Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Dawkins’ Philosophical Incoherence

Share
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Flipboard
Print
Email

In River out of Eden : A Darwinian View of Life Richard Dawkins wrote:

The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. As that unhappy poet A.E. Housman put it: ‘For Nature, heartless, witless Nature Will neither care nor know.’ DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music.

In a 2007 New Scientist/Greenpeace Science debate, Dawkins said:

Far from being the most selfish, exploitative species, Homo sapiens is the only species that has at least the possibility of rebelling against the otherwise universally selfish Darwinian impulse . . . If any species in the history of life has the possibility of breaking away from short term selfishness and of long term planning for the distant future, it’s our species. We are earth’s last best hope even if we are simultaneously, the species most capable of destroying life on the planet. But when it comes to taking the long view, we are literally unique. Because the long view is not a view that has ever been taken before in whole history of life. If we don’t plan for the future, no other species will . . .

Dawkins’ does not seem to understand that he cannot have his cake and eat it too, and that leads the world’s most prominent atheist/evolutionary biologist to make mutually exclusive truth claims that I would expect the average high school freshman to avoid. Let us examine a couple:

1. DNA is all there is, and we dance to its music. Yet it is possible for Homo sapiens to rebel against DNA. But how can DNA rebel against itself? I cannot rise above myself. I cannot reach down, grab my bootstraps, and pull myself off the floor.

2. There is no good and no evil. Yet Homo sapiens has the capability of planning for the future (presumably to avoid an undesired outcome or achieve a desired outcome). But if there is no good and no evil, on what grounds should we desire any particular outcome and plan for it?

UPDATE BELOW THE FOLD

From the comments, it seems that the 1st conclusion above is not as obvious as I thought it was.  Let me try to spell it out in small steps.

1. Dawkins is a philosophical materialist.

2. Philosophical materialism compels the conclusion that mind does not exist and that what we call “mind” is an illusion, an epiphenomenon of the chemical processes of the brain.

3. Consequently, to remain logically coherent Dawkins must believe in a pure biological reductionism. And he does. His statement “DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music” is just another way for Dawkins to say, “Look everyone! I’m a dyed-in-the-wool biological reductionist.” I would have thought that is obvious, but apparently it is not.

4. Biological determinism is an inescapable corollary to biological reductionism. In other words, if every choice we make can be reduced to the chemical processes of the brain, free will is an illusion. This is what Dawkins means when he says we dance to DNA’s music.

5. Then, having said that free will is an illusion, Dawkins sounds like a Cartesian dualist in the Greenpeace debate. He says it is possible for us to “rebel” against the “otherwise universally selfish Darwinian impulse.” If this is not special pleading, I do not know what is.

6. The selfish Darwinian impulse is universal, Dawkins says. We dance to DNA’s music. Our every choice is utterly determined. Free will is an illusion. No, wait, Dawkins replies. The Darwinian impulse is only nearly universal. “I” can rebel against it. Here’s the problem. If we accept Dawkins’ initial premises, the conclusion that “I” can rebel against biological determinism is pure gibberish for the simple reason that the “I” in that statement does not exist. There is only matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot “rebel” against itself. Indeed, the concept of matter in motion rebelling against matter in motion is logically incoherent. If Dawkins’ initial premises are correct, my body is nothing but a complex biological machine, and the self-awareness I feel is an illusion. Therefore, the very idea that “I” have a “choice” about whether to follow selfish Darwinian impulses is meaningless.

So we see that Dawkins is not just any sort of fool.  He is a simpering gutless fool.  He wants to have his atheism with its concomitant materialism, but he does not have the courage to face the earth shattering metaphysical conclusions that follow ineluctability from his premises.  Instead, he tries to smuggle foundational ethics (of a particularly Christian variety at that!) in through the back door.  He shirks not only in ethics but also in politics.  See here.

Give me Nietzsche over Dawkins any day.  One can disagree with Nietzsche, yet still come away with a sort of respect for his courage.  Nietzsche never simpered nor shirked.  He faced the terrifying conclusions of his premises head on.  In our time Will Provine follows in Nietzsche’s footsteps and takes his atheism seriously:  “Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent.”  Evolution: Free Will and Punishment and Meaning in Life, Second Annual Darwin Day Celebration Keynote Address.

Comments
“This part of the self, then, these motivations, must be designed, since they are not caused by anything else. Correct?” I would say we are designed to have “self” motivations." I'm not sure I see the difference?molch
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
11:19 AM
11
11
19
AM
PDT
"This part of the self, then, these motivations, must be designed, since they are not caused by anything else. Correct?" I would say we are designed to have "self" motivations. Vividvividbleau
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
11:10 AM
11
11
10
AM
PDT
"Some are some are not, sometimes evidence does not matter, sometimes choices are made in spite of the evidence. I dont subscribe to the notion that we always make the most rational choices, we someties knowingly make irrational choices." There are, I believe, three possible alternatives for the origin of "irrational" choices, that are made in spite of evidence on the table: 1) the choice is truly random. This is probably the case for lots of mostly inconsequential choices we make every day such as "should I get the strawberry smoothie or the chocolate milkshake" However, if a choice is important, I don't believe, and I suspect you don't believe either, that it will be made randomly, i.e. that we knowingly make important choices without regard to motivations. That leaves options 2 & 3: 2) Those motivations to make a seemingly irrational choice are an accumulation of evidences that are the building blocks of my motivation to make this choice. For an example I'll cite one from an earlier discussion on a different thread: "For example, I walk up to a taxi and before I get in I take a look. Let’s say the driver is obviously impaired, the inside looks shabby, the body is a mess, scrapes, dents, etc… I evaluate this evidence and decide whether or not I want to get in the cab. The rational choice seems obvious. BUT - By itself, this is not enough evidence to decide if it is a good idea to get into the cab. I need to put it in context with my repertoire of already accumulated evidence that impaired drivers are likely to cause accidents, etc. And I need to reconcile the recognition of all these factors with current circumstances. If I need a ride to the next hospital because I have a punctured artery, and if the cab in question is the only ride available, these two pieces of evidence will likely outweigh all the negative evidence in the final decision. This means that the choice is a direct and necessary consequence of the evaluation of evidence, and that the will to make that choice is a combination of all the evidence evaluations (which are commonly described as motivations) that factor into that choice." 3) The last alternative: "I presume they originate from “self” What the “self” most wants is not always purely a result of evidence." Which, if I understand you correctly, means that there is a part of the self that just "is", it's motivations are simply there and are NOT caused or influenced by evidence. This part of the self, then, these motivations, must be designed, since they are not caused by anything else. Correct?molch
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
10:58 AM
10
10
58
AM
PDT
"Yes, I agree – only that in my opinion these “filters” or perceptions are the result of accumulated evidence evaluations" Some are some are not, sometimes evidence does not matter, sometimes choices are made in spite of the evidence. I dont subscribe to the notion that we always make the most rational choices, we someties knowingly make irrational choices. "If the different “filters” that different people apply to arrive at different choices are NOT the result of earlier, accumulated evidence evaluations, what do you presume do they originate from?" I presume they originate from "self" What the "self" most wants is not always purely a result of evidence. Does that make any sense? LOL Vividvividbleau
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
09:58 AM
9
09
58
AM
PDT
@vivid -"BTW it is my position that everyone in the end only beleive and choose what they want. Just because we want to believe something does not neccessarily diminsh the validity of that belief or choice." Well said!above
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
09:45 AM
9
09
45
AM
PDT
"Difference in choices are based on their perception of the set of the evidence thay are evaluating. There are “filters” that evidence goes through so to speak." Yes, I agree - only that in my opinion these "filters" or perceptions are the result of accumulated evidence evaluations. Maybe this is where we differ in opinion? If the different "filters" that different people apply to arrive at different choices are NOT the result of earlier, accumulated evidence evaluations, what do you presume do they originate from? The only alternative I can come up with, from a design proponent's perspective, would be: design. Am I wrong?molch
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
09:44 AM
9
09
44
AM
PDT
"So, would you agree with me that differences in choices between different people are based on differences in the set of evidences that they are evaluating?" Interesting question. I guess I would modify this somewhat. Often times two people can look at the same evidence and come to different conclusions. Difference in choices are based on their perception of the set of the evidence thay are evaluating. There are "filters" that evidence goes through so to speak. Vividvividbleau
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
09:07 AM
9
09
07
AM
PDT
Vividbleau, I agree with you that we base our choices on what we "want" - on our desires. And I am in no way suggesting that making choices based on a desire diminishes the validity of that choice. On the contrary, I don't think there is any other basis for any choice BUT desire. Our desires, or motivations, are the outcome of evidence evaluations - conscious and subconscious. In other words, every choice is based on our judgement if the outcome will be advantageous (either instantaneously or in it's projectd future effects) in light of accumulated first and second hand knowledge=evidence and current circumstances=evidence. So, would you agree with me that differences in choices between different people are based on differences in the set of evidences that they are evaluating?molch
August 5, 2010
August
08
Aug
5
05
2010
08:54 AM
8
08
54
AM
PDT
Molch, Of course the designer designed me with the ability to choose. With that out of the way I choose to accept a designer freely because , and this may surprise you, because I want to believe in a designer. Since it is my "most" want it is my free choice. BTW it is my position that everyone in the end only beleive and choose what they want. Just because we want to believe something does not neccessarily diminsh the validity of that belief or choice. Vividvividbleau
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
05:31 PM
5
05
31
PM
PDT
Hi Vivid, According to your definition of "free choice" you basically mean free will in the sense of the freedom from coercion; I do agree with you on that assessment insofar as I accept the existence of a free will mostly in that exact sense. But, if you are somebody who accepts a designer as the cause for your existence, don't you assume that some aspect of your choices (for example making the choice of accepting the existence of that designer) is NOT a consequence of the design, and was therefore made "freely"?molch
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
05:11 PM
5
05
11
PM
PDT
Molch RE 66 I am not a fan of the term "free will" Every time I see that term what pops into my head is "free from what"? I much prefer the more accurate term "free choice" which is what I think people mean when they say "free will" Free choice is the ability ( within certain constraints) to choose whatever we most want given the options available to us at the moment the choice is made. Vividvividbleau
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
02:06 PM
2
02
06
PM
PDT
kairofocus: I am well aware of your reasons to believe that "evolutionary materialism is self-referentially incoherent and necessarily false." They are the same reasons that you "point out that you presumably trust your own cognition to be more than the grinding away of neurons against one another on mechanical necessity and chance." That's your presumption and has nothing to do with my actual position on the origin and function of cognition. My position on this issue is completely irrelevant to the question I asked in 55. I am asking anyone who is a proponent of the idea that designed creatures in a designed universe can have Free Will (in the general philosophical meaning of unconstrained or not completely constrained choice) to explain why they think so. Since kairofocus seems to continuously misunderstand my question, let me clarify: I am interested to understand WHICH component that goes into the making of any choice by a designed creature do you believe/deduce/assume NOT to be constrained by the creature's design. If you, kairofocus, don't want to answer that question, then just don't. Nobody forces you. But stop pretending that you think you know what my philosophical ideas and conclusions are and that my question must therefore be irrelevant.molch
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
01:49 PM
1
01
49
PM
PDT
Molch: The power of choice is inextricable from the power of cognition [e.g. reflect on the insight behind the root for the Greek word Logos, the basis of "logic": leg, to choose], or the workings of cognition become just mechanical cause with some random noise injected, and self stultifying. That is a big part of why evolutionary materialism is self-referentially incoherent and necessarily false. That is not a side issue, easily dismissed as you go on to your agenda. And in fact, 56 answers specifically to your 55:
M, 55: I glean from this discussion that the ID camp operates under the assumption that designed creatures in a designed universe have free will? how so? KF, 56: Do you regard your cognition as free enough to follow on logic and facts? [as in cf above] If so, [then] you believe in free will in the relevant sense, regardless of the implications of your underlying views, especially if they are as exposed and corrected above. Design thinkers are simply taking the intuitive logic of real cognition seriously.
In short, you projected the assertion of an implied unwarranted ASSUMPTION on our part. I point out that you presumably trust your own cognition to be more than the grinding away of neurons against one another on mechanical necessity and chance. I then pointed out that the inference design thinkers commonly make is from trusting cognition to being sufficiently free to really think and decide for ourselves, not just the subconscious and controlling impacts of genetic and psychosocial programming and conditioning. In short, you cannot pretend to be a really reasoning, really communicating, really knowing subject without implying significant freedom to choose. I know, that does not sit wit5h the dominant power of evolutionary materialism in our day, but so much the worse for that self-referentially incoherent evolutionary materialism. GEM of TKI PS: Let me excerpt as there is a bad habit of ignoring links: _____________ >> . . . [evolutionary] materialism [a worldview that often likes to wear the mantle of "science"] . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance ["nature"] and psycho-social conditioning ["nurture"], within the framework of human culture [i.e. socio-cultural conditioning and resulting/associated relativism].) Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited! Thus, evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze? In the end, materialism is based on self-defeating logic . . . . >> _______________ Onlookers, see the point?kairosfocus
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
10:21 AM
10
10
21
AM
PDT
#62 above Again a very interesting comment. You write: I think this is where the disagreement between the two of you lies. Given the different metaphysical positions you and tgpeeler hold, I think it would be safe to say that as per your metaphysic his argument is objectionable but as per his it’s perfectly valid But there is a problem here. It implies that when tgpeeler and I use an abstract word such as "beauty" or "zero" we mean different things. After all if I actually meant some immaterial entity I would presumably know that. But if we are talking about different things then we are not disagreeing at all. And that seems very paradoxical. We use the same language and I am sure we could have non-philosophical discussions about beauty without it ever crossing our minds we were talking about different things. This is why linguistic philosophy is actually so important. If we can't work out what we mean we are talking about things then we can go little further.markf
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
10:07 AM
10
10
07
AM
PDT
@ 55 & 60: "Cognition [has to be] free enough to follow on logic and facts" "A choice is made after evidence is evaluated through cognition." "in order to think logically and to evaluate fact and truth claims [through cognition], one has to be free enough to make real intellectual choices." So, your position is that one has to be able to make free choices in order to evaluate evidence upon which free choices are based. Thanks, but that's utterly unhelpful to answering my question in 54. Is anyone else interested in addressing 54?molch
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
09:24 AM
9
09
24
AM
PDT
-“You write that the problem with analytical philosophy is that it is reductionist. It is only a problem if a reductionist approach is false.” That’s correct. I would even go as far as say that even if reductionism is false, it might still be useful for instrumental purposes, but we would always need to be aware of its problems and limitations. -“However, I would not describe Wittgenstein as a reductionist – in fact he was a bit of a mystic, had some religious beliefs (I don’t agree with everything he said), and in his later writings (which are the ones I am referring to) was reacting against logical positivism. Yes, he did react/depart from positivism as I mentioned earlier. And I also agree that he was religious in some ways. He was influenced by both Kierkegaard and Tolstoy and if I am not mistaken he had an admiration for people of faith. -“One of the things he did, was to try to get at the meaning of words (and mathematics) and show that language is not just about naming things – a correspondence theory of truth is too simple. The meaning of words is not always something which those words refer to.” To some extend I agree. Words change meaning in different contexts, change meaning over time, can be used metaphorically and so on. What I would object to is emptying the word of its meaning like positivists do. I don’t want to get too deep into linguistic analysis (it’s so easy to get lost in it) but I will say this, language in my opinion is a living and a dynamic encyclopedia of the totality of human experience, both physical and spiritual. -“I argue that abstract concepts do not entail abstract things which the concepts refer to” I think this is where you and tgpeeler part ways. I think the disagreement might stem from the Kantian categorization of phenomenon vs nooumenon. But what if this categorization is not all that accurate (rhetorical question)? I happen believe that abstract objects too have an ontology, just not the same kind as physical objects do. But all this is very much dependent on one’s metaphysical position and operant methodology. -“tgpeelers conclude there must be some mysterious non-observable thing which the word refers to” I think this is where the disagreement between the two of you lies. Given the different metaphysical positions you and tgpeeler hold, I think it would be safe to say that as per your metaphysic his argument is objectionable but as per his it’s perfectly valid. I would be a little hesitant to accept the above statement as it places much emphasis on the ‘observable’ (which implies physicality) and don’t want to make human observation the defining factor ontology. So while I acknowledge your point, I don’t wish to limit myself to it. So once again, I think the disagreement lies in our definition of what constitutes what is ‘real’. Knowing the different worldviews that we hold, I think it would be hard to settle the argument.above
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
08:43 AM
8
08
43
AM
PDT
Onlookers: There are several areas where I could comment. I will briefly remark on several revealing points above: 1] Re Molch,56: Cognition is not something that can be free or unfree. Cognition is simply the term that describes thought processes such as logical thinking and the evaluation of facts. Evidently, and sadly, it escapes this commenter that in order to think logically and to evaluate fact and truth claims, one has to be free enough to make real intellectual choices. This is easily brought out by exposing the self-referential incoherence of Crick in his 1994 The Astonishing Hypothesis:
. . . that "You", your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased: "You're nothing but a pack of neurons." This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people today that it can truly be called astonishing.
To this,we may observe that plainly, if Sir Francis is included, this dramatically undermines the credibility of his own thought, for reasons as I pointed out yesterday at 44 and again at 46(and which M plainly overlooked or ignored). Of course, as 46 points out, these issues are already raised in the original post at the head of the thread, and amplified in Mr Arrington's update. The relevance of the concerns raised there decisively expose Crick's self referentially absurd reductio, and that is why ID thinker Phillip Johnson responded that Dr Crick should therefore be willing to preface his books: “I, Francis Crick, my opinions and my science, and even the thoughts expressed in this book, consist of nothing more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” (In short, as Prof Johnson then went on to say: “[[t]he plausibility of materialistic determinism requires that an implicit exception be made for the theorist.” [[In Reason in the Balance, 1995.]) 2] thought what is discussed here is Free Will in the common philosophical sense: the ability to make CHOICES free from constraints. A choice is made after evidence is evaluated through cognition. Immediately, choices are inextricably intertwined in real cognition, as already highlighted. Second, finite, fallible, morally fallen and too often ill-willed human beings are simply unable to make "CHOICES free from constraints." So, to avoid strawman distortions, the distinction we must mark is that between causally sufficient conditions and causal influences or constraints that do not amount to causal sufficiency. Free choice does not imply unconstrained or uninfluenced choice. 3] MF, 59: The Logical Positivists and the likes of tgpeeler share the same misconception – that meaning = reference i.e. the meaning of a word is always what it refers to. So when it comes to abstract words, for which there is no observable referent, the positivists conclude the word doesn’t mean anything and the tgpeelers conclude there must be some mysterious non-observable thing which the word refers to. Strawman, laced with subtle ad hominems. MF as a trained philosopher is fully aware that many theistic thinkers and others will easily accept the reality of abstract entities and give serious reasons for doing so; nor does he provide a serious rebuttal to the argument on the acknowledged reality -- as opposed to physicality -- of abstract entities. Koukl, in discussing the reality of evil and of morality, has an interesting take (which is discussed in App 8 my always linked note):
Evil is real . . . That's why people object to it. Therefore, objective moral standards must exist as well [i.e. as that which evil offends and violates] . . . . The first thing we observe about [such] moral rules is that, though they exist, they are not physical because they don't seem to have physical properties. We won't bump into them in the dark. They don't extend into space. They have no weight. They have no chemical characteristics. Instead, they are immaterial things we discover through the process of thought, introspection, and reflection without the aid of our five senses . . . . We have, with a high degree of certainty, stumbled upon something real. Yet it's something that can't be proven empirically or described in terms of natural laws. This teaches us there's more to the world than just the physical universe. If non-physical things--like moral rules--truly exist, then materialism as a world view is false. There seem to be many other things that populate the world, things like propositions, numbers, and the laws of logic. Values like happiness, friendship, and faithfulness are there, too, along with meanings and language. There may even be persons--souls, angels, and other divine beings. Our discovery also tells us some things really exist that science has no access to, even in principle. Some things are not governed by natural laws. Science, therefore, is not the only discipline giving us true information about the world. It follows, then, that naturalism as a world view is also false. Our discovery of moral rules forces us to expand our understanding of the nature of reality and open our minds to the possibility of a host of new things that populate the world in the invisible realm . . .
reality does not need to imply physicality, and sneering appeals to materialistic prejudice do not substitute for cogent argument. ____________ Especially in a context where MF is still failing to address the pressing issue of the credible incoherence of evolutionary materialism. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
04:23 AM
4
04
23
AM
PDT
PS A rather neat thought just occurred to me. The Logical Positivists and the likes of tgpeeler share the same misconception - that meaning = reference i.e. the meaning of a word is always what it refers to. So when it comes to abstract words, for which there is no observable referent, the positivists conclude the word doesn't mean anything and the tgpeelers conclude there must be some mysterious non-observable thing which the word refers to. Wittgenstein identified the common fallacy.markf
August 4, 2010
August
08
Aug
4
04
2010
01:18 AM
1
01
18
AM
PDT
#57 above Thank for you for your rational and polite comment. It is true that many great philosophers have said all sorts of strange things. My main point is that it is unreasonable to dismiss them as "simpering gutless fools" or even incoherent. As Dawkins shares the philosophy of some of them he is no more or less a simpering gutless fool then they are. You write that the problem with analytical philosophy is that it is reductionist. It is only a problem if a reductionist approach is false. However, I would not describe Wittgenstein as a reductionist - in fact he was a bit of a mystic, had some religious beliefs (I don't agree with everything he said), and in his later writings (which are the ones I am referring to) was reacting against logical positivism. One of the things he did, was to try to get at the meaning of words (and mathematics) and show that language is not just about naming things - a correspondence theory of truth is too simple. The meaning of words is not always something which those words refer to. Understanding the meaning of what you are talking about is something you need to do whenever you present an argument. tgpeeler argued that the existence of abstractions proved that materialism was false. I argue that abstract concepts do not entail abstract things which the concepts refer to. For some reason he thinks this is not addressing his argument. I suspect a misunderstanding somewhere along the line.markf
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
11:04 PM
11
11
04
PM
PDT
markf @ 42 -“ 1) There are lot of respectable philosophers as well as Dawkins that believe that materialism and determinism are compatible with free will?” Sure there are philosophers that believe in compatibilitism but there are also solipsists and nihilists out there. I mean, after nieztsche and his absurdities one can hardly be surprised by any position a philosopher might take. Also, I think dawkins is confused, not a compatibilitists. In his debate with quinn, when free will came up he said he had no interest in it, which doesn’t surprise me either to be honest. “Wittgenstein encouraged us to simply look at how we use words e.g. abstract nouns and mathematics. After a time you see his point of view and realise there isn’t anything corresponding to these words – rather they are tools in certain activities such as mathematics.” That's the problem with analytic philosophy. It’s reductionist in nature and if abused will leave one with the same conclusion as Wittgenstein. You analyze until you are either left with nothing or a tautology. Also, the way you phrase it, as it pertains to correspondence, assumes positivism as a methodology. Wittgenstein, from the little I know of him departed from that line of thought or was at least accused of doing so. At any rate, positivism collapsed so I don’t see much veracity in the statement. The way I would interpret the statement is more like a warning (against reductionisms) as opposed to a fact. Maybe he did not mean it as such but that’s the only way one can do so without leading to absurdities and reductios as pointed out by tgpeeler and kairosfocus.above
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
04:36 PM
4
04
36
PM
PDT
55: Cognition is not something that can be free or unfree. Cognition is simply the term that describes thought processes such as logical thinking and the evaluation of facts. I thought what is discussed here is Free Will in the common philosophical sense: the ability to make CHOICES free from constraints. A choice is made after evidence is evaluated through cognition. Do you agree?molch
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
02:53 PM
2
02
53
PM
PDT
Molch: Do you regard your cognition as free enough to follow on logic and facts? If so, you believe in free will in the relevant sense, regardless of the implications of your underlying views, especially if they are as exposed and corrected above. Design thinkers are simply taking the intuitive logic of real cognition seriously. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
02:34 PM
2
02
34
PM
PDT
I glean from this discussion that the ID camp operates under the assumption that designed creatures in a designed universe have free will? how so?molch
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
01:31 PM
1
01
31
PM
PDT
TGP: "Semper Fi, Mac!" (MF: Figure out the language game context for that remark. Then, figure out if "there isn’t anything corresponding to these words – rather they are tools in certain activities such as mathematics" . . . contrasting Ari in Metaphysics 1011b on truth and falsity along the way.) GEM of TKIkairosfocus
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
01:31 PM
1
01
31
PM
PDT
When someone has learned enough about philosophy so that they can weave enough banalities together to convince students that there is no inherent contradiction between materialism and human free will, we are seeing the literal fulfillment of Biblical prophecy. "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools" (Rom 1:22 KJV )JDH
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
01:09 PM
1
01
09
PM
PDT
#49 PS Where did you get the idea that I claimed that language could not communicate truth?markf
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
12:45 PM
12
12
45
PM
PDT
#49 tgpeeler I have a degree in philosophy. I understand that authority is not a substitute for argument. However, if a recognised authority puts forward an argument and it appears to tgpeeler to be meaningless or ridiculous then there are two possibilities: either (1) professional philosophers round the world have been duped for decades and tgpeeler is the one to see through it or (2) tgpeeler has not understood the full point of Wittgenstein's arguments I leave it to you to assess which is the more likelymarkf
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
12:43 PM
12
12
43
PM
PDT
And again the ORIGINAL argument is ignored. What, I'm supposed to take an hour of my time disabusing you of the fallacies in Wittgenstein's philosophy so you can ignore that too?? And by the way, if you know anything of philosophy, and I'm a complete amateur myself, you understand that there are no authorities in philosophy, only arguments. Engage the argument, if you please. As far as language not being able to communicate truth... I thought the self-contradiction was obvious, and therefore ridiculous. If I said "I am not writing this" would you not be justified in immediately rejecting that as ridiculous?tgpeeler
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
12:28 PM
12
12
28
PM
PDT
#47 tgpeeler There is an irony here. I offer a potted version of the works of Wittgenstein (widely recognised as one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century - possibly of all time) as a response to your comments about abstractions. You respond with: This is about the most ridiculous thing I have ever read. I guess it is safe to ignore Wittgenstein’s words since they don’t mean anything. You then accuse me of "nothing but dismissal".markf
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
11:56 AM
11
11
56
AM
PDT
Barry, you're going wrong here -
4. Biological determinism is an inescapable corollary to biological reductionism. In other words, if every choice we make can be reduced to the chemical processes of the brain, free will is an illusion. This is what Dawkins means when he says we dance to DNA’s music.
The chemical processes of the brain are also affected by the environment - the whole nature/nurture debate shows that it's not just DNA that affects us. More concretely, humans are able to learn. We do this by observing our environment, and that changes how we think (i.e. it changes the chemical processes of the brain). Thus, one can avoid dancing to DNA's music by dancing to other music, for example society's music. We can learn from the people, the society, around us and dance to that music. And yes, that can be the music of the Christian church as well.Heinrich
August 3, 2010
August
08
Aug
3
03
2010
11:48 AM
11
11
48
AM
PDT
1 2 3 4

Leave a Reply