Have Materialists Lost Their Minds?

_{Gil Dodgen

January 4, 2012

Intelligent Design, Mind}

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In answer to the question, I suggest that they have. Materialist philosophy inevitably leads to transparent absurdities and self-contradiction, whether moral relativism (a truth claim about morality that no truth claims about morality are valid), or that random errors can produce sophisticated information-processing technology (for which there is no evidence and much disconfirming evidence).

The no-free-will thing is yet further evidence of the lobotomizing influence of materialist philosophy. Just the other day I was in the supermarket, and decided to treat myself to some ice cream. I like the Haagen-Dazs coffee and dark chocolate varieties. I thought to myself, “Self, which flavor would you like to purchase?” I chose the dark chocolate.

A thoroughgoing materialist would argue that my choice was no choice at all, that my decision was determined by my brain chemistry and other such transparent idiocy.

I make free-will decisions all day long every day, just as everyone reading this post does.

The denial of this obvious fact, along with other absurdities and self-contradictions as mentioned above, leads me to conclude that materialists have indeed lost their minds.

Comments

tjguy, I answered your 12.1 beneath it (12.1.1) if you're interested.Bruce David_{January 10, 2012
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Mark: Thank you for your answers. They confirm my views on your views, and I will leave it at that. To answer your last question, my reasons to believe in free will are many, and of different kind. Some of them are scientific at least in part, some are philosophical, some come from my personal inner experience, some from religious references. The main argument that can be easily shared is: we have a direct intuition of being free in our conscious representation of reality. IMO, that intuition corresponds perfectly to the philosophical concept of libertarian free will, and to nothing else. Not certainly to the concepts of compatibilism. Strict determinism, the only logical alternative to libertarian free will, is deeply inconsistent with all our personal experiences, with all our representation of reality, with each single act and judgement in our lives. That is so obvious that only gew who believe in determinism have the courage to really visualize, understand and accept its extrene consequences. That's exactly the reson, IMHO, why compatibilism was "invented": to give determinists some "consolation", although illogical and inconsistent. This is my main rational argument. But again, my absolute belief in free will is based mainly on my inner personal experiences. You say: I don’t understand the distinction between internal and external constraints. and then: Our desires don’t tell us what to do. They are not some external force. They are us! Doing what you desire is choosing. Thatìs the point. You don't understand. A desire is an inner constraint, because it is inside us. What an outer constraint is should be obvious. The point is: we are not our desires. Choice is usually in acting against some desire that is in us, because other parts of us feel that such a desire is bad. A child knows that well. After all, I am sure that even compatibilists know that well. Desires are always conflicting. Many things are inside us, and they are often conflicting. We have a lot of different "parts", desires, functions, experiences inside us. We have conflicting memories, conflicting identities. Conflicting values. Each day is a war inside us. Are we just the sum of the contending parts? You seem to believe that. I don't. Our self is more than that. Our self is the final reference of all confliucting part. It is our self that represents those parts, identifies with them from time to time, and in the end, time after time, chooses in favor of something or some other thing. Inside us. For good or bad. That is the eseence of libertarian free will, and the essence of human existence.gpuccio_{January 10, 2012
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tjguy,
I’ve never read Conversations with God, but I’m wondering how you “know” that God is speaking directly to us in that book.
How does one "know" that any claimed source of revelation is valid? What authority is there other than oneself? People believe what they believe either because they decide that someone they have met or have seen or have read knows the truth and so they believe him or her, or because their reason leads them to believe something, or because their intuition or inner knowing tells them that something is true, or because they simply continue to believe what they were taught as children without ever questioning it. In any case, it is always the person him or herself that must decide whom or what to believe. There is no other option. In my case, I believe that it really is God speaking through Walsch in the Conversations with God series because what God says in those books makes more sense to me than anything else I have read or heard of from any other spiritual or religious source. And because it makes my heart sing.
How can God be righteous and just if He never judges sin and evil?
God is not righteous and just. God is loving. Unconditionally. A better question is, "How can God love us unconditionally and then turn around and judge, condemn, and punish us?" He can't. Unconditional love precludes judgement, condemnation, and punishment. When one loves unconditionally, one does not condemn, and one does not punish. (This does not preclude consequences, by the way. But consequences that come from a place of unconditional love are never punishment, and never derive from judgement and condemnation.)
Why would God explicitly state that He will never judge us when He explicitly states that He will judge us in His Word? That statement is enough to know without even reading the book that it is not from God. Yes, I accept the Bible as God’s Word.
I do not.
...a made up god who simply overlooks all evil and sin. Who would want to live under a King who ruled His kingdom like that? Not me, for sure.
First of all, I don't believe that the King/kingdom metaphor is apt. I think an infinitely wise and loving parent is a far better analogy, although that isn't perfect either. For myself, I would far better live at the mercy of a God who loves me unconditionally, one with whom I can have a true friendship, than a God that I must live in fear of. I'll go further. I am convinced that the belief in sin and the that God punishes sinners is, along with the belief that we are separate from each other and from God, the single most pernicious belief that bedevils humankind. It is this belief that allows us to justify judging, condemning, and punishing others who do not share our particular beliefs or who act in ways that we feel are ungodly or sinful. It justifies wars, and any action that is felt to be necessary to force people into proper belief. Furthermore, it prevents us from loving each other. The act of judgment is the single greatest impediment to love that there is. It is one of my most deeply held convictions that if we the humans are to pull ourselves out of the cycle of violence and misery in which we are stuck and create a world of peace, love, and harmony, then we must give up the twin notions of separation and sin, and begin to truly love each other.Bruce David_{January 9, 2012
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Gpuccio A rather cut down response. On free. You are right that all actions are constrained in some degree and not constrained in some respects. “free” as a relative term – more or less free – rather than absolute. Will is the more important part of the phrase free will. I don’t understand the distinction between internal and external constraints. I hope this throws some light on your point about the difficulty of all actions being free. On Will. You want a definition of “motive” but this leads us into contrary theories of mind which is too much for comments on a blog. Sorry to disappoint – but simply not enough time for that.
OK, but we do not rerally choose. We do what our desire, or at least our prevailing desire, tells us to do.
But that is the whole compatibilist point. Our desires don’t tell us what to do. They are not some external force. They are us! Doing what you desire is choosing. Moral responsibility arises when bad desires outweigh good desires.i.e. the bad in you outweighs the good. There is no need to overcomplicate things!
If what you describe were really possible, in absolute deterministic-random terms, I would simply say that free will does not exist, and that I was wrong. I would become a determinist, but never a compatibilist.
Then how do you know you have free will? What reason have you believing that your actions are not caused?markf_{January 9, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle: No, I have not conflated the two. I described a willed action. Yes, you did describe a willed action, but the non-materialist view posed by JDH, the non-materialist view which you claimed to reconcile with materialism, is a mental volition, intent, purpose, desire or belief. There is no "action" in a mental volition, intent, purpose, desire or belief, rather in a mental volition there is only thought without action. "action" only enters if and when mental volition requires movement, such as typing a keypad, getting up from a chair, clicking 'bid' on E-bay, making good on that new-year's resolution to lose weight, etc. I can believe the earth is flat without moving a muscle to verify or falsify that belief. I can resolve to lose weight and put off dieting indefinitely. I can believe I have freedom of thought without constraint, without having to put that mental volition to any material test. Yes, you described a "willed [the verb] action" whereas JDH and I describe mental "will" [the noun] which is merely volition, intent etc. without action. That you obdurately persist in explaining a volitional will viewpoint using your "willed action" viewpoint merely underscores your continued conflating of the two different usages of the term "will". You can freely deny it all you like, but the dictionary proves there are noun and verb usages and you plainly are using the verb usage to refute a noun usage. That is you conflating the two otherwise different usages. A willed action must be preceded by a decision/mental intention to act, or it is not a willed action. A useless and impotent tautology. And an intention to act must be followed by an action, or it is useless, and certainly not free. Thinking does not require acting. Arguably, we'd be better off with a lot more thinking and less acting, but I digress. You may call it useless, but you can't, with any intellectual honesty, insist that merely believing something mandates action. I can believe in a flat earth without acting on that belief. I can decide you're wrong, not post another word, and instead move on to other thoughts or tasks. Those are two examples of free will [the noun, meaning mental volition] that do not require "willed [the verb] action". I can intend all I want to lose weight this year, but unless I act on it, you would say, rightly, that I “lacked will”. Actually I would say you "lacked will [the verb] power" which is the common phrase, but as you so deliciously put it in your own words, your "intention" [your mental "will", the noun] can exist all year long without you acting ["willing", the verb] on it, now can't it :) So both intention and action are intimately bound together in the concept of “will”. Only when you conflate the two. Except, of course, when you resolve to lose weight, but don't act on that resolution. However, my point was a slightly different one – that an informed decision is a constrained decision. A totally unconstrained decision would be a totally uninformed one – one that was independent of any input factors. Plainly wrong. I can make an informed decision to either mimic a random number generator (at quantum scales), ignore it altogether, or contradict it digit by digit and I can instead describe patterns or other imagined sequences... my decision is both totally informed and totally unconsrained, and I can act on that decision or not. And therefore a decision that was “free” in that sense would not be “willed” in any coherent meaning of that term. And yet I can freely decide ["will" the noun] and even act ["will" the verb] to mimic, ignore, or contradict a random number generator. You can argue about the utility of that experiment, but you can not deny it coherently refutes your claim. Well, as I said, “will” treated not simply as a noun, but as a concept that is independent of action, seems meaningless to me. To will something, but be unable to act upon it is what kind of will? Hardly surprising. When you insist (in contradiction to standard dictionary and English usage) that every instance of "will" connotes an action, then of course independence from what you deem prerequisite seems meaningless. That is the obvious and inexorable consequence of conflating the noun usage with the verb usage. Consider the old adage "When your only tool is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail" => when your only expectation is "action", every "will" becomes a decree. It is a quite limiting mindset indeed when every thought mandates action, very exhausting I would expect. But I did not do any such thing. I started off by openly discussing what I thought could be the only coherent application of the multivalent adjective “free” to the concept of “will”. And yet here you persist in openingly denying the question was posed in terms of "free will [the noun]" and you insist in answering in terms of constrained will [the verb] and that "free" can mean constrained or limited. It never has. You can bang on about multivalent adjective “free” in your defense but what you can not do is substantiate your position with any standard dictionary usage wherein "free" means constrained or limited. As long as you fabricate and insist upon your novel meanings (an old and tiresome refuge of yours) there is no basis for communication with those of us who employ standard English. The agent is you, or me, and so the proper target for the adjective “free” is the self, not the “will”, so the question becomes “am I free?” Only in that imaginary world where you get to fabricate what JDH's question was. You have amply demonstrated for all to see how appropriate was his a priori dismissal of your viewpoint. Why should anyone here give you the courtesy of engaging your comments when you deny them the courtesy of addressing their questions as they framed them and can't even bring yourself to use standard dictionary meanings?Charles_{January 9, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle: If “free” means “without constraint” then “free will” is an oxymoron. A willed action is a constrained action – constrained by the factors that the will-ing agent weighs up in coming to that decision. This is where you go astray: “A willed action is a constrained action“. You have, perhaps unwittingly, conflated a mental intention, a “decision”, with a physical action, an implementation of that decision. “free will” is an adjective modifying a noun, you have conflated it with an adverb modifying a verb. The pivotal issue being “will” is both a noun meaning volition, intent or purpose, as well as a verb meaning to decree, ordain, or determine. In all cases “free” means free without constraint – that is the accepted meaning of “free”. The seeming oxymoron arises from your conflating the two cases.
No, I have not conflated the two. I described a willed action. A willed action must be preceded by a decision/mental intention to act, or it is not a willed action. And an intention to act must be followed by an action, or it is useless, and certainly not free. I can intend all I want to lose weight this year, but unless I act on it, you would say, rightly, that I “lacked will”. So both intention and action are intimately bound together in the concept of “will”. However, my point was a slightly different one – that an informed decision is a constrained decision. A totally unconstrained decision would be a totally uninformed one – one that was independent of any input factors. And therefore a decision that was “free” in that sense would not be “willed” in any coherent meaning of that term.
In the latter case, treating “will” as a verb, indeed our human action is rarely free and usually constrained in whole or in part, about which I doubt we have any disagreement. But I know of no one (except tempermental children and the insane) who argues or expects their “decrees, ordinations or determinations”, their “will” as a verb, to be without constraint.
Exactly (except I would take issue with your characterisation of “the insane”).
But it is the former case, treating “will” as a noun modified by the adjective “free” which is under discussion. How do we know of a certainty which case is under discussion? Because no one expects or argues they freely decree, ordain, or determine: no one sees themself as God with God’s omnipotence; even presidents and dictators recognize the limits of their power. Similarly, it is the former case, treating “will” as a noun where almost everyone (save argumentative atheists, materialists, and a few philosophers) expects their mental volition, intents and decisions to be free without constraint. As the argument herein pivots not on humans having omnipotence to bring about their decrees, but rather on their freedom to believe or choose, the argument plainly is about the case of “free” being an adjective which modifies “will” the noun.
Well, as I said, “will” treated not simply as a noun, but as a concept that is independent of action, seems meaningless to me. To will something, but be unable to act upon it is what kind of will? The road to hell, as they say, is paved with good intentions.
It is into this context of “will” the noun, meaning volition, intent, purpose or decision, that you have interjected the consequence of actions. The consequence of acting upon our mental volition, intent, purpose, decision is not the same as the mental volition, intent, purpose or decision itself.
No, it isn’t. That does not alter my point.
I can of my own free mental volition decide to jump off a cliff intending to fly, but the consequences of acting on that mental volition will kill me. I can likewise in an uninformed fashion, as would a child, tie a red cape around my neck and jump out of a tree also intending to fly like Superman but again the consequences of acting on that mental volition will injure, if not kill, me. As I mature, I learn and make more informed choices, I learn that what I intend may not always come to pass, what I want I may not always get. But my mental volition, intents, purposes, decisions remain free without constraint. I can freely want what I know I’ll never achieve. I can freely choose what I know will never come to pass: I can vote for losers, I can write bad checks, I can donate to useless charities; all with varying consequences but all having been freely chosen without regard for those consequences.
Voting for losers, writing bad checks, donating to useless charities are all intended actions. Whether they bring about the consequences you intend is another issue – whether those actions were adequately informed. But informed they presumably were, unless you were acting on the tosses of coins, in which case I’d scarcely describe them as willed, even though they might be free.
This free mental volition supercedes the material universe as well. Regardless of the position of planetary bodies or impinging quantum effects, my mental volition is free without constraint. I can mimic the output of a quantum random number generator and mentally choose to be as unpredictable as quantum effects or I can ignore the generator and be as predictable as the sunrise. But the sunrise can not be unpredictable, whereas I can freely so choose. Neither can the random number generator be predictable, whereas I can freely so choose. My mental volition is free whereas the universe is not.
Yes, I agree. One of the things we are free to do is to choose not to choose. For instance I can decide to toss a coin to determine which ice-cream I will have. That decision to “not decide” is a free decision. I think I actually made this point earlier!
Yes, there may be consequences to those mental choices, but the argument is that the “will” (noun meaning mental volition, intentions, purposes, choices) however informed or uninformed, is free without constraint, not that we can freely evade the consequences of our actions.
Well, I didn’t say that free means “freely evade the consequences of our actions”. I said that a willed decision is constrained by the information that we consider when arriving at a decision (including the decision not to decide). However, if every decision in our lives was decided by the click of a Geiger counter, while we would be perfectly unpredictable, we certainly would be exercising will.
That is why I spent time exploring what “free” could mean, coherently, when used to modify “will”. Yes, but you a) incorrectly conflated the verb form of “will” with the noun form of “will” in the context of non-material “free will” and b) ignored the fact that even the material universe (be it radioactive decay which inexorably will happen, or the availability of chocolate ice cream) is severely constrained, whereas our mental volition is free without constraint, free to think thoughts in defiance of material randomness or determinedness, free to think thoughts in defiance of factual truth (I can wrongly believe the earth is flat), and free to think thoughts that transcend material reality (I can believe in God, ghosts, even dimensions that artificially exist only in abstract math).
No, I didn’t so conflate those things, as I have explained above. And I agree with most of what you have said above. That is why I agree that we have free will. But I do not agree that any of that is “unconstrained” precisely because of the reasons you give – our thoughts are not randomly generated, they follow, one from another, logically, in accord with evidence, or even in defiance of it. What you think next is not independent of what you think now. If it were, i.e. if it were totally unconstrained, you would be unable to think coherently. That’s my point – that being capable of intentional action is a consequence of the constraints on what we intend, not on its “freedom” from causality. That is why I think it is more useful to think of “free will” as “freedom from immediacy” – we have real choices, we are not tightly constrained by what we want or need now, but can consider all kinds of future benefits, not only to ourselves, but to others. Which is why I think that “Am I free?” is a better question than “Do I have free will?” Well, It’s certainly a *different* question, but not the question JDH or I found interesting. I am free to think anything as I will (the noun), I am not free to do anything as I will (the verb). These are different questions. Had you lead off with: “A better question is “Am I free?”” I suspect neither JDH nor I would have paid much attention. I don’t think it is a different question, I think it’s a better way of posing the only coherent interpretation of the question: “do I have free will?”
Lastly, courtesy extends to posting here and allowing posters to frame their arguments as they freely choose. Courtesy does not extend to substitution of common meanings with opposite meanings merely to cloak an argument in the guise of “free will” when ‘constrained consequence’ is the conclusion being advocated. That is a “bait & switch” approach. While you may not have intended that approach, consider that you represent yourself here as highly informed and experienced on these subjects.
I cloaked nothing. Quite the reverse – I find it frustrating when a meaning I intended to be crystal clear is missed. So I utterly reject your accusation. As for what I “represent [my]self here as” – that’s for you to judge. I do not argue from any kind of authority, which would be utterly foolish. It doesn’t work on the internet.
So when it is observed that JDH uses “free will” in the non-materialist viewpoint and you purport to have an explanation that reconciles the non-materialist viewpoint with a materialist viewpoint (the bait), but your first postulate is to substitute the commonly understood meaning of “free” with its opposite (the switch), one can only conclude that didn’t happen by accident, especially from a person of your experience.
But I did not do any such thing. I started off by openly discussing what I thought could be the only coherent application of the multivalent adjective “free” to the concept of “will”.
Arguing that “free” doesn’t really mean “free” is an old tactic (dare I say ancient) often seen in atheist, materialist and hyperCalvinist talking points, likewise conflating freedom with unpredictibility (they are neither the same nor linked). That you, an informed experienced professor, would fall into such a tactic accidentally seems unlikely. I’m sure you knew what JDH meant and that it wasn’t what you were going to conclude.
I am not a professor, and have never claimed to be. And the word “free” does not have a single meaning in English usage. I gave what I thought was an appropriate definition for the concept. I hid/cloaked/dissembled nothing.
Reconsider your opening gambit: I am a materialist and I hold that we have free will, by which I mean we can make informed choices of action. You rule my position out, a priori. Why? Consider that computers “make informed choices of action” but neither you nor JDH would consider computers to have “free will” as JDH, I, and almost everyone means. And then you argued that “free” actually means it opposite (being caused) and expect “courtesy” when doing so. I try to be patient, charitable and civil, but trying to communicate when novel, opposite meanings are being used is not a matter for courtesy but for correction.
It is not “correction” to dispute the definition of a word. In the context of any discussion of “free will” it is crucial to establish what we actually mean by the phrase, which, on the face of it (as I said in the other thread – it’s a shame we have to keep jumping between threads) is not a coherent one. “Will” is not itself an agent, it is the name we give to the exercise of agency. The agent is you, or me, and so the proper target for the adjective “free” is the self, not the “will”, so the question becomes “am I free?” And I suggest that is what most people mean when they ask “do I have free will”? If they do not mean that, I must ask: what do they mean? Or, in this case, “what do you mean?”Elizabeth Liddle_{January 9, 2012
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My point is that if so many things depend on arrangements of matter, is it really so remarkable that both astrology and materialism also do? Anyway, astrology lacks empirical support and a plausible mechanism, and is rejected by most scientists and philsophers. For materialism, the opposite is true.champignon_{January 8, 2012
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Right, but no one is saying the arrangement of those have anything to do with human thought or personalitytodd_{January 8, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle: If “free” means “without constraint” then “free will” is an oxymoron. A willed action is a constrained action – constrained by the factors that the will-ing agent weighs up in coming to that decision. This is where you go astray: "A willed action is a constrained action". You have, perhaps unwittingly, conflated a mental intention, a "decision", with a physical action, an implementation of that decision. "free will" is an adjective modifying a noun, you have conflated it with an adverb modifying a verb. The pivotal issue being "will" is both a noun meaning volition, intent or purpose, as well as a verb meaning to decree, ordain, or determine. In all cases "free" means free without constraint - that is the accepted meaning of "free". The seeming oxymoron arises from your conflating the two cases. In the latter case, treating "will" as a verb, indeed our human action is rarely free and usually constrained in whole or in part, about which I doubt we have any disagreement. But I know of no one (except tempermental children and the insane) who argues or expects their "decrees, ordinations or determinations", their "will" as a verb, to be without constraint. But it is the former case, treating "will" as a noun modified by the adjective "free" which is under discussion. How do we know of a certainty which case is under discussion? Because no one expects or argues they freely decree, ordain, or determine: no one sees themself as God with God's omnipotence; even presidents and dictators recognize the limits of their power. Similarly, it is the former case, treating "will" as a noun where almost everyone (save argumentative atheists, materialists, and a few philosophers) expects their mental volition, intents and decisions to be free without constraint. As the argument herein pivots not on humans having omnipotence to bring about their decrees, but rather on their freedom to believe or choose, the argument plainly is about the case of "free" being an adjective which modifies "will" the noun. It is into this context of "will" the noun, meaning volition, intent, purpose or decision, that you have interjected the consequence of actions. The consequence of acting upon our mental volition, intent, purpose, decision is not the same as the mental volition, intent, purpose or decision itself. I can of my own free mental volition decide to jump off a cliff intending to fly, but the consequences of acting on that mental volition will kill me. I can likewise in an uninformed fashion, as would a child, tie a red cape around my neck and jump out of a tree also intending to fly like Superman but again the consequences of acting on that mental volition will injure, if not kill, me. As I mature, I learn and make more informed choices, I learn that what I intend may not always come to pass, what I want I may not always get. But my mental volition, intents, purposes, decisions remain free without constraint. I can freely want what I know I'll never achieve. I can freely choose what I know will never come to pass: I can vote for losers, I can write bad checks, I can donate to useless charities; all with varying consequences but all having been freely chosen without regard for those consequences. This free mental volition supercedes the material universe as well. Regardless of the position of planetary bodies or impinging quantum effects, my mental volition is free without constraint. I can mimic the output of a quantum random number generator and mentally choose to be as unpredictable as quantum effects or I can ignore the generator and be as predictable as the sunrise. But the sunrise can not be unpredictable, whereas I can freely so choose. Neither can the random number generator be predictable, whereas I can freely so choose. My mental volition is free whereas the universe is not. Yes, there may be consequences to those mental choices, but the argument is that the "will" (noun meaning mental volition, intentions, purposes, choices) however informed or uninformed, is free without constraint, not that we can freely evade the consequences of our actions. That is why I spent time exploring what “free” could mean, coherently, when used to modify “will”. Yes, but you a) incorrectly conflated the verb form of "will" with the noun form of "will" in the context of non-material "free will" and b) ignored the fact that even the material universe (be it radioactive decay which inexorably will happen, or the availability of chocolate ice cream) is severely constrained, whereas our mental volition is free without constraint, free to think thoughts in defiance of material randomness or determinedness, free to think thoughts in defiance of factual truth (I can wrongly believe the earth is flat), and free to think thoughts that transcend material reality (I can believe in God, ghosts, even dimensions that artificially exist only in abstract math). Which is why I think that “Am I free?” is a better question than “Do I have free will?” Well, It's certainly a *different* question, but not the question JDH or I found interesting. I am free to think anything as I will (the noun), I am not free to do anything as I will (the verb). These are different questions. Had you lead off with: "A better question is “Am I free?”" I suspect neither JDH nor I would have paid much attention. Lastly, courtesy extends to posting here and allowing posters to frame their arguments as they freely choose. Courtesy does not extend to substitution of common meanings with opposite meanings merely to cloak an argument in the guise of "free will" when 'constrained consequence' is the conclusion being advocated. That is a "bait & switch" approach. While you may not have intended that approach, consider that you represent yourself here as highly informed and experienced on these subjects. So when it is observed that JDH uses "free will" in the non-materialist viewpoint and you purport to have an explanation that reconciles the non-materialist viewpoint with a materialist viewpoint (the bait), but your first postulate is to substitute the commonly understood meaning of "free" with its opposite (the switch), one can only conclude that didn't happen by accident, especially from a person of your experience. Arguing that "free" doesn't really mean "free" is an old tactic (dare I say ancient) often seen in atheist, materialist and hyperCalvinist talking points, likewise conflating freedom with unpredictibility (they are neither the same nor linked). That you, an informed experienced professor, would fall into such a tactic accidentally seems unlikely. I'm sure you knew what JDH meant and that it wasn't what you were going to conclude. Reconsider your opening gambit: I am a materialist and I hold that we have free will, by which I mean we can make informed choices of action. You rule my position out, a priori. Why? Consider that computers "make informed choices of action" but neither you nor JDH would consider computers to have "free will" as JDH, I, and almost everyone means. And then you argued that "free" actually means it opposite (being caused) and expect "courtesy" when doing so. I try to be patient, charitable and civil, but trying to communicate when novel, opposite meanings are being used is not a matter for courtesy but for correction.Charles_{January 8, 2012
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Mark: First of all, I apologize for the delay in answering: work and other duties have prevented me from reading UD in the last 24 hours. And thank you for your answer. It is clear and simple, and that's why it gives rise, at least for me, to serious difficulties. So, I will express those difficulties, and then answer your final question and make some final comments. You say: To me the essential element of free will is acting according to motives, needs and desires. Things have motives, needs and desires in degrees. and: Free = able to act without constraint. Will = act according to motives. Well, I will discuss the problems with "free" and then with "will". Free. YOu define "free" as "able to act without constraint". Well, I see here a basci problem, which is not so much related to the aspect of consciousness, but to the main point of free will itself. My point is: no action is done without constraint. Constraints are always there, both outer and inner. You seem, as a compatibilist, to make a distinction between outer constraints and inner constraints, because you seem to consider inner constraints not constraints at all. OK, I will not dicuss that for the moment (more on that later). But, anyway, no action can be done without outer constraints. Outer constraints always limit the actions we can do, in greater or lesser degree. But in that sense, there would never be a "free" action. At the same time, if an action is done, it certainly means that existing constraints, whatever they are, could not prevent it. So, in that sense, any action is free, because any action was performed, and therefore any existing constraint could not prevent it. So, I believe that your definition leads to serious logical contradictions. Will. You define will as "act according to motives". OK. But how do you define "motives"? You say: "Things have motives, needs and desires in degrees". I can agree, but how do you define those things out of consciousness? What is a motive, is no conscious being is there? I do believe that "motive", "need", "function" and "purpose" cannot be defined out of subjective representations, because they are all words that describe subjective representations, and nothing else. In particular, they describe the feeling aspect of conscious representations. In the same way, concepts like "meaning", "truth" and similar describe the cognitive aspect of conscious representations. You seem to disagree with that. But then, I have to ask you an explicit, and clear, definition of "motive" that does not rely in any way on subjective representations of consciousness. You finally say: The process of choosing is determined by the options we are aware of and the various motives that impinge on us (plus possibly a random element). But that is not a constraint. That is doing what we want. So, it really seems that we always act freely, and equally freely, I suppose in the limits given by outer constraints. Because, according to what you say, inner contraints are not constraints at all. I would make two comments to that: a) From the point of view of classical, libertarian free will, that is in no way different from a deterministic position. It adds nothing to classical determinism, except for the suggestion of the words: "we are doing what we want". That are anyway a cause of many logical contradictions. b) From any point of view, it is a completely useless definition. If all actions are free, and equivalent, there is no difference between good and bad actions. Or at least, if there is a difference, it does not depend on compatibilist free will. You will probably say that an action coming from a good desire is good, and an action coming from a bad desire is bad. OK, but we do not rerally choose. We do what our desire, or at least our prevailing desire, tells us to do. So, no moral responsibility can be attributed to actions because they are "free". We can certainly give a moral connotation to desires, and therefore to corresponding actions, but that has nothing to do with our supposed "free will". We are bound to act according to our desires, and if our desires were formed because of previous actions (let's consider, for instance, some destructive habit), then again those previous actions were due to existing desires, and so on. As compatibilists seem to belive in moral responsibility, I would like you to explain in what sense. Finally, your question: Suppose that a master neurosurgeon were to reveal they had been monitoring your brain for the last 10 minutes. They were able to explain in terms of chemistry and electricity how your motives and perceptions were stored in the brain, how that caused you to debate options internally, and how that lead to your decision. Would you now say you had lost the free will you thought you had? If what you describe were really possible, in absolute deterministic-random terms, I would simply say that free will does not exist, and that I was wrong. I would become a determinist, but never a compatibilist. But obviously, I don't believe that what you describe is possible. I believe that an objective description could be possible of neural states, but that description will never be able to explain all the transitions from state to state in a deterministic way. And not even according to some random description. What I believe is that, if we can really describe those states, the same scenario of biological ID will be found: the continuous emergence of new dFSCI, of new meaning, that cannot be explained neither deterministically not probabilistically. I believe that the consciousness-brain interface, probably acting at quantum level, allows conscious representations to modify the form of neural states, in non deterministic ways, or at least in "prescriptive deterministic ways", as Abel would say, while not explicitly contradicting deterministic laws. I believe that our free will act essentially in how our consiousness reacts to its representations. I believe that such reaction cannot be explained by preexisting neural states, that it is morally meaningful (intuitively oriented towards good or evil, according to our free choice), and that our conscious reaction can "model" neural states, introducing dFSCI and contents that were not there before.gpuccio_{January 8, 2012
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Gpuccio Having asked me a lot of questions are going to read the answer? :-)markf_{January 8, 2012
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Well, I would agree that we are not using language to successfully communicate here. I'm not persuaded that the "abuse" is on my side. If "free" means "without constraint" then "free will" is an oxymoron. A willed action is a constrained action - constrained by the factors that the will-ing agent weighs up in coming to that decision. That is why I spent time exploring what "free" could mean, coherently, when used to modify "will". And I suggest that it is used in a relative sense, as well as in an absolute sense (more commonly, I would argue). No human being is totally "without constraint". I am not free (as I said in the other thread) to play Chopin on the piano, even if I willed it, because I do not have the skill. On the other hand, I am free to choose between playing Bach or Marais on my viol, because I have the skills to do either. I am less free to choose Forqueray, however, because I am heavily constrained by its technical demands. So the point I was (clearly unsuccessfully in your case) attempting to make is that when we talk about "free will" we cannot be talking about "free" in the sense that a totally unconstrained entity like a uranium nucleus is "free" to decay at any time between now and a million years hence, with no apparent constraints on that time at all. In other words, "free" as a qualifier of "will" cannot sensibly mean what is often meant by "random". A willed decision is an informed decision, wouldn't you agree? So I am arguing that "free will" is the capacity to make, and execute an informed decision, not the capacity to make and execute a totally uninformed decision, which would not, coherently, then be an act of "will". Far from being an "abuse" of language, I submit that to regard the "free" in "free will" as meaning "without constraint" ist to make a nonsense of the expression. Which is why I think that "Am I free?" is a better question than "Do I have free will?" And I would argue that human beings are free, freer than any other living creature, because they are free from what I tend to call the "constraints of immediacy". We can choose our actions not simply because they suit "me, now" but because they may benefit others, myself in the future, others in the future, others as yet unborn, etc. That is a coherent, IMO, sense in which we are truly free to choose our actions. I have yet to read an alternative sense that actually makes sense.Elizabeth Liddle_{January 8, 2012
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Dear Mike, As usual, a UD commenter like you makes my point much more insightfully and eloquently than I. I just figure stuff out by reason, mathematics, and examining the evidence. When it became apparent to me that this Darwinism stuff was junk "science" -- unrelated to reason, mathematics, or an objective examination and evaluation of the evidence -- and even more clearly a desperate attempt to promote an irrational materialist worldview, I said, "To hell with that. I'll abandon my lifelong commitment to the poisonous and destructive nonsense of materialism and follow the evidence where it leads."GilDodgen_{January 7, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle I stated precisely what I meant by free will. Yes, and your meaning (as qualified and elaborated in your own words) is "not simply free of some prior causal" If, for example, you tell people you "hold a PhD", that is expected to mean you actually have been awarded that degree by some acredited institution. It does not mean that you're an undergrad accummulating credits with the goal of earning a PhD. We don't get to change 'holding a PhD' into some neologism that suits undergrads. Likewise we don't get to redefine "free". "free" means without constraint; it does not mean the "opposite of acausal" [i.e. the opposite of 'having no cause' which would be 'having cause' or 'being caused']. Your exact words were:
“Free will” cannot of course simply mean “free” of some causal prior. So by “free”, in relation to “willed action” we mean the opposite of “acausal”.
Your meaning of "free" is "having cause"!!! And as you seem unable to grant me the basic courtesy of assuming that I am posting in good faith This is not a matter of basic courtesy. No amount of politeness or civililty on either of our parts excuses such egregious abuse of language.Charles_{January 7, 2012
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I stated precisely what I meant by free will. And as you seem unable to grant me the basic courtesy of assuming that I am posting in good faith, I will not respond to you further.Elizabeth Liddle_{January 7, 2012
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And did you write the earlier sentance? I am a materialist and I hold that we have free will, by which I mean we can make informed choices of action. Wherein you failed to qualify that by "free will" you actually meant (as later disclosed) "not simply free of some causal prior." Which will do you believe we have? The will that is "free" ["simply", i.e. without qualification as used by JDH and presumed in your rebutal to JDH] or the will that is "not simply free" [of some causal prior]? How is anyone expected to coherently parse such self-contradictory equivocal usages? The English language has a wealth of words to choose from that mean something less than "simply free" will: Constrained will, limited will, circumscribed will, determined will, predetermined will... Pick a term whose definition actually fits the usage you intend to argue, and make your case, with consistent terminology. Stop hijacking words to bootstrap your argument past obstacles.Charles_{January 7, 2012
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Yes, but so do baking soda, bowling scores, meteor showers and flatulence.champignon_{January 7, 2012
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Don't both depend on arrangement of matter?todd_{January 7, 2012
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todd, The similarity is extremely superficial. Both perspectives hold that human personality and behavior ultimately depend on something outside of the person, but apart from that, I don't see many similarities, much less 'remarkable' ones.champignon_{January 7, 2012
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And did you read the following sentences as well?Elizabeth Liddle_{January 7, 2012
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Does astrology have laws for the motion of cosmic matter? I think astrologists accept the state of the universe evolves according to physical laws, they just think where everything is at a given time has influence on personality. This is remarkably similar to those who believe the molecular arrangement of brain matter determines thoughts and preferences and causes the 'illusion' of free will.todd_{January 7, 2012
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“Free will” cannot of course simply mean “free” of some causal prior. Charles_{January 7, 2012
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Nicely put (your last point). I agree, of course.Elizabeth Liddle_{January 7, 2012
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Mark, Sure, but the determining positioning are quite similar, no?todd_{January 7, 2012
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Would you cite the sentence in which I used the phrase "not simply free"? In full, please.Elizabeth Liddle_{January 7, 2012
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Elizabeth,
I don’t think quantum indeterminacy is relevant to the issue of free will.
I don't either, but Gil seems to think that 1) non-determinism is essential to free will, and 2) chaotic systems are necessarily non-deterministic because they are unpredictable in practice. I was pointing out that #2 is a problematic assumption (so is #1, but I figured that the problem with #2 would be easier to explain).
As for the scaling issue, yes, I think quantum effects do scale up to the macro level... And for that matter, at neural level, there are at least some people who think that quantum effects scale up to the level of the ion, potentially tipping the balance of timing of the firing of neurons...
The question isn't whether quantum effects scale up to the macro level -- what better illustration of that than a Geiger counter? The question is whether they scale up in chaotic systems, which is what the Michael Berry quote addresses.
But, as I said, I don’t think the issue has anything to do with whether we are free to make informed choices or not, although it may have something to do with whether we are free to make uninformed choices, and thus outwit a predator!
I agree. As I wrote on another thread: This also highlights an odd fact about libertarian free will vs. compatibilism. A libertarian thinks he is most free when his actions are least constrained by his nature, while for a compatibilist it is exactly the opposite: freedom consists in doing exactly what is in one’s nature to do.champignon_{January 7, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle I told you exactly what I meant. On what planet does "not simply free" mean "free"? The same planet where "I hold a PhD" means I hold "not quite a PhD"?Charles_{January 7, 2012
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I hid nothing, pretended nothing, cloaked nothing, masked nothing. I told you exactly what I meant. I am not dishonest and I posted in good faith.Elizabeth Liddle_{January 7, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle please do not accuse me of dishonesty. I'll go you one better. I do not accuse you of dishonesty by which I mean you honestly spelled every word correctly. Fair enough?Charles_{January 7, 2012
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Elizabeth Liddle "Dissemble" means to cloak, mask, hide, pretend. You pretend that "we have free will" when the meaning you hid, cloaked or masked was your true meaning of "not simply free". That is you dissembling. Get over it.Charles_{January 7, 2012
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