“Meaning” vs. “MEANING”

Oh what a wonderful discussion I have missed! Barry is wrong on basically everything, as always, but enough about that. Let's get to the point. When atheists or agnostics say there's no ultimate meaning or purpose, it does not follow that there's no purpose at all. Meaning is subjective or relative to them, and this actually makes sense quite deeply. For example, directions (left, right, up, down) are relative to the viewer. It's incomplete to say "The squirrel is left," full stop. More properly it can be said, "The squirrel is five yards left from me" or from you, i.e. the direction is relative. Despite being relative, the direction is pretty meaningful. It determines the location of the squirrel. Yet is there an ultimate direction? Is there an ultimate location? Generalising the directions all across the universe, it seems like the ultimate location is "everywhere", but how coherent is the proposition "The ultimate location is everywhere"? Does not look so readly graspable. So, from the fact that there are relative directions it does not directly follow that there is also an ultimate direction. It takes a separate argument to arrive at that. While we are arguing with varying degrees of success, life goes on as per usual relative directions. E.Seigner

Hi William. I think this discussion may be coming to end, but I do have some responses. First, you write,

I would like to note that you are taking this far afield from the main argument. You have not responded to many of my points about what the logic indicates are the consequences of a subjective morality

Much of the first part of our discussion was about my explaining my thoughts on morality in absence of any objective standards. I then asked you some questions to try to get the reverse perspective of someone who believed otherwise. I think I have stayed on the main topic, but have wanted it to be balanced in terms of each of us both questioning the other and explaining our own position. And I have responded to your points - I just haven't given you answers you accept, and I don't think that is going to change. Perhaps in a later post I'll add to my explanation, but what I have to say won't change your opinion, I'm sure. I imagine we'll go away from this discussion each thinking the other is wrong. But I'll start with this. You write,

If morality refers to an objective commodity, then it is necessary that “mind”, in some respects, is an objective landscape where moral rights and wrongs are similar to gravity or inertia in our physical landscape. I hold there to be other objective features of the mental landscape – logic, mathematics & geometry, for example. As we are physical entities contained in a physical universe, we are also mental entities contained in a universal mind, so to speak. Part of the whole yet individuated subsets. Like reason, conscience is fundamentally a sensory capacity that can sense or recognize (like sight or hearing) objective features of the mental landscape. Like sight or hearing, our moral sense is imperfect and open to misinterpretation, but what it is sensing is objectively real. No, I cannot prove any of this; I can only point to certain things to support it...

However, earlier in #107 you wrote,

I will tell you this: I don’t know if an objective standard for morality exists, but if I want my metaphysical beliefs to be consonant with how I must live and behave in the world, I must employ the premise of an objective morality ....

But now you say that even though you can't prove it (and I understand that metaphysical beliefs can't be proven) you believe that there is a mental world in addition to a physical world, that our mind can access that mental world, and that our conscience can access that part of the mental world that concerns morality. And later you explain that even though conscience doesn't perfectly sense those objective moral standards, "conscience can be refined or desensitized and used in concert with reason to better evaluate the moral landscape." So it seems to me you do believe in objective moral standards, and that the conscience is "sensing" an objectively true standard about torturing babies in the same way the mind knows that 2 + 2 = 4 as a mathematical self-evident fact. So, it seems like there is an inconsistency between what you said in #107 and what you said today, and it seems like what you said today is more the true case for your beliefs. I don't believe there is a separate "mental world" that we have special access to. I am not a dualist. This is probably the fundamental difference between the two of us. You do believe in objective moral standards that exist outside of us that are true in a way that our "subjective" truths are not, and that we do have access to those standards separate from any empirical knowledge we might have about human beings. I don't believe that objective world exists, or that that access exists - so we are right back to the fundamental difference that started this discussion. This also takes me back to my post at #84, where I asked,

Now explain to me objective knowledge of morals. To the extent it is analogous to objective knowledge of the physical world, what experiences can we have to acquaint ourselves with the existence of these objective morals, and more importantly, what common experiences are there such that any human being, properly acquainted with the experiences, would accept them as objectively true.

Assuming your belief in this mental world, given that it is an imperfect sense and given we can't have any shared experience of what our consciences feel (although we can talk about the experience), how are to come to any agreement as to what thes objectives standards are - even if conscience in your sense is present, so are all sorts of other factors in a person's psychology, so it seems like we still have a subjective judgment from every person. Is gay marriage wrong? Is a man having multiple wives wrong? Is slavery wrong? Is the submission of women to their husband, or men in general wrong? Is war wrong? Is stealing to feed your starving children wrong? Is letting a man die from cold and starvation on the street because there is no community shelter wrong? Is contraception wrong? Is stem cell research from fetal cells wrong? Is self-assisted, self chosen death wrong? Is eating pork wrong? Is driving a spike through a blessed communion wafer wrong? The list goes on and on - are there objective standards that answers these questions? Explain to me how one is supposed to know, and come to agreement with one's fellow human beings, about what these objective standards are, and how we are supposed to separate those objective standards from all the subjective complexities of human beings. You keep pointing to one extreme example concerning babies, but you really haven't explained how your belief escapes the dilemma that each person has to make their own decisions about morals in general - it is not at all self-evident that a self-evident set of moral standards or principles are universally available to human beings through their conscience. I am sure that a cross-cultural study of what people consider objective standards would show quite a bit of similarity, because of a common human nature, and yet also even a greater amount of diversity because of differences in personality and culture. I don't see the evidence that these objective standards exist. You would probably respond that irrespective of that diversity of what people think, the objective standards are there, but I repeat that in the real world of real human action, each person's overall assessment of the situation is subjective. Again, your persistent use of one extreme example does not address the more general question. That's enough for this post. Perhaps I will write more later, but I've ot other things to do now. Aleta

Lots to read here - I'm going out for a while to beat the snowstorm, but will return ... Aleta

But how does he know what is right! What rules are you referring to? If accepted social norms aren’t sufficient, and there are not any objective standards that you are sure of that exist, how do you know what is right?

You don't "know", except perhaps in the case of self-evident moral truths (depending on how you define "knowing"). Like with any of your senses, you develop an understanding through use of conscience and reasoning as best you can when navigating the moral landscape and learning from your mistakes and clearing up your misconceptions when reason dictates that you were wrong about a moral view. Unless morality is assumed to be an objective commodity sensed through the conscience and subject to rational examination, we have no basis for debate about "what is right" other than emotional pleading, rhetoric and manipulation via terminology. If you and I both assume that there is an objective source of morality, then we have something to work with in a debate by beginning with what we both agree are self-evidently true moral statements, then leading to statements that are necessarily true derived from those self-evidently true statements, leading to conditionally true statements and generally true statements. We have the basis for an actual, logical argument, whereas under subjectivism all we have is "because I feel like it". For example, if someone believes that self-determined death is morally wrong and shouldn't be permitted, I am entirely open to hearing such an argument and to adjusting my own perspective if I find the logic of the argument compelling. William J Murray

Aleta said:

I feel strongly that people should have the legal and medical right, and access to the means, to end their own life .... I know that there are people who feel strongly that this is wrong, both for the individual to contemplate doing and the government to allow. Now, William, I’m interested in the meta issue here: not the issue of whether this is right or wrong, but how do you go about making a judgment about whether this is right or wrong compared to how I do. How does your belief that you need to act as if objective standards exist, and your belief that your conscience (as you perhaps have explained in response to my first point above) and your appeal to necessary and self-evident truths lead you to a judgment in this case? Perhaps addressing an example like this would make it possible for you to be more specific about how you implement your beliefs in real situations.

Without libertarian free will the concept of morality is necessarily (logically) meaningless. A fundamental requirement of a moral system is the free will capacity to make both wrong and right choices. Since this is a fundamental, necessary aspect of morality, the individual freedom to make both good and bad moral decisions must be respected - honored - as much as it is possible to do so, especially when no others are being directly, purposefully harmed. The capacity to cause emotional pain in others by our personal decisions is simply the nature of free moral choice. Take away any capacity to harm others and you have pretty much taken away any meaning morality has. There are arguments one could make on either side of such an issue. Like with the processing and rational evaluation of any sensory data, our capacity to understand through conscience is imperfect. That a thing objectively exists, and that we can sense it, doesn't mean our interpretation of it represents the absolute truth about that thing. I think that whenever possible, we should err on the side of respecting the freedom of sane adults otherwise believed to be in possession of their mental faculties to make moral decisions for themselves, even if we believe they are making the wrong decision and even if it emotionally pains us. Believing that right and wrong objectively exist is not the same as claiming that I have perfect knowledge of right and wrong or perfect knowledge of how to best interpret the moral landscape. William J Murray

Aleta said:

And here’s a bigger question, possibly covered in the part about conscience above: if objective standards might not even exist, even if you believe they do for the sake of having a reason to be good, how do you know and decide what to do in any given particular situation.

The external world might not exist; it might be part of a delusion I'm having. However, I cannot live as if it doesn't exist. I believe it exists for the sake of navigating what it appears to be and how it appears to work. Acting as if the external world doesn't objectively exist hurts, whether or not such pain is part of a delusion. Objective moral standards might not exist, but I must act as if they do because acting as if they do not hurts. Like you, it pains me to even contemplate certain immoral actions, and the pain would destroy me if I did not act in certain situations as if it is objectively wrong for others to do a thing. The problem is that if all I have to justify my intervention is the exact principle that must justify their act in the first place, any act I choose hurts. My conclusion is that, like in the physical world, my concept of a subjective morality must be wrong as surely as my concept of a subjective gravity would be wrong. I cannot stand by while my child is about to step off a cliff because they believe gravity works differently for them; I must intervene. My concept of gravity must be that it is objectively true for everyone or else I'm in for a world of hurt. My concept of morality must be that it objectively applies to everyone or else I am in a world of hurt. What I believe must accommodate what I actually experience. What I actually experience cannot be accommodated by the concept of subjective morality. There are moral cases where I must act, am compelled to act, as surely as physical events can compel me to act. Just as the senses can be exercised and become more sensitive, and just as you learn to apply logic to that which your sense pick up in order to evaluate the information, conscience can be refined or desensitized and used in concert with reason to better evaluate the moral landscape. William J Murray

Aleta said:

My first response here is that I’m sorry to hear that – that seems like a very limited view of why we should be good.

"We"? Under subjectivist morality that is determined individually, there is no reason why "we" should be good; there are only equal (in principle) individual justifications. You are using more concepts you have no right to use and providing implications not available to your premises. Since "good" can literally mean anything under subjectivism, your statement translates to " that seems like a very limited view of why we should do whatever we do". You are using "should" collectively and "good" as if it already means something other than what anyone individually feels like it means. You are reifying an entirely subjective "I can if I feel like it" into an objective "we should", which is unavailable under your premises. An even better (subjectivism-consistent) translation is "that seems like a very limited set of justifications for why you would do whatever you do". So what? Under subjctivism, I don't need a justification in the first place. Are you also going to point out that I have a very limited set of reasons why sometimes I buy avocados and sometimes I do not? What possible difference would it make to a logically-consistent moral subjectivist as long as I'm not hurting them?

But beyond that, what necessary consequences are you talking about? Necessary consequences of acting as if you believe in objective standards, or necessary consequences of actually being good in respect to those standards, or what?

The physical landscape doesn't care if you believe in gravity or not, whether you are utterly ignorant of it as a physical force or not; you pay a price for ignoring gravity and you can derive benefits from understanding it and how it works. I see the moral landscape the same way. It doesn't ultimately matter if you believe in it as long as you abide by it when it comes to not harming yourself or getting others harmed by your lack of understanding. The problem is, not understanding a thing may at some point lead one to do something that can repeatedly and eventually irreparably harm them or others if they insist that what they are doing cannot be what is harming them in the first place. William J Murray

Aleta said:

I’m assuming the logical conclusion you are referring to here is that if one doesn’t act as if one believed in objective standards, one must adopt the position that “might makes right”. Am I correct that is what you are referring to, or are you referring to more.

Logically one must adopt it - practically, of course, they can ignore or be ignorant of the logic. I want to reiterate what I mean by "might makes right"; it is a shorthand means of saying "because I feel like it" and "because I can", which are the essential, logical justifications under subjectivist morality. You hold a thing as moral because you feel like it; you act on those feelings, including intervening in the affairs of others, because you can. You have no claim to a superior moral view or a superior right; in fact, subjectivity necessarily renders their views and behaviors, in principle, the equal of your own. William J Murray

Aleta said:

Also, I’m interested in what you call necessary or self-evident truths. My experience has been that often (not always) these are only necessary or self-evident to those who already believe in the existence of some objective reality, and that they don’t appear so necessary or self-evident to others. I’ve offered an example to think about below that might allow you to give an example of necessary or self-evident truths you utilize in making moral judgements

A self-evident truth is a statement that, once one understands it, understands it to be true and that to deny it leaves one in absurdity. 1. I exist 2. 2+2=4 3. Error exists An example of a self-evidently true moral statement is: It is wrong for anyone, anywhere to torture children for fun. Once you understand the statement, unless you are a sociopath or insane, you understand that it is true, and to deny it is to render morality an absurd proposition. Any moral system where, for an individual, "torturing children for fun" is as morally good an act as, say, comforting the sick, is an absurd moral system. There's no use calling such a system "morality"; rather, it's just a system of emotionally/rhetorically justifying whatever you want to do anyway. William J Murray

Aleta said:

This puts a new twist on things. You believe that you have a conscience that has a “sensory capacity.” Sensory capacity to sense what? This sounds a lot like you believe you have a moral sense of something outside yourself: i.e. objective standards. And yet you say you don’t know whether objective standards exist. Can you explain more about your conscience and what it senses?

I would like to note that you are taking this far afield from the main argument. You have not responded to many of my points about what the logic indicates are the consequences of a subjective morality - such as, your improper utilization of concepts logically irreconcilable with your premises, and your inability to justify any moral choice as, ultimately, anything other than "because I feel like it". This leaves you on equal moral footing with a person who tortures children. He has as much right to force his moral views on that child as you have to force yours on him if you attempt to intervene. That said, if morality refers to an objective commodity, then it is necessary that "mind", in some respects, is an objective landscape where moral rights and wrongs are similar to gravity or inertia in our physical landscape. I hold there to be other objective features of the mental landscape - logic, mathematics & geometry, for example. As we are physical entities contained in a physical universe, we are also mental entities contained in a universal mind, so to speak. Part of the whole yet individuated subsets. Like reason, conscience is fundamentally a sensory capacity that can sense or recognize (like sight or hearing) objective features of the mental landscape. Like sight or hearing, our moral sense is imperfect and open to misinterpretation, but what it is sensing is objectively real. No, I cannot prove any of this; I can only point to certain things to support it. For instance, the existence of self-evidently true statements and the necessity of logical principles supports this view. That 2+2=4 is necessarily true in any possible world indicates that there are objectively true aspects to some mental propositions, which one cannot deny on pain of absurdity. Which is why I use the moral example I use; a universe where torturing children for fun is fundamentally as moral as, as good as, comforting those hurt by illness or loss is an absurdity. No sane person can reasonably hold this to be true and believe that their concept of morality is acceptable. That example represents what I call one of the brick walls of the moral landscape. It's something you "run into", like a brick wall, and know (as much as you can know anything) that it is there,, and that it is wrong, even if you cannot see it, because of the pain it inflicts on any non-sociopath simply by thinking about it. Doing what amounts to promoting the idea that torturing children for fun is as moral as any other subjective moral preference is, IMO, something that cannot be justified even by subjectivists once they realize what they are doing. Well, unless they're sociopaths. William J Murray

Mung, I'm not sure what you are getting at, so maybe you should be clearer. Two of those statements are self-evident logical truths (thinking of math as a subset of logic) and one is a self-evident empirical truth (the awareness statement.) I'm off to bed. If you want to continue this discussion, perhaps you could explain why you are asking those questions? Aleta

I asked which of the three you deny. Just say none if you don't deny any of the three. Let me put it differently. Aleta, which of the three do you affirm is a self-evident truth? Mung

I didn't deny anything - I said one statement was different. I accept that the existence of my awareness is a self-evident truth, although it is an empirical truth and is different than a mathematical or logical truth. Aleta

Same way you do, I imagine. I'm not even sure what you are asking. There are common philosophy of mind issues about exactly who is aware, and Eastern philosophies explore this topic as part of one truly experiencing how "i" is an illusion, according to them. As I said to box, I'm really interested in staying on topic based on the discussion I'm having with William, but I didn't want to ignore your question. Aleta

Aleta, which of the three do you deny is a self-evident truth? Mung

Aleta:

My knowledge that I am self-aware is something that I experience and observe – that is how I know it is true. That’s why I said “I am self-aware” is an empirically true fact.

How do you observe that you are self-aware? Just wondering. Mung

The first hit on google defines empirical as meaning "based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic." My knowledge that I am self-aware is something that I experience and observe - that is how I know it is true. That's why I said “I am self-aware” is an empirically true fact. Aleta

Aleta:

Hmmm. One of these things is not like the others.

Brilliant deduction!!! So? But in fact, none of the three is the same. Which of the three do you deny is a self-evident truth? Why do you think that "I am self-aware" is an empirically true fact? Mung

I didn't mean you weren't welcome - anyone can post anyplace any time. However, I've found it satisfying and useful to have this discussion stay on topic so well. Aleta

Aleta, I didn't mean to intrude, so I just bow to excuse myself and walk away like it never happened. Box

In respect to the discussion he and I are/were having, I'm interested in how he uses his conscience, which he hasn't discussed, and self evident and necessary truths to make moral judgments given his position that he acts as if objective standards exist even if he is not sure that they do. I'm not sure 2 + 2 = 4 has much bearing on that, although he may have used those examples in other discussions on other topics. Aleta

Aleta, in post 119 you wrote that you were interested in self-evident truths. Your question was addressed to WJM, but if memory serves me right, he used these examples in the past. Box

Hmmm. One of these things is not like the others. The statement "I am self-aware" is a different kind of statement than the other two, but I think everyone would agree that for themself this is an empirically true fact. But what's your point? Aleta

Aleta & centrestream, Let's start with these three self-evident truths: “2+2=4? “I am self-aware” “A=A, A is not equal to not-A” [ denial leads to irrationality (absurdity) ] Box

Aleta: " My experience has been that often (not always) these are only necessary or self-evident to those who already believe in the existence of some objective reality, and that they don’t appear so necessary or self-evident to others." I couldn't say it better. Whenever read people say that something is self evidently true (at least here on UD) it is always an attempt to place artificial limitations to the discussion. A false argument from authority, if you will (and even if you won't). I have no doubt that Barry, Gordon and William believe that they are following (or not, free will after all) a set of objective standards, morals and values, that are external to the human subjective experience. But nobody has explained, or provided evidence, that these are not the result of societal give and take; an evolutionary stable strategy, if you will forgive me the dated evolutionary concept. centrestream

I think I see three issues here. Let's start with this one.

In most cases, I begin with conscience and then apply logic and, where necessary, refer to self-evident truths or necessary truths. The main difference between a subjectivist and myself0 is that the subjectivist believes that conscience is an entirely subjective set of feelings, while I consider the conscience to be a sensory capacity similar to eyesight or hearing.

This puts a new twist on things. You believe that you have a conscience that has a "sensory capacity." Sensory capacity to sense what? This sounds a lot like you believe you have a moral sense of something outside yourself: i.e. objective standards. And yet you say you don't know whether objective standards exist. Can you explain more about your conscience and what it senses? Also, I'm interested in what you call necessary or self-evident truths. My experience has been that often (not always) these are only necessary or self-evident to those who already believe in the existence of some objective reality, and that they don't appear so necessary or self-evident to others. I've offered an example to think about below that might allow you to give an example of necessary or self-evident truths you utilize in making moral judgements You write,

I’m saying that all sane people must act as if there are objective moral standards. Any that profess subjectivism are either ignorant of the logic, unable to process the logic, lying, or are self-deluded.

I'm assuming the logical conclusion you are referring to here is that if one doesn't act as if one believed in objective standards, one must adopt the position that "might makes right". Am I correct that is what you are referring to, or are you referring to more. You write,

Choosing to believe that such standards exist in the first place, and that there are necessary consequences, is the only reason I have for trying to be good.

My first response here is that I'm sorry to hear that - that seems like a very limited view of why we should be good. But beyond that, what necessary consequences are you talking about? Necessary consequences of acting as if you believe in objective standards, or necessary consequences of actually being good in respect to those standards, or what? And here's a bigger question, possibly covered in the part about conscience above: if objective standards might not even exist, even if you believe they do for the sake of having a reason to be good, how do you know and decide what to do in any given particular situation. At the risk of getting us sidetracked on a particular issue, I'd like to offer an example for us to think about - one controversial enough that reasonable people do disagree, but not too inflammatory (I hope.) I feel strongly that people should have the legal and medical right, and access to the means, to end their own life at an appropriate time, taking into account various factors such as the time they are thought to have left to live, the quality of life they are likely to have during that time, the drain of time, energy, emotions, financial resources etc. that most likely will occur during that time. I also think this decision should ultimately be in the hands of the person himself and those he has chosen to help make that decision. I know that there are people who feel strongly that this is wrong, both for the individual to contemplate doing and the government to allow. There was a recent case in the news concerning a woman who moved to Oregon, one of the few states to allow this, who died a week or so ago under these circumstances. Now, William, I'm interested in the meta issue here: not the issue of whether this is right or wrong, but how do you go about making a judgment about whether this is right or wrong compared to how I do. How does your belief that you need to act as if objective standards exist, and your belief that your conscience (as you perhaps have explained in response to my first point above) and your appeal to necessary and self-evident truths lead you to a judgment in this case? Perhaps addressing an example like this would make it possible for you to be more specific about how you implement your beliefs in real situations. ========= Added after reading 116. You write,

The objectivist is obligated to do what is right whether he likes it or not, whether he prefers it or not, and has a responsibility to live by those rules or else face the necessary consequences.

But how does he know what is right! What rules are you referring to? If accepted social norms aren't sufficient, and there are not any objective standards that you are sure of that exist, how do you know what is right? Aleta

Aleta said:

As I often have said, I would rather live with uncertainty than believe things that are not true. I would rather live with the human dilemma of needing to choose about right and wrong without knowing that there might be some “right” answer that I am accountable to than do what you have done and escaped that dilemma by choosing to act as if something were true even though you don’t know if it is or not.

Problematically, under moral subjectivism, you have no fundamental reason to care about the truth at all. How on earth can a moral subjectivist justify preferring truth to comfort? As far as my dilemma, there are some things you cannot delete from the memory file; once I realized what my logical options were, I couldn't go back to being non-cognizant of the logic. The abyss I faced is the same one necessarily in front of every moral subjectivist; some just have their eyes closed, and yes, you can live your life to the end quite well that way. But, once you realize what it logically means to be a subjectivist, you cannot re-shut your eyes and go back to blissful ignorance. William J Murray

While you and I may have welcomed Jesus into our hearts, it is unChristian to call those who have not yet seen the light insane. We must work to persuade these souls into the fold.

I'm not a Christian. I'm not trying to persuade anyone of anything. I'm making a logical argument about two different premises, nothing more. William J Murray

aleta said:

I guess I really can’t understand how you think your position allows you to be in any different position than I am. Believing in something because it makes life seem to be easier to live, even if it might not be true, is a metaphysical choice (a subjective one at that), but not the kind of choice I would make.

How I choose what I believe is irrelevant to the logical validity of the argument I've been presenting about the conclusions that necessarily stem from your premises. You have detoured the debate into some kind of armchair psychoanalysis about me. Here is one differences between a logically consistent moral subjectivist and an objectivist: The logically-consistent subjectivist can simply redefine a wrong as a right if they wish. Subjectivists are not obligated to behave according to any presumed set of objective rules, and because there are no necessary moral consequences to any action good or bad there's no reason not to simply do whatever one feels is in their own best interest. The objectivist is obligated to do what is right whether he likes it or not, whether he prefers it or not, and has a responsibility to live by those rules or else face the necessary consequences. Those are two entirely different positions. William J Murray

"I’m saying that all sane people must act as if there are objective moral standards." While you and I may have welcomed Jesus into our hearts, it is unChristian to call those who have not yet seen the light insane. We must work to persuade these souls into the fold. Alicia Renard

Aleta said:

You seem to be saying that whether there are objective standards or not – the truth of that is irrelevant – you must act as if there are because the alternative, might makes right, is untenable to you.

I'm saying that all sane people must act as if there are objective moral standards. Any that profess subjectivism are either ignorant of the logic, unable to process the logic, lying, or are self-deluded.

First, the fact that you see a fairly, or completely, black-and-white choice between acting as if objective standards exist and the amoral subjectivist alternative doesn’t mean that all others must feel those are the only two alternatives.

What they feel is entirely irrelevant to this argument, which is about the rational conclusions that necssarily follow from the premise. Of course, few self-described moral subjectivists understand or are even aware of the logical consequences to their intellectually held beliefs.

Like all logic applied to things which don’t have empirical referents, your sense that logic compels you to “employ the premise of an objective morality” is really a reflection of your belief in the abyss you see between believing in objective standards and the amoral, “might makes right” alternative. Other people, me for instance, don’t see that abyss, and therefore draw different logical conclusions.

The existence or lack of an abyss that may be emotionally troublesome doesn't change whether or not a conclusion is logically valid. One's statements and actions are either logically consistent with their premises, or they are not. There is no special consideration given one's particular psychology.

And irrespective of the ways in which my post at#84 might be irrelevant, as you don’t know whether objective standards exist or not, how do you decide what is right or wrong in any given circumstance?

In most cases, I begin with conscience and then apply logic and, where necessary, refer to self-evident truths or necessary truths. The main difference between a subjectivist and myself0 is that the subjectivist believes that conscience is an entirely subjective set of feelings, while I consider the conscience to be a sensory capacity similar to eyesight or hearing.

Do you just do the best you can, the same way a subjectivist would,

When I do the best I can, it is in reference to an assumed standard by which my actions can be judged on a gradient from bad to good, which is where "best" has significant meaning. Also,such behavior is assumed to have necessary consequences (good or bad). If I fail to do my best, I cannot simply redefine "best" or "good" as a subjectivist could. Logically-consistent subjectivists can simply call anything they do the "best" they can because they are the presumed sole arbiter of what is good and bad, and there are no necessary consequences. Why even bother rating your behavior in such a manner?

and then choose to believe that you are acting in accordance with objective standards?

Choosing to believe that such standards exist in the first place, and that there are necessary consequences, is the only reason I have for trying to be good. Please not that there is a difference between self-described subjectivists and logically consistent subjectivists. IMO, there are very, very few logically consistent subjectivists around, and I doubt anyone here is one. William J Murray

Barry, I have shown you that if subjective morality is a mere "preference", then so is yours:

What Barry doesn’t realize is that if he defines “preference” broadly enough to encompass a subjectivist’s moral judgments, it is broad enough to include the objectivist’s moral judgments as well. After all, the objectivist prefers that others adhere to his or her morality just as the subjectivist does. The only difference is that the objectivist thinks that his or her subjective morality matches up with some absolute, binding, external standard.

You subjectively prefer that others conform to what you subjectively consider to be an absolute, objective morality. Yet even if we assume that God exists and that we understand his morality, a question remains: Why should God's subjective morality be considered objective? Why should it be binding on us? I look forward to your answers. keith s

William, that is very interesting, and not what I have understood you to be saying up to this point. What I say in the following is with all due respect for the fact that your position, and how you reached it, is obviously important to you and well thought out. You seem to be saying that whether there are objective standards or not - the truth of that is irrelevant – you must act as if there are because the alternative, might makes right, is untenable to you. I have several responses. First, the fact that you see a fairly, or completely, black-and-white choice between acting as if objective standards exist and the amoral subjectivist alternative doesn't mean that all others must feel those are the only two alternatives. You seem to make it clear that acting as if objective standards exist is in fact a choice on your part. The fact that you think this is the only logical option is a subjective judgment - you can't escape that you are in the same boat as the subjectivist even though that is what you strongly want to do. Like all logic applied to things which don't have empirical referents, your sense that logic compels you to "employ the premise of an objective morality" is really a reflection of your belief in the abyss you see between believing in objective standards and the amoral, "might makes right" alternative. Other people, me for instance, don't see that abyss, and therefore draw different logical conclusions. And irrespective of the ways in which my post at#84 might be irrelevant, as you don't know whether objective standards exist or not, how do you decide what is right or wrong in any given circumstance? Do you just do the best you can, the same way a subjectivist would, and then choose to believe that you are acting in accordance with objective standards? I guess I really can't understand how you think your position allows you to be in any different position than I am. Believing in something because it makes life seem to be easier to live, even if it might not be true, is a metaphysical choice (a subjective one at that), but not the kind of choice I would make. As I often have said, I would rather live with uncertainty than believe things that are not true. I would rather live with the human dilemma of needing to choose about right and wrong without knowing that there might be some "right" answer that I am accountable to than do what you have done and escaped that dilemma by choosing to act as if something were true even though you don't know if it is or not. Aleta

markf

#105 BA I note that you ducked the question. Do you believe there are important differences?

I thought I answered the question. Perhaps you will understand the answer better if I phrase it this way: As someone who believes in the existence of an objective transcendent standard of morality, it goes without saying that I believe there are “important” differences between a choice that implicates no moral issue and a choice that implicates a substantial moral issue. If no such objective transcendent moral standard exists, who is to say whether there is an “important” difference between the two choices. Indeed, if an objective transcendent moral standard does not exist, the word “important” in your question has no meaning except “that which I consider to be important.” Barry Arrington

It would be useful to provide an example. However, please don’t continue to use torturing babies. I have a two year old granddaughter and a new grandchild on the way and it pains me deeply to think about that example. I picked a middle-of-the-road example for the physical world, and I would hope you would also.

There's a reason I use that example. If morality is ultimately a matter of personal preference, and if what is right for an individual can only be determined by that individual, then such an act can in fact be good as much as any other act can be good; and you have no foundation by which to call it wrong for that person other than "because I say so", and no grounds to intervene other than "because I can". Which reduces your morality to "might makes right", the same morality the other person uses to justify his horrible act as "good". If you are okay with a morality that boils down, essentially, to "might makes right", then I have no further case to make. William J Murray

Aleta, Your #84 attempts to paint the debate as being about how we come to know things about the world, and whether or not we can "know" that there is an objective basis to morality. That is utterly irrelevant to my current argument. My argument is one of logic, not evidence, in the form of "IF we postulate morality refers to an objective source, THEN ..." and "IF we postulate morality refers to a subjective source, THEN..." If one is willing to follow the inferences to the necessary conclusion, it becomes clear that the two premises lead to entirely different moral structures. Anyone who is not a sociopath lives as if morality refers to an objective commodity, even if they intellectually believe and claim otherwise. IOW, you might claim to be a moral subjectivist; you might believe in moral subjectivism; you phrase things and live, however, like a moral objectivist. William J Murray

Aleta said:

William, your objections only have weight if there are in fact objective standards of right and wrong. Can you show me why you think I should believe that is the case, as I outlined in #84?

No, my objections are valid whether or not there is inf act an objective source of right or wrong. Just because there is no objective source of right and wrong doesn't mean you get to employ terms and concepts that require the premise of an objective right and wrong. You have no logical right to them regardless, because your premise is that of a subjective right and wrong. William J Murray

Aleta said:

To you, everything is knowledge in the sense that one needs to know about something that exists outside of oneself.

I would be really careful about assuming things about me. The only kind of thing I consider to be "knowledge" is that which I personally experience. I don't consider anything else knowledge, but rather opinion, speculation, assumption or belief. My arguments about subjectivist morality stand or fail regardless of my own personal beliefs. I will tell you this: I don't know if an objective standard for morality exists, but if I want my metaphysical beliefs to be consonant with how I must live and behave in the world, I must employ the premise of an objective morality or else my morality boils down to "because I say so" and "because I can". I can't live like that - I know, I've tried. The only principle that can prevent morality from boiling down to "might makes right" is the premise of a natural law, necessary, objective source of "right" and "wrong". I looked really hard to avoid that and to find some other way of being "good", but there's no alternative. As others here say, ultimately, if there is no objective good, then good is really nothing more than a trivial, rhetorcial device used to manipulate others and justify what we already prefer. William J Murray

#105 BA I note that you ducked the question. Do you believe there are important differences? markf

Markf:

Do you accept there are important differences between the two?

Mark, I understand your need to believe that there is an “important” difference between your subjective evaluation of ice cream and your subjective evaluation of whether you should steal. The conclusions compelled by your premises are, to say the least, bleak, and I don’t blame you for averting your gaze from them. Barry Arrington

William, your objections only have weight if there are in fact objective standards of right and wrong. Can you show me why you think I should believe that is the case, as I outlined in #84? Aleta

BA #100

Indeed there are, and you outline some of them. But they are both subjective opinions. A synonym for “subjective opinion” is “preference.” They are both preferences. I don’t know why you fight so hard against such an obvious conclusion that is absolutely compelled by your own premises.

As I have said repeatedly I really don't care how you want to define "preference" - I don't think of it as a synonym for "subjective opinion" but who cares, it is only semantics. We both accept that there is a subjective element in both. My concern is that you want to ignore the substantial differences as when you wrote in #86 to Aleta:

You seem to believe that your preference for vanilla ice cream is somehow different from your preference not to commit murder.

Do you accept there are important differences between the two? markf

Re 100: Hi Barry. Given (my position) that there are no objective standards, calling every judgment that one makes a "preference" without any way to differentiate different types of preferences is not very useful. Perhaps you would like to respond to my post at #84? My claim is that your belief that objective standards exist is in fact a subjective belief - a metaphysical "preference", if you will, not an objectively verifiable belief. If I am right, then the distinction you are making between valid judgments based on objective standards and subjective preferences is a non-issue: everything is a subjective "preference". In that case, those of you who believe (erroneously) that there are objective standards need to accept that you don't have some superior foundation for your moral beliefs - you're just like everyone else in the world who has their "subjective" ideas about right and wrong. Aleta

Aleta @98 said:

This has been your position from the beginning: that since you believe in an objective nature of right and wrong, any belief which doesn’t accept that can’t legitimately talk about right or wrong. I reject your premise concerning the objective nature of right or wrong, so of course I reject your conclusion. I think we’ve probably established this disagreement about as thoroughly as we can.

You have no logical right to use the terms "right" and "wrong" if you use them as if they refer to an objective standard, and if you do so, it is not "legitimate" under subjectivism. In order to have a logical right to use "right" and "is" and "wrong" in a certain way, they must be defined as and employed as something consonant with and derivable from your subjectivist premises. Yet, you seem resistant to define those terms, and characterize the concepts, in a manner consonant with subjectivism. Ultimately, under subjectivism, "right" and "wrong" are matters of personal preference, even if it is deeply felt personal preference. The term "is wrong" doesn't indicate an implied claim of objective reailty, but under subjectivism is a short form version of saying, and is essentially synonymous with, "is something I dislike". Those are logically legitimate ways of speaking about right and wrong under subjectivism, and those characterizations are what your premises give you a logical right to. You cannot have your cake and eat it too; you cannot logically abandon objective morality yet still demand to be able to use terms and phrases in ways that require that premise. William J Murray

Markf @ 99:

But there are substantial differences between my subjective opinion that vanilla ice-cream is nicer than chocolate and my subjective opinion that it is wrong to steal stationary from the office.

Indeed there are, and you outline some of them. But they are both subjective opinions. A synonym for “subjective opinion” is “preference.” They are both preferences. I don’t know why you fight so hard against such an obvious conclusion that is absolutely compelled by your own premises. Barry Arrington

BA #95

You seem to believe that a preference you hold with extreme intensity shouldn’t be called a “preference,” but you give no reason why this should be the case.

As I hope I said – I am not concerned with the definition of the word “preference”. But there are substantial differences between my subjective opinion that vanilla ice-cream is nicer than chocolate and my subjective opinion that it is wrong to steal stationary from the office.  It is nothing to do with the intensity of the feeling. Someone might be absolutely obsessed with getting the right flavour of ice-cream and, while they belief it is wrong to steal office stationary, feel it is nothing to get worked up about. Some of the key differences are: 1) My opinion about stealing stationary is based on evidence and reasons e.g. it is a slippery slope to more serious crimes, companies actually lose $x million a year through theft like this, the shareholders that suffer are not just rich business men etc etc. You would be hard put to give reasons or evidence for your opinion on the flavour of ice-cream. 2) My opinion about stealing stationary is based on very widely shared values  the vast majority of people accept that theft is wrong, I imagine opinions are pretty much divided on ice-cream 3) My opinion about stealing stationary affects others in the sense that if I think stealing office stationary is wrong then I don’t just think I should not do it – I think everyone should not do it – and other things being equal I will try to prevent them doing it as well as abstaining myself (I might not try very hard given the minor nature of the offence).  If I prefer vanilla ice-cream that usually has no implications for anyone else (excepting odd circumstances when I am choosing food for a dinner party or such like) There are probably other significant differences but the important point is that lumping all opinions with a subjective element together is a gross over-simplification. markf

This is is response to #94 - I haven't read the posts that have come in after that, but I'll finish this post anyway. William, you write,

You believe that the nature of right and wrong is subjective; I believe it is objective. It is my contention here and going forward that the premise of the subjective nature of “right and wrong” is (1) irreconcilable with how you employ moral terminology and attempt to justify your moral views/system, that you use concepts only reconcilable with the objective premise.

This has been your position from the beginning: that since you believe in an objective nature of right and wrong, any belief which doesn't accept that can't legitimately talk about right or wrong. I reject your premise concerning the objective nature of right or wrong, so of course I reject your conclusion. I think we've probably established this disagreement about as thoroughly as we can. You write,

You believe that the nature of right and wrong is subjective; I believe it is objective.

And I've said that your belief about the objective nature of right and wrong is itself subjective. So I think the next step here, which is what you may be working on, is for you to respond to my post at #84 about explaining in what way the nature of right is wrong is objective, and how one might be convinced of that. Aleta

My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely “a preference”. To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called “preferences” really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings.

But that's not what I'm doing. I'm only "lumping together" those beliefs that are held as referring exclusively to subjective commodities as "preferences"; I'm not including beliefs one considers to be about objective commodities because stating that one believes that John is 32 years old is not the same as saying that one believes it is wrong for John to spank their children; one belief is about something held to be an objectively true fact, which can be ultimately verified or disproved; the other belief is held as a personal view ultimately determined by entirely subjective considerations. They are categorically different kinds of beliefs/views. Now, others have made this same case - that beliefs about right and wrong cannot be compared to preferences about ice cream; the question I have is: why not? How are the two qualitatively different? It seems to me that, under subjectivism, what one personally likes and dislikes plays the essential role in developing a list of what is right and what is wrong; "I don't like slavery" or "I like the idea that everyone should be treated equally" or "I really, really dislike the idea of torturing children." It seems to me that morality cannot ultimately be quantified by the subjectivist as anything other than, at its root, something determined by personal preference. It might carry much more intense emotional attachment; it might be attached to a larger moral framework and justified via various moral systems (but then, how did one choose that framework or system except by personal preference), but at the end of the day, if the subjectivist's preference changes, that is all that is necessary for a wrong to become a right. IOW, if a subjectivists who was formerly against homosexuality realizes they're gay and prefer homosexuality to be a right thing instead of a wrong thing, there is nothing stopping them from from simply changing a wrong thing to a right thing based on their personal preference. It may be more complex than that, it may be harder than that, but in principle all that is required to turn a wrong into a right, under subjectivism, is personal preference. When a subjectivist says that such a line of thought "trivializes" the term's "right" and "wrong" by characterizing them as "nothing more" than personal preferences, my response is that a right or wrong that is ultimately determined by personal preference is trivial. Don't blame me for pointing it out. All I've done (IMO) is properly characterize what the terms "right" and "wrong" and "is" necessarily mean under subjectivism, and what the necessary logical ramifications are. I can understand that you object to having such deeply held, complex beliefs simply and trivially characterized, but that's really the point; the manner in which you hold your "rights" and "wrongs" and respond to moral events/challnges is incongruent with your claim that they are subjective in nature. More to come. William J Murray

BA #86: These two statements cannot be reconciled logically. You seem like a person of intelligence and good will. So to me it is fascinating that you seem unable to grasp this obvious conclusion.

Aleta is obviously a very intelligent person. However I fully share Barry's amazement. For some unknown reason, there are highly intelligent ppl who are unable to connect the dots. Simple fact: 'materialism entails that there is no such thing as a person, free will, morality, consciousness and so forth.'

The physical facts fix all the facts. The mind is the brain. It has to be physical and it can’t be anything else, since thinking, feeling, and perceiving are physical process—in particular, input/output processes—going on in the brain. We can be sure of a great deal about how the brain works because the physical facts fix all the facts about the brain. The fact that the mind is the brain guarantees that there is no free will. It rules out any purposes or designs organizing our actions or our lives. It excludes the very possibility of enduring persons, selves, or souls that exist after death or for that matter while we live. Not that there was ever much doubt about mortality anyway. [Rosenberg]

Yet the forum is filled with 'materialists' who are unaware of the unavoidable consequences of the theory. Box

markf

Barry – you can extend the word “preference” to cover everything that is not a cast iron fact if you like but some “preferences” are based on reasons and evidence and deeply held common (but not universal) values while others are trivial whims

. Straw man. I never said that all of your preferences were held with the same intensity of feeling. Certainly that is not the case. Let us say that your preference A is held with extreme intensity (e.g., I prefer not to hurt children) and preference B is held on a trivial whim (e.g., I like vanilla ice cream). What is the same about preference A and preference B? They are both preferences of course. You seem to believe that a preference you hold with extreme intensity shouldn’t be called a “preference,” but you give no reason why this should be the case. Barry Arrington

I asked:

Is “what an individual believes” ultimately the final arbiter of what is right and wrong for that individual?

Aleta said:

I have spent some time trying to flesh out my answer to this question, but it seems like a truism to say that yes, what a person believes is right or wrong is what a person believes is right or wrong. A person will have assimilated and integrated input from many different sources in building those beliefs, but how can someone act upon anything other than their beliefs?”

What do you mean by "act upon" their beliefs? Do you mean in accordance with their conscious beliefs? Their subconscious, more intractable, deep assumptions they may not even be aware of? People can believe X is wrong and do X anyway; they can believe X is right and not do it; people can have behavioral compulsions they apparently cannot control; people can become emotional and do all sorts of things that are not reconcilable with their conscious beliefs. My line of questioning here is to get a commitment on your part about what final or true arbiter is in determining "what is right" for the individual under subjectivism. You have apparently made such a commitment when you said:

There is no“final arbiter” of what is right or wrong, in the sense of being an objective standard, so all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations.

You reiterated:

ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong for them . . . all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations.

Note: I didn't say "final arbiter" in any objective sense, but rather simply said that the final arbiter, under subjectivism, for what an individual refers to as "right and wrong", is themselves - however they make such determinations.

You seem to think that only people who believe in some objective source of standards have the right to talk about right and wrong, but that is not true, and really circularly assumes that you are correct that such standards exist, which I don’t believe.

Not at all. What I've claimed is that when you talk about right and wrong, it necessarily means and implies different things because we have entirely different concepts about the nature of right and wrong. Our views on what acts are right and which are wrong may be identical; our behavior may be identical; but our concept of the nature of right and wrong couldn't be more different. You believe that the nature of right and wrong is subjective; I believe it is objective. It is my contention here and going forward that the premise of the subjective nature of "right and wrong" is (1) irreconcilable with how you employ moral terminology and attempt to justify your moral views/system, that you use concepts only reconcilable with the objective premise, and (2)that your premise is irreconcilable with how you and any other non-sociopath actually behaves in the world. Note: I'm not claiming that any subjectivist behaves worse than objectivists, or that objectivists as a group behave better, my point is only that moral subjectivism is rationally unsupportable as anything other than "beause I say so" and "because I can" (hereafter referred to as "might makes right"). To be continued. William J Murray

Barry, I think MarkF's response to you in 87 is appropriate. Here's what I wrote in #82:

My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely “a preference”. To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called “preferences” really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings.

It is not realistic or accurate to not have a more nuanced or sophisticated view than "everything's a preference." And, referring back to 84, given that I believe that objective standards don't exist, and have solicited some defense about why one should be convinced they do, then the belief that they exist is actually just a subjective belief also - a preference for a certain metaphysical perspective. Would you accept that preferring Christianity over Buddhism is equivalent to preferring vanilla over chocolate? Aleta

keith s:

1. If God exists, his morality is subjective, just like ours.

That is your opinion and given your track record it is most likely wrong. Joe

Who is to say that Aleta's definition of "wrong" is correct? (68) And who determines if the definition actually was in effect? Joe

#89 keith s My preference for toilet paper unrolling over the top is far from trivial. If it unrolls from the bottom it gets out of control. This is objectively wrong. markf

markf:

Barry – you can extend the word “preference” to cover everything that is not a cast iron fact if you like but some “preferences” are based on reasons and evidence and deeply held common (but not universal) values while others are trivial whims. To lump them together is little more than an orator’s trick.

I agree. The usual technique is to compare a subjectivist's moral judgments to something trivial like a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream, or for the toilet paper unrolling over the top vs the bottom. What Barry doesn't realize is that if he defines "preference" broadly enough to encompass a subjectivist's moral judgments, it is broad enough to include the objectivist's moral judgments as well. After all, the objectivist prefers that others adhere to his or her morality just as the subjectivist does. The only difference is that the objectivist thinks that his or her subjective morality matches up with some absolute, binding, external standard. Some points: 1. If God exists, his morality is subjective, just like ours. 2. Subjective morality is the only kind of morality that has an impact on the world. 3. I have yet to encounter a theist who could satisfactorily explain why God's morality should be considered objectively binding on us. 4. Our consciences are clearly not a trustworthy indicator of objective morality. I'll justify those claims in response to the inevitable pushback. keith s

Well done Aleta. You explain things very nicely. I fear you are about to repeat a debate that has been had a thousand times on this forum with no one changing their mind about anything. But you never know. markf

If there is no objective standard, the standard is subjective. If the standard subjective it is based on subjective choices. A synonym for that phrase is “preference.”

Barry - you can extend the word "preference" to cover everything that is not a cast iron fact if you like but some "preferences" are based on reasons and evidence and deeply held common (but not universal) values while others are trivial whims. To lump them together is little more than an orator's trick. markf

Aleta @ 82:

ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong for them . . . all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations.

My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely “a preference”.

These two statements cannot be reconciled logically. You seem like a person of intelligence and good will. So to me it is fascinating that you seem unable to grasp this obvious conclusion.

To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called “preferences” really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings.

But you are the one who says that “ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong.” And you also say that there is no objective standard upon which to base those choices and that a person has to make the determination himself. If there is no objective standard, the standard is subjective. If the standard subjective it is based on subjective choices. A synonym for that phrase is “preference.” You seem to believe that your preference for vanilla ice cream is somehow different from your preference not to commit murder. But they are both preferences.

You seem to think that only people who believe in some objective source of standards have the right to talk about right and wrong,

WJM never said that. WJM is saying they have no right to talk about “right and wrong” as if those words mean anything other than “what I prefer” and “what I do not prefer.” Your logic, Aleta, leads to that conclusion.

but that is not true, and really circularly assumes that you are correct that such standards exist, which I don’t believe.

WJM does need not to assume that an objective standard exists to conclude that to a subjectivist the words “right and wrong” mean “what I prefer” and “what I do not prefer.” That statement is true even if an objective standard does not exist. Barry Arrington

I like the way you have set this out Aleta. I am looking forward to Williams response. 5for

Hi William. I'm not sure whether you are going to continue our discussion or not, but I'm going to add to it by switching the emphasis - I'd like to talk about what you mean by objective standards, or more specifically, how you know that they exist and what they are. I use the phrase "objective standards" here to refer the general idea of "meaning, purpose, morals and values which exist independently of human beings, are absolutely or ultimately true, and are derived from some ultimate source, which we can take to be God in some form. You can amend that description or suggest an alternative phrase if you wish. Let's talk first about objective knowledge about the physical world. I take the word objective to imply two things here: 1. It is about what we commonly consider part of the physical world, the experience of which is available to our senses in some form, and 2. Is such that any human being, if given access to the proper experiences, would agree that the knowledge is valid. I'd like to take an example that is neither too simple (the sky is blue) not too esoteric (helium has two electrons), so I'll take as example the circulation system of the blood in the human body: from the heart through the arteries to the capillaries (invisible to the naked eye), and back to the heart via the veins. I think it is uncontroversial to consider this objective knowledge. However, it is also not obvious knowledge - it took quite a bit of investigation before William Harvey correctly described the main system in the 1600's, and it took the invention of the microscope to finally add the capillaries to our understanding. So, even though none of us can easily go and look at the circulation of the heart, any human being could become acquainted with the experiences others have had, accept their experiences, get some direct experience if they wish (such as taking a biology class that included a cadaver lab), and otherwise become convinced the mainstream description of the circulation of blood is correct. This is an example of objective knowledge of the physical world. Now explain to me objective knowledge of morals. To the extent it is analogous to objective knowledge of the physical world, what experiences can we have to acquaint ourselves with the existence of these objective morals, and more importantly, what common experiences are there such that any human being, properly acquainted with the experiences, would accept them as objectively true. And, if objective morals are in some way not analogous to objective knowledge about the physical world, explain the differences and describe what is the case about objective morals. It would be useful to provide an example. However, please don't continue to use torturing babies. I have a two year old granddaughter and a new grandchild on the way and it pains me deeply to think about that example. I picked a middle-of-the-road example for the physical world, and I would hope you would also. Are you willing to give this a try? Others are invited to participate if they are interested in the same type of thoughtful and civil discussion that William and I have been having. Aleta

There is no final arbiter of what is right and wrong for any individual. Isn't that what it means to say that there is no objective morality? When I, as a "subjectivist" say that something is "wrong" I think I mean that the thing is prohibited or at least discouraged under the rules of the society that I and the individual are a part of and I agree with those rules in that particular case. Torturing children is prohibited by the rules of my society and I agree with that rule, so I'd say it's wrong. Driving 85 mph on an empty interstate highway on a bright dry day is prohibited by the rules of my society, but I don't think I'd say it's wrong. congregate

Hi William. Let's start at the end and work backwards. Your last statement was

Or is it that answering the question yes or no will leave your worldview in a bad spot either way?

I am not at all concerned about leaving "my worldview appearing in a bad spot" in your eyes. I don't believe there are any objective meanings, purposes, morals, values, etc. derived from any outside metaphysical source such as God (it would be nice to have a shorthand way of saying that), so my worldview is already in an irrevocable bad spot in your eyes, and no explanation I make about meanings, purposes, etc. that I make will change that. So being in or out of a bad spot is just not relevant to this discussion. You asked,

Is “what an individual believes” ultimately the final arbiter of what is right and wrong for that individual?

I have spent some time trying to flesh out my answer to this question, but it seems like a truism to say that yes, what a person believes is right or wrong is what a person believes is right or wrong." A person will have assimilated and integrated input from many different sources in building those beliefs, but how can someone act upon anything other than their beliefs? There are social and legal parameters about what is right or wrong socially and legally, and consequences of various sorts for not agreeing with those (I have said all this before), but ultimately a person has the final responsibility to determine what is right or wrong for them, and can choose to disagree with the social and legal world around them. There is no"final arbiter" of what is right or wrong, in the sense of being an objective standard, so all a person can do is make the best determination for themself both in terms of general principles and individual situations. There is no other choice than to have to choose. You write,

I’m using the term “subjectiviism” as a shorthand way of expressing the view that meaning, value, and morals are subjective in nature, and do not refer to objectively existent commodities.

OK, that's clear. If "subjective" merely means not believing in any "objectively existent commodities," than that word is a short way of saying what I believe. If the word carries other connotations, then those would have to be addressed individually. You write,

So, what does the phrase “is wrong” actually mean to a subjectivist? The only thing I can come up with is that you are using sloppy language to say “that action is something I prefer didn’t happen”.

You seem to think that only people who believe in some objective source of standards have the right to talk about right and wrong, but that is not true, and really circularly assumes that you are correct that such standards exist, which I don't believe. My thoughts about right and wrong, and to varying degrees all peoples, are not merely "a preference". To lump together everything a person believes, from what kind of ice cream they like to what kind of deepest, most heartfelt basic principles they have about how to live into one big category called "preferences" really misunderstands, or misrepresents, the reality and complexity of human beings. I have the right to call things right and wrong, and so do you. But you don't have a superior or exclusive right to use those terms just because you believe your sense of right and wrong comes from some outside "objective" source. Some concluding comments: First, this has been a useful discussion to me because it's good to explore and articulate one's position. I appreciate your thoughtfulness and civility. Here are some ways that I am understanding the situation: To you, everything is knowledge in the sense that one needs to know about something that exists outside of oneself. We all possess knowledge about physical things that exist - we have objective knowledge of the physical world. You believe that one can also possess knowledge about metaphysical things such as meaning, purpose, etc. in a way that is somehow analogous to objective knowledge about the physical world: both that meaning, purpose, etc. exist independently of human beings and that we have access to those meanings (that is, both ontologically and epistemologically there are objective standards.) I don't believe in those objective standards. Therefore, for me, there is both knowledge and choice. There is a vast amount of objective knowledge we can obtain about the physical world, including experiences within ourself that are not available to others. However, there are things concerning various kinds of judgments (such as about meaning, purpose, etc.) that, although we can take into account objective data, ultimately boil down to us having to choose our position. Many years ago I wrote a paper for an anthropology class on comparative religion and worldviews that made a distinction that has stayed with me all these years. There are two kinds of beliefs, those that we confirm and those that we affirm. That is the distinction I'm making here: human beings can assemble and evaluate lots of objective knowledge, but at some point, after all the facts are assembled, on a regularly basis we have to choose what "big picture" meanings, purposes, values, and morals we wish to act on. Our judgements about right and wrong are affirmations - statements we make, in words and action, about who we have chosen to be. It may be disconcerting, and lead to some wishful thinking, to know that there isn't some externally available answer as to how we should believe and act, but there isn't. As I said earlier, we have no choice but to choose. Aleta

I haven’t given you answers that satisfy you because my answers don’t refer to any ultimate metaphysical source of meaning, but as far I I can tell I’ve been answering your question.

I'm not asking you to refer to any such source. I'm asking you to clarity your position wrt subjective meaning and what it means, under that premise, when you make certain statements or utilize terms in certain ways. You say X, but I don't know what X would mean under subjectivism because the only way I know how to interpret X is if it X is referring to or utilizing a commodity that is known, expected, or assumed to be objective in nature. So when you say "X is wrong", and "is" doesn't require an objective, arbitrating source, what does "is" mean? You cannot prove it "is" wrong; you cannot demonstrate it "is" wrong; you cannot even logically argue it "is" wrong. So, what does "is" mean here? You cannot mean "is" in the sense that something "is" made of steel or that 5 "is" the right answer to "what is 2+3". You can be using "is" like "Red is my favorite color", but how can you say "red is the wrong favorite color for others"? Compare to "it is wrong for others to gratuitously torture children". See what I mean? I don't see how a subjectivist can say that it is wrong for others to torture children without it logically requiring an objective means to make such an evaluation. You can say that according to humanist (or some other set of) principles, which are written down and objectively exist as written principles, it is wrong for others to torture children, but then we run into a problem; according to you, individuals are free to disregard/dismiss such moral rules if they disagree with them, meaning such rules are not objectively binding arbiters of right and wrong in the first place. They would only be rules that you have individually adopted and can individually dismiss. So we are back to: what do you mean when you say that the behavior of others "is" wrong? That's why I ask by what standard or principle that doesn't reduce to "because I say so" or "because I feel like it"? So, what does the phrase "is wrong" actually mean to a subjectivist? The only thing I can come up with is that you are using sloppy language to say "that action is something I prefer didn't happen". That is what I'm trying to understand. Subjectivists use terms and phrasings that normally imply/invoke objective references, but claim they are valid under a subjective frameset. I'm looking for someone to explain how those phrases/terms are meant. Saying "they are the same only subjective" doesn't explain anything, it just draws a semantic equivalence between concepts that have not been shown conceptually applicable under subjectivism. IOW, I and others see your use of such terms as logical fallacies - stealing a concept your premises do not entail.

Also, I don’t understand what you mean by “under subjectivism”, or at least I don’t want to be held responsible for holding to some “ism” – I’m just explaining my own thoughts.

I'm using the term "subjectiviism" as a shorthand way of expressing the view that meaning, value, and morals are subjective in nature, and do not refer to objectively existent commodities.

You make it sound like I’m advocating that people’s beliefs are whimsical,

I'm not making it sound that way. For some reason you're making an incorrect inference. I'm not claiming such beliefs are whimsical; my argument is solely about the logic of such views. Is "what an individual believes" ultimately the final arbiter of what is right and wrong for that individual? I don't see how it is difficult to simply answer yes or no to that question. Is it loaded in some way, or does it make an erroneous assumption about something? Is it a "have you stopped beating your wife" question? If so, how so? Why can you not answer yes or no to it? Or is it that answering the question yes or no will leave your worldview in a bad spot either way? William J Murray

I'm not sure why my answers are not answers to "your actual questions." I haven't given you answers that satisfy you because my answers don't refer to any ultimate metaphysical source of meaning, but as far I I can tell I've been answering your question. Also, I don't understand what you mean by "under subjectivism", or at least I don't want to be held responsible for holding to some "ism" - I'm just explaining my own thoughts. (More below.) And although I appreciate your efforts to paraphrase my position - that is a good technique for constructive dialog. I'm not going to sign off on every phrase you use as being how I would say things, but a lot of what you say is approximately my position. However, I want to comment on the last paragraph:

While there may be laws or social mores that conflict with the individual’s view, under subjectivism what is right for the individual is not determined by such external laws and mores. Even though such views might be enforced, one way or another, on the individual, capacity to enforce doesn’t change the fact that what the individual considers right for them is right for them.

I think that the vast majority of people truly integrate the vast majority of social mores, some of which are codified in laws, into their own belief and value system. It's not just that those are "enforced" on the individual - the individual truly assimilates them so there is a genuine correspondence of agreement between the person and society. There are times, however, when a person may reach the conclusion that society is wrong, and at such times the person may have to think about whether acting against the mores of society is worth whatever consequences might entail. In cases of social mores, often society is diverse enough that one might offend some, but not all. However, in the extreme case, rare but perhaps significant, that someone choose to disobey laws because they think the laws are wrong, one has to be prepared for those consequences. So I don't think your paragraph captures the true situation. But ultimately, at some point everyone individual does make choices about what they believe and how they are going to act. I'm also puzzled my your emphasis on "subjective" and "subjectivism." You make it sound like I'm advocating that people's beliefs are whimsical, without any reference to reality, which would be false. People take all sorts of objective facts into account in building their beliefs. In my case, and relevant to this discussion, I know a lot about different religions and belief systems, both modern and primitive, and a lot about what the fields of sociology and psychology have to say about people. I've read a lot of great literature and philosophy where other human beings, ones known for the depth of their thought and their skill of expression, have offered their thoughts on these great issues. My beliefs have not arisen in a vacuum - they've been influenced by a great deal of objective knowledge about the world and about what other people think. As I am pointed out a number of times, if by "subjective" you mean "not incorporating or related to any metaphysical source of objective truth", then yes, everything is subjective because that objective truth does not exist. However, if you mean something else, or at least something additional by "subjective" then perhaps you should explain. Aleta

Aleta, I understand you are providing responses, but from my end of the conversation they are not answers to my actual questions. What I asked in #76 is if what is right for an individual is determined by an individuals subjective views. It appears that in 77 you are saying yes - however an individual subjectively ends up with their concept of "right", that is what is "right" for that person. What right "is", in the final analysis, is whatever the individual believes it is. IOW, the final arbiter of what is right for anyone is what they subjectively believe is right for them, because there is no external, objective arbiter of "right and wrong" beyond the subjective views of the individual. While there may be laws or social mores that conflict with the individual's view, under subjectivism what is right for the individual is not determined by such external laws and mores. Even though such views might be enforced, one way or another, on the individual, capacity to enforce doesn't change the fact that what the individual considers right for them is right for them. Correct? William J Murray

to JDH: all that you mention is not obvious, to various degrees. But even if one accepts the four statements you made, it is very much not obvious that the God of the Bible exists, or even that the creator of the four properties you mention has any interest, ethical or otherwise, in the actions of human beings. Aleta

William, you keep asking the same questions, and I've answered them. A very brief summary of the situation is: 1. Each person builds a system of meaning, purpose, ethics, values, etc. from a complex interplay of their basic common core human nature; their individual innate nature; a set of concentric cultural influences starting with the family and moving outwards, for some, to an identification with all of mankind; their education, their particular life experiences; their internal reflection on all of the above, etc. All of this adds up to a persons views and beliefs about meaning, purpose, ethics, and values. 2. There are no objective meanings et al that derive some outside source such as God. Therefore, the process described in 1) above is the way all human beings derive their meanings et al. There ain't no other way - this applies to you as much as anyone. Aleta

Aleta, Under subjectivism, is what is right or wrong for each individual determined solely by their own subjective views, preferences and beliefs? William J Murray

Aleta@74 said,

For what it’s worth, if someone believes something exists, the burden of proof is on that person, not the person who doesn’t believe.

No. If I said I don't believe the sun exists ( even though its presence dominates the sky ) the burden of proof would be on me. Basically you can't make any hard and fast rule about who the "burden of proof" actually lies with. But it should be on the one that goes against the obvious inference of observation. For example, the presence of the sun is obvious. The person who believes the "sun does not really exist" would probably have the burden of proof in this case. Its very obvious to all that we have free will (that's why people who do not believe in free will call it an illusion ). It's obvious that biological forms and all there intricacies seem to be the result of design ( as says Richard Dawkins -before proposing evolution as the blind watchmaker ). It's very obvious that the constants have been fine-tuned for life ( so says Brian Greene before claiming the multiverse is responsible ). it's very obvious that you can't create something from nothing without a creator. ( But cosmologists just posit that at some point the Big Bang just happened ). Each one of these observables lead to the obvious conclusion that there is a God. I would say the burden of proof is obviously on those who would observe all of the evidence and still posit "NOT GOD". The Bible puts it the most clearly. "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." JDH

I am not absolute certain about any metaphysical issues: I have made that clear in previous posts. But my best judgment about the matter, based on all my experience and education, is that there are no objective standards derived from and related to some external source, such as a God. For what it's worth, if someone believes something exists, the burden of proof is on that person, not the person who doesn't believe. I'm very familiar with the claims made by Christian apologists about how somehow Christianity has a validity that other religions don't have, and they are very much not compelling. Aleta

Aleta @ 72:

My rejoinder is this: there are no objective standards.

You seem to be absolutely certain about this assertion. On what do you base your absolute certainty? Barry Arrington

Standards are derived from multiple sources, so yes, sometimes people reject the standards of society and choose to follow their individual notion of what is right. You boil my position "down to one single principle: 'because I say so'". You say that this is all "subjectivists" can fall back on, as opposed to "objectivists". My rejoinder is this: there are no objective standards. As I have said before, your beliefs are created in exactly the same way as mine, and are as "subjective" as mine. Just believing that there are objective standards does not make it so, and does not give your notions about standards a firmer foundation than mine. You may find it difficult to consider that human standards are tentative human conclusions which each individual has to evaluate and choose to adopt, or not, but believing that there are objective standards that get us out of that responsibility is an escape based on wishful thinking about things that do not exist, not a solution. Aleta

Aleta, I have not "rejected" that "whole idea", as you present it, about such standards. Only a moron thinks that there is no such thing as social standards or other standards that people find to be meaningful that are not presumed to be connected to an objective source. My argument isn't that I reject that such standards are often employed by people. My argument isn't that such people are not at least as "good" as those who believe in an objective source of meaning and moral values. My argument (which I have not yet fully made here) is that any worldview that rests on the premises of subjective standards & values, or even one that rests on the "common human nature" foundation, necessarily, logically boils down to one single principle: "because I say so". A brief outline of the argument: If one points at common human nature, common human nature includes both the good and the bad. Since picking one doesn't depend on any objective good or bad, it's just a case of "because I say so" - whichever one you happen to pick or find affinity with. If one makes the case that society picks and makes a standard, the problem is, what do you do if you disagree with the social standard? Do you change your personal views, disobey society, or try to change society? The problem is that if society sets the standard, you must change your views to fit that standard; otherwise, if you disobey or try to change society, you are asserting your "because I say so" principle as being above the social standard. This works all the way up the ladder to even globally-agreed standards (if there are any). If it was a globally agreed standard that women be treated as property, would that then be an acceptable standard for you if you felt otherwise? Or if the standard was to ostracize & discourage homosexuality, would that be acceptable to you? Or would you consider your personal standard superior? Which is why I ask, wrong by what standard? You appeal to a series or set of subjective-standard external sources to support your view, but the fact is that if you disagreed with standards derived from those sources strongly enough, you'd simply disobey them or work to change them. This puts "personal preference" at the driver's seat as the ultimate standard for subjectivists. Your reference to various outsides sources becomes diversionary (although not purposefully so), because if you disagreed with any of those references strongly enough, you would not feel compelled to adjust your own views to be in line with those sources. Problematically, I doubt you'd agree that "because I say so" or "because I feel like it" are valid moral principles - indeed, you'd probably consider them the antithesis of a moral principle. Yet, logically, that is all that subjectivists are left with. You point to external references, like society or "human nature" and call such references "standards", but how is a standard anything of the sort when one can abandon the standard whenever they disagree with it? And that's where my question about the term "wrong" means comes in; when the actual standard is "because I feel like it" or "because I say so", if someone feels like gratuitously torturing children, in what meaningful sense can that act be considerd "wrong"? Under subjectivism, logically, all you can say is that you personally disagree with the act. It's not "wrong" by any meaningful standard other than the only one which is actually, ultimately binding on you: your own personal views and preferences. IOW, "wrong" cannot mean to you, a subjectivist, what it means to objectivists. When an objectivist says an act is wrong, he/she means it in the sense of "you gave me the wrong file" or "your prediction about the score was wrong"; the wrongness refers to something at least presumed to be an objective commodity. Logically speaking, you are using the term "wrong" to mean "I don't agree with that person's personal choice.", like saying "they are wrong when they enjoy chocolate ice cream" or "they are wrong to prefer country music". You're calling something "wrong" when you have no worldview basis for making such a judgement. If it's all subjective, then nobody is "wrong"; there are only people that behave in a way you personally approve of, and those who do not. If you and others here are not up to giving us insight from from the subjectivist perspective, I hardly think you have the footing for chiding Mr. Arrington on what you consider to be bad assumptions. William J Murray

I've already answered that question. You reject the whole idea that meaningful standards have been/are developed by human beings consonant with human nature for the needs of people individually and society as a whole, and you reject any standards that don't have, in your opinion, a connection with some objective source, which I don't believe exists. So there really is nothing more for us to discuss, I think. Aleta

Aleta, Unfair according to what? Unjust according to what? Immoral or unethical according to what? Please explain. William J Murray

I'm not here for any length of time, but that's a silly question: we all know what wrong means. Here are some definitions from the web:

1 a : an injurious, unfair, or unjust act : action or conduct inflicting harm without due provocation or just cause 2 : something immoral, or unethical; especially : principles, practices, or conduct contrary to justice, goodness, equity, or law

You don't need to believe in God to know what wrong means. Aleta

If Aleta is actually gone, perhaps someone else will take up his banner and attempt to answer something for me. Aleta said:

Of course I am repulsed by the idea of torturing a child, (and somewhat repulsed by your fixation on using that example), and I believe it would be terribly wrong, but I don’t need to believe in God or objective moral standards to believe that.

What does Aleta mean by the term "wrong"? William J Murray

Hi William. Although I need to move away from this discussion and return to my regularly scheduled life, I should briefly reply since you took the time to write a lengthy and thoughtful post. First, when I say "lasting peace", I mean lasting while I live. You ask,

Are you telling me sincerely that you don’t have at least some longing for an escape from existential obliteration and a continued, satisfying, happy experience with loved ones – or adventure, or some other wonderful experience?

I have no such longing, and absolutely no belief that is a possibility. If I contain some non-material aspect, which is a possibility, then I'm inclined towards the Buddhist view, in a metaphor from Alan Watts, that what happens to the soul is like throwing a drop of water back into the sea - all individuality is lost and that non-materiality is absorbed into whatever "cosmic ocean" might exist. But the fact that my time to live is limited, and then will be over, does not bother me - all things are transitory, and one of the things one should do in this life to gain peace is to accept that and be able to let go of things, including life, when their time has run it's course. Second, you and others have this notion that if there is no objective standard then there are no standards at all. I have addressed that a bit in several posts, and it would take a book on human nature to flesh it out, but that's just wrong. Of course I am repulsed by the idea of torturing a child, (and somewhat repulsed by your fixation on using that example), and I believe it would be terribly wrong, but I don't need to believe in God or objective moral standards to believe that. You write,

People do not study and argue/debate in this way about that which they assume is a subjective, personal preference. People (well, rational people) do not condemn others or interfere in their actions over what they consider subjective, personal preference.... If such things are truly subjective, what are you hoping to accomplish in such study/debate?

Everyone's beliefs, including yours, are "subjective, personal preferences". I engage in discussion because we can influence each other, and we learn and broaden our perspective by sharing our thoughts. I don't care whether you like vanilla ice cream or not, but I do care if you support public education or not, to take one example, so at appropriate times I will make the case for public education in the hopes I can influence someone. Skipping over more stuff, you conclude with saying again exactly the point I disagree with:

Under meaning/value subjectivism, you have no logical argument available to you; all you can do here is assert your particular personal preferences as “goods”. It is an empty argument that has no means of evaluating in any significant sense. To embrace meaning/value subjectivism is to abandon logical argument and embrace empty, emotional rhetoric.

Your idea that somehow there is some logical path to objective standards, and that appealing to the full range of human nature is embracing "empty, emotional rhetoric" is wrong - period. It is also, to me, a sad thing. Your beliefs in objective standards and God and whatever else you believe in are just as subjective as anyone else's - the fact that you believe in these objective standards does not make it so. There is no way anyone's beliefs can be anything but subjective in the sense that they are what we, the subject, have created. However, the creation of beliefs takes place through a process that also takes evidence, experience, and logic into account - subjective is not the same as whimsical. That's it for me - regular life resumes.... Aleta

Aleta said:

I acknowledge that it common for many people, and I will include myself as one, have a strong desire to search for truth or for a lasting, deep peace and happiness. However, it is not true for me that I long for “for something more meaningful, deeper, or true beyond the merely subjective and transitory.”

There's a bit of contradiction here; your desire a lasting, deep peace and happiness is at least somewhat incompatible with being accepting of the transitory nature of at least Earthly, physical experience. On this, you later say:

Whatever truth and peace I find, to whatever extent I do, are in fact subjective and transitory. They are certainly transitory because they’ll be over when I’m dead.

Even if it is a fact that they are transitory, that doesn't mean one doesn't long for non-transitory peace and happiness. But let's be fair: it's not certain your experiences will be over when you are dead. You just believe this to be the case. If you could continue to exist and experience deep peace and happiness (or any number of things) even after you die, can you say that you wouldn't want that? Aren't many people sad when a loved one dies, or when their own death approaches, because some part of them (even devout believers in an afterlife) is afraid and sad that it will be the end of their experience? Are you telling me sincerely that you don't have at least some longing for an escape from existential obliteration and a continued, satisfying, happy experience with loved ones - or adventure, or some other wonderful experience?

I would like to find what truth and peace while I can, but I don’t have any belief that that truth, or the source of that peace, is “ultimate”. All we can do is find some truth and peace within the limits of our experience and abilities. I’m not looking for any ultimate, final answers, because I don’t think there are any.

I'm not sure what you mean by "some" truth. You surely don't mean "some" truth as in a small piece of some universal objective truth wrt "meaning". All you can mean here is that you figure out something that is true for you and may not be true for others, right? As far as the term "ultimate" truth or meaning, I think it's a little distracting. I prefer to use the term "objectively valid" or existentially true for everyone. Are you okay with, say, someone gratuitously torturing a child, as long as it doesn't interfere with your life? If it is subjectively true for them that they find meaning and value in such activity, is it okay with you? I would suggest the answer is no. If you could snap your fingers and end child torture/hunger around the world various warlords or foreign governments agreed with you or not, would you do so? I suggest your answer would be "yes". If you had the power to stop war on the far side of the globe by merely wishing it to end and save thousands from suffering because of it, would you do so? The reason most people would find these questions rhetorical is because they do not consider - even for a second - that their views on these matters represent subjective, personal feelings, or even cultural norms, but rather existential, objectively valid truths that the individual not only has the right to bring to reality if possible, but which represent an obligation to do what one can to alleviate the suffering of the innocent. If you could snap your fingers and make chocolate everyone's favorite flavor of ice cream, or make everyone agree to your favorite music as being the best, would you do so? Of course not - because you consider such unwarranted coercion of the personal proclivities and views of others an egregious wrong. This why I have said that the materialist cannot live as if the serious meaning and values they have are actually subjective, transitory commodities unless they are sociopaths. If we see someone harming a child, we do not stop and ask them their subjective values and meaning in life. We attempt to stop them, period, or else we feel pain, regret and guilt. We do not consider it a transitory, subjective thing; we are willing and feel obligated to act on these meaning of life values and considerations. Quantifying them as "subjective" is IMO a purely intellectual enterprise that completely ignores our real-world experience. That someone else or another cultures feels it is a good thing to mutilate the genitalia of little girls doesn't give us any pause in our obligation to put it to and end if we can. We don't shrug our shoulders and say, "well, it's a different culture". WJM said:

“If one actually believes it is all subjective and in the end of things doesn’t ultimately matter, what’s the point of arguing about it or really even thinking about it much?”

Aleta said:

That makes no sense: do you mean I shouldn’t take delight in my darling two year old granddaughter, or love my wife, or devote years to teaching high school kids, because my life will come to a end some day. This is my one-and-only opportunity to be alive: the fact that my life is transitory is all the more reason to embrace it while I can.

What you have written in response to my quote appears to be a non-sequitur. I didn't say anything about enjoying such things as life has to offer; I asked what is the point in thinking much about meaning/values/existential truths (even if it is an existential truth that there are no other existential truths wrt meaning), much less debating/arguing about it? Are you trying to convince others of your subjective views? Are you trying to convince others that it is an existential truth that there are no such existential truths with regard to meaning and value? If such things are truly subjective, what are you hoping to accomplish in such study/debate? It's as if you are subjecting yourself to arguing with others who believe your favorite flavor of ice cream should be vanilla, when you know such proclivities are a matter of subjective, personal taste. Why bother with such an argument at all? Does it bother you that their favorite flavor of meaning-to-life is one of the the "objectively true" family of flavors? It's like you're asserting to someone who prefers an "objectively true" flavor that "objective true" flavors aren't real. It makes no sense to engage in such an argument. People do not study and argue/debate in this way about that which they assume is a subjective, personal preference. People (well, rational people) do not condemn others or interfere in their actions over what they consider subjective, personal preference.

And “subjective” is not a dirty word. As I said in post 28 on the Big Questions thread, the fact that I am the only person who can build and experience my meaning of life is not the same as saying it doesn’t matter what I choose. If you want, you can go read that so I don’t repeat myself here.

In the other thread, you said:

It is extremely erroneous black-and-white thinking to believe that if one doesn’t believe in some external, ultimate source of meaning by which to structure one’s behavior one can choose to be any way one wants to be without any limit whatsoever. This is nonsense: among other things, it is contradicted by the fact the only an extremely small number of people exhibit pathological, psychopathic behavior, for which they are soundly condemned, and millions of people who don’t believe in God lead lives that are indistinguishable from their theistic neighbors.

In the first place, I'm sure Mr. Arrington doesn't believe that anyone, short of psychopaths and sociopaths, actually act as if there is no objective meaning and values to life. He believes that such meaning and values are written into the hearts of all people of whatever religion or non-religion. There is a difference between professing to believe X, and actually acting as if X is true. People can profess and intellectualize all sorts of beliefs, but they often do not actually act as if those beliefs represent reality. I think that the case Mr. Arrington is making is that if such universal values/meaning actually did not exist and actually did not influence most people's capacity to act/believe whatever they wished, in theory one could act/believe/become whatever they wanted behavior-wise. In such a case, nothing is preventing it except one's own personal preferences and the cultural influences around them. One can certainly overcome their preferential habits and cultural programming in order to take advantage of a less restricted personal behavioral policy. Also, the subjective meaning view offers no obligation to go against social norms or put oneself at risk defying cultural preferences. That a society prefers slavery and subjugation of woman is equitable to that society preferring a certain kind of food or music. Is there a compelling reason to challenge the musical preferences of a country and put your life at risk in so doing? If not, why risk your life attempting to change society in the matters of how women are treated and slavery? If it's just a matter of personal preference, why not go along with the Nazis? Why risk everything to maintain a personal preference or subjective belief?

We are constrained by human nature: virtually all humans want to love and be loved, want to exercise their talents and take delight in doing so, want to contribute to those around them, and so on. Despite the large cultural differences that exist in people, there is a solid common core of values inherent in us as a species. These qualities are present in children from birth, and arise from their biological nature, not from any philosophical considerations of theism or anything else.

You've selectively left out a few aspects of human nature which have also manifested in great quantities throughout history, such as being self-serving (greed, lying, using others, etc.); a propensity towards domination/violence (as the history of the world attests), and a hostile attitude towards the "other" (other groups/cultures/beliefs). Mr. Arrington's case is that if there is no "ultimate" means by which to judge which aspects of human nature one should employ/cultivate in the first place, and which ones one should avoid, there is no objectively valid reason to pick love over instilling fear in others or to choose contributing over taking whatever one can if one so prefers. The fact that you picked "good" traits to focus on instead of "bad" traits is further demonstration that you do not act or argue as if such values truly are subjective in nature. Mr. Arrington is not insisting that people will act badly if there is no such metaphysical influence/restraint; he is pointing out that there is no substantive reason not to and no reason to argue against those that choose to other than the fact that you personally prefer otherwise - which is not and cannot be an argument, it's just a statement of personal choice. In a scenario where one realizes, believes and acts as if there are no objectively true meaning or values, every appeal to any "positive" or "good" human values is nothing more than an assertion of personal preference and a rhetorical appeal to emotion. There cannot be any logic involved when there is no objective basis by which to arbit which meaning/values are good or bad, right or wrong. You end by saying:

So for those of you who think that materialists can be, and might as well be, nihilists for which anything is OK, you are just flat out wrong. To deny that God exists is not to deny the reality of the positive qualities that are central to our human nature.

The problem is that you have no objective means by which to assess those qualities as "positive" in the first place; they are just qualities of human nature, the same as a propensity towards violence, subjugation of the weak, self-serving hedonism, etc. You claiming that instilling love is a positive quality and instilling fear a negative one is, under subjective meaning/values, no different than somone who claims hate is positive and kindness a negative. Under meaning/value subjectivism, you have no logical argument available to you; all you can do here is assert your particular personal preferences as "goods". It is an empty argument that has no means of evaluating in any significant sense. To embrace meaning/value subjectivism is to abandon logical argument and embrace empty, emotional rhetoric. Yet here you are, explicitly implying that certain human traits are "positive", and that others are negative, as if there is some means by which to objectively assess such things. William J Murray

Jennifer Fulwiler: Scientific Atheism to Christ - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aw8uUOPoi2M What caused Jennifer Fulwiler to question her atheism to begin with? It was the birth of her first child. She says that when she looked at her child, the only way her atheist mind could explain the love that she had for him was to assume it was the result of nothing more than chemical reactions in her brain. However, in the video I linked above, she says:

"And I looked down at him, and I realized that’s not true."

========== The Heretic -Who is Thomas Nagel and why are so many of his fellow academics condemning him? Andrew Ferguson – March 25, 2013 Excerpt: A materialist who lived his life according to his professed convictions—understanding himself to have no moral agency at all, seeing his friends and enemies and family as genetically determined robots—wouldn’t just be a materialist: He’d be a psychopath. http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/heretic_707692.html?page=3 bornagain77

keiths @ 59:: There's a reason I used the past tense of "characterize", keith. I would no longer characterize my longing as the search for truth - as your quote from TSZ correctly indicates. For most of my life, however, my search was for truth, as I have expressed in more detail on many threads at TSZ, until I realized truth was not what I was really wanted. William J Murray

Aleta said,

do you mean I shouldn’t take delight in my darling two year old granddaughter, or love my wife, or devote years to teaching high school kids, because my life will come to a end some day. This is my one-and-only opportunity to be alive: the fact that my life is transitory is all the more reason to embrace it while I can.

No, I think you should do all those, but stop irrationally believing that your darling two year-old granddaughter is the result of many thousand improbable and unguided occurrences . Taking into account the fact that the universe had a beginning, that it is incredibly fine-tuned for life, that consciousness is easily observed but CANNOT be explained, that some form of limited free will is undeniably observed, and that, as it says in the Bible, your darling granddaughter is "fearfully and wonderfully made", WHY oh WHY do you insist that it is your rational side which chooses NOT to believe in God. It is my opinion, that you have an emotional reason to reject a creator. It is an a priori position you take and hold in spite of the evidence, not because of it. When intelligent men, claiming to be "scientific" have to propose billions of unseen, undetectable universes in order to justify the miracle of life they see in this one, you know as well as I know, that they are not making a rational judgment. They have just a priori decided that they can not allow anything to be evidence for God, lest they let a divine foot in the door. Please choose not only to celebrate your darling granddaughter, but also get to know the God that made her. It makes life that much better. JDH

to WJM: OK, I'll take back saying it was flippant, and I'll respond to this serious reply. I acknowledge that it common for many people, and I will include myself as one, have a strong desire to search for truth or for a lasting, deep peace and happiness. However, it is not true for me that I long for "for something more meaningful, deeper, or true beyond the merely subjective and transitory." I would like to find what truth and peace while I can, but I don't have any belief that that truth, or the source of that peace, is "ultimate". All we can do is find some truth and peace within the limits of our experience and abilities. I'm not looking for any ultimate, final answers, because I don't think there are any. Whatever truth and peace I find, to whatever extent I do, are in fact subjective and transitory. They are certainly transitory because they'll be over when I'm dead. But you write, "If one actually believes it is all subjective and in the end of things doesn’t ultimately matter, what’s the point of arguing about it or really even thinking about it much?" That makes no sense: do you mean I shouldn't take delight in my darling two year old granddaughter, or love my wife, or devote years to teaching high school kids, because my life will come to a end some day. This is my one-and-only opportunity to be alive: the fact that my life is transitory is all the more reason to embrace it while I can. And "subjective" is not a dirty word. As I said in post 28 on the Big Questions thread, the fact that I am the only person who can build and experience my meaning of life is not the same as saying it doesn't matter what I choose. If you want, you can go read that so I don't repeat myself here. Aleta

Aleta: I do have a “deep longing” (although that isn’t exactly the phrase I would use) for understanding the nature of man – I find our existence fascinating and have avocationally devoted quite a bit of time and energy to my studies.

How does your naturalistic position accommodate all this? What is 'the nature of man', 'fascination' and 'devotion' if not merely 'particles in motion'? You speak highly of 'our existence', but why, since you know it is merely an illusion to - yes to what? - 'particles in motion'? How do you ... talk like that - being a materialist? Box

William J Murray, here at UD:

I characterized my particular longing as a search for truth.

William J Murray at TSZ:

I guess you could say that I’m the ultimate pragmatist; I don’t care if my beliefs are true; I only care that they work (or at least appear to). If they stopped working, I’d believe something else. Doubt, in my system, is a non-sequitur.

I love William. :-) keith s

<blockquote.So your flippant remark is really off-base, I think. It wasn't flippant. Do you really think there is all that much daylight between your longing to understand the nature of man and Mr. Arrington's stated longing to know or fulfill our ultimate purpose? I characterized my particular longing as a search for truth. Others might characterize that longing as a longing for some kind of enlightenment or for a lasting, deep peace and happiness. Whether or not we have access to such knowledge doesn't change the fact that it is the experience of longing for something more meaningful, deeper, or true beyond the merely subjective and transitory that drives us to study, research and argue passionately about our views and beliefs. If one actually believes it is all subjective and in the end of things doesn't ultimately matter, what's the point of arguing about it or really even thinking about it much? William J Murray

Although I'm pretty sure WJM just wanted to be flippant, not serious, I'll offer a serious reply. In college, I was an anthropology major, and my main interests were religion, belief systems, and socialization. Over the years I've been interested in, and had various opportunities to study, philosophy (both Western and Eastern), psychology, the history of Western Civilization, the philosophy and history of science, and other related topics. I do have a "deep longing" (although that isn't exactly the phrase I would use) for understanding the nature of man - I find our existence fascinating and have avocationally devoted quite a bit of time and energy to my studies. Having this interest is not at all the same as longing for ultimate meaning. In fact, as with many people who study comparative religion, it is my understanding of the wide diversity of human religions and belief systems, both cultural and personal, that has helped convince me that we have no access to any knowledge about what the universe is "ultimately" about, if anything. So your flippant remark is really off-base, I think. Aleta

Aleta said:

I have an adult lifetime of thinking and studying these issues..

Nothing says "no longing for ultimate meaning" like spending an adult liftetime thinking about and studying these issues. William J Murray

centrestream: I absolutely agree. My experience in UD has been that if you disagree with what Barry (or Mr. Mullings, or Denyse) claim are ultimate truths you are not worth being listened to. And then you are banned. lol. And that ought not be the case. Right? Why not? Mung

Thank God Aleta thinks the debate over ID is meaningful! Mung

To roding at 51: very good point. The Christian emphasis on a ultimate meaning or purpose derived from and in respect to God is the cultural foundation for the longing that Barry believes is universal. But people raised in other cultures have different perspectives. In Buddhism, one of the goals is to free oneself from being attached to theories about the universe so that one can truly experience what is rather then what ones thinks about what is. Rational knowledge has its place and power, but when it comes to addressing one's spiritual needs, Eastern religions see excessive rationalizations as an impediment. Aleta

Aleta: ". I certainly reject the notion that Barry has some superior access to knowledge about the state of all men’s hearts, and I doubt if there is any empirical evidence to support his claim." I absolutely agree. My experience in UD has been that if you disagree with what Barry (or Mr. Mullings, or Denyse) claim are ultimate truths you are not worth being listened to. And then you are banned. centrestream

Most of the perspectives shared here from those advocating a meaning or purpose to life seem to have a Christian foundation. But what about other religious and/or spiritual perspectives. I'm not a Buddhist myself, but wouldn't some Buddhists say that the very idea of needing a special purpose is just a manifestation of ego and an "I" centered view of the world? Is then this idea of needing meaning/purpose (whatever you want to call it, I don't want to get into semantics!), a very Western perspective (and on a philosophy that looks to an external agent for purpose). Thoughts? roding

There are a few points mentioned today that I'd like to comment on. I think I'll take them one point at a time. Barry had written the following:

An intense longing for Ultimate Purpose/Significance is at the bottom of every human heart. Everyone, from fundamentalist Bible thumpers to militant atheists, searches for a greater context in which to situate their lives. The honest materialist does not deny the longing.

Both I, MarkF, and others have pointed out that we have no such longing. As I have explained, I agree that human beings, as part of their nature, derive significant meaning from being part of some larger group, or identifying with some abstract ideal: people find a "greater context in which to situate their lives" in their family, in their local community, in their occupation and profession, in the national allegiance, in their favorite sports team, the organizations they join, and so on. We are social animals, and this need - this longing, is common to virtually all human beings. But that is different than longing for an ultimate meaning or purpose. My guess is that many people throughout the world have no such longing, and certainly not an intense longing at the bottom of their heart. MarkF in post 34 points out that

Barry is claiming we all have some sort of deep yearning for an ultimate purpose and says that anyone who denies this is dishonest. This is a statement about human psychology to be answered by observing a large sample of humans and seeing if they do in fact have this yearning.... I note that I myself have no such yearning and several others on this OP have said the same. On what basis is Barry going to prove us wrong?

and then MarkF points out some flaws in Barry's statement:

He cannot answer it by: * Appealing purely to logic – this is an empirical matter * Noting his own yearning and assuming everyone else is the same * Repeating the odd quote from famous writers [I assume referring to the Dawkins quotes] * Accusing anyone who disagrees of being dishonest

I strongly support MarkF's point here. Somehow Barry claims to know something about all men's intense longing for an ultimate purpose, and he claims that I am dishonest if I don't acknowledge that longing in myself. How can Barry know this? Furthermore, how can Barry feel so sure of his knowledge that he think's I'm being dishonest if I don't acknowledge the feelings he thinks I ought to have. I certainly reject the notion that Barry has some superior access to knowledge about the state of all men's hearts, and I doubt if there is any empirical evidence to support his claim. I have an adult lifetime of thinking and studying these issues, and am quite sure of my beliefs. It really is not conducive to constructive dialog to tell me that I am being dishonest when I disavow a intense longing for an ultimate purpose. It's not right to project one own's beliefs onto other people like that, rather then being willing to accept the differences between people and respect other people's integrity as one would want their integrity respected. I don't doubt that Barry has an intense longing for an ultimate purpose, and that it comes from positive beliefs rather than a fear of an abyss that he thinks might be there without that purpose, but not everyone is the same, and I would hope my beliefs would be taken at face value rather than accusing me of self-deception and dishonesty. Aleta

lol. another great OP Barry. Got the cockroaches scurrying about looking for someplace dark to hide. A meaningful life is a purposeful life. In universe without purpose that's almost meaningful. But not quite. Mung

At first glance I thought this thread was about football brothers! Mung

MF

Uh? I am sorry but this is complete gobbleydook to me. Could you rephrase your case in plain English?

Ultimate from the Oxford Dictionary "Final or fundamental fact or principle" Ultimately life has no meaning. Fundamental fact (ultimately), life has no meaning. Factually life has no meaning. KS

But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.”

What he is saying is "But it is not incoherent to say that life has no factual meaning or factual significance but in spite of the facts it still has meaning and significance to me" Lets replace meaning with Supreme Being. "But it is not incoherent to say that life has ultimately (factually) no Supreme Being but there still is a Supreme Being for me" So I ask is either one of the above coherent and rational.How would KS respond to someone espousing the latter? Vivid vividbleau

Centrestream @2

I have no problem with the fact that there is no ultimate purpose and meaning to life. I much prefer being responsible for bringing purpose and meaning to my own life.

Keith s

Meaning is inherently subjective. An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there.

Centrestream, your statement echoes aspects of Sartre. That a human, on atheism, could being responsible for "bringing" purpose would have to be part of his/her essence, something that they a priori "bring" to their existence. I don't have the time or inclination to argue existentialism with you (or Sartre) suffice to say that on atheism I find it bankrupt. Also, there is a touch of will to power which WJM has just dispensed with. . . which leads me to Keith s. Even if we allow your definition of meaningful to be included in the mix, it is does not help your argument. One of your synonyms was "important", but I think it was StephenB who pointed out that it would be better for you to have included "importance" to make your statement non-contradictory. Meaning, in that sense, is subjective, that is, you assign "importance" to varying degrees to life/events. (Come to think of it, this is hardly any different from saying that subjectively held meanings are subjectively held. Should the charge be switched from "being contradictory," to "being tautological"? but I digress . . .) And so what? BA was not suggesting that nobody can attach more or less "importance" to events in their lives, as if the events in one's life makes up the totality of it. And this is where we must depart paths: In some important sense (foreign to me, so help me out) you do not believe (define, think of, etc . . .) your life as anything beyond the events that happen within it and your subjective feelings about them. That is why you so passionately stick with statements such as the one above. It may also be why, when queried a la the shorter catechism (Westminster): What is the chief end of man? Your answer can only be "to do whatever each considers meaningful." (please, correct me if I am wrong) which is a far cry from, "to enjoy and glorify God forever." I will not (overly) moralize on which is better practical philosophy, but I do recommend three essays by C.S Lewis whose topic at first seems to be education, but is in fact a brilliant if brief introduction and discourse on what Lewis termed the Tao, and what we know as natural law, "The Abolition of Man." I do not suggest these essays as some sort of "winning" argument. I suggest them so that you may read them. Tim

VB

The word ultimate in the context of this OP is to say that factually meaning has no existence.

Uh? I am sorry but this is complete gobbleydook to me. Could you rephrase your case in plain English? markf

No one can act as if the meaning to/in life is subjective in nature outside of sociopaths. If one truly considered the meaning to/in life subjective, they would not have any problem with how others found meaning in/to life as long behavior stemming from such views didn't involve them. IOW, as long as Nazi views on the meaning to/in life didn't directly affect them, what do they care if a few million Jews are exterminated? This is just competing subjective views playing themselves out on the evolutionary battlefield. Does the subjectivist also care if one species of finch wins the evolutionary battle over another? Whomever wins, it's just the survival of the fittest, correct? William J Murray

RE 42 To be consistent "life has no factual Supreme Being but a Supreme Being is factual" Vivid vividbleau

MF VB

Let me ask you is it coherent and rational to say ” it is factual that God does not exist but God still exists”?

MF

It is not coherent. But I don’t see what this has got to do with anything KeithS wrote.

The word ultimate in the context of this OP is to say that factually meaning has no existence. One then is saying that even though factually there is no meaning there is meaning. I was trying to show that by replacing the word life with God to see how that would fly with Keith. Perhaps this would be a better way of asking the question. Is it coherent and rational to say "life has no factual Supreme Being but God is factual "? I have not added "to me" because I think that those two words are irrelevant and just confuses things but you can add it if you want. Vivid vividbleau

PS: One of the subtleties of the substitution tactic is that it reflects the implicit premise, might and manipulation make 'right'/ 'truth'/ 'meaning'/ 'purpose' . . . etc. A very dangerous road to go down. PPS: I should note Provine in that telling U of T Darwin Day address 1998, just so we don't lose sight of the fact that significant evo mat advocates have publicly admitted the point BA has made and some troubling linked points:

Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will . . .

The no freedom of responsible action directly undermines choice, ability to reason (which requires power to freely think and choose . . . cf my point that computation is not rational contemplation), thus to warrant knowledge, thus knowledge, understanding, and of course meaning evaporates. PPPS: The tendency of materialists to undermine or even denigrate and dismiss philosophical matters including logic, epistemology, ethics and worldviews analysis aka metaphysics, should not be overlooked. kairosfocus

CY, busy playing fireman, but here on may give relevant backdrop, read on down to the infographic on Schaeffer's line of despair and context. I would highlight that evolutionary materialism is ancient and from Plato on has been corrosive of reason, knowledge, meaning and ethics. Cf The Laws, Bk X. KF kairosfocus

#38 VB

Let me ask you is it coherent and rational to say ” it is factual that God does not exist but God still exists”?

It is not coherent. But I don't see what this has got to do with anything KeithS wrote. markf

Keiths did not say life does not exist. He said it has no ultimate meaning – quite different things. I did not say that Keith said life does not exist. I am talking about profound facts and using something else as an example. Let me ask you is it coherent and rational to say " it is factual that God does not exist but God still exists"? Vivid

vividbleau

Keith s: "The Designer, if he/she/it exists, is just one more beholder, and yes, meaning is in the eye of the beholder." See, that's what you get wrong every time. Assuming the designer is God, the Creator of the universe, He is not "just one more beholder." He is the first cause, and He caused before there was anything to behold. As such, the meaning He ascribes is above all others. In an earlier post I clarified the Christian view of meaning as an ethic based in the character of God. God did not design Himself. If He exists at all, He is eternal, unchanging. His character has always been. When we find meaning through His character, we are not beholding something that God once beheld; rather, He dispenses His eternal character through us, if that makes any sense (read #23). God does not behold his own character. There are no mirrors reflecting God to Himself. He already knows himself. Otherwise He would not be God. It would be very different, I suppose if God purposed us to be idolators, ascribing ultimate meaning upon inanimate temporal objects, rather than deriving meaning through Him alone. Then we could, I suppose, ascribe our own meaning to those objects and perhaps find some fulfillment through them. But that is apparently not the case. We are not free to create God in our own or anybody else's image. Logic does not permit this, let alone doctrine. He did not ascribe those parameters. And indeed history has shown the consequences of doing so. In purveying meaning to us through his character, the creator dispenses with idolatry altogether, rightfully condemning it, and as such gives true ultimate meaning that is not based in temporal things, but in His eternal perfect unchanging, loving character. He ascribes intent because He created with intent. The consequence or parameter of not accepting His intent, is to be relegated to the "whims" of His creation as all that exists; to assume no ultimate purpose, while still yearning for it. To as Barry describes, "stare into the abyss." The designer of the can opener is similar, though not exactly like the Creator, since he was also designed. But he is able to ascribe intent on the object of his creation. He purposes it as a can opener and not an ink pen. Assuming the can opener is conscious and assumes itself in the role of ink pen. The intent of the designer is not thus usurped by such a choice. Rather, the designer can ascribe upon his creation consequences for assuming a purpose other than his intent. As part of the design, the can opener cannot by choice, escape the consequences (parameters) ascribed upon him by design. This is ultimately what the Isaiah passage means to convey in its full context. While a designed entity may ascribe upon itself meaning outside the purveyance of its designer, a designer can ascribe consequences (parameters) that would make an assumption of his original purpose (meaning) more beneficial than otherwise. This is why the original meaning and intent transcends any intent subsequently ascribed by a conscious subject. Of course you don't believe that such a designer exists. You are therefore forced by your chosen belief to reject ultimate purpose, but your position begs the question, since you still adhere to a need for meaning and purpise in your life, no matter how trivially you insist that it doesn't have to be "ultimate" purpose. If you were to be consistent with the view that there is ultimately no purpose in life, you would cast off all pretensions that your life is meaningful. But to do that, you would by action be proving the opposite. Your conscious act of casting off all meaning and purpose, would in fact be a purposeful reaction to your stated belief in non-purpose, ultimately proving the self-defeating nature of your stated belief. CannuckianYankee

KeithS

Suppose God exists and created us. I can still regard my life as meaningful, even if the meaning I find in it is different from the meaning God attributes to it.

Bad logic. God doesn't "attribute" meaning to his creatures, he confers it. Their reason for being is, by definition, His decision, not theirs.

There is no contradiction here, because meaning is subjective.

The contradiction is nothing short of violent. If meaning is subjective to the creature, then the meaning conferred on the creature by the Creator has been obliterated.

God, if he exists, is one more subject.

Bad logic. God is objective to us. He is subjective to Himself just as we are subjective to ourselves. StephenB

#33 VB

How could something not exist but exist for me?

Keiths did not say life does not exist. He said it has no ultimate meaning - quite different things. markf

Barry wishes to restrict meaning to:   1. Linguistic intention.2. Ultimate purpose.3. Culturally adapted belief system.   Rather than get into a debate about the meaning of meaning let’s work with those.  Barry is claiming we all have some sort of deep yearning for an ultimate purpose and says that anyone who denies this is dishonest. This is a statement about human psychology to be answered by observing a large sample of humans and seeing if they do in fact have this yearning. He cannot answer it by: * Appealing purely to logic – this is an empirical matter * Noting his own yearning and assuming everyone else is the same * Repeating the odd quote from famous writers * Accusing anyone who disagrees of being dishonest Unfortunately Barry does not provide a reference to any such sample. I note that I myself have no such yearning and several others on this OP have said the same. On what basis is Barry going to prove us wrong? markf

But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.”

So Keith is it incoherent or irrational to say "God has no ultimate existence or significance but God still has existence and significance to me" How could something not exist but exist for me? I would ask what you would say to such a person but we already know. Vivid vividbleau

KeithS, let me fine tune my question a little bit more. To Barry, you wrote,

In your OP, you are attempting to stack the deck in your favor by limiting “meaning” to the following three definitions:

So, the subject on the table was the definition of the word "meaning," but then you wrote,

"Meaningful things aren’t limited to those three categories. Here’s the second definition that Google returns for “meaningful”:

But "meaningful" is not a synonym for "meaning." Those words cannot be used interchangeably. This, by the way, is a Darwinist Debate Tactic--changing the subject. If you really believed that "meaning" was subjective, you would not feel the need to smuggle in the word "meaningful" as a substitute in an attempt to mislead the poor reader. Did you think no one would notice? StephenB

StephenB, You crack me up. Read what I wrote:

Meaningful things aren’t limited to those three categories. Here’s the second definition that Google returns for “meaningful”: having a serious, important, or useful quality or purpose. “making our lives rich and meaningful” synonyms: sincere, deep, serious, in earnest, significant, important “a meaningful relationship” [Emphasis added]

LMGTFY keith s

KeithS, at this point you are just filling up cyberspace with empty words. Nothing you have said will save your argument. Also, I want to know where you found a definition of "meaning" that included synonyms like, "rich," "sincere," "in earnest" and a "meaningful relationship." Please provide the website. StephenB

CannuckianYankee:

You’re still claiming that meaning and purpose are in the eyes of the beholder only, which is to be expected from a person who has so obviously cast off all rational thought.

:-)

But for the sake of the onlookers, It is rather the purveyor of truth, the designer, if you will that dispenses meaning, not the receiver. Intent is greater than perception. Do you doubt this?

The Designer, if he/she/it exists, is just one more beholder, and yes, meaning is in the eye of the beholder.

“You turn things upside down, as if the potter were thought to be like the clay! Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, “You did not make me”? Can the pot say to the potter, “You know nothing”?” Isaiah 29:16 NIV

Suppose God exists and created us. I can still regard my life as meaningful, even if the meaning I find in it is different from the meaning God attributes to it. There is no contradiction here, because meaning is subjective. God, if he exists, is one more subject. keith s

keith s If you wouldn't say that your "life, were meant for nothing.” Would you say that your life IS meant for something? If "Life is not meant" is false Then "Life is meant" must be true c hand

StephenB:

Once again, KeithS is trying to pull a fast one. The definition of “meaningful,” which is subjective, cannot be substituted for the word “meaning,” which has an objective component. You will not find synonyms like sincere, rich, or in earnest attached to the word “meaning.” KeithS must have understood this, so he searched for a subjectivized form of meaning (meaningful) and tried to pass it off as part of the definition of “meaning.”

Come on, StephenB. To say thatlife has meaning and significance to me is to say that it's meaningful to me. You are a native English speaker, correct? keith s

Keith s: "It’s still subjective. The designer of the can opener sees it as being meant to open cans, but Clarence the Conscious Can Opener sees the meaning of can opener life as something else entirely. Two subjects, two meanings." You're still claiming that meaning and purpose are in the eyes of the beholder only, which is to be expected from a person who has so obviously cast off all rational thought. But for the sake of the onlookers, It is rather the purveyor of truth, the designer, if you will that dispenses meaning, not the receiver. Intent is greater than perception. Do you doubt this? "You turn things upside down, as if the potter were thought to be like the clay! Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, "You did not make me"? Can the pot say to the potter, "You know nothing"?" Isaiah 29:16 NIV Scripture is often insightful on questions of meaning. The author of this ancient text understood the difference between a purveyor, a designer and the one designed. Purpose derives from the purpose-giver, not the other way around. You turn things upside down as if the can were to be like the can maker. CannuckianYankee

keiths:

But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.”

StephenB:

Yes it is. If your were meant for nothing then it is a contradiction to say that you are going to be meant for something.

I didn't say that I, or my life, "were meant for nothing". Why are you making things up? My words are right in front of you.

To say life is meant for nothing conflicts with the statement, life means something to me.

Again, you're making things up. Knock it off. keiths:

Meaning is inherently subjective.

StephenB:

You perception of meaning is subjective but the fact of meaningfulness and purposefulness is objective.

No. Meaning itself is subjective, but the fact that meaning exists is objective. This should be obvious. That the word "hell" has meaning is an objective fact, but the meaning is different for an American versus a German. It's subjective. The same thing holds true when talking about the meaning or significance of life. keiths:

An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there.

StephenB:

It can seem meaningful to one person and seem banal to another person, but it cannot be both meaningful and meaningless. To be is not to seem.

"Meaningful" and "banal" are relative to the person making the judgment. Again, this should be obvious.

Indeed, the meaning you try to create can easily be in conflict with what you were meant to be if, in fact, you were created for a purpose. So it is with any created thing.

Exactly! Meaning is subjective.

A can opener was meant to open cans. If it were conscious and had free will, it might decide that it would be more subjectively meaningful to be a ball point pen, In keeping with that point, it might insist that it had created its own meaning, but the objective fact that it was meant to be a can opener and nothing else is inescapable.

It's still subjective. The designer of the can opener sees it as being meant to open cans, but Clarence the Conscious Can Opener sees the meaning of can opener life as something else entirely. Two subjects, two meanings. keith s

Aleta

Keith S addressed this in #5 when he quoted some definitions from Google, such as “having a serious, important, or useful quality or purpose, making our lives rich, deep, serious, in earnest, significant, …”

The first part of that definition is correct (Having a serious, important, or useful quality or purpose) I am going to challenge the second part

“making our lives rich and meaningful” synonyms: sincere, deep, serious, in earnest, significant, important “a meaningful relationship” I’m speaking of that kind of meaning in my comment above:

Once again, KeithS is trying to pull a fast one. The definition of "meaningful," which is subjective, cannot be substituted for the word "meaning," which has an objective component. You will not find synonyms like sincere, rich, or in earnest attached to the word "meaning." KeithS must have understood this, so he searched for a subjectivized form of meaning (meaningful) and tried to pass it off as part of the definition of "meaning." How about Darwinist Debating Tactic #19--smuggling the definition of one word into part of the definition of another word. StephenB

"I think the phrase ultimate meaning or ultimate purpose adequately describes the view of the theist: that in the mind of God, and as an aspect of the intentions of his actions, the universe has a purpose; and more importantly, humans have a purpose in his eyes, and their lives derive an ultimate meaning from their relationship with him as part, a very special part, of his creation. The overriding meaning and purpose of one’s life comes from and relates to a source outside of oneself – one immensely more powerful and knowledgable than any human could ever be – God. Please correct me if this is not an adequate, although brief, description of ultimate meaning. I think this is a fairly standard understanding most people would have of the phrase 'ultimate meaning.'" - Aleta Be careful in summarising the Christian view here. In so doing you have left out the most important part. " The overriding meaning and purpose of one’s life comes from and relates to a source outside of oneself " The more complete view is that purpose of one's life derives from the character of God, not simply from "outside the self." We don't meditate on bicycles and tea cups, rather, on the selfless, other-directed character of God exemplified in Christ. Acknowledging that Christ's life is superior to our own, we learn to be selfless, other-directed as he is. In so doing, our lives have meaning and purpose outside the need to fulfill our own desires. To miss this is to miss the crucial point in the incarnation, crucufixion and resurrection. So ultimate meaning isn't a feel-good esoteric religious experience of a powerful entity outside the self, rather, it is taking into oneself the character of God, which is manifest in us as what the apostle calls the fruit of the spirit: love, joy, peace patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. (Galatians 5:22-23). None of these characteristics are too controversial. In fact, Paul states, "against these things there is no law." In "choosing" these characteristics as part of your ethic, your meaning, you are not so much as choosing them, as allowing them to be manifest in you. We don't come upon such an ethic naturally by choice. In fact, it would be safe to say that while no person could rationally condemn such an ethic, world cultures don't exactly encourage it explicitly. Human laws tend to scratch the surface of such an ethic without overtly demanding it. As is said, you can't legislate morality. But under the surface of our laws is this ethic. We don't choose it, it finds its way to us through human law. So human law is but a shadow of what theists view as the ultimate meaning in life. Jews utter the Shema Yisrael, Christians talk of the golden rule. other traditions have similar pronouncements. Even atheists claim to adhere to a similar ethic. I fail to see how this is in any way a chosen meaning, yet it approaches what all of us mean when we talk about loving those close to us, and to our fellow humans. It seems to me that it is woven into the fabric of our laws however marginally. So is meaning really as subjective as materialists suppose? When we talk of meaning, we talk of entities that lurk in the shadows of our collective concious, and they seem to be the same spirits when we expose them to the light. That the Christian manifestation is more explicit shouldn't be at all surprising. It is the Christian ethic, which after all, provided us with the basis for the notion of freedom, dignity and human rights. It wasn't a choice; it was forced upon us by scripture. We can choose another path, certainly, and we often do, but such a path is objectively more perilous as history demonstrates time and again. But the materialist claims that there is no "ultimate" meaning, while at the same time affirming the basic meanings that all other rational humans adhere to, while declaring that such meaning has not been hoisted upon them by rational discourse, like it has all the rest; that he/she is free to choose this meaning for him/herself quite apart from an objective mandate. Their actions speak much louder than their words on the matter, and they contradict. When they love another, they are doing an objective "ought." That it has meaning to them is not by choice but by rational mandate as part of their human makeup. CannuckianYankee

Lots to try to unpack here, but I'll give it a try. 1. First, I don't think I can accept Barry's three definitions of meaning, especially his attempt to define meaning as I am using it. I understand, of course the first use of meaning in terms of what a word means, and I don't think we have to worry about getting confused about that. I think the phrase ultimate meaning or ultimate purpose adequately describes the view of the theist: that in the mind of God, and as an aspect of the intentions of his actions, the universe has a purpose; and more importantly, humans have a purpose in his eyes, and their lives derive an ultimate meaning from their relationship with him as part, a very special part, of his creation. The overriding meaning and purpose of one's life comes from and relates to a source outside of oneself - one immensely more powerful and knowledgable than any human could ever be - God. Please correct me if this is not an adequate, although brief, description of ultimate meaning. I think this is a fairly standard understanding most people would have of the phrase "ultimate meaning." However the meaning of meaning that Barry wants to ascribe to me is wrong. Barry says that I say [these are Barry's words] that "human belief and meaning systems are human inventions that are inculcated into members of a culture." This is true fact (for a short sentence), but is a fact about meaning, not a definition of meanings. Keith S addressed this in #5 when he quoted some definitions from Google, such as "having a serious, important, or useful quality or purpose, making our lives rich, deep, serious, in earnest, significant, ..." Meaning in this sense refers to the biggest questions and deepest feelings we have about our lives and the world around us: how are we to treat our fellow man, how can we contribute to the well being of our society, how do we spend our time in what various human activities in order to make the most of our capabilities, how can we best actualize our potential for positive satisfying human traits such as love and affection, awe, peace, etc., and minimize fear, anger, depression, etc. What overriding "big picture" do we have about who human beings are and how are we to live in this brief period of time we are alive? Our answers to those questions constitute the things than "give our life meaning." These questions and feelings are really no different than the ones asked by a theist. There are not two different meanings of meaning, one for Barry and one for Aleta: we both have the same human needs, the same human resources to draw on, and basically the same questions. The source of disagreement is where one gets those answers, and most specifically, whether there is an outside source that provides an ultimate purpose or whether those are derived from the human experience, drawing on our nature as an organism, the concentric circles of culture we all inhabit (family, community, nation, etc.), and our own integration of all our personal experience in order to exist as a meaningful whole in our own eyes. 2. Barry then quotes Dawkins: "[In the universe there] is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference", and you decide to call this the “Materialist Prime Directive.” Now I am not Dawkins, nor particularly a Dawkins fan, so I certainly don't want to be held responsible for what Dawkins said. So I would hope we could stick to what I have said, and not Dawkins: I wrote, "the universe as a whole has no purpose nor does it add an external meaning to our life", which is different in important ways than what Dawkins says. You further load the discussion with your own preconceptions by calling this the “Materialist Prime Directive.” I don't consider my belief that the universe does not give me purpose or meaning a "prime directive" of any kind. Purpose and meaning in my life are local affairs, and there is no reason why the universe as a whole should be involved. Just because your belief that God gives meaning and purpose to human beings is a prime directive to you doesn't mean that the negation - that the universe doesn't supply meaning and purpose, is a prime directive for me. To define my beliefs (which are mine, not yours), as if they were obligated to being seen as the opposite of ours, in all their implications, is wrong. The fact that there is no ultimate meaning coming from the universe is a non-event in my life - I have no reason to believe that the universe has any such impact on me, or should have. So I reject the characterization of my belief as a "prime directive". I am directed by other understandings, but not that one. Barry then wrote, "No one is able to stare into the abyss without flinching. I noted that even those that insist there is no Ultimate Purpose/Significance feel compelled to seek a kind of meaning as a substitute for Ultimate Purpose/Significance." I disagree with much of what you say here for similar reasons as above, and since what you say here in effect is meant to apply to me, I'll tell you where I think you're wrong. Your sentence "No one is able to stare into the abyss without flinching" contains all your own preconceptions of how you think I see the world, but your are wrong. The universe is not an abyss, I'm not staring into it, and when I do contemplate its non-purposeful nature, there is nothing to flinch from, for as explained above I have no reason to expect the universe to supply purpose: I get my meaning and purpose from much more local sources. Your whole metaphor conjures up images that relate to your worldview because of the feelings you would have if you lost your belief in God, but the metaphor soes not apply to me. 3. You write, "an intense longing for Ultimate Purpose/Significance is at the bottom of every human heart. Everyone, from fundamentalist Bible thumpers to militant atheists, searches for a greater context in which to situate their lives. The honest materialist does not deny the longing." Again, more projection from your own worldview, I think. It is a fact of human psychology that people strive to organize their understanding of their lives into a meaningful whole. Given how dependent we are on both learning and abstract thinking, this is a necessity. And for most people, to varying degrees, some sense of wanting to understand the "big picture" issues mentioned above is part of that desire. However, to say that "Ultimate Purpose/Significance is at the bottom of every human heart" is to, again, impose conceptions from your own worldview on all others. I am, for the sake of this discussion, "an honest materialist" and I don't have an intense longing for an ultimate purpose. I don't think such a thing exists, and it doesn't seem reasonable to even think that it might. 4. In the part Barry titled Aleta's Argument, Barry is primarily discussing Dawkins, and I've already said I'm not interested in discussing any one's views but mine, and that I'm not a fan of some of the things Dawkins has to had to say about this. It's getting late, so I'll jump to Barry's last paragraph:

I argue that the human longing for “meaning” (i.e., Ultimate Purpose/Significance) is a very real phenomenon, and that longing is directed at something real. Aleta agrees there is a longing, but he dismisses that longing as a mere cultural adaptation. Here’s the problem with that. Once one realizes that “meaning” in Aleta’s sense of the word is empty and arbitrary, a mere evolutionary adaptation foisted upon us by our genes, the game is up. Because it is a truism that a meaning (cultural adaptation) that is meaningless (arbitrary/random) can have no meaning (ultimate significance).

This whole paragraph is full of misconceptions about what I believe. "Once one realizes that “meaning” in Aleta’s sense of the word is empty and arbitrary", says Barry I never said that. Meaning in the sense I mean it is neither empty nor arbitrary - to each person their sense of meaning is important, complex, connected to strong emotions, and a product of the person's attempt to integrate their experience into a useful and meaningful whole. I can't imagine how this could be called empty or arbitrary. Barry says, "... a mere evolutionary adaptation foisted upon us by our genes." I never said that our beliefs were "mere", nor that they were "foisted upon us by our genes." This is more of Barry characterizing statements and beliefs that he thinks materialists must have because he defines his notion of them in opposition to his own wordview. Barry says my beliefs, as a product of a combination of my human nature, my specific genetic nature, my society, my culture, my life experience, and my cognitive processing are "meaningless (arbitrary/random)." I can't begin to understand what he means here. Of course there a elements or randomness in my life, just as they are in everybody's: if I would have been shipped off to Tibet as a baby my understanding of the world would be very different, but my sense of it being my understanding would be just as strong. But to me, my big picture understandings are the product of some of the most focussed work I've done in my life - there is nothing arbitrary or random about them. And Barry finishes with concluding that my notion of meaning "has no meaning (ultimate significance)." But here at the end he is treating his notion of an ultimate meaning as the standard by which all meaning should be judged, and since I don't believe in ultimate meaning he declares that my meanings are meaningless. But that is just stacking the deck - loading the conclusion with his preconceptions. I don't believe ultimate meaning exists, and I don't expect it to exist. I have deep respect for the ways that human beings make meaning for themselves based on our experiences here in this life, but I don't think the universe, or any God of the universe, supply those meanings for us. This has gotten long, and is wordy and redundant in places, but it's my bedtime! One last response to Barry's footnote;. He writes, "Though he quibbles with whether he is actually a materialist. I think he prefers to consider himself an agnostic who accepts materialism provisionally. He can explain what he believes if I a wrong." Fairly accurate. I'll clarify by saying that I believe all we can really know is the material universe, because even if there is a non-material aspect to the universe (which there might be), all we can know is its effects when it "touches" the material world. I see a distinction between the world of which we can have empirical knowledge and the world behind that world, so to speak, about which we can only speculate. Also, ... this could go on and on. Enough for now. Aleta

Barry, Phew. StephenB came along just in time, eh? You were probably beginning to worry that you might have to defend your own statement. Well, you're still on the hook:

Barry, You claimed that my position was contradictory:

And why is it so hard for you to grasp that you want to have it both ways, just like Dawkins and Aleta.

Do you have the courage of your convictions, or are you going to run away from yet another challenge? I wrote:

I don’t want to “have it both ways”. There is no contradiction in my position.

If you think otherwise, then identify the contradiction. Quote the statements of mine that you believe are contradictory, and explain why you think so. The onlookers are watching. Can you back up your statement, or will you fold yet again?

It's your claim. Can you back it up? Quote the statements of mine that you believe are contradictory, and explain why you think so. keith s

ESCAPE FROM REASON "The truly adult view, by contrast, is that our life is as meaningful, as full and as wonderful as we choose to make it." - RD "Meaning is inherently subjective. An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there. I am content that my life has meaning to me and to the people I love. I don’t need a Big Meaner in the Sky to regard my life as meaningful." - KS "I have no problem with the fact that there is no ultimate purpose and meaning to life. I much prefer being responsible for bringing purpose and meaning to my own life. To do otherwise, in my opinion, is just lazy and defeatist. If you prefer to live like this, that is your choice. I chose otherwise." - CS "For your information I find it quite bearable to believe “that our life is completely meaningless, that the universe is indifferent to our existence, that literally nothing we say, think or do has any ultimate significance." - MF The above are not surprisingly, similar statements on meaning: that it is subjective, selective, and that we should not make any attempt to pin it down to a particular definition, thus: "Barry, In your OP, you are attempting to stack the deck in your favor by limiting “meaning” to the following three definitions: 1. Linguistic intention. 2. Ultimate purpose. 3. Culturally adapted belief system. Meaningful things aren’t limited to those three categories. Here’s the second definition that Google returns for 'meaningful”'" - KS As far as the first statement from Dawkins, I think JDH at #1 has effectively dismantled it: "My INTELLECTUAL, RATIONAL side realizes there is no meaning. But my EMOTIONAL side chooses to live within the confines of a made up purpose and meaning of my choosing.......... What is ironic is that this the attributions are directly backwards." But what of "meaning is inherently subjective?" It is easy to see why materialists view meaning as subjective, given their protests in pinning it down to specific defining criteria, but is it truly rational to believe that all meaning is subjective? is not such a position self-defeating? It would be interesting to see an in-depth analysis of this question from perhaps WJM, Kairosfocus, Barry or VJT. I personally view the position as an excuse to avoid solid stances on ethical issues, to "have it both ways." They find it quite bearable to accept this position because it comes with a temporary payoff: the ability to ignore concsience in situations of their choosing. To make up one's own meaning is to make up one's own rules. JDH nailed this one. They approach the scientific questions with their stated emotional desire to find their own "meaning." As such, we can never really have a meaningful discussion with such people, as in their view they are free to move the goal posts, to make up the rules as they go along, and to demand that we follow suit. Richard Dawkins has never capitulated on any one of his positions precisely because of his emotional commitments, not because of any intellectual ones, which explains his highly passionate and emotional atheist rhetoric when dealing with his opponents. We can expect the same pattern with all the others who take the same position. "Meaning is inherently subjective. An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there." No, there's no contradiction there, but there is a reduntancy that proves nothing. That a person views an experience as meaningless does not render it so. For example, I have experienced your quote. You meant somethimg by it. My failure to see your point does not force it into the realm of the meaningless. You still meant something. Meaning is therefore not only in the eyes of the beholder, but in the intent of the purveyor. it has little to do with whether I accept its meaning or not. If you read this, you are receiving my own attempt at producing meaning, rather than projecting meaning upon words from me that are bereft of purpose or meaning until you happen upon them. You could never learn from another if you are truly free to create your own meaning. This is why I believe your position to be self-defeating. CannuckianYankee

KS @ 15. StephenB already ably (as usual) points out the holes in your argument. No need to for redundant smackdowns. Barry Arrington

KeithS

But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.”

Yes it is. If your were meant for nothing then it is a contradiction to say that you are going to be meant for something. You cannot logically be what you are not.

But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.”

Yes, it is. To say life is meant for nothing conflicts with the statement, life means something to me.

Meaning is inherently subjective.

You perception of meaning is subjective but the fact of meaningfulness and purposefulness is objective.

An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there.

It can seem meaningful to one person and seem banal to another person, but it cannot be both meaningful and meaningless. To be is not to seem. Indeed, the meaning you try to create can easily be in conflict with what you were meant to be if, in fact, you were created for a purpose. So it is with any created thing. A can opener was meant to open cans. If it were conscious and had free will, it might decide that it would be more subjectively meaningful to be a ball point pen, In keeping with that point, it might insist that it had created its own meaning, but the objective fact that it was meant to be a can opener and nothing else is inescapable. StephenB

This all sounds like a lot of equivocation on the meaning of meaning. Advocates of the religious view that our lives have "meaning" seem to be arguing that it exists only insofar as our lives can be shown to serve a purpose in the mind of a Creator. What that purpose might be is most likely beyond our power to discover unless the Creator chooses to divulge it to us and He, She or It - if such exist - has been remarkably tight-lipped about the whole thing since the first century. The only documentary evidence we have the might have a bearing on the issue - the Bible - is inconsistent, contradictory and inconclusive. Believers are left to struggle with an inscrutable purpose which they hope and believe will turn out to be to their advantage in the long term. Atheistic materialists - or materialistic atheists - as has been pointed out before, have very little to offer as an alternative. Atheism is the absence of belief not an alternative belief. Atheism is not trying to win converts from other faiths by offering a better package of benefits in this life and rewards in the afterlife. It can't. It has nothing to offer potential adherents and, hence, should not be seen as a threat to the worlds religions. Except perhaps for a couple of questions. To whit, if the meaning of life resides in a purpose formed in the mind of an intelligent agent, what purposes count - or not - and why? Why shouldn't my purpose or your purpose be just as 'meaning-izing' as anyone else's? Seversky

Keith,

Keith: If I find my life to be meaningful (and I do), then it has meaning.

What is the meaning of your life? Box

Barry, You claimed that my position was contradictory:

And why is it so hard for you to grasp that you want to have it both ways, just like Dawkins and Aleta.

Do you have the courage of your convictions, or are you going to run away from yet another challenge? I wrote:

I don’t want to “have it both ways”. There is no contradiction in my position. If you think otherwise, then identify the contradiction. Quote the statements of mine that you believe are contradictory, and explain why you think so.

The onlookers are watching. Can you back up your statement, or will you fold yet again? keith s

Aleta, Mark and others such as Hitchens have explained why a person can have a fulfilled life with meaning and purpose without believing in God. Barry and other theists such as WL Craig have suggested that real purpose and meaning can be had only if it comes from an outside source. I think its worth considering what these 2 view of meaning and purpose entail. Its understandable that people want to be part of something larger. There is a certain kind of bliss felt by soldiers in a large battle or dancers in a big intricately choreographed performance when you realize you're a cog in a much larger machine. I think a similar thing can happen when one finds oneself in the midst of an historical event- no matter how insignificant ones part is. However valid these feelings are they shouldn't be confused with having a purpose for ones own life. I would say that meaning and purpose, by definition, has to come from within. Anything else, any purpose imposed from outside is no different than the purpose the Master has for the slave. It doesn't matter if this purpose comes from a Master, a boss, a president or the creator of the universe. I can think of an immediate objection some might make to my characterization but I might as well wait to see if anyone comments. RodW

KS @ 11. Read the OP again. You do not seem to have understood it, because you ask me to explain something I have already explained in detail. When you demonstrate you understand the OP, perhaps I will engage with you. Barry Arrington

As to:

Meaning is inherently subjective.,,, I know that the Big Meaner is important to you, but I don’t need a Big Meaner in order to find meaning in my life. If I find my life to be meaningful (and I do), then it has meaning. Not ultimate meaning, but meaning nonetheless.

Exactly who is this I that keith s is referring to that is so important to have meaning for in his life?

The Confidence of Jerry Coyne - Ross Douthat - January 6, 2014 Excerpt: But then halfway through this peroration, we have as an aside the confession that yes, okay, it’s quite possible given materialist premises that “our sense of self is a neuronal illusion.” At which point the entire edifice suddenly looks terribly wobbly — because who, exactly, is doing all of this forging and shaping and purpose-creating if Jerry Coyne, as I understand him (and I assume he understands himself) quite possibly does not actually exist at all? The theme of his argument is the crucial importance of human agency under eliminative materialism, but if under materialist premises the actual agent is quite possibly a fiction, then who exactly is this I who “reads” and “learns” and “teaches,” and why in the universe’s name should my illusory self believe Coyne’s bold proclamation that his illusory self’s purposes are somehow “real” and worthy of devotion and pursuit? (Let alone that they’re morally significant: But more on that below.) http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/the-confidence-of-jerry-coyne/

i.e. There is no person named keith s in keith s's worldview, there is just a neuronal illusion of an "I" in keith s's worldview who wishes to have an illusion of meaning. In effect keith s is an illusion wishing to have and illusion! :) As to this statement of the neuronal illusion of keith s's "I",,,

Meaning is inherently subjective.,,,

Contrary to what keith s's neuronal illusion of self, "I", may wish to be true, the fact of the matter is that subjective experience, i.e. consciousness, is not reducible to a material basis. In fact, subjective experience, i.e. consciousness, is axiomatic to quantum mechanics, and takes primary consideration over what keith s presupposes to be an objective material reality that can exist apart from his consciousness of it.

"It will remain remarkable, in whatever way our future concepts may develop, that the very study of the external world led to the scientific conclusion that the content of the consciousness is the ultimate universal reality" - Eugene Wigner - (Remarks on the Mind-Body Question, Eugene Wigner, in Wheeler and Zurek, p.169) 1961 - received Nobel Prize in 1963 for 'Quantum Symmetries' “No, I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.” Max Planck (1858–1947), the originator of quantum theory, The Observer, London, January 25, 1931 “Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else.” (Schroedinger, Erwin. 1984. “General Scientific and Popular Papers,” in Collected Papers, Vol. 4. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences. Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig/Wiesbaden. p. 334.)

Dividing the world into subjective and objective is known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics.

On The Comparison Of Quantum and Relativity Theories - Sachs - 1986 Excerpt: quantum theory entails and irreducible subjective element in its conceptual basis. In contrast, the theory of relativity when fully exploited, is based on a totally objective view. http://books.google.com/books?id=8qaYGFuXvMkC&pg=PA11#v=onepage&q&f=false How observation (consciousness) is inextricably bound to measurement in quantum mechanics: Quote: "We wish to measure a temperature.,,, But in any case, no matter how far we calculate -- to the mercury vessel, to the scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some time we must say: and this is perceived by the observer. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer.” John von Neumann - 1903-1957 - The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, pp.418-21 - 1955 http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/neumann/ The Measurement Problem in quantum mechanics – (Inspiring Philosophy) – 2014 video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qB7d5V71vUE

No where is the gravity of the measurement problem, i.e. that material reality does not exist until we look at it, more clearly illustrate than "Leggett's inequality"

Quantum Physics – (material reality does not exist until we look at it) – Dr. Quantum video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1ezNvpFcJU

If you have trouble accepting the implications of the preceding video, don’t feel alone, Nobel prize winner Anthony Leggett, who developed Leggett’s inequality to try to prove that an objective material reality exists when we are not looking at it, still does not believe the results of the experiment that he himself was integral in devising, even though the inequality was violated by a stunning 80 orders of magnitude. He seems to have done this simply because the results contradicted the ‘realism’ he believes in (realism is the notion that an objective material reality exists apart from our conscious observation of it).

Do we create the world just by looking at it? - 2008 Excerpt: In mid-2007 Fedrizzi found that the new realism model was violated by 80 orders of magnitude; the group was even more assured that quantum mechanics was correct. Leggett agrees with Zeilinger that realism is wrong in quantum mechanics, but when I asked him whether he now believes in the theory, he answered only “no” before demurring, “I’m in a small minority with that point of view and I wouldn’t stake my life on it.” For Leggett there are still enough loopholes to disbelieve. I asked him what could finally change his mind about quantum mechanics. Without hesitation, he said sending humans into space as detectors to test the theory.,,, (to which Anton Zeilinger responded) When I mentioned this to Prof. Zeilinger he said, “That will happen someday. There is no doubt in my mind. It is just a question of technology.” Alessandro Fedrizzi had already shown me a prototype of a realism experiment he is hoping to send up in a satellite. It’s a heavy, metallic slab the size of a dinner plate. http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_reality_tests/P3/

And to further solidify the case that 'consciousness precedes reality' the violation of Leggett's inequalities have been extended. This following experiment verified Leggett's inequality to a stunning 120 standard deviations level of precision:

Experimental non-classicality of an indivisible quantum system - Zeilinger 2011 Excerpt: Page 491: "This represents a violation of (Leggett's) inequality (3) by more than 120 standard deviations, demonstrating that no joint probability distribution is capable of describing our results." The violation also excludes any non-contextual hidden-variable model. The result does, however, agree well with quantum mechanical predictions, as we will show now.,,, https://vcq.quantum.at/fileadmin/Publications/Experimental%20non-classicality%20of%20an%20indivisible.pdf

The preceding experiment, and the mathematics behind it, are discussed beginning at the 24:15 minute mark of the following video:

Quantum Weirdness and God 8-9-2014 by Paul Giem - video https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=N7HHz14tS1c#t=1449

Richard Conn Henry is quite blunt as to what Leggett's inequality 'means': Leggett's inequality Alain Aspect and Anton Zeilinger by Richard Conn Henry - Physics Professor - John Hopkins University Excerpt: Why do people cling with such ferocity to belief in a mind-independent reality? It is surely because if there is no such reality, then ultimately (as far as we can know) mind alone exists. And if mind is not a product of real matter, but rather is the creator of the "illusion" of material reality (which has, in fact, despite the materialists, been known to be the case, since the discovery of quantum mechanics in 1925), then a theistic view of our existence becomes the only rational alternative to solipsism (solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist). (Dr. Henry's referenced experiment and paper - “An experimental test of non-local realism” by S. Gröblacher et. al., Nature 446, 871, April 2007 - “To be or not to be local” by Alain Aspect, Nature 446, 866, April 2007 (Leggett's Inequality: Verified, as of 2011, to 120 standard deviations) http://henry.pha.jhu.edu/aspect.html

Also see Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers on "the Hard Problem' of consciousness

bornagain77

Barry,

And why is it so hard for you to grasp that you want to have it both ways, just like Dawkins and Aleta.

I don't want to "have it both ways". There is no contradiction in my position. If you think otherwise, then identify the contradiction. Quote the statements of mine that you believe are contradictory, and explain why you think so. keith s

KS

Why is that so hard for you and Barry to grasp?

And why is it so hard for you to grasp that you want to have it both ways, just like Dawkins and Aleta. Barry Arrington

Barry refers to Aleta, Mark and the people who agree with them (such as myself) as "materialists". The term is used as a pejorative but I think its also inaccurate. No one believes that material objects are all that is. Many would say that a universe that operates solely by natural laws summarizes their position but no one knows the basis of those laws and I think it may be something that's fundamentally unknowable. I think a better label for our position is 'anti-superstitionalist' with a 'superstitionalist' being a person willing to invoke ill-defined ad hoc explanations ( such as God) for anything they choose. RodW

Box, Read my comment:

Meaning is inherently subjective. An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there. I am content that my life has meaning to me and to the people I love. I don’t need a Big Meaner in the Sky to regard my life as meaningful.

I know that the Big Meaner is important to you, but I don't need a Big Meaner in order to find meaning in my life. If I find my life to be meaningful (and I do), then it has meaning. Not ultimate meaning, but meaning nonetheless. Why is that so hard for you and Barry to grasp? keith s

FYI: I just saw this - I'd checked for a reply on the other post, but hadn't looked at the home page. I'll try to find time to reply later tonight. Aleta

Keith,

Barry: Say two men come up to a panel painted black. The first one says to his friend, “that panel is black. I don’t like it.” His friend says, “I quite agree that it is painted black, and I don’t like it either. But so long as I pretend it is painted white, it is in fact white to me.” Life has meaning or significance or it does not. It is incoherent to say “life has no meaning or significance but it has meaning and significance to me.”

Keith: But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.”

How does the word "ultimate" help you out Keith? What are you saying? "The panel is ultimately painted black, but it is still white to me?" Box

Barry, In your OP, you are attempting to stack the deck in your favor by limiting "meaning" to the following three definitions: 1. Linguistic intention. 2. Ultimate purpose. 3. Culturally adapted belief system. Meaningful things aren't limited to those three categories. Here's the second definition that Google returns for "meaningful":

having a serious, important, or useful quality or purpose. "making our lives rich and meaningful" synonyms: sincere, deep, serious, in earnest, significant, important "a meaningful relationship"

I'm speaking of that kind of meaning in my comment above:

I am content that my life has meaning to me and to the people I love. I don’t need a Big Meaner in the Sky to regard my life as meaningful.

keith s

The following exchange from the other thread is relevant, so I'll repost it here. markf, to Barry:

For your information I find it quite bearable to believe “that our life is completely meaningless, that the universe is indifferent to our existence, that literally nothing we say, think or do has any ultimate significance.

keiths:

Me too. It’s enough that life has meaning and significance to us. No need for an imaginary source of “ultimate significance.”

Barry:

Say two men come up to a panel painted black. The first one says to his friend, “that panel is black. I don’t like it.” His friend says, “I quite agree that it is painted black, and I don’t like it either. But so long as I pretend it is painted white, it is in fact white to me.” Life has meaning or significance or it does not. It is incoherent to say “life has no meaning or significance but it has meaning and significance to me.”

keiths:

But it’s not incoherent to say “life has no ultimate meaning or significance but it still has meaning and significance to me.” Meaning is inherently subjective. An experience can be meaningful to one person while another sees it as utterly banal. There is no contradiction there. I am content that my life has meaning to me and to the people I love. I don’t need a Big Meaner in the Sky to regard my life as meaningful.

keith s

as to: " but can you honestly say that this quest for understanding is not an adaptive trait that improves survival and reproductive probabilities?" Yes! Why No One (Can) Believe Atheism/Naturalism to be True - video Excerpt: "Since we are creatures of natural selection, we cannot totally trust our senses. Evolution only passes on traits that help a species survive, and not concerned with preserving traits that tell a species what is actually true about life." Richard Dawkins - quoted from "The God Delusion" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N4QFsKevTXs Scientific Peer Review is in Trouble: From Medical Science to Darwinism - Mike Keas - October 10, 2012 Excerpt: Survival is all that matters on evolutionary naturalism. Our evolving brains are more likely to give us useful fictions that promote survival rather than the truth about reality. Thus evolutionary naturalism undermines all rationality (including confidence in science itself). Renown philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued against naturalism in this way (summary of that argument is linked on the site:). Or, if your short on time and patience to grasp Plantinga's nuanced argument, see if you can digest this thought from evolutionary cognitive psychologist Steve Pinker, who baldly states: "Our brains are shaped for fitness, not for truth; sometimes the truth is adaptive, sometimes it is not." Steven Pinker, evolutionary cognitive psychologist, How the Mind Works (W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 305. http://blogs.christianpost.com/science-and-faith/scientific-peer-review-is-in-trouble-from-medical-science-to-darwinism-12421/ Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism by Alvin Plantinga - video https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL80CAECC36901BCEE Content and Natural Selection - Alvin Plantinga - 2011 http://www.andrewmbailey.com/ap/Content_Natural_Selection.pdf Quote: "In evolutionary games we put truth (true perception) on the stage and it dies. And in genetic algorithms it (true perception) never gets on the stage" Donald Hoffman PhD. - Consciousness and The Interface Theory of Perception - 7:19 to 9:20 minute mark - video https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=dqDP34a-epI#t=439 etc.. etc... bornagain77

Sorry Barry, I don't think that purpose and meaning is a truism. That we seek understanding is, but can you honestly say that this quest for understanding is not an adaptive trait that improves survival and reproductive probabilities? If it does, then it can be explained by evolution. I have no problem with the fact that there is no ultimate purpose and meaning to life. I much prefer being responsible for bringing purpose and meaning to my own life. To do otherwise, in my opinion, is just lazy and defeatist. If you prefer to live like this, that is your choice. I chose otherwise. centrestream

What is really interesting about the two statements of Dawkins is he will probably tell you something on the order of this: (Note: I have read a quote similar to this from a well known atheist who writes for a popular web site ) My INTELLECTUAL, RATIONAL side realizes there is no meaning. But my EMOTIONAL side chooses to live within the confines of a made up purpose and meaning of my choosing. _______________ What is ironic is that this the attributions are directly backwards. Any INTELLECTUAL, RATIONAL observation of the universe including the impossibility of the unguided origin of life; the fine-tuning for life; the undeniable existence of consciousness, some form of limited free will, and morality - will conclude that at the root of the universe is a creator who has purpose and intent. For EMOTIONAL reasons the materialist denies these observations and satisfies his EMOTIONAL need for NOT GOD with absurd unscientific theories of multiverse, one in 10^140 chances actually being necessary to have occurred because of the anthropic principle, and just-so stories. Thus for EMOTIONAL reasons (they basically don't want there to be a GOD) they adopt a materialist framework. While INTELLECTUALLY and RATIONALLY they admit that it only makes sense to live in a universe of purpose. Exactly backwards JDH