Compatible? Not Really.

_{Barry Arrington

December 20, 2008

Intelligent Design}

Share: Facebook; Twitter; LinkedIn; Flipboard; Print; Email

One of our commenters says he has solved the determinism problem by becoming a “compatibilist.” Briefly, a compatibilist is someone who tries to avoid the logic of his premises by resorting to semantic dodges about the meaning of free will. The compatibilist says that free will is compatible with determinism (thus the name). Isn’t that kinda like saying my existence is compatible with my nonexistence? Yes, it is. But the compatibilist avoids this problem by re-defining “free will.” The compatibilist says that “free will” does not mean “the liberty to choose;” instead, says he, it means “the absence of coercion.” In other words, he says that so long as a choice is not coerced it is completely free even if it is utterly determined.

The problem with this approach is easy to see – just as we don’t get to win a game by changing the rules to suit us in the middle of the game, we don’t get to impose meaning on words to suit the conclusion we want to reach. The entire issue in the determinism/free will debate is whether we have liberty to choose. Suppose I ask my friend Joe the following question: “Do I have free will, if by “free will” I mean ‘the liberty to choose?’” It is obviously no answer to that question to say, “Yes, you have free will if by free will you mean, “the absence of coercion.” I really do want to explore the question about whether I have the liberty to choose, and Joe’s answer is not helpful. You might even say Joe dodged the question. Thus, in the end, the compatibilist answers a question no one has asked.

“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, aphorism 109

Comments

I just read Clive Hayden's point about "Rib" getting the boot. Does anybody here think we're being a little strict by banning so many people? I mean, maybe we aren't, but I'd like to keep the discussions fair. I just don't want this sweet blog to come across as a place that is intolerant of other's views.Domoman_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
04:30 PM
4
04
30
PM
PDT}

GilDodgen, you said,
I was once a militant, Dawkins-style atheist, and am now a devout Christian theist. No one who knew me would have ever predicted that choice.
That's really cool! What changed your mind? It'd be awesome if Dawkins would turned away from his militant atheism and became a Christian.Domoman_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
04:28 PM
4
04
28
PM
PDT}

"I didn’t mean that the coercion absolutely prevents the action, rather that it renders the choice nonfree." Avo see my post #68? If the choice was self determined it is a free choice. Of course choices are often constrained by options that is I may have restricted options from which to choose from. That does not make my choices any less free. Vividvividbleau_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
02:59 PM
2
02
59
PM
PDT}

StephenB Thanks, I think about it a lot. 8^> There is some truth in determinism, (i.e. we cannot stop breathing, eating, etc. without dying) because we are material creatures(think "Shylock") but we are more than that. We do (emphasize "do") act independent of material reality, which places us foursquare into some immaterial reality, but I prefer to avoid Cartesian dualism and all its entanglements and view it as the "image" placed within us. “People hardly ever make use of the freedom they do have, for example, freedom of thought; instead they demand freedom of speech as compensation.” Friedrich Nietzschedgosse_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
02:47 PM
2
02
47
PM
PDT}

dgosse @69, very nice!StephenB_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
02:11 PM
2
02
11
PM
PDT}

-----William J. Murray: "I think something posters here are really burying under semantics and discussions about constraint and coercion is this: true free will is able to make a decision or intend a choice in defiance of whatever constraint, coercion, or cause-and-effect scenarios it finds its apparatus-of-application mired within. In other words, whatever the physical and mental conditions, context and programming of the body/brain/mind might be, the “thing” we call free will must be a spark of uncaused intent outside of all of that, or it is essentially meaningless, bound to intend as a result of cause." That is a splendid way of putting things. Thanks.StephenB_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
02:00 PM
2
02
00
PM
PDT}

Vivid, "Nonsense. The threat of capital punishment is coercion and people commit urder all the time." I didn't mean that the coercion absolutely prevents the action, rather that it renders the choice nonfree. Indeed, most people are afraid to commit murder and those who do hope to get away with it. My interest is in the Christian concept of free will, in which the focus is not so much upon the actual ability to choose, but whether a coerced choice can be considered free. Believing in universal salvation, I am also interested in how this noncoerced, free choice takes place when it will ultimately be (in the long run) the only choice that exists. Stephen B, Very fine post a@ 56. I wish I had something to add. There is good evidence for determinism, and good evidence for nondeterminism, as well as the visceral human belief in it, plus the sense of pointlessness of a fully determined reality. In my opinion we lack enough knowledge of how reality actually works to be sure.avocationist_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
01:44 PM
1
01
44
PM
PDT}

It will be ignored here, but I can't resist pointing out again that this is a lot of incredibly sophisticated, abstruse academic theorizing, albeit fascinating, that appears much too interesting to look at empirical evidence that might bear on the issue. After all, it is certain that somehow a priori (that is, academic common wisdom) that there can be no such empirical evidence. That said, I subscribe to GP's "transcendental I" as the best concept.magnan_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
01:38 PM
1
01
38
PM
PDT}

Learning How to Fly "Flying is easy, all you need to do is throw yourself at the ground and miss." (paraphrase from on of the "Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxie" books) --------------------------- "Free will" is the capacity to guide your own thoughts and actions independent of the usual cause and effect relation observed in material nature. "Freedom" is the ability to determine your thoughts and behaviour outside of the usual constraints observed in physical sciences. "Liberty" &c "Determinism" is the claim that your thoughts and behaviour are conditioned/constrained/determined/ by the usual constraints we observe in the physical sciences. "Determinisim" is the claim that, while I think I reflectively chose these words and ordered them on the page, the I that chose these words and the reflective process by which I chose them is illusory. Being who and what I am I could have done nothing else. "Compatabilism" is the attempt to reconcile the hard determinism of materialsm with the implicit dualism of free will without admitting to anything other than materialism. To accomplish this (willful) feat of of reasoning they postulate either a compromised definition of "free will" or "freedom" or "liberty" or they postulate some "emergent property of matter" that bestows supernatural abilities (if we accept nature as the observed universe of cause and effect phenomena) that has miraculously "appeared" in living creatures, most conspicuously in human creatures. Each condition leads to absurdities. The first one, that all our actions are the result of an unbroken, if extrememly complex, chain of mindless causes and effects then the words I have just written are, and can be, nothing more the random fluctuations in the universal motion of matter. (maybe they are!) The other claim of "emergent property" hypothesized the "emergence" of something, without apparent cause, that is unknown in the world of the physical sciences, a conscious, acting, "I" with the capacity to affect the otherwise purely physical independent of observed causes. It never ceases to amaze me that so many otherwise intelligent people would gladly surrender their existence to defend the irrational materialistic hyposthesis. My excuse, for my earlier materialism, is ignorance - I had never heard the arguments pro or con, since they were not discussed in the circles within which I moved. However, when I did learn the arguments, the pro-materialist arguments regularly struck me as obviously absurd. I could not and would not accept that the thinking, acting, choosing "I" is a figment of "my" imagination. That, my friends, is an act of "will"!dgosse_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
01:21 PM
1
01
21
PM
PDT}

“rib” is no longer with us.
Congratulations on your first banning, Clive. You are going to fit in nicely around here. I guess you are not a pollywog anymore.crater_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
01:12 PM
1
01
12
PM
PDT}

(14) GilDodgen I was once a militant, Dawkins-style atheist, and am now a devout Christian theist. No one who knew me (then) would have ever predicted that choice. And yet, when you look back on your "choices," isn't it obvious to you that you could not have chosen differently?Michael Haanel_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
12:55 PM
12
12
55
PM
PDT}

"I felt I had to contradict you only in the sense that I do not consider free will an “effect”, but a property, or a function if you want, of the transcendental I." gp I think you object to the term "effect" in reaction to materialistic determinism. However the posts you write are most certainly effects determined by you. "But I would agree with you if what you mean is that acts of free will are “caused” by the transcendental I “through” free will. Is that good for you?" You betcha.I determine my choices, my will is determined by me, my will is never free from me, the transcendental "I". This is why I hate the term "free will" The will is not free, can never be free. As this thread aptly demonstrates alot of the time is taken up discusiing what the will is not free from LOL. However to deny free will is not the same as denying free choice. Although my will is not free ( ie from me) as long as I am the determiner of my choices my choices are free because they are "self determined" My definition of free will is any choice that is self determined. Vividvividbleau_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:49 AM
11
11
49
AM
PDT}

Vivid: I wrote #66 before reading your #65. Please let me know if it answers your point.gpuccio_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:43 AM
11
11
43
AM
PDT}

vividbleau: Again, we must probably just agree on the use of words. That should not be a problem. You had written: "As for whether or not the will is determined: is anyone seriously suggesting that it is not determined? Every effect has a cause.” I felt I had to contradict you only in the sense that I do not consider free will an "effect", but a property, or a function if you want, of the transcendental I. But I would agree with you if what you mean is that acts of free will are "caused" by the transcendental I "through" free will. Is that good for you? My point was that, anyway, acts of free will are events which have, at least in part, a transcendental cause, to which we cannot apply all usual categories. And you are right, there is no doubt that the "transcendental I" of which I speak is also "me" (if we are speaking of "my" transcendental I, of course). And I take full responsibility for my posts, transcendental or not. :-)gpuccio_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:36 AM
11
11
36
AM
PDT}

"So, those choices are effects without a cause." When one must resort to deny causality of effects I would say one needs to reexamine their position. To be fair gp I have read enough of your posts here to know you are a very good thinker and BTW I always make it a point to read what you write. I cannot believe that you really mean that effects have no causes. Tell me it isnt so!! :) Vividvividbleau_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:31 AM
11
11
31
AM
PDT}

Stephen: "Quite simply, they want to use free-will rhetoric to put a human face on an inhuman doctrine." I agree. The simple fact is that the true consequences of a consistent deterministic view of reality are utterly unacceptable to the human mind. I think it is unavoidable that determinists try to play intellectual games to make it more human and to avoid the most unpleasant consequences of what they believe. It's a form of self-defence, I believe. The discussions on this blog are good evidence of how the two great materialistic lies of contemporary "science", darwinism (denial of design in nature) and AI (denial of the empirical status of consciousness and of its properties, including free will) are inevitably connected, and support each other in the more general view of materialistic reductionism. About God's ability to know without denying free will, I would suggest that we can assume that God is out of time, and it is therefore perfectly logical that He may know things from His transcendency. For Him, past and future are probably equally known. But only previous knowledge from inside time would pose a real challenge to free will.gpuccio_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:24 AM
11
11
24
AM
PDT}

“If I am falling out of an aeroplane how do I choose to go up?” Is there no difference between intent and capacity to succeed in your world view? William, if you fall out of an airplane you are going to go down.tribune7_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:23 AM
11
11
23
AM
PDT}

Mark Frank: I'm glad to meet another philosopher on this post. Pink's book has two chief merits: it's unusually perspicuous in setting out the historical background to the current debate on freedom - for that reason alone it's worth buying - and it makes some essential conceptual distinctions that other authors on the subject have mostly failed to do. It's pretty hard to summarize a tightly argued philosophy book in a single post, but I'll try, as you're evidently not sure about the merits of buying and reading Pink's book. Here are some of the key points made by Pink: 1. Freedom depends on our capacity for rationality. However, it is a profound mistake to identify freedom with reason with reason - or even with practical reason. For instance, many of my beliefs about the external world are imposed upon me by my reason: they are beyond my control and it would make no sense to speak of them as being free. 2. In many situations, reason may leave us with only one sensible option; to be free is always to have a capacity to act otherwise. Someone (e.g. God) who is incapable of being silly is, TO THAT EXTENT, not free. 3. Actions are voluntary; decisions are not. I can just decide to act; I cannot just decide to decide. Decisions, unlike actions, are not subject to my will or command. Nevertheless, our decisions are still up to us: they are still free. (Selfish decisions illustrate this point very well.) 4. Hobbes claimed that freedom is nothing more than doing what you want to do (acting voluntarily). He then argued that because decisions are not voluntary, they are not free. Hobbes' error arose from his conception of the will as nothing more than a cause and motivator of actions. Pink contends that the will is a capacity for action and not just a cause; which is why we hold people responsible for what they decide on and intend. 5. As Pink sees it, the two big objections to the coherence of a libertarian account of freedom are (i) the randomness problem - how are free actions to be distinguished from uncaused random events? - and (ii) the exercise problem: if we grant Hobbes' premise that being an effect of prior causes is what defines an action, then a libertarian account of freedom would paradoxically entail that action's very identity comes from a kind of causal influence which has to be limited in order for the action to qualify as free. 6. Pink solves the exercise problem by offering an alternative account of action to Hobbes'. On Hobbes' account, what characterizes an intentional action is having a special kind of CAUSE (our desires), which is directed at an EXTERNAL goal. According to Pink, what distinguishes an intentional action is not a special kind of cause, but a special kind of rationality: practical reason. A decision to act need not have a CAUSE at all. In the case of a decision to act, the goal-direction is INTERNAL: it comes not from an outside cause (prior desires) but from its very own object: the action decided upon. Decisions, unlike mere desires, are formed with the purpose of ensuring that what we desire comes true. I can DESIRE that my country wins the World Cup, but I cannot rationally be said to DECIDE that my country will win, as my decisions have no bearing on this fact. Contrast this with my deciding to go for a walk. This decision of mine is rational, not just because walking is good for me, but for a further practical reason: my deciding to go for a walk is actually likely to result in my doing so. (With desires, by contrast, the sole yardstick of their rationality is whether the object sought is actually good or desirable.) Having distinguished the rationality of practical decisions from that of desires, Pink formulates his response to the exercise problem. An agent has a vast array of possible goals, and an agent's freedom consists in his/her control over which of these goals to aim at or intend. 7. Actions, as we have seen, can be uncaused without being any the less genuine and deliberate. But then, what distinguishes them from random events? To answer this objection, Pink urges us to stop thinking of freedom as a kind of CAUSAL power, as agent-centered accounts of freedom claim. Freedom is a power, but unlike causal powers, it can be exercised in more than one way - which way we exercise it being under our control. When I decide to do something, my decision is not an EFFECT of mine, or of any power I possess; rather, it is simply the way in which I exercise my freedom. My freedom consists in the taking of the decision itself. Absence of causal determination is a NECESSARY but NOT SUFFICIENT condition for freedom. Not all undetermined events are free; only those which we are in control of can be described in this way. This disposes of the randomness problem. 8. Freedom is exercised when we are in control of our actions. However, although freedom is manifest in practical reason, freedom cannot be reduced to practical reason. Reason per se is not free - many of our beliefs are rational but not free. Freedom is not just a capacity to act undeterminedly; nor is it a capacity to act rationally; nor is it a causal power. Rather, freedom is a power which is exercised when we are in control of our actions. "As a power, freedom is simply what it is - and not some other thing," writes Pink. 9. Finally, Pink turns the tables on the skeptics. Anyone who still objects that the libertarian account is incoherent is engaging in philosophical question-begging: they are assuming that actions are simply an effect of desires, which excludes the very possibility of self-determination. I hope that helps.vjtorley_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:18 AM
11
11
18
AM
PDT}

Mark (50) These aren’t shades of meaning. You and Barry define free will as “liberty to choose”. Freedom and liberty are synonyms. The stone in your garden does not have freedom to choose. That’s why I asked if you meant the same as “ability”. You say not. Ability and liberty are not synonyms. Ability implies having the power to achieve an objective. Liberty simply implies having the power to try. I have the liberty to fly to the moon. I do not have the ability to do so. Now, if you want to say free will means having the ability to choose, that's not such a bad definition. I think I even like it better than Barry's.tribune7_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:18 AM
11
11
18
AM
PDT}

re #55 "I an sorry, but I have to contradict both of you. In my model, free will is a property of the transcendental I. So, it generates choices without “exterior” motives (including in “exterior” also the deterministic components of body and mind). So, those choices are effects without a cause. That’s why free will is transcendental. The lack of exterior motives does not mean that the outputs of free will are similar to random fluctuations. Indeed, they are the opposite. They derive from the transcendental nature of the I..." Hi gp. Long time lurker and occasional participant. Lost my password months ago and just recently wordpress sent me a new one after months of requests. Contradict me all you like but I am confused about your basis of contradiction. It seems to me you made my point. The transcendental "I" you speak of is also you is it not? If so then you determined to write this post or was it someone or something else? Vividvividbleau_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:17 AM
11
11
17
AM
PDT}

William J. Murray: I appreciated all your points in the previous posts. I agree with you completely. Clive: for once, I think I am happy of the decision. And believe me, it does not happen often that I approve that kind of decisions...gpuccio_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
11:07 AM
11
11
07
AM
PDT}

"rib" is no longer with us. we should refer to him in the future as "r.i.p." instead :)Clive Hayden_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
10:58 AM
10
10
58
AM
PDT}

"If I am falling out of an aeroplane how do I choose to go up?" Is there no difference between intent and capacity to succeed in your world view? In other words, if I choose kiss a date, but she turns her face and slaps me, does my failure to accomplish the act somehow negate the fact that I chose to kiss her? If I jumped out of a plane and my chute failed to open, you can bet that I'd be choosing like mad to float or fly all the way down, even if my choice failed to culminate in equal consequence. The point is, there is a great difference between the intent of a choice and the apparent capacity to succeed. True free will - the intent that precedes the attempted act - isn't necessarily limited by any physical restriction like physics or potential success.William J. Murray_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
10:26 AM
10
10
26
AM
PDT}

Determinism should be defined as the theory that all events, including human actions and choices, are, without exception, totally determined. One should pay close attention to the words “totally determined,” because that connotation is critical. I think it should be obvious that once determinism is understood for what it is, then free will, that is, that ability to be the cause of an action, is, by definition, impossible. Any other definition constitutes a calculated opening for a manipulation of the language in an attempt to have it both ways. The word was designed, after all, to mean something. All classic determinists insisted that we simply had no choices at all. Behaviorist psychologists, as we know, use it to explain away bad choices, which are not really choices at all. That is, after all, what the materialist world must logically imply. In order to humanize this inhuman conception, materialist philosophers borrow from theistic formulations to blunt the point of their materialism. So, they come up with “epiphenomenalism,” or the inexplicable emergence of something like a mind which, as it turns out, is not really a mind at all. Then they change the meaning of free will to be the “absence of coercion,” which, as it turns out, is not really free will at all. Then, to blunt the meaning of “determinism,” which does not allow for man’s free will, they borrow from theism’s concept of “Predestination,” which does. So, they cheat at both ends by tweaking the definition of determinism on the front and by compromising the meaning of free will on the back end. Surely, it must be evident that the whole of the moral life and all of moral responsibility depends on this capacity to help, harm, or neutralize the actions of others, to change one’s own character, and even to change history. It should be equally obvious that only a mind can reject the brains impulses and redirect them in order to make that happen. A brain is a very complicated and intricate physical organ, to be sure, but it is a physical organ nonetheless. Without the mind’s guidance, it is a mere slave to the physical world of which it is a part. That too, is a necessary conclusion for materialism and determinism. The only real paradoxes that must be explained are of a theological nature. Christianity reconciles the apparent contradiction between God’s foreknowledge and our free will by pointing out that the former need not exclude the other. Just because God knows the stock market is going to crash, for example, doesn’t mean the God caused it. Materialists, however, cannot have that luxury. That means that, for them, there is no paradox, only a hard reality. Their hard determinism leaves no room for God any more than their hard Darwinism leaves any room for design. They can’t let the designers “foot in the door,” but they can quietly smuggle in design like attributes into their conception of Godless matter and hope that no one will notice. Quite simply, they want to use free-will rhetoric to put a human face on an inhuman doctrine.StephenB_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
10:22 AM
10
10
22
AM
PDT}

Mark: I appreciate your balanced answer at #39. I think that in the end we agree. You say: "1) or 1a) both make compatibilism false by definition. If you define free will as something that cannot be determined then of course it cannot be determined. Using that definition I would say that free will does not exist." First of all I agree with 1a). And I agree that, by my definition, compattbilism is false. That is trivial, but it was exactly my point. And I agree that, in your view, free will does not exist. Because, you see, all the other things that you, or compatibilists, suggest as "free will", for us, tbose who believe in true free will, are not free will at all. In other words, compatibilism, for us who do believe in true free will, is only a game played by those who don't believe in true free will and want to substitue other concepts for it. Nothing bad in that, but you will understand that we, who believe in true free will, are not so interested. I agree also about your position about 2), in the sense that it is the only position that a materialist can have. I will just remind that, IMO, that position is an unwarranted denial of the empirical value of subjective experience, but I will not repeat here all my arguments against strong AI. Finally, a clarification. You say: "Then you are asking for choices to be made without motive. How would that be different from random fluctuations?" And vividbleau says: "As for whether or not the will is determined: is anyone seriously suggesting that it is not determined? Every effect has a cause." I an sorry, but I have to contradict both of you. In my model, free will is a property of the transcendental I. So, it generates choices without "exterior" motives (including in "exterior" also the deterministic components of body and mind). So, those choices are effects without a cause. That's why free will is transcendental. The lack of exterior motives does not mean that the outputs of free will are similar to random fluctuations. Indeed, they are the opposite. They derive from the transcendental nature of the I, and therefore are cognitive and moral in nature. Let's say that the I responds to deterministic inputs according to transcendental cognitive and moral intuitions, which apply to the deterministic scenario, but are independent from it. Choices are a moral result of those intuitions. CSI generation is a cognitive result of them.gpuccio_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
10:18 AM
10
10
18
AM
PDT}

rib said, “I didn’t ask for an apology. I asked for a single standard to be applied to ID supporters and critics alike at UD.” I am applying that standard, and we may need to get something straight first, the standard is not whether one asks for an apology, it is whether someone is decent enough to give it. You aren’t. I am. That’s a double standard, even by your estimation, and I won’t allow it. Either you realize that you don’t have autonomy to treat UD folks however vile and disrespectfully you want on that other site and expect for us to grant you privileges on this site–That’s a double standard too–or you will no longer post here. I don’t need any suggestions from you. Either you apologize for your insults, or you will be gone. Understand?Clive Hayden_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
10:17 AM
10
10
17
AM
PDT}

Rib @48. Your response shows that you have absolutely no interest in advancing the discussion of ID vs. materialism. Clive has shown much patience to you, but you do not reciprocate. Your comments on the "Uncommonly Dense" thread had shades of 1984 or Animal Farm. Perhaps your unique history has resulted in deterministic factors, which allowed you to respond in no other way. Or perhaps you are materialist fundamentalist. My vote is for the latter. If you had only called him "smarmy," that would be one thing, but you said:
"Extreme illness calls for extreme treatment. I prescribe solitary confinement with a forced diet of Burroughs and Bukowski. Once that has had the desired effect, we can begin to introduce him gradually to the reality-based world.”
So, Rib...are you interested in advancing the discussion, treating Clive like a fellow human being, and are open to alternative arguments, or are your responses completely determined by your previous experiences?TCS_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
09:21 AM
9
09
21
AM
PDT}

vjorley Thanks for the reference - but my first degree was in philosophy so I am fairly familiar with most of the arguments. Unless there is some outstanding new idea in this book I am not sure if it will add value.Mark Frank_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
08:42 AM
8
08
42
AM
PDT}

Mark Frank: I sympathize with your perplexity. If you want a good account of freedom from a libertarian perspective, my suggestion is this: go and get a copy of Thomas Pink's "Free Will: A Very Short Introduction" (Oxford University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-19-285358-9) which can be ordered at http://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-Short-Introduction-Introductions/dp/0192853589 . In my experience, reading what other people think of a book is no substitute for reading it yourself, so I hope you won't allow yourself to be influenced by the fact that some reviewers liked Pink's book and some didn't.vjtorley_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
08:34 AM
8
08
34
AM
PDT}

Re #48 If I am falling out of an aeroplane how do I choose to go up? Re #47 These aren't shades of meaning. You and Barry define free will as "liberty to choose". I am trying to discover what you mean by liberty in this case. I cannot find a meaning for either "liberty" or "freedom" without a context which implies what the subject is free from. You seem to able to do so. That's why I asked if you meant the same as "ability". You say not. So now I am flummoxed. I just don't know what you mean by liberty to choose. It is like the conversation has come to a complete halt.Mark Frank_{December 21, 2008
December
12
Dec
21
21
2008
07:17 AM
7
07
17
AM
PDT}

Prev 1 … 3 4 5 6 7 Next

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Leave a Reply