Has anyone ever wondered why Darwin’s followers …

WJM

(1) Is the moral system logically consistent including a logically sound basis for supporting it;

(2) does it correspond to how (sane) people actually behave (or **can** actually behave in terms of being logically consistent with the moral system proposed);

Well which is it? Mind you it is  possible to behave logically consistently with almost all moral systems.

(3) if there is any significant or sound reason to care about what is morality at all (under which I offered the reason one would have to care about behving morally in my NLM sysetm: necessary consequences).

Other than just wanting to be compassionate etc?  I think the only thing you offer is the carrot and stick which strikes me as an immoral reason for sticking to a moral code – just looking out for the interests of oneself – wouldn’t be moral if could get away with it etc.

Utilitarianism is entirely circular thinking; “IF” we define morality as X, then pursuing X is moral.

It is true that all objective systems have this problem that they are not clear whether they are defining “moral” or telling you to be moral. That’s because “X is moral” is not in essence a description of X but an exhortation to encourage X (based on a specific type of motive)

NLM doesn’t use definitional fiat to justify itself. … It tells you were morality is (baked into all of existence, a part of the landscape we exist in and are part of), a way to access it (conscience), and a means by which to examine it (logic). That doesn’t provide a conclusion about “what is moral” built into the premise.

So how do you define moral?

Obviously, there are no necessary consequences under Utilitarianism; what you do may or may not result in an increase in the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, and since Utilitarian is a consequentialist perspective, you can spend your whole life doing things with the belief and intention of creating the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, but if the results of your behavior actually result in a net reduction in happiness, then you have behaved immorally regardless of your intention.

Utilitarianism is not that crude! In most formulations you are moral if you behave with the genuine intention of greatest happiness of greatest number and of course there are variations on that. But anyway I only accepted a consequentialist code as an example. Take Kantian categorical imperative as an alternative.

Under my NLM, you are not morally responsible for the apparent consequences; you are only responsible for acting either in accordance with or in contradiction to your conscience. Whether that makes more people happy or less is not your concern, because under NLM “happiness” is not itself necessarily a binding moral obligation – your or that of others.

I think most moral systems say you are responsible for acting according to your conscience.  What they are doing is educating or guiding your conscience.

This is why corresponding necessary consequences are required. If you do what is moral, then good must be the result regardless of what appears to be the outome; if you do evil, then negative consequences must be the result, regardless of if it appears otherwise; otherwise there’s no real way to determine what act will cause what eventual outcome, and so no way to determine how to act.

I am still confused by what you mean by necessary consequences and also how you judge the consequences to be good or bad. Mark Frank

seversky said:

Is the principle, I feel that way, immoral intrinsically?

The principle "because I feel like it" is, IMO, self-evidently immoral because it can be used to justify any behavior at all as moral. It think that it is also obviously immoral as a justification. If you are saying that "because I say so" and "because I feel like it" are valid moral principles, further argument is irrelevant as far as I'm concerned. I'm happy to stand aside and let observers judge based on what they've read so far.

It is logically consistent and does not reduce down to immoral principles by definition.

"Because I say so" is also a logically consistent form of moral subjectivism. However, if X can be moral one minute and immoral the next because some entity says so, it's logically incomprehensible. Unless god is talking to us directly, there's no way to determine which supposed words of god actually come from god. As such, it's not a morality worth caring about because there's no rational means by which to make any determinations whatsoever. If you had bothered to read my comments here not addressed to you, you wouldn't be asking me to repeat things I've already said several times in this thread alone.

What is the origin and basis of the authority of NML if not divine authority? Could NML exist without a God?

Once again, reading what I've already written would be helpful. My NML is the form that "good" is an immutable, absolute aspect of god, and thus necessarily a part of anything god creates and an intrinsic aspect of existential purpose. Morality, then, refers to an aspect of existence even god cannot change. Thus, no "authority" has "decreed" what good is; good is what it is and nothing can ever change it. Not even god. Just as god cannot change 1+1=2, and god cannot create a 4-sided triangle, god cannot make gratuitous child torture a good thing. BTW, I should have said "My argument is that it is the only logically consistent form of morality that doesn’t logically digress to immoral principles (because I feel like it, because I can); corresponds to how people actually act; and is worth caring about. William J Murray

Necessary good or bad consequences. This is the bit where it gets circular and I think you are trying to explain with the paragraph above which I could not understand. We are trying to decide why NML is better than say utilitarianism. They both lead to logical consequences. How do you decide that NLM’s consequences are better than utilitarianism’s consequences without using NLM to make the decision?

(1) Is the moral system logically consistent including a logically sound basis for supporting it; (2) does it correspond to how (sane) people actually behave (or **can** actually behave in terms of being logically consistent with the moral system proposed); (3) if there is any significant or sound reason to care about what is morality at all (under which I offered the reason one would have to care about behving morally in my NLM sysetm: necessary consequences). Utilitarianism, generally speaking, asserts that happiness is the purpose of morality, that one should engage in activities that appear to have the best chance of acquiring the most happiness for the most people. Originally, Utilitarianism was a form of NLM that derived happiness as a moral maxim from an assumed characteristic of god (god's happiness). As such, it might have a leg to stand on, but in it' modern incarnation, the only foundation Utilitarianism can have is definitional; if you define morality as "greatest happiness for greatest number of people", then of course Utilitarianism would be by definition the correct form of morality. Utilitarianism is entirely circular thinking; "IF" we define morality as X, then pursuing X is moral. Well, you could substitute anything for X and have the same validity. NLM doesn't use definitional fiat to justify itself. It doesn't say "morality is whatever is the greatest happiness, so you should do whatever leads to the greatest happiness". It tells you were morality is (baked into all of existence, a part of the landscape we exist in and are part of), a way to access it (conscience), and a means by which to examine it (logic). That doesn't provide a conclusion about "what is moral" built into the premise. Obviously, there are no necessary consequences under Utilitarianism; what you do may or may not result in an increase in the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, and since Utilitarian is a consequentialist perspective, you can spend your whole life doing things with the belief and intention of creating the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, but if the results of your behavior actually result in a net reduction in happiness, then you have behaved immorally regardless of your intention. That doesn't even make any sense. We live in a largely chaotic system; nobody can control the ultimate consequences of their actions because there is too much stuff interacting in unforeseen ways. Any form of moral consequentialism ultimately requires us to just be lucky in that our actions just happen to ultimately produce greater net happiness. Under my NLM, you are not morally responsible for the apparent consequences; you are only responsible for acting either in accordance with or in contradiction to your conscience. Whether that makes more people happy or less is not your concern, because under NLM "happiness" is not itself necessarily a binding moral obligation - your or that of others. The fact is that you cannot know what the eventual material or physical ramifications might be of any act you commit, whether of good intentions or bad. This is why corresponding necessary consequences are required. If you do what is moral, then good must be the result regardless of what appears to be the outome; if you do evil, then negative consequences must be the result, regardless of if it appears otherwise; otherwise there's no real way to determine what act will cause what eventual outcome, and so no way to determine how to act. William J Murray

Wjm: No, the only advantage is that it is logically consistent and doesn’t reduce down to immoral principles. Is the principle, I feel that way, immoral intrinsically? Divine authority is not a good basis for a moral system, as I’ve said many times. It is logically consistent and does not reduce down to immoral principles by definition. What is the origin and basis of the authority of NML if not divine authority? Could NML exist without a God? I never said I had any evidence that it is true. My argument is that it is the only logically consistent form of morality that doesn’t logically digress to immoral principles (because I feel like it, because I can). If premises of logical argument are based on personal feelings then the result even in logical form is derived from" immoral principles" As I’ve said several times, the alternative is if conscience is a sensory and not intuitive/emotional capacity Sorry I missed that but now your line of argument about nihilism makes sense. All others senses require a mind to process the information, is the conscience different? velikovskys

WJM You may recall my interest in this debate is not defending subjectivism which has been done many, many times – whether you think it successful or not. I am concerned for a change to explore your defence of NML. So I am going to skip some stuff and get straight back to that.

There are no “criterion”; I’m not judging what is good in this part of the argument, but rather premising that whatever the good purpose of existences is, doing good helps fulfill that good purpose. That would be why, in fact, doing good is good in the first place. The consequences would be good by definition.

I am afraid I truly cannot understand this paragraph  and I think it obscures a key point.  Perhaps you can provide a few examples.

I haven’t been making an argument that the good in my moral system is better than the good in other moral system; I’ve been making the argument that my NLM is logically sound and that moral subjectivism is logically unsound and not worth caring about anyway.

NLM may be logically sound but so are many other objective systems. The key question remains – on what basis do you decide that NLM is the best of all the logically sound objective systems?  Earlier you offered three reasons: 1) Logically consistent. That’s what we have just been talking about. There are many such systems. 2) Corresponds to how people behave. People actually behave in a wide variety of ways but most moral systems account for their actual behaviour reasonably well. 3) Necessary good or bad consequences. This is the bit where it gets circular and I think you are trying to explain with the paragraph above which I could not understand. We are trying to decide why NML is better than say utilitarianism.  They both lead to logical consequences. How do you decide that NLM’s consequences are better than utilitarianism’s consequences without using NLM to make the decision? Mark Frank

MF:

The whole point of subjectivism is that there is no ultimate logical justification for any particular moral view

Prezactly. There is no IS on evolutionary materialism that can ground OUGHT. It is therefore not a moral system but an AMORAL one, which inherently opens the door to nihilism with might/manipulation makes 'right,' 'good,' 'truth' etc. And -- with all due respect -- if that does not get the attention of any sane person bigtime, the sanity of such a person is in question. Plato had it right, 2350 years ago:

Ath. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin")], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse], and not in legal subjection to them.

It is time to wake up and get out of the cave, to see the real world beyond the befuddling smoke and bewitching shadow shows of the materialists' cave! KF kairosfocus

MF said:

You are criticising subjectivism for not being objectivism.

I'm pointing out that your particular description of some inner attributes of moral subjectivism are not entailments of moral subjectivism per se, but are (apparently) only your personal experience of morality. Other moral subjectivists are not bound to experience morality like you do, or as you describe.

The whole point of subjectivism is that there is no ultimate logical justification for any particular moral view.

As I've said repeatedly.

You justify NML because it necessarily leads to good consequences. But what is your criterion for good in this case?

There are no "criterion"; I'm not judging what is good in this part of the argument, but rather premising that whatever the good purpose of existences is, doing good helps fulfill that good purpose. That would be why, in fact, doing good is good in the first place. The consequences would be good by definition.

What moral system are you using to arbitrate between your objective system and other objective systems?

I haven't been making an argument that the good in my moral system is better than the good in other moral system; I've been making the argument that my NLM is logically sound and that moral subjectivism is logically unsound and not worth caring about anyway.

Subjective morality proposes that to be moral is to follow the promptings of your conscience (understood as a set of motives as described above).

No, it does not. You are the one attempting now to put de facto objective constraints on "moral subjectivism" that apparently conform to your own personal experience. Other moral subjectivists are not bound at all, by any reason, to listen to the conscience or only consider "deep" feelings as moral urgings.

It would appear to follow directly that being moral leads to a clear conscience. Please explain why that does not follow.

Because under moral subjectivism, one needn't consider conscience at all. Their moral perspective may be that conscience is an emotion that gets in the way of proper behavior, such as ensuring the success of you, your loved ones and/or family. Moral Subjectivism doesn't entail listening to your "conscience" at all. Some people prefer empathy as the source of their morality; others prefer to be more practical and put self-survival and self-success above all other considerations. A logically consistent moral subjectivist cannot tell others how to define and arbit their morality as you are attempting to do. Mark Frank, you are apparently constructing a subjective version of a kind of moral subjectivism that you personally adhere to, but the problem is that your category of morality doesn't allow for the claim that your personal view can be "the one true form" of subjective morality - because that form must be considered entirely subjective in nature. While what you have described is certainly allowable under moral subjectivism, it is not entailed by it. But, even so, lets admit arguendo that you could present your "cleared conscience satisfaction" case to the hypothetical immoral criminal in our example; do you think he doesn't already know that if he does what his conscience is indicating he will have a clear conscience? Isn't he already choosing to sacrifice a clear conscience for other perceived gains? What you are offering him provides no reason for him to change his behavior because his behavior already accounts for his lack of a clear conscience. He has traded it willingly for other things. Whether he acts on it or not, at least my NLM gives him a reason to change his behavior. William J Murray

p.p.s. I realize I may have delivered an off-hand compliment in the past. I just wanted to show my appreciation before signing off. I find this forum unhelpful at best, tedious/unpleasant at worst. Take care good sir never forget joy JD Welbel

William J Murray I love your writing. It's been stimulating and thought provoking beyond compare. Your words, at times, have seemed transcendentally inspired, and, in turn have inspired me to think, to write, even to share the joy and wonder they've directed me towards. truly, thank you I wish you all the happiness, joy and wonder in the world for your contribution to mine P.S. sorry for the public (and blatantly off topic) effusion as I have no idea how to contact you privately JD Welbel

WJM  

You are confusing what you actually feel, and what you actually think, with what is logically consistent with moral subjectivism.

I don’t think so.

You have no logical justification under moral subjectivism to be claiming what is moral for others, or even what kinds of feelings count as morals in the first place. By so doing, you are holding your own feelings and views as the de facto objective standard.

You are criticising subjectivism for not being objectivism. The whole point of subjectivism is that there is no ultimate logical justification for any particular moral view. I can only respond to my own conscience (which is as I say a combination of non-selfish motives such as compassion, sense of fair play etc). As I said:

X judges Y to be immoral in certain respects. Y judges X to be immoral in certain respects. They debate, give reasons, and often come to some understanding. Sometimes there an unbridgeable chasm and if X cares deeply enough and has the means he may even attempt to inflict his morals on Y’s behaviour by force. That is human nature.

My point is that you are no better off.  You justify NML because it necessarily leads to good  consequences. But what is your criterion for good in this case? What moral system are you using to arbitrate between your objective system and other objective systems?

Satisfaction from a clear conscience is not an entailment of subjective morality;

Subjective morality proposes that to be moral is to follow the promptings of your conscience (understood as a set of motives as described above). It would appear to follow directly that being moral leads to a clear conscience. Please explain why that does not follow.

necessary good and bad consequences is an entailment of the NLM I’ve outlined. Only one system **provides** (entails) a reason to listen to one’s conscience and start behaving better

See above – on what basis do you decide if the consequences are good or bad? It may help to recognise the distinction between evaluating something according to a standard (NLM, Utilitarianism, virtue ethics etc) and evaluating the standards themselves. Clearly you cannot use the standards as part of the process of deciding between standards. Subjectivism recognises that there is no way round this but luckily there is a lot of agreement about standards. Mark Frank

Mark Frank @ 131, You are confusing what you actually feel, and what you actually think, with what is logically consistent with moral subjectivism. You have no logical justification under moral subjectivism to be claiming what is moral for others, or even what kinds of feelings count as morals in the first place. By so doing, you are holding your own feelings and views as the de facto objective standard. You can't have your cake and eat it, to. Mark Frank @ 132: Satisfaction from a clear conscience is not an entailment of subjective morality; necessary good and bad consequences is an entailment of the NLM I've outlined. Only one system **provides** (entails) a reason to listen to one's conscience and start behaving better. William J Murray

Joe: "Compassion is irrational in a materialistic world…" I am sure that you can provide a relevant reference for this claim. lack of Focus

WJM

Moral subjectivism in and of itself doesn’t provide a reason to care about your conscience.

Appreciating the satisfaction you will get from a clear conscience is a reason.

In fact, not caring about your conscience is a perfectly valid form of morality under moral subjectivism.

As I said in #125 and again in #131 - what makes a judgement moral is the motive. One way of describing this is - a moral judgement is a judgement made out of conscience (conscience being a convenient way to sum up the promptings of compassion etc). So by definition it is not moral not to respond to your conscience. Mark Frank

WJM

Under moral subjectivism, you have no capacity to define what the criteria are for morality for everyone else. If a person calls a whim “moral”, it is by definition. If a person prefers their morals to be based on deep-seated, considered compassion and reason, then they are by definition. Whatever one prefers to be the basis of their morality is the factual basis of what is right and wrong for them.

It all boils down to personal preferences and subjective feelings under moral subjectivism, whether they are deeply compassionate and reasoned or whims. Both are equally moral. Attempting to continually paint it as otherwise seems to indicate that you are uncomfortable with some of the entailments and potentials of moral subjectivism.

1) As described in #125 not every whim counts as a moral motive. What makes a judgement a moral judgement is the type of motive (they are a loosely related set of motives – compassion, sense of duty, sense of equity etc ) not the particular behaviour that is being endorsed. The weights we give to these motives and the conclusions we come to as to how to behave vary.  The point is that there is no need for some external standard to tell us those motives are moral.  They are part of human nature. 2) I can and do define what I think is moral behaviour for others and myself. So I do have a capacity to judge with I think is moral for others – as they do for me. 3. You  say that under subjectivism X’s views and Y’s views are equally moral. You are looking for a higher criterion to choose between them. But I recognise that there is no higher criterion. X judges Y to be immoral in certain respects. Y judges X to be immoral in certain respects. They debate, give reasons, and often come to some understanding. Sometimes there an unbridgeable chasm and if X cares deeply enough and has the means he may even attempt to inflict his morals on Y’s behaviour by force. That is human nature. The activity we call morality. I am not attempting to paint it otherwise and I am comfortable with it in the sense of being sure it is right (Please don't get into Barry's habit of telling me about my inner psyche). What I think I have demonstrated is that you are in exactly the same situation.  You prefer NLM but there is no superior standard that says NLM is more moral than any other objective morality. How could there be? That would be a moral standard that was above NLM.  Mark Frank

Mark Frank said:

On the other hand as a subjectivist he might realise that the prompting of his conscience are real desires based on human nature and responding to them might give him deep satisfaction.

There are any number of things he **might realise** which could push his behavior toward more moral or even less moral activity **after his adoption of the system**; the question was not what he **might realise** on his own, but rather which system by itself gave him a reason to listen to his conscience and act more morally. Moral subjectivism in and of itself doesn't provide a reason to care about your conscience. In fact, not caring about your conscience is a perfectly valid form of morality under moral subjectivism. William J Murray

WJM #127 Sure the carrot and stick might give him a reason to listen harder to his conscience. The fact that it is objective doesn't seem to have mich significance unless there is a reason for doing what that objective code dictates - which brings us back to the carrot and stick. On the other hand as a subjectivist he might realise that the prompting of his conscience are real desires based on human nature and responding to them might give him deep satisfaction. Mark Frank

Mark Frank:

We have been over this so many times. It is not just any old “because I feel like it”. It is preferences based on deep seated motives such as compassion as suggested above. These motives are deep felt and based on reasons.

Under moral subjectivism, you have no capacity to define what the criteria are for morality for everyone else. If a person calls a whim "moral", it is by definition. If a person prefers their morals to be based on deep-seated, considered compassion and reason, then they are by definition. Whatever one prefers to be the basis of their morality is the factual basis of what is right and wrong for them. It all boils down to personal preferences and subjective feelings under moral subjectivism, whether they are deeply compassionate and reasoned or whims. Both are equally moral. Attempting to continually paint it as otherwise seems to indicate that you are uncomfortable with some of the entailments and potentials of moral subjectivism. William J Murray

MF, I'd like you to think about a couple of hypothetical situations and respond to a question about them. Let's say Bob is an immoral criminal and he is enjoying his criminal life - let's say he forces women into prostitution, sells drugs to minors, and extorts protection money from local businesses. Let's also say Bob has never thought much about morality, much less entertained any deep examination of the concept. Let's also stipulate that Bob isn't a sociopath and does have some pangs of conscience about what he does. Let's say that you can convince Bob that morality is subjective in nature; that ultimately, whatever we prefer is, in fact, moral, and that there are ultimately no in-kind necessary consequences to anything we do. Being convinced of this, does Bob have any reason at all to pay increased attention to his conscience and stop his immoral, criminal activities? Now, let's say that I convince Bob that morality is an objective commodity that one can sense with their conscience, and that there are necessary, in-kind consequences Bob cannot escape - both good and bad - depending on the moral quality of his behavior. Being convinced of this, does Bob have any reason at all to pay increased attention to his conscience and stop his immoral, criminal activities? Note: I'm not saing Bob would likely change his behavior; I'm just asking, in your honest opinion, which belief provides at least a reason for Bob to consider changing his behavior. William J Murray

Compassion is irrational in a materialistic world... Joe

#124 WJM  

I’ve presented here and other places lengthy arguments about this. Subjectivists do not behave as if moral subjectivism is true; they behave as if their moral views are objective in nature. I understand that you disagree with this, but this is the main reason that moral subjectivism fails IMO.

People behave to further what they perceive to be good. But I won’t go over it again.

3) Necessary consequences.

This is just a part of the “worth caring about” differentiation of a sound vs unsound moral system. Perhaps I should have said “necessary good consequences for moral behavior and necessary negative consequences for immoral behavior.” It’s not enough for a moral act to have a necessary consequence; we must assume it has a necessarily positive consequence, in some way, even if we cannot see it.

Good, positive, bad, negative according to what moral code? You can’t use NML to judge if the consequences are good or bad if you are saying that having good or bad  consequences is what defines NML.

Second, if morality = personal preferences, why should I bother with a moral system at all? Why not just do what I prefer to do and don’t do what I prefer not to do? What is the point of a moral system if it is not used to arbit between what one prefers to do vs what one should do? If they are the same thing, who needs morality?

Morality is not a difference between what one prefers and what one ought. It is a difference between two kinds of preferences. Preferences to do things like relieve suffering, see fair play and preferences to do things like eat well and have sex.  The first are moral – the second concerned only with personal satisfaction. Like all preferences we sway between one and the other.

I’ve always admitted there is a logically consistent form of subjective morality – the “because I feel like it, because I can” version. However, the problem is that if these are the fundamental principles of morality, it renders morality irrelevant. The answer to every moral challenge is “because I feel like it”, and the justification for moral interventions is “because I feel like it and because I can”. Also, of course, there are no necessary in-kind consequences; there are only the consequences that happen to follow, and those consequences could be anything.

We have been over this so many times. It is not just any old “because I feel like it”. It is preferences based on deep seated motives such as compassion as suggested above. These motives are deep felt and based on reasons. Mark Frank

2) Corresponds to how people behave.

I've presented here and other places lengthy arguments about this. Subjectivists do not behave as if moral subjectivism is true; they behave as if their moral views are objective in nature. I understand that you disagree with this, but this is the main reason that moral subjectivism fails IMO.

3) Necessary consequences.

This is just a part of the "worth caring about" differentiation of a sound vs unsound moral system. Perhaps I should have said "necessary good consequences for moral behavior and necessary negative consequences for immoral behavior." It's not enough for a moral act to have a necessary consequence; we must assume it has a necessarily positive consequence, in some way, even if we cannot see it. First, there must be necessary (inescapable and significant) in-kind consequences (postive or negative) - arbitrary consequences do not meet the necessary standard, even if those arbitrary consequences are the apparent, physical results of your own moral activities. IOW, if bad results come from good moral intentions, and that's all there is to it, that's not good enough. Why bother, if that's all there is to it, and bad things keep happening if your intention is good? One must have motivation to keep doing good in the face of personal peril and even death, and to not do immoral things even it appears outcomes for doing immoral things are desirable. Second, if morality = personal preferences, why should I bother with a moral system at all? Why not just do what I prefer to do and don't do what I prefer not to do? What is the point of a moral system if it is not used to arbit between what one prefers to do vs what one should do? If they are the same thing, who needs morality? I've always admitted there is a logically consistent form of subjective morality - the "because I feel like it, because I can" version. However, the problem is that if these are the fundamental principles of morality, it renders morality irrelevant. The answer to every moral challenge is "because I feel like it", and the justification for moral interventions is "because I feel like it and because I can". Also, of course, there are no necessary in-kind consequences; there are only the consequences that happen to follow, and those consequences could be anything. William J Murray

#122 WJM So it doesn't matter if it is true as long as it is logically consistent, corresponds to how people behave and has necessary consequences. Presumably any other system that satisfies those conditions would be equally morally valid. I would argue that subjectivism has all these properties – at least as much as NML if not more. 1) Logically consistent. In the past you have accepted that subjectivism is logically consistent given that morality is a just a matter of preferences (I would like to qualify that – but I don’t need to for my argument) 2) Corresponds to how people behave. Our preferences on moral matters are largely consistent so it does correspond to human behaviour at least as much as NML does. 3) Necessary consequences. I am bit confused by what you mean by this, but subjectivism means expressing what you want to happen morally from which it follows logically you will try to do what you consider to be right because that is what you want to happen. This is a truly logical and necessary connection between morality and action. You seem to be saying that under NLM the only connections between deciding something is good and performing it are either an inclination to faithfully serve a good existential purpose for all for its own sake (i.e. a preference) or a carrot and stick – but of course a carrot and stick can be applied to any morality that a sufficiently powerful force happens to want to enforce – so it is hardly a logical feature of NLM. Mark Frank

I agree with much of this but I am really surprised to learn that you don’t care if the NML is true! So would any moral system that was logically consistent, corresponded to how people behaved and had necessary consequences do?

I think so.

But why should anyone bother to fulfil that purpose?

Carrot and stick if one isn't inclined to faithfully serve a good existential purpose for all for its own sake. To avoid the personal negative consequences of immoral behavior at least for themselves, and to acquire the positive personal consequences of moral behavior - again, at least for themselves. If they don't care about such consequences, they are of course free to behave immorally. William J Murray

WJM

It would be if I had ever claimed it was the truth. I’ve never made that claim – only that it is the only logically sustainable form of morality that (1) corresponds to how people behave anyway, and (2) is worth caring about. As I have said repeatedly, a morality without necessary consequences isn’t worth caring about in the first place. An ought without a sound, substantive reason why I ought is not a morality worth caring about.

I agree with much of this but I am really surprised to learn that you don’t care if the NML is true!  So would any moral system that was logically consistent, corresponded to how people behaved and had necessary consequences do?

Because, as I have said, in my version of NML it is postulated there are necessary consequences to moral and immoral behavior, both for yourself and for the world around you. Oughts exist in relation to an objectively good, existential purpose; doing good necessarily promotes towards the fulfillment of that good purpose whether one can see and understand it or not.

But why should anyone bother to fulfil that purpose? Mark Frank

Mark Frank said:

Surely your obligation is to show that NLM is the truth and Kantianism is wrong – not just that there is more motivation to pursue it?

It would be if I had ever claimed it was the truth. I've never made that claim - only that it is the only logically sustainable form of morality that (1) corresponds to how people behave anyway, and (2) is worth caring about. As I have said repeatedly, a morality without necessary consequences isn't worth caring about in the first place. An ought without a sound, substantive reason why I ought is not a morality worth caring about.

Continuing to pretend to be a Kantian objectivist I would respond in two ways: 1) I am defining what people ought to do – not what they are motivated to do – some people are moral and do what they ought to do, other do not. That is a well known fact.

That doesn't answer the challenge of why anyone should care about it in the first place. Unless there are necessary consequences, the "oughts" are entirely empty and ultimately beg the question - why ought I treat others according to the categorical imperative? The answer is logically circular "you ought because you ought".

2) Anyway why bother conforming to the NML?

Because, as I have said, in my version of NML it is postulated there are necessary consequences to moral and immoral behavior, both for yourself and for the world around you. Oughts exist in relation to an objectively good, existential purpose; doing good necessarily promotes towards the fulfillment of that good purpose whether one can see and understand it or not.

(As it happens Kant did propose a logical reason for being a Kantian. To do otherwise would be to treat myself as different from all other people and that is logically inconsistent. I don’t think it is adequate but it is more logical than any reason I have heard for conforming to the NML.)

It's only logically inconsistent given the assumption you should treat others the same as you would have yourself treated. It's entirely circular and it hangs out there without any reason to do so. It's like saying someone ought do X and then telling them there's no reason why they ought do it, then saying that if you assume you ought do it, it would be logically inconsistent not to do it, and that is the reason you ought do it. Say what?? William J Murray

WJM #117

My obligation is only to show that my NLM is superior logically to objective Kantianism. I think I can do that with one question: Under the premise that Kantian morality is objectively true, why should I bother with trying to behave in a moral fashion?

Surely your obligation is to show that NLM is the truth and Kantianism is wrong – not just that there is more motivation to pursue it?  Continuing to pretend to be a Kantian objectivist I would respond in two ways: 1) I am defining what people ought to do – not what they are motivated to do – some people are moral and do what they ought to do, other do not. That is a well known fact. 2) Anyway why bother conforming to the NML? (As it happens Kant did propose a logical reason for being a Kantian. To do otherwise would be to treat myself as different from all other people and that is logically inconsistent. I don't think it is adequate but it is more logical than any reason I have heard for conforming to the NML.) Mark Frank

ZachrielThere is little doubt that some child-sacrificing priests enjoyed their work, and derived religious satisfaction.

You can find sociopaths who would agree with that practice. That's a trivial fact. That doesn't equate to a society at large.

In any case, we can imagine a universe of gods that requires such a sacrifice, so it is clearly within the realm of imaginable.

I can imagine a universe of pink unicorns too. Not everything imaginable is worth imagining, if we're considering the realm of reality. Show me a universe where societies at large actually embrace child torture for pleasure. Otherwise, you're spouting idle gas. I'd rather think about pink unicorns. mike1962

Mark Frank said:

Suppose I am a true Kantian who holds the categorical imperative is the objective moral code to which all humans are necessarily bound. How do you prove me wrong?

My obligation is only to show that my NLM is superior logically to objective Kantianism. I think I can do that with one question: Under the premise that Kantian morality is objectively true, why should I bother with trying to behave in a moral fashion? William J Murray

velikovskys said:

How is the decision of what the basis of the “objective standard” is not a personal subjective preference?

The question is if an objective standard holds up to logical scrutiny, not if one prefers it.

So the advantage of your system is not its morality,since you have no evidence it leads to more moral behaviour, but its enforcement of the subjective morality.

No, the only advantage is that it is logically consistent and doesn't reduce down to immoral principles.

You ,on the other hand, are using the seal of approval of a subjective preferenced divine authority as evidence of universality of natural law if such thing exists as a reason.

I have no idea what this means. Divine authority is not a good basis for a moral system, as I've said many times.

I understand completely, my view is you have no non subjective evidence that is true beyond pleasure alone is not a good reason to cause pain in babies therefore all morality is objective.

I never said I had any evidence that it is true. My argument is that it is the only logically consistent form of morality that doesn't logically digress to immoral principles (because I feel like it, because I can).

I could be wrong, please provide the alternative if it is not an intuitive appeal

As I've said several times, the alternative is if conscience is a sensory and not intuitive/emotional capacity/sensation. William J Murray

Seversky said:

Whatever an individual thinks is moral is moral by his or her beliefs. Other individuals may judge it immoral by their lights. How do we decide between them? On what grounds can we decide which view should prevail?

The argument is about what a logically consistent moral subjectivist (LCMS) has grounds to judge as moral or immoral.The LCMS cannot say what is moral for others, but can only say what is moral for himself. The LCMS must agree to this because it is the very nature of subjective morality.

Barney is perfectly entitled to judge Fred’s actions wrong by his own moral beliefs.

Not if Barney is supposedly an LCMS. If morality is by nature subjective, only Fred can tell if what he is doing is moral for him; Barney cannot judge if what Fred is doing is moral or not because Barney doesn't know what Fred thinks about it. If Barney is going to say "I can judge Fred's actions by my own moral views", then Barney is using his own views as a de facto objective standard by which the actions of others can be judged. Simply saying "I, Barney, subjectively believe that Fred's actions are immoral .." doesn't indemnify him against the explicit implication and use of his own moral code as objectively applicable to others. IOW, Barney doesn't get to have his cake and eat it too.

If Barney believes that it is immoral, as a general principle, for anyone to be beaten with a club against their will then he is entitled to make that claim about Fred’s action.

But Barney, our LCMS, cannot have such a belief that it is wrong "for anyone" to be beaten with a club against their will because then the belief would be serving as a de facto objective morality belief. Barney's beliefs must be consistent with the logical entailments of moral subjectivism.

He is perfectly entitled to claim that what Fred is doing is wrong just as Fred is entitled to claim that what he is doing is right.

No. Subjectivists must phrase all of their moral judgements in personal terms. Saying what Fred should and shouldn't do is like saying what flavor of ice cream Fred likes and dislikes. You don't get to say what ice cream Fred likes and in the same fashion you cannot say what Fred should and shouldn't do. What morality is for Fred is necessarily determined by Fred under moral subjectivism. Thus, Barney cannot say "Fred's behavior is wrong" any more than Barney can say "Fred's favorite flavor is vanilla". It's a non-sequitur. Barney cannot make a judgement that Fred's favorite flavor is the wrong flavor. Barney may not like vanilla; it may repulse Barney when he sees other people eating vanilla; but Barney simply cannot say that the favorite flavor of other people is not vanilla and then swoop in to stop them from eating it.

The question, as before, is at what point or under what circumstances or if at all is Barney entitled to take action to prevent Fred doing something he believes is wrong.

No, actually the question is: what kind of condemnation of what Barney is observing is logically justified under moral subjectivism? Barney cannot say that the act itself is universally wrong for everyone, because that implies an objective morality, even if it is Barney's own morality that he is applying as a de facto universal rule. Barney cannot say that the act is immoral for Fred because only Fred can say what is moral or immoral for Fred. Under LCMS, the immorality of what Barney observes must be tied only to Barney's perspective in order for it to be subjective in nature.

No, absolutely not. Fred may believe that is moral for him to beat his wife and Barney may concede that Fred believes it is moral but there is no logical requirement at all for Barney – and certainly not Wilma – to agree that it is moral.

If they are all LCMS, then yes, they must agree that what Fred is doing is moral. If Fred says "My favorite flavor of ice cream is vanilla," it is a statement of fact about his subjective preference. Fred and Wilma must admit this; they cannot say "No, his subjective preference is not vanilla". Under moral subjectivism, that's all "right" and "wrong" is; it is entirely, factually a subjective preference or view or feeling by the individual - nobody else has any say in the matter of what is moral for Fred to do. Seversky, your terminology is what is tripping you up. You are using the terms "right" and "wrong" in a way that is not derivable from moral subjectivism. A little exercise will help you here: Let's substitute "vanilla" for "beat your wife". Let's substitute "like" and "dislike" for "right" and "wrong". Fred says he likes vanilla; this translates into "It is moral for me to beat my wife". Your response is: you don't like vanilla, but then, nobody asked you to beat Fred's wife. You don't get to say that Fred doesn't like vanilla. You don't get to say that nobody likes vanilla. You must admit that Fred likes vanilla (it is right for fred to beat his wife). What would it mean to say, "Well, Fred shouldn't find it moral to beat his wife?" That is again making a reference to some arbiter serving as a de facto objective standard. You don't get to disagree with what Fred says his favorite ice cream is; you can only say that you don't like vanilla, and that you don't like to see Fred eating vanilla; but you cannot say that Fred liking vanilla is wrong without referring to some de facto objective standard as arbiter. William J Murray

Wjm: Non-sequitur and irrelevant. All beliefs are held subjectively – this is a trivial fact. That is entirely different from holding the view that what one’s belief is about is also subjective and entirely a matter of subective preference How is the decision of what the basis of the "objective standard" is not a personal subjective preference? And your subjective preference is for the justification classical theism of some sort. Unless Kantians and Pragmatists hold that their respective systems are the objectively valid/true morality according to which all humans are necessarily bound, So the advantage of your system is not its morality,since you have no evidence it leads to more moral behaviour, but its enforcement of the subjective morality. then they hold that morality is subjective and that they personally prefer Pragmatism or Kantianism and think they are “better” forms of morality for whatever reason. You ,on the other hand, are using the seal of approval of a subjective preferenced divine authority as evidence of universality of natural law if such thing exists as a reason. No. While I might come to my adoption of objective morality via subjective senses and interpretation There is no " might" about it. that doesn’t mean that the morality I’ve adopted is a system predicated on the view the morality is innately subjective. That is the difference. It’s hard for me to believe you don’t understand this. I understand completely, my view is you have no non subjective evidence that is true beyond pleasure alone is not a good reason to cause pain in babies therefore all morality is objective. Unless you are going to equivocate all acts that ensue from sensory perception as “because I feel like it”, I could be wrong, please provide the alternative if it is not an intuitive appeal the difference is that I don’t consider what I am “feeling” in moral instances to be an entirely subjective matter, Many people feel the same way. Such as the slaveholders in the American South in their time. just as I don’t consider what I touch with my fingers or see with my eyes to be an entirely subjective matter. I hold those sensations to be of objectively existent phenmena. Me too. velikovskys

Let me rephrase #112 another way which is a bit more precise. Suppose I am a true Kantian who holds the categorical imperative is the objective moral code to which all humans are necessarily bound. How do you prove me wrong? Mark Frank

WJM As I explained in #108 consequentialists of all sorts, Kantians and indeed countless other moral systems think theirs is an objective moral code. You owe us an explanation of why your objective code is superior to theirs. Mark Frank

velikovskys:

Of course you holding your morality as objective is a subjective belief,too.

Non-sequitur and irrelevant. All beliefs are held subjectively - this is a trivial fact. That is entirely different from holding the view that what one's belief is about is also subjective and entirely a matter of subective preference. Unless Kantians and Pragmatists hold that their respective systems are the objectively valid/true morality according to which all humans are necessarily bound, then they hold that morality is subjective and that they personally prefer Pragmatism or Kantianism and think they are "better" forms of morality for whatever reason.

As is yours,William. Just as relativism is.

No. While I might come to my adoption of objective morality via subjective senses and interpretation, that doesn't mean that the morality I've adopted is a system predicated on the view the morality is innately subjective. That is the difference. It's hard for me to believe you don't understand this.

Why is gratuitous child torture wrong other than because you “feel like it ” is self evident?

Unless you are going to equivocate all acts that ensue from sensory perception as "because I feel like it", the difference is that I don't consider what I am "feeling" in moral instances to be an entirely subjective matter, just as I don't consider what I touch with my fingers or see with my eyes to be an entirely subjective matter. I hold those sensations to be of objectively existent phenmena. William J Murray

Wjm: Unless utilitarians and kantians hold that their morality is objective in nature, Of course you holding your morality as objective is a subjective belief,too. those systems are subsets of subjective morality, As is yours,William. Just as relativism is. and so are ultimately justified by “because I feel like it”, becuase the individual feels like utilitarianism or kantianism (?) are the best models for morality. Why is gratuitous child torture wrong other than because you "feel like it " is self evident? velikovskys

William J Murray @ 95

Zachriel: I appreciate the interaction. For now, however, I consider my case against subjective morality conclusive as of #70. Of course, I don’t expect others to agree, but I’m satisified the case has been made for all open-minded, reasonable people not ideologically committed to moral subjectvism.

I appreciate that you have identified #70 as your best case to date against moral subjectivism. You expectation that others might not agree is also well-founded.

Logically consistent moral subjectivists must admit that a necessary entailment is that morality = whatever the individual thinks is moral, is moral for that individual by definition.

Whatever an individual thinks is moral is moral by his or her beliefs. Other individuals may judge it immoral by their lights. How do we decide between them? On what grounds can we decide which view should prevail?

Thus, Barney cannot say it is wrong for Fred to beat his wife with a club, because only Fred can say what is right or wrong for Fred to do. Barney simply has no grounds to make a claim about what is moral or immoral for Fred to do.

Barney is perfectly entitled to judge Fred’s actions wrong by his own moral beliefs. He is perfectly entitled to claim that what Fred is doing is wrong just as Fred is entitled to claim that what he is doing is right. The question, as before, is at what point or under what circumstances or if at all is Barney entitled to take action to prevent Fred doing something he believes is wrong.

The best that Barney can say is that it is wrong for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife with a club, or that it would be wrong for Barney to beat Fred’s wife with a club. Barney cannot, however, make any claims about what is moral or immoral for Fred to do

If Barney believes that it is immoral, as a general principle, for anyone to be beaten with a club against their will then he is entitled to make that claim about Fred’s action.

Claiming that it is immoral for Barney to beat Fred’s wife and so Barney must stop it is transferring Barney’s personal morality onto Fred as if it was binding on Fred as well, as if Barney could logically use his own morality to judge what is right or wrong for Fred to do. However, Barney – as a logically consistent moral subjectivist – can only judge what is right or wrong for himself, not for others.

Moral subjectivism does not just mean that individuals moral beliefs apply only to themselves. It is the position that there is no objective morality, no external standard against which all other moral claims can be measured, that such beliefs reside only in the minds of intelligent agents such as ourselves.

The only logically consistent, justifiable option left for intervening is because Barney considers it moral for himself to stop Fred from beating his wife with a club. He cannot say what is moral for Fred, he can only say what is moral for himself, and even if he holds it immoral for himself to beat Fred’s wife, he cannot transfer that view onto “for Fred”.

There is another option open to Barney which brings into consideration the moral beliefs of the third actor in this little tableau - one whose beliefs you have consistently ignored - in other words, Wilma, Fred’s wife. It is reasonable to assume that she is of the same mind as Barney inasmuch as she also thinks it is wrong for Fred to beat her with a club. This makes the opinion against beating two-to-me against Fred. We might also reasonably assume that Betty, Barney’s wife and Wilma’s close friend, is also opposed the beating, which gives us a majority against of three-to-one. We might easily increase that majority against still further if we canvassed other resident in the Flintstone’s neighborhood.

Thus, as a logically consistent moral subjectivist, Barney must admit Fred’s act of beating his wife with a club is as moral for Fred as Barney’s own moral decisions are for Barney. Thus, Fred beating his wife with a club is moral by definition and logical entailment (Fred thinks it is moral); Barney must admit it is moral for Fred by definition and entailment under moral subjectivism.

No, absolutely not. Fred may believe that is moral for him to beat his wife and Barney may concede that Fred believes it is moral but there is no logical requirement at all for Barney - and certainly not Wilma - to agree that it is moral. Although there are a few exceptions, in general moral prescriptions are general principles. Whether an action is judged moral or immoral is determined by the nature of the action itself not the individual who commits it. If I believe that it is morally wrong for a man to beat his wife with a club then I am saying that its wrong for all men, including Fred, to beat their wives. The obvious question, as before, is under what circumstances would Barney be morally entitled to act on his belief by physically intervening to prevent Fred beating his wife and thereby imposing his moral beliefs on Fred. Absent any overriding moral authority, this can only be decided by the will of the majority - in other words, collective morality. If most people agree that it is wrong to beat people, even if only because they would not like to be beaten or have their family and friends beaten, then that is sufficient to make it morally wrong because there is no better alternative by which the matter can be decided.

So, let me put it somewhat more succinctly to summarise, now that I’ve worked out this well-phrased, logical argument against subjectivism: Under moral subjectivism, only the individual can say what is moral for them to do; others cannot say what is moral for anyone else because that would imply moral objectivism. If Fred thinks it is moral for him to beat his wife, then it is by definition (under moral subjectivism). Barney must admit, as a logically consistent moral subjectivist, that it is moral for Fred to beat his wife if Fred thinks it is moral. Barney cannot make logically-consistent statements about what is moral “for Fred” under moral subjectivism; he must phrase all of his moral oughts in terms only of “for Barney”. Thus, Barney can only say that it is immoral for Barney to beat Fred’s wife, or that it is immoral for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife.

In a universe in which there is no other moral authority to which we can refer, the only morality to which we can agree to be subject is that which we decide for ourselves. If we observe the function of morality in society we can see that, in general terms, it serves to regulate the behavior of the members of that society towards one another by discouraging some behaviors and encouraging others. The purpose of such regulation appears to be to protect what are agreed to be the legitimate interests of the members of that society. If the population of Bedrock had agreed that it was generally wrong for a man to beat his wife with a club - except, possibly, as part of a mating ritual - then, if Barney saw Fred beating Wilma, not only could he reasonably claim it was wrong, not only would he be morally bound to intervene but he would logically justified in so doing by acting on the only rational grounds available which is the preservation of the legitimate interests and rights of others. Seversky

WJM  

That was the entire prior argument before you asked me specifically about my particular moral beliefs, mostly carried on in exchanges with you and Zachriel, culminating at #70 (#70 is not an exhaustive retelling of the entire argument – that’s just where I felt the case had been made conclusively). I covered both divine command and subjective morality, which – as far as I know – only leaves some form of NML, which was the premise for further discussion about my personal moral views.

Ah now I begin to understand. I had not realised how unusual your beliefs about morality are.  #70 was not about proving NML correct but about proving subjectivism  wrong (not that I accept the proof but that is another very old story).  This only acts as an argument for NML if you believe that everything other than divine command theory and NML are subjective. This would be news to all those utilitarians, Kantians etc. Most of them believe that their theory is objective grounds for morality. You need to prove that all objective theories other than NML are either subjective or illogical. In other words what privileges your objective theory over all those other objective theories? Mark Frank

William J Murray: some form of NLM Natural law morality is not inconsistent with subjectivism, as long as you recognize that what may be natural and common for humans may not be natural or common for other organisms. A sentient mantis would probably have a different natural morality. Natural law typically relies on self-evidence, because humans are presumed to share the same moral outlook. William J Murray: (3) Subjectivist interventions cannot be based on morality at all, because determining what is moral for others to do is not a logically available commodity In subjectivism, moral precepts are not logical constructs, but are due to moral sensibilities conditioned by culture. William J Murray: People cannot live as if moral subjectivism is true (outside of sociopaths) because they make moral interventions when they find the acts of others to be immoral That is incoherent and implies you still don't understand subjectivism. A subjectivist certainly can attempt to impose their moral standards on others, if that is what their moral standards imply. Zachriel

Mark Frank said:

Most people, whatever their view of morality (including us subjectivists) go through much the same process. We all have consciences that prompt us in our moral opinions. We all use logic to assess whether our opinions are consistent. We all examine the consequences of moral statements.

As I have said repeatedly. I've never argued that there is a behavioral difference.

The difference lies in the ultimate justification for those opinions.

And whether or not those ultimate justifications can properly ground views expressed, judgements and behaviors.

Utilitarians justify in terms of greatest happiness, Kantians in terms of categorical imperatives, subjectivists accept that there is no ultimate justification but there is a lot of agreement in practice.

Unless utilitarians and kantians hold that their morality is objective in nature, those systems are subsets of subjective morality, and so are ultimately justified by "because I feel like it", becuase the individual feels like utilitarianism or kantianism (?) are the best models for morality.

You need to explain why your ultimate justification (the NML) is superior to all these others – which takes us back to 1.

But then you say:

We are drifting into your attack on subjectivism which has been done many, many times. I want to explore your own morality for a change.

You are the one taking the argument back to the attack on subjectivism. I've already shown conclusively, IMO, why NLM is the only viable moral system and why I've adopted it as the foundational model for my moral system. If you want to learn more about my moral system, why are you still asking me to justify why I've chosen that moral system in the first place? Justifying why I picked NLM necessitates "attacks" on both subjective and divine command morality. William J Murray

Mark Frank: Yes – but what makes NML “the only potentially rational category of morality”? That was the entire prior argument before you asked me specifically about my particular moral beliefs, mostly carried on in exchanges with you and Zachriel, culminating at #70 (#70 is not an exhaustive retelling of the entire argument - that's just where I felt the case had been made conclusively). I covered both divine command and subjective morality, which - as far as I know - only leaves some form of NLM, which was the premise for further discussion about my personal moral views.

As far as I can see the only argument you have presented is that other forms of morality lead to people denying moral statements that you find self-evidently true.

Well, it's disappointing that that's what you came away with, but not surprising. That would be an utterly ridiculous argument to make against subjective morality.

That is why it is relevant to debate whether there are actually any self-evidently true moral statements.

No, it's not. I'm not "debating" whether or not there are any self-evidently true moral statements; I'm describing to you (at this juncture) how I go about developing my NLM. Though the existence of self-evidently true moral statements can be used to support the existence of the claim that an objective morality exists, I have found the confusion and resistance to the phrase "self-evidently true" makes it too problematic to use in such an argument (about what category of morality is logically sustainable). I recently realized that it's just not necessary to use SETMS (self-evidently true moral statements) to make the case against subjective morality (as this thread makes clear). I used the GCT example not as an example of a SETMS, but to show the vacuity of both moral subjctivism and divine command; to wit: if GCT must be considered as potentially moral as anything else in a moral system, then the idea of morality is nonsense. Under NLM, I don't have to consider such a potential; if GCT is immoral by natural law, god cannot command it to be moral, and it's not moral for anyone at any time regardless of their views. I don't have to worry that it may be moral at some point or under some circumstances, rendering my moral system comprehensible and actionable.

If you have another argument for showing that all other approaches to morality are not rationally sustainable then by all means present it.

Already have - in this thread. In addition to the case above, I made the case here: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/atheistsmaterialists-are-closet-moral-objectivists/ Which you participated in. However, I think #70 above clarifies the points I was making in the prior thread. To sum up: Under subjectivism: (1) Anything can be moral, by definition, as long as an individual thinks it is. Thus, subjective morality boils down to "because I feel like it". (2) Ultimately, all moral interventions reduce to the principle "because I feel like it, because I can" (3) Subjectivist interventions cannot be based on morality at all, because determining what is moral for others to do is not a logically available commodity (unless they tell you). (see #70 above) One subjectivist cannot determine what is moral for anyone else to do. (4) People cannot live as if moral subjectivism is true (outside of sociopaths) because they make moral interventions when they find the acts of others to be immoral (see #70 above). Divine Command morality is simply not a rational system, because anything can be moral for anyone at any particular time if god commands it. There would be no way to assess any of it because it would be completely arbitrary. This leaves NLM and developing a course of action to develop a reasonable, rational morality from that premise. William J Murray

#94 // on emergentism // I don’t wish to derail this thread, so I restrict myself to just one short note on emergentism – aka non-reductive materialism. If the intricate efforts to account for downward causation - ‘higher level’ causal influence on ‘lower levels’ - while (somehow) respecting the principle of physical causal closure, teach us anything then it is that wiggle room is infinitely small. Naturalism doesn't allow for real downward causation stemming from emergent "configurational powers" that are independent from the parts. Independent downward causation just cannot be established in any meaningful way. So, despite all efforts by emergentists, the dependence of the emergent whole on the physical parts remains such that nothing of true existence and relevant causal importance can ever arise. IOW emergentism cannot generate forces strong enough to account for the degree of control over our actions that we experience and must assume in order for us to regard ourselves as rational free agents who are capable of doing science amongst many other things. Box

LOF: Perhaps, this summary of core Christian morality has escaped your attention:

Rom 13:8 Keep out of debt and owe no man anything, except to love one another; for he who loves his neighbor [who practices loving others] has fulfilled the Law [relating to one’s fellowmen, meeting all its requirements]. 9 The commandments, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not kill [--> force here being, murder], You shall not steal, You shall not covet (have an evil desire), and any other commandment, are summed up in the single command, You shall love your neighbor as [you do] yourself. 10 Love does no wrong to one’s neighbor [it never hurts anybody]. Therefore love meets all the requirements and is the fulfilling of the Law. [AMP]

Where, murder in the womb, is still murder. Sorry if that is painfully blunt. But sometimes we need to plainly say: A is A. KF PS: On the latest push-point on the radical agenda, I have cited and commented on Dr Alveda C King, niece of MLK, here: http://kairosfocus.blogspot.com/2015/04/matt-24-watch-256-dr-alveda-c-king-of.html . . . with onward links. FYI, FTR. kairosfocus

Folks, Plato came by last night and reminded me to post his 2350 year old warning (and he said he was picked to do so by a delegation of 100 million ghosts of victims of radical secularist-anticlerical regimes in the past century or so):

Ath. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin")], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse], and not in legal subjection to them.

When objectivity of OUGHT is denied, one directly implies that grand delusion has been let loose in the human mind, without firewalls. Thus, immediately we have self referential absurdity . . . and litanies of the real or imagined sins of those you would dismiss cannot change that. Only, distract from it, cloud, confuse, polarise and poison the atmosphere. And, of course, the insistent dismissal of the reality of our being under proper moral government -- closely tied to the implication that if OUGHT is real, there is a world foundational IS that grounds it such that doing the right, good, just and true is "reasonable service" -- leaves us to just the premise Plato warned us against: might and manipulation make 'right,' 'good,' 'truth' etc. If that absurdity does not wake you up real fast and get your attention, bigtime, you are in deep, deep, deep en-darkenment pretending to be light, and are stupefied by the smoke from the fires projecting the bewitching agit-prop shadow shows on the wall of your cave of darkness. KF kairosfocus

WJM

Let’s make sure we stay on track and keep aware of what we’re talking about. Prior to you asking me about my “own beliefs about morality”, I was making an argument about the logical viability of moral subjectivism vs natural law objectivism.

Sure. Again – you have written rather a lot so I will skip to the summary.  

1. Natural Law Morality is the only potentially rational category of morality that also describes how we all must act anyway;

Yes – but what makes NML “the only potentially rational category of morality”?  As far as I can see the only argument you have presented is that other forms of morality lead to people denying moral statements that you find self-evidently true.  That is why it is relevant to debate whether there are actually any self-evidently true moral statements. If you have another argument for showing that all other approaches to morality are not rationally sustainable then by all means present it.

2. The only way forward under NLM is by trusting the conscience to at least observe fundamental moral truths while humbly admitting our fallibility even then and using logic and introspection to refine our understanding of the moral landscape and our conscience and better realize the difference between our moral sense and subjective, personal feelings.

Most people, whatever their view of morality (including us subjectivists) go through much the same process. We all have consciences that prompt us in our moral opinions. We all use logic to assess whether our opinions are consistent. We all examine the consequences of moral statements. The difference lies in the ultimate justification for those opinions. Utilitarians  justify in terms of greatest happiness, Kantians in terms of categorical imperatives, subjectivists accept that there is no ultimate justification but there is a lot of agreement in practice. You need to explain why your ultimate justification (the NML) is superior to all these others – which takes us back to 1.

A couple of questions for you, Mark: Do you not think there is a difference between finding something abhorrent and finding something immoral? Do you not think it is possible for you to not find a thing abhorrent at all but still know it is immoral?

We are drifting into your attack on subjectivism which has been done many, many times. I want to explore your own morality for a change. Mark Frank

"Last I checked, wasn’t it the Christians who were anti-abortion?" Not all Christians. lack of Focus

Really? Please explain to me the difference? Or do you think that killing babies is morally OK?

Last I checked, wasn't it the Christians who were anti-abortion? computerist

The belief that there are objective moral truths is an opinion, often religiously based. The fact that societal morals have changed over time is strong evidence that this opinion is wrong. The belief in objective morality, however, can be very dangerous. At one time it was considered morally acceptable, if not imperative, to kill homosexuals and adulterers. There are still some barbaric societies that believe it is morally acceptable to murder people. lack of Focus

Joe: "lack of Focus- There is a difference between sacrificing a baby and torturing a baby for your own pleasure." Really? Please explain to me the difference? Or do you think that killing babies is morally OK? lack of Focus

MF @ 89:

The whole debate is about whether there is such a thing as the actual truth or just opinions. That is why I could not answer the question as you phrased it.

I have a little more time to devote to this. As I said in comment 93, of course Mark Frank can answer the question as posed. Since he appears to be afraid to do so, I will answer it based on the conclusions to which materialist premises compel one to go. Barry: Mark, is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? Mark: The answer to your question is that my metaphysics compel me to say that the phrase “affirmatively good thing” is all but meaningless in the sense you are using it. There is no such thing as “good.” There is no such thing as “evil.” There is only my personal preferences competing with everyone else’s personal preferences, and all of those personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain. Certainly there is no external standard by which we can discern whether the personal preferences resulting from the electro-chemical processes in my brain are in any sense morally superior to the personal preferences resulting from the electro-chemical processes in anyone else’s brain. It follows, Barry, that if by the “good” you mean the desirable and by the desirable you mean that which a person actually desires, then of course I can imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing. In fact, we live in just such a universe. How do I know? Because certain people have in fact desired to torture an infant to death for personal pleasure. On the other hand, if by “good” you mean “conforms to an external moral standard," the question is, as I said, meaningless, because no such standard exists. End of colloquy. Mark, it is up to you to tell me how any of the conclusions I’ve reached are not in fact compelled by materialist premises. WJM is correct. Very very few people actually live as if materialist metaphysics were actually true. And those people who do we call psychopaths. Barry Arrington

Zachriel: I appreciate the interaction. For now, however, I consider my case against subjective morality conclusive as of #70. Of course, I don't expect others to agree, but I'm satisified the case has been made for all open-minded, reasonable people not ideologically committed to moral subjectvism. All I'm doing now is explaining how I go about developing my NLM to Mark Frank. Howver, once again, I do appreciate the interaction. Developing the reasoning and succinct means of explaining that part of the argument was worth well worth the dozens of repetitive cycles of moral argument I've spent trying to understand and word it. :) IMO William J Murray

William J Murray: While Zachriel has admitted to the significant points – that GCT is necessarily as moral as anything else (moral equivalence) That is not our position, as we already noted. Try again. Box: Show me an example of this alleged “non-reductive” materialism. Emergentism is a typical view within non-reductive materialism. You could start with the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-7 William J Murray: Thus, Barney cannot say it is wrong for Fred to beat his wife with a club Of course he can. William J Murray: , because only Fred can say what is right or wrong for Fred to do. That is incorrect. Anyone can judge Fred's actions by their own moral code. Box (quoting): "It is the source of at least two other profound myths: that we have purposes that give our actions and lives meaning and that there is a person “in there” steering the body, so to speak." *So to speak.* He's using the term to refer to the conscious self. In any case, materialism represents a wide variety of views, so pointing to a single author shows that such a view exists, but not that it is the only possible interpretation of materialism. mike1962: There were societies that practiced child sacrifice because they were afraid of their god(s) and thought that the sacrifice would appease the god(s), but what societies practiced child torture for personal pleasure and thought it acceptable? There is little doubt that some child-sacrificing priests enjoyed their work, and derived religious satisfaction. In any case, we can imagine a universe of gods that requires such a sacrifice, so it is clearly within the realm of imaginable. Barry Arrington: I asked you: Is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? If you imagine other universes, then the person judging may not even exist. Most people would read the question to refer to the judgment of people who live in the alternative universe. Zachriel

Mark @ 89. Run baby run. Of course you can answer the question. You just refuse to do so. Why do you refuse to do so? I already covered that at comment 50, and you obligingly confirmed my comment there. Thank you. Barry Arrington

@Box:

No they don’t. Is it possible to imagine a square triangle?

Barry doesn't claim, that in his example "torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure" is defined as an "evil thing". JWTruthInLove

Mark Frank said:

The only absurdity or self-contradiction that I have seen you identify in denying that GCT is always wrong is that it is something you and I find abhorrent.

Let's make sure we stay on track and keep aware of what we're talking about. Prior to you asking me about my "own beliefs about morality", I was making an argument about the logical viability of moral subjectivism vs natural law objectivism. During that argument I used GCT as an example of the kind of thing logically-consistent moral subjectivists must admit are, in principle, under moral subjectivism, as moral as anything else by definition. This is important to remember: first I've committed to natural law morality because it is the only rationally sustainable categorical form of morality, and not because I've shown or even necessarily believe that self-evidently true moral statements exist. The categorical argument precedes my subsequent search for self-evidently true moral arguments in the pursuit of fleshing out my moral code (which holds that morality refers to a natural law, objective landscape). Second,I am explaining to you my personal moral beleifs and how I come about them under the premise of NLM. I look for moral statements without which objective morality falls prey to the same irrational problems as subjectivism because I need to be diligent in not mistaking personal predilections and feelings for moral values. I'm looking for something I can reasonably be sure is a sound basis for any further fleshing out of my moral code. I'd like something as impervious to error as possible: one such statement is gratuitous child torture is immoral. Finding such statements certainly depends on using ones conscience, since it is considered (under the accepted moral category) the sensory perception of the actual moral landscape (even if fallible). Please note: it is only after I've established that NLM (natural law morality) is the only rationally sustainable form of morality that I then go about figuring out the best way to proceed - by cautiously looking for self-evidently true moral statements upon which I can reasonably found my moral code. Could I be wrong? Sure, but I still have to proceed as best I can under the presumption of NLM because it's the only kind of morality we're left with. None of that has anything to do with the feeling of "abhorrence". Mutual abhorrence doesn't indicate a self-evidently true moral statement any more than personal abhorrence indicates a thing is immoral at all. Let me give you an example: I find male gay sex incredibly abhorrent (in terms of Merriam-Websters definition of "abhor" - loathe, find repugnant). Even the thought of it makes me cringe. I have to turn away on such scenes in movies or TV. Does that mean that I find male gay sex immoral? No. I don't find it to be immoral at all. I just find it personally repulsive and emotionally disturbing. Actually, I find the thought of male gay sex more repulsive than the thought of GCT. However, my conscience doesn't sense that it is immoral, and I cannot make any logical case against it. In fact, I can make a pretty fair case in favor of it being moral (as an expression of love between two consenting adults). Given the prior commitment to NLM (under a different argument), if GCT can be a good, moral part of our NLM, then anything can be moral and there is no means by which to navigate our NLM landscape because we wouldn't be able to trust our conscience at all, not even to observe and sort out a basic framework. IOW, if GCT is moral and my conscience is that far out of whack with the moral reality; I might as well just give up trying to be a good person. So, to summarize: 1. Natural Law Morality is the only potentially rational category of morality that also describes how we all must act anyway; 2. The only way forward under NLM is by trusting the conscience to at least observe fundamental moral truths while humbly admitting our fallibility even then and using logic and introspection to refine our understanding of the moral landscape and our conscience and better realize the difference between our moral sense and subjective, personal feelings. A couple of questions for you, Mark: Do you not think there is a difference between finding something abhorrent and finding something immoral? Do you not think it is possible for you to not find a thing abhorrent at all but still know it is immoral? William J Murray

Barry Arrington: is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing?

LarTanner: It must be possible to imagine, since your very words conjure such an image.

No they don't. Is it possible to imagine a square triangle? Box

Barry #87

It conflates what some evil people might believe about a matter with the actual truth about the matter.

The whole debate is about whether there is such a thing as the actual truth or just opinions. That is why I could not answer the question as you phrased it. Mark Frank

Comment #87:

is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing?

It must be possible to imagine, since your very words conjure such an image. Now, a question for you. Why do you find it necessary to add the expression "for personal pleasure" to your question? Can you imagine a universe in which there is some intention that makes it actually, affirmatively good to torture an infant to death? LarTanner

MF @ 74. My prediction was confirmed. You did your level best to evade the obvious answer. Your evasion fails for a simple reason. It conflates what some evil people might believe about a matter with the actual truth about the matter. Let’s examine your statement.

. . . other people and societies have not only imagined such universes, they have believed they lived [in] such a universe.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that some evil people actually believe that torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing. That is not the question. I did not ask you whether you can imagine a universe in which some evil people mistakenly believe that torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing. I asked you a very different question. I asked you: Is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? Some Nazis thought the Holocaust was a good thing. They were wrong. It was evil. Even if someone believes torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing, they are wrong. It is evil. Now, I will ask you the question again. Try hard to read and answer the question I actually ask. Be honest with yourself just this once and try not to evade it: Mark, is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? Barry Arrington

Mark Frank: In that case we have no disagreement as we are talking about different subjects. Does it feel like that to you?

The thing is, when you use the word "evil" you probably do mean ontological evil. I suspect you just won't admit it or are in denial because you're afraid of facing the consequences of the reality of ontological evil. Otherwise you are merely highjacking the word "evil", which is dishonest. Why would you want to do that? Why not just stop using the word? Why not stop pretending there's any sort of equivalence between ontological evil and the subjective notions you're trying to pass off as "evil?" Child torture for pleasure is ontologically evil. mike1962

#83 mike1962

When you speak of “evil” and I speak of “evil” we are talking about different things.

In that case we have no disagreement as we are talking about different subjects. Does it feel like that to you? Mark Frank

Mark Frank: The point is not whether such societies practiced it for personal pleasure but whether it is logically conceivable for a society to find it morally acceptable. WJM’s argument is that accepting GCT is logically absurd.

Yeah, I think it very much a salient point. I too think it's absurd. Human nature never has produced a society where child torture for pleasure is morally acceptable. It's idle gas to assert that any would. Asserting the "conceivability" of things that would never happen due to the nature of the actors is not logically justifiable. mike1962

Mark Frank: We do all believe that child torture is evil. We are just disputing the grounds and meaning of that belief.

No, you redefine "evil" to mean nothing more than a judgement based on a subjective feeling. That's not evil. That's mere belief. "I believe that is evil" is not logically equivalent to "that is evil." In your world (assuming you really believe it), nothing is ontologically evil. You use the word in a different sense. When you speak of "evil" and I speak of "evil" we are talking about different things.

Repeating very insistently that we should be honest and admit it does not add to the discussion.

I dunno, it kinda feels right. mike1962

#80 mike1962 It is of course possible that you are the one that doesn't get it. We have thought about (and debated) these things many times and we are neither stupid or dishonest. We do all believe that child torture is evil. We are just disputing the grounds and meaning of that belief. Repeating very insistently that we should be honest and admit it does not add to the discussion. Mark Frank

#79 mike1962 The point is not whether such societies practiced it for personal pleasure but whether it is logically conceivable for a society to find it morally acceptable. WJM's argument is that accepting GCT is logically absurd. I am afraid, in view of all the revolting practices that have been morally acceptable at other times, it is all too conceivable. Mark Frank

Mark Frank(I don’t agree it is always wrong to to force my personal, subjective whims on others). The only absurdity or self-contradiction that I have seen you identify in denying that GCT is always wrong is that it is something you and I find abhorrent.

You guys still don't get it. To your credit (I assume) you act as if child torture is really and truly evil. This is a good and honorable thing. The thing is, dollars to donuts, regardless of what you guys say, I think you really do believe in your heart of hearts that child torture really is evil. Be honest and admit it. You just have no rationally consistent basis for believing so. Be honest and admit it. It may change your life. mike1962

lack of Focus: There are plenty of examples of societies where children were sacrificed to appease their god(s). It was not considered to be morally wrong.

There were societies that practiced child sacrifice because they were afraid of their god(s) and thought that the sacrifice would appease the god(s), but what societies practiced child torture for personal pleasure and thought it acceptable? None that I know of. Can you name any? mike1962

WJM

I said there are some self-evidently true moral statements , two of which I provided, which I begin with in order to derive other true moral statements. “Self-evident” means that to deny them as true moral statements necessarily results in absurdity or self-contradiction; it doesn’t mean everyone will agree that they are self-evident or even that they are moral truths. If one says that GCT can be a moral activity, or if one says that it can be moral to force ones personal, subjective whims on others, why even bother using the term?

OK. I will concentrate on GCT (as I don’t agree it is always wrong to to force my personal, subjective whims on others). The only absurdity or self-contradiction that I have seen you identify in denying that GCT is always wrong is that it is something you and I find abhorrent.  There  have been societies (e.g. Incas) that believed GCT can be moral.  They had their own consistent moral codes which did not result in anything they found absurd. Even if you want to dispute whether they really did approve of GCT it is logically possible to imagine such a society which is all that my argument requires. Your problem with GCT is not in the end a logical one.  It is simply (and understandably) that you loathe it. Approving of it does not necessarily lead to absurdity or even the collapse of morality (which might for example insist that it is moral to do their God’s will and praise piety and courage rather than kindness and empathy). Mark Frank

lack of Focus- There is a difference between sacrificing a baby and torturing a baby for your own pleasure. Joe

BA: "Is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing?" You don't have to imagine it. There are plenty of examples of societies where children were sacrificed to appease their god(s). It was not considered to be morally wrong. The decisions to discard what we would now consider to be a barbaric practice only came about after they discarded (or modified) these religious beliefs. I don't know enough about history and anthropology to suggest the motivation for stopping this practice, but I doubt that it had anything to do with the existence of objective moral truths. lack of Focus

Mark Frank:

You say they are self-evidently true – yet on the vast majority of moral issues (abortion, capital punishment, gay rights) there are large numbers of people who strongly disagree and even on issues where there is massive agreement (GCT) there are individuals and societies that disagree.

I said there are some self-evidently true moral statements , two of which I provided, which I begin with in order to derive other true moral statements. "Self-evident" means that to deny them as true moral statements necessarily results in absurdity or self-contradiction; it doesn't mean everyone will agree that they are self-evident or even that they are moral truths. If one says that GCT can be a moral activity, or if one says that it can be moral to force ones personal, subjective whims on others, why even bother using the term? Morality becomes an absurd proposition under those conditions.

The term “Self-evident” doesn’t seem to be help much. You need somehow to differentiate this situation from the one that we hold which is that the vast majority of people have the same strongly held subjective opinion about some issues and differ on others.

A "self-evident truth" has no logical connection whatsoever to consensus. A self-evident truth is recognizable as true even if nobody else agrees with it. If everyone disagreed that 1+1=2, it is still self-evidently true for that can recognize it. People - even the majority of people - deny what is evident all the time. Our ability to recognize a self-evidently true moral statement, or a necessary logical corollary thereof (not that we always or even most of the time do) even in the face of opposing consensus, gives us a sound logical justification for opposing consensus and attempting to change the consensus view, and even to defy consensus. This recognition of self-evidently or necessary moral truthsl (not that all moral truths, or even most, are self-evident or necessary), along with our recognition that such are objective and carry important consequences (even if we intellectually argue otherwise), drives us as moral responsibilities and obligations to act in defiance of consensus even when our own safety and comfort is at risk. It's simply not rational to do so for something one holds to be nothing more than personal, subjective feelings.

When you say how people have to behave do you mean how they actually behave?

Unless they are sociopaths or otherwise considered insane, yes.

The first falls apart because as we know people actually behave in all sorts of ways.

No, outside of sociopaths and the otherwise insane, people do not ever behave as if they are logically consistent moral subjectivists regardless of what they argue (which is the point of my entire line of moral arguments here and at TSZ).

Your criterion for choosing one moral code over another seems to be based on your assessment of what may be wrong or right (an assessment that you admit may be faulty).

If by "moral code" you mean what individual acts I consider to be right or wrong, then of course it's based on my assessment. That's all anyone has to work with in any case about anything, even when personally assessing the testimony of others. The question isn't "how we assess what is right or wrong", but rather "what is the logical framework" within which that assessment occurs and whether or not that framework is logically consistent, justifies our behaviors, and offers a morality worth caring about.

What right do you have to inflict that moral code on others who have different assessments of the moral landscape?

Because I consider their assessment necessarily, objectively wrong (unavailable under subjectivism) and I consider an intervention morally obligatory (IOW, I would be behaving immorally if I did not intervene). That's what gives me the right and the obligation. Since I also consider free will important, I hold that it is only right for me to interfere if (1) I am asked by the individual to interfere, or (2) I am morally obligated to interfere. Unless I am morally obligated to interfere, I don't interfere (in terms of forcing others to comply with my moral view in a particular matter).

Note that it would be logically circular to say you have that right because your moral code gives you that right. We are currently trying to determine how your moral code is justified so we cannot use the moral code to justify itself.

Please do not conflate a category of moral system with a particular moral code. My argument is entirely about the logical viability of competing moral system categories and is not about what particular code ("assessment of the landscape") is more accurate than the other. Even as a self-proclaimed moral subjectivist, your assessment of the actual moral landscape could be much more accurate than mine even given your protestations that it is not an objective landscape and even while you deny you are doing any such thing. Being a moral objectivist doesn't give you a special ability to accurately assess the moral landscape; we're all fallible and prone to error. No, my argument is entirely about the logical ramifcations entailed by moral subjectivism (I have similar arguments about divine command morality which I've sprinkled in here and there). Moral subjectivism and divine command morality are simply not viable categorical candidates for a rational, meaningful morality that justifies how all sane people must behave (actually behave) anway. Even if person A believes X is wrong and person B believes it is right and they will fight to the death for their respective moral positions, the are both necessarily behaving in a manner only logically justifiable under moral objectivism (unless, of course, one or both are sociopaths). That various moral codes conflict with each other isn't germane to the point that it is only under objective morality that morality can make any rational sense at all. William J Murray

#73 BA You failed to specify who is doing the imagining. You and I cannot imagine a universe where we believe it is a good thing. However, other people and societies have not only imagined such universes, they have believed they lived such a universe. Furthermore I can imagine a universe where some people think it is a good thing (can't you?). You were assuming objectivism in your argument. Mark Frank

MF @ 72: Is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing? Anticipating your evasion of the obvious answer, I will give the obvious answer. No. Therefore, there is at least one self-evident moral truth. If there is one self-evident moral truth, there is no reason in principle there cannot be others. The fact that all moral questions are not equally clear does not undercut this proposition. Barry Arrington

WJM – thanks for your lengthy response. There is too much to respond to all of it so I have tried to concentrate on what I think is the essence.  If you think there are other parts I should have responded to then please say so.

Humans (some or most) have the capacity to sense what I call the moral landscape via their conscience. The large majority of us can easily recognize certain self-evidently true moral statements, such as GCT is immoral …. No further argument is necessary to establish that such things are wrong – once we understand the meaning of those statements, we know they represent evil (immoral acts)

You say they are self-evidently true – yet on the vast majority of moral issues (abortion, capital punishment, gay rights) there are large numbers of people who strongly disagree and even on issues where there is massive agreement (GCT) there are individuals and societies that disagree. The term “Self-evident” doesn’t seem to be help much. You need somehow to differentiate this situation from the one that we hold which is that the vast majority of people have the same strongly held subjective opinion about some issues and differ on others.

So, I subscribe to the unalterable, innate natural law version of morality because it is, IMO, the only logically consistent form of morality that coincides with how people have to behave anyway. I then discern self-evidently true moral statements (statements which, if false, render the very concept of morality absurd or without value), from there I develop necessarily true moral statements, conditionally true moral statements and generally true moral statements, employing my conscience as a sensory capacity and logic to examine everything the conscience perceives just as I do with other sensory capacities.

It appears that there you prefer natural law morality (your whim as it were) because it is: a) logically consistent b) coincides with how people have to behave anyway When you say how people have to behave do you mean how they actually behave?  Or  how you “sense” they ought to behave? The first falls apart because as we know people actually behave in all sorts of ways.  The second implies that you favour natural law because it leads to moral judgements that you perceive to be self-evidently correct. But of course other people disagree about some of these self-evident statements and perceive other moral statements to be correct (in some cases they believe them to be self-evidently correct).  Your criterion for choosing one moral code over another seems to be based on your assessment of what may be wrong or right (an assessment that you admit may be faulty). What right do you have to inflict that moral code on others who have different assessments of the moral landscape? (Note that it would be logically circular to say you have that right because your moral code gives you that right. We are currently trying to determine how your moral code is justified so we cannot use the moral code to justify itself.) Mark Frank

Zach, In the following quote Rosenberg is even more clear on the non-existence of the "person":

The neural circuits in our brain manage the beautifully coordinated and smoothly appropriate behavior of our body. They also produce the entrancing introspective illusion that thoughts really are about stuff in the world. This powerful illusion has been with humanity since language kicked in, as we’ll see. It is the source of at least two other profound myths: that we have purposes that give our actions and lives meaning and that there is a person “in there” steering the body, so to speak. [Rosenberg, The Atheist's Guide To Reality, ch.9]

Given materialism, persons are myths - do not exist. Box

Zachriel, Logically consistent moral subjectivists must admit that a necessary entailment is that morality = whatever the individual thinks is moral, is moral for that individual by definition. Thus, Barney cannot say it is wrong for Fred to beat his wife with a club, because only Fred can say what is right or wrong for Fred to do. Barney simply has no grounds to make a claim about what is moral or immoral for Fred to do. The best that Barney can say is that it is wrong for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife with a club, or that it would be wrong for Barney to beat Fred's wife with a club. Barney cannot, however, make any claims about what is moral or immoral for Fred to do. Claiming that it is immoral for Barney to beat Fred's wife and so Barney must stop it is transferring Barney's personal morality onto Fred as if it was binding on Fred as well, as if Barney could logically use his own morality to judge what is right or wrong for Fred to do. However, Barney - as a logically consistent moral subjectivist - can only judge what is right or wrong for himself, not for others. Thus, as a logically consistent moral subjectivist, Barney must admit Fred's act of beating his wife with a club is as moral for Fred as Barney's own moral decisions are for Barney. Thus, Fred beating his wife with a club is moral by definition and logical entailment (Fred thinks it is moral); Barney must admit it is moral for Fred by definition and entailment under moral subjectivism. The only logically consistent, justifiable option left for intervening is because Barney considers it moral for himself to stop Fred from beating his wife with a club. He cannot say what is moral for Fred, he can only say what is moral for himself, and even if he holds it immoral for himself to beat Fred's wife, he cannot transfer that view onto "for Fred". However, this puts Barney in a logical predicament; if Fred beating Fred's wife is moral for him, why would Barney feel like it was his moral duty to stop an act that Barney must admit is moral by definition under moral subjectivism? (This is the reason I enjoy engaging in these debates, even if it seems circular. Sometimes it takes a while to develop concepts and phrasings to uncover certain elegant pieces of logic like this that make you go "OMG!") So, let me put it somewhat more succinctly to summarise, now that I've worked out this well-phrased, logical argument against subjectivism: Under moral subjectivism, only the individual can say what is moral for them to do; others cannot say what is moral for anyone else because that would imply moral objectivism. If Fred thinks it is moral for him to beat his wife, then it is by definition (under moral subjectivism). Barney must admit, as a logically consistent moral subjectivist, that it is moral for Fred to beat his wife if Fred thinks it is moral. Barney cannot make logically-consistent statements about what is moral "for Fred" under moral subjectivism; he must phrase all of his moral oughts in terms only of "for Barney". Thus, Barney can only say that it is immoral for Barney to beat Fred's wife, or that it is immoral for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife. Assuming Barney can stop himself from beating Fred's wife, his only logical justification for intervention is because it is immoral for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife. However, this puts Barney in a logical predicament; if Fred beating Fred's wife is moral for him, why would Barney feel like it was his moral duty to stop an act that Barney must admit is moral by definition under moral subjectivism? William J Murray

Zachriel: That’s *a* view of materialism. Turns out there are many theories of materialism, both reductive and non-reductive.

Show me an example of this alleged "non-reductive" materialism.

Zachriel: In the excerpt you provided, Rosenberg talks about the brain, which is an organ of a person.

And he goes on explaining that such a person does not exist - is an "illusion". He also explains that under materialism it is an illusion that thoughts are about anything at all, either things inside or outside the brain.

Zachriel: Perhaps you meant to say “mind”, not “person”.

I don't understand your point. According to materialism there is no person, no free will, no self, no reason, no ability to do science and no soul. Do you want "no mind" to be included in that list? Box

Mark Frank said:

So presumably you accept that Barry was wrong when he said “It is amusing watching Zachriel intentionally miss WJM’s point.”

While Zachriel has admitted to the significant points - that GCT is necessarily as moral as anything else (moral equivalence) and that moral interventions are nothing more than forcing what one holds to be nothing more than personal, subjective feelings/views on others (as far as I'm concerned, a devastating set of admissions that render further debate unnecessary for reasonable people),

he is still, intentionally or not, avoiding the logical implications of those points.

He insists that most people (and even most self-styled moral subjectivists) don't consider whims moral; that's irrelevant. He thinks that if one deeply feels, for long periods of time, a moral choioce it somehow makes it different, morally and logically, than acting on whims and calling it moral. There is no rational or logical distinction under moral subjectivism. Zachriel is emmploying rhetoric to either deliberately or unconsciously hide the trivial nature of moral subjectivism from us and/or from himself. Mr. Arrington apparently is of the opinion you both are knowingly avoiding this point. I know from personal experience that it is certainly possible to deceive yourself to the point that you don't consciously know the folly of what you are saying no matter how smart you are. Logically consistent moral subjectivists would just ditch the word and concept of "morality" altogether; it's indistinguishable as a concept from "I feel/felt like doing X" and it can only be used to subjectively manufacture a sense of justification for doing what you feel like doing.

As I read this same old debate it occurs to me that it is always a case of you attacking subjectivism (which I think on the whole we defend politely and honestly).

As far as I can tell, I challenge it politely and honestly.

How about defending your own beliefs about morality? There are many different “objective” moralities such as Aristotle’s good life, Kant’s categorical imperative, G.E. Moore’s intuitionism, various forms of utilitarianism and different theistic moral codes. Which one do you believe to be the correct one and in what sense is it morally superior to the others?

At best I only superficially know anything about any of those. I've developed my own concept of objective morality which may or may not coincide with those. I've outlined it several times here and at TSZ. Essentially, I hold that morality (what is good) is an essential, unalterable attribute of god (along with the priciples of logic, fundamental mathematical concepts, etc.) that becomes sewn into the fabric of existence regardless of what god creates by necessity. Thus, what morality refers to is a fundamental, necessary, unalterable (even by god) aspect of being and existence. Humans (some or most) have the capacity to sense what I call the moral landscape via their conscience. The large majority of us can easily recognize certain self-evidently true moral statements, such as GCT is immoral, and that forcing what are nothing more than personal, subjective whims on others is wrong. No further argument is necessary to establish that such things are wrong - once we understand the meaning of those statements, we know they represent evil (immoral acts) (which is why Zachriel is trying to gain distance from whims as moral). It doesn't matter what you call yourself (subjectivist or objectivist), you can still sense the moral landscape, you can still sense your moral obligations, which is why I don't claim that atheists necessarily act any differently from moral objectivists. I don't subscribe to divine command morality because, logically, it's still a might-makes-right perspective, and it removes logic from the equation. If god's whims can make GCT moral then morality defies logic, is incomprehensible, and who the heck knows if a person is acting on their own whim or god's? So, I subscribe to the unalterable, innate natural law version of morality because it is, IMO, the only logically consistent form of morality that coincides with how people have to behave anyway. I then discern self-evidently true moral statements (statements which, if false, render the very concept of morality absurd or without value), from there I develop necessarily true moral statements, conditionally true moral statements and generally true moral statements, employing my conscience as a sensory capacity and logic to examine everything the conscience perceives just as I do with other sensory capacities. Since I also believe in free will, I know it is possible to fool myself about anything, so I hold that I must be humbly cautious when it comes to moral interventions and judgements; I'm fallibly perceiving and interpreting the moral landscape and need to keep that in mind. In addition, I hold that there are necessary consequences when it comes to moral behaviors both good and bad - otherwise, why bother? I believe that ultimately one can destroy themselves by choosing to do immoral things. Such destruction is not "punishment" in any sense other than the same way gravity "punishes" you for jumping off a cliff. In the same manner, the consequences of leading a moral life are not "rewards" in any sense other than you are "rewarded" for eating healthy foods and exercising regularly. Also, I think that respecting the free will right of others to do immoral things is extremely important, and that moral interventions should only be used in a very limited capacity for egregious situations. That's why I'm a social liberal - consenting adults should be free to do pretty much whatever they want as long as they are not directly harming anyone else, IMO. William J Murray

Box: Here’s A.Rosenberg once more That's *a* view of materialism. Turns out there are many theories of materialism, both reductive and non-reductive. Box: Silly or not, the existence of persons is incompatible with materialism. In the excerpt you provided, Rosenberg talks about the brain, which is an organ of a person. Perhaps you meant to say "mind", not "person". Zachriel

William J Murray: And as I’ve pointed out, that objection is irrelevant because under moral subjectivism “transient whim” is necessarily as morally valid as anything else, as you agree. No, we don't agree. With subjectivism, you need to draw a distinction between what the subjectivist thinks and what the subjectivist thinks of others. While the metaethics is that subjectivists can base their morality on any arbitrary standard, the ethics is draw by the specific person based on their own moral standards. Take Fred and Barney, both subjectivists. Barney thinks it is wrong for someone to beat their wife with a club. He understands that Fred may have a different view of morality, but that isn't incumbent on Barney. He acts according to his own moral precepts, which means intervening when Fred beats Wilma with a club. There is nothing incoherent with this view. Furthermore, Barney may try to find common ground with Fred, and if he can't convince Fred, they may still seek compromise to prevent further conflict and establish a "rule of thumb". They agree not to use a stick bigger than the thumb. There is nothing incoherent with this view. William J Murray: Whether the feeling is transient whim or a deep, introspective sense of obligation, under moral subjectivism both are equally moral. Barney doesn't think so, and while Barney recognizes that Fred acts more on whim than thought, Barney still draws his own moral conclusions. There is nothing incoherent with this view. William J Murray: The logical entailment of moral subjectivism is that in principle, if person X considers gratuitous child torture highly moral, and person X considers preventing gratuitous child torture highly moral, the two behaviors are morally equivalent in exactly the same logical fashion and in the only way that anything is ever moral – via the subjective perspective of the individuals assessing the behavior. This is where you become confused. Because you insist there is an objective standard, you think there is a standard against to which to compare moral views. Rather, Barney judges Fred by his own standard, and Fred judges Barney by his own standard. It turns out that people tend to share many beliefs, so a consensus develops within society which people take to be objective. But as moral norms change over history, we can see that there is no objective standard, just a general sense of shared values. There is nothing incoherent with this view. Zachriel

Zachriel,

Box: Similarly there are materialists who act as if persons exist while materialism denies their existence

Zachriel: No, materialism doesn’t deny the existence of people. That’s just silly.

Silly or not, the existence of persons is incompatible with materialism. Can you point me to a description of materialism that says otherwise? Here's A.Rosenberg once more:

FOR SOLID EVOLUTIONARY REASONS, WE’VE BEEN tricked into looking at life from the inside. Without scientism, we look at life from the inside, from the first-person POV (OMG, you don’t know what a POV is?—a “point of view”). The first person is the subject, the audience, the viewer of subjective experience, the self in the mind. Scientism shows that the first-person POV is an illusion. Even after scientism convinces us, we’ll continue to stick with the first person. But at least we’ll know that it’s another illusion of introspection and we’ll stop taking it seriously. We’ll give up all the answers to the persistent questions about free will, the self, the soul, and the meaning of life that the illusion generates. The physical facts fix all the facts. The mind is the brain. It has to be physical and it can’t be anything else, since thinking, feeling, and perceiving are physical process—in particular, input/output processes—going on in the brain. We can be sure of a great deal about how the brain works because the physical facts fix all the facts about the brain. The fact that the mind is the brain guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives. It excludes the very possibility of enduring persons, selves, or souls that exist after death or for that matter while we live. Not that there was ever much doubt about mortality anyway. [The Atheist's Guide To Reality]

What's interesting that Rosenberg spends an entire chapter 8 explaining that “thoughts” in the brain can’t be about anything at all, either things inside or outside the brain - because they are material. Then, in chapter 9, he goes on explaining that persons don't exist. What Rosenberg doesn't seem to realize that the ability to do science is obviously lost somewhere along the road .... Box

WJM #55

Addressing my argument is not the same as refuting it – and Zachriel has already agreed to the significant points.

So presumably you accept that Barry was wrong when he said “It is amusing watching Zachriel intentionally miss WJM’s point.”  As I read this same old debate it occurs to me that it is always a case of you attacking subjectivism (which I think on the whole we defend politely and honestly). How about defending your own beliefs about morality?  There are many different “objective” moralities such as Aristotle’s good life, Kant’s categorical imperative, G.E. Moore’s intuitionism, various forms of utilitarianism and different theistic moral codes.  Which one do you believe to be the correct one and in what sense is it morally superior to the others? Mark Frank

WJM @63... You can say it over and over, and then over again, and you won't get them to see it (or admit it.) Their morality is not anything beyond, “they feel like it” and “because they can". Period. All the other words they say don't change that fact. It's the fact that they pretend otherwise is the amusing thing. From one who reads this site for the amusement, thanks everyone for the amusement. mike1962

Zachriel said:

As we pointed out, “they feel like it” and “because they can” are idioms that imply transient whim rather than moral sensibility as most people experience it.

And as I've pointed out, that objection is irrelevant because under moral subjectivism "transient whim" is necessarily as morally valid as anything else, as you agree. Whether the feeling is transient whim or a deep, introspective sense of obligation, under moral subjectivism both are equally moral. Thus, a deep moral sensibility is not any more "moral" than transient whim. Thus, there is no significant moral or logical difference between the two. The difference between the two characterizations is purely cosmetic and makes one "feel better" (event though there is no significant reason for it) about their behavior in comparison to those who impose morality on whims.

And what is that justification?

That they are behaving as they should according to an objective moral standard.

It’s certainly possible for a subjectivist to think that trivial whims are moral, though most certainly do not. Then again, an objectivist can also think that way, and act that way.

A rationally consistent moral objectivist cannot think that way because under moral objectivism, morality refers to an objective commodity that is independent of their personal feelings or transient whims. While some objective moralities might hold that the whims of god are objective moral standards, that particular example is not an entailment of moral objectivism and, even as an example here, still puts morality beyond every individual's personal feeling and whims. Moral objectivism can also refer to natural law morality where morality is an immutable aspect of the basis and essence of being and existence that no entity or force can alter. Moral objectivism offers a framework for a moral premise, structure and justification entirely unavailable under moral subjectivism.

We’ve already addressed this. For the vast majority of subjectivists, whim is not a sufficient basis for morality, hence it can’t be a fundamental principle.

"Because I feel like it" does not = "whim". "Whim" is a subset of "because I feel like it". Even if one feels a deep sense of obligation and spends a long time coming to a moral conclusion, they still do so entirely because they feel like it; they have no other justification they can turn to. The principle as stated doesn't trivialize subjective morality; it reveals the essential trivial nature of subjective morality. It's no wonder you keep objecting to it and of course most self-styled "moral subjectivists" wouldn't characterize their moral justifications that way. It strips away the pretense and obfuscation and reveals subjective morality for what it is.

Not at all. A subjectivist judges the actions of others by their own morality.

How any individual subjectivist judges the actions of others by their own subjective morality is entirely irrelevant to the point. The logical entailment of moral subjectivism is that in principle, if person X considers gratuitous child torture highly moral, and person X considers preventing gratuitous child torture highly moral, the two behaviors are morally equivalent in exactly the same logical fashion and in the only way that anything is ever moral - via the subjective perspective of the individuals assessing the behavior. That doesn't mean that any individual feels the two are morally equivalent; it means that the moral subjectivist must admit that, logically speaking, in principle (the principle that morality = how the individual subjectively feels about an act), the two situations (1, person A committing gratuitous child torture and 2, the person attempting to stop it) are morally equivalent. IOW, situation 1 is person A committing GCT and feeling like it is moral = moral. Situation 2 is person B preventing GCT and feeling like it is moral = moral. The two acts are morally equivalent under moral subjectivism. William J Murray

Box: Similarly there are materialists who act as if persons exist while materialism denies their existence No, materialism doesn't deny the existence of people. That's just silly. Zachriel

Zachriel,

William J Murray: (Under subjectivism, the rationally consistent subjectivist must agree that they are unilaterally forcing what are nothing more than personal, subjective views/inclinations on others because they feel like it and because they can.

Zachriel: As we pointed out, “they feel like it” and “because they can” are idioms that imply transient whim rather than moral sensibility as most people experience it.

That shows that these subjectivists are not rationally consistent and nothing else. Similarly there are materialists who act as if persons exist while materialism denies their existence, as if reason is trustworthy and is not produced by uninterested dumb blind forces, as if science is possible while without persons and rationality it's clearly not. Inconsistent behavior doesn't show that materialism allows for morality, persons, reason and science, it simply shows that some people behave inconsistent with their beliefs. Box

William J Murray: (Under subjectivism, the rationally consistent subjectivist must agree that they are unilaterally forcing what are nothing more than personal, subjective views/inclinations on others because they feel like it and because they can. As we pointed out, "they feel like it" and "because they can" are idioms that imply transient whim rather than moral sensibility as most people experience it. William J Murray: Under the objective perspective, the objectivist can logically justify their interventions as something other than “because I feel like it” and “because I can”. And what is that justification? William J Murray: Under moral subjectivism, intervening due to trivial momentary impulses is as moral as any other action as long as the individual considers them to be moral. It's certainly possible for a subjectivist to think that trivial whims are moral, though most certainly do not. Then again, an objectivist can also think that way, and act that way. William J Murray: Most people would not agree that if you enjoy gratuitously torturing children then doing so is moral for you; A subjectivist makes their own judgments about morality. The vast majority will judge it immoral. They may recognize that the torturer thinks otherwise, but will disagree. William J Murray: IMO, for most people, such an act is self-evidently, absolutely, objectively wrong in all possible worlds and they would react with moral disgust towards anyone even considering the possibility that such behavior is moral “for those that feel like doing it.” Absent the "objectively", most subjectivists would agree. William J Murray: What difference does that make under subjectivism? It makes all the difference. People assign values to moral options, then balance these values. William J Murray: (1) Anything an individual considers to be moral is moral for that person by definition By tautology. A person who thinks an action is moral thinks the action is moral. Others may disagree. William J Murray: (2) The fundamental principles under moral subjectivism are “because I feel like it” and “because I can”. We've already addressed this. For the vast majority of subjectivists, whim is not a sufficient basis for morality, hence it can't be a fundamental principle. William J Murray: (3) Under moral subjectivism, all actions and perspectives are morally equivalent in principle as long as the individual considers their behavior/views moral. Not at all. A subjectivist judges the actions of others by their own morality. Zachriel

Box - check out the particles in motion in the doorway Joe

It's devastatingly simple: Under materialism only particles in motion are real, which implies that persons, reason, science, morality and a host of other stuff are not. Box

More succinctly, if you hold that your behavior is in principle the moral equivalent of a child rapist or serial killer (as a logically-consistent moral subjectivist must), what's the friggin' point of referring to morality at all? It can justify and allow anything. William J Murray

Mark Frank said:

Barry – it appears that you cannot identify anything that WJM has asserted that Z failed to address.

Addressing my argument is not the same as refuting it - and Zachriel has already agreed to the significant points. Logically consistent moral subjectivism necessarily means that: (1) Anything an individual considers to be moral is moral for that person by definition, including forcing their every whim on others and including gratuitous child torture. (2) The fundamental principles under moral subjectivism are "because I feel like it" and "because I can". However the individual arranges their personal tolerances, reactions and intervention points is fully endorsed under moral subjectivism. (3) Under moral subjectivism, all actions and perspectives are morally equivalent in principle as long as the individual considers their behavior/views moral. So, there is no room for the moral superiority atheists/materialists feel they have over the "old testament god", slave owners or religious fanatics that fly planes into buildings full of innocent people - not if one is a logically consistent moral relativist. No, there's no room for moral outrage at all because their behavior is, in principle, morally equal to your own. William J Murray

Zachriel said:

Assuming the subjectivist believes in enforcing their morality on others, then {A}, of course. They see someone, Fred, beating someone else with a club, Wilma, and they may intervene without first asking Fred his opinion on metaethics.

In a debate like this you cannot skip the salient part or else onlookers might draw an equivalence between a subjectivist engaging in unilateral moral interventions and an objectivist doing the same; the same terminology doesn't imply the two are the same conceptually or have the same logical consequences under each worldview. Under subjectivism, the rationally consistent subjectivist must agree that they are unilaterally forcing what are nothing more than personal, subjective views/inclinations on others because they feel like it and because they can. Under the objective perspective, the objectivist can logically justify their interventions as something other than "because I feel like it" and "because I can". Zachriel said:

In English, the idioms “because I feel like it” and “because I can” imply trivial momentary impulses.

Unfortunately for Zachriel, his diversion about"trivial momentary impulses" is irrelevant. Under moral subjectivism, intervening due to trivial momentary impulses is as moral as any other action as long as the individual considers them to be moral. Logically consistent moral subjectivism fully embraces trivial impulses as "moral" as long as the individual feels like such actions are "moral".

Instead, most people have moral sensibilities, and because most people have moral sensibilities, they have a shared language of morality, and a set of behaviors that most people find acceptable that tempers the trivial momentary impulses.

Because people have a shared moral language and shared moral sensibilities doesn't mean they are (1) moral subjectivists, and (2) if they are, behave in accordance with the logical consequences of moral subjectivism. Most people would not agree that if you enjoy gratuitously torturing children then doing so is moral for you; IMO, for most people, such an act is self-evidently, absolutely, objectively wrong in all possible worlds and they would react with moral disgust towards anyone even considering the possibility that such behavior is moral "for those that feel like doing it."

Most subjectivists don’t advocate enforcing every whim on others.

It doesn't matter what "most subjectivists" advocate or agree to; the logical ramifications are clear.

Some moral imperatives are stronger than others.

What difference does that make under subjectivism? If a subjectivist wishes to consider every whim equally moral, then for that person, every whim is equally moral, defines his "good", and moral subjectivism logically endorses it as a perfectly valid morality.

And even then, the moral imperative may be to convince rather than control. It depends on the individual morality, and the balance people strike between the different values of liberty and moral rectitude.

None of the above matters at all to the point. How some or most individual self-described moral subjectivists actually behave has nothing to do with admitting the logical entailments of moral subjectivism and whether or not, upon realizing the logical entailments, most moral subjectivists would still consider themselves such. IOW, if a moral subjectivist truly realized that their morality boiled down to the fundamental principles of "because I feel like it, because I can", would they still be comfortable calling themselves moral subjectivists? If they had to admit that their moral views are the exact equal in principle to **any other behavior**, including the views/behavior of serial killers and child rapists, and that their interventions to prevent such things were the same in principle as the actions of the person committing such atrocities, would they find any value in referring to any sets of behaviors as "moral"? I don't think so, and I think it is obvious by the way you and other scramble around trying to erect semantic and irrelevant moral differences between your actions and the actions of any child rapist or serial killer. Because, under moral subjectivism, there is no and can be no meaningful distinction. There's no reason to call anything moral at all, under moral subjectivism, other than to generate some empty sense of justification and self-satisfaction. It's like patting yourself on the back for choosing vanilla over chocolate - a completely arbitrary method of feeling good about doing what you prefer to do anyway. William J Murray

Barry - it appears that you cannot identify anything that WJM has asserted that Z failed to address. You can of course refute that by indicating the sentences WJM wrote that were not addressed. Instead you assure us all that everyone sees it. I guess this is a variant of one of your favourite arguments: "I am right because I am obviously right" Mark Frank

Mark @ 51, That would, of course, be redundant with WJM's work. Everyone sees it, and "everyone" includes you. You only pretend that you don't. If that's what it takes to cope with your cognitive dissonance, I suppose you have to do it. I just have to think it would be so much easier to finally admit the obvious to yourself. Barry Arrington

#50 Barry I am glad you know so much about our inner psyche's and that it gives you so much amusement. I guess it is more satisfying than identifying the point that Z failed to address. Mark Frank

It is also amusing to watch Mark Frank jump to Zachriel's defense, because he too cannot face the moral contradictions entailed by his metaphysics. Barry Arrington

Barry Zachriel has addressed WJM's points with remarkable concision and accuracy as he has done many times before. It would be interesting to see which statement of WJM's you think he has not addressed. Mark Frank

It is amusing watching Zachriel intentionally miss WJM's point. He is obviously not able to bear the moral contradictions of his metaphysics, so he pretends they don't exist. If I had to pretend the moral contradictions of my metaphysics do not exist in order to live with myself, I hope I would reevaluate them. That's just me though. Barry Arrington

William J Murray: my argument is two-fold; one either admits that {A} their morality endorses unilaterally forcing what they hold to be nothing more than personal, subjective views/feelings on others, OR {B} they are behaving hypocritically wrt logically consistent moral subjectivism. Assuming the subjectivist believes in enforcing their morality on others, then {A}, of course. They see someone, Fred, beating someone else with a club, Wilma, and they may intervene without first asking Fred his opinion on metaethics. William J Murray: because I feel like it / because I can fundamentally immoral and not viable as their fundamental moral principle. In English, the idioms "because I feel like it" and "because I can" imply trivial momentary impulses. Instead, most people have moral sensibilities, and because most people have moral sensibilities, they have a shared language of morality, and a set of behaviors that most people find acceptable that tempers the trivial momentary impulses. William J Murray: In any event, however, I’m happy to leave the argument at the point where you agree that subjective morality necessarily entails (logically speaking, if you interfere at all in the behavior of others under moral pretense) unilaterally forcing what you believe to be nothing more than personal, subjective feelings/views on others because you dislike/disagree with what they are doing. No. And we corrected this above. Most subjectivists don't advocate enforcing every whim on others. Some moral imperatives are stronger than others. And even then, the moral imperative may be to convince rather than control. It depends on the individual morality, and the balance people strike between the different values of liberty and moral rectitude. Zachriel

Zachriel said:

Sure. But if your moral code doesn’t make that prohibition, then it’s not hypocritical, which contradicts your statement above.

No, it doesn't, because my argument is two-fold; one either admits that their morality endorses unilaterally forcing what they hold to be nothing more than personal, subjective views/feelings on others, OR they are behaving hypocritically wrt logically consistent moral subjectivism. If they admit it, which you do, then they can be logically consistent, non-hypocritical moral subjectivists; the problem with that, I suggest, is all sane, rational people who consider themselves moral should find the principle because I feel like it / because I can fundamentally immoral and not viable as their fundamental moral principle.

As shown, your argument is fallacious. Someone can hold to subjective morality, with that subjective morality not only allowing interference with others, but compelling interference with others.

I'm sorry, I should have said:

my argument is that moral subjectivism has logical entailments, and that no sane, reasonable person can (1)accept those entailments as a valid morality AND (2) live as if they are true.

Yes, a person can be logically consistent and hold to subjective morality by agreeing that their fundamental, operational moral principle is "because I feel like it, because I can" and live their life as if whatever they felt like doing was by definition "morally good" and they had the right to unilaterally force their likes on others because they feel like it and because they can. People can and do live as if whatever the feel like doing is justifiable as "good" and that feeling like doing it gives them the right to do it. However, we call those people sociopaths. We don't consider them sane or reasonable. In any event, however, I'm happy to leave the argument at the point where you agree that subjective morality necessarily entails (logically speaking, if you interfere at all in the behavior of others under moral pretense) unilaterally forcing what you believe to be nothing more than personal, subjective feelings/views on others because you dislike/disagree with what they are doing. And that moral subjectivism necessarily means that gratuitously torturing a child is as moral as saving a child from gratuitous torture, depending on your role in the scenario. If a/mats are agreeable to that, then God help us. William J Murray

As the identical debate takes place here approximately once a month – maybe we can save some time by recording the main points somewhere we can easily go back and replay them? Mark Frank

William J Murray: It’s also hypocritical if your moral code prohibits you from ever unilaterally pushing what you believe to be are entirely subjective, personal views onto others, because you’ve agreed that’s what morals are under subjectivism. Sure. But if your moral code doesn't make that prohibition, then it's not hypocritical, which contradicts your statement above. William J Murray: my argument is that moral subjectivism has logical entailments, and that no sane, reasonable person can (1)accept those entailments as a valid morality or (2) live as if they are true. As shown, your argument is fallacious. Someone can hold to subjective morality, with that subjective morality not only allowing interference with others, but compelling interference with others. Here is a famous statement of relative morality, by Charles James Napier.

Be it so. This burning of widows is your custom; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them, and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to national customs.

Zachriel

Zachriel said:

It’s not hypocritical unless your moral code prohibits ever pushing your moral code on others.

It's also hypocritical if your moral code prohibits you from ever unilaterally pushing what you believe to be are entirely subjective, personal views onto others, because you've agreed that's what morals are under subjectivism.

In a democratic society, there is typically a process by which the people can express their moral views. Most people in a culture share many beliefs, so there is the possibility of consensus, or at least compromise.

None of that makes their moral views any less hypocritical or logically consistent.

We can deduce entailments, including instrumental tests, from the notion of bricks and then independently test those entailments. The strength of those entailments provide confidence in our brick hypothesis.No such tests are possible for moral or aesthetic sensibilities. The best you can do is take a poll.

If I were making a case that objective morality was independently verifiable, this might be germane to the argument. However, I'm not making that case. I'm not attempting to prove that objective morals factually exist; my argument is that moral subjectivism has logical entailments, and that no sane, reasonable person can (1)accept those entailments as a valid morality or (2) live as if they are true. One of those entailments would be that gratuitously torturing child can be a morally good act. Another of those entailments is that moral interventions are ultimately based on the principle of "because I feel like it" and "because I can". William J Murray

William J Murray: The problem I’m addressing is that the moral subjectivist must either admit (1) their hypocrisy in holding moral views to be entirely subjective juxtaposed against their willingness to force their moral views on others It's not hypocritical unless your moral code prohibits ever pushing your moral code on others. Maybe your moral code allows you to do so in some circumstances, or maybe your moral code requires it in all cases. William J Murray: (2), as you have stated, the foundational principles of their subjective morality are in fact because I feel like it and because I can. Of course. If someone is dictator, they can impose their moral views on others. In a democratic society, there is typically a process by which the people can express their moral views. Most people in a culture share many beliefs, so there is the possibility of consensus, or at least compromise. William J Murray: There is no independent measure of brick walls “outside of human sensibility”. We can deduce entailments, including instrumental tests, from the notion of bricks and then independently test those entailments. The strength of those entailments provide confidence in our brick hypothesis. No such tests are possible for moral or aesthetic sensibilities. The best you can do is take a poll. William J Murray: My alternative solution (to the problem I’ve actually been addressing, not the one you seem to think I’m making) is to premise that morality refers to an objective, immutable, natural law commodity which no entity can change, and that there are necessary consequences to both moral and immoral activities, and that we have the imperfect capacity to subjectively perceive and interpret this objective commodity (as with any other perceptive sense). That's nice, but you can provide no independent scientific evidence of that. All you have are your moral sensibilities, which you insist are objective. Zachriel

Zachriel said;

Pointing to a moral code, even if you claim it is divinely inspired, doesn’t eliminate the problem.

It doesn't eliminate the problem of people disagreeing with you and it doesn't eliminate the problem of getting into conflicts over their disparate moral views. But then, as I've said repeatedly, those are not the problems I'm addressing. The problem I'm addressing is that the moral subjectivist must either admit (1) their hypocrisy in holding moral views to be entirely subjective juxtaposed against their willingness to force their moral views on others (while simultaneously holding that forcing your subjective views on others because you feel like it and because you can is immoral), or (2), as you have stated, the foundational principles of their subjective morality are in fact because I feel like it and because I can. Your next question implicitly admits this:

What is your alternative position when it’s clear there is no independent measure of morality outside of human sensibility?

There is no independent measure of anything outside of human sensibility. What a trivial category to place morality in! There is no independent measure of brick walls "outside of human sensibility". Perhaps you mean "outside of human emotional feelings"? If that's what you mean, how can it possibly be "clear" that morality only exists there? My alternative solution (to the problem I've actually been addressing, not the one you seem to think I'm making) is to premise that morality refers to an objective, immutable, natural law commodity which no entity can change, and that there are necessary consequences to both moral and immoral activities, and that we have the imperfect capacity to subjectively perceive and interpret this objective commodity (as with any other perceptive sense). This premise gives us the rational justification (grounds) for us to, on certain occasions, force our moral views on others (for their own good, whether they realize it or not), consider some things to be moral obligations for everyone (in light of necessary consequences for ourselves and others); consider some things to be moral unalienable moral rights for everyone; humbly consider our own fallibility when it comes to perceiving and interpreting the moral landscape; so that we can act without being hypocrites; so that we can have moral principles that are not themselves self-evidently immoral (because I feel like it, because I can). It gives us a logical foundation from which to hope that we can rationally debate morality from self-evident moral truths (such as: it is wrong to torture children gratuitously) to logically necessary moral truths and so on, without it merely being a "might makes right" scenario. If morality is merely "because I want to" or "because I like it", moral debates are nothing but bartering, badgering and manipulation. William J Murray

:-) @ Axel. If you keep watching it, maybe something interesting will form. Although I wouldn't want you to stay in the salt cellar that long. Air, water, salt combining ... plus Axel. Maybe some totally new properties will emerge. Silver Asiatic

Zachriel @37, Congrats. You are the king of the non-sequitur. mike1962

'...Chemicals don’t create their properties, and for chemical-compounds it’s the same. The moon and tides didn’t rely on mutations and selection. Molecules and physical forces self-organized (as it is claimed) to create the solar system. When certain chemicals come together to form human beings, those chemicals have the properties of all the behaviors we see.' Are you sure about all that, Silver Fox? Only a few minute ago, I stopped watching a lump of salt in my salt-cellar to see if it had been caused by moisture, or if it was the beginnings of some ambitious construction project. Axel

William J Murray: I’m not attempting to make the case that athesits/materialists behave differently than theists. I’m making the case that atheists/materialists (1) cannot rationally justify their behavior wrt morality, and (2) cannot provide a rationally coherent, principled basis for their morality that is anything other than “because I feel like it, because I can”. Moral sensibility is innate to humans. Those who share values may then create an ethical code as an expression of those sensibilities. If someone doesn't share those sensibilities, they may reject the code. Pointing to a moral code, even if you claim it is divinely inspired, doesn't eliminate the problem. William J Murray: That doesn’t make their morality any more valid than the morality of the person they have banded together against. It's valid for them, but perhaps not for those who reject the code. Some will go to war over which side of the egg to break. What is your alternative position when it's clear there is no independent measure of morality outside of human sensibility? Zachriel

Zachriel said:

Let’s look at your statement again.

That was your statement which I quoted and just attached the worldview from which we agree it is drawn. In any event, it doesn't change the fact that I'm not attempting to make the case that athesits/materialists behave differently than theists. I'm making the case that atheists/materialists (1) cannot rationally justify their behavior wrt morality, and (2) cannot provide a rationally coherent, principled basis for their morality that is anything other than "because I feel like it, because I can".

And people who don’t like murderers (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath) band together and enact rules against murder (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath).

That doesn't make their morality any more valid than the morality of the person they have banded together against. In any event, Zachriel provides the money quote. After I ask:

what principle gives you the right to intervene in the affairs of others, such as when you find someone gratuitously torturing children?

He responds:

Presumably because they feel a compulsion to do so.

IOW, "because I feel like it / because I can" is the "moral principle" that justifies intervening in the affairs of others. I'm happy to leave it at that for all onlookers. William J Murray

Zachriel Enough with the twaddle, chemical reactions don't give a crap how you feel. Andre

MF

Evolution does not cause chemicals to want to eat any more than the moon causes a water molecule to have a tide – tides are a property of collection of water molecules organised in a certain way.

It seems to me that this is a simpler and more coherent idea than the evolution hypothesis. Molecules organized in a certain way become planets, oceans, tides, pine trees, earthworms and human beings. When the chemicals are combined to form those things, then the chemicals have certain properties. So it would be the combined-chemical properties of antelope to eat grass. The chemical-combination that formed human beings has the property of having arms and legs, various styled haircuts, doing good deeds, watching TV or committing murder. Chemicals don't create their properties, and for chemical-compounds it's the same. The moon and tides didn't rely on mutations and selection. Molecules and physical forces self-organized (as it is claimed) to create the solar system. When certain chemicals come together to form human beings, those chemicals have the properties of all the behaviors we see. To me, that's a more coherent story of origins, although I find it very unbelievable. At least it seems more consistent in my view. Silver Asiatic

William J Murray: It’s a good thing then that I’m not making a case that there is a difference between the behaviors of atheists/materialsts and religious people. Let's look at your statement again. William J Murray: Atheism/materialism morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances. Religious morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances, circumstances which include your religious outlook. William J Murray: Moral subjectvism categorically defines morality as what one “subjectively thinks”; this means that only the individual can know what is, by definition moral for him or herself. That's right. And people who don't like murderers (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath) band together and enact rules against murder (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath). William J Murray: Who is Zachriel talking about when he says “Some might think …”? Torturers, per your original scenario. Zachriel: Obviously, if someone thinks some act is morally good, then that person thinks it is morally good. Some might think it is morally wrong, but do it anyway due to some compulsion; while others may simply have no moral sensibility, in which case it is neither moral or immoral to them. William J Murray: Certainly not moral objectivists, because they would think he’s wrong because his actions are in contradiction to an objective good. So? People often do things they think are wrong, whether they are moral objectivists or not. Some do things that you might think are morally wrong, but they think are morally right, whether they are moral objectivists or not. William J Murray: I’d like to ask so-called moral subjectivists: what principle gives you the right to intervene in the affairs of others, such as when you find someone gratuitously torturing children? Presumably because they feel a compulsion to do so. Andre: Why would we want to be altruistic? Usually it's due to a feeling of empathy that compels action. If you have no feelings of empathy, then you will probably not feel compelled to help others. Zachriel

Advice to a candidate who is asked "Do you believe in Evolution?": Render unto Darwin the things that are Darwin's, and unto God the things that are God's Teachings of Jesus are timeless:) ppolish

Mark Frank..... Why would we want to be altruistic? And if I like being selfish is it morally wrong and does it decrease my fitness? Andre

Zachriel said:

Turns out that religious people also commit murder.

It's a good thing then that I'm not making a case that there is a difference between the behaviors of atheists/materialsts and religious people. Now, Zachriel attempts to walk back the implications of subjective morality with some distracting semantics: Zacrhiel said:

Obviously, if someone thinks some act is morally good, then that person thinks it is morally good.

No, Zachriel. Moral subjectvism categorically defines morality as what one "subjectively thinks"; this means that only the individual can know what is, by definition moral for him or herself. ONLY he/she knows what his personal, subjective view is. Thus, for that individual, gratuitously torturing children is moral. Zachriel continues:

Some might think it is morally wrong, but do it anyway due to some compulsion; while others may simply have no moral sensibility, in which case it is neither moral or immoral to them.

Who is Zachriel talking about when he says "Some might think ..."? Certainly not moral objectivists, because they would think he's wrong because his actions are in contradiction to an objective good. So, Zachriel must be talking, at least hypothetically, about moral subjectivists, and if Zachriel is trying to make the case for the logical validity of that perspective, he must be talking about hypothetical, logically-sound moral subjectivistis. But, why would a logically-consistent moral subjectivist (LCMS) consider what person X is doing "wrong"; when the only arbiter of "what is wrong" is the individual committing the act themselves? Under the perspective of subjectivism, the LCMS must realize others are going to have different moralities than he; he cannot assess if it is wrong for person X to gratuitously torture children; all the LCMS knows is that if he were to do it, it would be immoral. So, the LCMS has no logical means by which to consider the behavior of person X "wrong"; all the LCMS can do is make the judgment that if he himself engaged in the behavior, it would be wrong.

We are altruistic because we like to help others. Knowing the cause of that desire makes no difference.

This means that altruistic behavior and gratuitous child torture are equally moral, depending on what the individual likes. Once again, I'd like to ask so-called moral subjectivists: what principle gives you the right to intervene in the affairs of others, such as when you find someone gratuitously torturing children? William J Murray

Dr. Dean Radin And Dr. Roger Nelson Respond to Global Consciousness Project Criticisms - audio http://www.skeptiko.com/74-radin-nelson-global-consciousness/ Roger Nelson and Dean Radin Defend 9/11 Global Consciousness Claims http://mindpowermasters.blogspot.com/2009/06/roger-nelson-and-dean-radin-defend-911.html bornagain77

SA I will try to be clearer.  I am very happy to accept your correction that evolution does not cause us to want to be altruistic. It cause us to be altruistic part of which is wanting to do things like help people. Just as hunger is wanting to eat. You seem to be concerned by fact the chemicals don’t want to do things while people do want things.  It is not uncommon for a collection of things to have properties that the individual things do not – a wave is not a property of a water molecule,  a traffic jam is not a property of a car, Dennet in “Freedom Evolves” gives a particular good account of how objects in Conway’s Game of Life have properties (such as moving) even though they comprise pixels that do not have those properties. In the same way we have all sorts of properties that our individual components – cells, chemicals, atoms, subatomic particles – do not.  Evolution does not cause chemicals to want to eat any more than the moon causes a water molecule to have a tide – tides are a property of collection of water molecules organised in a certain way.

It’s a selfish ideology, as I see it. It’s very destructive of human life and culture. I consider it anti-human — an enemy to human life.

It is not an ideology. An ideology is a motive, a reason for acting. Evolution is just a proposed cause for the motives we observe people having. That is my point. Mark Frank

Unguided Evolution stumbles upon altruism, nice. Theistic Evolution predicts altruism. Predicts evil also. Theistic Evolution is a more complete version of Evo Theory. ID is better science than both Unguided or Theistic Evo however. Mountains of evidence. ppolish

BA77,

Mass Consciousness: Perturbed Randomness Before First Plane Struck on 911 – July 29 2012 Excerpt: The machine apparently sensed the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre four hours before they happened – but in the fevered mood of conspiracy theories of the time, the claims were swiftly knocked back by sceptics. But it also appeared to forewarn of the Asian tsunami just before the deep sea earthquake that precipitated the epic tragedy.,, Now, even the doubters are acknowledging that here is a small box with apparently inexplicable powers. ‘It’s Earth-shattering stuff,’ says Dr Roger Nelson, emeritus researcher at Princeton University in the United States, who is heading the research project behind the ‘black box’ phenomenon. http://www.network54.com/Forum.....uck+on+911

8O That link isn't working for me---do you have an alternate source? Edit: Nevermind, I was able to get to it. daveS

MF I found your explanation confusing.

Evolution (and other things) cause us to want to be altruistic because in the long run that increases our biological fitness.

I would simplify that to "Evolution causes us to be altruistic". Adding "want to" adds another element that is not explained. If altruism increases fitness, then evolution would make us be altruistic, and not merely "want to be altruistic". Creating the desire, which could be unfulfilled, is an unnecessary problem. It points to free-will. We "want to be altruistic" but we're not. Why would evolution provide that option? It's the same with food. Evolution supposedly caused earthworms to eat organic material. They don't "want to" eat that, they just do. This has to be traced back chemically. Supposedly, chemical compounds form into organisms we call earthworms, and those chemicals need organic matter for some unexplained reason. If these chemicals don't get food, they die. So, evolution had to create "hunger". Apparently, there were organisms that didn't have hunger pains, and they died because they didn't know they had to eat, or something like that. But as far as we can tell, chemicals aren't hungry. They don't need to eat anything. So, evolution does not explain why chemical compounds we call "life" have to eat anything at all. But then to add on to it, that evolution cause chemicals to "want to" eat, is more of a problem. Beyond, that we have the evolutionary origin of "liking" things. Again, it doesn't appear that bacteria like or dislike anything. They just do what evolution supposedly cause them to do. In the same way, evolution causes altruism. As the author of the OP explained, it's a self-seeking property of all organisms. "I love you because evolution caused me to, and you have some benefit for me". "You are my friend because you are a principled cooperator in the evolutionary process, and that is an overall benefit to me." It's a selfish ideology, as I see it. It's very destructive of human life and culture. I consider it anti-human -- an enemy to human life. The "it" I refer to is the ideology, and not any particular individuals who defend it or claim to uphold it. Silver Asiatic

Yes, Zach, "Altruism can increase fitness". So are Theists more fit AND more altruistic than Atheists? http://m.livescience.com/38743-religious-women-having-more-babies.html ppolish

Naturalism/Materialism predicted morality is subjective and illusory. Theism predicted morality is objective and real. Morality is found to be deeply embedded in the genetic responses of humans. As well, morality is found to be deeply embedded in the structure of the universe. Embedded to the point of eliciting physiological responses in humans before humans become aware of the morally troubling situation and even prior to the event even happening.

Human Cells Respond in Healthy, Unhealthy Ways to Different Kinds of Happiness - July 29, 2013 Excerpt: Human bodies recognize at the molecular level that not all happiness is created equal, responding in ways that can help or hinder physical health,,, The sense of well-being derived from “a noble purpose” may provide cellular health benefits, whereas “simple self-gratification” may have negative effects, despite an overall perceived sense of happiness, researchers found.,,, But if all happiness is created equal, and equally opposite to ill-being, then patterns of gene expression should be the same regardless of hedonic or eudaimonic well-being. Not so, found the researchers. Eudaimonic well-being was, indeed, associated with a significant decrease in the stress-related CTRA gene expression profile. In contrast, hedonic well-being was associated with a significant increase in the CTRA profile. Their genomics-based analyses, the authors reported, reveal the hidden costs of purely hedonic well-being.,, “We can make ourselves happy through simple pleasures, but those ‘empty calories’ don’t help us broaden our awareness or build our capacity in ways that benefit us physically,” she said. “At the cellular level, our bodies appear to respond better to a different kind of well-being, one based on a sense of connectedness and purpose.” http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/07/130729161952.htm Quantum Consciousness – Time Flies Backwards? – Stuart Hameroff MD Excerpt: Dean Radin and Dick Bierman have performed a number of experiments of emotional response in human subjects. The subjects view a computer screen on which appear (at randomly varying intervals) a series of images, some of which are emotionally neutral, and some of which are highly emotional (violent, sexual….). In Radin and Bierman’s early studies, skin conductance of a finger was used to measure physiological response They found that subjects responded strongly to emotional images compared to neutral images, and that the emotional response occurred between a fraction of a second to several seconds BEFORE the image appeared! Recently Professor Bierman (University of Amsterdam) repeated these experiments with subjects in an fMRI brain imager and found emotional responses in brain activity up to 4 seconds before the stimuli. Moreover he looked at raw data from other laboratories and found similar emotional responses before stimuli appeared. http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/views/TimeFlies.html Scientific Evidence That Mind Effects Matter – Random Number Generators – video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KE1haKXoHMo Mass Consciousness: Perturbed Randomness Before First Plane Struck on 911 – July 29 2012 Excerpt: The machine apparently sensed the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre four hours before they happened – but in the fevered mood of conspiracy theories of the time, the claims were swiftly knocked back by sceptics. But it also appeared to forewarn of the Asian tsunami just before the deep sea earthquake that precipitated the epic tragedy.,, Now, even the doubters are acknowledging that here is a small box with apparently inexplicable powers. ‘It’s Earth-shattering stuff,’ says Dr Roger Nelson, emeritus researcher at Princeton University in the United States, who is heading the research project behind the ‘black box’ phenomenon. http://www.network54.com/Forum/594658/thread/1343585136/1343657830/Mass+Consciousness-+Perturbed+Randomness++Before+First+Plane+Struck+on+911

bornagain77

Seversky said:

So morality could be possibly be objective but in reality humanity’s moral beliefs are subjective, it is just logically a problem to admit the truth of the matter. One must be dishonest to be logically moral.

Humanity's moral beliefs are subjectively held. There is no "logical problem" in admitting that. All knowledge and belief is subjectively held, accumulated via our subjective sense. We do not know if what we subjectively experience, know or believe is a factual accounting of objectively existent phenomena; this point was made by Plato long ago. The question is if we believe/hold to be true that some of our experiences, knowledge and belief do reflect phenomena that objectively exists "out there" somewhere. We either believe/hold this to be the case or we are solipsists. It is not dishonest to believe/hold that some of what one experiences has an objective existence of its own; it's the only honest way to live. Even if we call ourselves solipsists, we still behave as if at least some, if not most, of what we experience, objectively exists "out there". The dishonesty is in when one claims that something experienced (morality) doesn't objectively exist "out there", but then acts as if it does.

Such is the nature of subjective morality even if one acts like it is objective.

Immutable Natural Law morality doesn't have the problem of self-referential incoherence (subjective morality) or the Euthyphro Dilemma (divine command morality).

The same as those who believe there is an objective moral code, the subjective basis for that belief . Objectively applied to all.

Then you are distinguishing between your own subjective, personal feelings about what is good and what is evil? And that is how you tell "the" difference between good and evil - however you happen to feel about it? Thus, your subjective morality boils down to the principle: Because I subjectively feel like it. Thus, if you feel like gratuitously torturing a child, then by your argument that is the way you tell between good and evil; how you subjectively feel about it, and so torturing a child is moral. What gives you the right to intervene in the moral behaviors of others if what they are doing is, in your view, a matter of subjective perspective and does not refer to any objectively wrong behavior?

In practice you have admitted it is,

No, I haven't. We do not know if morality refers to an objective or a purely subjective phenomena. Like with anything else (Plato's Cave), in all matters we are trapped within the subjectie confines of our own subjective viewpoint. However, unless we are solipsists, we believe and in many cases must act as if some things exist outside of our subjective perspective, objectively, in a universe "out there". Morality is one of those things we must act as if exists, in some way, objectively, just as we must act as if other things outside of ourselves actually exist objectively. To act as if morality exists objectively, but insist it only exists subjectively, is not only hypocritical, it points to a problem in your worldview; why are you insisting morality is subjective in nature if you must act as if it is objective in nature?

Objectively applied morality, treat others as you wish to be treated.

Or, treat others as if they are mere objects for you to use for personal gain. It's as moral a principle for behavior as any other in a subjective-morality world. William J Murray

William J Murray: Atheism/materialism morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances. Turns out that religious people also commit murder. William J Murray: If you consider it right to torture children gratuitously, it is morally good (as morally good as anything gets under a/mat), if you consider it wrong, then it is immoral. Obviously, if someone thinks some act is morally good, then that person thinks it is morally good. Some might think it is morally wrong, but do it anyway due to some compulsion; while others may simply have no moral sensibility, in which case it is neither moral or immoral to them. Silver Asiatic: The idea is: “people usually don’t go around committing murders, so there’s nothing to think about here” Actually, the idea is that most people don't have a desire to commit murder. Silver Asiatic: We praise people like that – they’re ignorant of the game and just do good deeds, not realizing that evolution is merely compelling them to do them for their ‘winning strategy’. That a mother might feel compelled to sacrifice for their children doesn't make her less courageous, even if we recognize the evolutionary benefit. Silver Asiatic: They know that helping, loving, charitable actions are really just selfish desires done for our own interest. Obviously, a mother who sacrifices for her children isn't doing it for her own interest, but out of love for her children. Mark Frank: Evolution causes us to want to eat sweet things because having calories (at one time) increased our fitness. That doesn’t mean we eat sweet things because it increases our fitness (indeed in the modern world it does the reverse). We eat sweet things because we like the taste. We are altruistic because we like to help others. Knowing the cause of that desire makes no difference. This. bornagain77: So evolution is about survival of the fittest except when it is about survival of the most altruistic? Altruism can increase fitness. Zachriel

Theists are more fit than Atheists. http://m.livescience.com/38743-religious-women-having-more-babies.html ppolish

Mark Frank We are fit because we're altruistic because we like sweet things because we like it because it causes fitness...... Got you. Andre

Seversky: As for good and bad, what’s to stop us from working out for ourselves? Wjm: Nothing. The problem is the logical ramifications of a group that has worked it out for themselves and has come to the conclusion that morality is subjective or that morality is issued by divine command. Previously William: Any sane person knows that alltheir beliefs are subjective beliefs that they may be mistaken about. Nobody here that I know of is asserting that they have “objective” beliefs. So morality could be possibly be objective but in reality humanity's moral beliefs are subjective, it is just logically a problem to admit the truth of the matter. One must be dishonest to be logically moral. While nothing stops them from doing so, the nature of what they have “worked out” is problematic both from a historical and a logical perspective. Such is the nature of subjective morality even if one acts like it is objective. Look at what you just said. If there is no objective good/evil, what exactly is it that the a/mats are “distinguishing between”? The same as those who believe there is an objective moral code, the subjective basis for that belief . Objectively applied to all. If morality is indeed subjective, In practice you have admitted it is, nobody can know the difference between good and evil because there can be no “the” difference between good and evil. Of course they can based on whatever subjective criteria they choose for whatever reason, just like you, what they can't do is claim that they have a absolute knowledge. Your argument for subjective morality is laced with terms, claims and implications that only make sense if morality is objective in nature. Objectively applied morality, treat others as you wish to be treated. velikovskys

So evolution is about survival of the fittest except when it is about survival of the most altruistic? Man you just got to love a theory that can explain away any evidence no matter how contradictory it is. Of course some may think that such unfalsifiable flexibility of a theory is a sure sign that the theory is in reality a pseudo-science, but I'm sure evolution can also explain why some people would believe that evolution is a pseudo-science!

Doubting Darwin: Algae Findings Surprise Scientists - April 28, 2014 Excerpt: One of Charles Darwin's hypotheses posits that closely related species will compete for food and other resources more strongly with one another than with distant relatives, because they occupy similar ecological niches. Most biologists long have accepted this to be true. Thus, three researchers were more than a little shaken to find that their experiments on fresh water green algae failed to support Darwin's theory — ,, "When we saw the results, we said 'this can't be."' We sat there banging our heads against the wall. Darwin's hypothesis has been with us for so long, how can it not be right?" The researchers ,,,— were so uncomfortable with their results that they spent the next several months trying to disprove their own work. But the research held up.,,, The scientists did not set out to disprove Darwin, but, in fact, to learn more about the genetic and ecological uniqueness of fresh water green algae so they could provide conservationists with useful data for decision-making. "We went into it assuming Darwin to be right, and expecting to come up with some real numbers for conservationists," Cardinale says. "When we started coming up with numbers that showed he wasn't right, we were completely baffled.",,, Darwin "was obsessed with competition," Cardinale says. "He assumed the whole world was composed of species competing with each other, but we found that one-third of the species of algae we studied actually like each other. They don't grow as well unless you put them with another species. It may be that nature has a heck of a lot more mutualisms than we ever expected. "Maybe species are co-evolving," he adds. "Maybe they are evolving together so they are more productive as a team than they are individually. We found that more than one-third of the time, that they like to be together. Maybe Darwin's presumption that the world may be dominated by competition is wrong." http://www.livescience.com/45205-data-dont-back-up-darwin-in-algae-study-nsf-bts.html Oceanic microbes behave in a synchrony across ocean basins - March 16, 2015 Excerpt: Researchers have found that microbial communities in different regions of the Pacific Ocean displayed strikingly similar daily rhythms in their metabolism despite inhabiting extremely different habitats -- the nutrient-rich waters off California and the nutrient-poor waters north of Hawai'i. Furthermore, in each location, the dominant photoautotrophs appear to initiate a cascade effect wherein the other major groups of microbes perform their metabolic activities in a coordinated and predictable way.,,, The bacterial groups common to both ecosystems displayed the same transcriptional patterns and daily rhythms -- as if each group is performing its prescribed role at a precise time each and every day, even though these communities are separated by thousands of miles. "Our work suggests that these microbial communities broadly behave in a similar manner across entire ocean basins and that specific biological interactions between these groups are widespread in nature,",,, "Surprisingly, however, our work shows that these extremely different ecosystems exhibit very similar diel cycles, driven largely by sunlight and interspecies microbial interactions," said Aylward, "This suggests that different microbial communities across the Pacific Ocean, and likely waters across the entire planet, behave in much more orderly ways than has previously been supposed," http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/03/150316102112.htm

bornagain77

SA I seem to write the same things about this every couple of months. Don't confuse the cause of moral behaviour with the justification. Evolution (and other things) cause us to want to be altruistic because in the long run that increases our biological fitness. That doesn't mean that even the most knowledgeable evolutionary scientist is altruistic because they want to increase their fitness. To give an analogy. Evolution causes us to want to eat sweet things because having calories (at one time) increased our fitness. That doesn't mean we eat sweet things because it increases our fitness (indeed in the modern world it does the reverse). We eat sweet things because we like the taste. We are altruistic because we like to help others. Knowing the cause of that desire makes no difference. Mark Frank

From the OP, Mr. Nowak explains:

In these repeated games, winning strategies are generous, hopeful, and forgiving. They accept less than half of the pie, but share many pies; they hope to establish cooperation with newcomers; they forgive occasional defection.

Cooperation comes from evolution. We cooperate in order for our species to survive and reproduce. It's the way multicellularity works:

Multicellularity means that cells cooperate with each other. They are no longer in an all-out competition for whoever reproduces fastest. Instead, they divide as needed for the benefit of the organism.

So, cooperation is for the benefit of the organism. Cooperation enables us to have a 'winning strategy' in evolution.

In a most recent approach, we search for mechanisms that allow “saints” to cooperate without looking, without calculating the costs and benefits, without being aware of the game that is being lost or won.

Since evolution made cooperation basically a selfish strategy to win in the game of life, we really don't like that. It's kind of ugly and embarrassing. So, there are 'mechanisms' that make us obey evolutionary demands 'without looking' at the self-centeredness of it all. In fact, the good people are not even 'aware of the game'. We praise people like that - they're ignorant of the game and just do good deeds, not realizing that evolution is merely compelling them to do them for their 'winning strategy'. The 'good people' are living in an illusion that they're not being selfish. But that's ok. Evolution made it that way - we need those ignorant people around. Fortunately, we have evolutionists who are smarter than everyone else to explain all of this to us. They know that helping, loving, charitable actions are really just selfish desires done for our own interest. Evolutionists do good deeds, but not in the 'saintly way' of being totally ignorant of reality and living in an illusion, but rather, fully aware. They're university professors, after all. You can't get much more important than that. But we excuse evolutionists of being openly selfish because they're so intelligent and they teach us everything we need to know about life.

We recognize principled cooperators, who we can trust when times get rough, and we preferentially associate with them. We call them friends.

Yes, "we call them friends". The "principled cooperators" in our life who we associate with, because they benefit us. That's why we 'associate with them'. It's like multicellular cooperation. We need friends because they give us a better winning strategy for survival and reproductive success, the true goal of life. Silver Asiatic

WJM

Atheism/materialism morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances.

Zachriel was attempting to be cute and appeal to a populist view. The idea is: "people usually don't go around committing murders, so there's nothing to think about here". But in this case, his little comment expressed exactly what materialist morality is: acts are of neutral value, we just do what our nature dictates.

Or we can just boil it down to this: Morality under atheism/materialism means that you consider an act right or wrong as your nature demands given your circumstances. If you consider it right to torture children gratuitously, it is morally good (as morally good as anything gets under a/mat), if you consider it wrong, then it is immoral.

Exactly. Zachriel argued against this idea previously, but he inadvertently expressed it quite clearly now. We consider acts right or wrong depending on whatever our nature demands. We know our nature is often violent, irrational and hostile. Whatever our nature demands is what is right for us. But taken a logical step further, there is no right or wrong. There's just doing whatever our nature demands. Evolution made us this way and it doesn't matter what we choose to do, under that belief-system. Silver Asiatic

Seversky

What has what we are made of got to do with the value of what we think and feel?

In the a/mat view, what we're made of is what causes us to think and feel.

Are a computer’s calculations worthless because it’s made of silicon and copper and plastic?

It's a pretty good analogy. The calculations are worthless to the computer. The silicon and copper and plastic do not care. Even the software doesn't care if it exists or not. We care because we have immaterial qualities of intention, purpose, meaning, intelligence, imagination, future aspirations, goals -- and we want to explore and learn and discover the truth about things -- all of which transcend (and contradict) the evolutionary determinants of survival and reproduction.

As for good and bad, what’s to stop us from working out for ourselves?

A consistent a/mat wouldview would stop us. We persist in working out good and evil in opposition to materialism. Many, probably most atheists use and apply the moral structures derived from theism (and which have no support under atheism) to live moral lives. Just because a person says he or she is a materialist, doesn't mean he or she has to live consistently with atheist-materialist thought. The same is true for theists. The question is not judging various individual persons - but judging the belief-system and worldview in itself. As following ...

And doubting a/mats ability to distinguish between good and evil is a bit rich coming from people who apparently wouldn’t know the difference unless God had told them.

Can you see the difference in these two statements?: 1. I doubt than any atheist has the ability to distinguish between good and evil. 2. Atheistic/materialism provides no rational basis for distinguishing between good and evil. Silver Asiatic

Zachriel said:

The ‘universe’ doesn’t dictate what you should or shouldn’t be. Rather, it’s in your individual nature. You presumably commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances.

I completely agree that this is what a/mat means in terms of morality. That's a great summary: Atheism/materialism morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances. Or we can just boil it down to this: Morality under atheism/materialism means that you consider an act right or wrong as your nature demands given your circumstances. If you consider it right to torture children gratuitously, it is morally good (as morally good as anything gets under a/mat), if you consider it wrong, then it is immoral. It all just depends on the individual's nature and circumstances. William J Murray

William J Murray: The problem is that such a universe doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be, either. The 'universe' doesn't dictate what you should or shouldn't be. Rather, it's in your individual nature. You presumably commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances. Zachriel

Seversky said:

What has what we are made of got to do with the value of what we think and feel? Are a computer’s calculations worthless because it’s made of silicon and copper and plastic?

No, they're not worthless; they're just not moral. Biological automatons that do what they do entirely because they are caused to do so by the forces of physics are not making moral choices because there is nothing else they can do in any particular instance other than what physics dictates via happenstance colliding/interacting collections of molecules.

As for good and bad, what’s to stop us from working out for ourselves?

Nothing. The problem is the logical ramifications of a group that has worked it out for themselves and has come to the conclusion that morality is subjective or that morality is issued by divine command. While nothing stops them from doing so, the nature of what they have "worked out" is problematic both from a historical and a logical perspective.

The fact that the universe is pitiless and indifferent doesn’t mean we should be.

The problem is that such a universe doesn't mean we shouldn't be, either.

Look up the is/ought gap. And doubting a/mats ability to distinguish between good and evil is a bit rich coming from people who apparently wouldn’t know the difference unless God had told them.

Look at what you just said. If there is no objective good/evil, what exactly is it that the a/mats are "distinguishing between"? If morality is indeed subjective, nobody can know the difference between good and evil because there can be no "the" difference between good and evil. Your argument for subjective morality is laced with terms, claims and implications that only make sense if morality is objective in nature. William J Murray

wallstreeter4 @ 7

If an atheist acts according to his own worldview and to Darwin’s view, they are nothing but pieces if meat that came together over millions of years through chemical interaction and blind chance . No ultimate meaning . Three is no good or bad in this worldview , just blind pitiless indifference as Dawkins correctly states . When atheists talk about good or bad ! Sorry but I have to chuckle and shake my head in amazement

What has what we are made of got to do with the value of what we think and feel? Are a computer's calculations worthless because it's made of silicon and copper and plastic? As for good and bad, what's to stop us from working out for ourselves? The fact that the universe is pitiless and indifferent doesn't mean we should be. Look up the is/ought gap. And doubting a/mats ability to distinguish between good and evil is a bit rich coming from people who apparently wouldn't know the difference unless God had told them. Seversky

Andre @ 6

And if that is true it needs to be addressed.

Why? That would seem to be what News and others here would like. Seversky

If an atheist acts according to his own worldview and to Darwin's view, they are nothing but pieces if meat that came together over millions of years through chemical interaction and blind chance . No ultimate meaning . Three is no good or bad in this worldview , just blind pitiless indifference as Dawkins correctly states . When atheists talk about good or bad ! Sorry but I have to chuckle and shake my head in amazement . wallstreeter43

Seversky And if that is true it needs to be addressed. Andre

Depending on where you live, you may be paying for school systems that force this stuff down kids’ throats, thanks to the Darwin in the schools lobby.

Not to worry. According to one survey, some 13% of science teachers are openly teaching Christian creationism in the science classroom and the bulk of the remainder avoid trouble by not mentioning evolution by name at all. Seversky

WD400 By implying that chemical reactions can choose a outcome that is different than other chemical reactions. It's total nonsense. Chemical reactions obey the laws of nature. Always. Newton 's efforts to turn lead into gold should be enough to tell you why the materialist version of evolution is total nonsense. Andre

What's wrong with the quoted passage? Do you not think children are similar to , but different from, their parents. Or that some genetic variants have higher fitness than others? wd400

"Depending on where you live, you may be paying for school systems that force this stuff down kids’ throats, thanks to the Darwin in the schools lobby." Teaching of naturalism in public schools is state establishment of atheism, in the US this is a violation of the first amendment of the constitution. In the past, state atheism this has not ended well: http://ncu9nc.blogspot.com/2015/03/video-lecture-by-john-lennox-explains.html Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

“Over a half century ago, while I was still a child, I recall hearing a number of old people offer the following explanation for the great disasters that had befallen Russia: "Men have forgotten God; that's why all this has happened." Since then I have spent well-nigh 50 years working on the history of our revolution; in the process I have read hundreds of books, collected hundreds of personal testimonies, and have already contributed eight volumes of my own toward the effort of clearing away the rubble left by that upheaval. But if I were asked today to formulate as concisely as possible the main cause of the ruinous revolution that swallowed up some 60 million of our people, I could not put it more accurately than to repeat: "Men have forgotten God; that's why all this has happened.”

Viktor Frankl

“If we present a man with a concept of man which is not true, we may well corrupt him. When we present man as an automaton of reflexes, as a mind-machine, as a bundle of instincts, as a pawn of drives and reactions, as a mere product of instinct, heredity and environment, we feed the nihilism to which modern man is, in any case, prone. “I became acquainted with the last stage of that corruption in my second concentration camp, Auschwitz. The gas chambers of Auschwitz were the ultimate consequence of the theory that man is nothing but the product of heredity and environment; or as the Nazi liked to say, ‘of Blood and Soil.’ I am absolutely convinced that the gas chambers of Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Maidanek were ultimately prepared not in some Ministry or other in Berlin, but rather at the desks and lecture halls of nihilistic scientists and philosophers.”

Jim Smith

News: Depending on where you live, you may be paying for school systems that force this stuff down kids’ throats, thanks Quelled horreur! velikovskys