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(Photo of Asimo, a humanoid robot created by Honda. Wikipedia photo taken by Gnsin at Expo 2005.)
Over at Why Evolution Is True, Professor Coyne has suddenly woken up to the fact that for many people (including scientists), morality is a powerful reason for believing in God. Coyne thinks this is silly, and that the whole attempt to derive morality from God is doomed. But the arguments he puts forward for his point of view are rather facile, and he fails to address the central problem with his own position.
What might that problem be? Like most atheistic scientists, Professor Jerry Coyne doesn’t believe in free will. As he puts it:
Indeed, studies of the brain are pushing back notions of free will in precisely the way that studies of evolution have pushed back the idea of a creator-god.
We simply don’t like to think that we’re molecular automatons, and so we adopt a definition of free will that makes us think we’re free. But as far as I can see, I, like everyone else, am just a molecular puppet. I don’t like that much, but that’s how it is.
And again, here:
It seems to me that in view of physical determinism (plus fine-scale physical stochasticity involving quantum events), there is no way that we can make decisions that are truly free. Some, like [Humanities professor William] Egginton, simply finesse the question by redefining “free,” but I don’t think that these redefinitions of “free will” comport with how most of us understand the term, or with how it’s been historically (not philosophically) understood.
(Emphases and square brackets mine – VJT.)
So tell me, Professor Coyne: if we are not free, then (a) how are we supposed to be good, (b) why should we bother anyway, and (c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort, if their decisions aren’t really free?
Another inconsistency of atheists who share Professor Coyne’s views on freedom is that they are nearly always angry at someone – be it the Pope or former President George W. Bush or global warming deniers. I have to say that makes absolutely no sense to me. Look. If I’m just an automaton, whose behavior is determined by circumstances beyond my control, as Professor Coyne claims, then I can quite understand someone attempting to re-program me, re-educate me or condition me into behaving the “right” way, if they don’t like what I’m doing. I can even understand someone deciding to liquidate me because I’m a faulty piece of machinery that cannot be re-programmed. But please, spare me your moral outrage, your sermonizing, your finger-wagging lectures and your righteous indignation. That I cannot abide. You don’t lecture the PC on your desk when it doesn’t do what you want. If I’m just a glorified version of a desktop PC, then why lecture me?
Next, Professor Coyne invokes Plato’s Euthyphro argument in order to discredit all forms of morality that are based on belief in God:
Religious people have yet to come to grips with Plato’s Euthyphro argument (originally couched in terms of piety rather than morality, but the principle is the same): we would not follow God’s “morality” if God decreed that we perform acts like taking slaves or killing the wives and children of our enemies. That’s because we don’t really think that morality is equivalent to the dictates of God. Rather, we have a prior notion of what is moral. If you respond that God is good, and would never ask people to commit immoral acts, that too shows that you have a notion of morality that’s prior to God. (It also shows that you haven’t read the Bible.)
Here’s my answer to Professor Coyne:
Regarding the Bible, see my comments below. All that the Euthyphro argument proves is that our general notion of morality is prior to any revealed religion, and hence that morality cannot be based entirely on some alleged revelation from God, or some supposed set of commands from God. Our general notion of morality is grounded in the nature of things – hence the term, “natural law ethics.” A thing’s nature defines what is good for it. But a thing’s nature is in turn grounded in the reality of the uncaused, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent Being who maintains the universe in existence and who gives things their natures. This is the God of natural theology, and the reason why we invoke such a Being in order to explain the cosmos is that no other being is capable of doing so. And in the absence of such a God, there is no satisfactory way in which an atheist can answer the meta-ethical question: why should I treat other individuals in accordance with their natures? Why should I want what is good for them?
“But isn’t the standard of good still something external to God?” I hear you object. My reply: that depends on what you mean by “external.” If you mean that living things (which have a good of their own) are by nature distinct from God, then of course the answer is yes. But if you mean that they are independent of God, then my answer is no.
“But why couldn’t God be omniscient and omni-malevolent by nature, instead of omni-benevolent?” I hear some readers ask. Because it is He who gives things their ends, which define what is good for them. For Him to will the wholesale frustration of ends that He had created would be a contradiction in terms. Nor could God be morally indifferent: that would mean that God had no desire to realize ends which He created in order to be realized – which is another contradiction.
I conclude that the Euthyphro argument can be easily answered, and in no way weakens belief in God.
Next, Professor Coyne asks why theists and atheists tend to reach similar moral conclusions, if morality is ultimately based on God:
If you derive morality from God, how come atheists and religious people give similar answers to moral dilemmas (the work of Marc Hauser and colleagues)?
The short answer is that (i) atheists, like religious people, possess the use of reason; and (ii) atheists, like religious people, are capable of recognizing the nature of things – including human beings – and identifying what is good for them, up to a point. I say “up to a point,” because atheists and theists are likely to differ when it comes to ultimate human ends like religion, which includes the worship of God, as well as on our obligation not to alter our God-given natures (e.g. by having a sex change operation, or replacing part of your brain with a silicon chip).
I might add that citing Professor Marc Hauser as an authority for a scientific assertion might not be a good idea, at the present moment.
But Professor Jerry Coyne has more ammunition up his sleeve: why, he asks, if God is changeless, does morality change over time?
And if morality comes from God, why has what we view as “moral” changed so much in modern times? Most of us now feel that slavery and the subjugation of women, racial minorities and gays are immoral, but they weren’t seen that way a few centuries ago. Did God’s orders change?
First, morality isn’t based on God’s orders, but on the nature of things, which owe their being to God. Human beings possess reason and free will; hence slavery is contrary to their nature. Men and women alike possess reason and free will, and all races of human beings possess these faculties; hence there can be no grounds for subjugating one race or sex to another. And no-one, as far as I know, has ever argued that gays lack reason, so enslaving them is out of the question, regardless of how one views their behavior. The fact that many people in past ages failed to recognize these obvious conclusions doesn’t require us to assume that God has changed. It’s people who have changed, not God.
Second, the changes that Professor Coyne describes apply only to a relatively small sliver of human history. People have always favored their own tribe, but racism based on skin color is a relatively novel phenomenon; the Roman Empire, which had African Emperors (see here and here), a Senate that was one-third African at one point, and many Africans in prominent positions in society, was largely free from racism. And while the subjugation of women was pretty awful in ancient Greece, it was nowhere near as bad in ancient Sumer, let alone in prehistoric societies. My point here is that the “Whig view” of history as a long steady march towards liberty is flat-out wrong, and the notion that religion has held back morality is even more so. Atheists had little or nothing to do with most of the moral advances that have occurred in human history: the elimination of child sacrifice; the elimination of infanticide; the rule of law; habeas corpus; the adoption of international rules for warfare; the acceptance of international arbitration; the elimination of slavery; the elimination of torture; the recognition of women as men’s spiritual equals; and the elimination of racism. Atheists should stop claiming credit where credit is not due.
Third, I would invite readers to have a look at the following articles, which illustrate how religion has saved hundreds of millions of lives during the past 2,000 years:
A Global Perspective in the Epidemiology of Suicide by Associate Professor Jose Manoel Bertolote and Dr. Alexandra Fleischmann.
Bertolote and Fleischmann point out that in Muslim countries (e.g. Kuwait) where suicide is most strictly forbidden, the suicide rate is close to zero (0.1 per 100,000). The suicide rate is highest in atheist countries such as China, where it is 25.6 per 100,000. There are 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. If they were living under the atheistic regime of China, 450,000 of them would be killing themselves every year, or 45,000,000 per century. Anything that saves that many lives has got to be socially beneficial.
Live Longer, Healthier and Better: The Untold Benefits of Becoming a Christian in the ancient world by Professor Rodney Stark. In Christianity Today, Issue 57, January 1, 1998.
Reconstructing the Rise of Christianity: the Role of Women by Professor Rodney Stark. In Sociology of Religion, Vol. 56, Fall 1995.
The above articles by Professor Stark describe how the Christian teaching of the spiritual equality of men and women, coupled with its prohibition of abortion and infanticide, improved the lot of women in the Roman Empire, and how Christians saved millions of Romans’ lives by caring for the sick during plagues. In the Roman Empire, the male head of the household could order any female living in his household to have an abortion. What’s more, a married woman who gave birth had no legal right to keep her child unless the male head of the household picked it up and set it down on the family hearth. Otherwise the child had to be placed outside in the street, where it would either die of exposure or be picked up by some unscrupulous rogue and sold into slavery. Girls were exposed far more often than boys: research has shown that the ratio of men to women in the Roman Empire was at least 120:100.
“So what’s your point?” I hear you ask. Here’s my point. Population of the Roman Empire: about 60 million people. Annual number of births (assuming say, 40 births per 1000 people per year): about 2.4 million, or 1.2 million boys and 1.2 million girls, of whom 200,000 were killed. Enter Christianity: up to 200,000 girls’ lives saved per year, or 20 million per century, or 200 million over a period of a millennium. Still think religion doesn’t matter?
90 Million Missing Females, and a $45 Trillion Gap: The Fruits of Misguided Family Planning. Zenit Daily Dispatch, 24 July 2004.
Examines the social consequences of female infanticide in China and India, and of declining fertility rates around the world.
Finally, Professor Coyne argues that the Bible illustrates the utter folly and futility of basing one’s morality upon belief in God:
And what about the “morality” of scripture? Clearly God once ordered all kinds of genocide and murder, including rape and (my favorite story) inducing a bear to murder forty-two youths for simply making fun of Elisha’s bald head (2 Kings 2:23-24).
But this objection is irrelevant to the key issue. Andrew Zak Williams’s article in the New Statesman, which Jerry Coyne is commenting on, asked public figures and scientists to explain why they believe in God, not why they believe in Judaism or Christianity. Many respondents nominated morality as a reason for believing in God. The issue we need to address is therefore whether morality requires God, in order to be rationally justifiable. Arguments based on allegedly immoral commands by God in Scripture are therefore beside the point. At most, they prove that the God of the Bible is not the true God. Such arguments leave classical theism – defined as the belief in a God who is transcendent, perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable and incapable of being decomposed into parts – entirely intact. Logically speaking, one can accept classical theism without believing in any religion.
In any case, arguments based on allegedly immoral commands by God in Scripture are weak. The books of Scripture were written 2,000 to 3,000 years ago, in foreign tongues (mostly ancient Hebrew and Koine Greek), by people whose mindset and mental outlook was very different from our own. Using the story of Elisha and the bears, as Coyne does, to argue against revealed religion assumes that we know who the offenders were (Were they young men, teenagers or boys?), what their intentions were towards Elisha (Did they mean to harm him or merely to mock him?), what their offense was (Was it mockery, blasphemy, attempted assault or attempted murder?), and to what degree they were punished (Were they actually conscious and in pain while being mauled to pieces by the bears, or did God cause them to drop dead instantly of shock as soon as the bears appeared?) We can’t be certain of any of these things, for the story in question. There are too many unknowns.
Professor Coyne’s unfounded assertion that God orders rape in the Bible is also based on his own highly questionable interpretation of Scripture. The following articles may serve as a useful counter-balance: an article on the slaughter of the Midianites and another on Old Testament laws about rape and virginity by Christian apologist Glenn Miller; The Bible and Rape – A Response to Michael Martin by Matt and Madeleine Flanagan; and The Old Testament and Rape by Sam Shamoun.
In short: Professor Coyne appears to suffer from the naive delusion that there is such a thing as the “plain sense of Holy Scripture,” which an individual can discern for him/herself. The fact of the matter is that Scripture is never plain; it must be read in the context of the time and culture in which it was written, and the community to whom it was written.
I will conclude by asking Professor Coyne a question: how can he criticize scientists and public figures for grounding their morality in a belief in God, when his own brand of atheism offers no alternative, and even denies human freedom altogether?
Just claiming that humans have “free will” seems to give credibility to the atheist determinist. ‘Free will’ should be unpacked and broken down beyond the general term. It is absolutely certain that humans are limited to choices, we don’t have an ultimate free will to do anything, we are limited depending on the total knowledge at any given time. A child doesn’t have the free will to know certain things that only adults know. So, free will is really an individual choice between the set of options available.
I’ve always believed I have free will, from the simple fact that I never had to pay anything for it.
NO WAI! I thought faith was always blind and could by definition have no rationale.
Next thing you know, people will be doubting Darwin. GASP!
If there is no kernel of freedom within our minds, how did we come up with the very idea of “freedom?” Automatons with no freedom would never conceive of such an idea.
“The fact of the matter is that Scripture is never plain; it must be read in the context of the time and culture in which it was written, and the community to whom it was written.”
Scripture is never plain? All Scripture? Everywhere?
“Next thing you know, people will be doubting Darwin. GASP!”
Yeah, and I don’t appear to have the free will to believe Darwin anymore. I cannot help it. My genes made me.
Btw, for the philosophers out there, how does this work re the diad and the triad? Are those who accept the diad forced to reject free-will? Do those who accept the triad separate mind from brain?
I guess JP Moreland is the man to answer this question.
“So tell me, Professor Coyne: if we are not free, then (a) how are we supposed to be good, (b) why should we bother anyway, and (c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort, if their decisions aren’t really free?”
Even more to the point, if we are not free, then how can we *know* that we are not free. For, we cannot know *anything* if we are not free. One must eliminate all meaning from the concept of ‘knowledge’ (and really, of all concepts) in order to simultaneously claim that we are not free and that one may know this to be true.
You are the proof that God is. Each and every human being is the proof that atheism/materialism is false and offers only a false view of the nature of reality.
vj
I think it is several months since there was a meta-ethics debate on UD so it might be entertaining to go over some of this ground again. You deal with several topics. I will only do the bit on free will in this comment.
As you may remember, I disagree with Coyne and agree with Egginton. I think what we mean by free will is compatible with determinism (plus quantum uncertainty). You and Coyne think there is something else, “true free will”, but I think we can duck that issue when it comes to ethics. Let us define something called subfree will which corresponds to my feelings about free will. Very roughly subfree will is the ability to act according to desires and motives. Subfree is compatible with determinism. The motives and desires which are the internal state of the organism plus the environment determine how it will act. One can even imagine a robot programmed to have subfree will.
Now I would argue that subfree will is compatible with morality. So the presence or otherwise of true free will, whatever that means, is irrelevant to presence of morality.
How come subfree will is sufficient for morality? Well let’s get back to being angry with your PC. The fact is that many people are angry with their PCs when they do not do what they want (one of my clients just broke his laptop by throwing the mouse at it when it starting updating in the middle of a video). You say it makes no sense to you. But suppose laptops were programmed to react to anger. They were programmed to change things like update patterns according to praise and blame. Now it would make perfectly good sense to be angry with it.
To take your three specific questions. With only subfree will:
(a) how are we supposed to be good?
By following our evolved desire to be good.
(b) why should be bother anyway?
Because we like being good.
(c) why should we blame those who refuse to make the effort
Because that may change their behaviour.
I might have a go at Euthrypro in another comment …
OK. I have a moment so I will have a go at Euthyphro as well.
The Euthyrpo argument is not at all easy to answer.
The heart of the Euthypro dilemma is that morality is in the end a matter of opinion – deeply held opinions shared by most people on a wide range of subjects – but nevertheless a matter of opinion. Whatever you use to “ground” morality whether it be nature, God’s word, or utilitarianism, it is always logically possible to ask “why is that good?” It is never true by definition. Morality does not require God as an ultimate grounding because there is no ultimate grounding.
For example, you write “A thing’s nature defines what is good for it.” This needs clarifying. Do you literally mean what is good for that thing? In the sense that it will benefit that thing? This seems to be a definition of selfishness not of morality. More likely you mean something like “a thing’s nature defines how it ought to behave or what it is for that thing to be morally good”. The nature of the smallpox virus is to kill and disfigure millions of people. I dare say it is possible to argue that is not the true nature of the smallpox virus – but the very fact that it is possible to argue about this makes the case. If the nature of the smallpox virus defined what it is for a smallpox virus to be good then there would be no desire or need to argue that it is not in its nature to kill millions of people – killing millions of people would be true by definition. The fact that someone can reasonably argue that nature of things is not always good for that thing shows there are alternative grounds for deciding that something is good – and this is true of any grounds that may be proposed.
markf (#8, 9)
Thank you for your posts. I’ll discuss them in reverse order. When I say that “A thing’s nature defines what is good for it”, I do mean that a thing’s nature defines the conditions under which it will thrive, and what it must do in order to thrive. In other words, I meant good as in “beneficial”, and I would view moral good as a subset of that, since not all organisms that are capable of thriving are moral agents, and even moral agents have various non-moral goods – e.g. nutrition – in addition to their moral goods.
The goods of different living creatures inevitably come into conflict with one another. What’s good for the wolf might be bad for the sheep. As for viruses, they are not properly alive, but might be said to thrive in a derivative sense, and what’s good for them is often fatal for us. Obviously, it’s good for us to eliminate life-threatening viruses, such as smallpox.
The goods of most creatures are non-moral goods. A virus has no choice about killing millions of people, when it does so, and a wolf has no choice about killing sheep.
Regarding morality: I do believe that what is moral has to be good for me, in the sense that doing it somehow fulfils or completes me as a person. It need not accrue to my financial gain, of course; and it may even materially disadvantage me. But if it is good, then in some sense, my life must be more genuinely human for doing it. In that limited sense, at least, morality and self-interest must coincide.
I liked your illustration involving the PC. Perhaps an even better one would be a pet which is prone to occasionally misbehave by stealing food from the table. The pet’s owner might shout at it in order to deter it from getting up on the table, and might even give it a mild negative reinforcement if it does so. But in the midst of all this, the owner, if he/she is humane, remembers that the pet can’t help doing what it does. Anger directed at the pet might be appropriate; but indignation, never. It’s just doing what’s natural for it.
Someone who believes that humans have no more free will than pets, should (if he/she is logical) endeavor to control other people’s actions through behavior therapy. I find it somewhat amusing that hard determinists sometimes forget themselves when people don’t behave as they would like them to. It’s as if they feel a deep-seated need to blame something. I wonder why.
MF
All you have done is to restate the self-referentially incoherent amorality and irrationality that lie at the heart of evolutionary materialist atheism:
1 –> Try telling this — pardon directness, but this is a monstrous claim — fallacious, absurd and bankrupt talking point to a weeping, critically injured gang rape victim: “morality is in the end a matter of opinion” . . .
2 –> The fact is we have an undeniable intuitive knowledge of our dignity as human beings, and we properly find ourselves outraged at its violation. Nor is that outrage a mere shrug shoulders matter of “might makes ‘right’.” Rape victims know better than that.
3 –> Ever since Plato in The Laws, Bk X, the absurdity of atheistical, evolutionary materialist amorality has been publicly exposed as absurd and bankrupt:
4 –> When it comes to the grounding of morality and its roots in God, the IOSE course section on the Euthryphro dilemma, so-called points out the core fallacy in it as addressed to Judaeo- Christian Theism.
5 –> First, courtesy Wikipedia, the “dilemma” in a nutshell — and notice, dilemmas are primarily a rhetorical device:
6 –> The point of this dilemma in modern times is to try to suggest that theism or the like has no real answer to the is-ought gap that leads to atheism’s inherent amorality, either. So in effect, we have to shrug, take moral feelings as a brute given, and try to work out the best compromise we can.
7 –> The longstanding and never adequately countered reply pivots on the inherent character of the good God, who is the ground of our existence as creatures made in his image and living in a world replete with signs pointing to its Creator. So, God and goodness CANNOT be separated, and lie at the root of our being:
8 –> It is no secret that evolutionary materialism, since the days of Plato in The Laws, Bk X, reduces all to matter and energy moving under forces of chance and necessity, and so has in it no IS strong enough to ground OUGHT. Thence its inescapable amorality and irrationality.
9 –> The second leg of that reduction to absurdity, irrationality [cf. here], was aptly summed up by Haldane in his longstanding remark:
10 –> There is no easy, responsible, cogent reply to that dilemma, on an evolutionary materialistic footing. Indeed, evo mat boils down to establishing the premise of being deluded — cultural relativism is the polite way of putting that — as the core of mentality. (Hence the sort of issues being highlighted by Nancy Pearcey in the current interviews with Mrs O’Leary, e.g. here in no 3.)
11 –> But if our minds are so pervasively delusional, we have no reason to be confident in thought at all. Hence a lot of the chaotic forces at work ripping apart our visibly collapsing civilisation. Evo mat, having flown in on the promise of rationality, and turned it into the ideology or rationalism, ends in irrational absurdity.
12 –> By utter contrast contrast, let us see how Locke grounded liberty in his foundational second Essay on Government in Ch 2 S 5, by making a pivotal cite from Richard Hooker in the classic, Ecclesiastical Polity:
________________
If we would rescue our civilisation from the forces of chaos, we must needs listen to the counsel of that wise old Canon.
GEM of TKI
OOPS: I seem to have triggered the mod pile just now, was it too many links?
LET’s try again:
PART 1:
++++++
MF
All you have done is to restate the self-referentially incoherent amorality and irrationality that lie at the heart of evolutionary materialist atheism:
1 –> Try telling this — pardon directness, but this is a monstrous claim — fallacious, absurd and bankrupt talking point to a weeping, critically injured gang rape victim: “morality is in the end a matter of opinion” . . .
2 –> The fact is we have an undeniable intuitive knowledge of our dignity as human beings, and we properly find ourselves outraged at its violation. Nor is that outrage a mere shrug shoulders matter of “might makes ‘right’.” Rape victims know better than that.
3 –> Ever since Plato in The Laws, Bk X, the absurdity of atheistical, evolutionary materialist amorality has been publicly exposed as absurd and bankrupt:
4 –> When it comes to the grounding of morality and its roots in God, the IOSE course section on the Euthryphro dilemma, so-called points out the core fallacy in it as addressed to Judaeo- Christian Theism.
5 –> First, courtesy Wikipedia, the “dilemma” in a nutshell — and notice, dilemmas are primarily a rhetorical device:
6 –> The point of this dilemma in modern times is to try to suggest that theism or the like has no real answer to the is-ought gap that leads to atheism’s inherent amorality, either. So in effect, we have to shrug, take moral feelings as a brute given, and try to work out the best compromise we can.
7 –> The longstanding and never adequately countered reply pivots on the inherent character of the good God, who is the ground of our existence as creatures made in his image and living in a world replete with signs pointing to its Creator. So, God and goodness CANNOT be separated, and lie at the root of our being:
[ . . . ]
Part 2:
8 –> It is no secret that evolutionary materialism, since the days of Plato in The Laws, Bk X, reduces all to matter and energy moving under forces of chance and necessity, and so has in it no IS strong enough to ground OUGHT. Thence its inescapable amorality and irrationality.
9 –> The second leg of that reduction to absurdity, irrationality [cf. here], was aptly summed up by Haldane in his longstanding remark:
10 –> There is no easy, responsible, cogent reply to that dilemma, on an evolutionary materialistic footing. Indeed, evo mat boils down to establishing the premise of being deluded — cultural relativism is the polite way of putting that — as the core of mentality. (Hence the sort of issues being highlighted by Nancy Pearcey in the current interviews with Mrs O’Leary, e.g. here in no 3.)
11 –> But if our minds are so pervasively delusional, we have no reason to be confident in thought at all. Hence a lot of the chaotic forces at work ripping apart our visibly collapsing civilisation. Evo mat, having flown in on the promise of rationality, and turned it into the ideology or rationalism, ends in irrational absurdity.
12 –> By utter contrast contrast, let us see how Locke grounded liberty in his foundational second Essay on Government in Ch 2 S 5, by making a pivotal cite from Richard Hooker in the classic, Ecclesiastical Polity:
________________
If we would rescue our civilisation from the forces of chaos, we must needs listen to the counsel of that wise old Canon.
GEM of TKI
H’mm: Is seven links the current upper limit?
vj
I do believe that what is moral has to be good for me, in the sense that doing it somehow fulfils or completes me as a person. It need not accrue to my financial gain, of course; and it may even materially disadvantage me. But if it is good, then in some sense, my life must be more genuinely human for doing it.
But that doesn’t answer the essential point. What if someone asserts that it is morally good to deny your human nature if that leads to greater happiness for others?
There are two ways you can go:
1) You could get into an argument of contingent fact which shows that in practice denying your nature never leads to greater happiness for others in the long run. But now you have abandoned the case which says that the definition of morally good is being true to your nature.
2) Or you could argue that “good” means being true to your nature and not greatest happiness for greatest number. But in that case he can respond that what he means by “good” is greatest happiness for the greatest number and you are talking about different things! SO there is no dispute.
The root cause of the problem is that to describe something as good is to encapsulate your attitude to it and so every attempt to define it objectively will allow for the further response – why should I have that attitude to property X? Or to put it simply – you can’t derive an “ought” from an “is” – even when the “is” is “part of my human nature”.
To illustrate this – suppose a psychopath says he is in “some sense fulfilled and completed” as a person by making others suffer. How do you disprove this? More deeply – why do you feel a need to disprove it? Why do you not accept that is part of his nature just as it is part of a cat’s nature to play with a mouse before killing it? God made plenty of creatures whose nature was to inflict cruelty – why not some human beings?
That’s Euthrypro – now onto the free will bit ….
markf:
Then it is up to them to make their case.
vj
And there is the free will bit:
I wonder what you mean by “natural"? If my dog steals from the table then it certainly could have done otherwise. A dog has subfree will and even a limited moral sense. Like us dogs know rules, often want to obey them, sometimes fall for rival desires and motives, and may feel subsequent guilt. Clearly this is very limited. They are not able to imagine what it is like to be another creature – which is what gives us the basis for being indignant – “how could he be so thoughtless!”. But the ability to imagine what it is like to be someone else only requires subfree will. It does not require some other mysterious kind of free will.
markf:
Eating- do you think the desire to eat is supernatural?
Maybe, maybe not.
evidence?
Do they also spew unsupportable nonsense?
How do you know?
Onlookers:
Observe what MF willfully ignored, here at 13 above (or so — mod).
GEM of TKI
MF,
On free will:
Ever since Heisenberg’s discovery of the uncertainty principle, determinism has been dead. At the most fundamental level of physics we never know exactly how things behave or will behave. What Coyne and all the rest of these atheists do is put up a Strawman of the argument for free will.
No one in their right mind thinks that man’s will is totally free- that is, that we can will ourselves to do anything any time we want to. I would like to be in the Caribbean right now, but no amount of will is going to transport me there without getting on a plane or boat and actually traveling to that place. The world around us puts certain quantum physical limits on what we can cannot do. However, as Heisenberg showed, there is a certain amount of freedom in every event in nature and that is where the exercising of our will takes place. Every person is faced with decisions every day and each of us will decide differently even on the same kinds of decisions. Free-will, therefore, is just the concept of the reality of our will and the limited freedom that God allows us together acting as one. We all have free will because we all have a certain amount of freedom, and we all have a will. To suggest that free will does not exist because our will is not totally liberated is a simply a straw man argument. Further, when one believes they have free will they are more likely to exercise the depth of their freedom because they are aware of the possibility of choice. This is also true the other way around, that if one thinks they have no free will they will he less likely to exercise the fullness of their potential. Hence, this is where the illusion can become the reality and the reality an illusion.
On Morality:
Similarly, on morality and ethics, it is certainly true that if God does not exist then anything is permissible but not anything is possible. In a world where there is a divinely revealed law that is recognized, people are far more likely to act altruistically. And in a world where there is no absolute moral law recognized, people are far more likely to act only in their own self interests.
This is the difference between man obeying their God and man thinking he himself is God.
It has long been recognized by many intellectuals, philosophers and Theologians that the belief in a benevolent just God offers a moderating influence on society. That is, people are more likely to behave themselves and help one another if they believe that their good selfless deeds will not be in vain and will not go unnoticed. But this is also a self fulfilling and reinforcing phenomena, that a belief in God is intrinsically good for society also provides clear evidence for the Truth of God’s reality. That is, the fact that this system of divine morality works is itself clear evidence that it is ontologically true and real because the fact that it works is exactly what you would expect if it was real. Just so, on the other hand if we choose to believe in a world where the only truth is that men should seek for themselves, in whatever way best accommodates their wants and needs, then we have a society that does not function in a way that most people would consider preferable.
So the need for objective morality is built into the souls of people and the need for it is also built into the world in which they live. And this is evidence for the ontological truth of an absolute divine natural law of morality because nothing other than a supreme moral intellect could make the functional harmony of this system of natural moral laws necessary.
Another Chicago scientist, the Nobel Laureate Arthur Compton, thought that science itself would be impossible without genuine human freedom: if the scientist can’t genuinely decide how to respond to an unprecedented result in the laboratory, then how would science be possible of making genuine discoveries?
Compton was also among the earlier to use QM in order to argue against determinism in human behavior–not necessarily to argue *for* quantum uncertainties as the locus of free action (though he might have thought this was so), but definitively *against* determinism in behavior that claimed a basis in physics.
Anyone interested in this is invited to download “part 2” of my article (there are 3 parts in all) about Compton’s religious life and beliefs, published sequentially in the ASA journal in 2009. Part 2 is at http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2009/PSCF9-09dyn.html
#21 and #22
I agree that:
People (and indeed animals) have free will.
Determinism is false. There are events whose description is not totally determined by the conditions that are sufficient for them to happen.
I just think that
(A) Free will is adequately described by what I call “subfree will” above. Indeed I don’t understand what people mean when they reject that in favour of some other concept of free will.
(B) Events are to some extent determined by sufficient conditions and to some extent there is a “random” element.
(A) and (B) are compatible with each other and with morality and don’t require a deity.
MF:
Randomness is not freedom, especially freedom to think, reason, decide and act aright.
GEM of TKI
—MarkF: “The root cause of the problem is that to describe something as good is to encapsulate your attitude to it and so every attempt to define it objectively will allow for the further response – why should I have that attitude to property X? Or to put it simply – you can’t derive an “ought” from an “is” – even when the “is” is “part of my human nature”.
A thing is “good” if it does well what it was designed and intended to do. A good toaster produces quality toast. A good coffee maker produces quality coffee. Can a toaster be a good coffee maker? No, and if tries to become one, it will fail to make coffee, destroy itself, and likely harm anyone associated with the process.
A good person is one who does well what he/she was designed and intended to do–one who is advancing toward his/her end, which is love God and practice virtue. A “bad” person is bad insofar as he lacks virtue, that is, insofar as he fails to act in accordance with the purpose of his existence.
Can a person be a good animal or a good God? No, and if he tries to do either, he will destroy himself, compromise his capacity to reason, and do violence to the social order. If he tries to become a good animal, he will be consumed by his appetites and become a slave; if he tries to become a good God, he will be consumed by his pride and try to enslave others. In either case, he will hurt society. There is no such thing as a private vice.
If, on the other hand, a person was not designed and intended for any particular purpose, then he cannot be either good or bad, because there is no standard of good to violate–no moral objective that he can fail to meet. He can only be what he is and nothing more.
That also means that he cannot help or harm society because if there is no moral standard for individuals, then there can be no moral standard for a society comprised of individuals. What is a good society? A good society is one that makes it easy to be good and hard to be bad. What is a bad society? A bad society is one that makes it easy to be bad and hard to be good.
StephenB
I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others even though I don’t believe people are designed. Are we using the word “good” to mean the same thing?
a) If yes, then clearly to be good doesn’t mean to act as designed because I am applying to something which I don’t believe is designed.
b) If no, why do we feel we are disagreeing when we are talking about different things.
Corollary – if good means to act as designed then what reason is there to do good i.e. act as designed. What if I happen to prefer act not as designed? So what?
I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others even though I don’t believe people are designed. Are we using the word “good” to mean the same thing?
Probably not. You’re probably not even using the word “help” the same.
If no, why do we feel we are disagreeing when we are talking about different things.
Probably because for people who believe all talk of “good” or “help” comes down to subjective preferences which in turn have no basis, words like “good” and “help” are not only largely devoid of meaning, but parasitically deceptive in the process.
What if I happen to prefer act not as designed? So what?
What if your computer, instead of turning on when you press the on button, sputters and does nothing? Is it broken?
Mark @ 26,
No. Your “sub-free will” misses the point that there still is a “right and wrong” answer or decision to be made even if the situation is indeed limited by sufficient and or necessary constraints. So, the point is that there must be a fundamental natural moral order that could only have originated from the mind of a moral designer.
In other words, just because you “limit” free will to within a certain context, that does not remove free will altogether. You just have a more specific context in which free will is being exercised and investigated.
—markf: “I happen to believe that it is good for people to help others…”
Define “help.” Define “good.”
—“Are we using the word “good” to mean the same thing?”
Apparenly not. I defined “good,” you did not, and yet you disagree with my definition.
—“Corollary – if good means to act as designed then what reason is there to do good i.e. act as designed.”
It is more likely to produce temporal [not to mention eternal] happiness for yourself and others.
—What if I happen to prefer act not as designed? So what?”
Back to my examples @25 (Here abbreviated):
Toaster, which is made for one thing, tries to become a Coffee Maker, which is made for something else = destruction
Man, who is made for one thing allows himself to become something that he is not [an animal] or tries to make himself something he is not [his own God] = destruction.
Stephenb
help – to increase the happiness or relieve the suffering of others
good (ethical use) – when I say something is good I express my approval of it and my belief that I could bring others to approve of it. This approval may arise for a wide variety of reasons (e.g. utilitarian, sense of fairness)
Then we don’t disagree about anything of substance – just semantics. I am a bit surprised by your definition. Like most English speaking people, I sometimes use “good” to mean “fit for purpose” but this is different from the ethical use. Gas chambers are a good way of killing large numbers of people but ethically bad. You seem to only recognise the one use of the word. Given your use the the corollary applies.
This seems like selfishness to me – be good because it brings me happiness. But also this is a contingent statement subject to empirical enquiry. Suppose it turns out not to be true under certain circumstances? Then there is no longer any reason to be good?.
[Define good]
—markf: “good “(ethical use) – when I say something is good I express my approval of it and my belief that I could bring others to approve of it. This approval may arise for a wide variety of reasons (e.g. utilitarian, sense of fairness)”
So, for you, “good” is that which you approve of, but the things that others approve of are irrelevant?
—“Gas chambers are a good way of killing large numbers of people but ethically bad.”
Any good thing can be used for an evil purpose, and it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose. Returning to my examples of a good toaster and a good coffee maker, a bad person could use either as a torturing device. A good thing that is not being used properly becomes a bad thing, as my previous examples make clear.
A good person is one who practices virtue consistent with the purpose of his nature, which means that he will not use gas chambers, whether they are efficient or inefficient ways of serving some perverse end.
On the other hand, some men, who believed as you do, i.e. men who think that good is whatever they approve of, used gas chambers on helpless people. Unfortunately, your ethical perspective does not allow you to say that what they did was objectively, absolutely, and universally wrong. You can only say that you do not approve of it, and even then, you cannot say why?
—“You seem to only recognise the one use of the word. Given your use the the corollary applies.”
I acknowledge multiple uses of the word, but I recognize only one formal definition. Such is the requirement for a rational discussion.
[Practicing virtue for the sake of happiness]
—“This seems like selfishness to me – be good because it brings me happiness.”
Self interest is not the same as selfishness. To love one’s neighbor as one’s self is a virtue, a good thing. That is self interest. To love one’s self more than one’s neighbor is a vice, a bad thing. That is selfishness.
Self interest considers the neighbor’s happiness as being of equal value to one’s own happiness, which, as it turns out, produces happiness; Selfishness considers only its own happiness, which ultimately brings misery.
Not irrelevant. If others express their approve of something by saying it is good then the chances are I will also approve of it. Compare it to a word like “funny”. If I say a play is funny I am not just describing my reaction. I am also expressing my belief that others will have the same reaction. If others say a play is funny that is a reason for me to believe I may also find it funny.
Not so clear to me I am afraid At one moment you say something is good if it fufils the purpose for which it is designed. But then you say “it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose”. But what if it were designed for a bad purpose? I am not talking about using a toaster as torturing device. I am talking about using a rack as torturing device.
Actually it is frequently people with strong beliefs that they know what is objectively right who do the worst things. (The other great motivator to do horrific things is fear). They may base these beliefs on religion or national socialism or communism – but what they have in common is an unshakeable belief that they know what is right and it is not a matter of opinion. Those who think it is a matter of opinion may be dithering, lax, and perhaps more inclined to be selfish. But this does not lead to mass murder. There is little personal gain in instigating mass murder or genocide. That takes a much stronger passion – such as a firm conviction that God is on your side, or that the class war justifies everything, or that the other guys are going to murder you in your bed.
I can say that I passionately disapprove it and that I believe that virtually anyone else would agree. This is not a trivial claim. And I can say why – it inflicts tremendous suffering and is grossly unfair. Of course you can continue to ask “why"?”. You can say why is it wrong to inflict tremendous suffering? But you have the same problem. I can say “why is it good to behave as the God designed you?”. And you can only get out of it by saying that it what you mean by good. Likewise a utilitarian can say that what they mean by “good” is greatest happiness for the greatest number.
The interesting question is why when the debate gets to this point there still a disagreement. Having established different definitions of “good” you would think the rest was a matter of semantics to be solved with a good dictionary or by making up two new words – one to mean “fit for purpose” and another to mean “minimises suffering”. But we don’t feel satisfied because in fact morally “good” doesn’t just mean “fit for purpose” or “minimises suffering”. It implies something about your attitude to the object. A desire to promote it.
Call it self-interest if you like. Nevertheless, it is a matter of empirical investigation as to whether helping others does lead to your own happiness. It may that we observe that for some people under some conditions this is not true. Would such people have any reason for being good? Or suppose someone mistakenly believes that helping others will not increase their happiness now or in any future life e.g. an atheist who sacrifices her life for another person. Is this an irrational act because they didn’t act to promote their self-interest?
Onlookers:
Observe how Euthryphro has silently slipped away; without acknowledgement that it was overturned.
And, how the inescapable amorality of materialistic atheism drives the questions and talking points being posed.
GEM of TKI
Wouldn’t it be strange to find that we live in a a universe which allows freedom of choice only to discover that we don’t actually have freedom of choice?
—markf: “If others express their approv[al] of something by saying it is good then the chances are I will also approve of it.”
What happens when the vote is split? Is abortion a good thing or a bad thing?
—“I am not just describing my reaction. I am also expressing my belief that others will have the same reaction. If others say a play is funny that is a reason for me to believe I may also find it funny.”
But the majority opinion can change. Racism in the United States, which was once supported by the majority, is now supported only by a small minority. Which majority opinion do you agree with—the first or the second. What is your rationale for rejecting the other option?
—“Not so clear to me I am afraid At one moment you say something is good if it fufils the purpose for which it is designed. But then you say “it can remain good only if its designer is using it for a good purpose”. But what if it were designed for a bad purpose? I am not talking about using a toaster as torturing device. I am talking about using a rack as torturing device.”
Good does not necessary mean morally good because the latter applies only to people, not things, which are, in themselves, morally neutral. Only intelligent agents can be morally good or morally bad because only intelligent agents have wills. A good person is one that uses his intellect and will in ways that the creator planned and intended, that is, in conformity with his nature [ten commandments, beatitudes, sermon on the mount, natural moral law etc]. However, I agree with your point that a “thing” or device cannot be inherently good and then be made bad. So, I should not have said that it can “remain” good as long as it is being used properly. It is always good “for” something, even if it be for something perverse, and even if its user is using it immorally.
—“Actually it is frequently people with strong beliefs that they know what is objectively right who do the worst things.”
How do you know these are the morally “worst” things when you do not acknowledge that there are morally “better” things?
—“I can say that I passionately disapprove it and that I believe that virtually anyone else would agree.”
Part of your premise is that everyone, or almost everyone, will agree with you. Yet there are plenty of people who think that the wholesale execution of “unnecessary” people is a good thing. Many environmentalists seek to reduce the population by 90%.
That raises the obvious question: What about those, like these environmentalists, who disagree with you and would like to persuade you to their position? Is their sense of the good on par with yours? If not, why not? If so, whose morality should we accept if you end up disagreeing with them?
–“But you have the same problem. I can say “why is it good to behave as the God designed you?”. And you can only get out of it by saying that it what you mean by good. Likewise a utilitarian can say that what they mean by “good” is greatest happiness for the greatest number.”
It always reduces to one of two alternatives: Either we conform our behavior to THE moral code, which is my position, or we find A moral code that conforms to our behavior, which is your position.
In any case, Utilitarianism is not based on happiness. It is based on the pleasure/pain principle, which is not at all the same thing. According to utilitarianism, if ten-thousand people in a Roman Colosseum experience pleasure as they watch the pain of ten Christians being eaten by lions, and if the sum total of their pleasure surpasses the sum total of pain experienced by the Christians, they have had a morally edifying day. Also, you may be assured that the majority of Roman citizens present at that site had personally approved of the morality of murder for fun and had arrived at a consensus on the matter. They based their morality on the same standard as yours–personal preference and solidarity wherever you can find it.
—“Nevertheless, it is a matter of empirical investigation as to whether helping others does lead to your own happiness.”
Psychologists have known for years that helping other people increases happiness. For some, it is the first line of therapy.
—“Or suppose someone mistakenly believes that helping others will not increase their happiness now or in any future life e.g. an atheist who sacrifices her life for another person. Is this an irrational act because they didn’t act to promote their self-interest?”
I can see how they might think so, but then, operating from the wrong assumption can cause all manner of difficulties. That is why it is important to know the truth.
“… At most, they prove that the God of the Bible is not the true God. Such arguments leave classical theism – defined as the belief in a God who is transcendent, perfect, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent, immutable and incapable of being decomposed into parts – entirely intact. Logically speaking, one can accept classical theism without believing in any religion.”
So, just as I had long believed, this so-called “classical theism” *isn’t* Christianity.
As for the story of Elisha and the “youffs” … I think they weren’t really mocking his lack of hair, but his lack of foreskin. That is, they were mocking the state of being one of the Covenant … which is to say, they were mocking God himself.
I should have been a bit more explicit. It is easiest to explain it with the analogy of “funny”. If I say a play is funny I don’t mean that majority of audiences laugh at it at the moment or indeed that the majority of audiences laughed at it in the past. Indeed you can imagine coming out of a performance and saying “that was really funny but the audience didn’t seem to get it”. But I do mean that I believe that the majority of people will laugh at it if they see it as I see it and this will supersede their previous view. Funny is one of a large number of many words that bridge the gap between subjective and objective – others are interesting, frightening, exciting etc. They are subjective in they express a personal reaction but they also have an objective element in they express a believe that the object has the potential to produce the same reaction in the majority of other people (although it may not do so at the moment). Indeed without this belief we would not be justified in describing the object as frightening, exciting or whatever. We would have to qualify our description as something like “I found it exciting but I am not sure others would”.
Ethical judgements are like these but have an additional element. Not only are we expressing our reaction and our belief others will have the same reaction – but that reaction includes a strong desire that others will treat the object/action in the same way. If I think something is funny it is not of prime importance that others think it funny, although I believe they will. If I think something is ethically wrong it is of prime importance that others share the same view. I want this activity stopped.
I have tried to explain this a bit more fully here.
When I say they are the worst things I am expressing my belief as above. Whatever our definition of right and wrong, in practice both condemn mass murder and the fact remains that mass murder is mostly done by people with either strong moral opinions or who are very frightened – not by those without strong moral codes.
If there is an ethical dispute then both parties must mean the same thing by right and wrong (otherwise it would be a dispute about semantics to be settled by defining terms). The parties will may differ about facts. This can in theory be settled by empirical investigation. There may also be differences of values (because people share a lot of values but by no means all) – e.g. some people value freedom higher than life. It is possible that we may have a dispute e.g. over abortion where we can only say “X thinks it is murder” and “Y thinks it is not murder”. At this point there is no obvious way of deciding who is “correct”. But it doesn’t either party is happy to sit back and accept it as a difference of opinion. That is what is distinctive about moral issues. There may not be an objective way of settling it but I will still look for that additional fact or comparison or perspective that will bring you round to my way of thinking.
But there are many moral codes to choose from! Utilitarianism was just one.
Let’s hope they are right – otherwise you have no reason for doing what is good. If it turns out they are wrong what will you get up to?
Markf
Thank you for your posts. I’ve got a bit of free time now, so I’ll try to address your points. Let’s begin with free will. You write:
A few comments.
1. I can understand your definition of subfree will, when applied to organisms. Organisms can be meaningfully credited with desires and motives. Artifacts such as robots and laptop PCs have no built-in ends; they lack a “good of their own.” So I don’t know what it would mean to credit them with desires and motives.
2. If laptops were programmed to learn from their users’ anger, then it would certainly make sense to get angry when a laptop did not perform in the way you wanted it to. But getting angry when a laptop makes an error is one thing; getting angry at the laptop for making an error is a completely different language game, which presupposes an “I-thou” relationship between me and my PC – which, I would suggest, is inappropriate.
3. The dog represents a case where the language game can be played, to a point: it acts on its desires and motives, and is capable of learning rules. In these respects, it resembles human beings. However, a dog has no notion of “ought.” All it knows is “will.” It knows that if it takes the meat on the table, it will suffer adverse consequences; but the smell of the meat may be an overpowering one, which over-rides its normal tendency to behave as its master trained it to do. In such a situation, a wise master, knowing what causal factors govern the dog’s behavior, may display anger, in order to deter the dog from similar acts in the future; but he/she would be silly to actually get angry at the dog. When the dog took the meat from the table, there is a very real sense in which it could not have done otherwise; its desires were just too strong for it.
4. Could people be like that, all the time? Some people are; but we don’t try these people in a court of law. Such people are deemed incapable of distinguishing right from wrong – which is quite different from distinguishing pleasant from adverse consequences.
5. Metaphysics aside, to say that everyone is the (willing) slave of their desires (and hence only subfree) seems to be empirically false. There doesn’t seem to be any desire that humans cannot train themselves to conquer – although some are much better at doing so than others, of course. Fears are not as easily manageable; but even here, some are capable of extraordinary feats of bravery, even under torture.
6. On top of this, we are capable of reflecting on the propriety of having the desires we do, and attempting to change them. (A glutton may attempt to discipline himself.) A dog lacks these higher-order desires. That is one reason why it is not free.
Now let’s get back to the meaning of “natural.” You cite the case of the psychopath who feels fulfilled by making other people suffer. Two comments are appropriate here.
1. I know that the psychopath has the same nature as I do – human nature. If it is not good for me and the other human beings I know to inflict suffering on others, then how can it be good for the psychopath?
2. Even if the psychopath were from Mars, I’d still be certain that his desire was a perverted one. I could understand it if his natural inclination were merely to kill and eat me. The flesh of an organism certainly is the sort of thing that can benefit another organism: ask any carnivore. But there is no meaningful sense in which the suffering of organism A can be said to be good for organism B, per se. Hence I am sure that a Martian sadist would be acting according to an unnatural desire. A Martian cannibal would be another matter; but a believer in a personal God would not expect God to make a universe like that, where one race of intelligent beings had the built-in inclination to cannibalize another.
Markf
I’d like to return to an earlier remark of yours:
What I’m saying is that my nature doesn’t merely consist of “is-es”; it also includes irreducible “oughts.” Indeed, these are the most fundamental features of any organism’s nature: they define what it is to be a creature of that kind. A sheep is a quadruped: this statement tells us that it ought to have four legs, and if it doesn’t, there’s something wrong with it. A wolf is a carnivore: eating flesh is good for it. Human beings are social animals: it is not good for them to be alone.
I’d also like to comment on StephenB’s assertion that a thing is good if it does what it’s designed to do. This kind of finality is extrinsic, rather than immanent. Now, there is nothing to prevent a living creature from possessing both kinds of finality: an organism can be designed by God, and have a good of its own. However, I would still say that its proper good is intelligible, even to someone who does not believe in God. I would add, however, that God is the only answer to the meta-question: why should I pursue (or at least, respect) the built-in ends which define me, as a human being?
God, of course, was not designed to do anything. Yet there is a very real sense in which God is good. God’s nature is to know and love Himself perfectly, but because He is generous, He also makes finite beings, willing different ends for various kinds of creatures. Of course, some individual creatures may fail to reach these ends, but this failure only reflects God’s will to the extent that it contributes to the good of the cosmos as a whole.
Thus I would not say that God can do whatever He likes, vis-a-vis creatures. He is constrained by His own nature, for He cannot fail to be good.
Markf (#38)
I thought you made a number of good points about the objectivity of moral judgments in your latest post. I don’t disagree with them; I would just say they don’t go far enough. To resolve differences about whether something is a human being, for instance, we need to do some metaphysics – which means going “back to nature.”
[On the standards for morality]
—markf: “I should have been a bit more explicit. It is easiest to explain it with the analogy of “funny”. If I say a play is funny I don’t mean that majority of audiences laugh at it at the moment or indeed that the majority of audiences laughed at it in the past. Indeed you can imagine coming out of a performance and saying “that was really funny but the audience didn’t seem to get it”. But I do mean that I believe that the majority of people will laugh at it if they see it as I see it and this will supersede their previous view. Funny is one of a large number of many words that bridge the gap between subjective and objective – others are interesting, frightening, exciting etc. They are subjective in they express a personal reaction but they also have an objective element in they express a believe that the object has the potential to produce the same reaction in the majority of other people (although it may not do so at the moment). Indeed without this belief we would not be justified in describing the object as frightening, exciting or whatever. We would have to qualify our description as something like “I found it exciting but I am not sure others would”.
Can you apply your philosophy in any meaningful way? Both civil law and personal behavior are based on someone’s moral philosophy, which means that practical decisions have to be made about what is permissible and what is not.
Is abortion a morally good practice, a morally bad practice, or a morally neutral practice? Is racism a morally good practice, a morally bad practice, or a morally neutral practice? Are current laws on abortion and racism just or unjust? Why?
#42
Not all personal behaviour is based on a moral code. Few people look up in a book of rules as to whether something is right or wrong – you may be an exception.
One reason (among many) for having law (do you mean civil or criminal?) is because there is not universal agreement on what is right or wrong and society needs to arbitrate. There are many cases of laws that many people think are immoral and others do not.
Is abortion a morally good practice, a morally bad practice, or a morally neutral practice?
I have no doubt we differ on our views on abortion. It is one issue on which I find people have fervently held opinions which are just opinions. If you consider it to be almost equivalent to killing a baby I have no substantial evidence to fall back on to change your opinion. But likewise you have no substantial evidence to fall back on to prove your case (given that I am atheist). That is what makes it such a hot issue. Because neither of us are happy with the other’s conclusion, but neither can prove the other wrong.
You may counter by defining “good” as “confirming to nature” or some such thing. I will say I don’t accept that definition. But we are clearly disagreeing on more than definitions. Or why would we care?
#42
Stephenb
I don’t like my answer above. It was written in a rush. Here is a better attempt.
My concern is whether my philosophy is true not whether it is practical. However, you are right that practical decisions have to be made about what is permissible and what is not. And theoretically it might be easier to ignore the truth and pretend there is some universal moral code. However, history suggests that it is extremely hard to get societies to agree on what is permissible, even when they theoretically share a moral code, and that it is getting more and more difficult. I think it is just as practical to recognise that there are some moral issues on which there is substantial disagreement and no absolute right or wrong. For example, I am sure I do not share your views on abortion or homosexuality. But I also recognise we have way of proving each other wrong. If we were in the same society I would campaign vigorously to change your mind but if the majority was of your view and it became law then I would reluctantly accept it (and continue to campaign). That seems quite practical and actually conforms to how we behave in democracies.
—markf: “I have no doubt we differ on our views on abortion. It is one issue on which I find people have fervently held opinions which are just opinions.”
What is your view on the subject. Is abortion a morally good act, a morally bad act, or a morally neutral act?
—“If you consider it to be almost equivalent to killing a baby I have no substantial evidence to fall back on to change your opinion. But likewise you have no substantial evidence to fall back on to prove your case (given that I am atheist).”
What is my case, what evidence do you think I have to support it, and why do you think it fails to convince?
—markf: “That is what makes it such a hot issue. Because neither of us are happy with the other’s conclusion, but neither can prove the other wrong.”
How can I be happy or unhappy with a conclusion that you have not disclosed or the rationale behind it?
—markf: “I don’t like my answer above.”
OK.
—“My concern is whether my philosophy is true not whether it is practical.”
Good. I like that response. Is there such a thing as a true moral philosophy?
—“However, you are right that practical decisions have to be made about what is permissible and what is not. And theoretically it might be easier to ignore the truth and pretend there is some universal moral code.”
It was my understanding from your earlier comment that your concern is whether or not your moral philosophy is true. Are you now saying that there is no such thing as a true moral philosophy to concern yourself with?
—“However, history suggests that it is extremely hard to get societies to agree on what is permissible, even when they theoretically share a moral code, and that it is getting more and more difficult.”
Does it matter which things are considered to be permissible or not permissible? If so, what criteria should we use to make that determination?
–“I think it is just as practical to recognise that there are some moral issues on which there is substantial disagreement and no absolute right or wrong.”
On what basis does one decide whether or not a law is just or unjust?
—“For example, I am sure I do not share your views on abortion or homosexuality.”
Assuming that is the case, which of our views should be codified into law and why? Or, are you saying that no laws should be passed on any aspect of either issue?
A moral philosophy is not the same as a moral code. In my opinion there is no such thing as an objective universal moral code, that is my moral philosophy and I firmly believe it to be true.
Yes it matters. Subjective does not mean trivial. People care deeply about moral issues even though there is no ultimate objective basis for it. The criteria they use range widely – but luckily most people share most of the criteria so there is a basis for discussion. Common criteria include: lengthening human life spans, increasing happiness and decreasing suffering, allocating resources fairly, keeping commitments, loyalty to others.
See above for common criteria.
I want laws that accord to my views of what is right and I think those are the ones that should be codified. No doubt you have the opposite opinion. In the interests of living together I would abide by laws I thought were wrong on this topic (although campaigning against them) because I think the rule of law is even more important. I feel like you are looking for something more – but I am not sure what it is.
Onlookers:
Plato, The laws, Bk X, 2,350 years ago in the aftermath of Alcibiades and co, excerpted and annotated:
___________
>> [[The avant garde philosophers, teachers and artists c. 400 BC] say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art [[ i.e. techne], which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial . . . They say that fire and water, and earth and air [[i.e the classical “material” elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only . . . .
[[T]hese people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. (Cf. here for Locke’s views and sources on a very different base for grounding liberty as opposed to license and resulting anarchistic “every man does what is right in his own eyes” chaos leading to tyranny.)] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality “naturally” leads to continual contentions and power struggles; cf. dramatisation here], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, “naturally” tend towards ruthless tyranny; here, too, Plato hints at the career of Alcibiades], and not in legal subjection to them . . . >>
___________
Will Hawthorne, blogging at Atheism is Dead a few years ago:
____________
>> Assume (per impossibile) that atheistic naturalism [[= evolutionary materialism] is true. Assume, furthermore, that one can’t infer an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ [[the ‘is’ being in this context physicalist: matter-energy, space- time, chance and mechanical forces]. (Richard Dawkins and many other atheists should grant both of these assumptions.)
Given our second assumption, there is no description of anything in the natural world from which we can infer an ‘ought’. And given our first assumption, there is nothing that exists over and above the natural world; the natural world is all that there is. It follows logically that, for any action you care to pick, there’s no description of anything in the natural world from which we can infer that one ought to refrain from performing that action.
Add a further uncontroversial assumption: an action is permissible if and only if it’s not the case that one ought to refrain from performing that action . . . [[We see] therefore, for any action you care to pick, it’s permissible to perform that action. If you’d like, you can take this as the meat behind the slogan ‘if atheism is true, all things are permitted’.
For example if atheism is true, every action Hitler performed was permissible. Many atheists don’t like this consequence of their worldview. But they cannot escape it and insist that they are being logical at the same time.
Now, we all know that at least some actions are really not permissible (for example, racist actions). Since the conclusion of the argument denies this, there must be a problem somewhere in the argument. Could the argument be invalid? No. The argument has not violated a single rule of logic and all inferences were made explicit.
Thus we are forced to deny the truth of one of the assumptions we started out with. That means we either deny atheistic naturalism or (the more intuitively appealing) principle that one can’t infer ‘ought’ from [[a material] ‘is’. >>
_____________
That should give us a sobering context to evaluate the import of the exchange in this thread.
GEM of TKI
vj #39
– a response to your comments 1-6
Clearly there is an important difference between the decision making of a normal adult and that of a mentally defective adult, child, or animal and we usually regard this difference as essential for moral responsibility. ( I only point to the examples of animals etc to show that the beginnings of moral behaviour are to be found there.) However, I don’t think this difference corresponds to the difference between subfree will and your subfree will plus (in fact I don’t know what the “plus” is). To me the essential characteristics of moral responsibility include:
* Appreciates what it is to be right or wrong (this does not entail an objective basis for their knowledge – as discussed elsewhere)
* Can imagine what it is like to be another sentient being
* Can plan ahead
All of these things are compatible with subfree will.
Yes humans can train themselves to resist certain short-term selfish desires. But this is simply putting longer term and/or unselfish desires above short selfish ones. The captive who does not give away their colleagues under torture is doing so because he doesn’t want to give them away and this desire is stronger than the desire for the pain to stop. Someone with subfree will can do this.
How do you know? In fact what do you mean? They are the same species. But if you are assuming some kind of human essence then you are assuming the very thing we are discussing.
#40 vj
vj #40
In what sense is it wrong for a sheep to have less than or more than four legs? A sheep ought to have four legs if it going to live long and reproduce. But this is a factual statement not a value statement. In what sense ought a sheep have four legs over and above this? If there were a mutant strain of sheep with six legs that thrived and reproduced on what basis would you say it ought to have four legs?
[Assuming that is the case, which of our views should be codified into law and why? Or, are you saying that no laws should be passed on any aspect of either issue?]
—markf: “I want laws that accord to my views of what is right and I think those are the ones that should be codified. No doubt you have the opposite opinion. In the interests of living together I would abide by laws I thought were wrong on this topic (although campaigning against them) because I think the rule of law is even more important. I feel like you are looking for something more – but I am not sure what it is.”
I am asking you to think through the process. Eventually a decision will be made on which of our views will be codified into law. On what basis should that decision be made. Earlier, you argued that it should be based on a general consensus informed by your personal preferences, which itself is an impossible combination. Now, you say that you believe in the rule of law, but the rule of law was designed to protect the minority from the consensus decisions arrived at by a majority, or, what has been characterized as a “tyranny the majority.” In fact, the rule of law, which you now claim to embrace, is based on the concept of the natural moral law, which you have already disavowed. The point of the natural moral law is that it must be respected by everyone, majority, minority, and leaders–not just the majority. That is the only way each group can be protected by the other.
I am simply asking you to identify your standard for establishing civil and criminal laws, assuming that you have ruled out lawlessness as an option.
1) Laws based on a tyrant’s whim
2) Laws based on popular opinion or consensus
3) Laws based on Mark’s personal preferences
4) The natural moral law
—“mark: “I want laws that accord to my views of what is right and I think those are the ones that should be codified.”
What if your views are at odds with the views of most people? [the consensus] In that case, whose views should be codified into law, yours or theirs?
#51
I am simply asking you to identify your standard for establishing civil and criminal laws, assuming that you have ruled out lawlessness as an option.
1) Laws based on a tyrant’s whim
2) Laws based on popular opinion or consensus
3) Laws based on Mark’s personal preferences
4) The natural moral law
Why are we suddenly getting the philosophy of Jurisprudence? Anyhow my answer is I believe the process should be based on popular opinion – or more precisely a government elected by popular vote. This process may produce specific laws which I think are wrong. And I will try to influence popular opinion to my way of thinking. But one should operate within the process.
#52
What if your views are at odds with the views of most people? [the consensus] In that case, whose views should be codified into law, yours or theirs?
Theirs – although I may believe the resulting law to be wrong I would not override the process. But where is this all going? I don’t see its relevance.
Onlookers:
Without the foundation of the natural moral law instructed by principles of right reason an the inherent dignity of the human being, this boils down to the radically relativist tyranny of the 51% manipulated by the Plato’s Cave shadow-show puppet masters.
And as my ancestors can vouch, the tyranny of a majority can be awful for the minority.
And of course MF has not warranted why he can so ground his own views that he would wish the majority to bend to them.
GEM of TKI
StephenB #51
Now it is morning I will try to expand on this.
There are three different questions.
(1) Which laws are ethically the best
(2) What is the best process pragmatically for coming up with laws
(3) Should one obey any law however bad it is
(1) When I say the current law X is a bad one that is me expressing my opinion as I have described several times above. I disapprove of it, have grounds for my belief (see criteria above), and believe that I could persuade the majority of people to agree with it given the opportunity. If this is what you mean by “a general consensus informed by your personal preferences” then I see nothing impossible about it. In fact I just described it.
(2) The best system I know of for coming up with laws is that they be made by a democratically elected government. Have you got an alternative you prefer? The members of that government will come to their decision based on a range of different criteria and pressures. Naturally I hope they make their decisions based on my opinion of what is right and wrong. Is this what you call the tyranny of the majority? I would have thought you have much the same view about how laws should be made.
(3) Almost always I should obey the law but there may be situations in which I feel the law is so appalling I feel I ought to disobey it.
Onlookers:
Kindly, cf. 48 above —
. . . to see how — 2,350 years ago — it was already known that in an evo mat world, there is no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT. So, in such a view the only ultimate warrant or grounding for law is force: “the highest might is right” or “might makes right.”
If that sort of world does not send chills down your spine as you hear the moaning of 100 million ghosts of victims of regimes that adhered to such notions in the century just past, it should.
Let us instead look at how in Ch 2 sect 5 of his 2nd essay on civil gov’t, Locke grounded justice in the law of nature and the inherently good creator God who made us in his image as morally governed creatures; by citing the 1594+ words of Anglican Canon Richard Hooker in his classic Ecclesiastical Polity [which was actually praised by the pope of the time, across the bitter divide over religion].
Let us also note the background in the Golden Rule of Moshe and Jeshua d’Nazaret. We should also recognise the links Hooker makes to general ethical thought by citing Aristotle. That is, in light of what Mr Obama dismissed as an obscure epistle by Paul [which happens to be foundational to NT theology], Hooker is implying the premise in Rom 2:12 – 16, that God has implanted core moral law in our hearts, so that even if we do not have a proper worldview level grounding, we recognise the key truths on morality:
In that context, the gap between core moral principle and the patent equality of nature of our fellow human beings, is a rebuke to worldviews that imply the absurdity of amorality. We may insist on a morally absurd worldview, but we do so in the teeth of patent truth that decisively undercuts it.
On this alone, one is well-warranted in rejecting evolutionary materialism as self-referentially incoherent and destructive.
And, then, one has to address Haldane’s expose of the absurdity of the same evo mat on the credibility of mind (more elaborate discussion here):
One may play clever rhetorical games and choose to ignore such a reductio ad absurdum, but one cannot evade its consequences.
Horrible, destructive consequences that the ghosts of 100 million victims of C20 “scientific” tyrannies remind us of.
Consequences that we dare not forget, on pain of repeating some of the worst ever chapters of history.
GEM of TKI
PS: Cf this video (discussed here) to see the ever so familiar Plato’s Cave shadow show games that that worthy exposed in his The Republic, nearly 2,400 years ago.
F/N: In light of MF’s hint above —
. . . that subtly suggests the now widely believed slander that Christians would promote a theocratic tyranny [cf here in the UD WACs] — we must note that all too many secularists are ever so quick to try to take credit for the rise of modern democratic self-government of and by a free people. Cf here for a corrective, preliminary discussion of key Christian contributions to this “least worst” system of government for finite, fallible, morally fallen, too-often ill-willed human beings; and, on why its premises are so deeply rooted in the Judaeo-Christian worldview, as Hooker exemplifies.
F/N 2: Pardon a direct word or two to those who “don’t have the time” to attend to “long” correctives — how we refuse to attend to the much longer underlying evidence and argument in the root sources — to major and heavily promoted errors.
Errors, such as the slander that Christianity is wedded to tyranny, or the dangerous error that worldviews that have in them no IS that can adequately ground OUGHT should be taken seriously.
Given the horrible consequences that these and similar errors have had across time, there is a plain duty of care to take time to correct them.
To fail in that duty is to promote destructive error that one knows or should know — and has access to know — is error.
Markf (#50)
Thank you for your post. You wrote:
I wouldn’t say it’s wrong for a sheep to have less than or more than four legs. I would prefer to say that it’s bad for a sheep to have less than or more than four legs. You suggest that this statement can be cashed out as a hypothetical: A sheep ought to have four legs if it going to live long and reproduce. But these goals define what it is to be a good sheep – unlike the goal of, say, coming first in a sheep competition, which merely reflects the human preferences of the judges. A sheep which fails to realize the goals of living long and reproducing because of some inherent defect is a bad sheep.
What do I mean by an inherent defect? I mean a trait which would disadvantage a sheep in any natural environment in which the sheep might be expected to be found. Of course, there are some traits (e.g. the ability to go for long periods without water) which might serve a sheep well in some environments but not others; but three-leggedness disadvantages a sheep, no matter what natural environment it finds itself in.
I hope that answers your question.
I VJT:
Are you aware of Real Essentialism
Google Books
#61 vj
You introduced this sheep as an example of an “ought” which an animal carries with it. You have clarified this as not having an inherent defect where an inherent defect is something which disadvantages a sheep in a natural environment.
Two comments:
That three legs will disadvantage a sheep in a natural environment is a value free fact. Where does the “ought” come in.
Most sheep and other domestic animals have been bred with characteristics which would disadvantage them in a natural environment – excess wool, excess milk production in females, emphasis on producing good meat rather than athleticism etc. Presumably breeding this characteristics is a sin?
Mung:
I’m aware of Professor Oderberg’s book, but I’ve done all my book shopping for the year, so I’m afraid it will have to wait until next year.
Markf (#63)
You ask:
Something that disadvantages a sheep is by definition bad for it, and hence something it ought not have. A sheep ought not have three legs; it ought to have four.
When I say “bad for it”, of course, I do not merely mean that the sheep won’t like it. Dying is bad for you, even if it happens in your sleep. Disease is bad for you, even if you are unconscious while afflicted with it. I mean “bad” in the same way that lack of sunlight is bad for a plant. A plant ought to get a certain amount of sunlight every day; if it doesn’t, it fails to thrive.
Regarding your earlier comment on the psychopath: is your skepticism directed at the notion of human beings having a nature of any sort at all, or at the notion that we share the same nature? If it is the latter, then I would ask you in turn: if human nature exists, then upon what are you going to base it, if not on our common biology, as members of the species Homo sapiens? But if you mean the former, then it seems you are tending towards a kind of radical nominalism.
—Markf: “Whatever our definition of right and wrong, in practice both condemn mass murder and the fact remains that mass murder is mostly done by people with either strong moral opinions or who are very frightened – not by those without strong moral codes.”
Well, not exactly. I condemn mass murder because it is wrong. You condemn it because you don’t like it. It’s not the same thing.
In any case, the issue is not whether someone has strong feelings about morality. Everyone, including you and I, have strong feelings on the subject. What matters is whether or not their strong feelings are in keeping with the way the world really is.
Commitement to the objective moral law, which reflects the way the world really is, encourages everyone to pay tribute to the same standard. Without that standard, there is no rational justification for person A, who rejects abortion or mass murder as evil, to exhort person B, who feels abortion and mass murder should be allowed. Nor does person A have any rational standard for mobilizing a group effort to stop it since he can provide no rational reasons to call it evil.
—“Why are we suddenly getting the philosophy of Jurisprudence? Anyhow my answer is I believe the process should be based on popular opinion –or more precisely a government elected by popular vote.”
That paragraph does not address the issue because in conflates the task of electing people with the process of establishing just laws.
In fact, the subjective morality you recommend, by which we make up our own standards as we go along, promotes pure democracy which always leads to tyranny.
“Remember democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.”
— John Adams, letter to John Taylor, April 15, 1814
“Democracy will soon degenerate into an anarchy, such an anarchy that every man will do what is right in his own eyes and no man’s life or property or reputation or liberty will be secure, and every one of these will soon mould itself into a system of subordination of all the moral virtues and intellectual abilities, all the powers of wealth, beauty, wit and science, to the wanton pleasures, the capricious will, and the execrable cruelty of one or a very few.”
Walter Williams
vj
I think you are assuming what you want to prove. The fact a features is bad for it does not entail it ought not to have that feature. It depends on your values. I come back to my example of domestic animals that are bred to have features that are good for us but bad for them. Are you saying they ought not to have these features by definition?
I guess I am a nominalist in that I don’t think that abstract objects or universals exist. There are some properties that all humans share (or we would not call them humans), others that most share.
Stephenb
I suggest we leave this aspect. You think you condemn mass murder because it is objectively wrong. I think you condemn mass murder because in your opinion it does not conform to a moral code which in your opinion everyone should conform to. You then define “wrong” as not conforming to that code. We are not going to make any more progress.
We might make some progress on law-making.
In #51 you asked me to:
I described the process which currently operates in both our countries which is based on the views of democratically elected representatives who use a variety of criteria. What more can I do?
Can you name a single incidence of pure democracy – much less one leading to tyranny?
Clearly you are against pure democracy. What alternative do you want?
Markf (#67)
Thank you for your post. Rather than try to explain what I mean, I propose to let a philosopher far better than I – and an atheist, I might add – do it for me. If you will have a look at my post, Death of a grande dame: can we build morality on the foundation of natural goodness , you will readily perceive what I was getting at. To quote Foot:
Do you agree with Foot? If not, why not?
#69
While I have great respect for Foot I disagree with her. Throughout this work she is hiding an important assumption.
A plant needs roots in order to thrive in certain environments. People need courage in order to thrive in certain environments. It does not follow from this that
(a) Plants need roots to thrive in all environments.
(b) Humans need courage to thrive in all environments.
(c) Plants ought to thrive.
(d) Humans ought to thrive.
There are further problems with defining morality in terms of what a species needs. One is the concept of a species is not that clear – as Denyse is fond of reminding us. What is good for a horse may not be good for donkey – but what about a mule?
And I would still like to know your opinion of the morality of breeding domestic animals so that they would not survive in a natural environment but suit our needs more.
Onlookers:
Cf 57 above and 48 above, to see the elephant in the middle of the room.
On evolutionary materialist premises, there is no foundational IS sufficient to ground OUGHT, so all boils down int eh end to might and manipulation make “right.”
The consequences of such amorality and radical relativism — as with the prototype “pure” democracy, Athens in the days of a certain Alcibiades referred to above — are predictably and repeatedly utterly destructive.
So long as the grounding issue is not cogently addressed, there is no foundation for MF et al in making moral pronouncements.
Save, to borrow — without acknowledgement — from the view that DOES have a foundational IS who properly grounds OUGHT.
Namely, the inherently good Creator God.
So, now, is OUGHT real?
GEM of TKI
Markf (#70)
In answer to your question about the morality of breeding domestic animals so that they would not survive in a natural environment but suit our needs more: the first point I’d like to make is that even if it is bad for an organism to have a trait which biologically disadvantages it as a result of artificially breeding, insofar as its telos is frustrated, it doesn’t necessarily follow that it is morally bad for us to breed this trait in the organism.
Not all goods are moral goods; nor are all evils. Most goods are non-moral. Nor do all goods and evils depend on your perspective. In paradigm cases, they are independent of your perspective: heroin is bad for you, whether you like it or not. And thriving – be it plant, animal or human – is something that a scientist can usually observe and measure from a third-party standpoint.
The second point I’d like to make is that breeding an organism so that it is deprived of some body part or bodily function is an action which is prima facie immoral, and which therefore requires a very strong justification – e.g. the organism is a pest or a disease-carrier; or the loss incurred by the organism will somehow result in human lives being saved. Other, more minor alterations produced by breeding – e.g. excess wool, excess milk production in females, emphasis on producing good meat rather than athleticism – are far less problematic. They don’t rob the animal of a bodily function as such. They may be disadvantageous in the wild, but the animal will never return to the wild state, and even in the domestic state, minor alterations of the sort described above can hardly be said to deprive the animal of funktionslust.
Regarding your statements (c) and (d):
(c) Plants ought to thrive.
(d) Humans ought to thrive.
Foot does not make these claims. What she says is that plants ought to have those traits that they need in order to thrive – and presumably people should, too.
You also wrote that a plant needs roots in order to thrive in certain environments. My understanding is that apart from mosses (which have rhizoids, not roots) and a few flowering plants like Spanish moss (which is essentially rootless except for a short period right after germination), plants do need roots to take in water and minerals. But even supposing you’re right, it would still be the case that in its typical environment, to which it is naturally adapted (and in which it evolved), a plant will certainly need roots, and that therefore a plant should possess them.
You also wrote that people need courage in order to thrive in certain environments. One can think of societies (such as our own) where physical courage is seldom required (moral courage is another matter, of course). But even so, such societies are not likely to continue for long in this ideal state. All good things come to an end. Typically, physical courage is a trait that humans do need. So I would definitely be in favor of fostering the virtue of courage in any human society.
Finally, I agree that the boundaries of a species are often vague. Even so, there are many species traits which remain constant for millions of years, so even in a Darwinian sense, one can speak of these species as having a nature, since the pace of evolutionary change is so slow. However, this nature would not be fixed over time.
—markf: “I described the process which currently operates in both our countries which is based on the views of democratically elected representatives who use a variety of criteria. What more can I do?”
There is a difference between a “process” and the philosophy that informs it. I am discussing [or asking about] the latter. The country I live in, the United States, is a Republic [or at least it was designed to be that way], some might describe it loosely as a Representative Democracy, but it is not a pure democracy. The Republic under which I live was designed to establish just laws BASED ON a universal standard of justice called the natural moral law, and was designed not to permit its citizens, or for that matter, its leaders, to establish laws based on their own personal whim. In a pure democracy, citizens vote on laws based on their own personal whim with no regard whatever for the common good.
Unfortunately, the United States has lost its way on that front and now passes laws based on popular opinion and political whim, which is why it is losing its prosperity, and its credibility and its power.
—“Can you name a single incidence of pure democracy – much less one leading to tyranny?”
According to the Founding Fathers and other observers of history, all of the ancient democracies became tyrannies.
“It had been observed that a pure democracy if it were practicable would be the most perfect government. Experience had proved that no position is more false than this. The ancient democracies in which the people themselves deliberated never possessed one good feature of government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity.”
Alexander Hamilton
“The world is weary of statesmen whom democracy has degraded into politicians.”
Benjamin Disraeli
“The adoption of Democracy as a form of Government by all European nations is fatal to good Government, to liberty, to law and order, to respect for authority, and to religion, and must eventually produce a state of chaos from which a new world tyranny will arise.”
Duke of Northumberland
“I have long been convinced that institutions purely democratic must, sooner or later, destroy liberty or civilization, or both.”
Thomas Babington Macaulay
“Democracy forever teases us with the contrast between its ideals and its realities, between its heroic possibilities and its sorry achievements.
Agnes Repplier
A good politician under democracy is quite as unthinkable as an honest burglar.
H.L. Mencken
Nothing…is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man.
Thomas Jefferson
—“Clearly you are against pure democracy. What alternative do you want?”
A Constitutional Republic based on the natural moral law.
#72 vj
I will concentrate on the key problem:
Foot does not make these claims. What she says is that plants ought to have those traits that they need in order to thrive – and presumably people should, too.
Why ought plants have those traits that they need in order to thrive? This is a value statement and a matter of opinion. It is different from “if plants are to thrive they ought to have features x, y or z.” which is factual. I suspect Foot makes her case by not paying attention to this, but I haven’t read much of her stuff.
#73 Stephenb
I have learned something. The difference between a republic incorporating some “inalienable” rights and a democracy is not one that comes up much here. As I am sure you know the UK does not even have a written constitution.
I see two main issues:
(a) Does the possibility of a republic based on “natural moral law” demonstrate that morality is objective.
You clearly think that a government based on the natural moral law is better than other contenders. Even if this is true it does not entail that natural moral law is objectively true. It just shows it is effective.
(b) Do democracies which do not incorporate some kind of moral code which cannot be changed turn into tyrannies?
You give a lot of quotes to support this case but nothing else. My problem here is I don’t know what you count as a “pure democracy” and therefore one that should lead to tyranny. The majority of democracies I can think of have not lead to tyranny – but maybe they are not pure? I guess the Athenian democracy was as close to pure as you can imagine provided you were an adult male citizen. I am not aware that this led to tyranny among that group.
Do you actually have an example of a pure democracy that resulting tyranny?
Markf
I’d like to get back to what Foot says:
“So there’s this notion of a defect which is species-relevant. Things aren’t just good or bad, they’re good in a certain individual, in relation to the manner of life of his or hers or its species.”
From this, I take it that Foot is making the following claim: that which a plant ought to have is what it needs in order to thrive, given its way of life.
You object to that formulation and put forward the following alternative: “if plants are to thrive they ought to have features x, y or z.”
I take it as unexceptionable to claim that a thing ought to have what it requires in order to exist and function. Even for a machine, this is true. A computer ought to have a hard drive; without one, it can hardly be called a computer, as it cannot do anything. A plant ought to have roots; without these, it will very soon die, and cease to be a plant, as it will be unable to take in water and minerals. A horse ought to have a heart, and a strong one at that; without one, it will be unable to gallop, and will soon expire.
Are these value statements? Yes. Are they matters of opinion? No.
#78
I am sorry I disagree. The statement
A computer ought to have a hard drive
is not necessarily true. Suppose you are deeply opposed to computers. Then for you computers without hard drives are much better because they don’t work. The statement is a short-hand for:
If a computer is to work as designed then it ought to have a hard drive
And this not a value statement.
—markf: “Do you actually have an example of a pure democracy that resulting tyranny?”
I think ancient Rome would be a good example. However, I don’t want to leave you with the wrong impression. Any system that ignores the inherent dignity of the human person [as expressed in the natural moral law] is an evil system. So I agree with what I perceive to be your instinct, that is, anti-human religious tyranny imposed from the top down is just as destructive as anti-human mob rule imposed from the bottom up. Unchecked Ideology is no better or worse than unfettered mindlessness, and they both produce the same thing– slavery.
The point is that human dignity and human rights cannot be granted by other humans, they must be accepted a pre-existent as a non-negotiable reality—inviolate and untouchable. If society socially constructed them from the bottom up, society could deconstruct them the same way; if a ruler conferred them from the top down, he could withdraw them the same way.
@78 should read: The point is that human dignity and human rights cannot be granted by other humans, they must be accepted as a pre-existent, non-negotiable reality—inviolate and untouchable.
I am afraid I don’t know much about ancient Rome but it is difficult to see how it could be described as pure democracy given the great power of the unelected senate.
I would agree with all of that except the phrase [as expressed in the natural moral law].
In practice human rights are granted (and removed) by other humans. Some humans may accept them as non-negotiable and inviolate in the sense that the constitution should not allow them to be overridden by any law. The belief that they are pre-existing and in some sense exist outside of humanity may or may not help to sustain that. However, that doesn’t prove that human rights are pre-existing and exist outside of humanity. Many societies recognise and protect individual human rights and have sustained this without tying it back to a natural moral law – most Western European countries for example.
In terms of my moral philosophy, I don’t see human rights as being different from any other moral issue. I agree that it is right that individual rights are protected against majority rule or indeed any other kind of threat. I don’t think these rights should be absolutely sacrosanct – they have to be balanced against other things e.g. I can imagine that one day it might be necessary to make some kind of vaccination compulsory to avoid a global epidemic. But they are very important and government should be arranged so they can only be suspended under extraordinary circumstances. That is my subjective opinion for which I have some grounds. Luckily for me, I think most people with a Western liberal education would agree. There are obviously large areas of the world where the rulers (and I suspect the people) don’t agree or don’t put so much emphasis on human rights and given the opportunity I will try to persuade them otherwise.
I was intrigued by this for two reasons.
1) It implies that at one time the USA protected human rights better than it does now. Yet I see the history of the USA as a steadily improving record on protecting the rights of its citizens. When was the golden age? When the slave-owning founding fathers set it up?
2) Strange to tie the failure to protect human rights to prosperity, and credibility and power. Is this the measure of a morally good government? The country which seems to be acquiring prosperity, credibility and power most quickly is China. Do you believe China protects individual human rights based on a natural moral law?
—markf: “There are obviously large areas of the world where the rulers (and I suspect the people) don’t agree or don’t put so much emphasis on human rights and given the opportunity I will try to persuade them otherwise.”
Based on what principle? Would you say, “Please stop this because I don’t like it?” How does that persuade someone who does like it and would prefer not to stop? That strategy only works if you are a part of the majority. If you are in the minority, you are out of luck. Keep in mind that slavery is the norm of history. Freedom is the exception and is, at the moment, hanging on a thin thread in many places where it was once prevelant.
—“It implies that at one time the USA protected human rights better than it does now. Yet I see the history of the USA as a steadily improving record on protecting the rights of its citizens. When was the golden age? When the slave-owning founding fathers set it up?”
The Founders set up a principle at variance with their behavior, but they were self concious about the inconsistency and resolved to do something about it. By insisting on the principle of inherent dignity, they made reform possible at a later date. Example: By arguing on behalf of the natural moral law, Martin Luther Kind helped secure basic human rights for blacks, arguing that the majority opinion at the time was wrong. He said, in effect, “I don’t care how many people prefer this travesty, it is wrong because it violates the natural moral law, which cannot be voted on.” He told them to read their own founding documents! Women’s suffrage was one the same say.
Unfortunately, the United States has officially abandoned that principle, and rules by the whim of rulers and popular by opinion. At the moment, the majority is beginning to persecute selected minorities, who can no longer call on the rule of law to protect them.
—markf: “I am afraid I don’t know much about ancient Rome but it is difficult to see how it could be described as pure democracy given the great power of the unelected senate.”
You had asked for an example of pure democracy [or mob rule] that became transformed into a tyranny. In any case, mob rule doesn’t last very long and tyranny does. So, it is a lot harder to track down individual cases of the former and analyze them. Typically, mob rule doesn’t know where it is going it just doesn’t like where it has been.
Using the same types of arguments that people have used for ethical debates all over the world for millennia. Such things as:
* Direct appeals to emotion “just see how this woman suffers”
* Arguments from consistency – “you give this group certain rights but not that group for no reason”
* The golden rule – “suppose someone limited your rights in this way how would you feel”
and so on
Why do you guys keep on trying to equate subjectivism with not having any grounds? When say something is funny I say so for a reason – although the ultimate arbiter is whether it makes people laugh.
You seek some clinching universal principle for moral statements. But reality is not like that. Moral arguments are made on a complex overlapping set of criteria none of which are clinching but all of which we tend to share with other people. However, the arbiter is the potential these criteria have for human reaction.
Yes – and so far all you have come up with is a mixed democracy/oligarchy.
I appreciate it may be hard to find examples. But if you know of no examples how can you assert that one leads to the other so confidently?
Mark at 83, if you make those arguments and nothing changes from them, then there is nothing to be said about it. If you are correct, then it is neither right nor wrong in the end, and you had no argument to make in the first place.
–markf: “Using the same types of arguments that people have used for ethical debates all over the world for millennia. Such things as:
—“Direct appeals to emotion “just see how this woman suffers”
Well, let’s see how well your strategy works. If I told you that aborted babies suffer, would you change your position on abortion?
–* Arguments from consistency – “you give this group certain rights but not that group for no reason”
Does being inconsistent violate some objective standard of justice? If not, why bring it up. If so, you are appealing to the same objective standard that you deny. In any case, let’s put it to the test again. If I told you that unborn children do not get the same rights as born children, would you change your position on abortion?
–* The golden rule – “suppose someone limited your rights in this way how would you feel”
Is the golden rule a rule or is it just Mark’s reference. Let’s give it another try. If I pleaded with you to apply the golden rule to unborn babies in the womb, would you change your position on abortion?
—Why do you guys keep on trying to equate subjectivism with not having any grounds?”
Because subjectivism means not having any grounds.
—You seek some clinching universal principle for moral statements. But reality is not like that.”
Everyone who talks that way has already been born.
—markf: “I appreciate it may be hard to find examples. But if you know of no examples how can you assert that one leads to the other so confidently?”
Examples are not that hard to find. Ancient Greece and Rome both qualify as examples of pure democracies that became tyrannies. Do the words Caesar and Nero resonate with you?
Also, keep in mind that sometimes the order is reversed. Sometimes, lawless tyranny gives rise to revolution, followed by pure democracy, followed by another tyranny. Where there is no moral grounding, society is vulnerable to either extreme. Usually, though, tyranny is the order of the day, which means that there is no opportunity for experimentation with pure democracy.
Other times, unprincipled democracies produce soft tyrannies. That is beginning to happen in North America with hate crime laws, which is one way that selective minorities are given preference over those deemed less worthy. Equality under the law is possible only under the rule of law, which is possible only under the natural moral law.
Taking it the other way, can you think of any example of a pure democracy that did not become a tyranny? If not, I would say that I have the better part of the argument.
You are getting the idea! If you convinced me they suffered. Yes.
Because people like to think they have reasons for their moral position. By exploring their consistency you can sometimes show either that they have no reason or their reason is not what they think it is.
In this case probably no – because allocating rights is a moral judgement in itself. If you were to say something like why is it OK to kill a foetus a day before birth but not a day afterwards that would be a very challenging argument and I would agree that it is wrong.
It is an argument that works. Most, but not all, people accept it. That’s all.
No. Because I cannot imagine what it would be like to be a foetus in the womb. But again it is an argument with some power.
You seem to be able to produce arguments against abortion without resorting to an objective standard. When I say something is funny because of the comic timing, or the strong characterisation, or the choice of language – are these not grounds? Or is being funny objective?
Ah – now you are trying an emotional appeal! You really are good at these subjective arguments.
By ancient Greece do you mean Athens? I don’t believe it became a tyranny (can you name any Athenian tyrants?). It ended when the Macedonians invaded. I told you Rome was mixed democracy/oligarchy. Is this what you mean by a pure democracy?
I don’t know what you mean by a pure democracy – (but I assume it doesn’t mean a mixture of democracy and something else as in Rome!). I can name countless democracies that are not tyrannies – most of Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada. Meanwhile you have produced one example of a clearly impure democracy that eventually became a dictatorship after hundreds of years.
MF:
You clearly forget the fate of Athens post Peloponnesian war.
GEM of TKI
pardon my butting in but . .
Australia, New Zealand and Canada are not pure democracies. They are effectively republics/representational democracies with constitutional monarchy bases. They are very similar to the USA and actually have foundations that mirror the founding principals of the American Constitution. Therefore they couldn’t possibly count as “pure democracies” in the sense that StephenB means it. Or the Founding Fathers for that matter.
Just an FYI. . .
#91 MedsRex
Fair enough – but they are a lot purer than ancient Rome which was largely run by an unelected Senate. I don’t know what Stephenb means by a pure democracy, but if there aren’t any then it is hard to conclude they always lead to tyranny.
Med:
Thee is a reason why there are no pure democracies . . .
G
KF,
I agree.
MF,
I believe by a pure democracy he might mean:
a democracy minus a constitution. (a constitution being a guiding document based upon certain self evident, unalienable truths)
The people voting any laws directly into existence minus a system of checks and balances.
No representatives.
—markf: “You are getting the idea! If you convinced me they suffered. Yes.”
From Dr. Steven Calvin, perinatologist at the University of Minnesota ….“neural pathways are present for pain to be experienced quite early by unborn babies.”
“Severe and Excruciating” Pain
Have you seen the movie, “The Silent Scream,” which shows how the infant moves violently in an attempt to escape the assault and avoid the pain?
—“It is an argument that works. Most, but not all, people accept it. That’s all.” [The golden rule]
How do you know if it works or doesn’t work, given the fact that you reject all objective standards by which we could discern its workability?
[If I pleaded with you to apply the golden rule to unborn babies in the womb, would you change your position on abortion?]
—“No. Because I cannot imagine what it would be like to be a foetus in the womb. But again it is an argument with some power.”
Well, there you go, but I thank you for am honest answer. The good news is, as you stated earlier, that you would change your position on the morality of abortion if someone could convince you that it causes unborn babies to suffer. That bad news is that the good news doesn’t really apply after all because you can’t “imagine” what it would be like to suffer that way so the objective evidence doesn’t count.
—“You seem to be able to produce arguments against abortion without resorting to an objective standard.”
I am a big fan of both objective and subjective arguments, that is, the objective evil of unnecessary pain and the existential experience of those who feel it? Both matter.
—“When I say something is funny because of the comic timing, or the strong characterisation, or the choice of language – are these not grounds? Or is being funny objective?”
I think it has both an objective and subjective component. It is objective in the sense that almost all humor involves the process of setting the stage and then pulling out the rug. Without that universal dynamic, there is no humor. This works because humans, unlike animals, can appreciate irony. On the other hand, there is a subjective component because, although we have our humanity in common, we are, as individuals are different: We don’t always laugh at the same kinds of things or to the same degree. I, for example, think that Groucho Marx is much funnier than Jerry Steinfeld. That is subjective and individualistic. Even so, they both appeal to the same psychology of humor—surprise. That is objective and universal.
—“You really are good at these subjective arguments.”
I am a big fan of subjective arguments. Personal stories, for example, are dynamite. The problem is when we base our entire understanding of reality on that paradigm and ignore objective reality.
–markf: “By ancient Greece do you mean Athens? I don’t believe it became a tyranny (can you name any Athenian tyrants?).”
For reference, look at the history of Athens from 500 B.C. to 330 B.C. This is the period in which direct democracy [not representative democracy] degenerated into tyranny.
—“I told you Rome was mixed democracy/oligarchy. Is this what you mean by a pure democracy?”
Rome did not begin that way, nor did it end that way.
A pure democracy, as I pointed out earlier, is mob rule–direct decision making by all the members of the society with no constitution, no rule of law, nor reference to natural rights, no checks and balances, or no objective standards of justice. It is a process that is known not to work.
Stephenb #96
I did spend 10 minutes looking at this. I see no record of tyranny. There were a couple of short-lived moves away from democracy following the Peloponnesian War but they didn’t last and democracy was restored. Could you be more explicit. Who were the tyrants?
No it began as a monarchy and ended as a tyranny – in between it was a mixed oligarchy/democracy. If there was a time when you think it was a pure democracy – then just name the period and describe the system.
OK. I understand the definition. You were more explicit than saying this system doesn’t work. You said in #66:
The only example you have come up with that is close to your definition of a pure democracy is Athens. You have yet to point out a tyrant arising from this system. The Athenian system collapsed in the end – mainly because of external influences – but it did not end in tyranny and lasted for several hundred years (all systems come to an end eventually).
Having said all this, it is rather beside the main point of the thread. There are many impure democracies in the world with various checks and balances. Very few of them rely on a natural moral law.
Stephenb #95
The two arguments are independent. If you convinced me that after a certain term of pregnancy the foetus suffered then that would be a powerful reason for believing abortion at that term to be wrong.
And this is almost exactly the situation with moral judgements. Almost all moral judgements involve a limited set of considerations: happiness and suffering of others, fairness, loyalty, keeping committments. This works because humans unlike animals desire these things. On the other hand there is a subjective component because, although we have our humanity in common, we are, as individuals are different: we don’t always find the same things unacceptable e.g. homosexual practice. If you want to call this objective then we just disagree about the meaning of the word “objective”. To me the key thing is that both humour and morality work because of human psychology.
—markf: “And this is almost exactly the situation with moral judgements.”
—“And this is almost exactly the situation with moral judgements.”
Yes, that’s right. As is the case with art, morality has an objective component [the natural moral law] and a subjective component [extenuating circumstances for the individual that determine how the law is applied.] The former is metaphysical; the latter is existential. You acknowledge the subjective/existential component, but you disavow the metaphysical/objective component.
—markf: “You have yet to point out a tyrant arising from this system.”
Google “List of Greek Tyrants” on Wikipedia and zero in on the time line I suggested, namely 500 B.C. to 300 B.C.
–markf: “If you convinced me that after a certain term of pregnancy the foetus suffered then that would be a powerful reason for believing abortion at that term to be wrong.”
What about the evidence that I provided @95 that the fetus does, indeed, suffer as a result of abortion. How many references from doctors would it take to convince you? Have you ever watched the magnetic imagry of a fetus writhing in pain?
–markf: “Having said all this, it is rather beside the main point of the thread.”
OK. Let’s not speak any more of the evils of pure democracy.
#100 Stephenb
Google “List of Greek Tyrants” on Wikipedia and zero in on the time line I suggested, namely 500 B.C. to 300 B.C.
Here are the entries for these tyrants for Athens:
Pisistratus, 561 BC, 559 BC-556 BC and 546 BC-528 BC.
Hipparchus (527 BC-514 BC) and Hippias (527 BC-510 BC), sons of Pisistratus;
Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles leading members of the Thirty Tyrants following Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War.
Pisistratus, Hipparchus and Hippias preceded the introduction of democracy into Athens. The thirty were introduced by the Spartans following the Peloponnesian and their reign lasted about a year after which democracy was reintroduced.
I am sorry but it looks very much as though you do not know of a convincing example of a tyrant arising from pure democracy. But rather than admit it, you make me keep Googling in the hope I will turn one up or just stop pushing the issue. Why do not your own research? You are bound to come across one somewhere in the whole of human history.
#99
The sentence I put in bold was vital: This works because humans unlike animals desire these things. You said of being funny:
This “objective” element of humour can only be called humour because of the universal tendency of people to laugh at it. Funny doesn’t mean “the process of setting the stage and then pulling out the rug”. It means “liable to make us laugh”. It is an empirical fact of human nature that the rug pulling is a common element of almost all humour. If no one laughed it it then it wouldn’t be funny. It is only objective in the sense that almost everyone reacts the same way. Now if you want to define objective as “pretty much everyone reacts the same way” then I have no problem saying some aspects of morality are objective.
But I think you mean by objective that there is some object or property – the rightness or wrongness – that exists independently of any human reaction. In that sense being funny is clearly not objective. And yet you can still have grounds for saying something is funny.
—markf: “I am sorry but it looks very much as though you do not know of a convincing example of a tyrant arising from pure democracy.”
I specifically told you three times to check the dates from 500 BC to 330 BC, and three times you ignore those dates and comment on what went on prior to those dates. I will not give you a fourth chance. Whatever you say on this subject from now on will be met with a reminder of your unwillingness to follow those simplest of instructions.
—“This “objective” element of humour can only be called humour because of the universal tendency of people to laugh at it.”
No, the objective element in humor is the universality in human nature that causes humans to appreciate irony, just as it is the universality in human nature that causes human to know the difference between right and wrong. Naturally, you cannot understand that because you don’t think there is any such thing as human nature.
Stephenb
I did exactly what you suggested. When you suggested in #96 to look at the history of Athens in that period I did so and found no tyrants. When you were more specific in #100 I Googled “List of Greek Tyrants” on Wikipedia. I reproduced the entire list for Athens in my comment: #103. I did this because the first three entries were outside the time span you mentioned but I wanted you to see why I was dismissing these entries. That left just one entry: Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles. As I said they were leading members of the Thirty Tyrants following Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War – specifically 404 to 403 BC. As I also said in my comment they were put in place by the victorious Spartans – so nothing to do with the Athenian government at that time – and only lasted a year when they were replaced by democracy.
You could wrap up this entire little spat by simply naming one tyrant that came into power as a result of a pure democracy and describing briefly how they came into power. It does appear you are evading this challenge by setting me tasks! However, they have proved quite educational so far.
—markf: “Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles. As I said they were leading members of the Thirty Tyrants following Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War – specifically 404 to 403 BC.”
Very good. You are beginning to show signs of life. Why didn’t you just take my word for it?
—“As I also said in my comment they were put in place by the victorious Spartans”
So what? A govenment weakened by pure democracy will either self destruct or be take over from the outside. In this case, it was the latter. In other cases, such as the rise of Rome, it was the former. In some other cases, it is a combination of the two. Plato made the point over two thousand years ago, just as America’s Founding Fathers made the point over two hundred years ago.
Direct democracy has never been known to work. Do you know of any cases to the contrary? If not, then why do you continue to resist the point? By not answering the question you are conceding the point.
Also, Does this mean that you are not going to respond to my question? You said that you would change your position on abortion if I could convince you that it causes pain for the fetus. I provided [and can provide more] evidence that abortion does, indeed, cause pain to the fetus.
If pictures obtained through magnetic imaging show a fetus writing and pain during an abortion, and if medical professionals confirm that fact, and if that is not enough evidence to convince you, what would be? Or, is it the case that you have already decided that no amount of evidence could ever change your mind because your subjective brand of anti-life, moral relativism matters more to you than the evidence.
#107 StephenB
I am going to end this discussion unless you admit you have made some errors.
You said back in #65.
when challenged to produce an example you first referred to Rome which was anything but a pure democracy. You then asked me to find an example for you from Athens between 500 and 350 BC. When I looked and could only find Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles in that period you accused me of not following your directions. When I point out that they do fall into the period you suggested but were put in place by the Spartans, only lasted one year, and were followed by the restoration of democracy you respond thus:
Because I don’t trust you – with good reason it appears.
It appears you:
* Did not know of any examples of pure democracy leading to tyranny, but evaded the issue by trying to get me to find an example.
* Did not realise Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles were in the period you suggested. Otherwise why would you have accused me of not following your directions when I suggested them? Had you heard of them before I found the example for you?
* Ignored the fact they only lasted one year and were followed by the restoration of democracy and just seized on the one the point you that was more debatable (that they were put in place by the Spartans)
* Persist in trying to brush over the fact that Rome was not a pure democracy.
Given this kind of debating behaviour why should I bother to take seriously anything you claim about abortion?
And yes direct democracy has been known to work. Athens worked fine (for those citizens who were part of the democracy) for hundreds of years both before and after the Peloponnesian wars. All governments end eventually. There are however precious few direct democracies in history – so there is really no empirical base for your claim.
I am not actually that fired up about whether pure democracy leads to tyranny. You may well be able to find an example of one somewhere. I just think you need demonstrate a bit more integrity and humility to be someone worth debating with.
—markf: “am going to end this discussion unless you admit you have made some errors.”
Does this mean that you are going to use the debate about pure democracy to escape the challenge of answering my questions to you about abortion? So it would seem.
—“You said back in #65.
“pure democracy which always leads to tyranny.”
Right. I also asked you if you know of any exceptions. If there are no exceptions to the rule, it just might be a pretty good rule.
Pure Tyranny and pure Democracy represent two theoretical extremes on a political continnuum. What we know is that these extremes, to the extent that they approach 100% “purity,” do not contain the kinds of checks and balances needed to protect individual rights or minority rights, depending on which extreme is being imposed.
When I say that they don’t “work,” I don’t mean that they fail to survive for long periods of time; I mean that they must enslave people to maintain that survival.
Except for intransient mobs, a 100% pure democracy has never existed as a maintained culture because some groups are always left out of the mix. In ancient Greece, for example, slaves and women were not allowed to vote.
Indeed, it is instructive that even they recognized that total, pure democracy is impossible and unworkable for any length of time. What is a lynch mob except a pure democracy? What was the Reign of Terror except a pure democracy with no constraints? How much empirical evidence should I need to make that point. Ridicuous!
—“when challenged to produce an example you first referred to Rome which was anything but a pure democracy.”
It began as mob rule.
—“You then asked me to find an example for you from Athens between 500 and 350 BC.”
Sorry, but that is a false statement. I did not ask you FIND AN EXAMPLE FOR ME. I asked you to visit a website to confirm my point that there were, indeed, Greek tyrants, a point that you had contested. Since you didn’t believe me, I asked you to discover the truth for yourself. If I had not known the reference about the tyrants were there, I would not have sent you there. That should be obvious.
—“When I looked and could only find Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles in that period you accused me of not following your directions.”
That is another false statement. I pointed out that you had not followed directions when you came back from that site without having acknowledging those three tyrants. I invite anyone to go back and check the timeline.
–“When I point out that they do fall into the period you suggested
[at last Mark acknowedges the point]
—“I—”As I also said in my comment they were put in place by the victorious Spartans”
To which I responded, So what? A govenment weakened by pure democracy will either self destruct or be take over from the outside. In this case, it was the latter. In other cases, such as the rise of Rome, it was the former.
—“It appears you
—“* Did not know of any examples of pure democracy leading to tyranny, but evaded the issue by trying to get me to find an example.”
What is it about mob rule leading to Roman tyranny and direct democracy leading to Greek tyrants that you do not understand? I also provided current examples from the dynamics in my own country, which you ignored.
*–” Did not realise Theramenes, Critias, and Charicles were in the period you suggested.”
It was because I knew that those three tyrants existed in that time period that I scolded you for coming back from that site pretending that the information was not there. You are, once again, trying to fudge the time line.
–“Otherwise why would you have accused me of not following your directions when I suggested them? Had you heard of them before I found the example for you?”
Because you didn’t follow directions and acknowledge the existence of the tyrants in question until I sent you back a second time.
—* Ignored the fact they only lasted one year and were followed by the restoration of democracy and just seized on the one the point you that was more debatable (that they were put in place by the Spartans)”
I didn’t comment on what followed the tyranny because it is not related to what prompted the tyranny, which was the substance of my argument. I did comment on the fact that pure democracy can lead either to internal demoralization or external take over because you suggested that the latter point implies that the tyranny was not a result of the weakened democracy.
* Persist in trying to brush over the fact that Rome was not a pure democracy.
I told you at least three times that mob rule preceded the time period to which you refer. Some information can’t be conveniently arrived at by Googling. That is why people write books.
–“Given this kind of debating behaviour why should I bother to take seriously anything you claim about abortion?”
Because you might be able to demonstrate that you have the moral courage to answer hard questions as well as to ask them, especially my questions to you about abortion.
—“And yes direct democracy has been known to work. Athens worked fine (for those citizens who were part of the democracy) for hundreds of years both before and after the Peloponnesian wars.”
Again, I define a “working” government in terms of the quality of freedom, not in terms of endurance.
–“There are however precious few direct democracies in history – so there is really no empirical base for your claim.”
Part of the basis of my argument is that there is a reason so few direct democracies exist: They are not much better than tyrannies because they promote tyranny of the majority over tyranny of the minority.
—“I am not actually that fired up about whether pure democracy leads to tyranny.”
Good. Let’s hear your answer to the questions I asked of you.
–“I just think you need demonstrate a bit more integrity and humility to be someone worth debating with.”
I will leave the matter of my integrity and humility for others to decide. I have, after all, been around for a while. It seem prudent, however, to leave it with this question: Is it an act of humility to scrutize the arguments of your adversary while refusing to submit your own views to scrutiny?
Speaking of ancient Rome and Greece, we find this interpretation from Dinesh D’Souza [“What’s So Great About Christianity” (One of those books that provides insights that are unavailable from such places as Wikipedia, which disdains an ordered society as much as an ordered universe)]
“Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” While the ancients had direct democracy that was susceptible to the unjust passions of the mob and supported by large-scale slavery, we today have representative democracy, with full citizenship and the franchise extended in principle to all. Let us try to understand how this great change came about.”
A New Morality
“In ancient Greece and Rome, individual human life had no particular value in and of itself. The Spartans left weak children to die on the hillside. Infanticide was common, as it is common even today in many parts of the world. Fathers who wanted sons had few qualms about drowning their newborn daughters. Human beings were routinely bludgeoned to death or mauled by wild animals in the Roman gladiatorial arena. Many of the great classical thinkers saw nothing wrong with these practices. Christianity, on the other hand, contributed to their demise by fostering moral outrage at the mistreatment of innocent human life.”
Get the picture?
Also from historian Arnold Toynbee (Study of History)
Discussing democracy’s fragile nature:
and the “use of it most cautiously; otherwise the usual collapse into hysteric mob-rule anarchy, necessary order always restored by dictatorship and Machiavelli’s proven methods.”
Sound familiar? Again, this information is unavailable on Wikipedia.
StephenB, Markf and kairosfocus
I’m sorry to barge into this political discussion a little late, but I find it surprising that no-one has mentioned the example of Switzerland as a direct democracy.
I agree on the importance of having a constitution which defines human rights at the outset. Chile’s constitution, for instance, defines the right to life of every human being from the moment of conception. I’m glad there are still a few sane countries left on the planet.
But having done that, which form of government is better: a parliamentary democracy which lets politicians make the laws, or a direct democracy which lets the people decide? Personally I’d favor direct democracy. I know little of the history of ancient Greece and Rome, but I do know that Switzerland is much more conservative than most other European countries. Why is that? Because parliamentary committees stacked with clever social activists can usually get high-sounding laws passed through parliaments, which continually push the boundaries of what’s acceptable, for the sake of some specoius “right” which over the course of time becomes codified and then impossible to eradicate. It’s much harder to fool the people like that. They don’t listen to ethics committees stacked with activists. So I guess I’d favor something like the Swiss model, but starting with a Chilean constitution.
My two cents.
vj
Thanks for your comment. To be honest I think the best form of government is a far more subtle and complex issue than my rather childish spat with Stephenb.
I also am in favour of constitutional human rights. Curiously in the UK it is the right wing that is opposed to human rights legislation whether constitutional or otherwise – seeing it as “political correctness” (which for some reason is taken as a bad thing). I don’t see any need for human rights to be based on any religion. Indeed this is quite dangerous as anyone who does not follow that particular religion may feel absolved from any requirement to recognise those rights. On the other hand if rights are justified by appeal to our common humanity then no one can opt out of being human.
VJT:
There is a reason — and guess which now unacknowledged key source Locke was using — why we now have constitutional democracies, with representatives making law, and an executive accountable to it, with an independent judiciary.
At least, as an ideal.
All, backed up by an underlying foundational commitment to natural law based principles of justice and core morality, guided in decision-making by conscience and common good sense.
Switzerland’s cantons are more like having regular referendums and town hall meetings than the sort of mob-ocracy that is being highlighted as dangerously unstable and prone to the tyranny of the rage of crowds. Canetti on crowds and power is a relevant read.
All of this is being undermined in our day by the rise of amoral evolutionary materialism, and by associated radical relativism. The recent decisions in the UK on so-called anti-discrimination law [which turns out to be a sly way of persecuting Bible-believing Christians, who are being targetted as unfit to be foster [thus adoptive or natural] parents, and more, are a telling case in point. I am astonished at what a High Court allowed, and what a Government agency officially set the purpose of equality and human rights, said about the Christian faith: an INFECTION, one that children have to be protected against. (And cf the poll results here, especially those who think that something is “necessary”.)
The mob is beginning to roar again, and it is “to the lions” as usual.
But then, my opinion of the prospects for our civilisation sinks lower by the day.
My bottom-line: £2/1s/6d.
GEM of TKI
#109 StephenB
Just to be clear. Did you know the name of any tyrants arising from pure democracy when our little spat began? If so who were they?
Roman emperors do not count. Rome did not arise from mob rule. It went from Monarchy to Combined oligarchy/democracy to Emperors.