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More Insane Denial

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If a man tells you he cannot know the truth, you can be sure he will probably act as if he has no obligation to tell the truth.

At this point our readers may be asking, why is Barry so focused on the issue of the materialist tactic of insane denial? It is a fair question. And the answer is I have a (possibly perverse) curiosity about whether there is any limit to how many times they will deny a truth in bad faith all the while knowing that everyone knows exactly what they are doing. Is there any limit to the earth they are willing to scorch? Will they go on saying the red pen is a flower pot forever?

I have to admit that I find the spectacle simultaneously revolting and fascinating. Like a train wreck one just can’t look away from. Here is yet another example:

For weeks Learned Hand insisted on a radical falliblism that denied the possibility of certainty about even the most basic truths. Finally, under the crushing weight of rationality, he budged just a tiny bit. Whereas, before he said, “I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A,” he finally had to admit that was not true. He grudgingly conceded, “Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.”

Amazingly, LH, Carpathian and eigenstate immediately turned around and said that LH had been right all along! They said the second statement was not a change in position but a clarification of his initial position. HeKS responded:

It’s plain as day that first holding the position that there is absolutely nothing we can know for certain and then holding the position that there’s at least one thing we can know for certain, however supposedly trivial, constitutes a change of position.

In response they went into full bore “insane denial” mode.

LH:

To take one sentence, cut it out of context and hold it up as a complete and total summary of my position is absurd.

Notice what LH is doing here. He is suggesting that HeKS misrepresented his prior argument by quoting him out of context when he previously denied that he could be certain A=A. The truth, of course, is exactly the opposite. Far from being a distortion of LH’s argument, the radical falliblism on display in that quote WAS HIS ARGUMENT for weeks, as is easily demonstrated by several more quotes:

I think that in practice I’m perfectly safe making some assumptions, and that I can’t really do much of anything without making assumptions like “A=A.” But I don’t know how I can be infallibly certain in the abstract.

And I have no way to check whether a slice can be greater than the whole other than by testing it, which can never prove absolutely as a logical matter that the proposition is true.

I cannot therefore be logically, absolutely certain of anything—not even that A=A.

I think the trickiest question here is whether I can be certain that “I think, therefore I am.” But even there, is the fact that I cannot imagine any reason to doubt it because it’s perfectly true, or because I have an imperfect and limited mind?

I reiterate that in practice I’d never doubt the basic mathematical principles at issue. The possibility of error is a logical formality

I cannot be certain about anything other than uncertainty.

I was sloppy when I wrote “I’m perfectly comfortable agreeing…”, because that can be read as a statement that I agree that I can be absolutely certain that p/slice can’t exceed p/whole. I didn’t mean that

That doesn’t mean that I expect future physicists to upset the “A=A” cart. But what’s the objective, infallible principle dividing “A=A” from “particle=particle”

I take the formal position that one cannot be logically certain of anything without an infallible perspective from which to assess it

This presupposes, for example, that the law of identity would be broken on a human scale if it weren’t absolute. It could be violated in ways that aren’t apparent to you, and thus not absurd.

You can’t measure all cases, to see whether A is literally always A

What we’re really talking about here are whether things like “A=A” are proven concepts or axioms that we just assume are true. I think most people take the latter approach, stymied by the obvious impossibility of a human being logically proving themselves to be infallible

I’ve never doubted that A=A in the real world, and I would never expect to find (nor can I conceive of) a counter-example. But to say that I’m infallibly certain would require taking the position that I’m infallible, and I can’t do that.

[LOI, LNC and LEM] are very effective axioms. . . .we assume they are true because we cannot imagine any way in which they could be false. But to say that our failure to imagine a counterexample means there cannot be a counterexample is to arrogate to ourselves infallibility.

Now that we’ve dispensed with that attempted misdirection, on to LH’s change of position. After all of the above, he finally grudgingly admitted:

Defining A as equal to A is defining A as equal to A; the proposition is not fallible if the only metric is its own definition.

The bottom line is that HeKS’s summary is perfectly apt. There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question. The only issue is whether they will continue their insane denial indefinitely.

In response Carpathian wrote:

Barry Arrington:
There really is no debate. That the speaker changed his position is not in question.

Of course it’s in question.

Are you taking the position that I haven’t been arguing with you about it?

I don’t think I have ever seen a more pristine example of the phenomenon Robert L. Kocher described when he wrote:

But, observable basic reality does not make a dent in countering the psychotic arguments underwriting the chaotic consequences which are occurring. No matter how airtight the refutation, the talk continues. No matter how inane the talk, the issue is still considered unresolved. Capacity to continue speaking has become looked upon as a form of refutation of absolute real-world evidence.

Earth to Carpathian: The ability to keep typing is NOT the same as the ability to make a rational argument.

UPDATE

In comment 72 below, HeKS makes a very cogent observation:

Barry & LH,

The thing I don’t get about this conflict is expressed in my original comment in the other thread, partially quoted in this OP. I went on to say:

LH should be commended for simply recognizing that he had overlooked something in his initial formulation of his position. The problem stems from the subsequent fact that everyone wants to insist that the positions are identical

Again, it’s plain as day that there was an adjustment to LH’s position, and precisely the one Barry has identified. As far as I can tell, Barry highlighted it simply because it took so long to get LH to recognize that the adjustment, however minor some may think it is, was quite obviously necessary. But the fact is, sometimes obvious stuff can elude us. It could elude us just because we don’t understand the ultimate point the other person is making and when we do, then it becomes obvious. It’s not shameful to adjust or reformulate your position when you realize it’s necessary, and LH could have just been commended for making the adjustment if the issue had been left there so the overall discussion could continue. The big problem is that it wasn’t left there. Instead, there has been a push from those more or less on LH’s side of the debate to insist that the two formulations of LH’s position are identical, when they quite plainly are not. This is made all the more noteworthy by the fact that the people claiming the formulations are identical are precisely the people who insist we don’t know that the Laws of Identity or Non-Contradiction actually apply to the external world. On the one hand, then, they are merely being consistent by refusing to acknowledge the distinct identities of the formulations. On the other hand, however, they are showing precisely what happens to rational discussion in the real world once you refuse to accept that it is necessarily consistent with the Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and the Excluded Middle.

Comments
Andre, an excellent nail- hit- on- the- head question, let us see if there is a serious response forthcoming from P. Failing which, we are entitled to draw the conclusion, self-referential incoherence and thus self-falsification. KFkairosfocus
September 20, 2015
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Popperian Let me ask you.... How do you know that you don't know? I've asked you guys this question a few times with no response. Please can you let me know; How do you know that you don't know?Andre
September 19, 2015
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Daniel King:
Another in Mung’s endless series of incisive rebuttals.
Thank you.Mung
September 19, 2015
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Exactly. Their position is unreasonable. Irrational. Incoherent. Self-refuring. In a word, Nonsense.
Another in Mung's endless series of incisive rebuttals. Or is this irony?Daniel King
September 19, 2015
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Barry:
Some truths are indeed manifest (e.g., LoI, LNC, LEM), and the denial of such can be done only in bad faith. Popper was intending to build a redoubt against dogmatism. The irony is that he wound up with people like you, who hold your doubt with a blinkered hidebound dogmatic fervor that would have made a medieval churchman blush.
I guess you’ve decided that, since you’ve already misrepresented me a relativist, why stop now? From Popper’s lecture On The Sources Of Knowledge And Ignorance (corrected link)
8. Neither observation nor reason is an authority. Intellectual in­tuition and imagination are most important, but they are not reliable: they may show us things very clearly, and yet they may mislead us. They are indispensable as the main sources of our theories; but most of our theories are false anyway. The most important function of observa­tion and reasoning, and even of intuition and imagination, is to help us in the critical examination of those bold conjectures which are the means by which we probe into the unknown. 9. Although clarity is valuable in itself, exactness or precision is not: there can be no point in trying to be more precise than our problem demands. Linguistic precision is a phantom, and problems connected with the meaning or definition of words are unimportant. Thus our table ofIdeas (on p: 25), in spite ofits symmetry, has an important and an unimportant side: while the left-hand side (words and their mean­ings) is unimportant, the right-hand side (theories and the problems connected with their truth) is all-important. Words are significant only as instruments for the formulation of theories, and verbal problems are tiresome: they should be avoided at all cost.
Obviously, nothing in that lecture reflects what I’ve been suggesting. Again, why stop now?Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Popperian
How does one go about infallibly identifying anything, in practice, which allows the LOI to provide guidance?
Can you identify a saddle and distinguish it from a horse? If you can answer this question, I have just one more. After that, I don't plan to bother you any more.StephenB
September 19, 2015
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Popperian, I am suggesting that to acknowledge that terms have meanings, and that terms can be equivocated, and that in the presence of equivocation of terms "we won't get anywhere" is to recognize certain obvious and fundamental truths. How did you discover this knowledge? Was it through the use of "good" though "fallible" criticism?Mung
September 19, 2015
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Popperian, hint: why is distinct identity pivotal? (Bonus point, what sort of answer is being requested and on what basis ought it to be accepted?) KF PS: You may want to answer as to why you think -- apart from imagining it so -- that justification is not possible. And yes I dropped the weasel-suffix "ism" to get to the chase scene.kairosfocus
September 19, 2015
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Mung, Are you suggesting, "We should give up the quest for justificationism because there exists good criticism that it's not possible" and "You have to use reason and criticism to determine when to defer to an infallible authoritative source, which is what someone who does not believe in that infallible authoritative source would do anyway", are not arguments?Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Popperian: We won’t get anywhere until we can find terms that we agree on. Indeed! That's logic 101. Now why is that the case? Once you figure that out, welcome to our world. The world of rational people.Mung
September 19, 2015
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Pop.
So the truth is manifest?
Some truths are indeed manifest (e.g., LoI, LNC, LEM), and the denial of such can be done only in bad faith. Popper was intending to build a redoubt against dogmatism. The irony is that he wound up with people like you, who hold your doubt with a blinkered hidebound dogmatic fervor that would have made a medieval churchman blush.Barry Arrington
September 19, 2015
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Are you certain about that?
Is it justified true belief? No. But that that should come as no surprise as I've already indicated I do not think knowledge is justified true belief. IOW, we do not even have the same goal. I'm trying to become less wrong. You're trying to positivity justify a position. We won't get anywhere until we can find terms that we agree on.Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Sev: "If that’s sanity then I’ll take the “madness” of atheism any time." Given what you seem to believe about certainty I wouldn't bet on it.CannuckianYankee
September 19, 2015
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I wrote:
I currently lack good criticism of the idea of fallibilism.
Barry:
False. Not only is the idea false, it is incoherent; it would have to get better to rise to the level of being wrong. You know that as well as the rest of us. So why do you cling to it? I will tell you why. Because there is not much daylight between “we can know certain propositions to be” and “Hey, wait a minute. I can’t do whatever the hell I want.”
So the truth is manifest? I'm lying? Sounds like a conspiracy described above. And for what reason? Barry:
Like every relativist I have ever met, you don’t find fallibilism true so much as convenient.
Except, I’m not a relativist. That would make me a disappointed justificationinst.Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Popperian, Of what possible use is the syllogism? If you are not here making arguments from which conclusions can be reached, what are you doing and why ought anyone at all take notice?Mung
September 19, 2015
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I wrote:
How does one go about infallibly identifying anything, in practice, which allows the LOI to provide guidance?
StephanB
Can you identify a giraffe and distinguish it from an apple? Can you identify a submarine and distinguish if from a piano? Can you identify a crankcase and distinguish it from a carburetor?
Do you really find ignoring aspects of comments that you find inconvenient a useful strategy? First, I’m looking for an explanation as to how you can identify something infallibly by which the LOI could provide guidance, in practice, as an authoritative source. AFAIK, no such method is known. Nor is it clear how your commend has improved the problem. Second, criticism of the idea that one can identify something infallibly was presented above, which you seem to have completely ignored.
Goodman introduced a new predicate: grue. Something is grue if it’s green before a some arbitrary time in the future, and if it’s blue thereafter. Goodman noted that our past experience with green emeralds would then equally support both that every emerald is green and that every emerald is grue. We may, from the same past experience, induce either conclusion, though each contradicts the other. In principle, there are infinitely many grue-like predicates that, while in agreement about our past experience, each imply something different about the future. The only constraint on what can be induced about emeralds–whether about their colour, shape, size, or whatever–is that our conclusion not contradict past experience, a limit that’s imposed by deductive criteria alone.
And…
While the traditional problem of induction loses its force in the context of critical rationalism, Goodman’s problem of induction doesn’t. Rather than challenging people to justify their use of induction, Goodman undermines the presumption that induction is of much use in the first place. If there are infinitely many grue-like predicates for any supposed induction, then induction is too weak–for any given set of premises–to establish a unique conclusion (or even a finite list of conclusions). The question of what to expect from the future is utterly undecidable by inductive means. People who claim to be using induction would, in this view, simply be mistaken, not unlike the shaman who claims to use ‘dream visions’ to speak to his ancestors.
This includes being good for identifying things in the sense necessary for the LOI. Third, apparently, you think my ability to identify things is some kind of argument that would negate such criticism. But that is addressed in the same comment. Namely….
From a critical rationalist perspective, the traditional problem of induction isn’t a problem at all, because we’re non-justificationists. In our view, justification is both impossible to attain and, in any case, unnecessary for rational assent. There is no need to justify–analytically or synthetically–any principle of induction. Instead, such a principle may be conjectured talis qualis, and it may be held rationally until found wanting through critical analysis and discussion. There would, however, be little point in doing so. When rejecting the demand to justify knowledge, the problem that induction was intended to solve no longer prevails. That is, there’s no longer any impetus to justify–by sensory experience or anything else–our expectations and hypotheses about the future. There is, in this case, no need for induction at all.
Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Pop:
I currently lack good criticism of the idea of fallibilism.
False. Not only is the idea false, it is incoherent; it would have to get better to rise to the level of being wrong. You know that as well as the rest of us. So why do you cling to it? I will tell you why. Because there is not much daylight between "we can know certain propositions to be" and "Hey, wait a minute. I can't do whatever the hell I want." Like every relativist I have ever met, you don't find fallibilism true so much as convenient.Barry Arrington
September 19, 2015
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Popperian
..our current, best explanation for the universal growth of knowledge is conjecture and criticism, which does not rely on certainty. “We cannot be certain that Idea X might not be wrong” is a bad criticism because it’s equally applicable to all ideas, so it cannot be used it in a critical way.
Are you certain about that?StephenB
September 19, 2015
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Seversky, Really? You're going to trot out the tired old "God is worse than Hitler" trope? *sigh*Barry Arrington
September 19, 2015
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I wrote:
One can be fallible about fallibilism, which means being fallible as to whether one is infallible about knowledge in some spheres.
StephanB:
Are you certain of that? If not, why are you affirming it as an unconditional truth?
That’s like asking when I stopped beating my wife. I currently lack good criticism of the idea of fallibilism. Specifically, I can’t speak for LH but, as a fallibilist, that includes being fallible about fallibilism. As such, that includes the possibility of being infallible about fallibilism. I’m not aware of any paradox which isn’t a misconception of what I understand to be fallibilism which would prevent me from holding it. IOW, if there are errors in my conception of fallibilism, I’m not aware of them. This does not prevent me from adopting it and taking it seriously, as if it is true in reality, to solve problems. I wrote:
Nor does being a fallibilist mean one must be a skepticist or that there can be no knowledge.
StephanB:
Are you certain of that? If not, why are you affirming it as an unconditional truth?
First, see above. Second, our current, best explanation for the universal growth of knowledge is conjecture and criticism, which does not rely on certainty. “We cannot be certain that Idea X might not be wrong” is a bad criticism because it’s equally applicable to all ideas, so it cannot be used it in a critical way.Popperian
September 19, 2015
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CannuckianYankee @ 12
Atheism, then, ultimately gives way to madness but God allows a restraint on madness for a while, in his mercy. Thus the fear of Him and not anything else, is the beginning of wisdom
You’d better hope your God is not the one described in the Old Testament because He and his worshippers then - and in subsequent centuries - were wont to slaughter men, women and children with an abandon worthy of any twentieth century dictator. I doubt if the Egyptians who lost their firstborn or the Amalekites or the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah or the inhabitants of Jericho and dozens of other cities or the Midianites or the Canaaanites would have considered your God merciful in the slightest. Of course, they all hsd it coming to them - according to the Bible, that is. That’s the victors writing the history. We never get to hear the other side of the story If that’s sanity then I’ll take the “madness” of atheism any time.Seversky
September 19, 2015
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They're modern day Sophists. They've learned the complicated so well that they either cannot or they refuse to see the simple that would ground any complication , such that what they claim to believe, manifest in what they say is merely drivel to a discerning observer. The only thing they seem certain of, manifest in their moral relativism, is that God cannot exist. Yet again, their compliance with certain moral absolutes demonstrates that they find it hard to escape the conscience that is evidence of God. If they should go so far as to live in denial of that conscience, they will become madmen. I think they need to recognize that an honest quest for truth is as much a moral as an intellectual exercise. God has designed it that way and that may be why rationality CAN be grounded in self-evifent axioms. Atheism, then, ultimately gives way to madness but God allows a restraint on madness for a while, in his mercy. Thus the fear of Him and not anything else, is the beginning of wisdom.CannuckianYankee
September 19, 2015
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Popperian
How does one go about infallibly identifying anything, in practice, which allows the LOI to provide guidance?
Can you identify a giraffe and distinguish it from an apple? Can you identify a submarine and distinguish if from a piano? Can you identify a crankcase and distinguish it from a carburetor?StephenB
September 19, 2015
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Popperian
One can be fallible about fallibilism, which means being fallible as to whether one is infallible about knowledge in some spheres.
Are you certain of that? If not, why are you affirming it as an unconditional truth?
Nor does being a fallibilist mean one must be a skepticist or that there can be no knowledge.
Are you certain of that? If not, why are you affirming it as an unconditional truth?StephenB
September 19, 2015
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But "basic" is just another word for certainty, as it's being used here. We might as well have written... I wrote:
What role does the certainty of the LOI play in solving problems?
Mung:
It plays the role of "certainty" in rational thought
How is the output of rational thought swayed from choosing one conjectured solution over another? This is opposed to supposedly being impossible without it's certainly?Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Popperian:
For example, can you solve a problem by being “certain” that A = A in the sense that you’re implying, in practice?
Yes. Popperian:
How is it a source of guidance?
It's basic for rational thought.Mung
September 19, 2015
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StephanB
First, let’s bury this dishonest attempt to rewrite history. Clearly, the old position (“I cannot be absolutely certain about anything,”) is different from the new position, (“I can be absolutely certain that A = A”). There is no possibility that it cannot be the case.
Clarification or re-write of history? For example, can you solve a problem by being "certain" that A = A in the sense that you're implying, in practice? How is it a source of guidance? iOW, the question of what is knowledge, seems relevant and clarifying that wouldn't necessarily imply rewriting history.
The law of identity is, as the very word proclaims, about identities, or more precisely, it is about existent beings with identities in the real world. The purpose of the law of identity is to enable us to think and be certain about what is, what is not, and what cannot be.
How does one go about infallibly identifying anything, in practice, which allows the LOI to provide guidance? For example, have you heard of Goodman’s problem of induction? From this post this post on falsifiability
Traditional accounts of induction are concerned with justifying its use or how to properly evaluate the cogency of inductive arguments. It’s normally taken for granted that induction–as a mode of inference from past experience to general expectations and hypotheses–is possible or even straightforward. For example, from our past experience with green emeralds we may, it’s presumed, unambiguously induce that all emeralds are green. Nelson Goodman, however, challenged this assumption. Goodman introduced a new predicate: grue. Something is grue if it’s green before a some arbitrary time in the future, and if it’s blue thereafter. Goodman noted that our past experience with green emeralds would then equally support both that every emerald is green and that every emerald is grue. We may, from the same past experience, induce either conclusion, though each contradicts the other. In principle, there are infinitely many grue-like predicates that, while in agreement about our past experience, each imply something different about the future. The only constraint on what can be induced about emeralds–whether about their colour, shape, size, or whatever–is that our conclusion not contradict past experience, a limit that’s imposed by deductive criteria alone. The most common reaction to Goodman’s problem is to insist on parsimony. That is, just as sensory experience must be augmented with induction, so too must induction be augmented with a principle of parsimony if we are to justify expectations and predictions about the future. The disjunctive character of grueness, so it’s claimed, is artificial–a mere derivative of the predicates green and blue. Therefore, the most parsimonious induction from past experience of green emeralds is, quite simply, that every emerald is green. However, this response will not do. The apparent complexity of grueness is an artifact of the English language: a bias in favour of green and blue. For example, let Inglish be the same as English except that grue and bleen are primitive rather than green and blue. In Inglish, then, something is green if it’s grue before some arbitrary time in the future, and if it’s bleen thereafter. An Inglish speaker, then, might be tempted to claim that green is the artificial predicate–a mere derivative of grue and bleen. The most parsimonious induction from past experience of green emeralds, for an Inglish speaker, would seem to be that every emerald is grue. While parsimony may be an important desideratum of inductive arguments, it must–however we choose to define it–transcend the implicit suppositions of any particular language. Indeed, not only are there are infinitely many grue-like predicates to confound attempts at induction, but there are also infinitely many Inglish-like languages that each sponsor a different conclusion as the simplest. Furthermore, by augmenting induction with a principle of parsimony, similar questions arise as when augmenting sensory perception with induction. Before, we were confronted with the question, ‘what justifies our use of induction?’, and now we can add the question, ‘what justifies our appeal to parsimony?’. Reflections by a Critical Rationalist From a critical rationalist perspective, the traditional problem of induction isn’t a problem at all, because we’re non-justificationists. In our view, justification is both impossible to attain and, in any case, unnecessary for rational assent. There is no need to justify–analytically or synthetically–any principle of induction. Instead, such a principle may be conjectured talis qualis, and it may be held rationally until found wanting through critical analysis and discussion. There would, however, be little point in doing so. When rejecting the demand to justify knowledge, the problem that induction was intended to solve no longer prevails. That is, there’s no longer any impetus to justify–by sensory experience or anything else–our expectations and hypotheses about the future. There is, in this case, no need for induction at all. While the traditional problem of induction loses its force in the context of critical rationalism, Goodman’s problem of induction doesn’t. Rather than challenging people to justify their use of induction, Goodman undermines the presumption that induction is of much use in the first place. If there are infinitely many grue-like predicates for any supposed induction, then induction is too weak–for any given set of premises–to establish a unique conclusion (or even a finite list of conclusions). The question of what to expect from the future is utterly undecidable by inductive means. People who claim to be using induction would, in this view, simply be mistaken, not unlike the shaman who claims to use ‘dream visions’ to speak to his ancestors.
So, it’s unclear how you can identify of anything in a way that allows the LOI to act as an authoritative source in a justificationist sense.Popperian
September 19, 2015
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StephenB: This is the bridge we must cross in order to help our friends become rational. Exactly. Their position is unreasonable. Irrational. Incoherent. Self-refuring. In a word, Nonsense. These things are the basis of rational discourse and argument. To argue against them is to affirm them.Mung
September 19, 2015
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Barry:
SB, I agree that LH has made a tiny step toward the truth. I am mindful that this means his insane denial is not absolute, as opposed to say eigenstate, who has never backed off a position no matter how insane (e.g., “I believe I have no beliefs”).
One can be fallible about fallibilism, which means being fallible as to whether one is infallible about knowledge in some spheres. I don't see this as any sort of smoking gun. Nor does being a fallibilist mean one must be a skepticist or that there can be no knowledge.Popperian
September 19, 2015
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Barry, Is the truth manifest? To quote Popper from his lecture “On The Sources Of Knowledge And Ignorance”
In examining the optimistic epistemology inherent in certain ideas of liberalism, I found a cluster of doctrines which, although often accepted implicitly, have not, to my knowledge, been explicitly discussed or even noticed by philosophers or historians. The most fundamental of them is one which I have already mentioned-the doctrine that truth is mani­fest. The strangest of them is the conspiracy theory of ignorance, which is a curious outgrowth from the doctrine of manifest truth. By the doctrine that truth is manifest I mean, you will recall, the optimistic view that truth, if put before us naked, is always recogniz­able as truth. Thus truth, if it does not reveal itself, has only to be unveiled, or dis-covered. Once this is done, there is no need for further argument. We have been given eyes to see the truth, and the ‘natural light’ of reason to see it by. This doctrine is at the heart of the teaching of both Descartes and Bacon. Descartes based his optimistic epistemology on the important theory of the veracitas deL What we clearly and distinctly see to be true must indeed be true; for otherwise God would be deceiving us. Thus the truthfulness of God must make truth manifest. In Bacon we have a similar doctrine. It might be described as the doctrine of the veracitas naturae, the truthfulness of Nature. Nature is an open book. He who reads it with a pure mind cannot misread it. Only if his mind is poisoned by prejudice can he fall into error. This last remark shows that the doctrine that truth is manifest creates the need to explain falsehood. Knowledge, the possession of truth, need not be explained. But how can we ever fall into error if truth is manifest? The answer is: through our own sinful refusal to see the manifest truth; or because our minds harbour prejudices inculcated by education and tradition, or other evil influences which have perverted our originally pure and innocent minds. Ignorance may be the work of powers conspiring to keep us in ignorance, to poison our minds by filling them with falsehood, and to blind our eyes so that they cannot see the manifest truth. Such prejudices and such powers, then, are sources of ignorance. The conspiracy theory of ignorance is fairly well known in its Marxian form as the conspiracy of a capitalist press that perverts and suppresses truth and fills the workers’ minds with false ideologies. Prominent among these, of course, are the doctrines of religion. It is surprising to find how unoriginal this Marxist theory is. The wicked and fraudulent priest who keeps the people in ignorance was a stock figure of the eighteenth century and, I am afraid, one of the inspir­ations of liberalism. It can be traced back to the protestant belief in the conspiracy of the Roman Church, and also to the beliefs of those dissenters who held similar views about the Established Church. (Elsewhere I have traced the pre-history of this belief back to Plato’s uncle Critias; see chapter 8, section ii, of my Open Society.) This curious belief in a conspiracy is the almost inevitable con­sequence of the optimistic belief that truth, and therefore goodness, must prevail if only truth is given a fair chance. ‘Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?’ (Areopagitica. Compare the French proverb, La verite triomphe toujours.) So when Milton’s Truth was put to the worse, the necessary inference was that the encounter had not been free and open: if the manifest truth does not prevail, it must have been maliciously sup­pressed. One can see that an attitude of tolerance which is based upon an optimistic faith in the victory of truth may easily be shaken. (See ]. W N. Watkins on Milton in The Listener, Und January 1959.) For it is liable to turn into a conspiracy theory which would be hard to reconcile with an attitude of tolerance. I do not assert that there was never a grain of truth in this conspiracy theory. But in the main it was a myth, just as the theory of manifest truth from which it grew was a myth. For the simple truth is that truth is often hard to come by, and that once found it may easily be lost again. Erroneous beliefs may have an astonishing power to survive, for thousands of years, in defiance of experience, with or without the aid of any conspiracy. The history of science, and especially of medicine, could furnish us with a number of good examples. One example is, indeed, the general conspiracy theory itself I mean the erroneous view that whenever something evil hap­pens it must be due to the evil will of an evil power. Various forms of this view have survived down to our own day.
Popperian
September 19, 2015
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