Winds of change? Humanist deflates popcorn neuroscience

_{Denyse O'Leary

January 11, 2011

Culture, Darwinism}

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In “Mind in the Mirror,” Raymond Tallis reflects on V.S. Ramachandran’s The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human, “Neuroscience can explain many brain functions, but not the mystery of consciousness”:

The subtitle of V.S. Ramachandran’s latest book prompts a question: Why should “A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human” be of particular interest? The answer is obvious if you believe, as so many do, that humans are essentially their brains. When a brain scientist speaks, we should pay attention, for “What makes us human” then boils down to what makes our brains special, compared with those of other highly evolved creatures.

RaymondTallis

Dr. Ramachandran and many others, including prominent philosophers like Daniel Dennett and Patricia and Paul Churchland, promise that neuroscience will help us understand not only the mechanism of brain functions (such as those that coordinate movement or underpin speech) but also key features of human consciousness. As of yet, though, we have no neural explanation of even the most basic properties of consciousness, such as the unity of self, how it is rooted in an explicit past and explicit future, how experience is owned and referred to a self, and how we are, or feel that we are, voluntary agents. Neuroscience, in short, has no way of accommodating everyday first-person being.

No, and neuroscience is often invoked to explain things it doesn’t:

Here, as elsewhere, the intellectual audit trail connecting the neuroscience to the things he claims to explain is fragile. For a start, mirror neurons have been observed not just in monkeys and humans but also in swamp sparrows, enabling them to learn to sing the songs they hear. They are admirable birds, but their cultural achievements are modest. Moreover, the existence in humans of a distinct mirror neuron system with properties such as “mind-reading” is still contested. At any rate, the claim that mirror neurons are a “specialized circuitry for social cognition” in humans is a death-defying leap beyond the humble “Monkey see, Monkey do” function they were first observed to have.

Tallis describes himself, at his own site, as a humanist.

He is emeritus professor of geriatric medicine at the University of Manchester, and will publish Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity, presumably a bash at evolutionary psychology and related pseudosciences.

It’s good to see actual humanists weighing in on these questions. Humanism had a respectable history before it was taken over by Darwin worshippers, at which point, the term might better have become “primatist.” What the new humanists were really interested in of human experience is what a chimpanzee could replicate. And once Apes R’ Us hit pop culture, it did considerable damage. After all, many people do not want to rise to the challenge of being human.

Hat tip: Stephanie West Allen at Brains on Purpose

More stories from The Mindful Hack, my blog on neuroscience and spirituality issues:

Comments

vjtorley, The fact that physical mechanisms in our brains (and other parts of bodies) are responsible for our abilities to perceive, remember, speak, plan, understand music, perform mathematico-logical inferences, and so on is beyond doubt. These information processing tasks are implemented by our brains in the same sense (though not in the same fashion) as computers implement their information processing tasks, or automobile drive trains implement their locomotive tasks. To think otherwise would render incomprehensible a gigantic body of empirical knowledge. Now, what we do not know is if there are some aspects of cognition that require something (force, property, substance, ???) in addition to the physiological processes we're familiar with. And I agree with O'Leary, Tallis, you, and most here that consciousness remains a hard (mysterious) problem toward which neuroscience has not made progress; it is nonsense to try and explain sentience as an emergent property of complex neural function.
The idea is that intellectual activity – the formation of concepts, the making of judgments, and logical reasoning – is an essentially immaterial process. By essentially immaterial is meant that intellectual processes, in the sense just mentioned, are intrinsically independent of matter, this being consistent with their being extrinsically dependent on matter for their normal operation in the human being. Extrinsic dependence, then, is a kind of non-essential dependence.
Apparently Dr. Oderberg believes in dualism, but nobody knows if he's right or not. It could be that "intellectual activity" is an abstract way of describing certain physical (neural?) processes, the way "processing spreadsheets" is an abstract way of describing other physical processes (in semiconductors).
For example, certain kinds of plant depend extrinsically, and so non-essentially, on the presence of soil for their nutrition, since they can also be grown hydroponically. But they depend intrinsically, hence essentially, on the presence of certain nutrients that they normally receive from soil but can receive via other routes. Something similar is true of the human intellect…
Nobody knows if this is true or not. We certainly have nothing to indicate this is true in our shared experience; as far as we know nothing without a human brain in good working order is capable of displaying human intellect.
Until you can demonstrate that the dependence of thought on the brain is intrinsic rather than merely extrinsic, you have failed to make a convincing case for materialism.
I'm not making a case for materialism at all. What gave you that idea?
In which the case, the possibility of a non-material intelligence existing, be it natural or supernatural, remains a live option.
There are infinite numbers of "live options" about everything. We do not, however, tend to believe in "live options" unless there is some reason to believe it. When it comes to consciousness, we have very, very good reason to believe that consciousness requires a brain in good working order, and that if something goes wrong (drugs, injury, disease, death) consciousness goes away. null,
AIGUY: Now all we have to decide is what the designer of biological designs was. Dawkins thinks it’s evolutionary processes, but Meyer thinks it’s a rational conscious “agent” that is not itself a biological organism. You and Dembski seem to hedge a lot more about what you think it is, so I don’t think you two are saying anything specific at all. NULL: ID does not bother with identifying the designer – if someone wants to make that argument, they’re free to do so. It just happens to be an argument distinct from ID as I’ve ever seen it.
In that case, according to our definition of "design", "ID" consists of the following proposition: "The complex form and function in biology was caused by something that causes complex form and function." Great theory!! I guess science isn't so hard after all!
What’s more, I’d be more than happy to see Dawkins argue that design exists in nature and is real.
If you tell Dawkins to use the definition we've agreed upon here, he and everyone else will agree that "real design" exists in biology of course. Now, if you would like to offer a different definition, please do so.
AIGUY: Again: Each designer that you posit is a different hypothesis. An alien life form is one hypothesis. A demiurge is another one (although I still don’t know what those are). And so on. NULL: So if an archaeologist identifies a given carved flute as designed, but he doesn’t know who made said flute, he doesn’t have one hypothesis (this flute was designed) but dozens, even thousands (depending on the range of individual possible suspects)?
Archeologists infer that human beings build these characteristic artifacts of course. Because of what they know about human beings and everything else, they do not hypothesize that these are the products of dogs, or chimps, or aliens from outer space, or that they are products of nuclear fusion, or a demiurge, or an impersonal telic process, or... They invariably conclude that human beings built them! If we found a carved flute that existed before humans did, we would need a new hypothesis. (I would say the first clue would be we were looking for something with fingers and a mouth and that could blow air and hear.)
If it’s hyper-skepticism, then hyper-skepticism is getting pretty popular in philosophy of mind – it’s part of the panpsychist and related views, and possibly part of at least some neutral monist views. Further, why does it follow said people ‘endured hideous conscious agony’ necessarily? We aren’t certain of *that* either. People can hallucinate, they can have conscious experiences detached from external stimuli. When we don’t know, we don’t know. No one who’s thought it through ever says “I remember being unconscious”. Do I only have dreams when I remember the dreams? Do people ever have experiences they clearly forget? Mind, by your own view, has a lot of mysteries associated with it – we may as well take stock of what we do know, don’t know, and what assumptions we’re making. All mysterious, yes, and obviously no less so under dualism! What is not unclear is that neural processes mediate memory, perception, language, etc. And dualists, even idealists, would shrug and say ‘We don’t deny that’. The mystery remains, and deeply – s’all I’m pointing out on this front.
You know that I agree with all this, and I appreciate in you a fellow traveller down the rabbit hole and (hopefully) back to world of solid tables and chairs and breakfast cereal. You know that I'm all for saying "WE DO NOT KNOW". That is certainly my answer for OOL, and for consciousness. (WRT to unremembered pain - I assume you saw the movie "The Prestige"?)aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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aiguy, This verges hyper-skepticism. Even O’Leary admits we “lose consciousness” rather than just memory under anathesia. If people believed that they endured hideous conscious agony under the surgeon’s knife but then forgot about it, would they still submit to cosmetic surgery? If it's hyper-skepticism, then hyper-skepticism is getting pretty popular in philosophy of mind - it's part of the panpsychist and related views, and possibly part of at least some neutral monist views. Further, why does it follow said people 'endured hideous conscious agony' necessarily? We aren't certain of *that* either. People can hallucinate, they can have conscious experiences detached from external stimuli. When we don't know, we don't know. No one who's thought it through ever says "I remember being unconscious". Do I only have dreams when I remember the dreams? Do people ever have experiences they clearly forget? Mind, by your own view, has a lot of mysteries associated with it - we may as well take stock of what we do know, don't know, and what assumptions we're making. All mysterious, yes, and obviously no less so under dualism! What is not unclear is that neural processes mediate memory, perception, language, etc. And dualists, even idealists, would shrug and say 'We don't deny that'. The mystery remains, and deeply - s'all I'm pointing out on this front.nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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aiguy, Now all we have to decide is what the designer of biological designs was. Dawkins thinks it’s evolutionary processes, but Meyer thinks it’s a rational conscious “agent” that is not itself a biological organism. You and Dembski seem to hedge a lot more about what you think it is, so I don’t think you two are saying anything specific at all. ID does not bother with identifying the designer - if someone wants to make that argument, they're free to do so. It just happens to be an argument distinct from ID as I've ever seen it. What's more, I'd be more than happy to see Dawkins argue that design exists in nature and is real. But Dawkins doesn't take that line and you know it - he regards design as illusory. But even if he didn't, we can all have a nice little argument about what can in fact be responsible for given designs, what sort of inferences are possible in principle, and so on. Let's see who's hedging after it plays out. And besides, I recall Dawkins being open to the possibility of alien design in the OoL. Looks like the man entertains the possibility of more designers than you'd suspect, eh? I don’t think “alien life forms” is a very good hypothesis, but if you and Behe like that one, go with it. It's not a question of liking, it's a question of what's possible given the constraints of ID. Again: Each designer that you posit is a different hypothesis. An alien life form is one hypothesis. A demiurge is another one (although I still don’t know what those are). And so on. So if an archaeologist identifies a given carved flute as designed, but he doesn't know who made said flute, he doesn't have one hypothesis (this flute was designed) but dozens, even thousands (depending on the range of individual possible suspects)? If you want to consider the question in that light, go right ahead. Our ability to design is surely mediated by our physical brains and bodies. Our ability, sure. Maybe all others', maybe only some others'. ID certainly doesn't rule that out.nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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aiguy I'd like to address your claim that "brain functions underpin not only movement coordination and speech production and understanding, but also perception, memory, emotion, planning, problem solving of all sorts... in other words, our brains are responsible for thinking." I would respond by citing an old saying of the late philosopher Mortimer Adler: we can't think without our brains, but we don't think with them. The problem with your choice of verb ("underpin") is that it fails to distinguish between two kinds of dependence: extrinsic dependence and intrinsic dependence. This distinction is nicely illustrated by the philosopher Dr. David Oderberg in his online essay, Concepts, Dualism and the Human Intellect :
The idea is that intellectual activity - the formation of concepts, the making of judgments, and logical reasoning - is an essentially immaterial process. By essentially immaterial is meant that intellectual processes, in the sense just mentioned, are intrinsically independent of matter, this being consistent with their being extrinsically dependent on matter for their normal operation in the human being. Extrinsic dependence, then, is a kind of non-essential dependence. For example, certain kinds of plant depend extrinsically, and so non-essentially, on the presence of soil for their nutrition, since they can also be grown hydroponically. But they depend intrinsically, hence essentially, on the presence of certain nutrients that they normally receive from soil but can receive via other routes. Something similar is true of the human intellect...
Until you can demonstrate that the dependence of thought on the brain is intrinsic rather than merely extrinsic, you have failed to make a convincing case for materialism. In which the case, the possibility of a non-material intelligence existing, be it natural or supernatural, remains a live option.vjtorley_{January 11, 2011
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null,
Actually, we don’t even know this. We make inferences given various assumptions, but for all we know consciousness is constant, but memory is what fails. Back to Chalmers and the thermometer.
This verges hyper-skepticism. Even O'Leary admits we "lose consciousness" rather than just memory under anathesia. If people believed that they endured hideous conscious agony under the surgeon's knife but then forgot about it, would they still submit to cosmetic surgery?
Actually, even ‘thought’ is plenty mysterious, unless one is comfortable importing final causes right into matter (Where this or that brain state is ‘about’ this or that definitive tihng). Thought, intentionality and aboutness are just as, or more, problematic as consciousness/qualia is, at least on what used to be the typical materialist picture.
All mysterious, yes, and obviously no less so under dualism! What is not unclear is that neural processes mediate memory, perception, language, etc.
It reminds me of a question I saw asked on scienceblogs, after someone ranted and raved about how materialism was obviously true and could explain everything about minds. So someone asked, “What is matter?” Their response? “We’re not sure about that yet, but we’ll find out eventually.”
Matter? Never mind... Mind? No matter...aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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null,
Well, you’re certainly a designer. Or wait, is that untrue? Or possibly untrue? Can I make a reasonable inference about that question, even if I lack utter and certain knowledge?
If you deign to tell me what a "designer" is then I can answer the question.
What is the scientific definition of “design”? You tell me – apparently you’ve got a definition in mind, since you seem certain this can’t even be reasonably inferred.
Ok, if I get to define it, then I say the scientific definition of "design (noun)" is "patterns of complex form and function". Therefore I agree with you and Dembski and Meyer that we can detect design in biology... and I agree with Dawkins about that too! And the definition of "design (verb)" is "to cause a design (noun) to exist"... so I agree with Dembski and Meyer and Dawkins about that too. We all agree! Now all we have to decide is what the designer of biological designs was. Dawkins thinks it's evolutionary processes, but Meyer thinks it's a rational conscious "agent" that is not itself a biological organism. You and Dembski seem to hedge a lot more about what you think it is, so I don't think you two are saying anything specific at all.
Do I need to provide you with links to debates where Behe himself argues that the designer, for all we know, could be aliens or otherwise?
I don't think "alien life forms" is a very good hypothesis, but if you and Behe like that one, go with it.
How about links to Dembski admitting to the possible range of designers? If that would help, I’d be happy to do it. I have a feeling you’ve seen it before, though.
Again: Each designer that you posit is a different hypothesis. An alien life form is one hypothesis. A demiurge is another one (although I still don't know what those are). And so on.
Here’s a quote: “While it is incontrovertible that a brain in some sort of working order is necessary for everything from the most primitive tingle to the most exquisitely constructed sense of self, that is the beginning, not the end, of the story.”
mea culpa, apologies to Tallis. I was going from O'Leary's quotes of him, which only mentions things "such as" movement and speech. Our ability to design is surely mediated by our physical brains and bodies.aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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Just to add one thing. Huh? We lose consciousness easily by means of drugs, injury, or disease. This seems to imply that consciousness is also lost when our brain is not just injured but destroyed. Likewise, something without a brain to begin with is likely not to experience consciousness. Actually, we don't even know this. We make inferences given various assumptions, but for all we know consciousness is constant, but memory is what fails. Back to Chalmers and the thermometer. Thought on the other hand is less so. And the connection between the two (i.e. is consciousness causal?) remains mysterious as well. Actually, even 'thought' is plenty mysterious, unless one is comfortable importing final causes right into matter (Where this or that brain state is 'about' this or that definitive tihng). Thought, intentionality and aboutness are just as, or more, problematic as consciousness/qualia is, at least on what used to be the typical materialist picture. It reminds me of a question I saw asked on scienceblogs, after someone ranted and raved about how materialism was obviously true and could explain everything about minds. So someone asked, "What is matter?" Their response? "We're not sure about that yet, but we'll find out eventually."nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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aiguy, Demiurges have conscious brains? Then perhaps I’m a demiurge… how can I tell? Well, you're certainly a designer. Or wait, is that untrue? Or possibly untrue? Can I make a reasonable inference about that question, even if I lack utter and certain knowledge? What is the scientific definition of “design”? You tell me - apparently you've got a definition in mind, since you seem certain this can't even be reasonably inferred. The range of possibilities are your scientific hypotheses. They need to be evaluated against the evidence if you want to do science. One possibility is a computer, another is a living organism, another is an immaterial mind. I don’t think any of these are good hypotheses, and lumping them all together doesn’t help. Sure it helps, if it's being noted against the claim that ID fails because it requires an immaterial mind. If in fact it doesn't, so much for that objection. Do I need to provide you with links to debates where Behe himself argues that the designer, for all we know, could be aliens or otherwise? How about links to Dembski admitting to the possible range of designers? If that would help, I'd be happy to do it. I have a feeling you've seen it before, though. Sorry if my timing is bad. I just noticed the thread talking about mind/body stuff and the way Tallis’ argument seemd to imply that brain function was limited to supporting a few robotic-like functions rather than the vast breadth of cognition that we know it actually does underpin. Tallis did this? Really? Did you read the article? Here's a quote: "While it is incontrovertible that a brain in some sort of working order is necessary for everything from the most primitive tingle to the most exquisitely constructed sense of self, that is the beginning, not the end, of the story."nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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O'Leary,
There is currently no explanation for consciousness, materialist or otherwise, so nothing to oppose except rah rahs for a materialism that has done nothing significant in this area.
Just as I said - consciousness is mysterious. Thought on the other hand is less so. And the connection between the two (i.e. is consciousness causal?) remains mysterious as well.
Anyone who has been under anaesthesia a few times, as I have, will not be surprised to learn how consciousness is temporarily lost.
Huh? We lose consciousness easily by means of drugs, injury, or disease. This seems to imply that consciousness is also lost when our brain is not just injured but destroyed. Likewise, something without a brain to begin with is likely not to experience consciousness. null,
Do they have brains? Possibly. Conscious? Maybe we can infer that. How can you tell if you see one? Inference borne out of investigation I suppose.
Demiurges have conscious brains? Then perhaps I'm a demiurge... how can I tell?
ID means, as near as I can tell, that some things, even considered ‘natural’, may be the result of design and science can infer this.
What is the scientific definition of "design"?
What could be responsible for said design? There’s a range of possibilities. It’s not at all limited to ‘some immaterial mind’.
The range of possibilities are your scientific hypotheses. They need to be evaluated against the evidence if you want to do science. One possibility is a computer, another is a living organism, another is an immaterial mind. I don't think any of these are good hypotheses, and lumping them all together doesn't help.
It’s the oddest time to suggest she’s mounting the argument you think she is.
Sorry if my timing is bad. I just noticed the thread talking about mind/body stuff and the way Tallis' argument seemd to imply that brain function was limited to supporting a few robotic-like functions rather than the vast breadth of cognition that we know it actually does underpin.aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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aiguy, I don’t think I’ve seen one of those… do they have brains? Are they conscious? How can you tell if you see one? Do they have brains? Possibly. Conscious? Maybe we can infer that. How can you tell if you see one? Inference borne out of investigation I suppose. Are these supposed to be conscious? We know of lots of impersonal processes that reliably produce particular ends (like nuclear fusion) – how can you tell which ones are “telic”? Do they solve novel problems? How do you know? Good questions. Worthy of investigation, don't you think? We still have trouble 'knowing' that other human beings are conscious. Hell, as per Chalmers, we have trouble determining whether thermometers are conscious. Right – if ID means “alien life forms put life on Earth” then I won’t argue about it, except that ID should be renamed. ID means, as near as I can tell, that some things, even considered 'natural', may be the result of design and science can infer this. What could be responsible for said design? There's a range of possibilities. It's not at all limited to 'some immaterial mind'. Nobody will say what “design” (noun) means. If it means “the result of thinking” then we’re back to where we started. No, we're not. Not when you've based your arguments here on the claim that thinking requires a physical substrate, as if that stance alone were enough to undercut ID. All I have to do is show that ID doesn't rule out a physical being as a source of design. It doesn't. I don’t think these ideas are silly, but I don’t think there is any good reason for us to believe they are true. Moreover I don’t think there is a tremendous amount of popular interest in these ideas; that only arises when it appears the Designer is God-like. And I think it only arises when there appears to be design. Francis Crick suddenly found the suggestion that aliens were responsible for life on earth to be a very interesting idea when he made an ID inference. Dawkins has been cagey, but similarly toyed with such an idea. Others have as well. And 'God-like'? That's pretty murky. You don't need to be immaterial to be 'God-like'. (If you accept that, say, the roman pantheons were gods, you certainly don't need to be immaterial.) Apparently you haven’t read O’Leary much. Anyway my point here was about how Tallis/O’Leary downplay brain function – it isn’t just about movement and speech and a few other things; it is about thinking in general modulo consciousness. I've read plenty of O'Leary, and I enjoy her writings. I'm pointing out that O'Leary right here is quoting *a self-described humanist who apparently thinks brains are needed for thought* to illustrate skepticism about materialist explanations of mind. It's the oddest time to suggest she's mounting the argument you think she is. Sometimes people you normally disagree with can be expected to make a point you agree with. I'd really think this is one of those times, honestly. Or what, do you actually prefer the popular idea that the only people who doubt materialism vis a vis minds are theists?nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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There is currently no explanation for consciousness, materialist or otherwise, so nothing to oppose except rah rahs for a materialism that has done nothing significant in this area. If someone wants to write in and explain that in such-and-such a brain area researchers found ... forget it. Anyone who has been under anaesthesia a few times, as I have, will not be surprised to learn how consciousness is temporarily lost. We do not thereby learn what it is.O'Leary_{January 11, 2011
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Null,
A demiurge? Some brutely existing creative entity, I believe.
I don't think I've seen one of those... do they have brains? Are they conscious? How can you tell if you see one?
Impersonal telic process? I don’t see what’s hard about that at all – a process that reliably produces particular or a range of ends, yet is not itself a person.
Are these supposed to be conscious? We know of lots of impersonal processes that reliably produce particular ends (like nuclear fusion) - how can you tell which ones are "telic"? Do they solve novel problems? How do you know?
If you won’t argue with me, then you have no argument with ID on this front.
Right - if ID means "alien life forms put life on Earth" then I won't argue about it, except that ID should be renamed.
ID purports to identify design, not the designer, and the range of possible designers is not at all limited to the immaterial. So no, ID as ID is not wedded to a position on the viability of an immaterial mind.
Nobody will say what "design" (noun) means. If it means "the result of thinking" then we're back to where we started.
You may say ‘Well, okay, but the aliens and computer simulations are just silly’, and that’s fine. I find plenty of popular or obscure ideas silly. But the focus remains what it is.
I don't think these ideas are silly, but I don't think there is any good reason for us to believe they are true. Moreover I don't think there is a tremendous amount of popular interest in these ideas; that only arises when it appears the Designer is God-like.
AIGUY: O’Leary wants to pretend that because neuroscience can’t explain phenomenology, it means that we don’t need brains to think. My point here is that she’s wrong about that. NULL: Is she making that argument here? If so, she has a funny way of doing it – quoting some skeptical atheist/humanist doctor who says “Neuroscience can explain many brain functions, but not the mystery of consciousness”.
Apparently you haven't read O'Leary much. Anyway my point here was about how Tallis/O'Leary downplay brain function - it isn't just about movement and speech and a few other things; it is about thinking in general modulo consciousness.
It seems to me she’s doing precisely the opposite – that even among people who do claim that brains are necessary for thinking, materialism (certainly not Dennett-style materialism) doesn’t follow, and in fact some of those people regard such a conclusion as absurd. You don’t have to be a materialist to thinking the physical is important, even essential, for thinking. And on the flipside, believing the brain is essential for humans to think doesn’t suffice to show someone is a materialist. I’d think you of all people would enjoy having this pointed out.
Yes of course I agree with that part. above,
What we know about brain functions is that they correlate to those things you mentioned. At best one can claim that they provide a structure that facilitates the mental. But it’s the mental that does the thinking. That’s all we can claim to know. That of course does nothing to undermine dualism. Interractionist dualists have already addressed that numerous times and showed how the findings of neuroscience is compatible with dualism.
I'm not arguing against dualism. I'm pointing out that neural mechanisms are known to be responsible for memory, emotion, planning, problem solving, personality, and so on. We don't understand consciousness, and it could still be true that certain aspects of cognition require mechanisms/processes/effects that are still fundamentally unknown (a la Penrose for example).aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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@aiguy -"we have learned that brain functions underpin not only movement coordination and speech production and understanding, but also perception, memory, emotion, planning, problem solving of all sorts… in other words, our brains are responsible for thinking." What we know about brain functions is that they correlate to those things you mentioned. At best one can claim that they provide a structure that facilitates the mental. But it's the mental that does the thinking. That's all we can claim to know. That of course does nothing to undermine dualism. Interractionist dualists have already addressed that numerous times and showed how the findings of neuroscience is compatible with dualism. So any attempt to use neuroscience to support materialism as it is so often done by the dogmatic types is simply circular logic.above_{January 11, 2011
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I don’t know what an “impersonal telic process” is, or a “demiurge”, and I don’t think you do either. A demiurge? Some brutely existing creative entity, I believe. Impersonal telic process? I don't see what's hard about that at all - a process that reliably produces particular or a range of ends, yet is not itself a person. Logically an alien life form cannot be said to be responsible for first life, but if you’d like to argue they created life on Earth then you may join the Raelians in that and I’d leave you to your speculations. Likewise if you’d like to suggest that a computer was responsible, I won’t argue with you. The Raelians, or John Gribbin, or Nick Bostrom, or a number of multiverse advocates, or... If you won't argue with me, then you have no argument with ID on this front. ID purports to identify design, not the designer, and the range of possible designers is not at all limited to the immaterial. So no, ID as ID is not wedded to a position on the viability of an immaterial mind. You may say 'Well, okay, but the aliens and computer simulations are just silly', and that's fine. I find plenty of popular or obscure ideas silly. But the focus remains what it is. O’Leary wants to pretend that because neuroscience can’t explain phenomenology, it means that we don’t need brains to think. My point here is that she’s wrong about that. Is she making that argument here? If so, she has a funny way of doing it - quoting some skeptical atheist/humanist doctor who says "Neuroscience can explain many brain functions, but not the mystery of consciousness". It seems to me she's doing precisely the opposite - that even among people who do claim that brains are necessary for thinking, materialism (certainly not Dennett-style materialism) doesn't follow, and in fact some of those people regard such a conclusion as absurd. You don't have to be a materialist to thinking the physical is important, even essential, for thinking. And on the flipside, believing the brain is essential for humans to think doesn't suffice to show someone is a materialist. I'd think you of all people would enjoy having this pointed out.nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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Since when does ID make that claim? Since ID proponents repeatedly note that inferring design does not get one a positive identification of a designer – and that the spread of possible designers ranges from computer simulations, impersonal telic processes, aliens and alien civilizations, demiurges, and more – any suggestion that ID itself requires a position on the designer’s constitution would be undercut. Which isn’t to say someone couldn’t take any design ID infers and mount an argument for a specific identification – but that wouldn’t be an ID argument, anymore than arguing for the presence of teleology based on the function of the human heart is a (scientific) biological argument.
I don't know what an "impersonal telic process" is, or a "demiurge", and I don't think you do either. Logically an alien life form cannot be said to be responsible for first life, but if you'd like to argue they created life on Earth then you may join the Raelians in that and I'd leave you to your speculations. Likewise if you'd like to suggest that a computer was responsible, I won't argue with you. If you refuse to say what it is you are talking about, then you simply aren't saying anything at all. If you refuse to say what it is you are talking about except to insist that it "thinks", then we're back to where we started: To be consistent with our neuroscientific findings you'd need to eliminate anything without a brain of some sort (a complex physical information processing mechanism). O'Leary wants to pretend that because neuroscience can't explain phenomenology, it means that we don't need brains to think. My point here is that she's wrong about that.aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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Any theory (such as ID) that suggests thinking can proceed without a complex physical brain contradicts a huge body of evidence. Since when does ID make that claim? Since ID proponents repeatedly note that inferring design does not get one a positive identification of a designer - and that the spread of possible designers ranges from computer simulations, impersonal telic processes, aliens and alien civilizations, demiurges, and more - any suggestion that ID itself requires a position on the designer's constitution would be undercut. Which isn't to say someone couldn't take any design ID infers and mount an argument for a specific identification - but that wouldn't be an ID argument, anymore than arguing for the presence of teleology based on the function of the human heart is a (scientific) biological argument.nullasalus_{January 11, 2011
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"...neuroscience will help us understand not only the mechanism of brain functions (such as those that coordinate movement or underpin speech) but also key features of human consciousness....Neuroscience, in short, has no way of accommodating everyday first-person being."
I agree that neuroscience has made no progress helping us understand conscious experience. However, we have learned that brain functions underpin not only movement coordination and speech production and understanding, but also perception, memory, emotion, planning, problem solving of all sorts... in other words, our brains are responsible for thinking. The connection between thinking and conscious experience remains mysterious. So while Dennett and the Churchlands overstate neuroscience's ability to explain consciousness, Tallis and O'Leary understate the evidence that brains support cognition. Any theory (such as ID) that suggests thinking can proceed without a complex physical brain contradicts a huge body of evidence.aiguy_{January 11, 2011
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