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How Future Scholars Will View Evolution

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Centuries from now, here is how a history book is likely to describe the theory of evolution:

As with many new paradigms, evolutionary thought developed over a lengthy period. Within the period known as Modern Science, which had its beginnings in the middle of the second millennium, evolutionary thought began to emerge in the mid seventeenth century. At that time theologians and philosophers from various traditions strenuously argued that the world must have arisen via strictly naturalistic processes. These schools of thought contributed to what became known as The Enlightenment period in the eighteenth century which marked a major turning point in Western intellectual thought.

In The Enlightenment period theological and metaphysical positions became codified in Western thought. These positions became sufficiently accepted and familiar so as to be no longer in need of justification. Instead, Western thinking rapidly incorporated these positions as new truths. This new theology made strong commitments in the area of divine intent, action, and interaction with creation. The impact on science was profound as this theology mandated that God’s interactions with the world was to be strictly via secondary causes (i.e., natural laws), and that all of history must be governed solely by such causes. This paradigm later became known as Evolutionary Thought.

In Evolutionary Thought, science implicitly incorporated these theological and metaphysical commitments. Western, and by now worldwide, thought entered a dark age of anti intellectualism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this period all findings were described as evolutionary. Needless to say this was cause for ever more strained explanations of the evidence. Nonetheless, a rigid social and financial structure enforced adherence, complete with implicit penalties and harassment of dissenters.

Continued here

Comments
iconofid, R0b: My apologies for being away during the past couple of days. R0b, you asked me if I thought Perry Marshall's statement of his argument was invalid. I would say that it was a little muddled, that's all. Actually, I can't see anything wrong with a deductive version of Marshall's argument, as I proposed in #112: (1) DNA is a code; (2) All codes have to be created by a conscious mind; (3) DNA (a code) must have been created by a conscious mind. Notice that the above syllogism makes no mention of Marshall's natural-supernatural distinction. Thus iconofid's question, "What evidence do you have that conscious minds are not natural?" is not relevant here. Whether you regard conscious minds as natural or not, the point of premise (2) (in my recast version of Marshall's argument) is that only a mind can create a code. Kairosfocus threw down a challenge to iconofid:
If you can provide an empirical example of a code or language that occurs naturally, you’ve toppled my proof. All you need is one.
I would re-word that slightly:
If you can provide an empirical example of a code or language that was not designed, you’ve toppled my proof. All you need is one.
The example offered by iconofid was a very interesting one: the English language.
If you want something specific, the spoken English language will do. Not only is it natural, it’s also not designed.
With the greatest respect, iconofid, I have to disagree. Spoken English is the collective creation of the people who use it - all of whom have conscious minds. The patterns that are found in the spoken English language did not spring into existence out of the blue; some individual (or individuals) created them. It need not concern us here what that person's reason was - euphony, ease of use, misconstrual of an existing pattern or sheer laziness. All that matters here is that for any given pattern in the spoken English language, there was a time t in history when someone made a conscious choice to use a new pattern, either to convey a new meaning or a meaning previously conveyed by an earlier pattern. That person may not have known that he/she was creating a new pattern. However, insofar as that person intended that the new pattern be used to convey a particular meaning, what he/she did was certainly an act of design. As I see it, the English language is a bit like Linux. It's a work-in-progress, whose designs (the patterns embedded in our everyday speech) are continually being upgraded. With English, as with Linux, there are absolutely no restrictions on who is allowed to generate new patterns, or "improve upon" (i.e. modify) existing patterns used by speakers. I guess you could regard it as open-source software. Here's an example. In Shakespeare's day, the question "Where does he live?" would have been asked as follows: "Where lodges he?" (see Othello, Act III, scene 4). Somewhere along the line, the pattern "Where ____s he?" changed to "Where does he ____?" Why was a modal auxiliary verb introduced? I have no idea. Most likely it was a very gradual change, which was accomplished over several decades, as more and more people came to like the new pattern. But why shouldn't the creator of the new pattern be called a designer? Iconofid, you make the point that "English evolved and continues to evolve unpredictably." But that does not entail that it is not a designed product; all it means is that the designers do not collude amongst themselves. There is no grand plan for English, because no single individual or team is in charge of it. So what's the problem? As far as I can tell, my modified deductive version of Marshall's argument still stands. I explained in #112 why I think that the principle that codes have to be created by a conscious mind, has to be true. If you think premise (2) of my argument is wrong, iconofid, then I'd like to ask you this question: is there anything at all which you believe that only a conscious mind can do? I'm just curious.vjtorley
June 12, 2009
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kairosfocus says: In short, Icon has here utterly misinterpreted an inductive argument, trying to turn it into a question-begging syllogism. And instead of providing an empirical counter-example, you sutgtgest that it is an adequate rebuttal that it is logically possible that the key induction is false. Sure, as with any significant body of scientific reasoning. Now, all you have to do, Icon, is provide one clear counter-example. Of which, we find nowhere the faintest trace. Perry Marshall presents his two premises and conclusion as a "proof" of his god. If it's supposed to be a proof, it shouldn't be treated as an inductive argument. He assumes his conclusion in his second premise. That's not your fault, obviously, so if you want it treated as an inductive argument, let's have a look at it as you present it: (Kairo quoting Marshall with his own parentheses) 1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. [True] 2) All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information. [the second sentence makes the inductive context of the assertion plain. An empirically anchored and well-supported induction is not a begging of the question. Such inductions are the foundation of science, which of course is provisional knowledge of our world based on observation, inference and testing.] Here you say you have an empirically anchored and well supported induction. Firstly, what evidence do you have that conscious minds are not natural, and that the creation of codes by them cannot be described as a "natural process known to science"? Secondly, even if we agree for the sake of argument that "there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information", how does it follow that all codes are intelligently designed? Why should anything not currently understood by science require intelligent design. How do you conclude that from "observation, inference and testing"? 3) Therefore DNA was designed by a mind. [Inductively based logical inference] Based on what? If you can provide an empirical example of a code or language that occurs naturally, you’ve toppled my proof. All you need is one. [Note the provisionality that is here explicitly stated.] Any code you care to mention fits the bill. Why should any known code be unnatural? If you want something specific, the spoken English language will do. Not only is it natural, it's also not designed. As we're discussing observation and inference, observation would tell us that codes always precede intelligent designers, without known exception. From that, and the English language example, we could infer that codes can exist being intelligently designed, and can be produced by evolutionary processes (English evolved and continues to evolve unpredictably).iconofid
June 10, 2009
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Interestingly enough Kant rules out ID as an explanation of things....
"Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of sensuous things, although--as we have no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility--it will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist. In the explanation of given phenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena of nature, would not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be trying to explain what we do not sufficiently understand from known empirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The principles of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application to objects.
So Kant is fine with possibility of supernatural causes but thought the inference to them must be supported by evidence and must useful in lending insight into the better understanding of things. He clearly thinks that just speculating a transcendental explanation is not useful- there must be evidence and reasoning supporting that inference. But in his time there was no scientific model being laid out for the theory of ID- one that used biology and cosmology as the object of investigation through trying to find the limits of the three rational mechanisms of empirical scientific explanation (chance, contingency, necessity). ID fallows Kant's rules of induction and reasoning but makes the case that intelligence is a supported explanation by the evidence and such an inference to ID can lead to greater insight in how things came into being as well as there functioning nature. Newton arguably used reverse creation or reverse engineering thinking in his search for the laws of motion and cosmology. The ID template is not just inspiring but puts empirical science into a perspective where it can often more easily become illuminated. Francis Crick certainly thought DNA, due to its specified complexity, really made it clear that information is a now a fundamental force of nature and that information requires intelligence. He believed this so much so that he saw ET intelligence as being the most likely explanation for it's origin. So admittedly Kant did not know all of this at his time- but overall the science has come a long way since then and there are good reasons for now inferring the role of active intelligence supported by empirical evidence- and that is all ID claims to do.Frost122585
June 10, 2009
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The critique of pure reason was about synthesizing metaphysics and materialism.
"But, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to the constitution of their object; and the philosopher is not permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable obscurity. These questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas. For the object must be given in experience, and the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea.If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown; if the question, for example, is whether the object--the something, the phenomenon of which (internal--in ourselves) is thought--that is to say, the soul, is in itself a simple being; or whether there is a cause of all things, which is absolutely necessary--in such cases we are seeking for our idea an object, of which we may confess that it is unknown to us, though we must not on that account assert that it is impossible.* The cosmological ideas alone posses the peculiarity that we can presuppose the object of them and the empirical synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be given;and the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to the progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute totality--which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be given in any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard to a thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not be sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an object in itself. The question in relation to a possible experience is not, "What can be given in an experience in concreto" but "what is contained in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis must approximate." "
Here he once again defends the use of reasoning to a nonmaterial unknown explanation but he points out that what that explanation is (God? or Designer) must be shewn as either a suffcient or insuffient idea based on it's on rational nature. And this leads immeadtly to theology as then the arguemnt becmes about what the nature of that designer is and if it is rational to accept one description of it over anotehr. ID does not get into that all ID does is claim to infer design- and if one thinks that the designer must be a super natural one then on those grounds alone one cannot dismiss the theory simply based on a undefined inference. One must argue about why a supernatural cause "cannot" give rise to design in nature- which leads us to theology. Firthermore, Kant says,
"Although, therefore, the solution of these problems is unattainable through experience, we must not permit ourselves to say that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted.For the object is in our own mind and cannot be discovered inexperience; and we have only to take care that our thoughts are consistent with each other, and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as a representation of an object empirically given, and therefore to be cognized according to the laws of experience. A dogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory but impossible. The critical solution, which may be a perfectly certain one, does not consider the question objectively, but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the cognition upon which the question rests."
And so this idea of supernaturalism is not even possible to be argued against- by Kant's observation the questions must ultimately only be about the system which points to the object being investigated of the nature of conception of the object itself. So your quarrel might be either with the theory of ID or the nature of the designer, but the inferred connection to the designer, which simply fallows as a necessary extension of the theory, is unwarranted. And so if we are not challenging the theory we are challenging it's object and that leads us once again into the real domain of ID's demurrers which is theology- and of which ID does not make any claim there of. ID's object is intelligence/information and design which the theory claims can be inferred by it's effects in nature. To attack the object of the design is to pose a question about the nature of the designer. So say that in inference to intelligence is "supernatural" is false as intelligence is a naturalistic acting force. For one to challenge the inference of intelligence one must make the case that there can be no intelligence great enough to design the world- and that is an attack upon the nature of the object of the theory.Frost122585
June 10, 2009
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Icono just insists on ignoring all of the arguments being put forth against the position that super naturalism must not be allowed in science. NO one is saying to teach or do science about who or what the designer is- all ID does is infer to design. If you were to speculate 1000 years ago that there was a super complex coding system that is responsible for our biological existence people could have easily considered this a supernatural explanation. And to me DNA is very much super natural and that is why it requires the explanation of a designer. Kant was not saying keep religion out of science- he was saying science has limits which require empirical evidence but that if that evidence points strongly to a synthetic explanation than that explanation must be taken seriously. Kant would not have argued for some wall between science and religion. Kant considered all modes of thought part of one manifold- that is science religion and other things are all connected by the sane set of rules.Frost122585
June 10, 2009
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4] Icon, 113: why is it you’re objecting to my satirical question begging, but not Marshall’s serious question begging? It is obvious that Icon has again failed to simply examine my always linked, in which I make my chains of reasoning explicit. As the above shows, I make an inductive argument, and the real challenge to evolutionary materialism is as I just put it. (FYI, Icon, I have never previously heard of Mr Perry Marshall.) Let's look at the argument Icon objects to as question-begging, in the light of the above:
1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. [True] 2) All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information. [the second sentence makes the inductive context of the assertion plain. An empirically anchored and well-supported induction is not a begging of the question. Such inductions are the foundation of science, which of course is provisional knowledge of our world based on observation, inference and testing.] 3) Therefore DNA was designed by a mind. [Inductively based logical inference] If you can provide an empirical example of a code or language that occurs naturally, you’ve toppled my proof. All you need is one. [Note the provisionality that is here explicitly stated.]
In short, Icon has here utterly misinterpreted an inductive argument, trying to turn it into a question-begging syllogism. And instead of providing an empirical counter-example, you sutgtgest that it is an adequate rebuttal that it is logically possible that the key induction is false. Sure, as with any significant body of scientific reasoning. Now, all you have to do, Icon, is provide one clear counter-example. Of which, we find nowhere the faintest trace. 5] CH, 117: My own personal point of view is to withdraw the terms natural and supernatural, or at least, be open minded about how they’re used or abused. CH has a point. I would suggest that we need to change the frame of our thought: we routinely observe (a) natural events and objects (evidently spontaneous results of chance and/or necessity) and (b) ART-ificial ones. Thus, we see that causal factors: (i) mechanical necessity leading to intelligible, low contingency regularities, (ii) credibly undirected and stochastic contingency, and (iii) directed contingency are all reasonable. Thence, we may apply a causal/explanatory filter as an empirically based scientific analytical tool:
[1] examine an entity or process, by various facets or features or aspects as seems reasonable. [2] if the aspect is such that similar initial conditions lead to similar [and perhaps functionally related] outcomes, then [i] more or less mechanical laws of necessity are likely to be at work, leading to mechanical kinematic and dynamical models. [We move to dynamics when we postulate change-driving forces and resistances to same, relative to initial conditions. Kinematics studies change without reference to driving forces. Galilean and Newtonian studies of motion are the paradigmatic exemplars.] [3] If the aspect is highly contingent, seemingly similar initial conditions will give rise to dramatically different outcomes, though of course averaging behaviour and fluctuations may be also present. Such high contingency may -- on our experience of the world -- be [ii] credibly undirected and stochastic, [iii] credibly directed and purposeful. [4] On observing apparently undirected, stochastic behaviour, chance based models are appropriate, and the relevant statistics can be explored. Under certain circumstances of identifiable models, underlying structural dynamics and populations may be characterised, as in kinetic theory and statistical mechanics. [Event eh Gaussian model is based on the idea of a large cluster of factors that may shift positively or negatively by small amounts, giving an average with a scatter that yields the classic bell curve.] [5] in cases such as specified complexity or irreducible complexity, or code-based behaviours, we have empirically reliable sings of intelligence, so the logical inference is that ART [tekne], not NATURE is at work. [6] Once the list of relevant aspects has been run through, an overall explanatory model of the situation or object may be constructed, allowing description, modelling of driving forces, prediction and testing on observed or experimental conditions, thence on reliable success, technological application.
So, we see a generic format of the scientific method. 6] Lenoxus, 118: if you want to imitate, by means of design, those forms that work well in nature, why must we assume those forms themselves were designed? By some arguments, it might seem reasonable to suppose that they were, but ultimately, we would still want to test anything we developed anyway, rather than put all our confidence in the designer’s plan. The error here is to misread an inductive, empirically anchored inference to ART with an assumption. It seems to be driven by -- ironically -- the assumption and a priori imposition of Lewontinian materialism on science and the popular mindset:
. . . . It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [NYRB, 1997]
And, as for he issue of testing, the just above point on empirically based causal factor analysis, should provide adequate answer. 7] I largely agree with the notion that whenever you empirically confirm the supernatural, it kind of automatically becomes part of the natural. After all, it must be describable by some rules, even if those rules involve inherent unpredictability, like aspects of quantum mechanics. Cf again, the analysis model at 5 just above. Whenever one empirically confirms the ART-ificial, it becomes part of the intelligent. Candidates to be the intelligent cause may be within or beyond the cosmos, which can be addressed on circumstances. for instance, if tech cosmos is credibly fine-tuned and integrated in a complexly functional way to foster the existence of intelligent C-atom and water based life forms, then there is good reason to infer that the cosmos is grounded in an extra=-cosmic designer. Such a designer would by definition be beyond nature, and would not be reducible to nature. And, this is in fact a significant issue in cosmology, so the inference captioned just above is without warrant. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
June 10, 2009
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Folks: This AM, I am more focussed on the preview candidate for Firefox 3.5, noting that when I get to threads at UD that go to about 100 comments, the background on the OP and other sections goes to black.(At first it is white as usual, then as the page loads, it switches to black.) Am I the only one seeing this? [I don't see the problem in Safari, and it was not there pre 3.5 F/f.] Now on some follow-up points: 1] Nakashima-San, 111: I would still hold that there are some examples of codes (mappings) that are also transductions (for example from photons to electrical signals). It is probably possible to create a complex transducer that will also code [I think here especially of a transducer that would employ a complicated matrix of switches (including opto-electric switches) and associated circuits, or a complex analogue to digital converter used as a transducer], but in general coding is not the same thing as physically instantiated mapping. The idea is that the code maps from one domain to another, SYMBOLICALLY. That is, there is an alphabet of possible symbols that is used in clusters forming messages under certain representational and transformation rules, to represent and/or manipulate real or possible states of affairs in a real or model world; i.e. I am arguing that codes are inherently digital entities. If you will, let's take Wiki on codes, as a useful first reference:
In communications, a code is a rule for converting a piece of information (for example, a letter, word, phrase, or gesture) into another form or representation (one sign into another sign), not necessarily of the same type. In communications and information processing, encoding is the process by which information from a source is converted into symbols to be communicated. Decoding is the reverse process, converting these code symbols back into information understandable by a receiver.
So, codes are distinct from signals and analogue modulations thereof, which are actually physical implementations of mathematical operations -- i.e. transformations of t-domain [which enfolds space-domain here . . I am not just talking on 1-D signals] signals from one form to another, and in the first instance are thus smoothly variable, i.e. analogue. In a code, the symbols are -- and must be -- recognizably distinct. (of course since with appropriate choice of symbols and clusters or strings, we can in principle digitise just about any analogue signal.) 2] . . . for example from photons to electrical signals I am thinking that it is possible to do a direct opto-actuated switch matrix that would sense an optical signal and immediately yield a digital, coded output. In a simple case, we could consider a string of chopped IR beams [this gets us out of major headaches on the pervasive presence of light . . . esp fluorescent, i.e. pulsed light] feeding photodiodes that will yield a bit string that locates and sizes an entity that interrupts the beams. But in the relevant case, the eye, the outputs of the sensor matrix are not discrete state -- we are dealing with signals where pulse repetition rate is smoothly variable and is a log-compressed analogue signal. [And yes, the Brain and CNS are a sophisticated ANALOGUE computer that uses the neuron as the core element.] There is neural network processing back of the retina, indeed, but that is again a matter of a network of interconnected synapses that drive an analogue pulse repetition rate firing process in onward layers of the network. The nerves therefore carry a log-compressed, time-varying matrix signal, but it is smoothly varying not a symbolic code. [NB: the visual field is updated about every 1/8 second, hence the use of 16 - 24 frames/sec as the more or less minimum for perceiving smoothly varying motion, and of course 40 -50 or so Hz -- some of us, a very few, need up to about 60 Hz -- is the flicker fusion frequency range beyond which we perceive no flicker. Movies work by doing 24 frames/sec but double-pulsing the light, and NTSC and PAL/SECAM TV do even and odd fields that move from 25 - 30 frames to 50 - 60 Hz. Video is a very fascinating and subtly complex area of study . . . ] Of course other layers of processing allow the signal patterns to be "crispified" into recognition of text etc and deciphering of MEANING, at which point symbols -- digitalisation - has now entered the issue. And note: this move to SYMBOLISED MEANING is an intelligent step. One we do not really understand; though we routinely do it. (Computers that do optical recognition of text etc, are programmed, int eh end by intelligences. They are simply mechanically manipulating bits, not in themselves actually thinking intelligently. Take a look at assembly or machine code and associated register transfer algebra to see what this is about.) So, it is possible for a complex transducer to directly encode, but this is not relevant to the biological world, which is a world of analogue signal processing on signals that are based on smoothly varying pulse repetition rate for intensity, and on network wiring with subtly adjustable intensity of interconnexions for processing to separate out patterns. Onward, there is intelligent recognition and manipulation of symbols and objects, but he intelligent processes involved -- though familiar and routine -- are not understood. [E.g. Have you ever seen someone and mis-recognised who it was? Or, seen a familiar face in a cloud or the like?] 3] VJT, 112: Perry Marshall’s point . . . is not that the encoder or decoder needs to be intelligent - indeed, ants can perform these functions perfectly well - but that the symbol-creator has to be intelligent . . . . Perry Marshall’s inference that all codes are created by a conscious mind appears reasonable, especially when we bear in mind his additional point that “there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information.” Moreover, it seems to be necessarily true . . . Now, I 'ent so sure ants (both individually and collectively) are not smart! (Ever tried to keep them out of sugar or chocolate by making in effect a puzzle?) However, in comms, many encoders are as to functional dynamics, purely mechanical, so it is plain that encoders -- and decoders -- need not be intelligent in themselves. But, such mechanical entities are fulfilling patterns that are set up by intelligent designers, in the cases under our direct observation as to actual cause. (And of course, we know of no cases of observed emergence of encoders or decoders of any complexity that reflect undirected contingency and mere blind mechanical dynamics of necessity.) So, per our world of observation, we are back at tech design inference: on massively supported induction, codes and the entities that encode or decode mechanically, or even under program control, are created by intelligences. Moreover, as we are dealing with huge configuration spaces, we know that trial and error is maximally unlikely to get to the shores of islands of function on the gamut of the observed cosmos. So, optimising through trial and error-driven hill-climbing is not a credible strategy to get to first functionality. So also, we have good reason to infer that the presence of complex symbolic codes and associated processing systems is an empirically reliable sign of intelligence. (And, of course, I am making the underlying induction explicit. Those who would reject it have the burden of showing that it is credible on empirical evidence that compex codes and associated mechanisms and systems can spontaneously originate per chance + necessity with reasonable probability on the gamut of our observed cosmos.) [ . . . ]kairosfocus
June 10, 2009
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Clive Hayden:
When Harvard opens its first ID lab, it will take these engineering principles and wed them to biological science as a way of understanding more fully how the mechanics of whatever system they’re studying works, just like Jonathan Wells did for the turbine like mechanism that he studied, and how Michael Egnor studied the stabilizing ability of the brain while pounded under heavy blood flow.
Sounds good to me! The question then becomes: if you want to imitate, by means of design, those forms that work well in nature, why must we assume those forms themselves were designed? By some arguments, it might seem reasonable to suppose that they were, but ultimately, we would still want to test anything we developed anyway, rather than put all our confidence in the designer's plan. And it's not like we would say, "Let's make a robot with wings like a bat's, but let's not model this building after mountains, because we know mountains weren't designed." George de Mestral, the inventor of velcro, was proably a theist, but I doubt that was necessary to his being inspired by burdock. In any case, I largely agree with the notion that whenever you empirically confirm the supernatural, it kind of automatically becomes part of the natural. After all, it must be describable by some rules, even if those rules involve inherent unpredictability, like aspects of quantum mechanics. That doesn't mean that any one supernatural concept should ever be ruled out scientifically, but rather that no unwarranted assumptions about its nature should ever be made. If a being who seemingly resembled the God of Abraham appeared before me, I wouldn't automatically assume the total truth of the Old Testament, nor would I conclude that this being was omni-everything. I would, however, figure it most likely that this entity, or a being similar to it (an ancestor, perhaps), was indeed one who had appeared to at least one ancient Jew or Sumerian. (After ruling out the possibility of my hallucinating, of course.) Obviously I'm pretty much rephrasing what iconofid said earlier about observing an angel create. In fact, in keeping with this philosophy, one of my biggest issues with the ID mindset is not its acceptance of a designer, but its almost knee-jerk rejection of natural designers (such as aliens) — ironic considering how much evolutionists here are accused of close-mindedness. Again and again, we hear "Design is there for anyone to infer! It's a hard scientific alternative to Darwin! By the way, would you mind changing what constitutes 'science', please, because we would really like this designer to be undetectable due to its own super-nature." Have Dembski or Behe ever spent even a day pondering the possibility of extraterrestrial creators?Lenoxus
June 9, 2009
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Lenoxus, ------"Well, that was kind of my point. Seriously, could any of the residents IDers take a crack at explaining how methodological supernaturalism works differently than philosophical supernaturalism? The differences when it comes to naturalism are clear enough — some of us on this board are partaking of metaphysical but not methodological naturalism, because we’re defending naturalism but not doing any naturalistic science ourselves. When Harvard opens its first ID lab, what will the biologists there do differently?" All valid questions. My own personal point of view is to withdraw the terms natural and supernatural, or at least, be open minded about how they're used or abused. Radio waves were once considered supernatural, particle wave duality could still be considered supernatural, it depends on your philosophical presuppositions that you bring to the topic. In my own opinion, all of nature could be considered supernatural, since we have no reason to believe that we know better, given that the sample of nature, or supernature, is 1. I have other reasons for thinking so, but it would take a lot of explaining, or I could just refer you to The Ethics of Elfland in Orthodoxy by G. K. Chesterton, which is worth quoting in full. It must be remembered that methodological naturalism is no different from philosophical naturalism, so if methodological supernaturalism is to be dismissed because it presupposes philosophical supernaturalism, the same grounds would be in place to dismiss methodological naturalism given that it presupposes philosophical naturalism. It just depends on where you draw these lines between natural and supernatural. There have been shifts in where people have drawn these lines over the years. It would be folly to claim that nothing should exist except methodological naturalism, for that is not itself proven or even able to be demonstrated by methodological naturalism for the precise reason that it is a philosophical position. When Harvard opens its first ID lab, it will take these engineering principles and wed them to biological science as a way of understanding more fully how the mechanics of whatever system they're studying works, just like Jonathan Wells did for the turbine like mechanism that he studied, and how Michael Egnor studied the stabilizing ability of the brain while pounded under heavy blood flow. Put simply, these engineering principles help in understanding what is being studied. That is, at least, one way in which ID helps even methodological naturalism. To rule it out of hand is, to me, stifling.Clive Hayden
June 9, 2009
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When Harvard opens its first ID lab, what will the biologists there do differently?
Ask jerry. He'll tell you they don't need to open an ID lab.Adel DiBagno
June 9, 2009
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Wow, the posts that happen in a day! I'd like to re-enter the conversation to jot down some points & questions… First off is this: Did no one else notice the absurdity in Oramus's rephrasing:
2) All intelligent designers use DNA; there is no designer known to science that does not use DNA in designing organisms.
Really? Nothing is designed except DNA? Normally IDers are pretty good at coming up with dozens of examples of non-DNA design… ;) Conversely, if you really want to stretch the definition of "use" to mean that we all "use" DNA to create these posts, um, okay… I guess by a similar argument I'm using a printing press right now. Hmm, food for thought… :) I also feel compelled to repond to #63 Borne.
Lenoxus: “Until “design” becomes a specific, observable, mechanical phenomenon, calling something “designed” seems no different scientifically than calling it 'pretty’.” So calling an automobile designed is the same as calling it pretty? You need to take time to think before responding.
I still stand by that. Of course the fact that automobiles are designed is true, but it's a meaningless and useless statement until some sort of mechanism of origin is proposed, or at least a reason why its being designed is relevant to us. If penguins are designed, should that change the way we treat them? (Or the way we study them? The second is of course the sort of thing I and a lot of others have kept asking over and over about ID). In fact, I'm sure I will be proven wrong about this, but I can't think of a single area of science, academia, or work in general that consists of nothing but labeling a given artifact as designed and moving on to the next one. So by itself, the word "design" is meaningless, yet all IDers seem to want scientists to do is say "We consider DNA designed" and move on on the assumption that the designer is omni-everything, making that part of Official Science. Earlier in the same post Borne said:
Lenoxus: “Man, I can’t wait for the rise of methodological supernaturalism. “ How much more patently absurd can you get?
Well, that was kind of my point. Seriously, could any of the residents IDers take a crack at explaining how methodological supernaturalism works differently than philosophical supernaturalism? The differences when it comes to naturalism are clear enough — some of us on this board are partaking of metaphysical but not methodological naturalism, because we're defending naturalism but not doing any naturalistic science ourselves. When Harvard opens its first ID lab, what will the biologists there do differently?Lenoxus
June 9, 2009
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vjtorley:
Moreover, it seems to be necessarily true; so the inference should really be from: (2) All codes have to be created by a conscious mind; to: (3) DNA (a code) must have been created by a conscious mind.
Since you have changed Marshall's argument from an induction to a deduction, should we assume that you agree with icon's point that Marshall's argument didn't hold water?R0b
June 9, 2009
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Kairosfocus says: We are undeniably intelligent [and one cannot apart from question-begging assume or assert that we exhaust the field of actual or possible intelligence and associated capabilities]. Indeed. My question begging argument above was a parody of Perry Marshall's. He assumes his conclusion, and so did I. Here's his argument again: Marshall: 1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. 2) All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information. 3) Therefore DNA was designed by a mind. If you can provide an empirical example of a code or language that occurs naturally, you’ve toppled my proof. All you need is one. You see what I mean? So tell me, why is it you're objecting to my satirical question begging, but not Marshall's serious question begging? Cornelius Hunter could help you with his expertise on confirmation bias, perhaps.iconofid
June 9, 2009
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iconofid First, an apology. I mistakenly imputed to you the view that the laws of physics are a code; I was wrong. It was Lenoxus (#26), not you, who made that suggestion:
If I wanted, I could describe the laws of physics as “information” or “code”...
... which, as I pointed out, is loose talk. Perry Marshall's rigorous definition of "code" would exclude physical laws at the outset. Back to Marshall. In #97, you attempt to refute his syllogism...
1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. 2) All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information. 3) Therefore DNA was designed by a mind.
...with one of your own:
1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. 2) All intelligent designers require DNA; there is no designer known to science for whom DNA is not a prerequisite. 3) Therefore, DNA cannot be designed.
The first premise in your counter-syllogism is redundant. All you need are premises 2 and 3, and you can then argue as follows: All designers require pre-existing DNA, therefore no designer could have designed the first DNA. Oramus (#102) rightly criticized the ambiguity of your phrase "require DNA" in step 2, and re-wrote it as follows: 2) All intelligent designers use DNA; there is no designer known to science that does not use DNA in designing organisms. But even if you meant "All intelligent designers contain - and hence physically require - pre-existing DNA" rather than "All intelligent designers use DNA," there is still something wrong with your counter-syllogism. For your argument fails to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic dependence. All intelligent designers may happen to contain DNA; but there is nothing intrinsic to being a designer that requires it to possess DNA, rather than some other complex biomolecule. If premise 2 is true, it is accidentally true; there is no reason for it to be so. Compare this with Marshall's premise (2):
All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information.
The dependence of code upon a mind is arguably intrinsic, rather than extrinsic. To see this point, let's look at Perry Marshall's definition of "code" in http://www.cosmicfingerprints.com/dnanotcode.htm :
Code is defined as communication between an encoder (a “writer” or “speaker”) and a decoder (a “reader” or “listener”) using agreed upon symbols.
Perry Marshall's point here is not that the encoder or decoder needs to be intelligent - indeed, ants can perform these functions perfectly well - but that the symbol-creator has to be intelligent. The same goes for another defintion Perry Marshall puts forward:
I define "Coded information" as a system of symbols used by an encoding and decoding mechanism, which transmits a message that is independent of the communication medium.
So Perry Marshall's inference that all codes are created by a conscious mind appears reasonable, especially when we bear in mind his additional point that "there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information." Moreover, it seems to be necessarily true; so the inference should really be from: (2) All codes have to be created by a conscious mind; to: (3) DNA (a code) must have been created by a conscious mind. In your counter-syllogism, the argument does not flow through in the same way. Instead we have: 2) All intelligent designers happen to require pre-existing DNA. 3) Therefore, the first DNA was not designed - but nevertheless there is no reason in principle why it could not have been designed, by a Designer with a different biochemistry - or none at all. In this post, I have argued that the way in which codes require conscious, intelligent creators is very different from the way in which code-creators require DNA. I hope that helps clarify my position. Best wishes, Vincentvjtorley
June 9, 2009
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Mr Kairosfocus, Thank you, perhaps I used the term too broadly. However, I would still hold that there are some examples of codes (mappings) that are also transductions (for example from photons to electrical signals).Nakashima
June 9, 2009
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Nakashima-San: Codes are NOT transductions; the latter having to do with energy conversion through device physics effects, e.g. a dynamic microphone [love the old reliable Shure 58!] is a small, specialised DC generator. Ye olde 4-terminal resistor [with two take-off voltage leads) is a classic transducer much used in electronics, esp nowadays to get a current meter out of a DVM, which is usually naturally of high input impedance. (Ye just as old galvanometer is a blend of low current and low voltage actuating a coil against a spring, with a pointer running across a scale. One then fits around shunts and series resistances to get calibrated scales.) An active transducer would involve an amplifier element that gates energy form a power supply under the control of an input so there may be power gain. (Oddly, a classic early amplifier in this sense is the old Carbon granule mike in old fashioned telephones, that worked by causing C-granules to crush together more or less closely per the impinging compressions and rarefactions of the sound waves.) Codes are symbolic assignments that result in mappings from one domain to another. For instance, ASCII is a code mapping from the world of alphanumeric glyphs to 7-bit digital codes. One impinges a signal on a transducer to get the transformation process going, one modulates a signal to get a modulated signal; one assigns codes per mapping relationships to get coding or translation. Transduction, modulation and encoding are very different. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
June 9, 2009
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Mr Joseph, I always get an odd sense of triumphalism when you pin the validity of ID to the lack of human progress in a particular area of science. What is your back-up plan? Looking at my previous response to Mr Kairosfocus, we can see that codes are at base transductions, and as you point out, can evolve. This leads to a line of inquiry as to whether any of the transduction has a function that may be considered pre-symbolic. Another line of inquiry is whether the code can be subsetted for historical reasons. For example, was there a two codon gentic code before there was a three codon genetic code? Could new amino acids be added to an existing code without breaking to much?Nakashima
June 9, 2009
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Mr Kairosfocus, Mr Vjtorley was referring to Perry's page, where a simple definition of a code is given - a mapping from points in one space to points in another. No unecessary bells and whistles. Codes are basically transductions. tRNA transduces mRNA triplets into amino acids. Retinal cells transduce light into signal trains.Nakashima
June 9, 2009
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Nakishima, The issue isn't whether or not codes can "evolve". The issue is with the ORIGINS of the code. Ya see we don't have any experience with nature, operating freely cobbling together a code. We do have plenty of experience with agencies creating codes from scratch. So all you have to do is demonstrate that nature, operating freely can cobble together a genetic code and an icon of ID falls.Joseph
June 9, 2009
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Nakashima-San: In 94 above, you raised a technically interesting point:
Codes are actually pretty common in biology. Your retina is an example. There is a mapping between data encoded as photons and data encoded as electrical signals.
The interest turns on several significant distinctions (and I am aware that English is very much a second language for you, much less technical English): 1 --> First, we must distinguish between encoding and modulating (esp. analogue modulation): in encoding, a symbolic representation of a relevant state of the world is implemented, using arbitrary symbols according to a convention. But, in modulation (esp. analogue forms, including the relevant pulse modulation forms) the signal or state of affairs triggers transducers and a mechanical, non-symbolic modulation process for an underlying carrier. [I am of course very aware of the term, pulse code modulation [PCM], but of course the distinction is the insertion of "code" therein, even in the simple uncompressed 8421 binary coded PCM.] 2 --> Similarly, we must distinguish a code and a signal: a code is a symbolic representation, a signal is some physical variation that may carry information under suitable modulation [including simple transducer action and generation of an analogue to the relevant input]. 3 --> Next, photons as such do not ENCODE information, they simply are emitted or reflected or refracted based on circumstances in the world. (We of course use photons in opto-electronics, by manipulating beams of photons through sensor-transducer and modulation techniques. BTW, a transducer is a device or entity that passively or in some cases actively transforms energy from one form to another in a way that is amenable to onward processing, in the ideal cases linearly or logarithmically.) 4 --> In the case of vision, images have to be formed and patterns manipulated to have information to process. And that is a matter of sensor suites. i.e. arrays of detectors and onward neuronal processing networks; which are fundamentally analogue. (BTW, a similar process occurs with hearing, where sensor hairs trigger frequency domain responses, in effect doing an analogue Fast Fourier Transform.) 5 --> In the case of neurones, they generate puled signals, wee the neurone is either quiescent or fired. The response is by making a higher rate of pulsing when there is more intense stimulation, so that the output signal's modulation is a matter of pulse repetition rate. As Wiki notes in its article on neurones:
The conduction of nerve impulses is an example of an all-or-none response. In other words, if a neuron responds at all, then it must respond completely. The greater the intensity of stimulation does not produce a stronger signal but can produce more impulses per second. There are different types of receptor response to stimulus, slowly adapting or tonic receptors respond to steady stimulus and produce a steady rate of firing. These tonic receptors most often respond to increased intensity of stimulus by increasing their firing frequency, usually as a power function of stimulus plotted against impulses per second. This can be likened to an intrinsic property of light where to get greater intensity of a specific frequency (color) there has to be more photons, as the photons can't become "stronger" for a specific frequency. There are a number of other receptor types that are called quickly adapting or phasic receptors, where firing decreases or stops with steady stimulus, examples include; skin when touched by an object causes the neurons to fire, but if the object maintains even pressure against the skin the neurons stop firing . . . .
6 --> A typical model is the Weber-Fechner law, whereby response is seen as being to fractional change, i.e. the underlying signal is a more or less logarithmic pulse repetition rate signal. (And, as was noted, there are other structures that may cause the response to be differential, and non-integrating.) Such techniques of course economise on processing and allow for a wide dynamic range of real world circumstances to be sensed and responded to, with a bias to the point that it is change or difference that is often the important signal. [That is, the system is for good reason often biased towards adaptive, differential signals. BTW, pulse signals are generally demodulated by more or less integrative processes, such as low pass filtering. [And, yes I know that a LPF of form 1/(a + Ts) is not a strict integrator, but run up well beyond its frequency domain knee and tell me what is happening there . . . by comparison with the classic 1/s. Remember, too the significance of the use of signal chopping in instrumentation.] ) 7 --> By contrast, the DNA- RNA- Ribosome- Enzyme system in the cell is a digitally encoded, symbolic, algorithmic, flexibly programmed [think of how viruses can hijack the system] processing system. That is, the A, G, C, T/U monomers in sequence specify at least one (and probably more than one!) discrete code based on a four-state alphabet. And, the chaining chemistry of sugar-phosphate bonds, is more or less independent of the information encoded in side-chains. that's why, ever since March 19, 1953, Crick observed (here, in a letter to his son Michael):
Now we believe that the DNA is a code. That is, the order of bases (the letters) makes one gene different from another gene (just as one page of print is different from another) . . .
8 --> Onward, the protein making code specifies assembly of proteins as informationally controlled sequenced "handed" polymers, that fold to 3-D forms (sometimes, agglomerated) that then have [a] key-lock fits at their work sites, and [b] function based on the 3-D array of side-groups and augmentational/ activating atoms or groups. (The folding space of the proteinome -- even after solving the problem of why life molecules are overwhelmingly one-handed: left for proteins, right for nucleic acids -- is itself a major search challenge, which easily outstrips the search resources of warm ponds or comet heads or volcano vents deep underseas.) 9 --> And, to function they must be transported to the right work site and fit into the right process at the right time, indeed having of all things a packet switching style header system [this is similar -- NB, I here make a comparison, not a claim of identity -- to how TCP/IP, the protocol for the Internet, works] that allows them to be appropriately addressed and delivered, the headers being snipped off at the right times! _____________ In short, the digital coding and associated algorithmic information systems in the cell are a highly significant issue, and should not be conflated with the signal processing networks in the body otherwise. the nature and informational complexity of this system points strongly to design. Of course, the intricately organised and often irreducibly complex structure of the sensors subsystems in the body considered as a cybernetic system are also pointers to design. GEM of TKI PS: Icon, that we exhibit FSCI in our DNA, and irreducible complexity in our organs and systems, is an indicator that we are not the primary intelligences in the cosmos. That's all. (It in no way undermines the significance of the tested, reliable empirical traces of intelligent action as pointers to that action.) We are undeniably intelligent [and one cannot apart from question-begging assume or assert that we exhaust the field of actual or possible intelligence and associated capabilities]. However, as exemplars of that, we can be a useful sample of what intelligences do that are beyond the credible reach of undirected chance + mechanical necessity. Thence, we assess the reliable traces of intelligent action in the interesting cases of life and cosmic origins, and can infer from reliable sign to presence of intelligent action at the point of relevant origin. That we live in a contingent cosmos that reflects intricate fine-tuning that sets it up for intelligent, carbon-based life such as we are, suggests that the best candidate for the logically implied necessary being is a powerful and highly intelligent cosmogentic designer.kairosfocus
June 9, 2009
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Oramus: I believe Padre Pio’s stigmata is the top candidate among many examples of strong evidence for supernatural influence. How does science explain this modern example of divine influence that walked among us during the 20th century? You should see some of the Hindu claims! Ask Cornelius Hunter about confirmation bias, then consider how "miracles" always relate to the local religion, then look up schizophrenia and temporal epilepsy.iconofid
June 9, 2009
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Oramus There, fixed that for you Icon. Exactly, Oramus. petitio principii. As I said in the post, fun but fallacious.iconofid
June 9, 2009
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Frost122585 says: I am sure I am not. I am getting annoyed because you said you agreed with Kant- but Kant’s point is not that there might be supernatural causes- but that if the evidence supports their induction then it is correct and valid to do so. Here's the only thing I said I agreed with Kant on: Iconofid says: You continue, after quoting Kant pointing out that there may well be things the human mind cannot comprehend (something with which I agree): The bit in parentheses refers to the point that "there may well be things the human mind cannot comprehend". Especially with the word "may" involved, I couldn't see how anyone would disagree with that, and later in the thread I gave an example (how can we understand cause and effect where time =0?). I didn't say I agreed with him on anything else. Interestingly, here's what you quote from Kant: “in obedience to this advice, intellectual hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of our practical interests; nor should we introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight. For speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where than in experience; and, when we overstep its limits our synthesis, which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience, has no substratum of intuition upon which to build. But if–as often happens–empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intemperance–an error which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury. In the first paragraph, he seems to be saying that people shouldn't do exactly what the I.D. movement does appear to do. In the second paragraph, he seems to be saying that science should not be used to deny "what is above the sphere of its phenomenal cognition", presumably meaning his god, and of course empiricism cannot disprove or deny general supernatural propositions like gods and fairies, except in certain circumstances (as in a described god who created the earth flat, for example; empirical evidence would deny that particular god's existence). What it sounds like, although I can't see the context, is a bit like the "keep religion out of science and keep science out of religion" argument that we often hear, so I'm not sure why you, as a religious I.D. supporter, would quote that particular passage.iconofid
June 9, 2009
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2) All intelligent designers require use DNA; there is no designer known to science for whom DNA is not a prerequisite. that does not use DNA in designing organisms. There, fixed that for you Icon.Oramus
June 8, 2009
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Iconofid, I believe Padre Pio's stigmata is the top candidate among many examples of strong evidence for supernatural influence. How does science explain this modern example of divine influence that walked among us during the 20th century?
It would require strong direct evidence, though, for the very reason that MN has been put in place. Our species has a long and well documented record of inventing false supernatural explanations for things, which is why the current prejudice against the supernatural is based on observation and experience, not philosophy or theology.
Oramus
June 8, 2009
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I am sure I am not. I am getting annoyed because you said you agreed with Kant- but Kant's point is not that there might be supernatural causes- but that if the evidence supports their induction then it is correct and valid to do so. This is of course the same case for scientific reasoning- Kant never said Science needs to be the only domain where empiricism rules. No Kant showed that synthetic and analytical reasoning were both scientific so long as the synthesis is correct and the evidence supports it. I don't mind you holding a personal "belief" that supernatural things must be ruled out apriori- but that is not a valid scientific approach- and saying that you think it is, is just espousing your personal "belief" system- and this Site is not for materialistic proselytizing.Frost122585
June 8, 2009
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Frost122585: Icono you are just repeating your mantra. You even agreed with the Kant example What I agreed with Kant on was that there may be things which our minds cannot understand. That's all. Who wouldn't agree? An example might be trying to understand cause and effect at a point where time=0. Other than that, I think we seem to be talking at cross purposes. That may be my fault for lack of clarity, but it may not be. I don't believe in any supernatural beings, if that's what's upsetting you. Is there any reason why I should, and if so, which ones should I believe in and why should I choose those particular ones? "You are just repeating a political mantra and probably for theological reasons." Are you sure that you're not? Wouldn't you think that people who bring gods into biology are considerably more theological than people who don't? I think so.iconofid
June 8, 2009
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Icono you are just repeating your mantra. You even agreed with the Kant example- and yet you have insisted on making your so called "point about science" ambiguous enough so that no one can even address your concern without you witting the same thing again and again. You are just repeating a political mantra and probably for theological reasons. And I hope the moderators is taking note of this- not that i am demanding action but I hope they are taking note.Frost122585
June 8, 2009
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vjtorley: Why on earth should we be able to witness an angel doing anything? An angel doesn’t have a body. If it did, it wouldn’t be supernatural. It would belong in the same category as aliens (assuming they exist): super-human, physical intelligences. Now, to be sure, there are Biblical accounts of angels appearing to people, but these “apparitions” (however they occur) only take place if the angel wishes to manifest itself to people. But in many cases, an angel will not wish to be observed, so it will carry out its work invisibly. When you write that you would have to see an angel coming to earth and manipulating an organism’s genes before you’d believe in supernatural design, what you’re really saying is that no purely biological evidence would convince you of the existence of angels or other supernatural beings; you would have to see them before you could believe in their existence. Well, thanks for the angeology. I especially liked the bit about what they wish and don't wish. It seems that we can know something of the designers, although how is beyond me! This relates to the point I've been making on the thread. Science doesn't need to exclude the supernatural on some grand principle, it can just do it on the absence of evidence. As for the attempts that I.D. likes to make at indirect evidence, you talk about codes. "First, DNA is a bona fide code. Contrary to your suggestion in an earlier post, the laws of physics are not a code. The term “code” has a fairly rigorous definition." I was puzzled by the laws of physics comment, and think you might have been confusing me with another poster. As for the description of DNA containing code, I'm perfectly happy with that. As Mr. Nakashima points out, there are many codes in biology, and the chemical codes (including DNA) are not known to be designed. You respond, correctly, by pointing out that these codes are indirect products of DNA, to which I'll add that this includes our codemaking ability. You link to Perry Marshall's hilarious petitio principii Marshall: 1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. 2) All codes are created by a conscious mind; there is no natural process known to science that creates coded information. 3) Therefore DNA was designed by a mind. If you can provide an empirical example of a code or language that occurs naturally, you've toppled my proof. All you need is one. Here's mine: 1) DNA is not merely a molecule with a pattern; it is a code, a language, and an information storage mechanism. 2) All intelligent designers require DNA; there is no designer known to science for whom DNA is not a prerequisite. 3) Therefore, DNA cannot be designed. If you can provide an empirical example of an intelligent designer who does not have DNA as a prerequisite, you've toppled my proof. All you need is one. Fun eh? But fallacious.iconofid
June 8, 2009
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Mr Vjtorley, Wow! That cosmicfingerprints site is a wee bit over the top at times. I almost stopped reading at "infidels". But I persevered. I think the definition Perry quotes of a code is fine, but why he spends so much energy trying to deny that other codes exist is beyond me. It is not true that I have to explain the genetic code to explain the retinal code. That is a reductionist argument. I don't need to explain QM to explain everything and anything. The point was that the retinal code exists and varies significantly, that is all. re FoxP2, the article I was referring to is A Humanized Version of Foxp2 Affects Cortico-Basal Ganglia Circuits in Mice. HT to JLT on the Science Break thread of AtBC.Nakashima
June 8, 2009
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