Why no pet penitentiaries?

_{William Dembski

December 11, 2005

Darwinism, Evolution}

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[From a paper by one of my students:] According to DarwinÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s theory, humans are separated from the animals only by a matter of degrees, not by categories. This is the working presupposition behind the evolutionary ethics of James Rachels. Thus, there can be no fundamental difference between Ã¢â‚¬Å“evilÃ¢â‚¬Â committed by rhesus monkeys and that committed by the Great Apes Ã¢â‚¬â€œ- Homo sapiens. This is where the reductio meets the ad absurdum. To argue that crimes committed by animals and those committed by humans are equivalent does not comport with reality and it does not jive with our experience. While we do have pet cemeteries, we do not have pet penitentiaries. No one incarcerates a Mantis religiosa for the copulatory consumption of her mateÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s head, but Scott Peterson is justly sentenced for murdering his pregnant wife.

Comments

keiths, how would Dennett and friends explain the countless people who struggle for decades with addictions, destructive behaviors, etc... etc... and then, after a spiritual conversion experience, are liberated completely from said behaviors (despite numerous past failures to liberate themselves via sheer "will-power")? I realize that the question is somewhat off-topic and has arguably subjective elements, but I'm curious.Bombadill_{December 11, 2005
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punishement = punishment. I be an spel goode.Bombadill_{December 11, 2005
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Dave, not just rehabilitation, but also punishment. Retribution plays a role, as the afflicted families of victims find justice. There is a whole dimension of emotional aspects in regards to recompense in the crime / punishement scenario. I find the speculations of the material reductionist to be a "looks good on paper" sort of paradigm, but lacking in effectively explaining (reducing) the real-world situation.Bombadill_{December 11, 2005
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DaveScot writes: "If he had a real point he couldÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ve used a respected animal like a horse instead of bugs and monkeys." You horsist! I'm going to report you to the RMADL (Rhesus Monkey Anti-Defamation League). Aquinas writes: "Just because naturalists say that there is a difference in degree and not kind does not mean that they arenÃ¢â‚¬â„¢t just in punishing one and not the other." That's true. You'd have to 1) decide which human attributes justify punishment; 2) ask whether any of the animals share these attributes sufficiently to warrant the same treatment; and 3) if so, identify the animals who qualify. Note that the argument does not depend on evolution. "Designed" similarity would also suffice. ajl summarizes his take on Provine's view: "Some evolutionists (like William Provine specifically) would say that humans should not be incarcerated either. That is because they argue that humans...do not have free will...Therefore, they cannot be held accountable for their actions...And, when you make choices about breakfast and other things, you really arenÃ¢â‚¬â„¢t making a choice, but rather, your genes are playing a trick on you, making you think you are actually making a free choice." It's also possible to argue that even though humans are not accountable for their actions, incarceration is nevertheless justified when it protects society from harm and promotes rehabilitation in order to reduce recidivism, and the benefits to society outweigh the harm done to the incarcerated individual. Under this view the purpose of incarceration is not punitive, and you might even want to make prison as pleasant as possible to mitigate the harm done to the imprisoned individual, who after all simply had the bad luck to be born a person who was destined to become a criminal. ajl continues: "Also, some people on this blog advocating the naturalist position say that it is ok to convict Peterson. So, I was actually interested in how they synthesize ProvineÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s view." They might think that Peterson is likely to offend again, and that incarceration is necessary for society's protection and to reform Peterson. Another naturalistic view is compatibilism, which is eloquently defended by Daniel Dennett in his book "Freedom Evolves." This view holds that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Free will rests in the ability of an organism to receive input from the outside world, process it internally, and act on it. We choose what we want. The choosing and the wanting are completely inside us and not part of the outside world. So even if the choosing and the wanting are in fact deterministic, we nevertheless are free, because the choices and wants are ours. Dennett's twist on this (and the genesis of the book's title) is the idea that as the complexity of the internal deliberative process increases and the output of the process becomes less and less stereotyped, the freedom of our will can be said to be increasing. As evolution produces bigger and more complicated brains over time, freedom itself evolves, which provides the basis for a defensible concept of moral responsibility. A compatibilist might therefore approve of Peterson's imprisonment.keiths_{December 11, 2005
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Some evolutionists (like William Provine specifically) would say that humans should not be incarcerated either. That is because they argue that humans, like monkeys, earthworms, and apples, do not have free will. They are just made up of matter put together without any planning. Therefore, they cannot be held accountable for their actions. So, the idea is that we correctly find it absurd that we would arrest a monkey or llama. But, we haven't made the same connection of finding it equally absurd to arrest a human. Since of course, we are no different than those other 'cousins'. And, when you make choices about breakfast and other things, you really aren't making a choice, but rather, your genes are playing a trick on you, making you think you are actually making a free choice. BTW, I'm not being sarcastic or maligning Provine. I think this is actually one of Provine's main areas of thought. I don't agree with it, but thought that this is another angle that should be bantered about, given the article that was posted. Also, some people on this blog advocating the naturalist position say that it is ok to convict Peterson. So, I was actually interested in how they synthesize Provine's view. Finally, I hope I am accurately expressing Provine's argument (even though I only did it in about 2 sentances). If someone would like to add some additional nuances he has, that would be fine. But, I think it is a perspective that would make for interesting discussion on this thread.ajl_{December 11, 2005
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By the way, thanks for the James Rachels pointer. I've been a vegetarian for ethical reasons for the last 20 years, so I'm very interested in what Rachels has to say.keiths_{December 11, 2005
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Bill's student does not explicitly mention animal rights, but I gather that he or she is arguing the following: According to Darwin, animals and humans are related, differing only by degree. James Rachels says that this entitles them to ethical consideration, including the bestowal of rights. But if an ethical system grants rights to animals, then the flip side also applies: they should be held responsible for evil and punished accordingly, even to the extent of being sent to prison. But this is absurd. We don't hold animals responsible for evil (as in the praying mantis example), we don't build pet penitentiaries, and it would be ridiculous to do either of these things. To the student, if you are lurking out there in blogland: Is this a fair synopsis of the argument you were making? The excerpt also does not indicate what conclusions the student draws from the argument. Obviously, a reductio ad absurdum argument is intended to show that one or more of the premises is incorrect. In this case there are two main premises in James Rachels' argument. Let's look at each and examine the implications if it is incorrect. Rachels' first premise: 1) Humans differ from animals only by degrees, as evolutionary theory tells us. If this premise is incorrect, then humans must be in a fundamentally separate category from animals. This could either mean that evolutionary theory is wrong to assert their relatedness, or that evolutionary theory is right, but that other distinguishing attribute(s) place humans in a separate moral category. If the former, then the student would be arguing that evolutionary theory is wrong not because of any scientific evidence, but because it contradicts a particular moral intuition. The problem with such an argument, obviously, would be that it assumes the truth of the moral intuition rather than demonstrating it, and that it renders scientific evidence irrelevant in deciding a scientific issue (the truth of evolution), which is an absurdity. If the student is making the "distinguishing attributes" argument, then he/she should specify the attributes, show why they justify putting humans in a separate moral category, and demonstrate that other animals do not possess these attributes. Rachels' second premise: 1) The relatedness and similarity of animals to humans entitles animals to ethical consideration, including the bestowal of rights. This is probably the premise that the student intended to invalidate via the reductio ad absurdum. Let's look closely at one of the premises of the student's (not Rachels') argument. In my paraphrase, the premise was "If an ethical system grants rights to animals, then the flip side also applies: they should be held responsible for evil and punished accordingly, even to the extent of being sent to prison." The problem is easily seen if we substitute "young children" or "mentally disabled persons" for "animals" in the wording of the premise: "If an ethical system grants rights to young children, then the flip side also applies: they should be held responsible for evil and punished accordingly, even to the extent of being sent to prison." Most of us would disagree with the reworded premise. We believe that young children are not fully responsible for their actions, both because they do not completely understand the consequences and because their sense of right and wrong is not fully developed. (Remember that six year old boy who shot his classmate at school? See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/661564.stm . I remember reading at the time that the boy didn't understand that if he killed his classmate, she wasn't coming back.) The same reasoning applies to animals (remember the mantis example), and so the premise is invalidated. Note that if it is ever shown that some animals (presumably smarter ones like chimps) both understand the consequences of their actions and understand what's good and evil, at least with respect to the actions in question, then it might actually make sense, by analogy with humans, to hold them responsible and punish them for such actions. Because the student's argument hinged on the connection between being granted rights and being held fully responsible for one's actions, the argument itself is invalidated. Dembski's student presumably attends the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, where Dembski teaches. If so, there's a special irony in the argument, since the Bible itself states that animals should in fact be punished for violating the law, despite the student's intuition: 1. Exodus 19:12-13 demands that humans and animals who touch Mt. Sinai be stoned to death or shot with arrows. 2. Exodus 21:28-32 demands the stoning of oxen who gore people. 3. Leviticus 20:15-16 decrees that if a man or woman has sex with an animal, both the person and the animal must be killed. Finally, I should mention that Richard Dawkins addresses the moral implications of evolutionary similarities in an essay in his book, "A Devil's Chaplain."keiths_{December 11, 2005
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I think this passage is slightly misleading. The implication is that naturalists are wrong to punish Peterson and not the mantis, though this is (I would say) logically fallacious. Just because naturalists say that there is a difference in degree and not kind does not mean that they aren't just in punishing one and not the other. Would you agree that there is a difference in degree and not kind between lightly tapping someone with my fist and punching someone as hard as I could? Of course. But does it follow that you should punish both actions?Aquinas_{December 11, 2005
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My guess would be because penitentiaries are ostensibly for rehabilitation hence the definition "correctional institution". What's the chances of rehabilitating a mantis? If humans differ from other animals only in degree, which all scientific evidence indicates is true, then ability to learn from a mistake and not repeat it is just one of those things that differ by degrees and not by category. That said, comparing humans to insects reveals not only how ridiculous the author's point was but that he knows very well it's ridiculous. If he had a real point he could've used a respected animal like a horse instead of bugs and monkeys.DaveScot_{December 11, 2005
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