In short, at the end of the day, you still face the unanswered challenge of Plato in the Laws, 360 BC, that evolutionary materialism is radically relativist and amoral, based on the premises and assertions it imposes at the beginning of its analysis.
I doubt that Plato or anyone else around in 360 BC knew anything about modern evolutionary materialism but it us far from clear that he would necessarily have had a problem with it if he had. Regardless, it is not radical relativism that prevents us from subscribing to unsubstantiated claims of being in possession of Absolute Truth, it is the burden of proof. It should take more than someone's word - even a lot of them - to persuade any of us of that. The fact that methodological naturalism and science are amoral cannot be held against them as a criticism since they are not intended to investigate or adjudicate on questions of morality. To that extent, religion has no need to fear that science will trespass on that domain. Collisions will only occur where religion sees fit to pronounce judgment on claims that also fall within the jurisdiction of science.Seversky_{February 27, 2010
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Seversky,
Anyone can quote-mine.
Ha! yeah right Seversky - I misrepresented the scientist in question. Hilarious reply.
If I wanted, I could mine a few choice quotes from, say, Martin Luther or even Fred Phelps
Knock yourself out. And when you're through, I am going to ask how it impacts the observable evidence for design.
neither Sagan, Monod or Lewontin claim – or claimed – to speak on behalf of all science.
...oh, and the effort of (S)cience and scientists to distant themselves from the overreaching comments has been deafening, hasn't it? I'm sure the NCSE has a position paper on it.
There is also a big difference between personal opinion and scientific theory.
Yes, when the public flips on a program on TV about science, or reads a newspaper, or listens to an interview, its just too difficult to follow along with the constant stream of disclaimers being issued about scientist's mere opinions.
Everyone has an opinion on the question of origins but there is still no theory of origins
Oh, not true at all. There is a most definite theory of origins. In fact, its so much of a theory - so captivating in its absolute certitude - it has superceded mere theory status and become a priori assumption for all science to follow. The origin of everything happended by the authoratative mandate of chance, and chance alone. After all, if it happened to have occured in any other fashion, it would be in immediate violation of the prescribed doctrine set forth by the community of (S)cience. (which is, of course, not allowed) - - - - - - Seversky, you are pushing a position and making statements that are indefensible. Keep it up.Upright BiPed_{February 27, 2010
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kairosfocus @ 172
So, now, Sev, The challenge still remains:
can you ground morality as a binding ought, per the premises of naturalism?
We await your answer.
Straight to the point as always so I will try to be equally succinct. Short answer - no. Slightly longer answer - neither methodological nor philosophical naturalism are theories of morality nor even take positions on the question of morality. Proponents are well aware that the naturalistic fallacy precludes the possibility of validly inferring any moral position from what we observe of the natural world. All we can say is that moral codes are observed in human cultures. Their function appears to be to regulate the way that human beings behave towards one another in society so as to improve social cohesion and adhesion. Adherents of individual religions are observed to claim overriding authority for their specific moralities but the grounds for their claims are no more firmly-grounded than any others unless they are grounded in evidence that their theology has some basis in fact.Seversky_{February 27, 2010
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Upright BiPed @ 173
- – - – - – February 14th, 2010 THREAD: Lewontin: “materialism is absolute…” Sagan: “the cosmos is all that is…” Monod: “Chance alone…” Seversky “The fact is no one has a satisfactory theory of origins”. - – - – - – February 27th, 2010 THREAD: Seversky: “MN takes no position on whether or not God exists”
Anyone can quote-mine. If I wanted, I could mine a few choice quotes from, say, Martin Luther or even Fred Phelps which, by modern standards, would hardly redound to the credit of their faith. But would anyone believe that they are authoritative on contemporary Christian theology? By the same token, neither Sagan, Monod or Lewontin claim - or claimed - to speak on behalf of all science. They were expressing their own opinions or beliefs as was their right. There is also a big difference between personal opinion and scientific theory. Everyone has an opinion on the question of origins but there is still no theory of origins in the sense that there are theories of evolution or relativity or quantum mechanics.
Seversky_{February 27, 2010
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Clive Hayden @ 166
You still seem to be caught up on a category mistake, in thinking that God cannot be conceived as love, or goodness. He is, at least, that, not less than that. Your argument that that is as vacuous as saying that God is wetness or heat makes no sense, for goodness and love are not material things like wetness and heat, your analogy is what is vacuous.
I had not thought to find myself agreeing with Plantinga but, in the paper by Jeffrey E Brower cited earlier by vjtorley, he states my view succinctly:
In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property … In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property. (Plantinga 1980, 47)
and
No property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems to be an utter mistake. (Plantinga 1980, 47)
Seversky_{February 27, 2010
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Seversky: Theism Compared To Materialism Within The Scientific Method: http://docs.google.com/Doc?docid=dc8z67wz_5fwz42dg9bornagain77_{February 27, 2010
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171 kairosfocus 02/27/2010 6:53 am Seversky: I must repeat.
Really?osteonectin_{February 27, 2010
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December 31st 2009 THREAD: Sagan: “The cosmos is all there is, all there ever was, and all there ever will be”. Monod: “The scientific attitude implies what I call the postulate of objectivity – the fundamental postulate that there is no plan, that there is no intention in the universe. This is basically incompatible with virtually all the religious or metaphysical systems whatever”…”Chance alone is at the source of every innovaton, of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, only chance, absolute but blind liberty is at the root of the prodigious edifice that is evolution” Dawkins: “Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” Lewontin: “Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.” Meyers: “I’ll show you sacrilege, gladly, and with much fanfare. I won’t be tempted to hold it hostage (no, not even if I have a choice between returning the Eucharist and watching Bill Donohue kick the pope in the balls, which would apparently be a more humane act than desecrating a goddamned cracker), but will instead treat it with profound disrespect and heinous cracker abuse, all photographed and presented here on the web. I shall do so joyfully and with laughter in my heart.” Seversky:“Unlike religion, science does not deny any thing because it conflicts with some impregnable dogma." - - - - - - February 14th, 2010 THREAD: Lewontin: “materialism is absolute…” Sagan: “the cosmos is all that is…” Monod: “Chance alone…” Seversky “The fact is no one has a satisfactory theory of origins”. - - - - - - February 27th, 2010 THREAD: Seversky: "MN takes no position on whether or not God exists" - - - - - - - - Come'on Seversky...what color is the sky in your world?. Have you ever noticed the gap between what humans sometimes say and what is actually practiced on the ground? Remember, for instance, those good old boys who ran the paper mill with 300 employess of which 3 were black. Two souped up chlorine mix in the basement without ventilation and the third was a thin elderly woman who sat on the box in the sun by the gate handing out hardhats to white visitors only - just so everyone was safe. The head good ole boy would pass by her and smile when he pulled his Cadillac out of the plant and headed toward his comfortable neighborhood with clean schools and defensive zoning laws. He'd puff on his cigar and could happily tell himself that "rights" was passed, and they wudn't doin' no wrong. Thangs was jest fine as they wuz - nuthin' to think about. Ah hell - he might'a known sumbody who done some stuff a time or two, but them boys prolly had it comin to 'em anyway. Time to wake up, Sev. Denial is intellectual laziness at this level. Quit hiding behind methodological naturalism and pretending it isn't practiced and enforced as philosophical materialism. It is. Openly.Upright BiPed_{February 27, 2010
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So, now, Sev, The challenge still remains:
can you ground morality as a binding ought, per the premises of naturalism?
We await your answer. As does the ghost of Plato. G'day GEm of TKIkairosfocus_{February 27, 2010
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Seversky: I must repeat. The basic problem with your core objection, the Euthyphro dilemma -- so-called, is that it works off the idea that there is an unbridgeable is-ought gap. Thus, it is exploiting he ideas, thought habits and challenges of pagan or evolutionary materialistic worldviews to tyry to impugn the one worldview that has an IS that properly grounds oughtness. Namely, redemptive monotheism. For, the God who as to inmost character IS Love Himself, is Truth Himself, is Justice Himself, and is Reason Himself, is also Creator: "without Him was not anything made that was made." (Notice, too, the philosophical and theological sophistication of that seemingly so artless remark from John 1; which distinguishes contingent from necessary being and implies that God is the latter.) So, we may build on that to resolve your imagined knock-down case: 1 --> As already noted, God is Creator, but also the God of a certain character in which Love, reason and Truth are essential characteristics. So, the cosmos he made and sustains will reflect that: it will be orderly, intelligible and morally ordered. 2 --> Thus, morality is not either independent of God - no more than reason is independent of God -- nor is it a collection of arbitrary rulings rooted only in divine caprice. 3 --> The two horns of the dilemma in short, do not exhaust the logical options. So, it is fundamentally flawed, and is in itself a persuasive but misleading argument, i.e. a fallacy. (Cf detailed discussion here.) 4 --> Moreover, your caricature about cutting God up into parts is a strawmannish dismissal of Redemptive, Trinitarian Monotheism, which finds in the complex unity [echad vs. yachid] of the Root of being, the best explanation of and solution to The Problem of the One and the Many, including the problem of moral diversity, i.e. good vs evil. 5 --> As Probe's useful survey highlights:
When it comes to discussing worldviews the starting point is the question, Why is there something rather than nothing?{6} As you may already know, there are three basic answers to this question. The pantheist would generally answer that all is one, all is god, and this "god with a small g" has always existed. Second, the naturalist would say that something, namely matter [in some form], has always existed. Third, the theist holds that a personal, Creator-God is eternal and out of nothing He created all that there is . . . .When we look around at what exists, we see an amazing collection of seemingly disparate elements such as gasses, liquids, and solids, planets and stars, horses, flowers, rocks, and trees. And seeing all of these things we notice that they all exist in some sort of equilibrium or unity. How is it that such diversity exists in such apparent unity? And are we as human beings any more important than gasses or ants? . . . . The pantheist's commitment to an all-inclusive oneness leaves no room for the real world in which people live, where I am not you and neither of us is one with a tree or a mountain. The naturalist has no problem accepting the reality of the physical world and the diversity present in it. However, there is no solid ground for understanding why it is all held together. In short, [as Francis Schaeffer often noted] there is no infinite reference point so we are left with the circular argument: everything holds together because everything holds together; if it didn't, we wouldn't be here to see it. What a coincidence! In fact, coincidence, or chance, is the only basis for anything. As a result human beings are left with an absurd existence . . . . Trinitarian theism is the only option that contains within itself an explanation of both the one and the many while saying that people are important. In the Trinity, God has revealed Himself as the eternal, infinite reference point for His creation. Moreover, the Trinity provides the only adequate basis for understanding the problem of unity and diversity since God has revealed Himself to be one God who exists in a plural unity. Ultimately then, as Horrell concludes, "Every thing and every person has real significance because each is created by and finally exists in relationship to the Triune God." [Article, What Difference Does the Trinity Make?]
6 --> (Editors, pardon my reply to a dismissive attempted rebuttal on matters theological.) Nor are we bound up to bare unsupported assertions in a book, in claiming to have come to know God in the Face of the Eternal Son, and crucified but risen Saviour. For, the relevant texts are historically anchored in the teeth of hypersketpical dismissals, and the Spirit poured out across 2,000 years has left millions who have had a living, life-transforming knowledge of God. One may dismiss on selective hyperskepticism, but to actually face the facts and address cogently on the merits is another matter. For, the living reality of knowing God personally is something we in our civilisation know or ought to know about.) 7 --> Finally, I must address your claim that:
As a methodology, MN takes no position on whether or not God exists or what constitutes moral or immoral behavior. It is purely an investigative procedure.
8 --> The problem with this is that Methodological Naturalism -- as imposed increasingly since the 1980's and backed by the Materialistic Neo- magisterium that dominates institutions of Science -- is not merely a method of investigation [i.e. we see a bit of a self-serving euphemism], especially on matters of scientific studies of origins; where we did not anc cannort eityher directly observe or replicate the deep past. Instead, we are making inferences to best, provisional, current explanation on the temporal roots of data we observe in the present. 9 --> And in that context, as Lewontin so plainly admitted [and as can be discerned from parallel but subtler statements of say the US National Academy of Sciences], what is really going on is worldview level question-begging imposition of a priori materialism:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [NYRB, Jan 1997]
10 --> to this, Philip Johnson's rebuttal of November the same year is apt:
For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes thereafter. We might more accurately term them "materialists employing science." And if materialism is true, then some materialistic theory of evolution has to be true simply as a matter of logical deduction, regardless of the evidence. That theory will necessarily be at least roughly like neo-Darwinism, in that it will have to involve some combination of random changes and law-like processes capable of producing complicated organisms that (in Dawkins’ words) "give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." . . . . The debate about creation and evolution is not deadlocked . . . Biblical literalism is not the issue. The issue is whether materialism and rationality are the same thing. Darwinism is based on an a priori commitment to materialism, not on a philosophically neutral assessment of the evidence. Separate the philosophy from the science, and the proud tower collapses. When the public understands this clearly, Lewontin’s Darwinism will start to move out of the science curriculum and into the department of intellectual history, where it can gather dust on the shelf next to Lewontin’s Marxism. [The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism, First Things, 77 (Nov. 1997), pp. 22 – 25.]
____________ In short, at the end of the day, you still face the unanswered challenge of Plato in the Laws, 360 BC, that evolutionary materialism is radically relativist and amoral, based on the premises and assertions it imposes at the beginning of its analysis. As the above shows, the same challenge still stands unanswered by materialists today. (Thus their eagerness to try to use the Euthyphro dilemma, so-called, to try to drag theistic worldviews into the same morass of amorality is quite understandable, through distractive.) G'day GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 27, 2010
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Seversky, your comments are, once again, irrelevant. You are simply repeating a comment you made Jan 28 on methodological naturalism, and your comments were refuted several times on that thread, especially by vjtorley @175. This thread is about philosophical naturalism and, as indicated, no one has even come close to presenting a rational defense for it. Your one brief paragraph that is almost relevant simply describes that which needs defending.StephenB_{February 27, 2010
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StephenB @ 162
Notice again that naturalism cannot survive scrutiny, makes no attempt to provide a rational justification for itself, and, as always, resumes its scrutiny of theism—-always on offense, never on defense—always posing objections, never answering them—always holding the other side accountable, never holding itself held accountable or permitting others to hold it accountable.
Notice again an attempt to deflect legitimate criticism of an argument that included two fallacies by attacking the methodology of the critics. But it won't hurt to re-state the case for methodological naturalism (MN) as it is usually understood. The term "methodological naturalism" appears to have been coined by philosopher Paul de Vries in 1983. His purpose was to distinguish the working hypothesis of science, that the world may be explained in terms of its nature or observable properties, from philosophical naturalism which is the metaphysical claim that the natural or material world is all there is. As a methodology, MN takes no position on whether or not God exists or what constitutes moral or immoral behavior. It is purely an investigative procedure. It may study the origins and function of morality in human society but it cannot pass judgment on whether any particular moral belief is right or wrong, except in a provisional and functional sense. Also, as a methodology, MN is only vulnerable to attack on the grounds that it is ineffective as a means of finding out how the world works. As a defense, it can rest on a track record of discovery which unmatched thus far. As for philosophical naturalism, it is inferred from the lack of observations of anything that cannot be explained as part of the natural order of things and the fact that some mysteries that were previously attributed to some form of supernatural agency have been found to be susceptible to naturalistic explanation. There are certainly many beliefs about what might lie above and beyond but nothing in the way of hard evidence, at least not yet. Nothing to stop you trying, of course. Any attacks on MN on moral grounds simply founder on the naturalistic fallacy. Moralities cannot be derived legitimately from our observations of the way the Universe is set up, nor can MN be shown to imply or endorse any specific code.Seversky_{February 27, 2010
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Late to the party: Here is a truly classic cite, from Plato in The Laws, Bk X, implicitly discussing Alcibiades and co. and the era of the demise of Athens as leading Greek state. Here, Plato speaks in the voice of the Athenian Stranger who has fled Athens to Crete, and is dialogging with Cleinias and Megillus: ________________ >>Ath. . . . [The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. [In short, evolutionary materialism premised on chance plus necessity acting without intelligent guidance on primordial matter is hardly a new or a primarily "scientific" view! This is important for gaining some perspective on what it is, and where it leads on ethics as well as on the credibility of the mind, etc . .. ] . . . . [Thus, they hold that t]he Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [Relativism, too, is not new.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them. >> ________________ In short, the sort of cites we see above simply lay out the logical implications of the philosophical premise and ideology of materialism. Which as we well know, is currently being embedded into the novel, ideologically loaded definition of science being offered up by the US National Academy of Science, etc. So, once materialism is posited and established, amorality is in effect its implication. The known consequences have a very long and sad history in the record of our civilisation. GEM of TKI PS: I have never been able to figure out why the Euthyphro pseudo-dilemma is held up as a significant challenge to Judaeo-Christian theism. When you had gods dealing with a primordial order that they then had the dilemma of trying to shape to their will, that was one thing. but, in the worldview now being challenged, the point is that God is both Good and Creator, so he creates in accord with his character, and morality is inseparable form the foundation of the cosmos and from the character of its Creator. And, as Love, the ground and one-word summary of the virtues, requires real choice, evil is possible once virtue is possible. The Judaeo-Christian worldview then addresses the resolution of the world of clashing good and evil through redemption. (This discussion is helpful.)kairosfocus_{February 26, 2010
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V J Torley at 159, Thanks for the link—I shall have to have a look. As for the best critique of the Divine simplicity that I’ve seen on the Web—can’t say I’ve even searched. Plantiga was the first I’d read who was against it. I’m only a dilettante with lots of other stuff I have to do. You correctly encapsulate Plantinga’s argument, at least as I understood it, though of course he’s much more detailed. I count myself both a theist and a Platonist. For me it’s not that the eternal verities aren’t ideas in the Mind of God, it’s that God does not transcend them. All theodicies, no matter how complex, come back to this—even if the authors do not admit it: There are some things God cannot do. God cannot grant free will and also determine the outcome, have his cake and eat it too, make two plus two equal anything other than four. Even Granville Sewell’s wonderfully readable chapter that goes a long way in explaining natural evil assumes that even God couldn’t create a stable world and make it completely safe (maybe if God hadn’t hidden his face he might intervene on our behalf more). Paul Davies, a nontheist Platonist, chides Christians in this regard in The Mind of God. Does God transcend time and space? I’m the heretic here too, but I think we must all concede that we really do not know the nature of ultimate reality. I can neither understand there having been a past eternity of events nor there not having been such—it’s all really too wonderful for me to grasp. I think that people are just too certain of their grand scientific and theological theories. That’s one reason why ID provides stronger evidence of a Designer than the Big Bang—it’s closer to home and not dependent on all encompasing theory. Another reason is that the Big Bang (and the various “front loading” preferences) make God too remote. Is all this weakening God? Perhaps there are those out there who would make God weaker even than man, a creature or essence that cannot even plan the future or carry out his will. But to paint all Open Theists (such as, say, Alan Rhoda) this way is a straw man. Anyway I’m glad that these things are being discussed and dissenters no longer having you-know-what done to them. I predict that eventually ID will lead some to focus more on the Agency of God—that more than timelessness and disembodiment and abstractness we will come to see God as first and foremost a living God, a hands-on Creator, all those things that would put God squarely in the dimension of time just as in the Book. Well I think I’ve blathered on too much here. Appreciate your comments and knowledge.Rude_{February 26, 2010
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Seversky,
Christian theologians can divide God into as many pieces as they like. They can identify Him with an emotion like love or a moral property like goodness. It doesn’t help. Saying God is goodness or love is as vacuous as saying He is wetness or heat.
You still seem to be caught up on a category mistake, in thinking that God cannot be conceived as love, or goodness. He is, at least, that, not less than that. Your argument that that is as vacuous as saying that God is wetness or heat makes no sense, for goodness and love are not material things like wetness and heat, your analogy is what is vacuous.Clive Hayden_{February 26, 2010
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Bingo in #162. I scanned back over the responses. If an honest attempt was made, I missed it.Upright BiPed_{February 26, 2010
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“Is it necessary for God to ‘say’ that something is good/right for that thing to be good/right?” Not at all. For example, the Bible says that creation is “very good,” but it is entirely possible to reach the same conclusion on our own. The sweetness of honey, the colors of grass and sky, the wholesomeness of grain, the ingenuity of the beaver, the remarkable qualities of water, the courses of the planets, the force of gravity—all of these things are acknowledged to be “very good” by those who are not besotted with vanity. Even Darwin was infatuated with butterflies, for all his concern over the ichneumon wasp. The highest standard for what is good/right, however, is life: “In him was life, and this life was the light of men.” Life provides a purely objective standard of goodness in itself, a standard that existed before God’s word (i.e., the Bible) came into being. Adam and Eve chose the vanity of being like God over life, and this was the cause of their fall. All of the law and the prophets are summed up in the command to love one another, and this command is based on the sanctity of life. It requires no other substantiation. Nonetheless, human intellect has become so warped by its bondage to the grave that, in general, it needs the word of God in order to obtain a clear picture of what is good/right. “What is expected of you, O man, but to love mercy, do justice, and walk humbly with your God.” It seems unlikely that human beings could come to this conclusion by their own lights. Certainly Plato and Aristotle did not. They believed they could make themselves equal to God through the power of intellect, and they rated intellect more highly than either justice or mercy.allanius_{February 26, 2010
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Mr. Nakashima (#145) Thank you for a very thought-provoking post. I was particularly interested in your final remark:
A more interesting question to me is whether it is possible to be an intelligent species and yet have a fundamentally different morality due to some underlying difference in biology. Answering yes would affirm that morality is ultimately grounded in some aspect of the species niche we grew up in, and whether we are able to transcend that niche.
I argued above that moral norms are grounded in the fact that God made human nature with certain "oughts" built into it. This in turn invites the question: what if God had made us differently? In response, I would argue that there are certain kinds of intelligent creatures that God, being all-loving, could not make. The reason for this is that when we recognize another being as intelligent, that automatically entails our recognizing certain facts about that being's form of life: e.g. that it has a life-plan (otherwise it wouldn't be intelligent), that it is good for it to pursue knowledge and art, that it is good for it to pursue friendship (even if it enjoys being alone). In short, recognizing another being as intelligent entails recognizing it another self or "I." But that in turn entails recognizing that one is bound by the Golden Rule in one's dealings with such a being. The Golden Rule requires us to love others as we love ourselves. What would be truly fiendish would be a world in which intelligent beings were naturally constituted in such a way that they could not do what self-love requires (i.e. take proper care of their health) without harming other intelligent beings in the process. Now, imagine a planet with two races of intelligent beings, but with one obtaining its sustenance by killing and eating the other, out of natural necessity. There is no adequate alternative source of nutrition. Such a situation would trigger a "moral meltdown" in the race of predators: they would be killing and eating beings whom they knew to be every bit as morally significant as themselves. They would thus be faced with a cruel choice: murder or collective extinction by starvation. The latter option would mean that the predators' existence was in vain, and that they had no purpose in the higher scheme of things. A loving God could not create a race of intelligent beings like that. Discovery of such a race would therefore be tantamount to a falsification of the statement that an all-loving God exists. In matters not pertaining to life, it is less wise to be dogmatic. For instance, there may well be races of intelligent beings with only one sex, or with fifteen different sexes. If there were only two sexes, I'm inclined to think they'd have to be monogamous (as this would be the most rational arrangement for child-rearing) in a universe run by an all-loving God. But I may be wrong.vjtorley_{February 26, 2010
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Notice again that naturalism cannot survive scrutiny, makes no attempt to provide a rational justification for itself, and, as always, resumes its scrutiny of theism----always on offense, never on defense---always posing objections, never answering them---always holding the other side accountable, never holding itself held accountable or permitting others to hold it accountable.StephenB_{February 26, 2010
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Seversky -- maybe there are answers which the mind of man can't comprehend. If you accept Jesus -- i.e. His teachings, His sacrifice, His resurrection -- you will know beyond doubt that God is good. And you will understand that some of the specifics about what you are asking are not important at all.tribune7_{February 26, 2010
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Seversky (#152) Thank you for your post. I can certainly sympathize with the following remark of yours:
Christian theologians can divide God into as many pieces as they like. They can identify Him with an emotion like love or a moral property like goodness. It doesn’t help. Saying God is goodness or love is as vacuous as saying He is wetness or heat.
I think the paper which I cited above by Jeffrey Brower, entitled "Making Sense of Divine Simplicity," and available online at http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~brower/Papers/Making%20Sense%20of%20Divine%20Simplicity.pdf , will help resolve your difficulties about the notion of equating a Person with Goodness, Love or Truth. As Brower puts it:
According to the truthmaker interpretation, God is identical with the truthmakers for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him. Thus, if God is divine, he is identical with that which makes him divine; if he is good, he is identical with that which makes him good; and so on in every other such case. Now, since nothing can be regarded as identical with anything other than itself, this interpretation just amounts to the claim that God is the truthmaker for each of the predications in question.
Brower is very fair-minded in his the way he handles objections that mnight be raised against his proposal, and in my opinion he argues his case well.vjtorley_{February 26, 2010
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Hi Rude, Thank you for your post. I've been searching the Net, and I've finally located a paper by Jeffrey E. Brower, entitled "Making Sense of Divine Simplicity" at http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~brower/Papers/Making%20Sense%20of%20Divine%20Simplicity.pdf . It is, I think, the best defense of the doctrine of Divine simplicity on the Web, and it does address Plantinga's criticisms of the doctrine. Brower proposes a new interpretation of the doctrine: he construes it to mean that God is identical with the truthmakers for each of the true (intrinsic) predications that can be made about him, such as that God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and so on. Brower provides a cogent explanation and a robust defense of the notion of a truthmaker in his paper. Plantinga certainly did a magnificent job of demonstrating the utter absurdity of one commonly accepted understanding of the doctrine of Divine simplicity: namely, the view that God is identical with each of his properties - which implies that each of his properties is identical with each of the others, and hence that God is himself a property. Brower grants that Plantinga's criticisms of this version of the doctrine are justified, but he argues that certain other versions of the doctrine are not vulnerable to the same criticisms. Finally, Brower argues that the truthmaker interpretation is not only sufficient for making sense of divine simplicity, but also necessary. Out of curiosity, what's the best critique of the doctrine of Divine simplicity that you've seen on the Web?vjtorley_{February 26, 2010
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Greetings V J Torley, Unless you're religion rules that the Divine Simplicity be a doctrine that cannot be questioned, I'd recommend you read both sides of the argument. I can't get to the Edward Fesser blog here at work, but if he has a good criticism of Plantinga I'll want to read it. I must confess that the Divine Simplicity has seemed incoherent to me, and so when I saw that it was the same for Plantiga I was pleased.Rude_{February 26, 2010
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Hi Rude, I haven't read Plantinga's "Does God have a nature?" but I notice from the comments that Plantinga takes aim at Aquinas' doctrine of Divine simplicity. The Thomist philosopher Professor Edward Feser has recently posted a vigorous defense of the doctrine here: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/11/william-lane-craig-on-divine-simplicity.html As regards Platonism, let me simply observe here that one of the major achievements of early Christianity was that it managed to synthesize the Platonists' belief in eternal verities with the Jews' belief in a personal God. It accomplished this by describing the eternal verities as ideas in the Mind of God, who transcends time and space.vjtorley_{February 26, 2010
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Mark Frank (#152) Thank you for your post. I would more or less agree with your restatement of my comment 5 in #143. I would also agree with your comment:
This suggests that the answer to Alan’s question: Is it necessary for God to “say” that something is good/right for that thing to be good/right? is “no”... It is not God’s verdict that makes something good.
However, I would say that God's act of creating something with a certain nature is what makes it good. Built into that nature are certain norms which define what is good for that entity. For instance, it is an essential property of being an animal is that food is good for you - especially proteins, carbohydrates and fats. And it is an essential property of being a human animal that the pursuit of knowledge, art and friendship are good for you. God's saying that something is good is logically subsequent to his act of creating it. That's why it's not what makes something good. Thus God is still the source of all goodness, as I see it.vjtorley_{February 26, 2010
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Seversky,
The fact is, for God to be and do what Christian theology requires of Him, He must be an intelligent agent, much more than a person in the human sense to be sure, but still enough to be caught up on Euthyphro’s horns.
Why? And, btw, you have the same problem, even more of a problem once you've left the realm of a Godlike personality (one that can make decisions about goodness and evil), with evolution and the Euthyphro dilemma. Evolution and the atheistic cosmogony can't even get started on a system of ethics, and even if it did so by its own convention, the Euthyphro dilemma is there just as much for it as for anything else. Clive Hayden_{February 25, 2010
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Clive Hayden @ 148
To say that the moral law is God’s law is no final solution. Are these things right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right?
Lewis goes on to give a very neat exposition of the Euthyphro Dilemma, ending with:
Both views are intolerable.
which is right. Then he starts reaching:
At this point we must remind ourselves that Christian theology does not believe God to be a person. It believes Him to be such that in Him a trinity of persons is consistent with a unity of Deity.
Christian theologians can divide God into as many pieces as they like. They can identify Him with an emotion like love or a moral property like goodness. It doesn't help. Saying God is goodness or love is as vacuous as saying He is wetness or heat. Besides, if you read the only textual evidence we have for God's existence and nature, the Bible, He is quite clearly depicted as a person - immensely more powerful and knowledgeable than a human being, perhaps - but a person nonetheless and not some Borg-like hive-mind. I dare say that when the vast majority of Christians, including those here, think or speak about God they refer to 'Him" - or maybe 'Her' - not 'It' or 'Them" The fact is, for God to be and do what Christian theology requires of Him, He must be an intelligent agent, much more than a person in the human sense to be sure, but still enough to be caught up on Euthyphro's horns.Seversky_{February 25, 2010
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