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Failure to Educate? Failure to Persuade.

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Larry Moran replied to my latest post with an admission of failure. He thinks he has failed to educate, but I think rather he is confusing the word ‘persuade’ with the word ‘educate’.

He thinks I am rationalising junk DNA with a pile of ‘what-ifs’. But the fact is that most of my ‘what-ifs’ are already known to have some basis in reality. I am not denying any obvious reality. Indeed, the basic machinery of life looks like design, far more than when Paley was around. Yes, there could also be a great deal of junk. That’s why I have said a number of times that ID is not committed to the idea that there is no junk.

Yet, from my point of view, I see a whole pile of Darwinian/post-Darwinian materialists who have only partly explored the genome, working from an assumption that the genome was not designed, and thus are jumping the gun on the evidence. For example, Larry still seems to think that pseudogenes are of themselves ‘solid evidence’ of broken genes despite the fact that we know that at least some pseudogenes influence the rate of translation of real genes by competing with them; a simple design reason why there should be ‘false genes’ = pseudogenes. Who has explored the rest of them?

From his emotive response to my perfectly valid, albeit speculative suggestions (though they were not plucked out of the air either), I don’t trust this guy to think clearly and calmly about the possibility of design. That’s the real problem.

—-
Edit 12 May 2013:

Larry’s insistence that pseudogene = ‘broken gene’ comes from a particular way of thinking about biology: thinking of it in terms of a historical narrative rather than simply reporting the facts of what we see now. This affects much of what he talks about, but here I am choosing to focus on pseudogenes. The best way to talk science is to first state facts and provide an explanation, and then let the observer make up his mind, having been educated, and then let the observer attempt his own explanation of the facts. Being clear about what are facts, and what are interpretations, aids this, but Larry does not practice this when dealing with ID.

The facts are that we have many false genes (pseudogenes) that look like strikingly like particular real genes, and that some of them are known to be functional, and some of those are known to operate by regulating their corresponding real genes by generating competing transcripts. One possible history that would arrive at these observations is if a real gene was duplicated and then one copy was broken to make the pseudogene, and that some subsequently ‘discovered’ a function by chance. Larry believes this is the only possible explanation. He asserts ‘pseudogenes are broken genes’, as if true by definition. However, it is not the only explanation if one considers design. A designer might well make a false gene to regulate a real gene in this way. Why not? But Larry doesn’t consider design. He doesn’t even look at the possibility. That’s why he doesn’t understand that pseudogenes are not necessarily broken genes, and thus are not evidence for junk.

Larry was rather snide about computer scientists, as if they don’t understand the fundamentals of biology. Hmmm. I am more of a mathematical physicist than a computer scientist, and it seems to me that Larry doesn’t understand that stories/narratives about genes breaking and then discovering new function, are not enough for those looking for a natural (physical) explanation. I want to see hard probabilities. It seems that biologists are too happy with narrative and don’t realise the importance of probabilities. If you don’t know how to estimate probabilities, I am sure people like Doug Axe and the Biologic Institute could help you.

Comments
RDF: On the matter of obtainable degree of certainty, I think there is a difference between our degree of certainty in general on an overall view, and what obtains on some particular, specific points. This includes, especially the sort of internally self-referential matter that crops up in Royce's Error exists, and more generally the issue of the self-evident truth. For a second instance take 2 + 3 = 5, or more simply 1 + 1 = 2. Kindly explain to us how this fails of being certain beyond reasonable dispute once one understands what is being said (or once one sees a demonstration with toothpicks or the like: || + ||| --> ||||| ), in light of our experience of the world as conscious intelligences, and how rejecting such does not immediately land one in patent absurdities. (This also brings out the issue that to think at all we must recognise distinction, which implicates the identity cluster in all thought inextricably, LOI, LNC, LEM.) As a third case, consider the statement that a finite whole is greater than any of its proper parts, which is manifest in the case where ||||| --> || ; |||. SB above raisews a case of how the population of a state will be larger than that of one of its cities, and we could say the same regarding the area of the whole vs that of a city well within it. You will notice how in each of these cases, we see the foundational self-evident truths cropping up in a harmonious concert again and again. For instance, cause and effect are seen in the process of clustering and separating groups of "sticks" just above. On this matter, I repeat what you studiously avoid: the case of a simple observation that brings out several corollaries. Namely, once there is that distinct thing A, we may reflect on it [notice, it is self evident that we are going concern consciousnesses, at least to each one of us, and by extension we reasonably accept that there are other minds], and in reflecting on it we may freely ask and seek an answer to why it is, expecting a rational -- and so also coherent -- answer. This immediately implicates the issue that somethings depend on external on/off enabling factors for their existence and are termed contingent. That is particularly evident in that which has a beginning, as this raises the question SB just posed, of non-being having ability to trigger existence of being. It also raises the slightly subtler point that possibility of being depends on coherence of attributes such that we cannot have for instance a square circle. Now, you have tried to inject a third option, of a-causal origin, coming into existence. The problem with this is that it fails to examine the issue of on/off enabling factors and the consequence of having none, then mistakenly injects a beginning -- a coming into being. (I will address inductively based conservation laws in a while.) The match example you have ignored (I acknowledge my long ago debt to Copi's Logic on this . . . ) gives a good illustration: absent heat, fuel, oxidiser and chain reaction, there is no flame. So strike a match, allow it to half burn, then tilt the head up. Failing of fuel, it will go out. Similarly, no flame will be sustained if one tries to ignite it under water. Etc. Fire fighters use such principles all the time in their work.) We therefore see how dependence on enabling, on/off prior [not necessarily temporally prior, logically or ontologically prior) factors is a characteristic of contingent beings, per a simple example. In the end, in a way similar to how we were first taught that 2 + 3 = 5 by concrete example and made the conceptual connexion and linked the symbols to the understanding we derived from demonstration. Now, consider a candidate being that is possible (the attributes are coherent) and which can be described as existing in some possible worlds. Next, see this being as having no dependence on such external enabling factors as we just described. Without OFF-blocks, such a being cannot be prevented from existing. If it is possible, it will exist in at least one possible world, and indeed it will not fail of existence in any world save on pain of incoherence. In short, such a being is actual, and without cause, without beginning and without end. It has not come into being and it cannot cease from being. A simple illustration is the truth asserted in the statement 2 + 3 = 5. (That is, this is a true proposition that never began to be true, is true in any possible world, and cannot fail of being true.) In short, the core problem with your analysis above is that you inserted the notion of COMING INTO EXISTENCE without asking why. That is, you violated PSR. And, predictably (we are dealing with self-evident truths), ended in absurdity. Causality is a direct corollary of PSR. So is the question of contingent vs necessary being. With the issue of possibility/impossibility of a given being coming up in close support, based on coherence of attributes of being. We are dealing with a mutually supportive cluster of foundational principles here, and they are stubbornly refusing to be separated the one from the other. Of course, there is a modernist substitute for self-evidence, but it is not quite the same, embedding a little error in the beginning that ends in a wide gulch of error at the end (as Adler pointed out). First, he who would impose an ugly gulch between the world of phenomena and the world of things in themselves, runs into self referential incoherence, as this implies the exact sort of knowledge forbidden. Bradley was it, pointed this out over a century ago. Better is to think that one may in part err about the external world but there are somethings we can know to moral certainty about it and other things that are demonstrably or undeniably certain. Royce's Error exists is a good first example of such. This bridges the internal and external and is factually blatant as well as being demonstrably undeniable on pain of incoherence. That is a suggested world that is such that error does not exist is an incoherence and cannot exist, it is an impossible world. On that background, we may now look at the conservation laws on mass-energy, momentum and angular momentum, etc. Notice, these are laws on CONSERVATION in a world that is a going concern. They impose certain rules of change. As SB has repeatedly indicated, this does not speak to the origin of the world, where it is having a beginning, and in fact you have implicitly implied that the material world is in some form eternal. I have repeatedly highlighted the evidence that the world we inhabit has been such that over the past century it has become more and more evident that it has a finitely remote beginning, typically projected as 13.7 BYA. The singularity, AKA the big bang. In addition to other evidence that he observed cosmos -- the only one -- is contingent in many ways, indeed the fine tuning evidence points to high contingency on the underlying laws and parameters. So, it is relevant to highlight that that which conserves is distinct from that which originates. An attribute of a going concern world cannot properly be used to dismiss the evidence of contingency and the evidence of a beginning, leading to the question of the origin and indeed the creation of the observed cosmos. Unless the particular cosmos has come into existence, there is nothing to be conserved. In addition, you have also repeatedly ignored the warning from Lord Russell's inductive turkey -- yet another strawman tactic. Let me put it in these terms: the observation of a reliable pattern based on finitely many observations (as is inevitable for us) cannot preclude a wider framework in which the observed pattern is a special case. This is in fact the notorious case for Newtonian Dynamics, well known for nearly a century now. That is inductive science is delimited and provisional. So, you have to make allowances for the possibilities that -- unbeknownst to inductive turkeys glad of a 9:00 am feed every morning by the kitchen door -- there are such things as Christmas Eves and sharpened hatchets. (And I am reminded of the magisterial saying that there is an axe laid already to the root of the tree . . . ) In short the impressive sounding case has collapsed. Collapsed for want of addressing the real as opposed to the strawman issues. KFkairosfocus
June 13, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
Since we are discussing only one thing (thank goodness) we can go into a little more detail.
I agree this is far better!
First, I think we can agree that an effect is something that comes to be (I am avoiding the term “receives existence” since it has been heretofore a stumbling block).
Actually, I want to clarify right here, just so we don't get confused later. I would like to describe two types of causation. The first type (I) is causing mass/energy to exist. The second type (II) is causing something to change state or properties; all types of cause that are not of type I. Examples of causation-II include causing a billiard ball to start moving, causing a storm to form in a weather system, causing a baby to form in utero, causing a painting to be painted, and so on. Causation-II is what science studies. Causation-I is prohibited by the Law of Conservation of Mass/Energy, and it has never been observed. I'm not claiming that this means it never happened - I'm just saying that by definition if an instance of causation-I has ever happened, then the Law of Conservation does not hold without exception.
It comes to be either as being (something that now exists that once didn’t exist) or it comes to be as an addition to being (change).
You have used "coming into being" to refer to both what I'm calling causation-I and causation-II. Again, causation-II is unproblematic, while causation-I violates conservation laws.
So, what else can we say about this effect? Well, either it 1) came to exist from itself or 2) it came to exist from another. (Clearly, those are our only two choices, so we are on safe, non-controversial ground.
And here is where I have been arguing that you take a wrong turn. There are actually three logical possibilities that might describe how something comes to exist (and this applies to either cause-I or -II). The first possibility is that it is caused to exist or change by itself. The second possibility is that it is caused to exist or change by something else. The third possibility is that it comes to exist or change without being caused at all.
At this point let’s find out where each alternative takes us, assuming for the moment, only temporal effects that involve a “before and after.” 1) It came to exist from itself (through its own power). What is necessary for that to happen? [a] First, this effect must have the capacity to generate or cause itself (the thing that comes to be or changes elements of being). In order to accomplish that task, it must precede itself in order to do the generating or causing or changing. In other words, it must exist before it existed.
I agree that something causing itself to exist is an incoherent concept, for causation-I. For causation-II it is not logically impossible, but rather physically impossible. For example, there could be some possible world where the laws of motion are different (i.e. Newton's first law does not hold), and billiard balls spontaneously impart momentum to themselves and begin moving. This violates laws of physics, but not laws of logic.
[b] Second, this same effect (the thing that comes to be or changes) cannot really exist at all. It if did exist, then it could no longer be brought into existence because it would already have existence. Thus, it cannot be an effect at all.
Again I agree that this holds true for causation-I. For causation-II it is not clear: Taking the example of changing the motion of (i.e. accelerating) a billiard ball, the ball exists both before and after the causation event, but the motion has changed. However, the ball could have been moving initially, only at a different velocity or in a different direction.
Since [a] {[t must exist to be a cause} contradicts [b] {it cannot exist at all}, 1) cannot be possible since it violates the law of non contradiction.
All you've show so far is that for causation-I, it is incoherent to assert that something causes itself to exist, and it is also incoherent to assert that something that already exists can be caused to exist again.
2) It came to exist from another source. This option presents no logical problems. Therefore, 2) must be the case and 1) must not be the case.
Here is the crux of the matter No, this is a false dichotomy, because you have ignored the third logical possibility, which is that something comes into existence (for cause-I) or something changes state (for cause-II) without any cause at all.
Thus, when we consider the two possibilities 1) [a thing that comes into being or changes need not be caused by something else] or 2) [a thing that comes into being or changes must be caused by something else] and when we subject those two possibilities to the Law of Non-Contradiction, we are forced to concluded that all being and all change must come from outside the thing being brought into existence or being changed.
No, you are ignoring the logical possiblity that things can come to exist or change without cause. The only reason this would be precluded would be if the Law of Causality were true... but that is precisely the thing you are trying to demonstrate by deriving it from the Law of Non-Contradiction!
But this conclusion is nothing less than the Law of Causality. Hence, The Law of Causality is derived from the Law of Non-Contradiction.
No. You have assumed the Law of Causality when you insist that something must either be caused by itself or something else. In fact, there is this third logical possibility that the Law of Causality is false, and that things can some to exist or change without any cause at all. And this is why the Law of Causality cannot be derived from the Law of Non-Contradiction.
*Notice, also, that we could have substituted the word “receive” existence for the word “come into being” and achieved the same results. The latter formulation seems much more natural to me, but it seemed prudent to avoid the latter terminology given the problems we had with the application of that word.
Yes I think leaving that wording out helps us stay on track here.
What, then, do we do with the problem of causality outside of time?
Well, this is actually our second topic, which makes for a long post, but it is an even more interesting question!
In this case, we can go through all the same steps, except for any references to time or allusions to “before” and “after.” Thus, we don’t say chronologically prior but logically prior and continue on with the proof. Every effect depends on a cause because every contingent being requires something that is either logically prior (outside of time) or chronologically prior (in time). In that sense, the universe requires a logically prior First Cause, but everything in the universe requires a chronologically prior antecedent cause.
I would argue that without both time and locality, we simply can't understand causation. Here is why: We know causation by constant conjunction, and in order to observe constant conjunction, the event must be local and time-ordered. For example, if each time I kick a ball the ball begins to move, I can establish the cause-effect relationship between the kick and the ball's motion. However, if I kicked a ball in New York and found out that several years earlier an apple fell from a tree in Los Angeles, the causal relationship between those events would be incomprehensible. It would make a brick wall appearing out of nowhere seem totally understandable by comparison! Now, here you would (or should) argue that Hume was wrong, and Kant was right, and that causation is more than constant conjunction! As Kant demonstrated, contra Hume, our a priori mental categories enable us to establish a relationship of logical necessity between cause and effect that goes beyond constant conjunction. This is the sort of causal relationship that you are describing when you say something is logically prior but not chronologically prior, correct? But here is where your approach ultimately fails: The necessity that Kant describes is supplied not by our observations but by our minds. Kant says our minds can understand cause-effect relationships in a way that goes beyond constant conjunction, and that is because of our a priori concepts. But what are these a prior concepts? Time and space of course! Here it is in Kant's own dense prose:
But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which and in accordance with the norm of which they first become possible, and the appearances take on a lawful form—just as all appearances, notwithstanding the diversity of their empirical form, still must also always be in accordance with the condition of the pure form of sensibility [i.e., space and time]. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/
So if you stick with Hume, you can't possibly understand causality without conjunction in space and time. And if you try Kant, you'll see that our minds still require space and time to understand causality in terms of logical necessity.
I don’t think we need to use words such as “until” or “yet” if they do not resonate with you. As you say, there is no time ordering except on condition that time [and the attendant laws] is (are) brought into existence.
I would argue that you have already assumed the existence of time once you say that something is brought into existence. What does it mean for X be brought into existence except that at time T0, X does not exist, and then at later time T1, X does exist? How can you explain what it means without reference to time?
So, causality is preserved if the laws of conservation are simply brought into existence, that is, if the First Cause is logically (not chronoolgically) prior.
To say that something is logically prior but not chronologically prior is to say that it is prior in thought but not in reality. We can't make sense of causal relationships that do not obey temporal ordering and locality, and so we can't intelligibly speak of cause outside of spacetime. Now this is a good debate!! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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Hi Vividbleau,
You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty
You are trying very hard to make this sound contradictory, or stupid, or something, but it really is simple and clear. If you read any sort of introduction to epistemology, you would understand it. There are limits to the way we justify our knowledge, and no matter what we do, we cannot remove all possible sources of doubt.
you want Stephen to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about.
I would like Stephen (and you) to realize that one cannot answer questions regarding existence (origins, volition, ontology, etc) with absolute certainty by logical inference from self-evident axioms.
Got it.
I see you have a tendency toward sarcasm; it is not an effective debating technique.
RDF: Again, I argue that the LNC simply does not entail the LoC BECAUSE the LNC does not say anything whatsoever about the necessity of one thing causing another. VB: Above you are giving a cause ( because) as to why you argue that the LNC does not entail the LOC.But as we see your denial of causal necessity includes or at the very least implies some kind of causal neccessity in the denial.... Obviously unless you have a necessary ground ( cause) for your denial, how could your denial necessarily stand, how could your denial of the LOC convince someone that you are right.
For one thing, you seem to be conflating causes with reasons; they are not the same things. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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RDF
In that case, “no”.
Thanks for a clear yes or no answer.
Again, I argue that the LNC simply does not entail the LoC BECAUSE the LNC does not say anything whatsoever about the necessity of one thing causing another.
Above you are giving a cause ( because) as to why you argue that the LNC does not entail the LOC.But as we see your denial of causal necessity includes or at the very least implies some kind of causal neccessity in the denial.
BECAUSE the LNC does not say anything whatsoever about the necessity of one thing causing another.
Obviously unless you have a necessary ground ( cause) for your denial, how could your denial necessarily stand, how could your denial of the LOC convince someone that you are right. On the other hand if there is a neccessary cause or ground for your denial ( which is the case here) then it is self defeating since you are using a neccessary causal connection to deny that there are neccessary causal connections. Vividvividbleau
June 12, 2013
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RD
You have in a way admitted as much already, except that you want to say that the conservation laws weren’t violated because they did not exist yet. My counter-argument to that was that your position is incoherent because it relied on the time-ordering of events outside of spacetime.
Well, no, not really. I don't think we need to use words such as "until" or "yet" if they do not resonate with you. As you say, there is no time ordering except on condition that time [and the attendant laws] is (are) brought into existence. So, causality is preserved if the laws of conservation are simply brought into existence, that is, if the First Cause is logically (not chronoolgically) prior.StephenB
June 12, 2013
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Hi RD,
Still pending, among a few other things, is the problem of LNC -> LoC. I think it is an important point. Again, I argue that the LNC simply does not entail the LoC because the LNC does not say anything whatsoever about the necessity of one thing causing another. Everything in the universe could happen completely acausally, and this would not violate the LNC.
OK. This is worth a discussion. Since we are discussing only one thing (thank goodness) we can go into a little more detail. Let’s take in bite size chunks and go where the logic leads. First, I think we can agree that an effect is something that comes to be (I am avoiding the term “receives existence” since it has been heretofore a stumbling block). It comes to be either as being (something that now exists that once didn’t exist) or it comes to be as an addition to being (change). So, what else can we say about this effect? Well, either it 1) came to exist from itself or 2) it came to exist from another. (Clearly, those are our only two choices, so we are on safe, non-controversial ground. At this point let’s find out where each alternative takes us, assuming for the moment, only temporal effects that involve a “before and after.” 1) It came to exist from itself (through its own power). What is necessary for that to happen? [a] First, this effect must have the capacity to generate or cause itself (the thing that comes to be or changes elements of being). In order to accomplish that task, it must precede itself in order to do the generating or causing or changing. In other words, it must exist before it existed. [b] Second, this same effect (the thing that comes to be or changes) cannot really exist at all. It if did exist, then it could no longer be brought into existence because it would already have existence. Thus, it cannot be an effect at all. Since [a] {[t must exist to be a cause} contradicts [b] {it cannot exist at all}, 1) cannot be possible since it violates the law of non contradiction. 2) It came to exist from another source. This option presents no logical problems. Therefore, 2) must be the case and 1) must not be the case. Thus, when we consider the two possibilities 1) [a thing that comes into being or changes need not be caused by something else] or 2) [a thing that comes into being or changes must be caused by something else] and when we subject those two possibilities to the Law of Non-Contradiction, we are forced to concluded that all being and all change must come from outside the thing being brought into existence or being changed. But this conclusion is nothing less than the Law of Causality. Hence, The Law of Causality is derived from the Law of Non-Contradiction. *Notice, also, that we could have substituted the word “receive” existence for the word “come into being” and achieved the same results. The latter formulation seems much more natural to me, but it seemed prudent to avoid the latter terminology given the problems we had with the application of that word. What, then, do we do with the problem of causality outside of time? In this case, we can go through all the same steps, except for any references to time or allusions to “before” and “after.” Thus, we don’t say chronologically prior but logically prior and continue on with the proof. Every effect depends on a cause because every contingent being requires something that is either logically prior (outside of time) or chronologically prior (in time). In that sense, the universe requires a logically prior First Cause, but everything in the universe requires a chronologically prior antecedent cause.StephenB
June 12, 2013
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PS: Who said or implied anywhere near this discussion that inference to best warranted explanation or conclusion demands absolute certainty? The whole province of science for one is provisional, and no-one disputes that, once they know enough: in ever so many spheres we operate on balance of evidence, and at most moral certainty where one would be irresponsible on the balance of evidence to reject a conclusion, especially on an important matter. It seems that we here have yet another ignorant- stupid- insane- wicked ID supporter strawman caricature burning, polarising and confusing the issue. KFkairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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5FOR: There are indeed many things that we cannot be absolutely certain about, or incorrigibly certain about, or undeniably certain about, or demonstrably certain about. But, for some pivotal things, like error exists, we can be. I suggest you pause and reflect for a few moments on why, from multiple directions. Even imagine it is possible you are a brain in a vat under electro-chemical simulation, regarding that you got red X's for sums in primary school. If that were so, would it mean that errors do not exist? Nope, the wrong sums in the dream would still be wrong. And that's before we get to, the mistaken perceptions of such manipulated brains. And also, Vivid is right that the subjective sense of being self aware and aware of experience or perception is incorrigible and once present, undeniable. If one is appeared to redly, that is real.Such things, carefully reflected on, devastate many comfortable mantras of today's pomo views. KFkairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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If absolutely certainty was a prerequisite for reaching agreement with and making concessions to others, well, I don’t think anyone could ever reach agreement.
Sorry you must have me confused with someone else since I dont think absolute certainty is a prerequiste for reachig agreement. Vividvividbleau
June 12, 2013
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Maybe a better example – do you concede that Elvis is dead?
Elvis is dead?????? Vividvividbleau
June 12, 2013
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Maybe a better example - do you concede that Elvis is dead?5for
June 12, 2013
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I'm glad you got it Vivid! It's a pretty obvious and non-controversial point. If absolutely certainty was a prerequisite for reaching agreement with and making concessions to others, well, I don't think anyone could ever reach agreement. Will you concede that New York city will still be standing in 30 minutes time? I am certain it will be, but of course I can't be absolutely certain.5for
June 12, 2013
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And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don’t think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me.
I apologize I did not intend to misquote you I now understand your position better. You are not absolutely certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty but you want Stephen to concede to that which you are not absolutely certain about. Got it. Vividvividbleau
June 12, 2013
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RDF:
We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything.
Are you absolutely or relatively certain of what "we" can be? And if only relatively certain, are you certain that we are only relatively certain? (In short, could you be mistaken? Indeed, you seem pretty certain those who think we can be certain of some limited things, re in error? And if so, are you then not certain that error exists?) And so, we are back to the pivotally important case: error exists. As repeatedly shown -- but repeatedly ignored in haste to repeat the drumbeat assertion that we cannot be absolutely certain (presumably of anything, including this) -- this is undeniably true. But, it is even more plain that a mere proof is not able to persuade those who are sure that what is actually proved cannot be so. Even, at the price of pretending that it does not exist, even when repeatedly brought to attention. The onlooker, present and future, should take due note. KFkairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
RDF: You are confusing causality and conservation. My point about conservation was that creation ex-nihilo violated mass/energy conservation by definition. It had nothing to do with causality. SB: Not really. A caused universe, compete with conservation laws is a totally different prospect from an uncaused universe, complete with conservation laws.
What I'm arguing is that we cannot say that conservation laws hold without exception, and then say that God created mass/energy ex nihilo. This is similar to our argument about libertarianism and causality: We cannot say that causality holds without exception, and then say human choices are uncaused.
Hopefully, I can disabuse you of that notion with the post @607. Obviously, I cannot take credit for its form. I invite you (check out that congenial exhortation) to pay special attention to two things [a] The various contexts in which existence is given and received and [b] the extent to which logic can further illuminate the significance of what we know about the real world.
The passage argues that denying an uncaused first cause results in infinite regress of causes; I would agree. It further argues that accepting an infinite regress of cause does not explain existence; I agree with that too. However, positing a necessary being as a first cause does not help reconcile the existence of mass/energy with our conservation laws; we still have to admit that conservation laws are violated by any sort of creation ex nihilo, whether that creation is accomplished by a necessary being, a contingent being, or by something that isn't a "being" (agent) at all. You have in a way admitted as much already, except that you want to say that the conservation laws weren't violated because they did not exist yet. My counter-argument to that was that your position is incoherent because it relied on the time-ordering of events outside of spacetime.
We may soon be starting our own website.
Yes, I'd say over 600 posts in a thread nearly qualifies. Still pending, among a few other things, is the problem of LNC -> LoC. I think it is an important point. Again, I argue that the LNC simply does not entail the LoC because the LNC does not say anything whatsoever about the necessity of one thing causing another. Everything in the universe could happen completely acausally, and this would not violate the LNC. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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Hi Vividbleau,
Actually is was a request for help in understanding how you can absolutely be certain...
And once again I must remind you that you are mistaken. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything, and you will see that I have never said that we could be absolutely certain of anything. I don't think this is a very difficult point, but you keep misquoting me.
RDF: I already replied to this but apparently I didn’t make myself clear, so let me try again. VB: A yes or no would be clear.
In that case, "yes".
RDF: Many philosophers have sought absolute certainty, and most modern philosophers accept we have none. The reason is that we cannot guarantee that our own minds – our perceptions and memory – are reliable. Even Christian apologists like Alvin Plantinga accept this. VB: Alvin Plantinga is not absolutely certain that he is not experiencing some sort of subjective state?
Many philosophers have sought absolute certainty, and most modern philosophers accept we have none. The reason is that we cannot guarantee that our own minds – our perceptions and memory – are reliable. Even Christian apologists like Alvin Plantinga accept this. If you'd like to know what Plantinga thinks about the status of phenomenal experience as certain knowledge, you'll need to ask him I suppose.
RDF: (2) Any particular proposition regarding our experience is fallible. VB: Of course but are you not absolutely certain that you are, or your or something elses illusion, or your faulty and fallible memory is not experiencing?
Sorry I didn't understand this.
Are you not absolutely certain you are having some kind of subjective experience?
I'm not sure what you think the importance of this particular issue is. I've already explained to the best of my ability how even subjective awareness can be subject to various types of doubt. If you'd like to disagree, let's agree to disagree about this, and see if that leads to any more substantive disagreements regarding certain knowledge.
But really a yes or no cant be that difficult.
In that case, "no". Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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Pardon, we know NOT-E to be false . . .kairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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F/N 3: The truthfulness of Josiah Royce's Error exists (let us symbolise it E), in part pivots on exactly the want of certainty in our thought processes that RDF alludes to -- we make mistakes so error exists, a universally agreed easily substantiated morally certain fact. That is one way that we can be certain that error exists. The logical analysis that works on that then shows that it is undeniably true: Take E and then produce { E AND NOT-E }. On the strength of the strenuous objections we know E to be false so the conjunction MUST be false, which is saying that E is certain, given that E is the denial of NOT-E. And, surprise, the objectors to the possibility of certainty of knowledge, are pivoting on the perception that we are . . . in error, i.e. they are conceding the pivotal point, and so are showing just how well known this is. This is one demonstratively certain knowledge point that cannot easily be evaded -- except by pretending that it has not been put on the table. KFkairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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RD
Again, I commend you for your clear and direct points. I think these issues are important and interesting!
I appreciate the turn of events and your contribution to that end. Thank you. I will try to do my part to make the positive interaction a regular event.
You are confusing causality and conservation. My point about conservation was that creation ex-nihilo violated mass/energy conservation by definition. It had nothing to do with causality.
Not really. A caused universe, compete with conservation laws is a totally different prospect from an uncaused universe, complete with conservation laws.
Even if there is no action, the wording indicates some sort of proto-existence of something to which the attribute of “existence” is then added. That is where the logical contradiction appears.
Hopefully, I can disabuse you of that notion with the post @607. Obviously, I cannot take credit for its form. I invite you (check out that congenial exhortation) to pay special attention to two things [a] The various contexts in which existence is given and received and [b] the extent to which logic can further illuminate the significance of what we know about the real world.
We agree that the formation of universals requires intellect and is a rational process. My point was that it could not proceed from logic.
Absolutely right. We may soon be starting our own website.StephenB
June 12, 2013
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RDF
I’m not sure what you mean by “recycled back”, but what you have recounted is correct. What was your question?
Actually is was a request for help in understanding how you can absolutely be certain that there is no such thing as absolute certainty even though the assertion itself is neither absolutely true or false and you are not absolutely certain that there are limits to epistomlogical justification which is the basis for your assertion.
I already replied to this but apparently I didn’t make myself clear, so let me try again.
A yes or no would be clear.
Many philosophers have sought absolute certainty, and most modern philosophers accept we have none. The reason is that we cannot guarantee that our own minds – our perceptions and memory – are reliable. Even Christian apologists like Alvin Plantinga accept this.
Alvin Plantinga is not absolutely certain that he is not experiencing some sort of subjective state?
You ask, can’t we even be certain that there is at least one conscious mind – our own – in existence?
No I did not ask that I asked “ Are you not absolutely certain that at a minimum you are experiencing some kind of subjective state?”
Even this knowledge relies on fallible memory from moment to moment,
Yes my memory is fallible heck I may be an illusion that is why I used your term "subjective state"
(2) Any particular proposition regarding our experience is fallible.
Of course but are you not absolutely certain that you are, or your or something elses illusion, or your faulty and fallible memory is not experiencing?
Even if we can’t deny our phenomenological experience, if we can’t articulate a proposition about such in a way that is infallible then we can’t consider that even this constitutes knowledge that is justified absolutely,
Are you not absolutely certain that at the moment you think you have written the above?
nor can we (as Descartes tried to do) proceed to make inferences from our subjective experience in a way that is immune to doubt.
Are you not absolutely certain you are having some kind of subjective experience?
But I need to repeat the important point here that you seem to be ignoring: I am not interested in this sort of hyper-skepticism, where we doubt our physical perceptions and logic and reasoning and even our own minds.
I am not ignoring anything heck I am not even postulating I exist. I am asking you to answer some very basic simple questions. I have purposely asked them in different ways. But really a yes or no cant be that difficult. I understand after answering yes or no the why and wherefore's but really they are very simple questions although the reason for them may require a complicated explanation. Vividvividbleau
June 12, 2013
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F/N 2: It seems RDF has also not bothered to look at the discussion on why quantum theory CANNOT contradict the first principles of right reason, here on (read the linked continuation) in the UD WACs, per the saw off he branch on which one sits principle. Par for the course over the past several weeks and again telling on a fundamental disregard for duties of care to truth, accuracy, fairness and more. KFkairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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Hi StephenB, Good post - thank you for your responses on our debate points!
RDF: You rejected my rebuttal, insisting that existence could indeed be consistently used as a predicate (or perhaps that you weren’t really using existence as a predicate – I’m not really sure what you were arguing). SB: Its very simple really. There is nothing illogical about using an active verb to describe a passive event. I told you this long ago, but, of course, you chose not to process it.
We argued about this for some time, so you're mistaken to say I "chose not to process it". Since I felt my position was clearly correct and backed by a majority of epistemologists (even Christian ones) I declared that we should agree to disagree on this point and move on. You have not yet responded to my other argument against LNC -> LoC.
RDF: There is no such thing as absolute certainty – do you now concede this? SB: Of course not, neither do you since you are absolutely certain that we can have no certainty. We have already been there.
You have mistated my position. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything; we can, however, express certainty about any number of things because we feel we have a relatively strong warrant for belief. We have an extremely strong warrant for the belief that all of our beliefs are subject to at least some doubt, and there is nothing contradictory about this.
RDF: Libertarianism contradicts causality – do you now concede this? SB: I explained many times why that is not the case and I went into much detail. Just go reread my explanation.
Very well, let's put this in our "Agree to Disagree" bucket. My position is that contra-causal will actually is, well, contra-causal, which actually means against causality. Here is what Wiki says about your brand of non-physical (dualist/interactionist) libertarianism:
Such interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality. (emphasis added)
So it appears that the rest of the philosophical community agrees with me that libertarianism stands in opposition to causality, by definition. You disagree.
RDF: Our conception of causality cannot be applied in certain quantum domains and in the context of the beginning of the universe – do you now concede this? SB: I don’t know what you mean by our conception of causality. Quantum activity certainly does not violate the notion of efficient or final cause.
What I've said is that our notion of (in Aristotle's scheme) efficient cause normally presumes a number of conditions, including locality and realism. Both of these assumptions appear not to apply to the correlations of entangled quantum events. Of course you can just continue to relax the notion of causality as you did with the temporal aspect: You can say that cause-effect relationships needn't be ordered in time, needn't be proximal in location, and needn't deal with things that exist independently of our minds. One problem (and there are many) with that strategy is that it becomes impossible to say how we can ever detect causality in the first place!
RDF: You now agree that we cannot use logic to answer important questions about the world because you always have to go outside of logic to map the logic to the concept. SB: It isn’t that simple. One can do much with logic alone after one has had experience with the real world.
I think this is a very important point. When I made an argument about a fundamental claim of yours using predicate logic, you objected that my formulation of the logical propositions did not reflect the truth about the aspects of the world we were debating. And we could not resort to logic to resolve our differences! Logic is fundamentally the same as an algorithm - a computer program. And we all know that computer programs are only as reliable as the input: GIGO, right? Same with logic: You can make up any old logical formulation and prove whatever you'd like, but the proof has nothing to do with the concepts about existence (causality, origins, volition, etc) that we discuss.
RDF: You say knowledge gained by generalizing from experience is not “empirical”; I disagree for (what should be) obvious reasons. – do you now concede this? SB: There is nothing to concede since your formulation is not precise enough to be definitive. It depends on what you mean by empirical. I hold that all knowledge “begins” with sense experience but it doesn’t end there. You will have to explain yourself. If beginning with empirical sense experience is what you mean by empirical, then I agree. If, on the other hand, you think that knowledge ends with empirical sense experience, then I disagree.
I would say that all knowledge presupposes things (realism, LNC, etc) but it still makes perfect sense to divide knowledge into (1) that based on our experience of contingent facts about the world and (2) that based on self-evident axioms and rules of formal logic. And example of (1) would be "ice expands as it freezes" and an example of (2) would be the Pythagorean theorem. The issue arose regarding the idea that statements about the physical properties of wood or metal could be derived or evaluated using logic. For example, I said that the notion that wood might expand 2% but not 2000% is an empirical statement based on our experience-based knowledge of wood, and not a statement derived from axioms of logic. It is an important point I think because it illustrates your idea that questions about the world can be answered and confirmed merely by applying logic.
RDF: You do not seem to understand that identifying universals (such as chairs or swans) is an empirically-driven process without logical rationale. SB: To identify the universal, we must first experience the particular. Thus, to know that a chair is a chair requires [a] sense knowledge (empirical) and [b] intellectual formation of an idea that represents the object of sense knowledge. The formation of an idea is a rational function, not an empirical function.
We agree that the formation of universals requires intellect and is a rational process. My point was that it could not proceed from logic. There is one school of philosophy that actually does believe the formations of universals can be driven purely by logic from our fundamental sense perceptions. This philosophy is called objectivism, as outlined by Ayn Rand and her followers. I find her philosophy horribly confused and amateurish, but if you'd like to hold to your position you may want to see if your ideas align with hers (I think they don't). Anyway, I addressed a number of questions regarding the formation of these universals in order to illustrate that it has nothing to do with logic. For example: What is the essence of a chair? Is a backless chair a chair? One with three legs? One with no legs? A boulder with a flat spot for your butt?
[a] You claim that virtually all logicians reject the idea that a thing can “receive” existence even though the idea is centuries old.
Not exactly, but close: I claim that the majority of logicians agree that existence cannot be treated consistently as a predicate. It was my claim that the way you describe something with "potential existence" being able to "receieve existence" did indeed treat existence as a predicate - something that was added to a "potentially existing thing" in order to make it actually exist.
In your view, to receive existence is to “do” something. This is, of course, not the case. The receiver of existence is not doing anything at all.
The notion of "potential existence" seems to imply that something with definite characteristics is waiting to receive existence, and then when it finally does receieve existence, it then exists. This is what entails treating existence as a predicate: Existence is not something that can be added as a characteristic of something.
It is simply being brought into existence as given by the creator.
In that case, it is unproblematic: There exists X such that X was created by the creator.
To use the active verb “receive” does not, in this case, suggest action on the part of the receiver.
Even if there is no action, the wording indicates some sort of proto-existence of something to which the attribute of "existence" is then added. That is where the logical contradiction appears.
The creator gives existence to those who receive it, just as parents give life their offspring, who also receive it.
This equivocates regarding two very different sorts of "creation". The first applies to the creation of mass/energy, natural laws, and so forth; the second merely refers biological reproduction which, as far as we know, does not involve the creation of mass/energy.
It does not violate logic to use an active verb to describe a passive event. To receive existence is not to do anything since one cannot do anything in a state of non-existence. You have failed to respond to this point.
Again, even if it is not that action is being described, it requires that something has some sort of "potential existence" to which the attribute of "existence" is then added. That is where the logical contradiction appears.
[b] You insist that virtually all logicians reject the notion that existence can be received.
Again, what I said was that the majority of logicians reject that one can use "existence" as a predicate without contradiction, not that they reject the notion that "existence can be received". If you'd like me to provide cites for that I will, but only if you agree to concede your claims as a result.
[c] You say that something coming from nothing is identical to ex-nilio creation.
This is a matter of semantics obviously - the way I was using the verb "create", yes.
Obviously, this claim really does violate logic since it equates a caused universe (ex-nilio creation with an uncaused universe (something from nothing).
Conservation Law does not have anything to do with how mass/energy gets created or destroyed - it simply prohibits it. Whether a scientist in a laboratory does it, or some nuclear reaction inside a star does it, or God does, doesn't make any difference to the Law of Conservation.
In fact, ex-nilio creation is the very opposite of the idea that something could come from nothing. I have pointed this out to you several times. Indeed, Phinehas dramatized the point by distinguishing a bomb that was created and one that just appeared out of thin air. Yet you have provided no rational responses to any of these points. How can a caused universe be exactly the same thing as an uncaused universe?
You are confusing causality and conservation. My point about conservation was that creation ex-nihilo violated mass/energy conservation by definition. It had nothing to do with causality. Again, I commend you for your clear and direct points. I think these issues are important and interesting! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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F/N: Observe the turnabout accusation attempt by AF, who knows or should know my views on responsible freedom as an unalienable right, cf here. He is pushing words into my mouth that he knows don't belong there, in order to poison the atmosphere further and distract attention from his part in a circle that has been invidiously associating me with Nazism, among many, many other thins up to and including threats against my family. The nihilism Plato warned against as something evolutionary materialism opens the door to, is right here, all around us. With a boost from Alinsky's rules for radicals. KFkairosfocus
June 12, 2013
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Hi Vividbleau,
I don’t want to put words in your mouth but it appears the basis for your answer is that there are limits to epistemological justification. When I asked if you were absolutely certain that there were limits to epistemological justification you responded. No, just certain Now we have recycled back to where “there is no such thing as absolute certainty” even though it is neither absolutely true or false and you are not absolutely certain “just certain” that there are limits to epistemological justification.
I'm not sure what you mean by "recycled back", but what you have recounted is correct. What was your question?
I also asked “ Are you not absolutely certain that at a minimum you are experiencing some kind of subjective state?” I know you have a lot on your plate but my enquiring mind would like to know ?
I already replied to this but apparently I didn't make myself clear, so let me try again. Many philosophers have sought absolute certainty, and most modern philosophers accept we have none. The reason is that we cannot guarantee that our own minds - our perceptions and memory - are reliable. Even Christian apologists like Alvin Plantinga accept this. You ask, can't we even be certain that there is at least one conscious mind - our own - in existence? Descartes chose this as his bedrock assumption, and thought this perception should be incorrigible. My points about this were that (1) Even this knowledge relies on fallible memory from moment to moment, and (2) Any particular proposition regarding our experience is fallible. Even if we can't deny our phenomenological experience, if we can't articulate a proposition about such in a way that is infallible then we can't consider that even this constitutes knowledge that is justified absolutely, nor can we (as Descartes tried to do) proceed to make inferences from our subjective experience in a way that is immune to doubt. But I need to repeat the important point here that you seem to be ignoring: I am not interested in this sort of hyper-skepticism, where we doubt our physical perceptions and logic and reasoning and even our own minds. There are plenty of ways that we reach consensus on an unlimited number of propositions about the world, and if we dive down the rabbit hole of unsolved epistemological problems, we simply cannot assert anything at all. So, rather than demand absolute certainty, we instead look for strong warrant for our beliefs, and that works just fine. The more important point I've argued with SB about regarding certainty is that his attempt to ground various answers to deep questions (origins of the universe, free will, etc) in logic (the "Rules of Reason") is wrongheaded, because logic cannot unambiguously capture the complexity of these sorts of questions. Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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From F. J. Sheed: "The Argument from Contingency" If we consider the universe, we find that everything in it bears this mark, that it does exist but might very well not have existed. We ourselves exist, but we would not have existed if a man and a woman had not met and mated. Thesame mark can be found upon everything. A particular valley exists because a stream of water took that way down, perhaps because the ice melted up there. If the melting ice had not been there, there would have been no valley. And so with all the things of our experience. They exist, but they would not have existed if some other thing had not been what it was or done what it did. None of these things, therefore, is the explanation of its own existence or the source of its own existence. In other words, their existence is contingent upon something else. Each thing possesses existence, and can pass on existence; but it did not originate its existence. It is essentially a receiver of existence. Now it is impossible to conceive of a universe consisting exclusively of contingent beings, that is, of beings which are only receivers of existence and not originators. The reader who is taking his role as explorer seriously might very well stop reading at this point and let his mind make for itself the effort to conceive a condition in which nothing should exist save receivers of existence. Anyone who has taken this suggestion seriously and pondered the matter for himself before reading on, will have seen that the thing is a contradiction in terms and therefore an impossibility. If nothing exists save beings that receive their existence, how does anything exist at all? Where do they receive their existence from? In such a system made up exclusively of receivers, one being may have got it from another, and that from still another, but how did existence get into the system at all? Even if you tell yourself that this system contains an infinite number of receivers of existence, you still have not accounted for existence. Even an infinite number of beings, if no one of these is the source of its own existence, will not account for existence. Thus we are driven to see that the beings of our experience, the contingent beings, could not exist at all unless there is also a being which differs from them by possessing existence in its own right. It does not have to receive existence; it simply has existence. It is not contingent: it simply is. This is the Being that we call God. ------------------------------------------------------StephenB
June 12, 2013
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RDF
You rejected my rebuttal, insisting that existence could indeed be consistently used as a predicate (or perhaps that you weren’t really using existence as a predicate – I’m not really sure what you were arguing).
Its very simple really. There is nothing illogical about using an active verb to describe a passive event. I told you this long ago, but, of course, you chose not to process it.
There is no such thing as absolute certainty – do you now concede this?
Of course not, neither do you since you are absolutely certain that we can have no certainty. We have already been there.
Libertarianism contradicts causality – do you now concede this?
I explained many times why that is not the case and I went into much detail. Just go reread my explanation.
Our conception of causality cannot be applied in certain quantum domains and in the context of the beginning of the universe – do you now concede this?
I don't know what you mean by our conception of causality. Quantum activity certainly does not violate the notion of efficient or final cause.
And finally, the status of the other points about which we’ve argued:
You now agree that we cannot use logic to answer important questions about the world because you always have to go outside of logic to map the logic to the concept.
It isn't that simple. One can do much with logic alone after one has had experience with the real world.
You say knowledge gained by generalizing from experience is not “empirical”; I disagree for (what should be) obvious reasons. – do you now concede this?
There is nothing to concede since your formulation is not precise enough to be definitive. It depends on what you mean by empirical. I hold that all knowledge "begins" with sense experience but it doesn't end there. You will have to explain yourself. If beginning with empirical sense experience is what you mean by empirical, then I agree. If, on the other hand, you think that knowledge ends with empirical sense experience, then I disagree.
You do not seem to understand that identifying universals (such as chairs or swans) is an empirically-driven process without logical rationale. – do you now concede this?
Again, I have explained this to you many times. To identify the universal, we must first experience the particular. Thus, to know that a chair is a chair requires [a] sense knowledge (empirical) and [b] intellectual formation of an idea that represents the object of sense knowledge. The formation of an idea is a rational function, not an empirical function. PLEASE STOP PRETENDING THAT I HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THESE ISSUES. OTHERWISE, I WILL START CALLING THINGS BY THEIR RIGHT NAME AGAIN. It is now your turn. [a] You claim that virtually all logicians reject the idea that a thing can “receive” existence even though the idea is centuries old. In your view, to receive existence is to “do” something. This is, of course, not the case. The receiver of existence is not doing anything at all. It is simply being brought into existence as given by the creator. To use the active verb "receive" does not, in this case, suggest action on the part of the receiver. The creator gives existence to those who receive it, just as parents give life their offspring, who also receive it. It does not violate logic to use an active verb to describe a passive event. To receive existence is not to do anything since one cannot do anything in a state of non-existence. You have failed to respond to this point. [b] You insist that virtually all logicians reject the notion that existence can be received. Is seems fair, then, to ask how you can know this. You may believe or hope that virtually all logicians reject the idea, but that is an entirely different matter. It seems evident that most logicians have never even heard of the idea unless they are invested in realist epistemology. Indeed, it seems that you had never heard of the idea until I raised it. I would, therefore ask you to provide some citations from any of these logicians to give some support to your claim. [c] You say that something coming from nothing is identical to ex-nilio creation. Obviously, this claim really does violate logic since it equates a caused universe (ex-nilio creation with an uncaused universe (something from nothing). In fact, ex-nilio creation is the very opposite of the idea that something could come from nothing. I have pointed this out to you several times. Indeed, Phinehas dramatized the point by distinguishing a bomb that was created and one that just appeared out of thin air. Yet you have provided no rational responses to any of these points. How can a caused universe be exactly the same thing as an uncaused universe?StephenB
June 12, 2013
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RDF
II) My other points you have apparently conceded: 1) There is no such thing as absolute certainty – do you now concede this?
Help me here. When I asked you whether this statement was absolutely true or false you responded.
The above is neither absolutely true nor absolutely false of course. The point is about the limits to epistemological justification.
I don’t want to put words in your mouth but it appears the basis for your answer is that there are limits to epistemological justification. When I asked if you were absolutely certain that there were limits to epistemological justification you responded.
No, just certain
Now we have recycled back to where “there is no such thing as absolute certainty” even though it is neither absolutely true or false and you are not absolutely certain “just certain” that there are limits to epistemological justification. I also asked “ Are you not absolutely certain that at a minimum you are experiencing some kind of subjective state?” I know you have a lot on your plate but my enquiring mind would like to know ? Vividvividbleau
June 12, 2013
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Hi StephenB,
RDF: “I explained to you (and so did 5for) that the Law of Conservation uses the word “create” without the theological connotations of “A Creator”. You simply did not respond to this.” SB: This is, of course, yet another misrepresentation. I pointed out on more than once that the words First Cause can be used. This notion about theological connotations are getting in the way is just another disingenuous attempt to avoid argument.
You're pretty funny - I'm constantly trying to get you to stop insulting and complaining and actually make arguments! In any event, using the term "First Cause" rather than "God" doesn't address the issue: The Law of Conservation does not refer to a "First Cause" any more than it refers to a "God". Rather, the word "create" in this scientific law has nothing to do with agency - it simply means that mass/energy cannot appear out of nothing.
To create something from nothing is to cause it to come into existence. To simply appear out of nothing is to be uncaused.
You haven't been specific, but it appears you're saying that if the mass/energy of the universe simply appeared out of nothing, it would violate conservation, but if God created mass/energy out of nothing, it would not violate conservation. Is that what you are saying? If so, I don't see why you think that. If a scientist in a laboratory created mass/energy out of nothing, it would still violate conservation, so I would say if God did it, it would violate conservation too. I think the only counter-argument you've supplied is that God waited until he had already created mass/energy before he "created the law of conservation". Besides the fact that these sorts of statements can't possibly be tested to see if they're true, we've already seen that it would require time-ordered events in a context where time does not exist, which is incoherent. I think the only consistent way to think about this is that our concepts like conservation, causality, time, and space cannot be applied to the beginning of universe, and just like multiverse theories, theories of gods who can create natural laws are not empirically testable and are just faith-based speculations. Here's what you didn't get to in my last post:
I) LNC -> LoC Regarding LNC -> LoC, you have no response to my argument, so I will consider that you have conceded: 1) You made the argument that LoC is a necessary consequence of LNC. 2) I rebutted your argument based on the fact that your argument relied on existence being a predicate 3) You rejected my rebuttal, insisting that existence could indeed be consistently used as a predicate (or perhaps that you weren’t really using existence as a predicate – I’m not really sure what you were arguing). 4) In any event, I agreed to disagree about that, and used another argument to rebut your claim that LNC -> LoC. This argument simply pointed out that LNC was fully consistent with acausality. 5) You have not yet responded to this last argument. And again, here the other points I feel are most imporant: II) My other points you have apparently conceded: 1) There is no such thing as absolute certainty - do you now concede this? 2) Libertarianism contradicts causality - do you now concede this? 3) Our conception of causality cannot be applied in certain quantum domains and in the context of the beginning of the universe - do you now concede this? And finally, the status of the other points about which we’ve argued: 4) You now agree that we cannot use logic to answer important questions about the world because you always have to go outside of logic to map the logic to the concept. 5) You say knowledge gained by generalizing from experience is not “empirical”; I disagree for (what should be) obvious reasons. - do you now concede this? 6) You do not seem to understand that identifying universals (such as chairs or swans) is an empirically-driven process without logical rationale. - do you now concede this?
Unless you provide some sort of rebuttal to these points, it looks like you've implicitly conceded that I'm right about all of them! Cheers, RDFishRDFish
June 12, 2013
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Earth to Alan Fox: All of your posts are sad but telling! And what's even sadder is that you appear to be proud of that...Joe
June 12, 2013
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Alan Fox:
Trying to get a straight answer to “demonstrate how to calculate CSI” notorious?
1- We told you how to calculate CSI 2- You wouldn't even have to worry about CSI if your position had supporting evidence
Sure it was embarrassing to watch the emptiness of “Intelligent Design” exposed so completely but you can’t blame Patrick May for your own shortcomings.
Patrick May ate, it, Alan. Not only that he demonstrated the emptiness of evolutionism in the process.
So you would control free thought and expression if you could.
Actually it is our opponents' lack of thought and ill-willed expression that we find bothersome. And I will oppose that until until my last breath.Joe
June 12, 2013
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