If you go by the fact that Michael Denton, a local fave, has an article in it, revisiting his thesis about (Darwinian) evolution as a theory in crisis:
IN Evolution: A Theory in Crisis (Evolution), published in 1985, I argued that the biological realm is fundamentally discontinuous.1 The major taxa-defining innovations in the history of life have not been derived from ancestral forms by functional intermediates. This is the view that Sir D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson defended in On Growth and Form:
In short nature proceeds “from one type to another” [emphasis added] among organic as well as inorganic forms; and these types vary according to their own parameters, and are defined by physical-mathematical conditions of possibility. In natural history Cuvier’s “types” may not be perfectly chosen nor numerous enough but “types” they are; and to seek for stepping stones across the gaps between is to seek in vain, for ever.
The contrary view remained predominant among evolutionary biologists until, at least, the 1980s, and remains predominant as the view offered the public today.
There have been massive advances and discoveries in many areas of biology since Evolution was first published. These developments have transformed biology and evolutionary thought. Yet orthodox evolutionary theory is unable to explain the origins of various taxa-defining innovations.
It never needs to. Darwin’s followers can just get themselves in front of a judge or an OFSTED committee, screaming about creationism in the schools, no matter what the pattern of facts.
Here’s the About Us:
SCIENCE, it is often said, is a uniquely self-critical institution. Questionable theories and theoreticians pass constantly before stern appellate review. Judgment is unrelenting. And impartial. Individual scientists may make mistakes, but Science as an institution is irrefragable because its judgments are collective.
The editors of Inference: International Review of Science believe this view to be both wrong in conception and pernicious in effect. The process of peer review by which grants are funded and papers assigned to scientific journals does not—and it cannot—achieve the ends that criticism is intended to serve.
The editors are for this reason persuaded that the sense of skepticism engendered by the sciences would be far more appropriately directed toward the sciences than toward anything else.
Not, so far as sources tell me, associated with the Discovery Institute.
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