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Questioning Information Cost

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Di.. Eb.., or Dieb,  on the blog DiEbLog, has posted a number of questions, relating to the paper A General Theory of Information Cost Incurred by Successful Search. He raises a number of questions and objections to the paper.

Firstly, Dieb objects that the quasi-Bayesian calculation on Page 56 is incorrect, although it obtains the correct result. However, the calculation is called a quasi-Bayesian calculation because it engages in hand-waving rather than presenting a rigorous proof. The text in question is shortly after a theorem and is intended to explicate the consequences of that theorem rather than rigorously prove its result. The calculation is not incorrect, but rather deliberately oversimplified.

Secondly, Dieb objects that many quite different searches can be constructed which are represented by the same probability measure. However, if searches were represented as a mapping from the previously visited points to a new point (as in Wolpert and Macready’s original formulation), algorithms which derive the same queries in different ways will be represented the same way. Giving multiple searches the same representation is neither avoidable nor inherently problematic.

Thirdly, Dieb objects that a search will be biased by the discriminator towards selecting elements in the target, not a uniform distribution. However, Dieb’s logic depends on assuming that we have a good discriminator. As the paper states, we do not assume this to be the case. If choosing a random search, we cannot assume that we have a good discriminator (or any other component). The search for the search assumes that we have no prior information, not even the ability to identify points in the target.

Fourthly, Dieb doesn’t see the point in the navigator’s output as it is can be seen as just the next element of the search path. However, the navigator produces information like a distance to the target. The distance will be helpful in determining where to query, but it does not determine the next element of the search path. So it cannot be seen as just the next element of the search path.

Fifthly, Dieb objects that the inspector is treated inconsistently. However, the output of the inspector is not inconsistent but rather general. The information extracted by the inspector is the information relevant to whether or not a point is in the target. That information will take different forms depending on the search, it may be a fitness value, a probability, a yes/no answer, etc.

The authors of the paper conclude that Dieb’s objections derive from misunderstanding our paper. Despite five blog posts related to this paper, we find that Dieb has failed to raise any useful or interesting questions. Should Dieb be inclined to disagree with our assessment, we suggest that he organize his ideas and publish them as a journal article or in a similar venue.

Comments
2) How do you get back from the representation to the represented objects? If you have a set of searches which are mapped to a certain measure, how do you construct this set if the measure is given? If it is a "representation", you should be able to do so. 3) When I hear "collapsing", I've difficulties to think of a "representation". 5) Again, you don't give probability, but the output of a random variable. But I won't pursue this matter.DiEb
July 14, 2013
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Elizabeth:
For example, to take a trivial example: water will reliably find a way from a hilltop to the ocean , even though there are many obstructions in the way.
Unless that water is part of the Okavanga River.Joe
July 13, 2013
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No problem, Winston. I have given you posting rights at my blog if you would like to write an OP there.Elizabeth B Liddle
July 13, 2013
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Elizabeth Liddle, Fair question, but not one that is best dealt with in blog comments. I'm happy to clarify simple misunderstandings such as the case of DiEb here, but for serious discussion of the arguments, I think this is a very poor venue. I'm afraid I'll have to ask for more patience. Winston EwertWinston Ewert
July 13, 2013
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DiEb, 2) Yes, you have defined two searches represented with the same measure. There is no dispute about that. However, I still have no idea why you think that's a problem. You say, "it should be possible to draw conclusions from the representation about the represented object." But I can draw conclusions about the represented object. I can conclude how often it hits my target. Thats the question we are interested in. If I wanted to answer other questions, I'd have to pick a different representation. 3) The paper itself says that the framework only comes up to show that we can represent searches by measures. So yes, the whole thing does collapse into a measure. That's the whole point of the section. 5) If you want example of a probability, we can consider a case where we have noisy queries. Each query is the true value +/- some noise. The actual fitness value would allow us to calculate the probability of being in a target. Addendum) Sure. We didn't, but that would be an interesting area of research.Winston Ewert
July 13, 2013
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Addendum: Wouldn't it be nice to look a class of "searches" which use the same terminator and the same discriminator?DiEb
July 13, 2013
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2) Though "representation" is not a defined term in maths, mathematicians have some expectations when this term is used: especially it should be possible to draw conclusions from the representation about the represented object. In my comment #6 I have shown that there are two quite different searches (in your sense) which are represented by the same measure. Any thoughts on that? 3) Do you really want to go there: each six-tuple is picked at random and than projected by its own discriminator into the space of measures? Frankly, than nothing of a representation is left! Is this your intention? 5).
"You asked for a case where the result wasn’t 0 or 1 for the inspector."
Not exactly - I asked: "Have you any example of a problem where the inspector returns a probability other than 0 or 1?"DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Winston: this is a non-mathematical question, but I think it is pertinent: What makes you think that all searches are equiprobable? Or, alternatively, that any space in which not all searches are equiprobable must be the product of design? Because it seems to me that this is an unsafe assumption. For example, to take a trivial example: water will reliably find a way from a hilltop to the ocean , even though there are many obstructions in the way. This isn't because the water knows in advance where the ocean is, or that it even gets feedback as to whether it's getting closer or not. The search is simply a function of the physical landscape itself. Now you could argue, and I think Dembski sort of does, that ultimately, the landscape itself is only one of many equiprobable landscapes, including landscapes in which there is simply no exit to the ocean and the water simply evaporates in situ, as in saltpans and inland seas. And perhaps, therefore, the "search for a search" extends right back to the search for a life-generating universe. But at that point, the "universal probability bound" ceases to apply. We have no idea of the configuration space of life-generating universes, and certainly no citable figure or 10^150 possible events since the beginning of this one. So in what sense does the Search for a Search argument have any bearing on the question of Design? Is it not possible that, given the universe we have, with the properties it has, that life-generating searches are probable enough to have a decent chance of occurring?Elizabeth B Liddle
July 13, 2013
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Dieb, 2) This is the search for a search, not the search for a search algorithm. The search consists of both the algorithm and whatever fitness function or equivalent. Your two Dawkins examples are two different searches, even if they have the same search algorithm. You haven't given me any reason to suppose that searches making different queries yet being represented by the same distribution is problematic. Me and you might both be represented as male for certain purposes. (I assume that Di... is a male name). That doesn't pose any problem for anything. 3) The search is defined to be a six-tuple consisting of the initiator, terminator, inspector, navigator, nominator, and discriminator. The paper studies the question of picking a search at random, and that would imply picking each of the six components at random. We did not consider it necessary to specifically state that each individual component was also selected at random. That would seem to be implied. 4) Certainly, searches can be modelled without that feature. After all, we are arguing that we can model the entire search as just a probability distribution. 5) You asked for a case where the result wasn't 0 or 1 for the inspector. I provided one.Winston Ewert
July 13, 2013
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Keiths, There is no known relation. Winston EwertWinston Ewert
July 13, 2013
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ad 2:
On the second point, as modelled in the paper, if your distribution shifts depending on the target, than you have different searches for different targets. Searches are not allowed to depend on the target, you have to pick a search using your knowledge of the target.
A good search algorithm should provide different searches for different targets. This is possible as the fitness function is an element of a set of fitness functions - Dawkins's WEASEL works with a Hamming-distance to METHINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL and with a Hamming-distance to AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, finding the different strings. But that withstanding, I have given you two searches for the element {1} which are quite different, but are represented by the same measure. Any thoughts on that? ad 3: Where in the paper do you state that the discriminator is picked at random, too? ad 4:
the inspector and navigator are a division of the traditional fitness function into information relating to whether the current point is in the target and information relating to where to look for points in the target.
I don't see any reason for doing so - especially as you have the discriminator, too. But of course you are free to do so. ad 5: There are problems where the extreme value of the fitness function is not known - like the TSP. OTOH you have problems with known values for the fitness function: blind search, where the function takes the values 0 or 1, or Hamming-distances. The example I gave allowed us to know whether the point is in the target (Hamming-distance 0) or not (Hamming-distance bigger than 0).DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Hi Winston, Off topic, but I'm curious. Are you related to Donald Ewert?keiths
July 13, 2013
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No problem, Winston! I have a plenty of patience if I know there is a good probability that it will be rewarded! Thanks.Elizabeth B Liddle
July 13, 2013
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Elizabeth Liddle, Patience. Winston EwertWinston Ewert
July 13, 2013
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DiEb, On the second point, as modelled in the paper, if your distribution shifts depending on the target, than you have different searches for different targets. Searches are not allowed to depend on the target, you have to pick a search using your knowledge of the target. On the third point, this a search for a search. We are picking a search at random. As a result we may get a good discriminator and we may get a terrible one. Yes, if we assume that we have a good discriminator, we are going to get searches biased towards the target. However, that is not the scenario that the result is considering. On the fourth point, the inspector and navigator are a division of the traditional fitness function into information relating to whether the current point is in the target and information relating to where to look for points in the target. On the fifth point, consider defining the target to be the maximum of the fitness function. Since the maximum is unknown, we don't know for certain whether a particular point is in the target. So we can't represent it as a 0 or 1. From my perspective, points 2 and 3 suggests you're trying to make search for search into something it is not. Points 4 and 5 are essentially that you wouldn't have modelled it that way, and thus not very serious as actual objections. I look forward to seeing a published version of your thoughts. Winston EwertWinston Ewert
July 13, 2013
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Hi, Winston - Just a quick off-topic post: I was glad to see that you left a message on my TSZ response to your EnV piece. I was hoping you would respond at some stage to my post itself (and I apologise for initially mis-spelling your name). Here is the link: The eleP(T|H)ant in the RoomElizabeth B Liddle
July 13, 2013
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Correction: comment #6 titled "Secondly" has a wrong first line in the second enumeration. Instead of 1) First search: measure mu given by mu{1}=7/16, mu{2}=mu{3}=mu{4}=3/16 it should read: 1) First search: measure mu given by mu{2}=7/16, mu{1}=mu{3}=mu{4}=3/16 My apologies for this obvious error.DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Conclusion: It's always possible that I've misunderstood certain aspects of the paper. I would be grateful if you helped to clear up such misunderstanding. I hope that my comments above count as useful and at least a little bit interesting. I'm preparing an article, as I've promised earlier, but the work is quite tedious, and any clarification of the matters above. Furthermore, I'd like to know whether this "general framework" is still in use, or whether you have tried another way of representing searches as measures. Again, thank you Winston Ewert!DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Fiftly: Sorry, I may have been confused by the phrase "The inspector is an oracle that, in querying a search-space entry, extracts information bearing on its probability of belonging to the target ": if we look at the Dawkins's Weasel and take the Hamming-distance as the fitness function, each returned value other than 0 tells us that the probability of belonging to the target T for an element is zero itself, whether it is "METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASER" or "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA". I understand that you want to avoid the notion of proximity to a target, but your phrasing is misleading, too. Have you any example of a problem where the inspector returns a probability other than 0 or 1? In your examples, it seems to be always the output of a fitness function.DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Fourthly: So, what is the difference between the inspector and the navigator? The navigator may take the output of the inspector into account, but nonetheless one could conflate both into a single pair of values - especially as you allow "different forms" for the inspector. So you could get rid of the third row of the search matrix.DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Thirdly: This seems to be a little absurd. Shouldn't your representation work for any discriminator - even a good one? If we are following Wolpert's and Macready's formulation, a blind search means that we try to maximize a characteristic function. So, the natural discriminator should return this maximum if it is found in a query. If it doesn't, we build a discriminator which does: we have the output of the inspector, so why not use it? If you are telling us that the output of the inspector may be false, then I'd use another inspector, one which gives us the output of the fitness function. If you say now that the output of the fitness function may be dubious, I'd say "tough luck: I maximize this function whether the function is right or wrong - what else is there to do?". These added layers of entities which have a hidden knowledge about the target which isn't inherent to the fitness function seem to be superfluous.DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Secondly:The problem is that Dembski's, Ewert's and Marks's construction of the representation does not only depend on the discriminator (see the next point), but on the target, too. Take Omega = {1,2,3,4} and two searches with two steps: 1) The first search consist just of two random guesses, i.e., at each step, one of the numbers is given with probability 1/4. 2) The second search has two guesses, too. But at the first step, 1 is taken with probability 7/16 and each other number with 3/16, while at the second step, one is omitted from the guess and each other number it guessed with a probability of 1/3. These two searches are quite different: the first may produce a query (1,1) with probability 1/16, while the second never will. Now take a discriminator which returns the target if it is in the query and otherwise another element in the query at random. Such a discriminator seems to be quite natural and it is certainly within the range of the definition on pages 35 - 36. Now, the distribution which our discriminator infers on the search-space depends on the target: if we are looking for {1}, we get: 1) First search: measure mu given by mu{1}=7/16, mu{2}=mu{3}=mu{4}=3/16 2) Second search: a measure nu which is equal to mu. These are two algorithms which don't derive the same queries albeit in different ways, but nonetheless they will be represented the same way! In fact, if our target is {2}, we get other distributions: 1) First search: measure mu given by mu{1}=7/16, mu{2}=mu{3}=mu{4}=3/16 2) Second search: measure nu given by nu{1}=14/96, nu{2}=44/96, nu{3}=nu{4}=19/96. Frankly, this seems to be "inherently problematic".DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Firstly: Fair enough. So it's not a quasi-Bayesian calculation, but a Bayesian quasi-calculation. I will amend my post (Please show all your work for full credit...) by Winston Ewert's explanation.DiEb
July 13, 2013
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Winston Ewert, thank you for your post! I'll address the five points in the following comments. I prepared my answer in this post at my blog, as using mathematical symbols doesn't work here - therefore I'll have to make some simplifications.DiEb
July 13, 2013
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dmullenix, technically, individual organisms don't explore search spaces. Its only the entire collection of organisms that can be considered to be performing a search. To explore the entire search of DNA sequences would mean that there was least one bacteria with each possible DNA. Of course, that's far too vast to have actually occurred.Winston Ewert
July 12, 2013
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OT: Doug Axe weighs in on Darwin's Doubt: Answering Objections to Darwin's Doubt from University of Texas Biologist Martin Poenie Douglas Axe - July 12, 2013 http://www.evolutionnews.org/2013/07/answering_objec_1074411.htmlbornagain77
July 12, 2013
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What would an organism have to do to explore the entire search space? In other words, if a bacteria was to explore the entire search space, what would it have to do with its DNA every time it reproduced?dmullenix
July 12, 2013
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