“Meaning” vs. “MEANING”

_{Barry Arrington

November 9, 2014

Intelligent Design}

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Thank you to Aleta for taking up the opposing view of the nature of meaning in my Gotta Serve Somebody post. I started to write a response to his comment 34 and quickly realized that any response would be OP-sized and decided to start a new OP.

Some Definitions

“disagreement is not an easy thing to reach. Rather, we move into confusion.” John Courtney Murray

Part of the problem in the debate between Aleta and myself is that we use the word “meaning” in at least three different senses, (1) linguistic intention, (2) ultimate purpose, and (3) culturally-adapted belief system.

In an effort to see if we can actually reach disagreement as opposed to confusion, I propose to dispense with the word “meaning” altogether and to use in its stead the following:

Linguistic intention. Instead of “this word has the following meaning” I will use “this word has the following definition.”

Ultimate purpose. Instead of “the theist believes there is an ultimate meaning in the universe and the atheist denies that there is,” I will say “the theist believes there is Ultimate Purpose/Significance in the universe and the atheist denies that there is.”

Culturally adapted belief system. Aleta says that human belief and meaning systems are human inventions that are inculcated into members of a culture. Fair enough. I will use the phrase “Culturally Adopted Belief System” to refer to this type of “meaning.”

Barry’s Argument

The materialist believes there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance. As Richard Dawkins says in the following famous quotation:

[In the universe there] is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.

In my previous post I argued that the idea that our life is completely meaningless, that the universe is indifferent to our existence, that literally nothing we say, think or do has any ultimate significance, is unbearable. No one is able to stare into the abyss without flinching. I noted that even those that insist there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance feel compelled to seek a kind of meaning as a substitute for Ultimate Purpose/Significance. Dawkins again:

The truly adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to make it.

In the first quote Dawkins stares into the abyss, and in the second he flinches away. Why? Because an intense longing for Ultimate Purpose/Significance is at the bottom of every human heart. Everyone, from fundamentalist Bible thumpers to militant atheists, searches for a greater context in which to situate their lives. For theists the explanation for this longing is easy:

You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.

Confessions, Augustine of Hippo

The honest materialist does not deny the longing. At that same time he cannot admit that when we long for Ultimate Purpose/Significance we are longing for something that actually exists. So how does the materialist explain a near universal longing for something that does not exist? He explains it like he explains a lot of things (consciousness, the overwhelming appearance of design in nature, libertarian free will) — the near universal human impulse to place our lives within the context of some Ultimate Purpose/Significance is an illusion foisted on us by our genes, which in turn resulted from some evolutionary adaptation.

Aleta’s Argument

Aleta disagrees that the universe’s indifference is unbearable and that no one is able to stare into the abyss without flinching. He does not agree that even those who insist there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance feel compelled to seek Ultimate Purpose/Significance. He writes:

I do believe that humans do engage, and have engaged in “make believe” about some things that we really don’t know much, if anything about: I think most metaphysical religious beliefs fall into this category. But we have all sorts of other beliefs about how to treat our fellow man (or at least those that we include in our understanding of our community/society), about how to contribute to the well being of our society, how to spend our time in what various human activities are possible, and so on. Many of these beliefs are cultural: the fact that many people are brought up in them as children and that most of society supports them gives those beliefs a sense of being bigger than the individual. Human belief and meaning systems are human inventions. They are based on a mixture of empirical knowledge (confirmed beliefs) and agreements within the culture to see the world a certain way (affirmed beliefs). Calling then “make believe” devalues both them and the human beings for whom they are important.

Barry’s Response

Just like Dawkins Aleta wants to have it both ways. Consider again Dawkins’ first comment, which I will call the “Materialist Prime Directive.”

[In the universe there] is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.

Now consider again Dawkins’ second statement:

The truly adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to make it.

Dawkin’s second statement is radically irreconcilable with the Materialist Prime Directive, because if the Materialist Prime Directive is true, the words “meaningful,” “full,” and “wonderful” in the second statement are empty. Similarly, Aleta affirms the Materialist Prime Directive.* Then he says that “we have all sorts of other beliefs about how to treat our fellow man . . .” But if the Materialist Prime Directive is true, those beliefs about how to treat our fellow man are empty, mere evolutionary adaptations foisted upon us by our genes. Aleta chides me for calling them “make believe,” but they are indeed make believe in a very real sense of that phrase. If the Materialist Prime Directive is true, those beliefs are empty and arbitrary impulses that evolution “makes” us “believe.”

I argue that the human longing for “meaning” (i.e., Ultimate Purpose/Significance) is a very real phenomenon, and that longing is directed at something real. Aleta agrees there is a longing, but he dismisses that longing as a mere cultural adaptation. Here’s the problem with that. Once one realizes that “meaning” in Aleta’s sense of the word is empty and arbitrary, a mere evolutionary adaptation foisted upon us by our genes, the game is up. Because it is a truism that a meaning (cultural adaptation) that is meaningless (arbitrary/random) can have no meaning (ultimate significance).

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*Though he quibbles with whether he is actually a materialist. I think he prefers to consider himself an agnostic who accepts materialism provisionally. He can explain what he believes if I a wrong.

Comments

Oh what a wonderful discussion I have missed! Barry is wrong on basically everything, as always, but enough about that. Let's get to the point. When atheists or agnostics say there's no ultimate meaning or purpose, it does not follow that there's no purpose at all. Meaning is subjective or relative to them, and this actually makes sense quite deeply. For example, directions (left, right, up, down) are relative to the viewer. It's incomplete to say "The squirrel is left," full stop. More properly it can be said, "The squirrel is five yards left from me" or from you, i.e. the direction is relative. Despite being relative, the direction is pretty meaningful. It determines the location of the squirrel. Yet is there an ultimate direction? Is there an ultimate location? Generalising the directions all across the universe, it seems like the ultimate location is "everywhere", but how coherent is the proposition "The ultimate location is everywhere"? Does not look so readly graspable. So, from the fact that there are relative directions it does not directly follow that there is also an ultimate direction. It takes a separate argument to arrive at that. While we are arguing with varying degrees of success, life goes on as per usual relative directions.E.Seigner_{November 15, 2014
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Hi William. I think this discussion may be coming to end, but I do have some responses. First, you write,
I would like to note that you are taking this far afield from the main argument. You have not responded to many of my points about what the logic indicates are the consequences of a subjective morality
Much of the first part of our discussion was about my explaining my thoughts on morality in absence of any objective standards. I then asked you some questions to try to get the reverse perspective of someone who believed otherwise. I think I have stayed on the main topic, but have wanted it to be balanced in terms of each of us both questioning the other and explaining our own position. And I have responded to your points - I just haven't given you answers you accept, and I don't think that is going to change. Perhaps in a later post I'll add to my explanation, but what I have to say won't change your opinion, I'm sure. I imagine we'll go away from this discussion each thinking the other is wrong. But I'll start with this. You write,
If morality refers to an objective commodity, then it is necessary that “mind”, in some respects, is an objective landscape where moral rights and wrongs are similar to gravity or inertia in our physical landscape. I hold there to be other objective features of the mental landscape – logic, mathematics & geometry, for example. As we are physical entities contained in a physical universe, we are also mental entities contained in a universal mind, so to speak. Part of the whole yet individuated subsets. Like reason, conscience is fundamentally a sensory capacity that can sense or recognize (like sight or hearing) objective features of the mental landscape. Like sight or hearing, our moral sense is imperfect and open to misinterpretation, but what it is sensing is objectively real. No, I cannot prove any of this; I can only point to certain things to support it...
However, earlier in #107 you wrote,
I will tell you this: I don’t know if an objective standard for morality exists, but if I want my metaphysical beliefs to be consonant with how I must live and behave in the world, I must employ the premise of an objective morality ....
But now you say that even though you can't prove it (and I understand that metaphysical beliefs can't be proven) you believe that there is a mental world in addition to a physical world, that our mind can access that mental world, and that our conscience can access that part of the mental world that concerns morality. And later you explain that even though conscience doesn't perfectly sense those objective moral standards, "conscience can be refined or desensitized and used in concert with reason to better evaluate the moral landscape." So it seems to me you do believe in objective moral standards, and that the conscience is "sensing" an objectively true standard about torturing babies in the same way the mind knows that 2 + 2 = 4 as a mathematical self-evident fact. So, it seems like there is an inconsistency between what you said in #107 and what you said today, and it seems like what you said today is more the true case for your beliefs. I don't believe there is a separate "mental world" that we have special access to. I am not a dualist. This is probably the fundamental difference between the two of us. You do believe in objective moral standards that exist outside of us that are true in a way that our "subjective" truths are not, and that we do have access to those standards separate from any empirical knowledge we might have about human beings. I don't believe that objective world exists, or that that access exists - so we are right back to the fundamental difference that started this discussion. This also takes me back to my post at #84, where I asked,
Now explain to me objective knowledge of morals. To the extent it is analogous to objective knowledge of the physical world, what experiences can we have to acquaint ourselves with the existence of these objective morals, and more importantly, what common experiences are there such that any human being, properly acquainted with the experiences, would accept them as objectively true.
Assuming your belief in this mental world, given that it is an imperfect sense and given we can't have any shared experience of what our consciences feel (although we can talk about the experience), how are to come to any agreement as to what thes objectives standards are - even if conscience in your sense is present, so are all sorts of other factors in a person's psychology, so it seems like we still have a subjective judgment from every person. Is gay marriage wrong? Is a man having multiple wives wrong? Is slavery wrong? Is the submission of women to their husband, or men in general wrong? Is war wrong? Is stealing to feed your starving children wrong? Is letting a man die from cold and starvation on the street because there is no community shelter wrong? Is contraception wrong? Is stem cell research from fetal cells wrong? Is self-assisted, self chosen death wrong? Is eating pork wrong? Is driving a spike through a blessed communion wafer wrong? The list goes on and on - are there objective standards that answers these questions? Explain to me how one is supposed to know, and come to agreement with one's fellow human beings, about what these objective standards are, and how we are supposed to separate those objective standards from all the subjective complexities of human beings. You keep pointing to one extreme example concerning babies, but you really haven't explained how your belief escapes the dilemma that each person has to make their own decisions about morals in general - it is not at all self-evident that a self-evident set of moral standards or principles are universally available to human beings through their conscience. I am sure that a cross-cultural study of what people consider objective standards would show quite a bit of similarity, because of a common human nature, and yet also even a greater amount of diversity because of differences in personality and culture. I don't see the evidence that these objective standards exist. You would probably respond that irrespective of that diversity of what people think, the objective standards are there, but I repeat that in the real world of real human action, each person's overall assessment of the situation is subjective. Again, your persistent use of one extreme example does not address the more general question. That's enough for this post. Perhaps I will write more later, but I've ot other things to do now.Aleta_{November 15, 2014
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Lots to read here - I'm going out for a while to beat the snowstorm, but will return ...Aleta_{November 15, 2014
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But how does he know what is right! What rules are you referring to? If accepted social norms aren’t sufficient, and there are not any objective standards that you are sure of that exist, how do you know what is right?
You don't "know", except perhaps in the case of self-evident moral truths (depending on how you define "knowing"). Like with any of your senses, you develop an understanding through use of conscience and reasoning as best you can when navigating the moral landscape and learning from your mistakes and clearing up your misconceptions when reason dictates that you were wrong about a moral view. Unless morality is assumed to be an objective commodity sensed through the conscience and subject to rational examination, we have no basis for debate about "what is right" other than emotional pleading, rhetoric and manipulation via terminology. If you and I both assume that there is an objective source of morality, then we have something to work with in a debate by beginning with what we both agree are self-evidently true moral statements, then leading to statements that are necessarily true derived from those self-evidently true statements, leading to conditionally true statements and generally true statements. We have the basis for an actual, logical argument, whereas under subjectivism all we have is "because I feel like it". For example, if someone believes that self-determined death is morally wrong and shouldn't be permitted, I am entirely open to hearing such an argument and to adjusting my own perspective if I find the logic of the argument compelling.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Aleta said:
I feel strongly that people should have the legal and medical right, and access to the means, to end their own life .... I know that there are people who feel strongly that this is wrong, both for the individual to contemplate doing and the government to allow. Now, William, I’m interested in the meta issue here: not the issue of whether this is right or wrong, but how do you go about making a judgment about whether this is right or wrong compared to how I do. How does your belief that you need to act as if objective standards exist, and your belief that your conscience (as you perhaps have explained in response to my first point above) and your appeal to necessary and self-evident truths lead you to a judgment in this case? Perhaps addressing an example like this would make it possible for you to be more specific about how you implement your beliefs in real situations.
Without libertarian free will the concept of morality is necessarily (logically) meaningless. A fundamental requirement of a moral system is the free will capacity to make both wrong and right choices. Since this is a fundamental, necessary aspect of morality, the individual freedom to make both good and bad moral decisions must be respected - honored - as much as it is possible to do so, especially when no others are being directly, purposefully harmed. The capacity to cause emotional pain in others by our personal decisions is simply the nature of free moral choice. Take away any capacity to harm others and you have pretty much taken away any meaning morality has. There are arguments one could make on either side of such an issue. Like with the processing and rational evaluation of any sensory data, our capacity to understand through conscience is imperfect. That a thing objectively exists, and that we can sense it, doesn't mean our interpretation of it represents the absolute truth about that thing. I think that whenever possible, we should err on the side of respecting the freedom of sane adults otherwise believed to be in possession of their mental faculties to make moral decisions for themselves, even if we believe they are making the wrong decision and even if it emotionally pains us. Believing that right and wrong objectively exist is not the same as claiming that I have perfect knowledge of right and wrong or perfect knowledge of how to best interpret the moral landscape.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Aleta said:
And here’s a bigger question, possibly covered in the part about conscience above: if objective standards might not even exist, even if you believe they do for the sake of having a reason to be good, how do you know and decide what to do in any given particular situation.
The external world might not exist; it might be part of a delusion I'm having. However, I cannot live as if it doesn't exist. I believe it exists for the sake of navigating what it appears to be and how it appears to work. Acting as if the external world doesn't objectively exist hurts, whether or not such pain is part of a delusion. Objective moral standards might not exist, but I must act as if they do because acting as if they do not hurts. Like you, it pains me to even contemplate certain immoral actions, and the pain would destroy me if I did not act in certain situations as if it is objectively wrong for others to do a thing. The problem is that if all I have to justify my intervention is the exact principle that must justify their act in the first place, any act I choose hurts. My conclusion is that, like in the physical world, my concept of a subjective morality must be wrong as surely as my concept of a subjective gravity would be wrong. I cannot stand by while my child is about to step off a cliff because they believe gravity works differently for them; I must intervene. My concept of gravity must be that it is objectively true for everyone or else I'm in for a world of hurt. My concept of morality must be that it objectively applies to everyone or else I am in a world of hurt. What I believe must accommodate what I actually experience. What I actually experience cannot be accommodated by the concept of subjective morality. There are moral cases where I must act, am compelled to act, as surely as physical events can compel me to act. Just as the senses can be exercised and become more sensitive, and just as you learn to apply logic to that which your sense pick up in order to evaluate the information, conscience can be refined or desensitized and used in concert with reason to better evaluate the moral landscape.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Aleta said:
My first response here is that I’m sorry to hear that – that seems like a very limited view of why we should be good.
"We"? Under subjectivist morality that is determined individually, there is no reason why "we" should be good; there are only equal (in principle) individual justifications. You are using more concepts you have no right to use and providing implications not available to your premises. Since "good" can literally mean anything under subjectivism, your statement translates to " that seems like a very limited view of why we should do whatever we do". You are using "should" collectively and "good" as if it already means something other than what anyone individually feels like it means. You are reifying an entirely subjective "I can if I feel like it" into an objective "we should", which is unavailable under your premises. An even better (subjectivism-consistent) translation is "that seems like a very limited set of justifications for why you would do whatever you do". So what? Under subjctivism, I don't need a justification in the first place. Are you also going to point out that I have a very limited set of reasons why sometimes I buy avocados and sometimes I do not? What possible difference would it make to a logically-consistent moral subjectivist as long as I'm not hurting them?
But beyond that, what necessary consequences are you talking about? Necessary consequences of acting as if you believe in objective standards, or necessary consequences of actually being good in respect to those standards, or what?
The physical landscape doesn't care if you believe in gravity or not, whether you are utterly ignorant of it as a physical force or not; you pay a price for ignoring gravity and you can derive benefits from understanding it and how it works. I see the moral landscape the same way. It doesn't ultimately matter if you believe in it as long as you abide by it when it comes to not harming yourself or getting others harmed by your lack of understanding. The problem is, not understanding a thing may at some point lead one to do something that can repeatedly and eventually irreparably harm them or others if they insist that what they are doing cannot be what is harming them in the first place.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Aleta said:
I’m assuming the logical conclusion you are referring to here is that if one doesn’t act as if one believed in objective standards, one must adopt the position that “might makes right”. Am I correct that is what you are referring to, or are you referring to more.
Logically one must adopt it - practically, of course, they can ignore or be ignorant of the logic. I want to reiterate what I mean by "might makes right"; it is a shorthand means of saying "because I feel like it" and "because I can", which are the essential, logical justifications under subjectivist morality. You hold a thing as moral because you feel like it; you act on those feelings, including intervening in the affairs of others, because you can. You have no claim to a superior moral view or a superior right; in fact, subjectivity necessarily renders their views and behaviors, in principle, the equal of your own.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Aleta said:
Also, I’m interested in what you call necessary or self-evident truths. My experience has been that often (not always) these are only necessary or self-evident to those who already believe in the existence of some objective reality, and that they don’t appear so necessary or self-evident to others. I’ve offered an example to think about below that might allow you to give an example of necessary or self-evident truths you utilize in making moral judgements
A self-evident truth is a statement that, once one understands it, understands it to be true and that to deny it leaves one in absurdity. 1. I exist 2. 2+2=4 3. Error exists An example of a self-evidently true moral statement is: It is wrong for anyone, anywhere to torture children for fun. Once you understand the statement, unless you are a sociopath or insane, you understand that it is true, and to deny it is to render morality an absurd proposition. Any moral system where, for an individual, "torturing children for fun" is as morally good an act as, say, comforting the sick, is an absurd moral system. There's no use calling such a system "morality"; rather, it's just a system of emotionally/rhetorically justifying whatever you want to do anyway.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Aleta said:
This puts a new twist on things. You believe that you have a conscience that has a “sensory capacity.” Sensory capacity to sense what? This sounds a lot like you believe you have a moral sense of something outside yourself: i.e. objective standards. And yet you say you don’t know whether objective standards exist. Can you explain more about your conscience and what it senses?
I would like to note that you are taking this far afield from the main argument. You have not responded to many of my points about what the logic indicates are the consequences of a subjective morality - such as, your improper utilization of concepts logically irreconcilable with your premises, and your inability to justify any moral choice as, ultimately, anything other than "because I feel like it". This leaves you on equal moral footing with a person who tortures children. He has as much right to force his moral views on that child as you have to force yours on him if you attempt to intervene. That said, if morality refers to an objective commodity, then it is necessary that "mind", in some respects, is an objective landscape where moral rights and wrongs are similar to gravity or inertia in our physical landscape. I hold there to be other objective features of the mental landscape - logic, mathematics & geometry, for example. As we are physical entities contained in a physical universe, we are also mental entities contained in a universal mind, so to speak. Part of the whole yet individuated subsets. Like reason, conscience is fundamentally a sensory capacity that can sense or recognize (like sight or hearing) objective features of the mental landscape. Like sight or hearing, our moral sense is imperfect and open to misinterpretation, but what it is sensing is objectively real. No, I cannot prove any of this; I can only point to certain things to support it. For instance, the existence of self-evidently true statements and the necessity of logical principles supports this view. That 2+2=4 is necessarily true in any possible world indicates that there are objectively true aspects to some mental propositions, which one cannot deny on pain of absurdity. Which is why I use the moral example I use; a universe where torturing children for fun is fundamentally as moral as, as good as, comforting those hurt by illness or loss is an absurdity. No sane person can reasonably hold this to be true and believe that their concept of morality is acceptable. That example represents what I call one of the brick walls of the moral landscape. It's something you "run into", like a brick wall, and know (as much as you can know anything) that it is there,, and that it is wrong, even if you cannot see it, because of the pain it inflicts on any non-sociopath simply by thinking about it. Doing what amounts to promoting the idea that torturing children for fun is as moral as any other subjective moral preference is, IMO, something that cannot be justified even by subjectivists once they realize what they are doing. Well, unless they're sociopaths.William J Murray_{November 15, 2014
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Mung, I'm not sure what you are getting at, so maybe you should be clearer. Two of those statements are self-evident logical truths (thinking of math as a subset of logic) and one is a self-evident empirical truth (the awareness statement.) I'm off to bed. If you want to continue this discussion, perhaps you could explain why you are asking those questions?Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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I asked which of the three you deny. Just say none if you don't deny any of the three. Let me put it differently. Aleta, which of the three do you affirm is a self-evident truth?Mung_{November 14, 2014
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I didn't deny anything - I said one statement was different. I accept that the existence of my awareness is a self-evident truth, although it is an empirical truth and is different than a mathematical or logical truth.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Same way you do, I imagine. I'm not even sure what you are asking. There are common philosophy of mind issues about exactly who is aware, and Eastern philosophies explore this topic as part of one truly experiencing how "i" is an illusion, according to them. As I said to box, I'm really interested in staying on topic based on the discussion I'm having with William, but I didn't want to ignore your question.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta, which of the three do you deny is a self-evident truth?Mung_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta:
My knowledge that I am self-aware is something that I experience and observe – that is how I know it is true. That’s why I said “I am self-aware” is an empirically true fact.
How do you observe that you are self-aware? Just wondering.Mung_{November 14, 2014
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The first hit on google defines empirical as meaning "based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic." My knowledge that I am self-aware is something that I experience and observe - that is how I know it is true. That's why I said “I am self-aware” is an empirically true fact.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta:
Hmmm. One of these things is not like the others.
Brilliant deduction!!! So? But in fact, none of the three is the same. Which of the three do you deny is a self-evident truth? Why do you think that "I am self-aware" is an empirically true fact?Mung_{November 14, 2014
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I didn't mean you weren't welcome - anyone can post anyplace any time. However, I've found it satisfying and useful to have this discussion stay on topic so well.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta, I didn't mean to intrude, so I just bow to excuse myself and walk away like it never happened.Box_{November 14, 2014
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In respect to the discussion he and I are/were having, I'm interested in how he uses his conscience, which he hasn't discussed, and self evident and necessary truths to make moral judgments given his position that he acts as if objective standards exist even if he is not sure that they do. I'm not sure 2 + 2 = 4 has much bearing on that, although he may have used those examples in other discussions on other topics.Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta, in post 119 you wrote that you were interested in self-evident truths. Your question was addressed to WJM, but if memory serves me right, he used these examples in the past.Box_{November 14, 2014
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Hmmm. One of these things is not like the others. The statement "I am self-aware" is a different kind of statement than the other two, but I think everyone would agree that for themself this is an empirically true fact. But what's your point?Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta & centrestream, Let's start with these three self-evident truths: “2+2=4? “I am self-aware” “A=A, A is not equal to not-A” [ denial leads to irrationality (absurdity) ]Box_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta: " My experience has been that often (not always) these are only necessary or self-evident to those who already believe in the existence of some objective reality, and that they don’t appear so necessary or self-evident to others." I couldn't say it better. Whenever read people say that something is self evidently true (at least here on UD) it is always an attempt to place artificial limitations to the discussion. A false argument from authority, if you will (and even if you won't). I have no doubt that Barry, Gordon and William believe that they are following (or not, free will after all) a set of objective standards, morals and values, that are external to the human subjective experience. But nobody has explained, or provided evidence, that these are not the result of societal give and take; an evolutionary stable strategy, if you will forgive me the dated evolutionary concept.centrestream_{November 14, 2014
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I think I see three issues here. Let's start with this one.
In most cases, I begin with conscience and then apply logic and, where necessary, refer to self-evident truths or necessary truths. The main difference between a subjectivist and myself0 is that the subjectivist believes that conscience is an entirely subjective set of feelings, while I consider the conscience to be a sensory capacity similar to eyesight or hearing.
This puts a new twist on things. You believe that you have a conscience that has a "sensory capacity." Sensory capacity to sense what? This sounds a lot like you believe you have a moral sense of something outside yourself: i.e. objective standards. And yet you say you don't know whether objective standards exist. Can you explain more about your conscience and what it senses? Also, I'm interested in what you call necessary or self-evident truths. My experience has been that often (not always) these are only necessary or self-evident to those who already believe in the existence of some objective reality, and that they don't appear so necessary or self-evident to others. I've offered an example to think about below that might allow you to give an example of necessary or self-evident truths you utilize in making moral judgements You write,
I’m saying that all sane people must act as if there are objective moral standards. Any that profess subjectivism are either ignorant of the logic, unable to process the logic, lying, or are self-deluded.
I'm assuming the logical conclusion you are referring to here is that if one doesn't act as if one believed in objective standards, one must adopt the position that "might makes right". Am I correct that is what you are referring to, or are you referring to more. You write,
Choosing to believe that such standards exist in the first place, and that there are necessary consequences, is the only reason I have for trying to be good.
My first response here is that I'm sorry to hear that - that seems like a very limited view of why we should be good. But beyond that, what necessary consequences are you talking about? Necessary consequences of acting as if you believe in objective standards, or necessary consequences of actually being good in respect to those standards, or what? And here's a bigger question, possibly covered in the part about conscience above: if objective standards might not even exist, even if you believe they do for the sake of having a reason to be good, how do you know and decide what to do in any given particular situation. At the risk of getting us sidetracked on a particular issue, I'd like to offer an example for us to think about - one controversial enough that reasonable people do disagree, but not too inflammatory (I hope.) I feel strongly that people should have the legal and medical right, and access to the means, to end their own life at an appropriate time, taking into account various factors such as the time they are thought to have left to live, the quality of life they are likely to have during that time, the drain of time, energy, emotions, financial resources etc. that most likely will occur during that time. I also think this decision should ultimately be in the hands of the person himself and those he has chosen to help make that decision. I know that there are people who feel strongly that this is wrong, both for the individual to contemplate doing and the government to allow. There was a recent case in the news concerning a woman who moved to Oregon, one of the few states to allow this, who died a week or so ago under these circumstances. Now, William, I'm interested in the meta issue here: not the issue of whether this is right or wrong, but how do you go about making a judgment about whether this is right or wrong compared to how I do. How does your belief that you need to act as if objective standards exist, and your belief that your conscience (as you perhaps have explained in response to my first point above) and your appeal to necessary and self-evident truths lead you to a judgment in this case? Perhaps addressing an example like this would make it possible for you to be more specific about how you implement your beliefs in real situations. ========= Added after reading 116. You write,
The objectivist is obligated to do what is right whether he likes it or not, whether he prefers it or not, and has a responsibility to live by those rules or else face the necessary consequences.
But how does he know what is right! What rules are you referring to? If accepted social norms aren't sufficient, and there are not any objective standards that you are sure of that exist, how do you know what is right?Aleta_{November 14, 2014
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Aleta said:
As I often have said, I would rather live with uncertainty than believe things that are not true. I would rather live with the human dilemma of needing to choose about right and wrong without knowing that there might be some “right” answer that I am accountable to than do what you have done and escaped that dilemma by choosing to act as if something were true even though you don’t know if it is or not.
Problematically, under moral subjectivism, you have no fundamental reason to care about the truth at all. How on earth can a moral subjectivist justify preferring truth to comfort? As far as my dilemma, there are some things you cannot delete from the memory file; once I realized what my logical options were, I couldn't go back to being non-cognizant of the logic. The abyss I faced is the same one necessarily in front of every moral subjectivist; some just have their eyes closed, and yes, you can live your life to the end quite well that way. But, once you realize what it logically means to be a subjectivist, you cannot re-shut your eyes and go back to blissful ignorance.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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While you and I may have welcomed Jesus into our hearts, it is unChristian to call those who have not yet seen the light insane. We must work to persuade these souls into the fold.
I'm not a Christian. I'm not trying to persuade anyone of anything. I'm making a logical argument about two different premises, nothing more.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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aleta said:
I guess I really can’t understand how you think your position allows you to be in any different position than I am. Believing in something because it makes life seem to be easier to live, even if it might not be true, is a metaphysical choice (a subjective one at that), but not the kind of choice I would make.
How I choose what I believe is irrelevant to the logical validity of the argument I've been presenting about the conclusions that necessarily stem from your premises. You have detoured the debate into some kind of armchair psychoanalysis about me. Here is one differences between a logically consistent moral subjectivist and an objectivist: The logically-consistent subjectivist can simply redefine a wrong as a right if they wish. Subjectivists are not obligated to behave according to any presumed set of objective rules, and because there are no necessary moral consequences to any action good or bad there's no reason not to simply do whatever one feels is in their own best interest. The objectivist is obligated to do what is right whether he likes it or not, whether he prefers it or not, and has a responsibility to live by those rules or else face the necessary consequences. Those are two entirely different positions.William J Murray_{November 14, 2014
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"I’m saying that all sane people must act as if there are objective moral standards." While you and I may have welcomed Jesus into our hearts, it is unChristian to call those who have not yet seen the light insane. We must work to persuade these souls into the fold.Alicia Renard_{November 14, 2014
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