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Winds of change? Humanist deflates popcorn neuroscience

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In “Mind in the Mirror,” Raymond Tallis reflects on V.S. Ramachandran’s The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human, “Neuroscience can explain many brain functions, but not the mystery of consciousness”:

The subtitle of V.S. Ramachandran’s latest book prompts a question: Why should “A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human” be of particular interest? The answer is obvious if you believe, as so many do, that humans are essentially their brains. When a brain scientist speaks, we should pay attention, for “What makes us human” then boils down to what makes our brains special, compared with those of other highly evolved creatures.

RaymondTallis

Dr. Ramachandran and many others, including prominent philosophers like Daniel Dennett and Patricia and Paul Churchland, promise that neuroscience will help us understand not only the mechanism of brain functions (such as those that coordinate movement or underpin speech) but also key features of human consciousness. As of yet, though, we have no neural explanation of even the most basic properties of consciousness, such as the unity of self, how it is rooted in an explicit past and explicit future, how experience is owned and referred to a self, and how we are, or feel that we are, voluntary agents. Neuroscience, in short, has no way of accommodating everyday first-person being.

No, and neuroscience is often invoked to explain things it doesn’t:

Here, as elsewhere, the intellectual audit trail connecting the neuroscience to the things he claims to explain is fragile. For a start, mirror neurons have been observed not just in monkeys and humans but also in swamp sparrows, enabling them to learn to sing the songs they hear. They are admirable birds, but their cultural achievements are modest. Moreover, the existence in humans of a distinct mirror neuron system with properties such as “mind-reading” is still contested. At any rate, the claim that mirror neurons are a “specialized circuitry for social cognition” in humans is a death-defying leap beyond the humble “Monkey see, Monkey do” function they were first observed to have.

Tallis describes himself, at his own site, as a humanist.

He is emeritus professor of geriatric medicine at the University of Manchester, and will publish Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity, presumably a bash at evolutionary psychology and related pseudosciences.

It’s good to see actual humanists weighing in on these questions. Humanism had a respectable history before it was taken over by Darwin worshippers, at which point, the term might better have become “primatist.” What the new humanists were really interested in of human experience is what a chimpanzee could replicate. And once Apes R’ Us hit pop culture, it did considerable damage. After all, many people do not want to rise to the challenge of being human.

Hat tip: Stephanie West Allen at Brains on Purpose

More stories from The Mindful Hack, my blog on neuroscience and spirituality issues:

Comments
Above,
-”ID claims that each and every instance of CSI exceeding a certain threshold level (500 bits) is best explained as the work of an intelligent agent.” Has any darwinist produced any evidence to refute that?
If by "intelligent agent" you mean "human being" then this question makes sense and can be answered: No, only human beings have produced such things. Now, here's one for you: "AIGuy claims that each and every instance of intelligent agency requires CSI exceeding a 500 bit threshold". Has any IDist produced any evidence to refute that?
AIGUY: ”Trotting out probability calculations about life or physical constants does not constitute one single shred of evidence about how something with recognizable mental characteristics must have been involved” ABOVE: This is just dogma. There is no substance behind your words whatsoever.
You have a very weird view of what "dogma" is.
Beyond a certain probabilistic breaking point lies the impossible and if mindless happenstance cannot account for it then we must look elsewhere for the answer.
"Mindless happenstance" is not a satisfactory causal explanation for anything at all, of course. But if we don't know how something came about, we do indeed need to look for an answer. When you come up with one that explains how the CSI we observe in living systems and the physical constants, then I'll be interested to hear it so I can judge whether or not your explanation can be verified. If you invoke "intelligent agency" as your explanation then of course you'll need to provide an operationalized definition for that so we can decide if such a thing exists or not. Otherwise I will assume all you mean is what we already know about ("human beings and other animals"), which could not possibly be responsible for the phenomena we observe.
I could cite the law of excluded middle to put an end to this silly argument you’re trying to produce but I don’t even thing that’s necessary.
You're very confused - watch: 1) Either the universe was created by natural causes or it was created by supernatural magical self-organization. 2) You can't explain explain how natural causes can account for the existence of the universe. 3) Therefore the universe was created by supernatural magical self-organization. See - it's easy to use the excluded middle to prove any darn thing you'd like to :-) null,
Remember, what I consider ‘scientific’ depends in part on how others treat the word. Are you honestly making the claim here that we can infer nothing about the capabilities of designers, even ‘embodied designers’, such that if we were to come across a given artifact we couldn’t even make a reasonable inference based on the artifact itself?
OK, we'll leave science behind then. As to whether inferences are reasonable or not, that's a hard question obviously - some are and some aren't. I don't find inferring a human-like mind in something that is obviously nothing whatsoever like a human to be reasonable, but since we can't adjudicate these assessments by appeal to shared experience, let's just agree to disagree about that.
Unobserved, not unobservable. And really, I have to tell you? Let me ask this: What would constitute good evidence, a good definition of an intelligent agent, in your own view?
I do not believe there is any definition of "intelligent agent" that makes ID meaningful and allows us to judge the proposition against the evidence. If you disagree, let's hear your definition (fat chance of that :-)).
You didn’t say that. I was seeking clarification, because in the past – if I recall right – you specifically claimed to think computers were NOT thinking, were not conscious.
I would say that computers of today think without consciousness, that they make choices and decisions but lack libertarian free will, and that they have goals and desires but they are not consciously aware of them, and that they cannot experience emotions. Nobody can demonstrate that I am right or wrong about any of these things, for two different reasons. The first reason is because most of these propositions are analytic rather than synthetic, and the second reason is because the actual characteristics in question can't be observed.
Wait. Are you maintaining that ‘no mentalistic terms’ have been ‘operationalized’ – ever? No one has defined, say.. intentionality?
Of course ALL of the terms are operationalized... over and over again in every different conceivable fashion. Let us operationalize "intelligence", shall we? "Intelligence" is the ability to score over 70 on a Stanford-Binet IQ test, adminstered with a #2 pencil and a Scantron form. OK? Intentionality is a bit harder, but the beauty of operationalized definitions is that they cannot be wrong... by definition!
AIGUY: Yes, of course Searle agrees with me that a computer can say things to itself, metaphorically or not (I can build a computer that verbally instructs itself to do various things, listens to the instructions, and then even acts on them… or decides on the spot not to…). And nothing in your quote contradicts anything I said: Cognitivists of course believe that minds are rule-based, but I am not a cognitivist (although I was a long time ago). NULL: No, he doesn’t. Read what he wrote. The only way a computer ‘follows rules’ is, in Searle’s view, in a purely mechanical fashion. We impute mental behavior (the computer is following this rule!) to the machine.
Yes, that is what he thinks, and I disagree with him about that. I never denied that! What I said no competent philosopher would agree with is that one can refute functionalism or materialism by claiming "computers can't say to themselves 'I ought to do such-and-such'".
Unless you’re making the claim that a computer consciously decides ‘I am going to follow this rule’ – and has a ‘self’, and conscious thoughts of self.
I think we already have far too many undefined mentalistic terms floating about and needn't add 'self' to the mix. Anyway, computers decide things, know things, and yes (sorry Searle) understand things too - but I don't think they are conscious about it. Here I actually do agree with Dennett (and plenty of others): Intentional idioms like these don't really impute real characteristics to the entity, so there is nothing metaphorical about saying "my word processor keeps trying to reformat my paragraph because it thinks that I want to change the margins". When people object to using intentional idioms this way it is because they are associating sentience with them; even if they think there should be other differences, they can't come up with any.
But the alternate view is that, while we can’t get to the absolute certain truth, we can make inferences – and these inferences are scientific themselves.
Everybody makes inferences about everything all the time. They become scientific when they can be verified by appeal to shared experience. No such luck on the questions we're discussing.
Further, how am I not arguing in good faith? If I were defending ID as science while secretly not believing it were science, that would be one thing. I outright lay out my reasoning for all to see, and have done so repeatedly in the past. I’m just some guy – I don’t decide what science is for all. But I can decide what to treat or defend as science, based on the behavior of others.
Really - you have no opinion whatsoever about what distinguishes a scientific result from any other proposition?
You do have a low view of Dennett. Dawkins, sure, probably – I’ve no reason to deny that. Perhaps you’ll see my point about the uneven handling of one side v the other. (Remember, the NCSE bills itself as the premier defender of science, the frontline champions keeping metaphysics and philosophy out of science. Yet there’s Stenger, right on the recommended reading list. And that’s small potatoes compared to other nonsense they pull.)
Advocates on both sides overstate their case.aiguy
January 12, 2011
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AIG: Re 38: “ID” has added precisely zero evidence to ancient theological beliefs. If you call that scientific then I have no idea how you are using that word. Trotting out probability calculations about life or physical constants does not constitute one single shred of evidence about how something with recognizable mental characteristics must have been involved. 1 --> Are you able to show that Paley's discussion of the hypothesized self-replicating watch [already linked, 39] is not cogent? 2 --> Can you show us how the implications of the von Neumann self replicator do not consittute an advance that multiplies the force of Paley's inference on common sense? 3 --> Can you show us a case where digitally coded functionally specific complex information beyond 500 - 1,000 bits of storage capacity, is of known directly observed source, and the source is not an intelligent and skilled, knowledgeable designer? [If you cannot write English, you cannot write linguistically functional English text strings of over about 125 characters, for simple instance.] 4 --> Can you show us where Plato's trichotomy of main causal factors, chance, mechanical necessity, agency, has been superseded by reduction of the three to two or less, or augmented by a fourth? 5 --> Or, that said factors cannot be (and are not routinely) distinguished on empirical characteristics? (such as: (i) chance:fiweg35ygf, (ii) mechanical necessity: ggggggggggggg, (iii) art producing dFSCI, all in their priper context.) 6 --> Can you show that inference to best explanation on reliable sign is inductively improper? Or, that it is so untrustworthy that it is not generally used in inductive reasoning? 7 --> On what grounds do you dismiss the calculation that 1,000 2-state elements has 1.07*10^301 possible configs? Or that an observed cosmos of 10^80 or so atoms, changing state every 10^-45s for 4.3 * 10^17 s will go through some 4.3 *10^^142 states? Or that this is less than 1 in 10^150 of 10^301? 8 --> If not, then why are you so harshly dismissive of the observation that the search capacity of the observed cosmos is such that if it acts as a state search machine running at maximum reasonable capacity and rate [think of a cosmos of monkeys, typewriters, tables, paper and banana plantations], on a random walk starting from an arbitrary initial configuration, it would be unable to search out as much as 1 in 10^150 of the possible states of a 1,000 bit storage unit? 9 --> Is it then reasonable to suggest that chance based search strategies will be able to find islands of specific and complex function beyond that threshold in coded systems? 10 --> is it not true that, routinely, intelligent agents produce entities showing dFSCI beyond this threshold, on intelligence and knowledge, so that it is reasonable to infer from such dFSCI to intelligence as from sign to signified causal factor? 11 --> And, since DNA is just such a case of dFSCI, is it not therefore reasonable to infer on best explanation on reliable sign, that DNA is best explained on design? ______________ In short, the cited assertion reflects selective hyperskepticism, rather than any cogent rebuttal to the design inference. Now, further, we note that he inference is to a process, not to an identified, specific designer. That's fine so far. When we shift to the cosmos in which we observe the DNA, we find that it sits on a finely balanced operating point that on multiple parameters, creates a context in which C-chemistry, cell based, intelligent life can originate and thrive. A cosmos that credibly had a beginning 13.7 BYA. One that is therefore contingent -- and is caused. In turn, that points beyond itself (even through a multiverse, as already linked) to a root cause that is a necessary being, one that is intelligent and powerful enough to create a fit habitat for cell based life. The tone and want of substance as cited and as further found above, tell us that the harsh dismissal reflects a detestation of the conclusion, not the want of cogency in the point. And, if even a proof can be rejected on saying P => Q, NOT=Q so NOT=P, how much more an inference to best explanation. But, that comes at a stiff price. For, had there not been an issue in contention that provoked such ire, you would never have rejected the argument. How do we know that? Simple: you have routinely accepted posts in this thread as being produced by intelligent agents, not lucky noise. So, instinctively, you have acknowledged the power of dFSCI as a sign pointing to intelligent design. Similarly, you have recognised that functionally complex and purposeful effects -- posts -- have intelligent causes. All we are asking for is consistency and being willing to follow reasonable signs to where they point. And, unless you have clear evidence that a necessary being as the root of a cosmos with a beginning is IMPOSSIBLE, the fact of that beginning and the logic of necessary causal factors [if absent, they block an effect] implies thathere must be an adequate cause of such a finetuned cosmos. An intelligent extra-cosmic designer intending to produce a cosmos in which life is possible, is by far and away the best alternative. (Certainly, that is simpler than a quasi-infinite unobserved multiverse, with a cosmos-baking base-universe that is set up to produce a distribution of sub-cosmi that lo and behold covers a range that captures such an incredibly locally isolated finetuned sub-cosmos as we inhabit. Isolated flies on walls hit by bullets point to marksmen and rifles set up to tack-driving condition. ) G'night GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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-"Trotting out probability calculations about life or physical constants does not constitute one single shred of evidence about how something with recognizable mental characteristics must have been involved" This is just dogma. There is no substance behind your words whatsoever. Beyond a certain probabilistic breaking point lies the impossible and if mindless happenstance cannot account for it then we must look elsewhere for the answer. I could cite the law of excluded middle to put an end to this silly argument you're trying to produce but I don't even thing that's necessary.above
January 12, 2011
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aiguy, “ID” has added precisely zero evidence to ancient theological beliefs. If you call that scientific then I have no idea how you are using that word. Trotting out probability calculations about life or physical constants does not constitute one single shred of evidence about how something with recognizable mental characteristics must have been involved. Remember, what I consider 'scientific' depends in part on how others treat the word. Are you honestly making the claim here that we can infer nothing about the capabilities of designers, even 'embodied designers', such that if we were to come across a given artifact we couldn't even make a reasonable inference based on the artifact itself? And I pointed out that if you can’t even tell me what things in our experience qualify as thinking, intelligent, mindful entities, it hardly stands to reason that your “scientific theory” that attempts to explain the universe by invoking an unobservable “thinking mind” has an iota of validity. Unobserved, not unobservable. And really, I have to tell you? Let me ask this: What would constitute good evidence, a good definition of an intelligent agent, in your own view? Tu quoque Ain't effective when all I want is consistency. ;) Make no mistake: Every paper that invokes “intelligence” as an explanation of anything provides operationalized definitions, or it does not get published in a reputable journal. Why? Because in science every explanatory construct must be operationalized. This should be obvious to you. I have less faith in reputable journals than you do, clearly. Where did I say that? You are becoming very confused! I never said computers were conscious – where in the world did you get that idea? You didn't say that. I was seeking clarification, because in the past - if I recall right - you specifically claimed to think computers were NOT thinking, were not conscious. I’ll tell you where: Because none of these mentalistic terms are operationalized, so everyone constantly talks past each other, and we could argue about these questions for millenia without being able to resolve them by appeal to experience. Oh yeah… people have been doing that already. Wait. Are you maintaining that 'no mentalistic terms' have been 'operationalized' - ever? No one has defined, say.. intentionality? Yes, of course Searle agrees with me that a computer can say things to itself, metaphorically or not (I can build a computer that verbally instructs itself to do various things, listens to the instructions, and then even acts on them… or decides on the spot not to…). And nothing in your quote contradicts anything I said: Cognitivists of course believe that minds are rule-based, but I am not a cognitivist (although I was a long time ago). No, he doesn't. Read what he wrote. The only way a computer 'follows rules' is, in Searle's view, in a purely mechanical fashion. We impute mental behavior (the computer is following this rule!) to the machine. It is not, unless you're taking on some kind of interesting hylemorphism/hylozoism, 'following rules' consciously. You say 'Searle agrees with me that a computer can say things to itself, metaphorically or not' - as if the 'metaphorical' distinction isn't central here. He agrees, metaphorically, they can. Actually? No. He said it himself - the way a computer 'follows rules' is unlike the way a human 'follows rules'. Unless you're making the claim that a computer consciously decides 'I am going to follow this rule' - and has a 'self', and conscious thoughts of self. Instead let me put it this way: If you want to argue in good faith for consistency, then you must consistently treat all proposed solutions to the Big Mysteries according to the evidence. This means we must look at all current solutions and say “Sorry, we can’t judge if that is true or not because there are no observations we can make that would confirm that this cause exists and actually has the causal powers you attribute to it. So please do not present this as a scientific result.” But the alternate view is that, while we can't get to the absolute certain truth, we can make inferences - and these inferences are scientific themselves. Further, how am I not arguing in good faith? If I were defending ID as science while secretly not believing it were science, that would be one thing. I outright lay out my reasoning for all to see, and have done so repeatedly in the past. I'm just some guy - I don't decide what science is for all. But I can decide what to treat or defend as science, based on the behavior of others. I think the willingness to tolerate inconsistency and hypocrisy is what leads to these problems in the first place. I actually spend plenty of time ripping on Dawkins and Dennett myself, but it’s not hypocrisy to allocate one’s time unequally when condemning both parties in a debate. It’s only hypocrisy to apply different criteria yourself. So I would like to confirm the truth yourself, just between you and me and the rest of us oddballs that still participate in these forums. You do have a low view of Dennett. Dawkins, sure, probably - I've no reason to deny that. Perhaps you'll see my point about the uneven handling of one side v the other. (Remember, the NCSE bills itself as the premier defender of science, the frontline champions keeping metaphysics and philosophy out of science. Yet there's Stenger, right on the recommended reading list. And that's small potatoes compared to other nonsense they pull.)nullasalus
January 12, 2011
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@VJ -"ID claims that each and every instance of CSI exceeding a certain threshold level (500 bits) is best explained as the work of an intelligent agent." Has any darwinist produced any evidence to refute that?above
January 12, 2011
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F/N 2: Design, in the relevant sense for ID:
on family resemblance to known cases and our experience as designing intelligences:--
design is a causal process of intelligently directed configuration, shaping, adaptation or arrangement of components that fulfills a functional purpose/end/goal, and that often manifests functionally specific complex information, irreducibly complex function, or other characteristic, observable and reliable signs of design.
For instance in this sense the ASCII text strings used to create this definition are designed, and fulfill a linguistic function. A similar symbol string that implements object code on a computer is also designed, and the computer is designed.
The UD Glossary has a relevant set of definitions, that onlookers, has repeatedly been brought to AIG's attention previously. Excerpting: ____________________ >>Chance – undirected contingency. That is, events that come from a cluster of possible outcomes, but for which there is no decisive evidence that they are directed; especially where sampled or observed outcomes follow mathematical distributions tied to statistical models of randomness. (E.g. which side of a fair die is uppermost on tossing and tumbling then settling.) Contingency – here, possible outcomes that (by contrast with those of necessity) may vary significantly from case to case under reasonably similar initial conditions. (E.g. which side of a die is uppermost, whether it has been loaded or not, upon tossing, tumbling and settling.). Contingent [as opposed to necessary] beings begin to exist (and so are caused), need not exist in all possible worlds, and may/do go out of existence. Necessity — here, events that are triggered and controlled by mechanical forces that (together with initial conditions) reliably lead to given – sometimes simple (an unsupported heavy object falls) but also perhaps complicated — outcomes. (Newtonian dynamics is the classical model of such necessity.) In some cases, sensitive dependence on [or, “to”] initial conditions may leads to unpredictability of outcomes, due to cumulative amplification of the effects of noise or small, random/ accidental differences between initial and intervening conditions, or simply inevitable rounding errors in calculation. This is called “chaos.” Design — purposefully directed contingency. That is, the intelligent, creative manipulation of possible outcomes (and usually of objects, forces, materials, processes and trends) towards goals. (E.g. 1: writing a meaningful sentence or a functional computer program. E.g. 2: loading of a die to produce biased, often advantageous, outcomes. E.g. 3: the creation of a complex object such as a statue, or a stone arrow-head, or a computer, or a pocket knife.) Contingencies – possible outcomes that (by contrast with those of necessity) may vary significantly from case to case under reasonably similar initial conditions. (E.g. which side of a die is uppermost, whether it has been loaded or not, upon tossing, tumbling and settling.). Contingent [as opposed to necessary] beings begin to exist (and so are caused), need not exist in all possible worlds, and may/do go out of existence. Information — Wikipedia, with some reorganization, is apt: “ . . that which would be communicated by a message if it were sent from a sender to a receiver capable of understanding the message . . . . In terms of data, it can be defined as a collection of facts [i.e. as represented or sensed in some format] from which conclusions may be drawn [and on which decisions and actions may be taken].” Intelligence – Wikipedia aptly and succinctly defines: “capacities to reason, to plan, to solve problems, to think abstractly, to comprehend ideas, to use language, and to learn.” Intelligent design [ID] – Dr William A Dembski, a leading design theorist, has defined ID as “the science that studies signs of intelligence.” That is, as we ourselves instantiate [thus exemplify as opposed to “exhaust”], intelligent designers act into the world, and create artifacts. When such argents act, there are certain characteristics that commonly appear, and that – per massive experience — reliably mark such artifacts. It it therefore a reasonable and useful scientific project to study such signs and identify how we may credibly reliably infer from empirical sign to the signified causal factor: purposefully directed contingency or intelligent design. Among the signs of intelligence of current interest for research are: [a] FSCI — function-specifying complex information [e.g. blog posts in English text that take in more than 143 ASCII characters, and/or -- as was highlighted by Yockey and Wickens by the mid-1980s -- as a distinguishing marker of the macromolecules in the heart of cell-based life forms], or more broadly [b] CSI — complex, independently specified information [e.g. Mt Rushmore vs New Hampshire's former Old Man of the mountain, or -- as was highlighted by Orgel in 1973 -- a distinguishing feature of the cell's information-rich organized aperiodic macromolecules that are neither simply orderly like crystals nor random like chance-polymerized peptide chains], or [c] IC – multi-part functionality that relies on an irreducible core of mutually co-adapted, interacting components. [e.g. the hardware parts of a PC or more simply of a mousetrap; or – as was highlighted by Behe in the mid 1990's -- the bacterial flagellum and many other cell-based bodily features and functions.], or [d] “Oracular” active information – in some cases, e.g. many Genetic Algorithms, successful performance of a system traces to built-in information or organisation that guides algorithmic search processes and/or performance so that the system significantly outperforms random search. Such guidance may include oracles that, step by step, inform a search process that the iterations are “warmer/ colder” relative to a performance target zone. (A classic example is the Weasel phrase search program.) Also, [e] Complex, algorithmically active, coded information – the complex information used in systems and processes is symbolically coded in ways that are not preset by underlying physical or chemical forces, but by encoding and decoding dynamically inert but algorithmically active information that guides step by step execution sequences, i.e. algorithms. (For instance, in hard disk drives, the stored information in bits is coded based a conventional, symbolic assignment of the N/S poles, forces and fields involved, and is impressed and used algorithmically. The physics of forces and fields does not determine or control the bit-pattern of the information – or, the drive would be useless. Similarly, in DNA, the polymer chaining chemistry is effectively unrelated to the information stored in the sequence and reading frames of the A/ G/ C/ T side-groups. It is the coded genetic information in the successive three-letter D/RNA codons that is used by the cell’s molecular nano- machines in the step by step creation of proteins. Such DNA sets from observed living organisms starts at 100,000 – 500,000 four-state elements [200 k – 1 M bits], abundantly meriting the description: function- specifying, complex information, or FSCI.) Irreducible Complexity, IC — A system performing a given basic function is irreducibly complex if it includes a set of well-matched, mutually interacting, nonarbitrarily individuated parts such that each part in the set is indispensable to maintaining the system’s basic, and therefore original, function. The set of these indispensable parts is known as the irreducible core of the system. (Dembski, No Free Lunch, p. 285 [HT: D O'L]) >> __________________ I believe the above should be enough to make it clear what design proponents typically mean when they use design-related vocabulary. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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vjt,
I’ve finally figured out what’s bugging you. You seem to be laboring under a misapprehension: that ID purports to explain the origin of life or CSI, as a whole. It doesn’t! ID claims that each and every instance of CSI exceeding a certain threshold level (500 bits) is best explained as the work of an intelligent agent.
I was aware of this, yes. That is not what is bugging me. What is bugging me primarily is that ID uses the concept of "intelligent agent" as though everyone knows and agrees on what that means. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The concept of agency is used in philosophy (usually moral philosophy, sometimes philosophy of mind) or sometimes in fields like sociology. In those fields agency is discussed deeply: What is an agent? What distinguishes agents from non-agents? Do agents, according to some particular definition, exist or not? In contrast, "ID Theory" uses the term without clarification or qualification. Worse still, ID invokes this notion as an explanation for observed phenomena. This renders ID specious, unscientific, meaningless, and really annoying.
ID doesn’t claim that there is one intelligent agent (or group of agents) that produced all instances of life and CSI in our cosmos. To make that inference would be to commit the Fallacy of Composition.
None of this is relevant to my argument at all.
Even if we never find the ultimate source (or sources) of CSI in our cosmos, the discovery that an intelligent agent or agents produced life on Earth is still a useful one, and well worth knowing. I think most people would be fascinated to learn that.
If by "intelligent agent(s)" you mean alien life forms, then I understand what you mean, and yes that would be a terribly exciting discovery. Unfortunately people have been talking about that for a very long time, but there isn't a scrap of evidence that alien life forms even exist, much less brought life to Earth. If by "intelligent agent(s)" you mean something that isn't a life form at all, then I really don't have any idea what you might be talking about, and so it seems impossible to judge whether or not that idea has any merit. If you decide to characterize this thing in such a way that we might look to see if such a thing exists or not, then we could talk about that. And please don't imagine that the very phenomena you are trying to explain (certain high-CSI features of biology, say) constitutes evidence that your particular conception of the "intelligent agent" responsible actually exists! That mistake is endlessly tiresome. Just in case you're tempted, let me illustrate the problem: Q: What accounts for crop circles? A: The crop-circle-creation-force. Q: How do you know a crop-circle creation force exists? A: Just look at all the crop circles!
Incidentally, your assertion that “there is no evidence that anything with a brain existed before life on Earth” is unduly dogmatic, even by your standards. I could understand if you insisted on a material intelligence, but why should it need a brain as such? Surely that’s being rather parochial. Intelligent animals need brains; intelligent agents may or may not.
By "brain" I refer to a complex (high-CSI if you will) physical information-processing mechanism. Information processing mechanisms are capable of assuming large numbers of discrete physical states. If ID attempts to account for the initial origin of high-CSI mechanisms by invoking "intelligence", then it is invoking something that - as far as our experience-based knowledge confirms - invariably is (or contains) a high-CSI mechanism. That is logically impossible of course.
However, I would also like to note in passing that you have made a highly questionable assumption: that all intelligent agents are animals. We don’t know that; all we can say is that we’ve never encountered an agent in a laboratory who isn’t an animal. The neuroscientific findings you cite only apply to animals; they cannot be extrapolated beyond animals.
If you provide a useful definition of "intelligent agent" then we can decide this question; until then we can't. Since we can't even tell what things on Earth are "intelligent agents" and what things aren't, it seems pretty silly to imagine that we can decide if some unspecified, unobservable thing(s) that produced flagella and eyeballs and set the strength of the strong nuclear force was an intelligent agent or not.
Finally, let me state in passing that I have ten years’ experience as a computer programmer and analyst/programmer. I can’t claim any expertise on AI, but having worked with computers, I have acquired a healthy disrespect for them. Really, they’re just very sophisticated toys, and they don’t impress me.
Ahahahahahaha. Watch the upcoming Jeoparday challenge! Anyway, like your other claims, we can't really debate the point unless you operationalize your definitions (what is a toy and what isn't?).aiguy
January 12, 2011
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AIG: F/N: I believe you would benefit from reading the introductory survey on ID at NWEhttp://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Intelligent_design. (NB: It is common for NWE articles to start from the relevant Wiki article and do an editorial cleanup, giving credit to Wiki. This one is a start from scratch, which should tell you something.) Excerpting the opening statement: _______________ >> Intelligent design (ID) is the view that it is possible to infer from empirical evidence that "certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection" [1] Intelligent design cannot be inferred from complexity alone, since complex patterns often happen by chance. ID focuses on just those sorts of complex patterns that in human experience are produced by a mind that conceives and executes a plan. According to adherents, intelligent design can be detected in the natural laws and structure of the cosmos [I add: i.e. fine tuning that sets the cosmos at a delicately balanced operating point friendly to C-chemistry, cell based, intelligent life (also cf here for more elaborate discussions)]; it also can be detected in at least some features of living things [I add: e.g. the digitally coded functionally specific complex and algorithm-implementing information and related organisation in DNA and associated elements in the cell]. Greater clarity on the topic may be gained from a discussion of what ID is not considered to be by its leading theorists. Intelligent design generally is not defined the same as creationism, with proponents maintaining that ID relies on scientific evidence rather than on Scripture or religious doctrines. ID makes no claims about biblical chronology, and technically a person does not have to believe in God to infer intelligent design in nature. As a theory, ID also does not specify the identity or nature of the designer, so it is not the same as natural theology, which reasons from nature to the existence and attributes of God. [I add: so the illustration of a Paleyan watch at Wiki is inapt and strawmannish, especially as Paley does make a legitimate and detachable inference to design argument on the watch that includes in Ch 2, a discussion of the implication of a self-replicating watch, which I have simply never seen addressed by those who dismiss him -- a lot of good science has been done by people along the way of trying to do something else] ID does not claim that all species of living things were created in their present forms, and it does not claim to provide a complete account of the history of the universe or of living things. ID also is not considered by its theorists to be an "argument from ignorance"; that is, intelligent design is not to be inferred simply on the basis that the cause of something is unknown (any more than a person accused of willful intent can be convicted without evidence). According to various adherents, ID does not claim that design must be optimal; something may be intelligently designed even if it is flawed (as are many objects made by humans). ID may be considered to consist only of the minimal assertion that it is possible to infer from empirical evidence that some features of the natural world are best explained by an intelligent agent. It conflicts with views claiming that there is no real design in the cosmos (e.g., materialistic philosophy) or in living things (e.g., Darwinian evolution) or that design, though real, is undetectable (e.g., some forms of theistic evolution). Because of such conflicts, ID has generated considerable controversy . . . >> __________________ You will see that this article is utterly different from the ideologically loaded strawmannish mischaracterisation at Wiki. Similarly, you might benefit from a scan through the weak argument correctives at the top right this and every UD page. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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null,
We do not know with certainty? Sure
We have no reason to think we know at all.
But ID doesn’t claim otherwise – what is claimed is that we can, at this moment, with the knowledge we have, make certain inferences, and that such inferences are scientific. If you think ID touts itself as demonstrating utter truth, you’ve not been following ID much.
"ID" has added precisely zero evidence to ancient theological beliefs. If you call that scientific then I have no idea how you are using that word. Trotting out probability calculations about life or physical constants does not constitute one single shred of evidence about how something with recognizable mental characteristics must have been involved. I have no evidence to support any particular theory of how and why the universe exists as it does. Neither do you.
No, it’s subject to exactly the problems and limitations I’ve mentioned. They’re pretty common sense limitations of such investigations – you yourself spoke of operational definitions. I’m just pointing it out.
And I pointed out that if you can't even tell me what things in our experience qualify as thinking, intelligent, mindful entities, it hardly stands to reason that your "scientific theory" that attempts to explain the universe by invoking an unobservable "thinking mind" has an iota of validity.
Only if you freely redefine the boundaries of science, of what counts as support, and cast a blind eye towards what others are doing in that regard.
Tu quoque
I’ve noted repeatedly that ID makes inferences about design, and that said inferences do not require a mind to be utterly immaterial. My point on these definitions of ‘thought’ and ‘intelligence’ was more general, and related to the Menuge comments.
You failed to define "design" - because you have no definition that makes ID both meaningful and testable. Until you come up with definitions, ID is nonsense. Dembski tosses out ridiculously detailed calculations, probability bounds, pages of math... and then refuses to say what his conclusion might actually mean. What a joke.
My being correct comes at a price. We can’t decide, but we can come up with definitions and see how far we get with said definitions. These definitions may not be full-proof, they may involve some a prioris, and yet progress can be made – ...
Then DO IT! Don't just pretend that these definitions exist - tell me what they are! design (verb): design (noun): designer (noun): intelligent (adj): intelligence (noun): think (verb):
...and in other contexts, this is treated as scientific
Make no mistake: Every paper that invokes "intelligence" as an explanation of anything provides operationalized definitions, or it does not get published in a reputable journal. Why? Because in science every explanatory construct must be operationalized. This should be obvious to you.
AIGUY: Uh, no, I am not wrong about this at all. Read the post again: Neither Searle nor any other philosopher argues against functionalism or materialism by claiming that “A computer just processes information. It can’t say to itself: ‘I ought to do it this way, and not that way’”. Obviously a computer can “say to itself” precisely that, and they do that all the time. I had previously said I don’t happen to think thought proceeds by following rules, but I didn’t say that all philosophers agreed with that. NULL: A computer has a self?
You disagree??? GREAT!!!! Just tell me the operationalized definiton of "self" and we can see who is right? Is it becoming clear that these discussions have no place in science? I hope so.
It has consciousness? When last we spoke about this, you said you didn’t believe these things.
Where did I say that? You are becoming very confused! I never said computers were conscious - where in the world did you get that idea? I'll tell you where: Because none of these mentalistic terms are operationalized, so everyone constantly talks past each other, and we could argue about these questions for millenia without being able to resolve them by appeal to experience. Oh yeah... people have been doing that already.
As for Searle, from 47 of Minds, Brains and Science: “Now, the moral for this discussion of cognitivism can be put very simply: In the sense in which human beings follow rules (and incidentally human beings follow rules a whole lot less than cognitivists claim they do), in that sense computers don’t follow rules at all. They only act in accord with certain formal procedures. The program of the computer determines the various steps the machinery will go through; it determines how one state will be transformed into a subsequent state. And we can speak metaphorically as if this were a matter of following rules. But in the literal sense in which human beings follow rules computers do not follow rules, they only act as if they are following rules.” (His emphasis, not mine.) Yes, Searle would agree a computer can “say to itself” this or that. Quotes included. Treated as a metaphor.
Yes, of course Searle agrees with me that a computer can say things to itself, metaphorically or not (I can build a computer that verbally instructs itself to do various things, listens to the instructions, and then even acts on them... or decides on the spot not to...). And nothing in your quote contradicts anything I said: Cognitivists of course believe that minds are rule-based, but I am not a cognitivist (although I was a long time ago).
And the truth of the matter is there’s nothing innately dishonest about arguing for consistency, anymore than it’s necessarily dishonest for the definition of science to be argued about.
Let me retract my complaint about your "honesty" because it's too harsh for what your point is, sorry. Instead let me put it this way: If you want to argue in good faith for consistency, then you must consistently treat all proposed solutions to the Big Mysteries according to the evidence. This means we must look at all current solutions and say "Sorry, we can't judge if that is true or not because there are no observations we can make that would confirm that this cause exists and actually has the causal powers you attribute to it. So please do not present this as a scientific result."
But hypocrisy, beating up on one group for their excesses and candidly ignoring another, more prominent group’s excesses, for violating the same “rule”s? I question that.
I do not expect you to start writing letters to Dembski and Meyer and Behe; I expect you instead to complain to Stenger and Dawkins and Coyne. I actually spend plenty of time ripping on Dawkins and Dennett myself, but it's not hypocrisy to allocate one's time unequally when condemning both parties in a debate. It's only hypocrisy to apply different criteria yourself. So I would like to confirm the truth yourself, just between you and me and the rest of us oddballs that still participate in these forums :-)aiguy
January 12, 2011
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aiguy (#35) I just noticed your comment:
ONE MORE TIME: By the law of the excluded middle, the Designer of ID must either 1) have been a living thing and relied on a complex, physical information processing mechanism (like a brain) as all intelligent animals do, or 2) not. We look at these two mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: Under hypothesis (1) ID does not explain the origin of life or CSI, and instead merely reiterates what we all already know, that life begets life and complex machinery begets complex machinery. Also there is no evidence that anything with a brain existed before life on Earth. Hypothesis (2) is worse, since there is no evidence to support it and it contradicts neuroscientific findings.
I've finally figured out what's bugging you. You seem to be laboring under a misapprehension: that ID purports to explain the origin of life or CSI, as a whole. It doesn't! ID claims that each and every instance of CSI exceeding a certain threshold level (500 bits) is best explained as the work of an intelligent agent. ID doesn't claim that there is one intelligent agent (or group of agents) that produced all instances of life and CSI in our cosmos. To make that inference would be to commit the Fallacy of Composition. If you want a global explanation of the origin of all life and all CSI, please contact the philosophy department on a campus near you, and find a theistic philosopher who is willing to assist you. ID is a scientific program; as such, it has certain limitations. ID alone cannot tell us whether an immaterial agent produced all CSI in our cosmos - that's not a scientific assertion. But the statement that an intelligent agent is required to produce CSI exceeding a certain threshold level of complexity is a falsifiable scientific assertion. You assert that under hypothesis (1), ID "merely reiterates what we all already know, that life begets life and complex machinery begets complex machinery." No. ID asserts that intelligent agents are required to produce living things from non-living matter, and that only intelligent agents can produce complex machinery. Even if these agents happen to be composed of machinery, the point is that it's their intelligence that's critical to explaining what they produce. To assert that intelligent agents are required to produce living things from non-living matter is not "reiterating" anything - it's a genuinely informative scientific result, especially as many scientists continue to labor under the misapprehension that life on Earth arose without any input of intelligent agency. Even if we never find the ultimate source (or sources) of CSI in our cosmos, the discovery that an intelligent agent or agents produced life on Earth is still a useful one, and well worth knowing. I think most people would be fascinated to learn that. Incidentally, your assertion that "there is no evidence that anything with a brain existed before life on Earth" is unduly dogmatic, even by your standards. I could understand if you insisted on a material intelligence, but why should it need a brain as such? Surely that's being rather parochial. Intelligent animals need brains; intelligent agents may or may not. As for hypothesis (2), ID neither asserts it nor precludes it. We should keep an open mind. However, I would also like to note in passing that you have made a highly questionable assumption: that all intelligent agents are animals. We don't know that; all we can say is that we've never encountered an agent in a laboratory who isn't an animal. The neuroscientific findings you cite only apply to animals; they cannot be extrapolated beyond animals. Finally, let me state in passing that I have ten years' experience as a computer programmer and analyst/programmer. I can't claim any expertise on AI, but having worked with computers, I have acquired a healthy disrespect for them. Really, they're just very sophisticated toys, and they don't impress me.vjtorley
January 12, 2011
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aiguy Thank you for your comments. First, I'd like to go back to an earlier comment of yours:
I’m not arguing against dualism. I’m pointing out that neural mechanisms are known to be responsible for memory, emotion, planning, problem solving, personality, and so on. We don’t understand consciousness, and it could still be true that certain aspects of cognition require mechanisms/processes/effects that are still fundamentally unknown (a la Penrose for example).
If you believe that neural mechanisms are responsible for the distinctively human operations that people do - solving problems, planning ahead and so on - then in my book, that makes you effectively a materialist. Even if you were to maintain that "some aspects of cognition" may possibly be non-material, they seem to not do any real work in your scheme of things. So at best, you're an epiphenomenalist, which still makes you a kind of materialist. You also write:
But in any event, I’m not even arguing for materialism! All I’m saying is that minds do not appear to function without the action of complex machinery.
"Do not appear to function" or "cannot function"? Which is it? If the former, then why are you so skeptical regarding the possibility of an immaterial intelligence, simply because of experiments performed in the laboratory on one planet, and on one species of intelligent being, over a very short sliver of the history of the cosmos (100 years, compared with the 13.7 billion years that the cosmos has existed)? The fact that a gigantic number of experiments have been performed is simply irrelevant: the sample is biased, because it is confined to a single species, and a single planet. But if you mean "cannot function", then you are dogmatically asserting that minds - of whatever stripe - cannot function without underlying complex machinery. Now, I suggested to you previously the possibility that the dependence of the human mind on the underlying machinery of the brain is merely extrinsic (like that of plants on soil), rather than intrinsic as many scientists think. You rejected this proposal, so I take it you think that minds are intrinsically dependent on some sort of complex machinery. But if that's what you believe, then that makes you a materialist. In which case, I have to say I am perplexed by your bizarre denial that you are arguing for materialism. You must have a very strange definition of materialism. Second, I'd like to ask whether you have actually read Dr. Oderberg's article, Concepts, Dualism, and the Human Intellect . Judging from your comment:
You can imagine brains are unnecessary, sure... but you could also imagine that complex form and function pops into existence without intelligent cause!
... you seem to think that the principal argument against materialism is that I can conceive of thought occurring without a brain - which suggests to me that you haven't read Oderberg's article. Now, I quite agree with you that conceivability proves little or nothing regarding real possibility. I can conceive of a winged horse, but that doesn't make it possible. In fact, however, the arguments against materialism are far more philosophically sophisticated than you seem to think. On my Website, at http://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/whybelieve2.html#soul-formal , I list no less than seven major arguments against materialism, with links to essays by leading philosophers of mind. I would invite you to peruse these essays. Later on, I also discuss transcendental and phenomenological arguments, as well as attempted reductio ad absurdum arguments, but I attach less importance to these. I regard the seven formal arguments as the best. You seem to think that my claim that computers can't follow rules is a "very naive challenge" to strong AI. Methinks you haven't read the literature. Here are a few good links that will set you straight: Conscious computers are a delusion by Professor Raymond Tallis. Minds and machines by Dr. Gerard Casey. Immaterial Aspects of Thought by Professor James Ross. I would also like to note in passing that you have nowhere defined "machine." Third, regarding Near-Death Experiences, you wrote to Dala (#28):
And about the NDEs – If you think this is strong evidence for the existence of mind that can operate independently of mechanism, then this is a very important result. If true, it would convince me and many other people that an immaterial mind may have been responsible for creating life. So this is crucial to ID! Why do you think no major ID authors mention anything like this in their books?
OK. You want links? Here they are, courtesy of bornagain77. The Day I Died – Part 4 of 6 – The Extremely 'Monitored' Near Death Experience of Pam Reynolds – video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4045560 The Scientific Evidence for Near Death Experiences – Dr Jeffery Long – Melvin Morse M.D. – video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4454627 Blind Woman Can See During Near Death Experience (NDE) – Pim von Lommel – video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/3994599/ Kenneth Ring and Sharon Cooper (1997) conducted a study of 31 blind people, many of who reported vision during their Near Death Experiences (NDEs). 21 of these people had had an NDE while the remaining 10 had had an out-of-body experience (OBE), but no NDE. It was found that in the NDE sample, about half had been blind from birth. (of note: This ‘anomaly’ is also found for deaf people who can hear sound during their Near Death Experiences(NDEs).) http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2320/is_1_64/ai_65076875/ Enjoy! Fourth, you have asserted on this post that ID does not define "design." Here are two definitions from The Design of Life by Professor William Dembski and Dr. Jonathan Wells:
design (as entity) An event, object or structure that an intelligence brought about by matching means to ends. design (as process) A four-part process by which a DESIGNER forms a designed object: (1) A designer conceives a purpose. (2) To accomplish that purpose, the designer forms a plan. (3) To execute that plan, the designer specifies building materials and assembly instructions. (4) The designer or some surrogate applies the assembly instructions to the building materials. What emerges is a designed object. The designer is successful to the extent that the object fulfills the designer's purpose. designer An intelligent agent that arranges material structures to accomplish a purpose. Whether this agent is personal or impersonal, part of nature or beyond nature, active through miraculous intervention or through ordinary physical causes are all possibilities within the theory of INTELLIGENT DESIGN. In particular, a designer need not be a CREATOR.
I hope that answers your questions. Finally, I'd like to address your central claim that if life on Earth (and elsewhere in the cosmos) was designed, then the Designer must have been immaterial. ID doesn't assert this. You could, if you wished, maintain that aliens from another universe designed life in this universe. Do I think that's a good explanation? No, I don't. But ID, as a scientific research program, cannot rule this explanation out. P.S. Regarding the platypus, this might be of interest to you:
When the Platypus was first encountered by Europeans in 1798, a pelt and sketch were sent back to Great Britain by Captain John Hunter, the second Governor of New South Wales. British scientists' initial hunch was that the attributes were a hoax. George Shaw, who produced the first description of the animal in the Naturalist's Miscellany in 1799, stated that it was impossible not to entertain doubts as to its genuine nature, and Robert Knox believed it may have been produced by some Asian taxidermist. It was thought that somebody had sewn a duck's beak onto the body of a beaver-like animal. Shaw even took a pair of scissors to the dried skin to check for stitches.
When doing research of any kind, it pays to keep an open mind. That is why we should reject dogmatism about what minds do and do not need.vjtorley
January 12, 2011
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aiguy, I make neither of these assumptions. I believe we do not know if there is an end (beginning) of the causal chain for either life or the universe, and I do not assume anything at all about the nature of the first cause if does indeed exist. I think we do not know. I’m not sure I can make this any more clear than I already have. We do not know with certainty? Sure. But ID doesn't claim otherwise - what is claimed is that we can, at this moment, with the knowledge we have, make certain inferences, and that such inferences are scientific. If you think ID touts itself as demonstrating utter truth, you've not been following ID much. That’s patently ridiculous. It is exactly the case of course. No, it's subject to exactly the problems and limitations I've mentioned. They're pretty common sense limitations of such investigations - you yourself spoke of operational definitions. I'm just pointing it out. So whether ID is talking about alien life, gods, demiurges, or whatever, none of its hypotheses enjoy any scientific support at all. Only if you freely redefine the boundaries of science, of what counts as support, and cast a blind eye towards what others are doing in that regard. But approach the question consistently, and that changes fast. LOL! If you can’t define these mentalistic terms once and for all that is clearly ID’s problem, not mine. ID Theory offers “thought” or “conscious deliberation” or “intelligence” as it’s sole explanatory concept… but can’t operationalize any of these concepts. I've noted repeatedly that ID makes inferences about design, and that said inferences do not require a mind to be utterly immaterial. My point on these definitions of 'thought' and 'intelligence' was more general, and related to the Menuge comments. You couldn’t be more correct here! We can’t even decide how to tell if things that we can observe are ‘thinking’ or not… yet ID pretends we can discern whether or not something we cannot observe is capable of thinking! It’s just ridiculous. My being correct comes at a price. We can't decide, but we can come up with definitions and see how far we get with said definitions. These definitions may not be full-proof, they may involve some a prioris, and yet progress can be made - and in other contexts, this is treated as scientific. Uh, no, I am not wrong about this at all. Read the post again: Neither Searle nor any other philosopher argues against functionalism or materialism by claiming that “A computer just processes information. It can’t say to itself: ‘I ought to do it this way, and not that way’”. Obviously a computer can “say to itself” precisely that, and they do that all the time. I had previously said I don’t happen to think thought proceeds by following rules, but I didn’t say that all philosophers agreed with that. A computer has a self? It has consciousness? When last we spoke about this, you said you didn't believe these things. As for Searle, from 47 of Minds, Brains and Science: "Now, the moral for this discussion of cognitivism can be put very simply: In the sense in which human beings follow rules (and incidentally human beings follow rules a whole lot less than cognitivists claim they do), in that sense computers don't follow rules at all. They only act in accord with certain formal procedures. The program of the computer determines the various steps the machinery will go through; it determines how one state will be transformed into a subsequent state. And we can speak metaphorically as if this were a matter of following rules. But in the literal sense in which human beings follow rules computers do not follow rules, they only act as if they are following rules." (His emphasis, not mine.) Yes, Searle would agree a computer can "say to itself" this or that. Quotes included. Treated as a metaphor. You can infer what you’d like, but you can’t suggest any way to use our shared experience in order to demonstrate your inference is valid… so your inference can’t be considered scientific. Period. Is valid meaning what? Undeniably true with no hope of being wrong? Or a reasonable view considering the evidence? You seem to be suggesting that an inference isn't valid unless it's universally accepted, or that something isn't scientific unless same. That seems flatly incorrect. You can argue tu quoque to your heart’s content. That doesn’t change the truth of the matter. And the truth of the matter is there's nothing innately dishonest about arguing for consistency, anymore than it's necessarily dishonest for the definition of science to be argued about. But hypocrisy, beating up on one group for their excesses and candidly ignoring another, more prominent group's excesses, for violating the same "rule"s? I question that.nullasalus
January 12, 2011
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null,
Again, you assume that ultimately when we go back, there A) has to be an end to the chain, and B) that this end cannot be alive or intelligent in any way.
I make neither of these assumptions. I believe we do not know if there is an end (beginning) of the causal chain for either life or the universe, and I do not assume anything at all about the nature of the first cause if does indeed exist. I think we do not know. I'm not sure I can make this any more clear than I already have.
AIGUY: All I’m saying is as far as our uniform and repeated experience goes, everything that thinks needs a working brain. NULL: Again, it’s not the case.
That's patently ridiculous. It is exactly the case of course.
We never observe thought directly – what we do is make inferences.
Duh.
And I’ve pointed out repeatedly that ID doesn’t say “Well, whatever is responsible for life on earth didn’t have a working brain!” The inference is available.
ID doesn't say much of anything of course! That is the problem, and why it can't be evaluated against evidence. ONE MORE TIME: By the law of the excluded middle, the Designer of ID must either 1) have been a living thing and relied on a complex, physical information processing mechanism (like a brain) as all intelligent animals do, or 2) not. We look at these two mututally exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: Under hypothesis (1) ID does not explain the origin of life or CSI, and instead merely reiterates what we all already know, that life begets life and complex machinery begets complex machinery. Also there is no evidence that anything with a brain existed before life on Earth. Hypothesis (2) is worse, since there is no evidence to support it and it contradicts neuroscientific findings. So whether ID is talking about alien life, gods, demiurges, or whatever, none of its hypotheses enjoy any scientific support at all.
Further, you yourself claim later that thinking is not observed outside the lab, insofar as ‘thinking’ is given certain operational definitions. And what if that definition is wrong?
LOL! If you can't define these mentalistic terms once and for all that is clearly ID's problem, not mine. ID Theory offers "thought" or "conscious deliberation" or "intelligence" as it's sole explanatory concept... but can't operationalize any of these concepts.
It’s an open question of whether those ‘operational definitions of thought and intelligence’ are apt. But insofar as the question is open, it makes problematic these claims about observation of ‘thought’.
You couldn't be more correct here! We can't even decide how to tell if things that we can observe are 'thinking' or not... yet ID pretends we can discern whether or not something we cannot observe is capable of thinking! It's just ridiculous.
Incidentally, you’re wrong about the ‘rule’ argument. Plenty of competent philosophers, from Searle to otherwise, think it’s a powerful argument – in part because it helps show that when we talk about ‘brains following rules’, we either aren’t actually embracing materialism, or our example doesn’t mean what it sounds like it means – and we have to give up the explanatory power of such and move towards an eliminative materialism.
Uh, no, I am not wrong about this at all. Read the post again: Neither Searle nor any other philosopher argues against functionalism or materialism by claiming that "A computer just processes information. It can't say to itself: 'I ought to do it this way, and not that way'". Obviously a computer can "say to itself" precisely that, and they do that all the time. I had previously said I don't happen to think thought proceeds by following rules, but I didn't say that all philosophers agreed with that.
It provides support to a very reasonable inference. This inference may or may not change over time, depending on what data comes in. But yes, we really can make an inference now. Apparently everyone agrees – so long as that inferences is “in spite of everything, no design or mind”.
You seem to be repeating yourself without listening to me. We are discussing whether we have good evidential support to characterize the cause of life or the universe. I believe we both agree that we do not. You can infer what you'd like, but you can't suggest any way to use our shared experience in order to demonstrate your inference is valid... so your inference can't be considered scientific. Period.
it’s an unfair game.
You can argue tu quoque to your heart's content. That doesn't change the truth of the matter.aiguy
January 12, 2011
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F/N: We should also note that the design inference, strictly, is from observation of reliable signs of design to the conclusion that that which manifests such signs of design is designed. This then opens up the question who or what are credible candidates, but that is a secondary question. The primary issue is: can we identify reliable signs of design as cause? Obviously yes. On such signs, if the sign is present the cause is the best explanation. Beyond that, who dunit, and howtweredun, are onward questions. But they are not the decisive ones -- that is why we ever so often see a persistent skipping over of what is primary to try to debate what is secondary. Gkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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AIG: In light of the just above, pardon: I think you need to answer some issues on the merits, showing us in factual and logical steps how you justify your views. Dismissive assertions and quips (as appear above) will not do. While you are at it, I think this paper by O'Connor will be a useful first point of reference on the issue of the significance of freedom in agency. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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Onlookers: The above thread shows several of the characteristic challenges faced by a priori evolutionary materialistic thinkers on issues linked to origins. Let us list:
a: Lewontinian a priori materialism, which is self refuting [once one has to account for the credibility of mind on chance plus necessity acting on matter], b: selective hyperskepticism that injects a radical inconsistency in standards of warrant for knowledge claims -- reflective of that a priorism [especially the impact of the ideologised mind that leads one to filter off and reject out of hand relevant, cogent contrary evidence that simply does not fit with materialism -- our conscious, minded, enconscienced state], and c: the embarrassing point of needing to be free to think with a credible mind and to speak as one recognises one ought to -- logically and factually -- instead of simply playing out genetic and socio-cultural programming blindly; while using these faculties to compose and announce theories that deny the very faculties that you are forced to use to develop and communicate a theory.
When it comes to the existence and import of the fine-tuned observed cosmos, we unfortunately can see all of these fallacies in action. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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aiguy, Humans are smart, but didn’t create first life. Whatever created first life was (obviously, by definition) not itself alive, so it is something very different from anything we know from experience. Again, you assume that ultimately when we go back, there A) has to be an end to the chain, and B) that this end cannot be alive or intelligent in any way. You cop to this later in the reply, but the fact is we can make inferences at this moment about these things. At so many other times and situations said inferences are allowed and are call scientific. Why not now? All I’m saying is as far as our uniform and repeated experience goes, everything that thinks needs a working brain. Again, it's not the case. We never observe thought directly - what we do is make inferences. And I've pointed out repeatedly that ID doesn't say "Well, whatever is responsible for life on earth didn't have a working brain!" The inference is available. Further, you yourself claim later that thinking is not observed outside the lab, insofar as 'thinking' is given certain operational definitions. And what if that definition is wrong? You note Menuge and Dennett, but while I happen to think Menuge's argument points out serious flaws in Dennett's thinking, I'll note that Dennett played the game of 'agreeing everyone is conscious' by going back and radically redefine what 'conscious' could possibly mean straight from the beginning. It's an open question of whether those 'operational definitions of thought and intelligence' are apt. But insofar as the question is open, it makes problematic these claims about observation of 'thought'. Incidentally, you're wrong about the 'rule' argument. Plenty of competent philosophers, from Searle to otherwise, think it's a powerful argument - in part because it helps show that when we talk about 'brains following rules', we either aren't actually embracing materialism, or our example doesn't mean what it sounds like it means - and we have to give up the explanatory power of such and move towards an eliminative materialism. No problem there unless you claim that our shared experience confirms your particular inference, because it doesn’t. Shared experience confirms all sorts of scientific results, but nothing about how life started (or why it exists, etc). It provides support to a very reasonable inference. This inference may or may not change over time, depending on what data comes in. But yes, we really can make an inference now. Apparently everyone agrees - so long as that inferences is "in spite of everything, no design or mind". Again, our disagreement is about what to argue, not what we believe. You want to level the field by repeating the mistakes of people who overstate the scientific case for OOL without mind; I want everyone to admit that science doesn’t tell us things things – at least yet. No, I simply want consistency strived for on this topic. If making inferences about design based on science is not a mistake, then it's not a mistake - and making the inferences offered in this thread are not only scientific, but valid as far as they go. If making such inferences is a mistake, then let's see condemnations of those who are making them like Stenger, etc. When the game is "This sort of thing is horrible, condemnable, and must be fought when ID proponents do it. But when everyone else do it, let's shake our heads sadly - but ignore it and go back to criticizing ID proponents", it's an unfair game.nullasalus
January 12, 2011
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Even if you take the line that it’s assumed, there’s plenty of evidence that supports the capability in principle. Is there evidence humanity is capable of eventually, say… landing a human on Mars?
Humans are smart, but didn't create first life. Whatever created first life was (obviously, by definition) not itself alive, so it is something very different from anything we know from experience. We know nothing about things that are not complex organisms but can somehow perform complex tasks; we can make up stories that something like that exists, but they're just stories.
Really? Because, while I note that there is zero evidence available that any particular process is either in particular or as a whole unguided and unplanned ultimately or proximately (you can’t ‘see’ non-guidance – at best you can fail to find some correlations) there’s tremendous evidence of intelligent agents orchestrating not only CSI-rich mechanisms and processes, but non-CSI-rich mechanisms and processes as well. Any assumption that other processes and mechanisms take place or originate without a plan is exactly that – an assumption. Not even verifiable in principle.
You misunderstood: I said there is evidence that consciousness requires complex (CSI-rich) mechanism, not that we can't build both complex and simple artifacts. All I'm saying is as far as our uniform and repeated experience goes, everything that thinks needs a working brain.
But even if that were the case – hey, maybe there was no ‘first life’. Maybe it goes back eternally, some chain of designers in Biocosm or Gribbin or even Bostrom style. Maybe our understanding of conscious thought is woefully inadequate (really, that seems to be the case whether we like it or not.) Hell, maybe ‘first matter’ and ‘first life’/'originating thought’ were identical. Even our concept of ‘physical’ is up in the air at a fundamental level.
All completely true, null. All up in the air, so to speak. Exactly so.
And there’s quite a lot of evidence in favor of the proposition that life on earth was preceded by a mind of some sort. We have our evidence and our observations, and we make our inferences. The only difference is that some people don’t like certain inferences, and wish the field was restricted to only one kind.
I don't think the observable evidence suggests that, and you do... No problem there unless you claim that our shared experience confirms your particular inference, because it doesn't. Shared experience confirms all sorts of scientific results, but nothing about how life started (or why it exists, etc). Again, our disagreement is about what to argue, not what we believe. You want to level the field by repeating the mistakes of people who overstate the scientific case for OOL without mind; I want everyone to admit that science doesn't tell us things things - at least yet. vjtorley
AIGUY:Neuroscience does indicate that complex thought is necessarily tied to complex brains… VJT: No, it doesn’t. It doesn’t even indicate that complex thought is necessarily tied to complex brains for human beings. (For instance, there have been reports of NDEs occurring in the absence of brain function – bornagain77 has lots of videos.) All we can say is that so far, we’ve never observed complex thought occurring under controlled laboratory conditions, in the absence of a brain. That’s a vastly weaker claim.
Thinking without a working brain hasn't been reliably observed in or out of the lab, even though our experience of embodied thought is gigantic. You can imagine brains are unnecessary, sure... but you could also imagine that complex form and function pops into existence without intelligent cause! Just because we haven't observed that in a lab doesn't mean it couldn't happen, right? In fact, our experience confirms both of these beliefs: complex machinery does not come to exist without the action of mind, and mind does not operate without the action of complex machinery.
The fatal assumption you are making here is that thought is nothing but information processing.
If you read what I've written to you, you'll see I make no such assumption. I say information processing is necessary for thought; I do not say that it is necessarily sufficient.
Thought involves adverting to, or paying attention to, rules, and following those rules as norms that govern how we ought to think.
That's your opinion; I don't happen to think that describes how thought works.
That’s a very different thing from merely behaving in accordance with a rule, which is all that computers can ever be said to do (the rule in question being the one that they’ve been programmed to follow). A computer just processes information. It can’t say to itself: “I ought to do it this way, and not that way.”
Sorry but this is a very naive challenge to strong AI. Any competent philosopher - no matter what their particular stance - would agree that this sort of argument doesn't even pose a challenge to functionalism, much less materialism. But in any event, I'm not even arguing for materialism! All I'm saying is that minds do not appear to function without the action of complex machinery.
The attempt to reduce intentionality (or the normativity of thought) to physical processes is a philosophical failure. To see why, I’d recommend Dr. Angus Menuge’s article, Dennett Denied: A Critique of Dennet’s Evolutionary Account of Intentionality .
I don't think you're reading me carefully enough. I happen to think Menuge fails miserably, but that is completely irrelevant to the argument I'm making here. My argument can be compatible with dualism.
Lastly, I’d like to make a plea for genuinely open-ended scientific inquiry.
YES! We agree completely here.
The search for a Designer of the CSI we find in living things should not be constrained in advance by a set of generalizations about designers, which are based on purely inductive evidence. We’s never have discovered the platypus with thinking like that.
LOL... I think we would have discovered the platypus one way or the other just by swimming in Australian rivers :-) Anyway, I am as open-minded about this as one can get. Dala
What evidence tells us that “thinking” cannot proceed without a brain?
You need to be able to measure "thinking" (or "intelligence"), so you have to have some operationalized definition for that. Then you apply it to everything you can find and test to see if it can think or not. What you find is that every single thing that can think has an active, complex, physical information processing mechanism operating in it, and if this mechanism ceases to operate, the indications of thinking also cease. This is highly suggestive evidence that thinking requires brains.
The closest example of knowing what happens when our brain dies would be a “Near Death Experience”, and studies into such experiences seems to indicate that consciousness can infact exist without a brain.
You don't have to make the brain die to test my claim; you can incapacitate it easily with drugs. And about the NDEs - If you think this is strong evidence for the existence of mind that can operate independently of mechanism, then this is a very important result. If true, it would convince me and many other people that an immaterial mind may have been responsible for creating life. So this is crucial to ID! Why do you think no major ID authors mention anything like this in their books? KF You believe that fine-tuning suggests a "necessary, intelligent, deeply knowledgeable and powerful being". I disagree, and suggest that we do not know why the universe exists, or why physics is the way it is. We have no knowledge of anything remotely like anything that can "create natural laws" or "set physical constants". We have no reason to believe we understand anything about this stuff, and we most certainly can't call any speculation we come with a scientific inference or result (rather than our own personal faith-based belief).aiguy
January 12, 2011
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Dala: In addition AIG is failing to address the evidence that the observed cosmos as a whole reflects fine-tuned purposeful design that puts it at an operating point supportive of C-chemistry cell based life. A fairly simple analysis points from that radical contingency -- even through any of several multiverse type suggestions -- to a necessary, intelligent, deeply knowledgeable and powerful being that is prior to the sort of matter-energy space time world we observe. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
January 12, 2011
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aiguy: >Any theory (such as ID) that >suggests thinking can proceed >without a complex physical brain >contradicts a huge body of >evidence. What evidence tells us that "thinking" cannot proceed without a brain? The closest example of knowing what happens when our brain dies would be a "Near Death Experience", and studies into such experiences seems to indicate that consciousness can infact exist without a brain.Dala
January 12, 2011
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aiguy You write:
Neuroscience does indicate that complex thought is necessarily tied to complex brains... (emphasis mine - VJT.)
No, it doesn't. It doesn't even indicate that complex thought is necessarily tied to complex brains for human beings. (For instance, there have been reports of NDEs occurring in the absence of brain function - bornagain77 has lots of videos.) All we can say is that so far, we've never observed complex thought occurring under controlled laboratory conditions, in the absence of a brain. That's a vastly weaker claim. You also write:
The fact that physical mechanisms in our brains (and other parts of bodies) are responsible for our abilities to perceive, remember, speak, plan, understand music, perform mathematico-logical inferences, and so on is beyond doubt. These information processing tasks are implemented by our brains in the same sense (though not in the same fashion) as computers implement their information processing tasks, or automobile drive trains implement their locomotive tasks. (Emphasis mine - VJT.)
The fatal assumption you are making here is that thought is nothing but information processing. Thought involves adverting to, or paying attention to, rules, and following those rules as norms that govern how we ought to think. That's a very different thing from merely behaving in accordance with a rule, which is all that computers can ever be said to do (the rule in question being the one that they've been programmed to follow). A computer just processes information. It can't say to itself: "I ought to do it this way, and not that way." The attempt to reduce intentionality (or the normativity of thought) to physical processes is a philosophical failure. To see why, I'd recommend Dr. Angus Menuge's article, Dennett Denied: A Critique of Dennet's Evolutionary Account of Intentionality . Lastly, I'd like to make a plea for genuinely open-ended scientific inquiry. The search for a Designer of the CSI we find in living things should not be constrained in advance by a set of generalizations about designers, which are based on purely inductive evidence. We's never have discovered the platypus with thinking like that.vjtorley
January 11, 2011
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aiguy, In ID, the capabilities are simply assumed to be adequate to the task of producing any phenomenon we should choose to explain!!! That is exactly why “ID” cannot be evaluated against the evidence. Even if you take the line that it's assumed, there's plenty of evidence that supports the capability in principle. Is there evidence humanity is capable of eventually, say... landing a human on Mars? Again, I would say the evidence against the existence of conscious processes occuring outside of CSI-rich mechanisms is significant. Really? Because, while I note that there is zero evidence available that any particular process is either in particular or as a whole unguided and unplanned ultimately or proximately (you can't 'see' non-guidance - at best you can fail to find some correlations) there's tremendous evidence of intelligent agents orchestrating not only CSI-rich mechanisms and processes, but non-CSI-rich mechanisms and processes as well. Any assumption that other processes and mechanisms take place or originate without a plan is exactly that - an assumption. Not even verifiable in principle. It can’t be more obvious that anything we observe is compatible with the existence of a completely hypothetical being who can do anything but may choose not to. So no, the hypothesis of a “designer” isn’t testable one way or another. And what - nature has limits? At least in the case of designers we actually know, first-hand, some designers do exist and are capable. Actual evidence. Meanwhile, 'nature' is an abstract every bit as unbounded as a hypothetical designer, doubly so once we start looking at multiverse ideas (whether in the David Lewis form or the cosmological forms.) Neuroscience does indicate that complex thought is necessarily tied to complex brains, which seems to preclude the notion that whatever caused first life employed what we know as conscious thought. Necessarily? It couldn't establish that in the relevant sense if it tried - questions of the idea of an immaterial mind is outside the bounds of science by definition. Questions of necessity are where philosophy and metaphysics take over. But even if that were the case - hey, maybe there was no 'first life'. Maybe it goes back eternally, some chain of designers in Biocosm or Gribbin or even Bostrom style. Maybe our understanding of conscious thought is woefully inadequate (really, that seems to be the case whether we like it or not.) Hell, maybe 'first matter' and 'first life'/'originating thought' were identical. Even our concept of 'physical' is up in the air at a fundamental level. There is some evidence against the specific proposition of conscious minds preceding CSI, which would count against some types of candidate Designers. And there's quite a lot of evidence in favor of the proposition that life on earth was preceded by a mind of some sort. We have our evidence and our observations, and we make our inferences. The only difference is that some people don't like certain inferences, and wish the field was restricted to only one kind. Oh, what’s that? Just one of these but not the other? Hmm, doesn’t seem fair. It's their inconsistency, aiguy. Not mine. *They* rule that guys like Stenger or Dawkins are 'okay', people they can turn a blind eye to when they mix metaphysics/philosophy and science, but it's those "other guys" who have to be put on a different list. Let me know when they become consistent. Don't hold your breath. We really don’t disagree about anything except… honesty. Neither of us defends a scientific explanation for OOL, but while I want to say exactly that truth, you want to push one particular unfounded speculation (which may run afoul of neuroscience, but is so ambiguous that you can’t say) in order to even the score with the people pushing atheism. There's nothing dishonest about my position. I say explicitly what standards I'm using, and that standard is consistency. I could just as easily say you're being dishonest, since you walk around hammering against ID proponents for daring to make a design inference and call it 'science', but really, the design inferences made by Stenger and company seem not nearly to bother you as much - despite their being vastly more common, and wielding considerably more influence as a group in the relevant areas. No, I think you should argue that people shouldn’t push unfounded conclusions – that can’t be mistaken as a religious argument like ID is. Push to get the NCSE to stop detecting no-gods, not to get them to push demigods (or …urges). Funny thing is, I'm doing that - all by simply being consistent and honest. If detecting the lack of design is allowed and acceptable and scientific, then necessarily so is detecting the presence of design. If it's permissible to mix metaphysics and philosophy with science and pass it off as science, then it's permissible. What I am against here, first and foremost, is hypocrisy. If people are happy with science becoming the home of utter unbounded speculation, I'll live with that. I'll just fight against hypocrisy in the process. If people want - truly want - metaphysics, socio-political agendas, and (a)theology out of science, I'm fine with that too. But again, it's across the board.nullasalus
January 11, 2011
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null,
The ID position, I believe, is that one doesn’t need to ‘judge the capabilities’ in that way, because said abilities don’t need to be known in advance – or at least, not to that level of detail.
In ID, the capabilities are simply assumed to be adequate to the task of producing any phenomenon we should choose to explain!!! That is exactly why "ID" cannot be evaluated against the evidence.
I likewise point out that the sheer run of possible designers hasn’t kept many ID skeptics from making positive claims of the lack of design.
Again, I would say the evidence against the existence of conscious processes occuring outside of CSI-rich mechanisms is significant.
Apparently, this whole ‘being able to infer design’ thing only works if the inference offered is negative. Then, suddenly, we know quite a lot about what a (any!) designer would have REALLY done, and this is scientific knowledge no less.
First Dembski says Junk DNA is fully consistent with ID (human programmers don't write optimal code either, he points out). The rest of the ID movement doesn't get the memo, and starts "predicting" function will be found for junk DNA because designers wouldn't junk up the genome. This is all ridiculous precisely because ID makes no attempt to characterize the Designer it is proposing! It can't be more obvious that anything we observe is compatible with the existence of a completely hypothetical being who can do anything but may choose not to. So no, the hypothesis of a "designer" isn't testable one way or another.
Sure you can summon ‘some scientific reasoning’, depending on what that means. Is it therefore science to say ‘no design’?
I'd say this: The concept of "design" isn't operational in this context, so science in general doesn't answer that. Neuroscience does indicate that complex thought is necessarily tied to complex brains, which seems to preclude the notion that whatever caused first life employed what we know as conscious thought.
The reasonable ‘null hypothesis’ is ‘science is incapable of determining this one way or the other’. But if the door is open, the door is open, and ID is science.
There is some evidence against the specific proposition of conscious minds preceding CSI, which would count against some types of candidate Designers. When ID can think of any way to provide a testable characterization of the proposed entity(ies) there will be more to discuss, but until then it is a scientific non-starter. Science can't determine the existence of a spaghetti monster one way or another either, but we needn't give it another thought until the Pastafarians tell us something about this monster that would enable us to demonstrate that it exists.
Quick Quiz: At the NCSE website, home base of those blessed defenders of science, a book is cited: Stenger’s “God: The Failed Hypothesis. How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist.” Is this book on their list of works that pollute science by importing theological and metaphysical concepts into a realm (science) where they don’t belong, and passing them off as wholly scientific views? Or is it on their recommended reading list?
So your answer is to suggest "intelligent designers" and "spaghetti monsters"? I don't think this is a good response. Oh, what's that? Just one of these but not the other? Hmm, doesn't seem fair.
If pursuing consistency results in groups like that copping to mysterianism (at least insofar as science is concerned), I’ll be pleased. But so long as detecting the lack of design is considered scientific, and scientists who claim to be able to detect the acts of a designer (either broadly, or specifically God) are tolerated, even celebrated *as long as the detection turns up negative*, consistency and intellectual honesty demands supporting those who argue the (honestly, comparatively moderate) claim that a design inference is both reasonable and scientific. I’m willing to bet that advocating consistency will produce much more sympathy for mysterianism than advocating mysterianism.
We really don't disagree about anything except... honesty. Neither of us defends a scientific explanation for OOL, but while I want to say exactly that truth, you want to push one particular unfounded speculation (which may run afoul of neuroscience, but is so ambiguous that you can't say) in order to even the score with the people pushing atheism. No, I think you should argue that people shouldn't push unfounded conclusions - that can't be mistaken as a religious argument like ID is. Push to get the NCSE to stop detecting no-gods, not to get them to push demigods (or ...urges).aiguy
January 11, 2011
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aiguy, How in the world are you supposed to judge the capabilities of a demiurge?! Even worse, how is one to judge the capabilities of a completely undefined, uncharacterized “intelligent agent”? Clearly, such purely hypothetial entities can be said to be capable of anything at all, which renders them useless as explanatory constructs. The ID position, I believe, is that one doesn't need to 'judge the capabilities' in that way, because said abilities don't need to be known in advance - or at least, not to that level of detail. I likewise point out that the sheer run of possible designers hasn't kept many ID skeptics from making positive claims of the lack of design. Apparently, this whole 'being able to infer design' thing only works if the inference offered is negative. Then, suddenly, we know quite a lot about what a (any!) designer would have REALLY done, and this is scientific knowledge no less. I think you can indeed summon some scientific reasoning to defend the specific null hypothesis that no conscious entities preceded the complex form and function (CSI) that ID is intended to account for. I agree with you that this conclusion is by no means a definitive result(!), and that no other positive hypothesis accounting for the first CSI can be supported. Sure you can summon 'some scientific reasoning', depending on what that means. Is it therefore science to say 'no design'? If so, you've made the question of design a scientific question - and thus the contrary views are also 'scientific', even if in the minority. Or the majority, for that matter. And honestly, the very idea of a 'null hypothesis' of that type seems absurd here. The reasonable 'null hypothesis' is 'science is incapable of determining this one way or the other'. But if the door is open, the door is open, and ID is science. Your strategy is like that of the Flying Spaghetti Monster proponents. To counter what they felt was an unsupported viewpoint (theism) they made up another one (Pastafarianism). If all we have is wild speculation then the correct thing to argue for is what I argue for: mysterianism. Not ID. The FSM was a smear job from start to finish, an exercise in mockery. I'm merely pushing for consistency, and specifically I'm pushing for consistency among what is largely a pack of hypocrites. Quick Quiz: At the NCSE website, home base of those blessed defenders of science, a book is cited: Stenger's "God: The Failed Hypothesis. How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist." Is this book on their list of works that pollute science by importing theological and metaphysical concepts into a realm (science) where they don't belong, and passing them off as wholly scientific views? Or is it on their recommended reading list? If pursuing consistency results in groups like that copping to mysterianism (at least insofar as science is concerned), I'll be pleased. But so long as detecting the lack of design is considered scientific, and scientists who claim to be able to detect the acts of a designer (either broadly, or specifically God) are tolerated, even celebrated *as long as the detection turns up negative*, consistency and intellectual honesty demands supporting those who argue the (honestly, comparatively moderate) claim that a design inference is both reasonable and scientific. I'm willing to bet that advocating consistency will produce much more sympathy for mysterianism than advocating mysterianism.nullasalus
January 11, 2011
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null,
AIGUY: There are lots of intelligent causes – like dogs and chimps – but archeologists don’t think those were responsible. Neither do they think ghosts or gods or demiurges or nuclear reactions caused the flute to exist. NULL: Why? Because certain designers, in principle even if not specifically identified, are judged as being more capable of this or that given design?
How in the world are you supposed to judge the capabilities of a demiurge?! Even worse, how is one to judge the capabilities of a completely undefined, uncharacterized "intelligent agent"? Clearly, such purely hypothetial entities can be said to be capable of anything at all, which renders them useless as explanatory constructs.
Frankly, I’ve said outright that a large part of my sympathy for ID comes from the fact that many ID critics think it’s entirely possible to scientifically infer a positive lack of design or guidance in nature (or even go beyond inference to demonstrable fact, and scientific to boot.) You’ve read this from me before, I noted it recently in my own thread when explaining my position on ID.
I think you can indeed summon some scientific reasoning to defend the specific null hypothesis that no conscious entities preceded the complex form and function (CSI) that ID is intended to account for. I agree with you that this conclusion is by no means a definitive result(!), and that no other positive hypothesis accounting for the first CSI can be supported.
My sympathy for ID is conditional – if declaring evolution to be ‘unguided’, or certain biological/’natural’ things to be ‘not designed’ is the stuff of science, then so is contesting said claims and moving in the opposite direction. If that makes science messy, so be it – wild speculation based on little to no evidence doesn’t seem like much of a barrier at any other time lately.
Your strategy is like that of the Flying Spaghetti Monster proponents. To counter what they felt was an unsupported viewpoint (theism) they made up another one (Pastafarianism). If all we have is wild speculation then the correct thing to argue for is what I argue for: mysterianism. Not ID.aiguy
January 11, 2011
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aiguy, I disagree! You fail to distinguish or characterize at all the class of “intelligent” candidates except for the functional specification (“able to produce complex form and function”). So you can’t claim this “class” as the best explanation of anything, because we know nothing about it. We know plenty about it, and are able to abstract to a reasonable degree from there. Questions of whether it's the 'best' inference are on another level - I'm aiming for 'reasonable' here. A lower bar. Thus, if we use definition I supplied, nobody would deny that biological systems are designs, or that they have been designed. Dawkins would simply be forced to add “…and the designer of these designs is unguided evolution”. Dawkins also seems open to the prospect of alien designers conceivably, and I think ID proponents would be more than happy to consider 'evolution' as a design candidate to compare to. Isn't that really the point? All this simply underscores my point when I ask for ID’s definition of the word. So how about it – can you provide an actual definition of the noun “design” and the verb “design” (assuming that the noun “designer” means “something that designs”)? I’ll anticipate you’ll say it entails “foresight”, but deny that it necessarily requires consciousness (we’ve been down this road). Is that right? I'm just not interested here - been there, done that, wasn't persuaded. It was enough for me to point out that ID doesn't require the designer be immaterial, and to note the range of designers even noted ID proponents entertain as possible candidates. There are lots of intelligent causes – like dogs and chimps – but archeologists don’t think those were responsible. Neither do they think ghosts or gods or demiurges or nuclear reactions caused the flute to exist. Why? Because certain designers, in principle even if not specifically identified, are judged as being more capable of this or that given design? Frankly, I've said outright that a large part of my sympathy for ID comes from the fact that many ID critics think it's entirely possible to scientifically infer a positive lack of design or guidance in nature (or even go beyond inference to demonstrable fact, and scientific to boot.) You've read this from me before, I noted it recently in my own thread when explaining my position on ID. My sympathy for ID is conditional - if declaring evolution to be 'unguided', or certain biological/'natural' things to be 'not designed' is the stuff of science, then so is contesting said claims and moving in the opposite direction. If that makes science messy, so be it - wild speculation based on little to no evidence doesn't seem like much of a barrier at any other time lately.nullasalus
January 11, 2011
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null,
And we know some classes of candidates that can be best considered responsible for various particular types of form and function.
I disagree! You fail to distinguish or characterize at all the class of "intelligent" candidates except for the functional specification ("able to produce complex form and function"). So you can't claim this "class" as the best explanation of anything, because we know nothing about it.
No, I don’t think they’d agree. They’d question whether that was rightly called design – ...
You are ignoring the conditional... that Dawkins is told to use my definition that I offered here for the term "design(n/v)". Nobody denies that biological systems are characterized by complex form and function. Thus, if we use definition I supplied, nobody would deny that biological systems are designs, or that they have been designed. Dawkins would simply be forced to add "...and the designer of these designs is unguided evolution".
...hell, already there’s been rumblings from ID critics (and I say this as an ID critic of sorts) that merely using certain words is a bad idea, because it ‘gives the impression of design’. And again, this ignores Dawkins himself, and of course Crick, entertaining a certain other type of ‘design’.
All this simply underscores my point when I ask for ID's definition of the word. So how about it - can you provide an actual definition of the noun "design" and the verb "design" (assuming that the noun "designer" means "something that designs")? I'll anticipate you'll say it entails "foresight", but deny that it necessarily requires consciousness (we've been down this road). Is that right?
And really, you charge me with hyperskepticism for pointing out a pretty obvious limitation with regards to consciousness and memory, but I’m supposed to take seriously an idea which at heart implies we can’t even make an inference about (say) what could be responsible for a given artifact in nature?
You can surely make inferences about causes of things in nature, and if you can test them then you can call them scientific hypotheses. If you infer something outside of our experience (like immaterial intelligence) then you'll need to provide evidence that such a thing exists (because a priori it is highly unlikely). That leaves ID with the only other possibility - intelligent alien life forms.
AIGUY: If we found a carved flute that existed before humans did, we would need a new hypothesis. (I would say the first clue would be we were looking for something with fingers and a mouth and that could blow air and hear.) NULL: A new hypothesis? If only ID had some ideas on that front! Also, your ‘clue’ is an inference, not a certainty. Just like we wouldn’t necessarily be looking for 28 foot long caskets when trying to find the grave of the subject of the Lincoln Memorial.
Yes... your point here is? I pointed out that archeologists do not infer "intelligent cause" but rather they infer "human being" as the cause of the flutes they find. There are lots of intelligent causes - like dogs and chimps - but archeologists don't think those were responsible. Neither do they think ghosts or gods or demiurges or nuclear reactions caused the flute to exist. Now, if their inference to human involvement was falsified (because the flute is older than humanity, say), that would require the archeologists to start thinking of what else could have made the flute. And yes, they would hypothesize something with fingers and lips but not be certain of that. Nobody would know what could have been responsible until there was actual evidence of something with the ability to carve flutes that existed at the time. Or, if it was an "ID archeologist", they would just say "I think something capable of carving flutes made it", which would be of no help at all.
If ‘WE DO NOT KNOW’ were uttered more often when appropriate, it wouldn’t be as necessary...
I agree with everything you said from here on; well put.aiguy
January 11, 2011
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aiguy, In that case, according to our definition of “design”, “ID” consists of the following proposition: “The complex form and function in biology was caused by something that causes complex form and function.” Great theory!! I guess science isn’t so hard after all! And we know some classes of candidates that can be best considered responsible for various particular types of form and function. Yes, sometimes it isn't all that hard to at least start asking questions and making reasonable inferences. If you tell Dawkins to use the definition we’ve agreed upon here, he and everyone else will agree that “real design” exists in biology of course. Now, if you would like to offer a different definition, please do so. No, I don't think they'd agree. They'd question whether that was rightly called design - hell, already there's been rumblings from ID critics (and I say this as an ID critic of sorts) that merely using certain words is a bad idea, because it 'gives the impression of design'. And again, this ignores Dawkins himself, and of course Crick, entertaining a certain other type of 'design'. And really, you charge me with hyperskepticism for pointing out a pretty obvious limitation with regards to consciousness and memory, but I'm supposed to take seriously an idea which at heart implies we can't even make an inference about (say) what could be responsible for a given artifact in nature? If we found a carved flute that existed before humans did, we would need a new hypothesis. (I would say the first clue would be we were looking for something with fingers and a mouth and that could blow air and hear.) A new hypothesis? If only ID had some ideas on that front! Also, your 'clue' is an inference, not a certainty. Just like we wouldn't necessarily be looking for 28 foot long caskets when trying to find the grave of the subject of the Lincoln Memorial. You know that I agree with all this, and I appreciate in you a fellow traveller down the rabbit hole and (hopefully) back to world of solid tables and chairs and breakfast cereal. You know that I’m all for saying “WE DO NOT KNOW”. That is certainly my answer for OOL, and for consciousness. If 'WE DO NOT KNOW' were uttered more often when appropriate, it wouldn't be as necessary as it is for everyone from Tallis to O'Leary to otherwise to make the observations they do. I'd even be very happy with people making inferences, so long as they stressed they were making exactly that - inferences. A problem pops up when, as is very common, only certain inferences are allowed, and said inferences are boosted to 'truth' or close to it without warrant. Part of Tallis' complaint isn't just that he thinks Ram doesn't really explain all that much, but the certainty that comes with that non-explanation (and likewise the implicit or explicit suggestion that any doubt about such explanations are not just wrong, but delusional. Dennett was the master of this before the tide turned against him.) (WRT to unremembered pain – I assume you saw the movie “The Prestige”?) I did not, alas. I skip many popular movies and shows.nullasalus
January 11, 2011
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above, One thing I argue here is that ID can't make a scientific case by simply alluding to "design" as a cause. Instead, you must say what it is you think caused the complex form and function you are trying to explain. If you say a complex physical life form was the cause, that is one theory (not a very good theory, though). Alternatively if you say something without complex physical form and function was the cause and that it could reason and plan and build complex mechanisms, then you have another theory (which is even a worse theory, because it contradicts neuroscience).aiguy
January 11, 2011
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I think the following statement pretty much sums it up: "And dualists, even idealists, would shrug and say ‘We don’t deny that’. The mystery remains, and deeply – s’all I’m pointing out on this front." I don't see what aiguy is trying to argue here.above
January 11, 2011
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