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Orgel and Dembski Redux

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A couple of months ago I quoted from Lesli Orgel’s 1973 book on the origins of life.  L. E. Orgel, The Origins of Life: Molecules and Natural Selection (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; New York, 1973).  I argued that on page 189 of that book Orgel used the term “specified complexity” in a way almost indistinguishable from the way Bill Dembski has used the term in his work.  Many of my Darwinian interlocutors demurred.  They argued the quotation was taken out of context and that Orgel meant something completely different from Dembski.  I decided to order the book and find out who was right.  Below, I have reproduced the entire section in which the original quotation appeared.  I will let readers decide whether I was right.  (Hint: I was).

 

All that follows is a word-for-word reproduction of the relevant section from Orgel’s book:

 

[Page 189]

Terrestrial Biology

Most elementary introductions to biology contain a section on the nature of life.  It is usual in such discussions to list a number of properties that distinguish living from nonliving things. Reproduction and metabolism, for example, appear in all of the lists; the ability to respond to the environment is another old favorite.  This approach extends somewhat the chef’s definition “If it quivers, it’s alive.” Of course, there are also many characteristics that are restricted to the living world but are not common to all forms of life.  Plants cannot pursue their food; animals do not carry out photosynthesis; lowly organisms do not behave intelligently.

It is possible to make a more fundamental distinction between living and nonliving things by examining their molecular structure and molecular behavior.  In brief, living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity.*· Crystals are usually taken as the prototypes of simple, well-specified structures, because they consist of a very large number of identical molecules packed together in a uniform way.  Lumps of granite or random mixtures of polymers are examples of structures which are complex but not specified.  The crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity, the mixtures of polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity.

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* It is impossible to find a simple catch phrase to capture this complex idea.  “Specified and. therefore repetitive complexity” gets a little closer (see later).

[Page 190]

These vague ideas can be made more precise by introducing the idea of information.  Roughly speaking, the information content of a structure is the minimum number of instructions needed to specify the structure.  One can see intuitively that many instructions are needed to specify a complex structure.  On the other hand, a simple repeating structure can be specified in rather few instructions.  Complex but random structures, by definition, need hardly be specified at all.

These differences are made clear by the following example.  Suppose a chemist agreed to synthesize anything that could describe [sic] accurately to him.  How many instructions would he need to make a crystal, a mixture of random DNA-like polymers or the DNA of the bacterium E. coli?

To describe the crystal we had in mind, we would need to specify which substance we wanted and the way in which the molecules were to be packed together in the crystal.  The first requirement could be conveyed in a short sentence.  The second would be almost as brief, because we could describe how we wanted the first few molecules packed together, and then say “and keep on doing the same.”  Structural information has to be given only once because the crystal is regular.

It would be almost as easy to tell the chemist how to make a mixture of random DNA-like polymers.  We would first specify the proportion of each of the four nucleotides in the mixture.  Then, we would say, “Mix the nucleotides in the required proportions, choose nucleotide molecules at random from the mixture, and join them together in the order you find them.”  In this way the chemist would be sure to make polymers with the specified composition, but the sequences would be random.

It is quite impossible to produce a corresponding simple set of instructions that would enable the chemist to synthesize the DNA of E. coli.  In this case, the sequence matters; only by specifying the sequence letter-by-letter (about 4,000,000 instructions) could we tell the chemist what we wanted him to make.  The synthetic chemist would need a book of instructions rather than a few short sentences.

It is important to notice that each polymer molecule in a random mixture has a sequence just as definite as that of E.

[Page 191]

coli DNA.  However, in a random mixture the sequences are not specified, whereas in E. coli, the DNA sequence is crucial.  Two random mixtures contain quite different polymer sequences, but the DNA sequences in two E. coli cells are identical because they are specified.  The polymer sequences are complex but random; although E. coli DNA is also complex, it is specified in a unique way.

The structure of DNA has been emphasized here, but similar arguments would apply to other polymeric materials.  The protein molecules in a cell are not a random mixture of polypeptides; all of the many hemoglobin molecules in the oxygen-carrying blood cells, for example, have the same sequence.  By contrast, the chance of getting even two identical sequences 100 amino acids long in a sample of random polypeptides is negligible.  Again, sequence information can serve to distinguish the contents of living cells from random mixtures of organic polymers.

When we come to consider the most important functions of living matter, we again find that they are most easily differentiated from inorganic processes at the molecular level.  Cell division, as seen under the microscope, does not appear very different from a number of processes that are known to occur in colloidal solutions.  However, at the molecular level the differences are unmistakable:  cell division is preceded by the replication of the cellular DNA.  It is this genetic copying process that distinguishes most clearly between the molecular behavior of living organisms and that of nonliving systems.  In biological processes the number of information-rich polymers is increased during growth; when colloidal droplets “divide” they just break up into smaller droplets.

Comments
NL, this is not an appropriate context for debates on side issues, it is a place where there is an opportunity to face the resolution of a case of accusation and/or insinuation of quote-mining. The OP clearly establishes that what Orgel and Dembski discussed are substantially the same phenomenon. For you to resolve your patent misunderstandings of the design inference, its context and what complex specified information (and more particularly functionally specific complex organisation and associated information, especially digital information such as we find in D/RNA) is about you are directed to the weak argument correctives under the UD blog page resources tab, at the top of this and every UD page. KF PS: It is my intention to address the nature and significance of FSCO/I in light of the Orgel citation and other material points, soon.kairosfocus
January 21, 2015
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LH, when an accusation or insinuation of quote mining is made (especially when this is unfortunately a standard rhetorical strategy used by objectors to design thought in response to embarrassing citations of key testimonies against interest) and it is corrected on record, that should be acknowledged. As, a basic step of civility. KFkairosfocus
January 21, 2015
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Barry, I'm surprised you didn't learn your lesson the last time around. Don't you remember what happened? You got it completely wrong, and you got caught trying to erase the evidence before the rest of us could see it. Here's a reminder from that thread:
I just discovered something even funnier: Jeffrey Shallit himself — the very authority that Barry appeals to — confirms that Barry got it completely wrong: Barry Arrington: A Walking Dunning-Kruger Effect:
The wonderful thing about lawyer and CPA Barry Arrington taking over the ID creationist blog, Uncommon Descent, is that he’s so completely clueless about nearly everything. He truly is the gift that keeps on giving. For example, here Barry claims, “Kolmogorov complexity is a measure of randomness (i.e., probability). Don’t believe me? Just ask your buddy Jeffrey Shallit (see here)“. Barry doesn’t have even a glimmer about why he’s completely wrong. In contrast to Shannon, Kolmogorov complexity is a completely probability-free theory of information. That is, in fact, its virtue: it assigns a measure of complexity that is independent of a probability distribution. It makes no sense at all to say Kolmogorov is a “measure of randomness (i.e., probability)”. You can define a certain probability measure based on Kolmogorov complexity, but that’s another matter entirely. But that’s Barry’s M. O.: spout nonsense, never admit he’s wrong, claim victory, and ban dissenters. I’m guessing he’ll apply the same strategy here. If there’s any better example of how a religion-addled mind works, I don’t know one.
Excellent work, Barry. You’ve shown all of us that: 1. You have strong opinions about things you know nothing about. 2. You’ve attempted to mock someone who understands this stuff far better than you do. 3. The very authority you appealed to confirms that you got it completely wrong, as do Robb and I and Dembski himself, through his book. 4. You tried to erase the evidence by deleting the entire thread. You look pretty ridiculous right now. Is there anything else you’d like to do to embarrass yourself in front of your audience?
keith s
January 21, 2015
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Learned Hand:
Did Dembski not tie specified complexity to the calculation of P(T|H)? Seems like he does in Specification: The Pattern That Signifies Intelligence. Orgel doesn’t seem to use it at all; rather than the probability of something arising through a non-design hypothesis (or probabilities at all), he’s looking for the length of the instruction set.
You're right, LH. Barry is repeating his earlier mistake. He doesn't understand the difference between improbability and Kolmogorov complexity.keith s
January 21, 2015
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#6 kairosfocus
what independent - detachable - specification is there regarding the impression of a rock in mud, by contrast with a shod footprint with a shoe-maker's logo?
You are attempting to smuggle in the mentioned "minimum length of interaction chain" augmentation of CSI -> CSI(L), only in a vague, informal language suitable for postmodernist literary essay or casual chitchat on some forum. Namely, there is no scientifically objective "independent" or "detached" attribute of natural events that are within the common light cone, since there is always interaction chain, long and convoluted as it may be, that connects them. Hence, scientifically, all events within the sphere of visible universe are mutually connected via chain of interactions with each other, hence they are not objectively "independent" or "detached". And of course, within the vastly smaller sphere, such as Earth, or Solar system, everything is connected with everything else via countless interaction chains in myriad different ways i.e. nothing is objectively "independent" from each other. Among others, the shapes of the rocks on Mount Rushmore are certainly connected via many unbroken chains of physical interactions with the faces they mimic, just longer than the interaction chain connecting the shape of the fallen rock with its mud image in that counterexample. You are simply trying to sell here as an objective scientific criterium the subjective term "independent" which is simply a vague restatement of the threshold length of interaction chain beyond which one calls, simply by definition, events "independent" or "detached". It's no different than labeling things or creatures pretty or ugly, likeable or unlikable,... When attaching labels to things, anything goes whatever you heart desires. That kind of "objective" criteria will certainly get you as far as poetry, gender or race or social studies,... but they fall far short of any objective natural science. When you 'intelligently design' something, there is always an unbroken interaction chain between activities of your neurons and whatever product you hands intelligently produced, just like the ubroken chain, except perhaps longer, between the rock and mud in that high CSI counterexample. There is no "independence" or "detachment" anywhere in either process, other than as a wishful subjective figure of speech (like pretty and ugly,...). When you reshape a chunk of clay in your own liking, there is no objective scientific criteria that can distinguish that "intelligent action" from rock reshaping mud bank in its own liking. The most you can do is what I suggested as "augmentation" from CSI -> CSI(L) i.e. introduce a verbal convention based on the length (or 'intricacy' defined vias some labeling convention) of interaction chains L, so that one chooses to label connections with interaction chains below the threshold L as say 'xyz', and those with interaction chains above L as 'zyx' or whatever else your wish to call it, 'intelligent' vs 'dumb', 'pretty' vs 'ugly'... it's your wishful labels, you call the shots. Of course, as explained in the previous post, such verbal games "augmenting" CSI -> CSI(L), are of no more scientific value in objectively distinguishing 'intelligently designed' vs 'product of contingency and chance' than they are distinguishing 'pretty' from 'ugly'. They're empty labeling conventions, not scientific discoveries of some fundamental laws or patterns of nature.nightlight
January 20, 2015
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"I’m not a scientist or an expert. I could easily be totally wrong about how I’m reading Dembski, Orgel, or both." Yes, if you think they are talking about different things, that is proof enough that you have no idea what you are talking about. Perhaps you should read up on it a bit before you comment. BTW, the snark at the end is especially silly when you're wrong. Just sayin'Barry Arrington
January 20, 2015
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Let's all do the best we can to envision an exercise in missing the point. Ready? Go! Orgel clearly intended to associate his concept of specified complexity with the concept of information, something the opponents have repeatedly denied (having never read the source material until it was shoved in their face).Mung
January 20, 2015
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BA has taken time to prove a significant false accusation... I'm not sure that it's an "accusation" as opposed to a "disagreement," but in any event his point is only proven if those two things are actually fundamentally the same. The text doesn't support that, since they're talking about the concept in fundamentally different ways and Dembski is employing P(T|H) is a way totally foreign to Orgel's thinking. I'm not a scientist or an expert. I could easily be totally wrong about how I'm reading Dembski, Orgel, or both. But "Neener neener neener, read this blockquote and apologize!" is not a persuasive argument, much less "proof."Learned Hand
January 20, 2015
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LH, there is a time for favourite debate points and tactics, and there is a time to admit false accusation. BA has taken time to prove a significant false accusation, those who accused him need to own up and do the right thing. KF PS: On your side-track, it's coming on four years it was pointed out that WmAD extracted an information metric. FYI, it is a commonplace in science and mathematical modelling to transform from one form to another more amenable to empirical investigation. In this context a log-probability has been known to be an effective info metric since the 1920's to 40's. And, the Orgel remarks when they go on to address metrics of info on description length, gives such a metric. Reduce a description to a structured string of Y/N q's to specify state and you have a first level info metric in bits, e.g 7 bits per ASCII character. Where, the implication for relevant cases such as protein codes, is that the history of life has allowed exploration of the effective space of variability for relevant key proteins, so an exploration on the H-metric of avg info per element in a message (the same thing entropy measures using SUM pi log pi do . . . ) gives a good analytical approach, cf Durston et al.kairosfocus
January 20, 2015
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Did Dembski not tie specified complexity to the calculation of P(T|H)? Seems like he does in Specification: The Pattern That Signifies Intelligence. Orgel doesn't seem to use it at all; rather than the probability of something arising through a non-design hypothesis (or probabilities at all), he's looking for the length of the instruction set. Maybe it's self-evident how those two things are "almost indistinguishable." It doesn't seem to be evident from the text.Learned Hand
January 20, 2015
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NL, what independent -- detachable -- specification is there regarding the impression of a rock in mud, by contrast with a shod footprint with a shoe-maker's logo? Any rock impression will do. As for the reflection of a mountain in the surface of a lake, this is strictly mechanical necessity and a causal process linked to that, per incident angle equals reflected, it is a mechanical phenomenon or event, not an informational specification of high complexity. Any object bearing the relevant angular relationship will be reflected, and there is nothing that is specific about the image. A photo of the mountain and its reflection will bear a phenomenon that uses optics but will also have high functional specificity and complexity to produce an accurate record. Even, with a pinhole box camera and film, fixed and developed. KF PS: 5th, to get to a cosmos with terrestrial planets with rocks, mud, mountains and reflective lakes is a lot of fine tuning. PPS: It is side debates like this which lead me to stress that LO spoke in the context of functionally specific complex organisation and associated information [FSCO/I . . . as did Wicken in 1979], and to underscore the significance of the design inference explanatory process across mechanical necessity, blind chance and design per aspect of an object or phenomenon.kairosfocus
January 20, 2015
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Just for context: Leslie Orgel (1927–2007 )News
January 20, 2015
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Nightlight says No intelligence seems evident in either process, other than the intelligence needed to create and uphold physical laws. I say, Is the intelligence needed to create and uphold physical laws chopped liver in your opinion? It's possible that the origin of life and it's evolution was the result of some fantastically amazing frontloading natural law. Does that mean that intelligence was not involved in the process in your opinion? Peacefifthmonarchyman
January 20, 2015
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K @ 1: Indeed. Apologies and retractions should be pouring in, but I will not be holding my breath. Being a Darwinist seems to mean always being right, even when you are not.Barry Arrington
January 20, 2015
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While indeed Dembski & Orgel have essentially the same definition of specified complexity (including illustrations), the fundamental problem of that definition for the purpose used is a simple counter-example of non-live, non-inteligent instance of high specified complexity: A larger rock falls on a mud bank leaving detailed imprint of its surface in the the mud, creating instantly hundreds of megabytes, possibly into gigabytes, of specified complexity in the mud image. Or even simpler example with far greater CSI -- the whole mountain of rocks above the lake producing detailed image of their appearance reflected from the glassy surface of the lake, yielding arbitrary quantities of CSI. No intelligence seems evident in either process, other than the intelligence needed to create and uphold physical laws. The Orgel-Dembski concept of specified complexity fails to distinguish that case from DNA of the organism analogously imprinting physical, chemical and biological properties of the environment (so that organism is well harmonized with or adapted to the environment as we can observe with life). There is an obvious difference between the cases of rock+mud and DNA+environment in the length of the interaction chain -- while the rock & mud interaction chain producing high CSI is very short (in time and space), the chain of interactions linking DNA and the environment is very long. The Orgel-Dembski's CSI is completely blind, dumb and mute about the length of interaction chain. But even if one were to augment their CSI to some enhanced version, call it CSI(L), so that it defines some specific threshold/minimum length L (in space-time) of interaction chain before it declares a high CSI(L) an indicator of intelligent design behind it, it still doesn't help very much or for long. Namely, the short length of the interaction chain in the rock-mud case is a mere artifact of the particular example with a short time span (particularly short for rocks & lake example). One can easily conceive of far longer interaction chains e.g. rock bouncing/rolling out of the mud imprint and a resin filling the imprint, hardening eventually into amber still carrying the detailed imprint of the rock surface. Then after eons of time, the rock and amber could end up continents apart, with interaction chain linking them becoming arbitrarily long (as long as any that links DNA of an organism with its environment). Hence, neither CSI no CSI(L) work for the purpose Dembski wishes to use them.nightlight
January 20, 2015
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BA, Uh huh, retractions of objections in 5, 4, 3, 2 . . . NOT. (Don't hold your breath.) KFkairosfocus
January 20, 2015
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