Has anyone ever wondered why Darwin’s followers …

_{Denyse O'Leary

April 7, 2015

Culture, Darwinism, Peer review}

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… have a really hard time figuring out why anyone tries to be good?

The carriers of the evolutionary process are populations. Populations consist of reproducing individuals, such as cells, viruses, plants, animals, and people. Offspring inherit fundamental information from their parents. This information is encoded in genomes, if we focus on genetic evolution. Occasionally modifications arise. These new genetic variants are called “mutants.” Mutation generates new types, new molecular ideas. This constitutes the first half of the evolutionary process.

The second half is “natural selection.” The mutations might affect reproductive rates. Some mutant genes spread faster in the population than others. Nature becomes a gigantic breeder selecting for advantageous traits. Survival of the fittest is the underlying theme of natural selection. The world is fundamentally competitive. So it seems.

Depending on where you live, you may be paying for school systems that force this stuff down kids’ throats, thanks to the Darwin in the schools lobby.

Comments

Wjm: Non-sequitur and irrelevant. All beliefs are held subjectively – this is a trivial fact. That is entirely different from holding the view that what one’s belief is about is also subjective and entirely a matter of subective preference How is the decision of what the basis of the "objective standard" is not a personal subjective preference? And your subjective preference is for the justification classical theism of some sort. Unless Kantians and Pragmatists hold that their respective systems are the objectively valid/true morality according to which all humans are necessarily bound, So the advantage of your system is not its morality,since you have no evidence it leads to more moral behaviour, but its enforcement of the subjective morality. then they hold that morality is subjective and that they personally prefer Pragmatism or Kantianism and think they are “better” forms of morality for whatever reason. You ,on the other hand, are using the seal of approval of a subjective preferenced divine authority as evidence of universality of natural law if such thing exists as a reason. No. While I might come to my adoption of objective morality via subjective senses and interpretation There is no " might" about it. that doesn’t mean that the morality I’ve adopted is a system predicated on the view the morality is innately subjective. That is the difference. It’s hard for me to believe you don’t understand this. I understand completely, my view is you have no non subjective evidence that is true beyond pleasure alone is not a good reason to cause pain in babies therefore all morality is objective. Unless you are going to equivocate all acts that ensue from sensory perception as “because I feel like it”, I could be wrong, please provide the alternative if it is not an intuitive appeal the difference is that I don’t consider what I am “feeling” in moral instances to be an entirely subjective matter, Many people feel the same way. Such as the slaveholders in the American South in their time. just as I don’t consider what I touch with my fingers or see with my eyes to be an entirely subjective matter. I hold those sensations to be of objectively existent phenmena. Me too.velikovskys_{April 12, 2015
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Let me rephrase #112 another way which is a bit more precise. Suppose I am a true Kantian who holds the categorical imperative is the objective moral code to which all humans are necessarily bound. How do you prove me wrong?Mark Frank_{April 12, 2015
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WJM As I explained in #108 consequentialists of all sorts, Kantians and indeed countless other moral systems think theirs is an objective moral code. You owe us an explanation of why your objective code is superior to theirs.Mark Frank_{April 12, 2015
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velikovskys:
Of course you holding your morality as objective is a subjective belief,too.
Non-sequitur and irrelevant. All beliefs are held subjectively - this is a trivial fact. That is entirely different from holding the view that what one's belief is about is also subjective and entirely a matter of subective preference. Unless Kantians and Pragmatists hold that their respective systems are the objectively valid/true morality according to which all humans are necessarily bound, then they hold that morality is subjective and that they personally prefer Pragmatism or Kantianism and think they are "better" forms of morality for whatever reason.
As is yours,William. Just as relativism is.
No. While I might come to my adoption of objective morality via subjective senses and interpretation, that doesn't mean that the morality I've adopted is a system predicated on the view the morality is innately subjective. That is the difference. It's hard for me to believe you don't understand this.
Why is gratuitous child torture wrong other than because you “feel like it ” is self evident?
Unless you are going to equivocate all acts that ensue from sensory perception as "because I feel like it", the difference is that I don't consider what I am "feeling" in moral instances to be an entirely subjective matter, just as I don't consider what I touch with my fingers or see with my eyes to be an entirely subjective matter. I hold those sensations to be of objectively existent phenmena.William J Murray_{April 12, 2015
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Wjm: Unless utilitarians and kantians hold that their morality is objective in nature, Of course you holding your morality as objective is a subjective belief,too. those systems are subsets of subjective morality, As is yours,William. Just as relativism is. and so are ultimately justified by “because I feel like it”, becuase the individual feels like utilitarianism or kantianism (?) are the best models for morality. Why is gratuitous child torture wrong other than because you "feel like it " is self evident?velikovskys_{April 12, 2015
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William J Murray @ 95
Zachriel: I appreciate the interaction. For now, however, I consider my case against subjective morality conclusive as of #70. Of course, I don’t expect others to agree, but I’m satisified the case has been made for all open-minded, reasonable people not ideologically committed to moral subjectvism.
I appreciate that you have identified #70 as your best case to date against moral subjectivism. You expectation that others might not agree is also well-founded.
Logically consistent moral subjectivists must admit that a necessary entailment is that morality = whatever the individual thinks is moral, is moral for that individual by definition.
Whatever an individual thinks is moral is moral by his or her beliefs. Other individuals may judge it immoral by their lights. How do we decide between them? On what grounds can we decide which view should prevail?
Thus, Barney cannot say it is wrong for Fred to beat his wife with a club, because only Fred can say what is right or wrong for Fred to do. Barney simply has no grounds to make a claim about what is moral or immoral for Fred to do.
Barney is perfectly entitled to judge Fred’s actions wrong by his own moral beliefs. He is perfectly entitled to claim that what Fred is doing is wrong just as Fred is entitled to claim that what he is doing is right. The question, as before, is at what point or under what circumstances or if at all is Barney entitled to take action to prevent Fred doing something he believes is wrong.
The best that Barney can say is that it is wrong for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife with a club, or that it would be wrong for Barney to beat Fred’s wife with a club. Barney cannot, however, make any claims about what is moral or immoral for Fred to do
If Barney believes that it is immoral, as a general principle, for anyone to be beaten with a club against their will then he is entitled to make that claim about Fred’s action.
Claiming that it is immoral for Barney to beat Fred’s wife and so Barney must stop it is transferring Barney’s personal morality onto Fred as if it was binding on Fred as well, as if Barney could logically use his own morality to judge what is right or wrong for Fred to do. However, Barney – as a logically consistent moral subjectivist – can only judge what is right or wrong for himself, not for others.
Moral subjectivism does not just mean that individuals moral beliefs apply only to themselves. It is the position that there is no objective morality, no external standard against which all other moral claims can be measured, that such beliefs reside only in the minds of intelligent agents such as ourselves.
The only logically consistent, justifiable option left for intervening is because Barney considers it moral for himself to stop Fred from beating his wife with a club. He cannot say what is moral for Fred, he can only say what is moral for himself, and even if he holds it immoral for himself to beat Fred’s wife, he cannot transfer that view onto “for Fred”.
There is another option open to Barney which brings into consideration the moral beliefs of the third actor in this little tableau - one whose beliefs you have consistently ignored - in other words, Wilma, Fred’s wife. It is reasonable to assume that she is of the same mind as Barney inasmuch as she also thinks it is wrong for Fred to beat her with a club. This makes the opinion against beating two-to-me against Fred. We might also reasonably assume that Betty, Barney’s wife and Wilma’s close friend, is also opposed the beating, which gives us a majority against of three-to-one. We might easily increase that majority against still further if we canvassed other resident in the Flintstone’s neighborhood.
Thus, as a logically consistent moral subjectivist, Barney must admit Fred’s act of beating his wife with a club is as moral for Fred as Barney’s own moral decisions are for Barney. Thus, Fred beating his wife with a club is moral by definition and logical entailment (Fred thinks it is moral); Barney must admit it is moral for Fred by definition and entailment under moral subjectivism.
No, absolutely not. Fred may believe that is moral for him to beat his wife and Barney may concede that Fred believes it is moral but there is no logical requirement at all for Barney - and certainly not Wilma - to agree that it is moral. Although there are a few exceptions, in general moral prescriptions are general principles. Whether an action is judged moral or immoral is determined by the nature of the action itself not the individual who commits it. If I believe that it is morally wrong for a man to beat his wife with a club then I am saying that its wrong for all men, including Fred, to beat their wives. The obvious question, as before, is under what circumstances would Barney be morally entitled to act on his belief by physically intervening to prevent Fred beating his wife and thereby imposing his moral beliefs on Fred. Absent any overriding moral authority, this can only be decided by the will of the majority - in other words, collective morality. If most people agree that it is wrong to beat people, even if only because they would not like to be beaten or have their family and friends beaten, then that is sufficient to make it morally wrong because there is no better alternative by which the matter can be decided.
So, let me put it somewhat more succinctly to summarise, now that I’ve worked out this well-phrased, logical argument against subjectivism: Under moral subjectivism, only the individual can say what is moral for them to do; others cannot say what is moral for anyone else because that would imply moral objectivism. If Fred thinks it is moral for him to beat his wife, then it is by definition (under moral subjectivism). Barney must admit, as a logically consistent moral subjectivist, that it is moral for Fred to beat his wife if Fred thinks it is moral. Barney cannot make logically-consistent statements about what is moral “for Fred” under moral subjectivism; he must phrase all of his moral oughts in terms only of “for Barney”. Thus, Barney can only say that it is immoral for Barney to beat Fred’s wife, or that it is immoral for Barney to allow Fred to beat his wife.
In a universe in which there is no other moral authority to which we can refer, the only morality to which we can agree to be subject is that which we decide for ourselves. If we observe the function of morality in society we can see that, in general terms, it serves to regulate the behavior of the members of that society towards one another by discouraging some behaviors and encouraging others. The purpose of such regulation appears to be to protect what are agreed to be the legitimate interests of the members of that society. If the population of Bedrock had agreed that it was generally wrong for a man to beat his wife with a club - except, possibly, as part of a mating ritual - then, if Barney saw Fred beating Wilma, not only could he reasonably claim it was wrong, not only would he be morally bound to intervene but he would logically justified in so doing by acting on the only rational grounds available which is the preservation of the legitimate interests and rights of others.Seversky_{April 11, 2015
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WJM
That was the entire prior argument before you asked me specifically about my particular moral beliefs, mostly carried on in exchanges with you and Zachriel, culminating at #70 (#70 is not an exhaustive retelling of the entire argument – that’s just where I felt the case had been made conclusively). I covered both divine command and subjective morality, which – as far as I know – only leaves some form of NML, which was the premise for further discussion about my personal moral views.
Ah now I begin to understand. I had not realised how unusual your beliefs about morality are. #70 was not about proving NML correct but about proving subjectivism wrong (not that I accept the proof but that is another very old story). This only acts as an argument for NML if you believe that everything other than divine command theory and NML are subjective. This would be news to all those utilitarians, Kantians etc. Most of them believe that their theory is objective grounds for morality. You need to prove that all objective theories other than NML are either subjective or illogical. In other words what privileges your objective theory over all those other objective theories?Mark Frank_{April 11, 2015
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William J Murray: some form of NLM Natural law morality is not inconsistent with subjectivism, as long as you recognize that what may be natural and common for humans may not be natural or common for other organisms. A sentient mantis would probably have a different natural morality. Natural law typically relies on self-evidence, because humans are presumed to share the same moral outlook. William J Murray: (3) Subjectivist interventions cannot be based on morality at all, because determining what is moral for others to do is not a logically available commodity In subjectivism, moral precepts are not logical constructs, but are due to moral sensibilities conditioned by culture. William J Murray: People cannot live as if moral subjectivism is true (outside of sociopaths) because they make moral interventions when they find the acts of others to be immoral That is incoherent and implies you still don't understand subjectivism. A subjectivist certainly can attempt to impose their moral standards on others, if that is what their moral standards imply.Zachriel_{April 11, 2015
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Mark Frank said:
Most people, whatever their view of morality (including us subjectivists) go through much the same process. We all have consciences that prompt us in our moral opinions. We all use logic to assess whether our opinions are consistent. We all examine the consequences of moral statements.
As I have said repeatedly. I've never argued that there is a behavioral difference.
The difference lies in the ultimate justification for those opinions.
And whether or not those ultimate justifications can properly ground views expressed, judgements and behaviors.
Utilitarians justify in terms of greatest happiness, Kantians in terms of categorical imperatives, subjectivists accept that there is no ultimate justification but there is a lot of agreement in practice.
Unless utilitarians and kantians hold that their morality is objective in nature, those systems are subsets of subjective morality, and so are ultimately justified by "because I feel like it", becuase the individual feels like utilitarianism or kantianism (?) are the best models for morality.
You need to explain why your ultimate justification (the NML) is superior to all these others – which takes us back to 1.
But then you say:
We are drifting into your attack on subjectivism which has been done many, many times. I want to explore your own morality for a change.
You are the one taking the argument back to the attack on subjectivism. I've already shown conclusively, IMO, why NLM is the only viable moral system and why I've adopted it as the foundational model for my moral system. If you want to learn more about my moral system, why are you still asking me to justify why I've chosen that moral system in the first place? Justifying why I picked NLM necessitates "attacks" on both subjective and divine command morality.William J Murray_{April 11, 2015
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Mark Frank: Yes – but what makes NML “the only potentially rational category of morality”? That was the entire prior argument before you asked me specifically about my particular moral beliefs, mostly carried on in exchanges with you and Zachriel, culminating at #70 (#70 is not an exhaustive retelling of the entire argument - that's just where I felt the case had been made conclusively). I covered both divine command and subjective morality, which - as far as I know - only leaves some form of NLM, which was the premise for further discussion about my personal moral views.
As far as I can see the only argument you have presented is that other forms of morality lead to people denying moral statements that you find self-evidently true.
Well, it's disappointing that that's what you came away with, but not surprising. That would be an utterly ridiculous argument to make against subjective morality.
That is why it is relevant to debate whether there are actually any self-evidently true moral statements.
No, it's not. I'm not "debating" whether or not there are any self-evidently true moral statements; I'm describing to you (at this juncture) how I go about developing my NLM. Though the existence of self-evidently true moral statements can be used to support the existence of the claim that an objective morality exists, I have found the confusion and resistance to the phrase "self-evidently true" makes it too problematic to use in such an argument (about what category of morality is logically sustainable). I recently realized that it's just not necessary to use SETMS (self-evidently true moral statements) to make the case against subjective morality (as this thread makes clear). I used the GCT example not as an example of a SETMS, but to show the vacuity of both moral subjctivism and divine command; to wit: if GCT must be considered as potentially moral as anything else in a moral system, then the idea of morality is nonsense. Under NLM, I don't have to consider such a potential; if GCT is immoral by natural law, god cannot command it to be moral, and it's not moral for anyone at any time regardless of their views. I don't have to worry that it may be moral at some point or under some circumstances, rendering my moral system comprehensible and actionable.
If you have another argument for showing that all other approaches to morality are not rationally sustainable then by all means present it.
Already have - in this thread. In addition to the case above, I made the case here: https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/atheistsmaterialists-are-closet-moral-objectivists/ Which you participated in. However, I think #70 above clarifies the points I was making in the prior thread. To sum up: Under subjectivism: (1) Anything can be moral, by definition, as long as an individual thinks it is. Thus, subjective morality boils down to "because I feel like it". (2) Ultimately, all moral interventions reduce to the principle "because I feel like it, because I can" (3) Subjectivist interventions cannot be based on morality at all, because determining what is moral for others to do is not a logically available commodity (unless they tell you). (see #70 above) One subjectivist cannot determine what is moral for anyone else to do. (4) People cannot live as if moral subjectivism is true (outside of sociopaths) because they make moral interventions when they find the acts of others to be immoral (see #70 above). Divine Command morality is simply not a rational system, because anything can be moral for anyone at any particular time if god commands it. There would be no way to assess any of it because it would be completely arbitrary. This leaves NLM and developing a course of action to develop a reasonable, rational morality from that premise.William J Murray_{April 11, 2015
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#94 // on emergentism // I don’t wish to derail this thread, so I restrict myself to just one short note on emergentism – aka non-reductive materialism. If the intricate efforts to account for downward causation - ‘higher level’ causal influence on ‘lower levels’ - while (somehow) respecting the principle of physical causal closure, teach us anything then it is that wiggle room is infinitely small. Naturalism doesn't allow for real downward causation stemming from emergent "configurational powers" that are independent from the parts. Independent downward causation just cannot be established in any meaningful way. So, despite all efforts by emergentists, the dependence of the emergent whole on the physical parts remains such that nothing of true existence and relevant causal importance can ever arise. IOW emergentism cannot generate forces strong enough to account for the degree of control over our actions that we experience and must assume in order for us to regard ourselves as rational free agents who are capable of doing science amongst many other things.Box_{April 11, 2015
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LOF: Perhaps, this summary of core Christian morality has escaped your attention:
Rom 13:8 Keep out of debt and owe no man anything, except to love one another; for he who loves his neighbor [who practices loving others] has fulfilled the Law [relating to one’s fellowmen, meeting all its requirements]. 9 The commandments, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not kill [--> force here being, murder], You shall not steal, You shall not covet (have an evil desire), and any other commandment, are summed up in the single command, You shall love your neighbor as [you do] yourself. 10 Love does no wrong to one’s neighbor [it never hurts anybody]. Therefore love meets all the requirements and is the fulfilling of the Law. [AMP]
Where, murder in the womb, is still murder. Sorry if that is painfully blunt. But sometimes we need to plainly say: A is A. KF PS: On the latest push-point on the radical agenda, I have cited and commented on Dr Alveda C King, niece of MLK, here: http://kairosfocus.blogspot.com/2015/04/matt-24-watch-256-dr-alveda-c-king-of.html . . . with onward links. FYI, FTR.kairosfocus_{April 11, 2015
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Folks, Plato came by last night and reminded me to post his 2350 year old warning (and he said he was picked to do so by a delegation of 100 million ghosts of victims of radical secularist-anticlerical regimes in the past century or so):
Ath. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin")], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse], and not in legal subjection to them.
When objectivity of OUGHT is denied, one directly implies that grand delusion has been let loose in the human mind, without firewalls. Thus, immediately we have self referential absurdity . . . and litanies of the real or imagined sins of those you would dismiss cannot change that. Only, distract from it, cloud, confuse, polarise and poison the atmosphere. And, of course, the insistent dismissal of the reality of our being under proper moral government -- closely tied to the implication that if OUGHT is real, there is a world foundational IS that grounds it such that doing the right, good, just and true is "reasonable service" -- leaves us to just the premise Plato warned us against: might and manipulation make 'right,' 'good,' 'truth' etc. If that absurdity does not wake you up real fast and get your attention, bigtime, you are in deep, deep, deep en-darkenment pretending to be light, and are stupefied by the smoke from the fires projecting the bewitching agit-prop shadow shows on the wall of your cave of darkness. KFkairosfocus_{April 11, 2015
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WJM
Let’s make sure we stay on track and keep aware of what we’re talking about. Prior to you asking me about my “own beliefs about morality”, I was making an argument about the logical viability of moral subjectivism vs natural law objectivism.
Sure. Again – you have written rather a lot so I will skip to the summary.
1. Natural Law Morality is the only potentially rational category of morality that also describes how we all must act anyway;
Yes – but what makes NML “the only potentially rational category of morality”? As far as I can see the only argument you have presented is that other forms of morality lead to people denying moral statements that you find self-evidently true. That is why it is relevant to debate whether there are actually any self-evidently true moral statements. If you have another argument for showing that all other approaches to morality are not rationally sustainable then by all means present it.
2. The only way forward under NLM is by trusting the conscience to at least observe fundamental moral truths while humbly admitting our fallibility even then and using logic and introspection to refine our understanding of the moral landscape and our conscience and better realize the difference between our moral sense and subjective, personal feelings.
Most people, whatever their view of morality (including us subjectivists) go through much the same process. We all have consciences that prompt us in our moral opinions. We all use logic to assess whether our opinions are consistent. We all examine the consequences of moral statements. The difference lies in the ultimate justification for those opinions. Utilitarians justify in terms of greatest happiness, Kantians in terms of categorical imperatives, subjectivists accept that there is no ultimate justification but there is a lot of agreement in practice. You need to explain why your ultimate justification (the NML) is superior to all these others – which takes us back to 1.
A couple of questions for you, Mark: Do you not think there is a difference between finding something abhorrent and finding something immoral? Do you not think it is possible for you to not find a thing abhorrent at all but still know it is immoral?
We are drifting into your attack on subjectivism which has been done many, many times. I want to explore your own morality for a change.Mark Frank_{April 11, 2015
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"Last I checked, wasn’t it the Christians who were anti-abortion?" Not all Christians.lack of Focus_{April 11, 2015
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Really? Please explain to me the difference? Or do you think that killing babies is morally OK?
Last I checked, wasn't it the Christians who were anti-abortion?computerist_{April 11, 2015
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The belief that there are objective moral truths is an opinion, often religiously based. The fact that societal morals have changed over time is strong evidence that this opinion is wrong. The belief in objective morality, however, can be very dangerous. At one time it was considered morally acceptable, if not imperative, to kill homosexuals and adulterers. There are still some barbaric societies that believe it is morally acceptable to murder people.lack of Focus_{April 10, 2015
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Joe: "lack of Focus- There is a difference between sacrificing a baby and torturing a baby for your own pleasure." Really? Please explain to me the difference? Or do you think that killing babies is morally OK?lack of Focus_{April 10, 2015
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MF @ 89:
The whole debate is about whether there is such a thing as the actual truth or just opinions. That is why I could not answer the question as you phrased it.
I have a little more time to devote to this. As I said in comment 93, of course Mark Frank can answer the question as posed. Since he appears to be afraid to do so, I will answer it based on the conclusions to which materialist premises compel one to go. Barry: Mark, is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? Mark: The answer to your question is that my metaphysics compel me to say that the phrase “affirmatively good thing” is all but meaningless in the sense you are using it. There is no such thing as “good.” There is no such thing as “evil.” There is only my personal preferences competing with everyone else’s personal preferences, and all of those personal preferences can be reduced to the impulses caused by the electro-chemical processes of each person’s brain. Certainly there is no external standard by which we can discern whether the personal preferences resulting from the electro-chemical processes in my brain are in any sense morally superior to the personal preferences resulting from the electro-chemical processes in anyone else’s brain. It follows, Barry, that if by the “good” you mean the desirable and by the desirable you mean that which a person actually desires, then of course I can imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing. In fact, we live in just such a universe. How do I know? Because certain people have in fact desired to torture an infant to death for personal pleasure. On the other hand, if by “good” you mean “conforms to an external moral standard," the question is, as I said, meaningless, because no such standard exists. End of colloquy. Mark, it is up to you to tell me how any of the conclusions I’ve reached are not in fact compelled by materialist premises. WJM is correct. Very very few people actually live as if materialist metaphysics were actually true. And those people who do we call psychopaths.Barry Arrington_{April 10, 2015
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Zachriel: I appreciate the interaction. For now, however, I consider my case against subjective morality conclusive as of #70. Of course, I don't expect others to agree, but I'm satisified the case has been made for all open-minded, reasonable people not ideologically committed to moral subjectvism. All I'm doing now is explaining how I go about developing my NLM to Mark Frank. Howver, once again, I do appreciate the interaction. Developing the reasoning and succinct means of explaining that part of the argument was worth well worth the dozens of repetitive cycles of moral argument I've spent trying to understand and word it. :) IMOWilliam J Murray_{April 10, 2015
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William J Murray: While Zachriel has admitted to the significant points – that GCT is necessarily as moral as anything else (moral equivalence) That is not our position, as we already noted. Try again. Box: Show me an example of this alleged “non-reductive” materialism. Emergentism is a typical view within non-reductive materialism. You could start with the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199262618-e-7 William J Murray: Thus, Barney cannot say it is wrong for Fred to beat his wife with a club Of course he can. William J Murray: , because only Fred can say what is right or wrong for Fred to do. That is incorrect. Anyone can judge Fred's actions by their own moral code. Box (quoting): "It is the source of at least two other profound myths: that we have purposes that give our actions and lives meaning and that there is a person “in there” steering the body, so to speak." *So to speak.* He's using the term to refer to the conscious self. In any case, materialism represents a wide variety of views, so pointing to a single author shows that such a view exists, but not that it is the only possible interpretation of materialism. mike1962: There were societies that practiced child sacrifice because they were afraid of their god(s) and thought that the sacrifice would appease the god(s), but what societies practiced child torture for personal pleasure and thought it acceptable? There is little doubt that some child-sacrificing priests enjoyed their work, and derived religious satisfaction. In any case, we can imagine a universe of gods that requires such a sacrifice, so it is clearly within the realm of imaginable. Barry Arrington: I asked you: Is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? If you imagine other universes, then the person judging may not even exist. Most people would read the question to refer to the judgment of people who live in the alternative universe.Zachriel_{April 10, 2015
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Mark @ 89. Run baby run. Of course you can answer the question. You just refuse to do so. Why do you refuse to do so? I already covered that at comment 50, and you obligingly confirmed my comment there. Thank you.Barry Arrington_{April 10, 2015
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@Box:
No they don’t. Is it possible to imagine a square triangle?
Barry doesn't claim, that in his example "torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure" is defined as an "evil thing".JWTruthInLove_{April 10, 2015
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Mark Frank said:
The only absurdity or self-contradiction that I have seen you identify in denying that GCT is always wrong is that it is something you and I find abhorrent.
Let's make sure we stay on track and keep aware of what we're talking about. Prior to you asking me about my "own beliefs about morality", I was making an argument about the logical viability of moral subjectivism vs natural law objectivism. During that argument I used GCT as an example of the kind of thing logically-consistent moral subjectivists must admit are, in principle, under moral subjectivism, as moral as anything else by definition. This is important to remember: first I've committed to natural law morality because it is the only rationally sustainable categorical form of morality, and not because I've shown or even necessarily believe that self-evidently true moral statements exist. The categorical argument precedes my subsequent search for self-evidently true moral arguments in the pursuit of fleshing out my moral code (which holds that morality refers to a natural law, objective landscape). Second,I am explaining to you my personal moral beleifs and how I come about them under the premise of NLM. I look for moral statements without which objective morality falls prey to the same irrational problems as subjectivism because I need to be diligent in not mistaking personal predilections and feelings for moral values. I'm looking for something I can reasonably be sure is a sound basis for any further fleshing out of my moral code. I'd like something as impervious to error as possible: one such statement is gratuitous child torture is immoral. Finding such statements certainly depends on using ones conscience, since it is considered (under the accepted moral category) the sensory perception of the actual moral landscape (even if fallible). Please note: it is only after I've established that NLM (natural law morality) is the only rationally sustainable form of morality that I then go about figuring out the best way to proceed - by cautiously looking for self-evidently true moral statements upon which I can reasonably found my moral code. Could I be wrong? Sure, but I still have to proceed as best I can under the presumption of NLM because it's the only kind of morality we're left with. None of that has anything to do with the feeling of "abhorrence". Mutual abhorrence doesn't indicate a self-evidently true moral statement any more than personal abhorrence indicates a thing is immoral at all. Let me give you an example: I find male gay sex incredibly abhorrent (in terms of Merriam-Websters definition of "abhor" - loathe, find repugnant). Even the thought of it makes me cringe. I have to turn away on such scenes in movies or TV. Does that mean that I find male gay sex immoral? No. I don't find it to be immoral at all. I just find it personally repulsive and emotionally disturbing. Actually, I find the thought of male gay sex more repulsive than the thought of GCT. However, my conscience doesn't sense that it is immoral, and I cannot make any logical case against it. In fact, I can make a pretty fair case in favor of it being moral (as an expression of love between two consenting adults). Given the prior commitment to NLM (under a different argument), if GCT can be a good, moral part of our NLM, then anything can be moral and there is no means by which to navigate our NLM landscape because we wouldn't be able to trust our conscience at all, not even to observe and sort out a basic framework. IOW, if GCT is moral and my conscience is that far out of whack with the moral reality; I might as well just give up trying to be a good person. So, to summarize: 1. Natural Law Morality is the only potentially rational category of morality that also describes how we all must act anyway; 2. The only way forward under NLM is by trusting the conscience to at least observe fundamental moral truths while humbly admitting our fallibility even then and using logic and introspection to refine our understanding of the moral landscape and our conscience and better realize the difference between our moral sense and subjective, personal feelings. A couple of questions for you, Mark: Do you not think there is a difference between finding something abhorrent and finding something immoral? Do you not think it is possible for you to not find a thing abhorrent at all but still know it is immoral?William J Murray_{April 10, 2015
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Barry Arrington: is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing?

LarTanner: It must be possible to imagine, since your very words conjure such an image.
No they don't. Is it possible to imagine a square triangle?Box_{April 10, 2015
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Barry #87
It conflates what some evil people might believe about a matter with the actual truth about the matter.
The whole debate is about whether there is such a thing as the actual truth or just opinions. That is why I could not answer the question as you phrased it.Mark Frank_{April 10, 2015
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Comment #87:
is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing?
It must be possible to imagine, since your very words conjure such an image. Now, a question for you. Why do you find it necessary to add the expression "for personal pleasure" to your question? Can you imagine a universe in which there is some intention that makes it actually, affirmatively good to torture an infant to death?LarTanner_{April 10, 2015
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MF @ 74. My prediction was confirmed. You did your level best to evade the obvious answer. Your evasion fails for a simple reason. It conflates what some evil people might believe about a matter with the actual truth about the matter. Let’s examine your statement.
. . . other people and societies have not only imagined such universes, they have believed they lived [in] such a universe.
Let us grant for the sake of argument that some evil people actually believe that torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing. That is not the question. I did not ask you whether you can imagine a universe in which some evil people mistakenly believe that torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing. I asked you a very different question. I asked you: Is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing? Some Nazis thought the Holocaust was a good thing. They were wrong. It was evil. Even if someone believes torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is an affirmatively good thing, they are wrong. It is evil. Now, I will ask you the question again. Try hard to read and answer the question I actually ask. Be honest with yourself just this once and try not to evade it: Mark, is it possible to imagine a universe in which torturing an infant to death for personal pleasure is actually an affirmatively good thing?Barry Arrington_{April 10, 2015
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Mark Frank: In that case we have no disagreement as we are talking about different subjects. Does it feel like that to you?
The thing is, when you use the word "evil" you probably do mean ontological evil. I suspect you just won't admit it or are in denial because you're afraid of facing the consequences of the reality of ontological evil. Otherwise you are merely highjacking the word "evil", which is dishonest. Why would you want to do that? Why not just stop using the word? Why not stop pretending there's any sort of equivalence between ontological evil and the subjective notions you're trying to pass off as "evil?" Child torture for pleasure is ontologically evil.mike1962_{April 10, 2015
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#83 mike1962
When you speak of “evil” and I speak of “evil” we are talking about different things.
In that case we have no disagreement as we are talking about different subjects. Does it feel like that to you?Mark Frank_{April 10, 2015
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