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On the nature and detection of intelligence: A reply to RDFish

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In a series of recent posts, RDFish has made several penetrating criticisms of the Intelligent Design project, which can be summarized as follows:

(i) the ID project does not currently possess an operational definition of “intelligence” which is genuinely informative and at the same time, suitable for use in scientific research;

(ii) the explanatory filter used by the Intelligent Design community assumes that intelligence is something distinct from law and/or chance – in other words, it commits itself in advance to a belief in contra-casual libertarian free will (the view that when intelligent agents make a decision, they are always capable of acting otherwise), a view which is appealing to “common sense,” but which is highly controversial on both scientific and philosophical grounds;

(iii) the inference to Intelligent Design as an explanation is tantamount to an argument from ignorance: if something cannot be explained by either chance or necessity, it is automatically assumed to be the result of intelligence – a questionable assumption, as there are alternative teleological explanations for the specified complexity that we find in living things, which do not require intelligence;

(iv) any attempt to infer the existence of an Intelligent Designer of the specified complexity that we observe in Nature can be nullified by an equally valid counter-inference: since all of the intelligent designers that we have ever encountered are physical agents which are incapable of thinking in the absence of complex, highly specified, functional interactions between their body parts, we may legitimately conclude that Intelligence can never serve as an Ultimate Explanation for all of the functional specified complexity that we find in Nature. Any Intelligent Designer would have to be a complex, embodied being.

(i) On the definition of “intelligence”

The New Caledonian crow is capable of making hooks with its beak, in order to obtain food. Does that make it intelligent? Image courtesy of John Gerrard Keulemans (Catalogue of the Birds in the British Museum) and Wikipedia.

Why it’s not enough to define intelligence in terms of its effects

I put forward a definition of “intelligence” in the final part of my recent post, On not doing one’s homework: A reply to Professor Edward Feser. In that post, I argued that the attempt to define intelligence in terms of the ability to pursue long-term goals, or even to direct suitable means towards those long-term goals, fails to account for one vital feature of intelligence – namely, the fact that it necessarily involves grasping the form, or essential “whatness,” of a thing:

What does it mean for a being to be intelligent? At first, we might attempt to define “intelligence” in terms of one’s ability to pursue goals – especially long-term goals, which require foresight. But the mere ability to pursue goals does not make a being intelligent: even inanimate objects can be said to do that, insofar as they act in certain determinate ways, yet we say that they act blindly and not intelligently. Nor will it do to define “intelligence” as the ability to pursue long-term goals, as such a definition sheds no light on that whereby a being is capable of attaining these goals. One still wants to know: why are some beings capable of pursuing long-term goals, while others are not?

Could we perhaps define intelligence in terms of the ability to direct means towards certain ends? This sounds more promising. In their book, “The Design of Life” (2008, Foundation for Thought and Ethics, Dallas), Professor William Dembski and Dr. Jonathan Wells define “intelligence” as “any cause, agent, or process that achieves and end or goal by employing suitable means or instruments“(page 3), and on page 315, Dembski and Wells define intelligence in more detail, as “A type of cause, process or principle that is able to find, select, adapt, and implement the means needed to effectively bring about ends (or achieve goals or realize purposes). Because intelligence is about matching means to ends, it is inherently teleological.” …

While the attempt to define “intelligence” in terms of means and ends is genuinely illuminating, it still suffers from one defect: it overlooks form… [For example,] a knife is for cutting, but this definition does not tell us whether a knife has only a single handle, or a blade connected to a handle at both ends. Nor does it tell us whether a knife has only a single blade or multiple blades, as a Swiss army knife does. Finally, the cutting function of a knife cannot tell us whether the blade is straight, L-shaped or even D-shaped, as blades with any of these shapes could still cut well enough. The end alone, then, does not determine the form.

Since a thing’s ends do not determine its form, which makes it the kind of thing it is, we must conclude that the ability to grasp a thing’s ends, and even to direct it through various means towards those ends, does not constitute the nature of intelligence as such. For whatever else “intelligence” means, it surely refers to the ability to grasp a thing’s form or its essential “whatness.”

The same criticisms apply to attempts to define “intelligence” as “whatever it is that generates large amounts of functional, complex, specified information.” This definition is at least minimally informative, in that it tells us that something generates the information. But it is, nevertheless, a flawed definition. Defining an activity or process in terms of its effects tells us nothing about what that activity or process is. All it tells us it what the activity or process generates, which isn’t the same thing at all.

Why intelligence cannot be defined in terms of its ability to grasp the forms of natural objects

Accordingly, some philosophers have attempted to define “intelligence” in terms of the mind’s ability to receive or grasp the forms which characterize different kinds of natural objects – a definition which I find unsatisfactory, for reasons that I explained in my recent post:

For the act of understanding a concept cannot simply be defined as the “receiving” of a form – even a universal one. A key feature of concepts is that they are inherently normative. To entertain a concept of a certain kind of thing is to follow a rule which defines how we should think about that kind of thing. For instance, when I refer to a particle as having a positive electric charge, I thereby acknowledge that it has a disposition to attract negatively charged objects and to repel positively charged ones. Those are the rules that define the way we think about positive electric charges, and we agree to follow those rules whenever we talk about electricity. None of the commonly used spatial metaphors for intelligence can capture the act of following a rule.

Thus we cannot define intelligence in terms of an ability to “receive” abstract, universal forms, or to “contain” these forms, or to be in “immediate contact”with these forms, or to “extract” these forms, or to “grasp” these forms. Receiving, containing, touching, extracting and grasping are not rule-following activities as such. They are spatial metaphors for intelligence, but they do not capture its very essence.

Why language is integral to the definition of intelligence

I then argued that any proper definition of “intelligence” has to include the ability to express one’s thoughts in language:

Thirteen years ago, while I was training to be a mathematics teacher, I overheard a teacher explaining to a colleague of hers why she insisted that her students should show their workings when solving a mathematical problem. She remarked: “If they really understand how to solve the problem, then they should be able to explain why they solved the problem in that particular way. If they can’t, then they don’t really understand.” The teacher’s remark struck me as an insightful one. It encapsulates my reasons for being skeptical regarding claims that the much-vaunted tool-making abilities of crows, whose jaw-dropping feats have been in the news lately, demonstrate a capacity for reasoning on their part. It also illustrates that the definition of intelligence is necessarily bound up with the ability to express one’s thoughts in language.

The crucial point here is that the crows are unable to explain the basis of their judgments, as a rational agent should be able to do. The tool-making feats of Betty the crow look impressive, but we cannot ask her: “Why did you make it that way?” as she is incapable of justifying her actions…

What I am proposing in this post is that the act of understanding a natural object can only be characterized by the ability to specify the concept of that object, and the rules that define its form or essence, in language. This specification has to include a complete description of its “whatness” (or substantial form), as well as its built-in “ends” (finality). Not for nothing do we say: “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1).

An objection from RDFish: how could we ever be sure that an Intelligent Designer possesses a capacity for language?

A diagram illustrating the genetic code, according to the “central dogma”, where DNA ic copied to RNA, which is used to make proteins. Shown here are the first few amino acids for the alpha subunit of hemoglobin. The sixth amino acid (glutamic acid, depicted by the symbol “E”) is mutated in sickle cell anemia versions of the hemoglobin molecule. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

At this point, RDFish raises a very reasonable objection. What scientific evidence could we ever have, he asks, that the Intelligent Designer of life possesses the ability to explain His reasons for acting as he did, using language? The answer, as I wrote in my earlier post, is that we can already find evidence of the Designer’s linguistic abilities within living things themselves: they not only contain a digital code, but programs as well:

If each cell in an organism can be accurately described as running a set of programs, written in various programming languages, then since language is a “signature trait” of intelligent beings, it follows that these phenomena obviously require an Intelligent Being to produce them.

Dr. Stephen Meyer has written extensively about the digital code that we find in living things, in his highly acclaimed book, Signature in the Cell. The existence of digital code in living things points to their having had a Designer Who is capable of using language to describe their essential characteristics. But there’s more.

On April 8, 2010, Dr. Don Johnson, who has both a Ph.D. in chemistry and a Ph.D. in computer and information sciences, gave a presentation entitled Bioinformatics: The Information in Life for the University of North Carolina Wilmington chapter of the Association for Computer Machinery. Dr. Johnson’s presentation is now on-line here. Both the talk and accompanying handout notes can be accessed from Dr. Johnson’s Web page. Dr. Johnson spent 20 years teaching in universities in Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Europe. Here’s an excerpt from his presentation blurb:

Each cell of an organism has millions of interacting computers reading and processing digital information using algorithmic digital programs and digital codes to communicate and translate information.

On a slide entitled “Information Systems In Life,” Dr. Johnson points out that:

  • the genetic system is a pre-existing operating system;
  • the specific genetic program (genome) is an application;
  • the native language has a codon-based encryption system;
  • the codes are read by enzyme computers with their own operating system;
  • each enzyme’s output is to another operating system in a ribosome;
  • codes are decrypted and output to tRNA computers;
  • each codon-specified amino acid is transported to a protein construction site; and
  • in each cell, there are multiple operating systems, multiple programming languages, encoding/decoding hardware and software, specialized communications systems, error detection/correction systems, specialized input/output for organelle control and feedback, and a variety of specialized “devices” to accomplish the tasks of life.

To sum up: the use of the word “program” to describe the workings of the cell is scientifically respectable. It is not just a figure of speech. It is literal.

Intelligent Design theory, then, demonstrates in a striking way how it is possible to speak of the Designer of life and the cosmos as being truly intelligent, in a meaningful sense of the word. Such a Designer can legitimately be described as an Intelligent Being.

Since it is certainly possible for scientists to examine an object and look for evidence that it contains a digital code or a program, I would argue that the foregoing definition of “intelligence” is scientifically workable as well.

Too strong a definition?

Chaos Computer Club used a model of the 2001 monolith at the Hackers at Large camp site. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

It might be objected that the definition of “intelligence” which I am proposing is too restrictive, since we can easily identify an object as designed, even in cases when we possess neither a blueprint nor a recipe for the production of that object – which suggests that a demonstration of the Designer’s capacity to use language is not essential to warrant an imputation of design. For example, we can tell that a knife is designed for cutting, just by observing its sharp blade and straight edge, and the oft-cited example of the “monolith on the Moon” in the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey shows that we can confidently identify an object as designed, without knowing anything about the reasons, purposes and intentions of its maker.

In reply, I would point out that the design attribution in the fictional case of the lunar monolith was warranted by virtue of the fact that its dimensions were in the precise ratio of 1 : 4 : 9 (the squares of the first three integers) – an astronomically unlikely outcome for any unguided process. To explain the significance of this ratio, we need to employ the language of mathematics.

As regards the example of the knife: there are mathematical features of a knife blade (e.g. its straightness) which also suggest design. We can then Professor Dembski’s explanatory filter to these features, in order to rule out alternative explanations for these features (law and/or chance). In the case of a knife, the imputation of design is less certain than in the case of the lunar monolith, as there are natural processes which are capable of generating straight edges and sharp blades, whereas there are no known processes which are capable of generating the squares of the first three integers in the dimensions of a block of stone.

“But,” it may be objected, “wouldn’t we still be warranted in ascribing a highly complex arrangement of functional parts to a process of intelligent design, even if we were unable to describe the function of these parts in mathematical terms? Surely we don’t have to know the mathematics behind the optical functioning of the eye, in order to see that it was designed?”

The answer to this objection is that it is the specification that describes the function of the complex system which warrants our imputation of design in instances like these. Because the system possesses specified complexity, its function can be described succinctly, in relatively few words. This linguistic description, when combined with the successful application of Professor Dembski’s explanatory filter, gives us confidence that the system in question was indeed designed. What I would add, however, is that not only the function of the system but also its form (in this case, the arrangement of the parts) must be specifiable in human language, before we can be truly certain that the system was designed. I would also suggest that on some level, the form of an object must be capable of being concisely described, if the object in question is genuinely a designed object.

We can see, then, that the additional “language” requirement which I am proposing is hardly an onerous one, and that systems exhibiting functional specified complexity should be able to satisfy this requirement. A fortiori, we can be all the more certain that an object such as a living cell, whose form can not only be specified in language, but also described in terms of a digital code (encoded in the DNA of all living things) as well as a genetic program (which governs that cell’s development into a mature organism), is indeed a designed object.

(ii) Does Intelligent Design theory commit itself at the outset to a belief in contra-causal libertarian free will?

The International Space Station on 23 May 2010, as seen from the departing Space Shuttle Atlantis during space shuttle mission flight STS-132. Barry Arrington has argued, in a post titled, Put Up or Shut Up!, that regardless of whether or not intelligence is reducible to law plus chance, it still possesses certain hallmarks, which enable us to identify it and distinguish it from other processes. He then cited the space station as an example of an object which possesses abundant indicators of having been designed. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

RDFish objects that the explanatory filter used by the Intelligent Design community assumes that intelligence is something distinct from law and/or chance – in other words, it commits itself in advance to a belief in contra-casual libertarian free will. If RDFish had read my 2011 post, The four tiers of Intelligent Design – an ecumenical proposal, he would have seen the solution to his difficulties. In that post, I quoted from an earlier post by Barry Arrington, titled, Put Up or Shut Up!, in which Mr. Arrington argued as follows:

Let us assume for the sake of argument that intelligent agents do NOT have free will, i.e., that the tertium quid does not exist. Let us assume instead, for the sake of argument, that the cause of all activity of all intelligent agents can be reduced to physical causes.

Mr. Arrington contended that even if we make this assumption, for the sake of argument, we can still make legitimate design inferences. As he put it in an earlier post, titled, ID Does Not Posit Supernatural Causes:

For those, such as Aristotle, who believe free will exists, “agency” is a tertium quid (a third thing) beyond chance and necessity. The metaphysical materialist on the other hand must deny the existence of free will. For the materialist, what we perceive as free will or agency is an illusion, the complex interplay of the electro-chemical processes of our brain, which are in turn caused by chance and necessity only.

But the discussion needn’t break down here, because everyone should agree that whether intelligent agents have free will or not, they do in fact leave distinctive indicia of their activities. Did the engineers who designed the space station have free will or where they compelled to design the space station by purely electro-chemical reactions in their brain that can be reduced to the interplay of chance and necessity? For our purposes here it does not matter how one answers this question, because however one answers the question, it is certainly the case that the space station was designed by an intelligent agent. And it is certainly the case that the intelligent agents who designed the space station left indicia of their design by which an observer can distinguish it from asteroids and other satellites of the Earth that were not designed by intelligent agents.

The point is that for our purposes here, we need not argue about whether intelligent agents such as humans have an immaterial free will. Whether free will exists or not, it cannot be reasonably disputed that intelligent agents leave discernible indicia of their activity.

The foregoing passage should suffice to answer RDFish’s objection. Even if one views intelligence as being ultimately the product of law and chance (as materialists do), it still remains the case that intelligent agency has certain distinguishing marks (or indicia) which enable scientists to identify it as such.

In my 2011 post, The four tiers of Intelligent Design – an ecumenical proposal, I also elucidated the role of Professor Dembski’s explanatory filter, by drawing a distinction between proximate and ultimate causes:

At this point, we need to distinguish between proximate and indirect causes, and among indirect causes, we finally need to go back to the ultimate cause. The explanatory filter applies to proximate causes. It can tell us that whatever produced an alien artifact, for instance, must have been an intelligent agent. Likewise, it can tell us that the Being who produced the first living cell in the observable universe must have been intelligent. However, the explanatory filter says nothing about ultimate causes. The explanatory filter alone cannot tell us whether the ultimate cause of a pattern manifesting complex specified information is intelligent or not.

I might observe in passing that as a matter of strict logic, even if “intelligence” were proved to be something distinct from both law and chance, it would not necessarily follow that any entity possessing intelligence would also possess contra-causal free will. For instance, one might view intelligence as some kind of top-down causation, whose activity was determined, but not law-governed. I would like to stress that this is not a view which I take, although I think that animal minds might work in this way. The reason why I mention this possibility is simply to show that the Intelligent Design project does not commit itself at the outset to a particular view of free will – namely, the libertarian view, in which intelligent agents always the possess the power to do otherwise, when they make a choice.

Finally, RDFish may be wondering how one could possibly argue to the existence of a disembodied Intelligence, if Intelligent Design is compatible with materialism. I addressed this objection in my 2011 post, The four tiers of Intelligent Design – an ecumenical proposal:

The claim I am putting forward here is that there are four levels of inquiry in Intelligent Design:

(1) Which patterns in Nature can be identified, through a process of scientific investigation, as the work of intelligent agents? That is, which patterns in Nature can be shown to have intelligent agents as their proximate causes?
(2) Which of the patterns identified in (1) can be shown to have been caused by intelligent agents outside the observable universe?
(3) For which of the patterns identified in (2) as the work of intelligent agents from beyond our universe can scientists rule out chance and/or necessity as the ultimate cause?
(4) Which of the patterns identified in (3) would require an intelligence with an infinite information-generating capacity, and what kind of infinity are we talking about here (aleph-one or higher)?

… Now, I would certainly agree … that the laws of physics themselves require an Intelligent Designer, and I have several times argued for [this] view on Uncommon Descent (see here, here and here). This applies to the laws of the multiverse, just as much as it does to the laws of our observable universe. The Designer of these laws would therefore not be constrained by them, and would be able to contravene them if He saw fit to do so. But this is a Level 3 Intelligent Design argument. And it should be clear by now to readers that Barry Arrington’s recent Put Up or Shut Up! post was about Level 1 of Intelligent Design, not Level 2 or 3.

In short: it is only by appealing to the cosmological version of Intelligent Design (i.e. the fine-tuning argument) that we can establish the existence of a disembodied Designer, Who transcends the physical realm, and thereby refute materialism on strictly scientific grounds. I will have more to say below about the legitimacy of the cosmological argument in part (iv) below, where I address RDFish’s argument that any designer must be an embodied agent.

(iii) Are there alternative teleological explanations for the specified complexity we find in living things, apart from intelligent design?

The bacterium Proteus mirabilis on an XLD agar plate. Professor James Shapiro, an expert in bacterial genetics who champions a non-Darwinian version of evolution via “natural genetic engineering,” discovered that the gut bacterium Proteus mirabilis forms complex terraced rings, an emergent property of simple rules that the bacterium uses to avoid neighboring cells. Professor Shapiro has also shown that bacteria cooperate in communities which exhibit complex behavior such as hunting, building protective structures and spreading spores, and in which individual bacteria may sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the larger community. Image courtesy of Wikipedia.

To his credit, RDFish is no fan of Charles Darwin. Nevertheless, he correctly points out that discrediting Darwin does not suffice to establish the reality of Intelligent Design. Other explanations for the functional specified complexity that we find in living things have also been proposed, and RDFish is particularly impressed with the recent work done by Professor James Shapiro, author of Evolution: A View from the 21st Century (paperback, FT press, 2013). Professor Shapiro summarizes his views in a recent article titled, What Natural Genetic Engineering Does and Does Not Mean (Huffington Post, February 28, 2013):

For me, NGE [Natural Genetic Engineering] is shorthand to summarize all the biochemical mechanisms cells have to cut, splice, copy, polymerize and otherwise manipulate the structure of internal DNA molecules, transport DNA from one cell to another, or acquire DNA from the environment. Totally novel sequences can result from de novo untemplated polymerization or reverse transcription of processed RNA molecules.

NGE describes a toolbox of cell processes capable of generating a virtually endless set of DNA sequence structures in a way that can be compared to erector sets, LEGOs, carpentry, architecture or computer programming…

In summary, NGE encompasses a set of empirically demonstrated cell functions for generating novel DNA structures. These functions operate repeatedly during normal organism life cycles and also in generating evolutionary novelties, as abundantly documented in the genome sequence record.

However, Professor Shapiro was candid enough to admit that the origin of major evolutionary innovations (such as radically new functional arrangements of parts) remains an unsolved problem:

While NGE can help in understanding the molecular details of rapid and widespread genome change, it does not tell us what makes genomic novelties come out to be useful. How natural genetic engineering leads to major new inventions of adaptive use remains a central problem in evolution science.…

To address this problem experimentally, we need to do more ambitious laboratory evolution research looking for complex coordinated changes in the genome.

If we are able to observe cells coordinating NGE functions to make useful complex inventions in real time, major questions arise. How do they perceive what may be useful?… We need to figure out how to do experiments on this.

If experiments show that cells can make distinct appropriate NGE responses to different adaptive challenges, we need to figure out how they do so. This almost certainly would prove to be more than a strictly mechanical process… If such investigations take evolution science into areas that are more than strictly material, so be it. As long as we stay within the realm of natural processes, there are no boundaries on what science can address.

The protein hexokinase, as shown in a conventional ball-and-stick molecular model. In its simplest form, which is found in bacteria, this enzyme consists of hundreds of amino acids, which belong to a single domain. The proportion of amino-acid chains with a length of more than 100 units which fold up into a protein that can perform a useful biological function is so low that the odds of finding such a protein via an unguided process, even over billions of years, would be less than the odds of finding a needle in a haystack. To scale in the top right-hand corner are two of the protein’s substrates, ATP and glucose. Image courtesy of Tim Vickers and Wikipedia.

But as Professor William Dembski points out in a critical post titled, Is James Shapiro a Darwinist After All? (Evolution News and Views, January 25, 2012), Shapiro doesn’t go far enough in his questioning of Darwinism. He maintains that non-foresighted processes are sufficient to generate evolutionary novelty. The problem with this view is that non-foresighted processes are by definition incapable of searching for a “needle in a haystack,” which, as Dembski points out, is precisely the kind of search we require, in order to account for the origin of the highly complex proteins which we find in living things, each of which has its own specific function:

Neo-Darwinism essentially localizes the creative potential of evolution in genetic mutations. Shapiro rightly sees that this can’t be the main source of evolutionary variation. So he expands it to include “horizontal DNA transfer, interspecific hybridization, genome doubling and symbiogenesis.” Fine, now you’ve got a richer source of variation. But what is coordinating these variations to bring about the increasing complexity we find in biological systems? Shapiro’s answer is “natural genetic engineering.” Cells, according to Shapiro, are intelligent in that they do their own natural genetic engineering, taking existing structures through horizontal DNA transfer or symbiogenesis, say, and reworking them in new contexts for new uses.

But in making such a claim, has Shapiro really solved anything? Has he truly understood the evolution of any complex biological structures? …

Natural genetic engineering would actually mean something, providing genuine understanding of and solutions for the origin of novel biological structures, if Shapiro could point to actual, identifiable mechanisms and show how they take existing structures and then refashion them into new ones. But Shapiro doesn’t do this…

Shapiro doesn’t know the first thing about how natural genetic engineering itself works. What Shapiro knows is the inputs to evolution. Those inputs are richer than the impoverished inputs of Neo-Darwinism, whose main input is genetic mutation. So Shapiro adds symbiogenesis, lateral gene transfer, etc. We are supposed to be impressed. Okay, it’s great that scientists like Shapiro have been able to discover this enriched set of inputs. And Shapiro claims to have discovered a richer transformative principle for these inputs. Darwin gives us natural selection. Again, this is too impoverished for Shapiro. In its place (or, perhaps, supplementing it), Shapiro gives us natural genetic engineering.

But in fact, natural genetic engineering, in the way Shapiro uses it, is no more enlightening than natural selection, which Shapiro to his credit at least admits is bankrupt. But they’re both magic phrases, mantras that claim to provide insight into how evolutionary transformations occur, but in fact offer no real understanding, nor real solutions. We can see this in Shapiro’s latest reply to Gauger and Axe: “well-documented natural processes are more than adequate to explain how protein evolution for new functionalities can occur in a purely natural and combinatorial fashion.”

Come again? “More than adequate”? Such overblown rhetoric ought immediately to set off warning bells. My colleagues and I would be happy with mere adequacy. The problem is that the natural processes Shapiro cites don’t even rise to that level. To explain protein evolution, it’s not enough to point to some known antecedents (genetic shuffling of one form or another) and then merely invoke the label “natural genetic engineering,” as though this explained anything. Far from explaining what needs to be explained, it sidesteps and misdirects from the real question. This becomes evident when Shapiro cites getting new functionalities in a purely “combinatorial fashion.”

As a probabilist, I’ve had to do my share of combinatorics, a branch of mathematics concerned with counting possibilities. The problem is that in genetics and proteomics, the possible gene and protein products are immense, and so the challenge, always, is to find some biologically meaningful path through these combinatorial spaces. So, when Shapiro invokes natural processes that operate in combinatorial fashion, he is in fact explaining nothing about protein evolution but merely restating the problem.

Intelligent Design: not an argument from ignorance

The problem highlighted by Professor Dembski is not unique to James Shapiro’s theory of natural genetic engineering. It is a problem which besets any account of the origin of astronomically improbable structures with a specified function of their own (such as proteins). Foresight, coupled with an ability to visualize and express to oneself the form of the solution to the problem one is trying to solve, is the only kind of process that is capable of generating structures like these.

Finally, as Dr. Stephen Meyer has pointed out, the argument for an Intelligent Designer is not an argument from ignorance, as RDFish contends, but rather an abductive inference, or an inference to the best explanation. The argument is that we discover certain features in some systems (functional specified complexity) which we know that intelligent beings are capable of generating, by virtue of their ability to conceptualize. By contrast, the unguided processes known to us are extremely unlikely to generate these features within the time available. Given what we know, then, the inference that these features were produced by an intelligent agent is a rational one.

(iv) Is Intelligent Design incapable in principle of taking us to a disembodied Designer?

RDFish’s final objection to ID is that even if Intelligent Design inferences were sometimes warranted, they could never take us to an Intelligent Designer of the cosmos. The reason is that since all of the intelligent designers that we have ever encountered are physical agents which are incapable of thinking in the absence of complex, highly specified, functional interactions between their body parts, it is rational to infer, on the basis of known evidence, that any designer would possess a body instantiating the property of specified complexity. Since this designer would be unable to account for the complexity of its own body, we may conclude that there can, in principle, be no global explanation for functional specified complexity, on the basis of intelligent design. Any Intelligent Design project, then, can, at best, explain only some of the functional specified complexity we find in Nature; there will always be a residue that remains unexplained.

RDFish’s point is that the evidence we have for the proposition that any intelligent designer must be a complex, embodied being is just as powerful as the evidence for the proposition that the functional specified complexity we find in Nature was generated by an intelligent designer. Both propositions are amply confirmed by experience, which teaches us that (i) only intelligent agents are capable of generating highly complex systems which perform a specific function, and that (ii) intelligent agents are incapable of doing anything at all without bodies which function in a complex way. I would like to point out that RDFish is not espousing materialism here: his aim is not to show that mind and body are equivalent, but merely that they are inseparable, in our experience. We have no experience of disembodied minds, just as we have no experience of unguided processes generating highly complex functional systems.

However, I believe that RDFish overlooks a vital point. The evidence that we have for all intelligent agents being embodied is inductive: it is based on a sample of all the intelligent agents known to science – namely, living and dead members of the species Homo sapiens, plus a few species of mammals and birds, if one wishes to be very generous in defining “intelligence.”

By contrast, as I pointed out above, the evidence for Intelligent Design is abductive: it consists in identifying the best explanation for a set of observations which are confirmed by experience and careful testing.

To counter this distinction I have drawn, RDFish would need to formulate an argument, showing that a functioning, complex body constitutes the best possible explanation for an intelligent agent’s ability to think, and to design specified complex systems. That would amount to abductive evidence for RDFish’s claim that intelligent agents require functioning bodies, consisting of multiple parts, in order to be able to think.

The only argument I have seen from RDFish on this point is that many concepts – such as the concept of a protein, or for that matter, the concept of a particular body plan characterizing a certain phylum of complex animals – are inherently complex, and that these concepts require a physical medium of some sort, in order to store the information required to express them.

However, the notion that concepts need to be stored makes sense only for a time-bound designer. A Designer Who is outside space and time would have no need to store His concepts in the first place – and hence, no need to encode them in a physical medium.

In addition, I believe RDFish’s argument makes an illicit slide from the formal complexity of the concepts required by an Intelligent Designer to solve design problems, to the material complexity of the bodily parts possessed by all designers known to us. The formal concepts used by a designer to solve problems are by their nature integral to the design process, whereas the material structures used to represent these concepts are not. There is no reason in principle why a designer would need a complex body in order to solve problems. What a designer really needs are complex concepts. The evidence that all intelligent designers are embodied entities is therefore inductive, rather than abductive.

Nevertheless, RDFish might object that nothing could possibly warrant the claim that the cosmos itself was designed. Put simply, we have no experience of anything outside the cosmos: all of our concepts are derived from objects within the cosmos. If we step outside the very framework which supplies us with our concepts, what hope can we possibly have of reasoning soundly? We should therefore stick to what we do well, and confine ourselves to searching for explanations lying within our own cosmos, rather than beyond it.

The flaw in this argument lies in its Humean assumption that all of our mental concepts are derived from experience. There are, however, certain concepts which the mind constructs and then applies to the objects in our experience – concepts such as “agent,” “explanation,” “cause,” “effect,” “control,” “rule,” “nature,” “capacity” and “goal,” to name just a few. There is nothing illicit in applying these concepts to the cosmos as a whole. For instance, we can meaningfully ask whether the cosmos-as-a-whole had a cause, or whether it requires an explanation. We can also identify rules (laws of Nature) which characterize the cosmos-as-a-whole.

I have argued that we can legitimately infer the existence of a Designer of the cosmos on philosophical grounds from the existence of laws of Nature, in my two posts, Does scientific knowledge presuppose God? A reply to Carroll, Coyne, Dawkins and Loftus and Is God a good theory? A response to Sean Carroll (Part One).

In my post, Is God a good theory? A response to Sean Carroll (Part Two), I explain how the existence of an Intelligent Designer of the cosmos-as-a-whole can be defended on scientific grounds, by appealing to the fine-tuning argument, and why invoking the multiverse fails to undermine this argument. If RDFish wishes to peruse these articles and comment on them, he is welcome to do so.

Finally, I defend the intellectual coherence of a bodiless Designer in my 2011 post, Two pretty good arguments for atheism (courtesy of Dave Mullenix).

I hope this post of mine answers RDFish’s questions, and I would now like to throw the discussion open to readers.

Comments
But once you reject libertarianism […] it is now just another kind of physical process that happens to produce CSI. It is not special in any other way – it does not make free choices in order to produce CSI
This represents a poor understanding of the physical issues at hand. The translation of CSI (like the translation of any other form of recorded information) requires a local independence from physical determinism in order for the translation system to even function. This fact may or may not help to demonstrate libertarianism, but it renders its rejection moot (with regard to the design inference) – as Barry has previously pointed out.Upright BiPed
June 16, 2014
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I would certainly agree with you that if we found evidence that the cause of living things was something that could actually communicate broadly in natural language, then it would be exactly the sort of thing that we would call intelligent in a meaningful sense. But there is obviously no evidence that this was the case.
The material evidence of this already exists, and is virtually intractable.Upright BiPed
June 16, 2014
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The main point here is that comparing a formal (e.g. computer) language to natural language is like comparing the complexity of a snowflake to the complexity of a computer.
Human language and computer language are identical at the physical level. Both must bridge the physical discontinuity between the input and output of the system; simultaneously specifying an outcome while preserving the discontinuity. Both accomplish this by utilizing a finite set of iterative dimensional representations, presented to the system in a linear array, and both require two sets of physical protocols in order to function; one set to establish the arbitrary relationships (regularities) that allow the system to specify an outcome, and another set to establish the dimensional operation of the system itself. These are the readily identifiable properties of these systems; allowing them to produce effects that are not derivable from inexorable law. The only instances where these specific physical properties can be demonstrated to exist are in language, mathematics, and in the translation of the genetic code. Your analogy to a snowflake is incoherent.Upright BiPed
June 16, 2014
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Piotr, the ignorance is all yours.
You confuse a nested hierarchy with any classification or subdivision (especially one that involves different taxonomic ranks).
Evidence please.
The US Army can be represented as a branching structure, but since the structure has not been produced by a historical phylogeny, there is no nested hierarchy of inherited features.
LoL! Nested hierarchies do not require inherited features.
The Linnean system of ranks is not a nested hierarchy eithe
Of course it is. Even Doug Theobald says so in his "29+ evidences for macroevolution" Piotr, you have no idea what you are talking about and it shows.Joe
June 16, 2014
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You are projecting your ignorance on other people. You confuse a nested hierarchy with any classification or subdivision (especially one that involves different taxonomic ranks). The US Army can be represented as a branching structure, but since the structure has not been produced by a historical phylogeny, there is no nested hierarchy of inherited features. The Linnean system of ranks is not a nested hierarchy either -- or at any rate it isn't consistently based on a nested hierarchy of biological characters. It's ahistorical. That's precisely the difference between the Linnean system and cladistic taxonomies. I know that for some unfathomable reasons your mind refuses to understand it, and that you are not likely to grasp it in the future. I'm just stating it for the record.Piotr
June 16, 2014
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Piotr:
The nested hierarchy is a byproduct of speciation.
No, it isn't. The US Army can be placed into a nested hierarchy yet it does not involve speciation. Look just because a nested hierarchy can be depicted as a branching pattern doesn't mean just any branching pattern is a nested hierarchy. Linnean classification is a nested hierarchy and it doesn't have anything to do with common descent. IOW Piotr, you obviously don't know what a nested hierarchy entails.Joe
June 16, 2014
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evolutionism does not predict a nested hierarchy. Gradual evolution would produce a smooth blending of defining characteristics which would produce an overlapping Venn diagram and that would violate a nested hierarchy which cannot have any overlapping.
The nested hierarchy is a byproduct of speciation. If the structure of relationships can be represented as a family tree, innovations accumulate along its branches. Any clade derived from a common ancestor inherits the innovations acquired by that common ancestor. The pattern of similarities and differences between taxa reflects the structure of the family tree. You have the same phenomenon in the case of other, non-biological phylogenies, for example the family trees of languages, or manuscript genealogies (see the case of The Canterbury Tales). A nested hierarchy betrays the existence of a family tree. Recombination makes it impossible to construct a family tree for whole individual genomes in sexually reproducing populations within a species, but the non-recombining parts (such as the human Y chromosome, and mtDNA) do form neat family trees, and of course a nested hierarchy is visible in Y-haplogroups and mt-haplogroups.Piotr
June 16, 2014
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Evolve claims that "the intelligent designer is not proposed to exist by any scientific theory" Which is an interesting claim for a Darwinist to make since Darwinism itself seeks to 'explain away' the overwhelming 'appearance of design' in life and nature. It is interesting to note the history of the negative form of argumentation that Darwinism itself takes to try to refute the design hypothesis. The 'Design hypothesis' was overwhelmingly accepted as true during Darwin's day. Both classical neo-Darwinism and modern neo-Darwinism hold that natural selection acting on random genetic variations (and/or mutations) can produce not only new biological form and structure but also the 'appearance of design' in living organisms (i.e. The "blind watchmaker" hypothesis). This was, and is, clearly a negative form of argument against the design hypothesis. Darwin used this negative form of argumentation in 'The Origin of Species' as well as in his letters. Thus Darwin himself sought to 'explain away' the 'appearance of Design', as Darwinists to this day still do. The late Ernst Mayr, and other evolutionists, have put the negative argument against design like this: "The real core of Darwinism,, is the theory of natural selection. This theory is so important for Darwinian because it permits the explanation of adaption, the 'design' of the natural theologian, by natural means." Ernst Mayr "design without a designer" Francisco Ayala "Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose." Richard Dawkins - The Blind Watchmaker (1996) p.1 "Organisms appear as if they had been designed to perform in an astonishingly efficient way, and the human mind therefore finds it hard to accept that there need be no Designer to achieve this" Francis Crick - What Mad Pursuit - p. 30 living organisms "appear to have been carefully and artfully designed" Lewontin "The appearance of purposefulness is pervasive in nature." George Gaylord Simpson i.e. The main purpose of Darwinian evolution in the beginning, and always has been, to 'explain away' the overwhelming 'appearance of design' in life! Thus, since Darwinism itself needs to postulate a Intelligent Designer in order to try to refute that Intelligent Designer, then, contrary to Evolve's claim, his own pet scientific theory postulates a Intelligent Designer. Moreover, since Darwinism has spectacularly failed to demonstrate that unguided processes can produce the 'appearance of design' then the 'appearance of design' that Darwinism sought to 'explain away' is not illusory, as Darwininists held/hold, but is real as was originally held by the scientific community. The Return of the God Hypothesis - Stephen Meyer Abstract: Historian of science Frederic Burnham has stated that the God hypothesis is now a more respectable hypothesis than at any time in the last one hundred years. This essay explores recent evidence from cosmology, physics, and biology, which provides epistemological support, though not proof, for belief in God as conceived by a theistic worldview. It develops a notion of epistemological support based upon explanatory power, rather than just deductive entailment. It also evaluates the explanatory power of theism and its main metaphysical competitors with respect to several classes of scientific evidence. The conclusion follows that theism explains a wide ensemble of metaphysically-significant evidences more adequately and comprehensively than other major worldviews or metaphysical systems. Thus, unlike much recent scholarship that characterizes science as either conflicting with theistic belief or entirely neutral with respect to it, this essay concludes that scientific evidence actually supports such belief. http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_returnofgod.pdf The Return of the God Hypothesis - Stephen Meyer - video lecture: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueEpWIfXao8 "The presence of a creative deity in the universe is clearly a scientific hypothesis. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more momentous hypothesis in all of science." Richard Dawkinsbornagain77
June 16, 2014
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Evolve:
No model leads to such a thing and there’s no prediction that can be empirically measured.
LoL! Evolutionary and genetic algorithms model evolution by design and ID makes teh same basic predictions as archaeology and forensic science-> namely when intelligent agencies act they tend to leave traces of their actions behind. Traces other intelligent agencies can then detect and study.Joe
June 16, 2014
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RDF:
We already know that CSI exists, and when we hypothesize a cause of CSI that is nothing more than “something that can cause CSI” we learn precisely nothing.
LoL! It may tell RDF "nothing" but to we investigators it eliminates entire classes of possible causes and it tells us how to proceed with the investigation. Why are people wasting time on RDF when it is obvious it is scientifically illiterate and on an agenda?Joe
June 16, 2014
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Evolve- evolutionism does not predict a nested hierarchy. Gradual evolution would produce a smooth blending of defining characteristics which would produce an overlapping Venn diagram and that would violate a nested hierarchy which cannot have any overlapping. IOW once again you prove that you have no clue.Joe
June 16, 2014
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In a series of recent posts, RDFish has made several penetrating criticisms of the Intelligent Design project, which can be summarized as follows:
That's a joke, right?Joe
June 16, 2014
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RDFish, You say ID has too many defects and is non scientific. Do you think evolutionism (organization created by randomness) has less defects and is scientific? You are smart to write, but at the very end the issue is simple and has only two possible short answers: "is organization produced by intelligence or by non-intelligence". Please, answer "intelligence/non-intelligence", thank you.niwrad
June 16, 2014
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Mapou, But all that you said - nested hierarchy, gradual change in form, transitional forms, horizontal gene transfer etc - is exactly what the theory of evolution also predicts to happen by entirely natural mechanisms. So your designer now becomes redundant and unnecessary. Why does your designer act exactly as how evolution predicts?! I know why. You’re fitting or customising your designer to the data instead of predicting in advance what he actually did.Evolve
June 16, 2014
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RDFish, Comparing the multiverse with the intelligent designer is not right. The multiverse is a prediction made by some scientific theories or models. For example, the theory of inflation that has been proposed to explain the origin of our universe automatically leads to a multiverse. It’s a natural prediction, or fallout, of the model. The recent discovery of primordial gravitational waves (if it is confirmed) lends strong evidence to the theory of inflation. Thus if inflation is confirmed, that will make the case for a multiverse much stronger. Some of our models actually predict what effect a neighbouring universe will have on our universe that can be measured empirically. In contrast, the intelligent designer is not proposed to exist by any scientific theory. No model leads to such a thing and there’s no prediction that can be empirically measured. It’s totally a figment of imagination.Evolve
June 16, 2014
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A couple of side comments regarding the discussion . . . - I was taught that intelligence stems from language, but I don't carry on a narrative when I design something or solve a problem. I'd imagine that composers don't think linguistically when they write music, nor do chess masters when employing a grand strategy, and so on. - The fossil record includes organisms that look alike in some respects, and one can arrange them in a proposed sequence, but there's no way that doing so proves any evolutionary relationship. That's why "convergent" evolution was employed to explain some anomalies and strata were flipped to explain others. -QQuerius
June 15, 2014
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RDFish:
First, since ID professes to have no knowledge about the Designer, it hardly makes sense to expect ID to be able to reveal why the Designer chose to do one thing over another. Can you give examples of ID discovering the Designer’s motivation for various choices He made?
But we can infer several very important things about the designer(s). For examples: 1. We know that they are intelligent. 2. We know that they design things intelligently. 3. We know that they design things not just for function but also for beauty. 4. We know from experience how intelligent designers design things intelligently. One of the most prized principles of intelligent design is the idea of "reuse". In other words, we build new designs on top of existing designs. This necessarily creates not just an evolution of designs but a hierarchy of designs (a tree of life). This is exactly what is observed in nature. Another thing we can infer about the designers is that there were many of them, not just one. How do we know that, you ask? It is because we can observe many vastly different art styles in the designs of the species. Some of the designers seemed to have had a profound obsession with insects and spiders, for example. Finally, we can infer that the designers would want a non-nested tree of life. Why? Because we find it very useful in our own designs. A feature designed for one category of things (or species) will frequently be useful and adaptable in a completely different category. The only way to reuse such designs is to perform horizontal gene transfers. And guess what? This is what is observed in nature. So again, we can infer many things about the designers. I suspect that the real reason that the ID side is reluctant to go this route has to do with their religious beliefs or those of their backers. In other words, if you have been preaching that your God is all-knowing and all-powerful, then why would he need to design anything? The deity would instantly know how to create a hippopotamus from scratch. Poof. The problem with this is that this is not what is observed in nature. We do see a definite progression in the fossil record. IMO, the ID camp needs to grow up and face their weaknesses. They must get rid of the poofery. Otherwise, they lose.Mapou
June 15, 2014
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Should be: Second, it doesn’t matter if a theory launches questions.RDFish
June 15, 2014
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Hi StephenA,
We might then reply “Ok… but why did the designer choose that value?” and it would be a perfectly valid question.
First, since ID professes to have no knowledge about the Designer, it hardly makes sense to expect ID to be able to reveal why the Designer chose to do one thing over another. Can you give examples of ID discovering the Designer's motivation for various choices He made? Second, it doesn't matter if a query launches questions. Rather, it matters that it answers questions in a way that can be evaluated against empirical evidence. One could propose a perfectly ridiculous theory that launches as many questions as you'd like. Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
June 15, 2014
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OT: "I see a lot of atheists these days thinking that they can help themselves to a robust notion of consciousness, to real libertarian free will, to objective moral values and duties, to objective human rights, and to objective meaning in life, without giving credit to theism. It’s not rational to do this. As Frank Turek said on the latest episode of “Cross Examined”, atheists have to sit in God’s lap to slap his face." http://winteryknight.wordpress.com/2014/01/16/an-atheist-explains-the-real-consequences-of-adopting-an-atheistic-worldview/bornagain77
June 15, 2014
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There is no way we can test multiverse “theory”, mainly because there is nothing that multiverse theory cannot explain with the same simple reason: everything that can happen, happens. Likewise, there is no way we can test ID “theory”, mainly because there is nothing that ID theory cannot explain with the same simple reason: because the Intelligent Designer chose to. Neither of these has any scientific merit.
I would like to point out that the two explanations are not identical in how they explain things. ID may give the same explanation to a wide range of phenomena, but that explanation can then be used as a launching point for new questions. For example, we can ask why the gravitational constant is the way it is and the IDist will answer "Because the designer chose it to be that value." We might then reply "Ok... but why did the designer choose that value?" and it would be a perfectly valid question. Whereas a believer in the multiverse would answer the question "Every value that can happen, happens somewhere." Which leads us to ask... what exactly?StephenA
June 15, 2014
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Hi vjtorley, Thanks again for all the work you put in on the OP here. You did a great job in summarizing my points accurately, and kept to the topics at hand - I truly appreciate that (it is unique in my experience on this site). You also made a few arguments that I had not previously encountered. You won't be surprised to see that I disagree with virtually all of your arguments, but perhaps my some of my rebuttals will be novel for you too. 1) Intelligence as that which produces CSI With regard to this common definition for "intelligence":
"whatever it is that generates large amounts of functional, complex, specified information".
you comment:
This definition is at least minimally informative, in that it tells us that something generates the information.
But that is not informative because we already know this. We already know that CSI exists, and when we hypothesize a cause of CSI that is nothing more than "something that can cause CSI" we learn precisely nothing. So this definition is not just flawed; it is, in the context of ID, vacuous. It is as specious and empty of information as Molière's virtus dormitiva. I point this out because this particular meaning for "intelligence" is very common among ID supporters, and confuses these debates endlessly. What happens is that ID advocates argue by using the limited "that which creates CSI" definition, but then they believe and communicate the conclusions of ID in terms of a broad intuitive understanding of intelligence - something with conscious beliefs, desires, and intentions. It's a very pernicious equivocation, and it will arise again below. 2) Regarding the claim that language is integral to the definition of intelligence You share this idea with someone with whom you probably share very little else: Daniel Dennett. I've always meant to ask him the question I will ask you: How do you reconcile this view with human beings who are capable of navigating in the world, learning, remembering, solving problems, designing and using tools, and so on, but are incapable of generating and understanding grammatical language? (see here for a fascinating case of Ildefonso, an "intelligent agent" with no linguistic abilities). I think the important point here is that we have no theory that actually connects various aspects of mentality, such as the production of CSI, the generation and understanding of grammatical language, and conscious awareness. We have no model of intelligence that shows disparate mental abilities - musical understanding, logico-mathematical reasoning, spatial reasoning, emotional intelligence and understanding of other minds, and so on - arise from the same substrate, substance, or property. All of these abilities co-occur in normally functioning humans, but they may selectively disappear in pathological conditions. Savantism also suggests that these abilities can occur independently. And that's just talking about human beings: For all we know these abilities may not co-occur at all in something that is radically different than a human being (such as, say, an immaterial entity that exists outside of spacetime). What this means for ID is this: Just because some thing (entity, force, system, whatever) outputs CSI gives us no empirical warrant to assume that this thing can also get a joke, write a melody, read a book, tell us what it is thinking, or perform any other particular task. We know only that what produced the CSI was able to produce that CSI - and that explains nothing. 3) Inferring linguistic abilities from biological systems You argue that the workings of the cell constitute a computing system, and I think that's correct. But I don't think this serves your purpose (which is, as you say, "to demonstrate in a striking way how it is possible to speak of the Designer of life and the cosmos as being truly intelligent, in a meaningful sense of the word"). The main point here is that comparing a formal (e.g. computer) language to natural language is like comparing the complexity of a snowflake to the complexity of a computer. They are qualitatively different. We can generate and interpret formal languages, and we understand exactly how that is done, so we can also build machines that generate and interpret formal languages. But while we are normally capable of generating and understanding natural language ourselves, we have no idea how we manage to do that, and we cannot build AI systems that understand natural language (at anything even beginning to approach human competence) either. I would certainly agree with you that if we found evidence that the cause of living things was something that could actually communicate broadly in natural language, then it would be exactly the sort of thing that we would call intelligent in a meaningful sense. But there is obviously no evidence that this was the case. So again you're left only with the claim that "anything smart enough to build a computer systems ought to be able to read and write [Greek, Hebrew, English, etc]". But as I argued in (2), unless we're talking about a human being, we have no basis to assume that these abilities necessarily go together. And even if we are talking about a human, we couldn't be sure (as Ildefonso and thousands of other language-less humans illustrate). Thus, if you insist that natural language abilities are a requisite aspect of intelligence, ID is unable to show that the cause of life was intelligent. 4) On contra-causal free will In his space station illustration, Barry is in effect suggesting that ID define "intelligence" as "that which produces CSI" rather than the definition "that which transcends law + chance", that others here prefer. But once you reject libertarianism, then wherever you see CSI, and you claim that you have indicia of intelligence, it is now just another kind of physical process that happens to produce CSI. It is not special in any other way - it does not make free choices in order to produce CSI, for example. You refer repeatedly to "unguided processes" that cannot possibly account for this or that biological system, and you take this as evidence of intelligent action. The similar term "undirected process" appears in the canonical definition of ID Theory:
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection. [emphasis added]
But under materialism, what might a process be "guided" or "directed" by? If everything including intelligence is a physical process, then what could "guide" it? ID needs to claim that intelligence transcends physical cause in order to posit that there is something outside of physical processes that can direct them in ways that undirected processes cannot go. It is not for nothing that libertarian assumptions are baked into the explanatory filter, the canonical definition of ID, and virtually all of the discussions on this forum. If you cannot rule out "unguided processes" en masse, you can no longer treat our failure to explain some phenomenon as evidence that something categorically different called "intelligence" was responsible. All you can say is "We know of no physical process that would account for this system, thus we posit that some other physical process capable of producing this system was responsible". Which takes us to the next topic... 5) On ID as an argument from ignorance
The problem highlighted by Professor Dembski is not unique to James Shapiro’s theory of natural genetic engineering. It is a problem which besets any account of the origin of astronomically improbable structures with a specified function of their own (such as proteins). Foresight, coupled with an ability to visualize and express to oneself the form of the solution to the problem one is trying to solve, is the only kind of process that is capable of generating structures like these.
But it is not possible to compute the probability of occurrence of things with unknown origin, as the following illustration makes clear: If we did not understand lightning, we might calculate the probability that a church steeple will be struck by lightning as follows: Divide the total area in square feet of all steeples in the city by the square feet of the entire city. This would be a very small number, and the fact that church steeples were often struck by lightning would be a glaring anomaly that would be best explained by divine intervention - and it typically was. But of course the probability computation was performed in ignorance, and assumed that all locations in a city were equally likely to be struck. Before Ben Franklin figured it out, nobody could imagine how a lightning bolt could aim itself at a church all by itself, unless it was aimed by an intelligent agent with foresight. But it turned out that the reason lightning preferentially hits church steeples had nothing to do with a conscious decision based on some divine dislike of church steeples. Rather, there were constraints upon the locations due to electromagnetic phenomena that were not understood at the time. The same mistake is made by ID when it, say, computes protein probabilities by multiplying out all possible orderings of amino acids because our current understanding of physical chemistry doesn't supply us with any other constraints. What appears as astronomical improbability may simply be a reflection of our ignorance regarding what is going on. 6) On abductive inference
Finally, as Dr. Stephen Meyer has pointed out, the argument for an Intelligent Designer is not an argument from ignorance, as RDFish contends, but rather an abductive inference, or an inference to the best explanation.
An abductive inference is not simply the least bad of a number of poor guesses. Science does abductively infer explanations, but there still has to be some empirical support for what is assumed. The notion of a disembodied being that exists outside of spacetime and has the ability to arrange matter according to its conscious intentions is well outside of our uniform and repeated Earthly experience, and would require some empirical evidence that such a thing was possible in order to be an accepted scientific result. Not only does ID fail to provide evidence for this, but as far as I can tell, ID literature does not even address the need for it.
By contrast, the unguided processes known to us are extremely unlikely to generate these features within the time available.
Again you appeal to the notion of "unguided processes" that you want to rule out en masse, even though you've claimed that ID is compatible with determinism/physicalism. In any event, the truth of the matter is that we know of nothing that could have been responsible for these features. Maybe there are principles of self-organization that we don't understand. Maybe causality is much different than we think (retro- or circular- causality). Maybe there's a disembodied omnipotent god outside of spacetime. Maybe quantum phenomena transfer information in ways we don't understand. Maybe we live in a multiverse where everything that can happen does happen. But none of these are clear hypotheses with empirical support; the correct answer is "we do not know".
Given what we know, then, the inference that these features were produced by an intelligent agent is a rational one.
I won't argue that the belief is irrational; I hope it is clear, however, that the belief that some conscious entity that can explain its reasons for its actions was responsible is not something ID can empirically support, by a longshot. 7) On disembodied designers
However, I believe that RDFish overlooks a vital point. The evidence that we have for all intelligent agents being embodied is inductive: it is based on a sample of all the intelligent agents known to science – namely, living and dead members of the species Homo sapiens, plus a few species of mammals and birds, if one wishes to be very generous in defining “intelligence.”
It isn't that the intelligent agents in our experience just happen to have brains (as well as livers and spleens). Rather, we know that the thing that enables intelligent agents to be intelligent is the operation of our brains. In fact, you just posted an excerpt from an article in Answers in Genesis that you recommendend that included this:
The brain, no doubt, makes it possible for us (not the brain!), to sense, perceive, think, reason, believe, ...
Of course we can imagine some radically different sort of intelligent agents who somehow think without any physical mechanism, just as we can imagine physical phenomena that work in some radically different way that causes information from the environment to directly shape the genome (NGE). But imagination isn't theory.
The evidence that all intelligent designers are embodied entities is therefore inductive, rather than abductive.
You've gone to some trouble to argue that we cannot inductively generalize over the class of intelligent agents. You argue that just because all intelligent agents in our experience use their brains to think, and just because it would seem that physical mechanisms are required in order to store and process information, we can't rule out that other sorts of intelligent agents may have radically different characteristics. But that simply bolsters the points I made above: we cannot inductively generalize over the class of intelligent agents! We have only ourselves as instances of intelligent agency, and we can't assume that anything radically different from ourselves that outputs CSI is necessarily like us in any other way. If you feel free to hypothesize unknown sorts of intelligent agents that don't need physical states to store and process information, others can hypothesize unknown sorts of processes that produce CSI without linguistic, conscious minds.
However, the notion that concepts need to be stored makes sense only for a time-bound designer. A Designer Who is outside space and time would have no need to store His concepts in the first place – and hence, no need to encode them in a physical medium.
Once again, there is no limit to what we can hypothesize to be true, but if you'd like to set the bar so low that this kind of speculation becomes a serious scientific theory, then we might as well posit a multiverse, which can be invoked to explain anything and is equally inaccessible to empirical evaluation. Scientific reasoning is not about thinking up whatever we can that - if only it were true - would account for what we see, and then picking our favorite story and calling it an abductive inference. There really does have to be some good reason for believing our conclusions are true. There is no way we can test multiverse "theory", mainly because there is nothing that multiverse theory cannot explain with the same simple reason: everything that can happen, happens. Likewise, there is no way we can test ID "theory", mainly because there is nothing that ID theory cannot explain with the same simple reason: because the Intelligent Designer chose to. Neither of these has any scientific merit. I'll stop here, as I've addressed what I feel are your main arguments. I hope I have helped you understand why you still have failed to craft some definition of "intelligence" that is both meaningful and operationally useful in the context of ID, why ID is unable to support the attribution of various specific mental abilities to the cause of life. I look forward to your comments! Cheers, RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
June 15, 2014
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RDFish:
To say “something coming from nothing” is called creation ex nihilo.
StephenB
June 15, 2014
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I'd like to suggest an addition to the site. A simple means of tagging posts as either intelligently designed or not intelligently designed, with perhaps a third option of ambiguous. It never ceases to amaze me that people can post here at UD and argue that it's not possible to detect intelligently designed posts.Mung
June 15, 2014
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So, RD is wrong in his science here. But, then, why wouldn't he be? Since, as is unavoidable for the modern-day atheist, he himself, has shown a distinct, a priori tenderness for cherry-picking in his acceptance of the findings of modern science.Axel
June 15, 2014
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.... are physical agents which are incapable of thinking in the absence of complex, highly specified, functional interactions between their body parts, we may legitimately conclude that Intelligence can never serve as an Ultimate Explanation for all of the functional specified complexity that we find in Nature. Any Intelligent Designer would have to be a complex, embodied being.' Far from being a penetrating insight, this is plain wrong, as has been amply demonstrated by personal NDEs, monitored by the latest medical technology. So, it is not simply a matter of inductive/abductive evidence, that gives the lie to RDF's contention concerning a necessity for interaction of the spirit with the physical body, and between various parts of the latter.Axel
June 15, 2014
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Hi VJT, I'm gratified that you've prepared a serious reply to my points, and see that you have indeed summarized them very well in your introduction. I'm looking forward to reading your post. Perhaps you'll convince me of where I've gone wrong, or perhaps I can help you understand where you have! Thanks and stay tuned, it will take some time... RDFish/AIGuyRDFish
June 14, 2014
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