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[quote mine] Charles Darwin: “all has been intelligently designed”

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From Letter 3154 — Darwin, C. R. to Herschel, J. F. W., 23 May [1861]

One cannot look at this Universe with all living productions & man without believing that all has been intelligently designed

Charles Darwin, 1861

I think that would make a perfect textbook sticker.

Comments
NOTE: Mod Piled . . . and a try to fix it by shortening gets nowhere. Okay, a quickie summary on key points. 1] reductio: this works by the main form of deduction, implication. Namely P -> Q, Not-Q, so Not P. And, where Q is self contradictory or cuts across a known truth, it is false. EM, as shoewn above is arguabley even compellingly rself-referentially inconsistent by virtue of including the origin of the mind it must use to argue to its conclusions, and failing to provide an adequate mecanism for mind. 2] Cases in point: as 49 and onward links show, EM thinkers routinely run into this roadblock once we extend their pattern of dismissive thought on their opponents to their own thinking. For instance, if all is nothing but conditioning, that includes the EM thinker, such as Marx or Skinner etc. 3] Stating vs affirming propositions; DK in 185 misfires by conflating two very different things. To state is not to affirm,a nd to affirm is to claim that a proposition has a certain truth value, namely 1 or T. Affirming adds a lot to what one is saying, as any examination of propositional calculus will underscore; this is of course the foundation-stone of Digital Electronics, through Boolean Algebra. 4] Elephant hur ling a g ain: above there was a remark to the effectt hat Google searches turn out so many hits on Plantinga etc. But of course unless these go further than the sort of misfires already dissected above, on emergentism [i.e magic], distractors or misrepresentations that are knocked over, this multiplication of errors only underscores the point made since Plato against naturalistic reductionism. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 6, 2007
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Hi All (esp. Trib, P & & DK ): Continuing to battle a sick PC while waiting on a new one. The Gremlins are having fun! I looked at the onward exchange overnight, and must agree with P that too much of this interaction on the EM-supportive side now seems to be very much like an attempt to change the subject. But perhaps, there is a substantial issue there, so let's first look at it then comment on a few points of substance: 1] Deduction and reductio: There are three varieties of arguments of consequence to our discussion: deductive [which includes not just syllogistic arguments but the far more common implication arguments], inductive, and abductive. As I noted on previously in my page on phil tools, scientific arguments use abduction to propose creative explanations, deduce consequences, and test them against observation, then induce that reliable explanations are to be taken provisionally as warranted, true beliefs. In Mathematics, we routinely infer through chains of implications, either to directly infer a conclusion, or else to deny the consequent so that we might reject a specific antecedent claim in the chain of inference. That is, reductio in Mathematics rests on the logic of implication P => Q, NOT-Q so not -P. Of course, in the steps of inference, what happens is that we have a circle of trusted principles and results used int eh inferences, and one chosen null hyp if you will, that will on deduction, yield a contradiction, i.e affirming A and NOT-A in the same sense. Since a contradiction has truth value 0, on material implication it “implies” any and everything, i.e results in confusion. We therefore reject such a result. 2] Extending to coherence as a worldviews test for EM In the case in view, Evo Mat, we are dealing with a worldview, but the same logic applies. Here, as 49 etc summarise, the point is that EM asserts that all of the world we experience as we live is the product of chance plus necessity acting on essentially physical objects [atoms and related particles in the end]. So, we see the cascade of evolutionary explanations from cosmogenesis, through planetary origin, through chem evo through abiogenesis, on to macroevolution and finally socio-cultural evolution, then voila, us here int his forum. Now, too, routinely, EM thinkers discredit their opponents as having their thoughts and conclusions shaped not by logic or truth, but by the dynamics of the above listed evolutions. Freud, Marx, Skinner, Crick and many others can be given as illustrations in point. But that knife cuts both ways, and it immediately brings their own thoughts into self-reference and inconsistency. Further, as Plantinga, Lewis, Willard, and others all the way back to Plato etc point out, this is a property of not just the particular cases, but is a general one: such thinkers argue that EM and other forms of naturalism end up unable to account for mind relative to the dynamics of chance and necessity, leading to dynamical inadequacy and incoherence, thence to self-referential incoherence given the subject at stake. In short, the issue is that relative to its own proposed dynamics of origin and development of the cosmos from hydrogen to humans, EM saws off the branch on which it sits. For, as C S Lewis was fond of pointing out, such a position is arrived at by . . . THINKING. In that context, the persistent attempt to invoke magic – aka, “emergent properties” that are radically different from those of the constituent parts and their interactions, or the consistent changing of subject [which diverts attention and may serve to cloud the atmosphere through use of loaded language], or to alter the argument into a different one all point to the compelling force of the argument as it stands. For instance, let us consider . . .kairosfocus
September 6, 2007
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Hi All (esp. Trib, P & & DK ): Continuing to battle a sick PC while waiting on a new one. The Gremlins are having fun! I looked at the onward exchange overnight, and must agree with P that too much of this interaction on the EM-supportive side now seems to be very much like an attempt to change the subject. But perhaps, there is a substantial issue there, so let's first look at it then comment on a few points of substance: 1] Deduction and reductio: There are three varieties of arguments of consequence to our discussion: deductive [which includes not just syllogistic arguments but the far more common implication arguments], inductive, and abductive. As I noted on previously in my page on phil tools, scientific arguments use abduction to propose creative explanations, deduce consequences, and test them against observation, then induce that reliable explanations are to be taken provisionally as warranted, true beliefs. In Mathematics, we routinely infer through chains of implications, either to directly infer a conclusion, or else to deny the consequent so that we might reject a specific antecedent claim in the chain of inference. That is, reductio in Mathematics rests on the logic of implication P => Q, NOT-Q so not -P. Of course, in the steps of inference, what happens is that we have a circle of trusted principles and results used int eh inferences, and one chosen null hyp if you will, that will on deduction, yield a contradiction, i.e affirming A and NOT-A in the same sense. Since a contradiction has truth value 0, on material implication it “implies” any and everything, i.e results in confusion. We therefore reject such a result. 2] Extending to coherence as a worldviews test for EM In the case in view, Evo Mat, we are dealing with a worldview, but the same logic applies. Here, as 49 etc summarise, the point is that EM asserts that all of the world we experience as we live is the product of chance plus necessity acting on essentially physical objects [atoms and related particles in the end]. So, we see the cascade of evolutionary explanations from cosmogenesis, through planetary origin, through chem evo through abiogenesis, on to macroevolution and finally socio-cultural evolution, then voila, us here int his forum. Now, too, routinely, EM thinkers discredit their opponents as having their thoughts and conclusions shaped not by logic or truth, but by the dynamics of the above listed evolutions. Freud, Marx, Skinner, Crick and many others can be given as illustrations in point. But that knife cuts both ways, and it immediately brings their own thoughts into self-reference and inconsistency. Further, as Plantinga, Lewis, Willard, and others all the way back to Plato etc point out, this is a property of not just the particular cases, but is a general one: such thinkers argue that EM and other forms of naturalism end up unable to account for mind relative to the dynamics of chance and necessity, leading to dynamical inadequacy and incoherence, thence to self-referential incoherence given the subject at stake. In short, the issue is that relative to its own proposed dynamics of origin and development of the cosmos from hydrogen to humans, EM saws off the branch on which it sits. For, as C S Lewis was fond of pointing out, such a position is arrived at by . . . THINKING. In that context, the persistent attempt to invoke magic – aka, “emergent properties” that are radically different from those of the constituent parts and their interactions, or the consistent changing of subject [which diverts attention and may serve to cloud the atmosphere through use of loaded language], or to alter the argument into a different one all point to the compelling force of the argument as it stands. For instance, let us consider . . . 3] DK, 185: To say that something is true is to assert that thing. Thus, to say that the proposition, “I saw you downtown last week,” is true, adds nothing substantive to Tom’s original statement. Now, this is an excellent example of the subject shift above. First, it ducks the key point about a proposition: it is true or false. To state a proposition is not to affirm its truth value, so to add to a statement, P, that TV [P] = 1, does add something important, especially where there is warrant in the affirmation. More importantly, under this issue lurks the point that Locke addressed in his introduction to his essay on human understanding, Section 5, as cited and linked in 79 above:
Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with [by God, cf. context, a cite in Gk fr 2 Pt 1:2 – 4] because they are not big enough to grasp everything . . . It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant [Matt 24:42 - 51], who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us [Prov 20:27] shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do muchwhat as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
And of course, to go on to selectively and question-beggingly doubt what one does not want to accept while being more generous with what one is inclined to accept is obvious self-referential inconsistency. So, now, can we return tot he substantial issue before us, whether in my formulaiton in 49 or P's subsequent ones? GEM of TKI PS: Above DK attempts an unfortunate bit of elephant hurling by Google-search numbers. To do so he ignores the point that when we inspect the arguments, they are either irrelevant to the soundness or otherwise of the argument in 49 etc, or else they are simply and demonstrably unsound, or they disguise an acceptance.kairosfocus
September 6, 2007
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To say that something is true is to assert that thing. Thus, to say that the proposition, “I saw you downtown last week,” is true, adds nothing substantive to Tom’s original statement. So, asserting the truth of a proposition is logically superfluous. Similarly, to say that the proposition, “Tom saw Dick downtown last week,” is false, is simply to deny that proposition.
This doesn't seem very responsive. I asked several pointed questions, and suddenly you switch from talking about perceptions to talking about propositions. I'm still wondering the following about your perception -oriented concept of truth. 1. How does Tom’s perception about Dick being downtown not make it true? 2. If Tom were to go to court and tell a Judge that he saw Dick downtown with another woman on this particular date, how would this not meet your standard of truth, since Tom, to the best of his ability, would be giving an accurate accounting of his experience? 3. You seem to be suggesting that Tom’s perception and experience fall short of actual truth, but if truth does not transcend perception and experience, how is this possible? Could you please help clear these up before jumping on to other things?Phinehas
September 5, 2007
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A deductive argument consists of premises and a conclusion. A deductive argument must satisfy two conditions: (1) the premises must all be true, and (2) the argument must be valid. If those conditions are satisfied, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. No valid deductive argument can guarantee the truth of its premises unless its premises are tautologies. You will advise me if you disagree with any of the above.
This is becoming a sideshow. A cynical person might suspect that it is becoming so because you feel more comfortable arguing about arguing than addressing the original argument on points. Not being quite that cynical, I will make another attempt. No, I don't disagree with any of the above. Why would I? I note however, that the above does not state that any deductive argument whose intent is to move logically from one proposition through a series of steps in order to demonstrate self-referential incoherence must only and always be stated as a single syllogism. To make such a restriction is arbitrary and absurd. It would be like saying that a mathematical proof starting at any arbitrary axiom can only ever have one step in it. I feel rather silly even having to explain this, so I really hope we can move past arguing about arguing in order to address the issue on the table.
Does this mean that I am forbidden to challenge or question your premises?
On the contrary. I would be absolutely thrilled to have you challenge a premise. You seem to be operating under the mistaken impression that when you change a premise, you have somehow challenged it.Phinehas
September 5, 2007
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Phinehas #178:
Let’s start with the “transcendent reality” issue, since surely every part of the argument must hinge on our understanding regarding this. You gave the following helpful illustration. Tom: I saw you downtown last week with a strange woman. Dick: It couldn’t have been me, because I was in Paris last week. Tom: But I saw you. Dick: Here is a dated photo of my wife and me standing before the Eiffel tower, and here is my wife who will confirm my account. Tom: I guess I was mistaken. In your illustration, it seems clear to me that Tom and Dick are both arguing as though there is an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. They are arguing as though there is a truth about whether Dick was downtown or not. The truth about whether or not Dick was downtown is not defined by perception, or else how does Tom’s perception about Dick being downtown not make it true? Given you previous field goal posts for truth (as in, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth…”), if Tom were to go to court and tell a Judge that he saw Dick downtown with another woman on this particular date, how would this not meet your standard of truth, since Tom, to the best of his ability, would be giving an accurate accounting of his experience? In other words, you seem to be suggesting that Tom’s perception and experience fall short of actual truth, but if truth does not transcend perception and experience, how is this possible?
To say that something is true is to assert that thing. Thus, to say that the proposition, "I saw you downtown last week," is true, adds nothing substantive to Tom's original statement. So, asserting the truth of a proposition is logically superfluous. Similarly, to say that the proposition, "Tom saw Dick downtown last week," is false, is simply to deny that proposition. It follows that the question of whether there is a substance called "truth," that exists independently of propositions is to assert the existence of an entity that adds no new information. Likewise, concerning notions of a "transcendent reality," or of "an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience." The words "transcendent, ideal, and fundamental" add no further information to the term "reality" They generate illusions of metaphysical entities that confuse our thinking.Daniel King
September 5, 2007
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Sorry for the bad formatting above. The paragraph above my penultimate sentence, "Does this mean that I am forbidden..." should have been included in the previous blockquote of remarks by Phineas.Daniel King
September 5, 2007
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Yes, welcome back, kf. You certainly had an adventurous journey. For the time being, I hope you won't mind if I continue my dialog with Phinehas. Phinehas #179:
The argument is deductive. That should be clear.
Good. Here are what I understand to be properties of a deductive argument: A deductive argument consists of premises and a conclusion. A deductive argument must satisfy two conditions: (1) the premises must all be true, and (2) the argument must be valid. If those conditions are satisfied, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. No valid deductive argument can guarantee the truth of its premises unless its premises are tautologies. You will advise me if you disagree with any of the above.
...I am a bit confused about what could possibly motivate you to suggest that a reductio ad absurdum argument showing through a logical series of conclusions how the original premise was flawed must be reduced to a single syllogism.
I am not familiar with the rules pertaining to a reductio ad absurdum argument. Are there special rules above and beyond the properties I cited above?
The rest follows logically (although you are, of course, free to demonstrate how it does not). One suspects that you are not so much interested in clarifying your beliefs here as you are in changing my argument. Evidence abounds in this thread that you prefer this tact mightily over actually addressing arguments.
Flawed premise. OK up to “ability,” but then it gets off track with notions of a transcendent reality. I would say, “There is nothing deterministic about random mutation and natural selection that would inevitably have brought about the existence of human beings, to say nothing of beings that possess thinking brains.” Again, it is my beliefs and suppositions that are proposed to be questionable.
After throwing out an unsupported assertion, you once again spell out what you [think I should have argued? | wish I had argued? | would prefer to address as an argument?] ??? This is the same tact you took with KF. Could you humor me here, and attempt to address arguments without restating them? Just try it for once? I mean, I don’t mind if you offer up a restatement when asking for clarification about what someone is arguing, but the continued resort to restating arguments without the permission on the person making the argument might reveal a deep insecurity about your ability to address them. You do realize, do you not, that making unsupported assertions while restating an opposing argument into some arbitrary form that you prefer isn’t the same thing as addressing an argument? Does this mean that I am forbidden to challenge or question your premises? What is the unsupported assertion?Daniel King
September 5, 2007
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BTW, P, can I use your summary with appropriate ascription of source?
Of course! I'd be tickled pink to be able to contribute in any way. And welcome back!Phinehas
September 5, 2007
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Welcome back, KFtribune7
September 5, 2007
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All (esp P and DK): " It seems a rather interesting exchange continued during my adventures in Barbados and on one of our regional carriers. (Let's just say, I had the experience of hearing my flight “closed for boarding” on arriving at the check-in counter, then was told the plane -- due to Dean -- had not left Grenada, then nope the plane was on the ground but the crew was stuck in G, then finally the plane was under repairs, amounting to six hours delay; then we finally flew only to wait an hour for baggage, learning then that the baggage had not been loaded! At least, I made it home complete with “carry by hand” expensive ceramics [a gift – the interview at the local airport, along lines of did you personally pack this, to which my response was, more or less that only a pro should pack that sort of thing! They acted like they were catching a “mule” until they saw the real nice pieces!] and I suspect that both the travel fun and the PC adventures subsequent to arrival -- I am unexpectedly in the laptop market again . . . looking at a nice Toshiba (with fond Mac and Vaio thoughts/fantasies . . .), but may have to settle for a pedestrian Dell -- were due to a few vexed gremlins!) My overall assessment is that P has won, hands down – and has given a nice summary on points along the way of the original case as excerpted in 49 above [and as linked therefrom]. BTW, my flight and departure lounge reading of choice was Dallas Willard's extension of the issue in this paper on the conundrum of naturalism and knowledge; well worth the “three-times” read that sort of stuff usually takes to soak in. BTW, P, can I use your summary with appropriate ascription of source? The fact that DK has found himself trying to substitute a debate over a strawman issue on metaphysics, instead of addressing the dynamical coherence thence logical coherence of Evolutionary Materialism, is telling. On points of interest: 1] Chance + Necessity --> Cosmos [from hydrogen to humans], again . . . In essence, the worldview of naturalism, for our purposes, is best described as a cascade of evolutionary materialist evolutions driven by chance + necessity only, i.e. agency is rules out ahead of time, however one may rationalise that. (The usual claim is more or less, “there is no evidence of agents until we turned up,” which of course begs a few questions. A softer phrasing is that we should only assert empirically observed entities in science, i.e material ones, again begging the question; for we may ask ourselves, just who is making the observation, and -- on the point of this thread as Sal has graciously allowed it to officially evolve -- why we should trust the deliverances of the senses and minds implicated?) Now, notoriously [Cf. Denyse's many posts on this here and at her own blogs], the C + N --> Cosmos view runs into difficulties with four “big bangs” and one corollary: [1] origin of a fine-tuned, life-habitable, scientifically observable cosmos; [2] origin of life based on immensely complex and functionally specified molecular information systems in DNA, RNA, enzymes, ribosomes, etc, which is well beyond the credible reach of C + N within the ambit of the observed cosmos [3] origin of body-plan level biodiversity on earth which requires the same information-generation and processing, moving across a bit length from about 1 Mbits to 3 – 4 Gbits, well beyond the reasonable reach of C + N on the scale just described. [4] origin of a credible mind [and of associated morality . . .] required to think through the issue. --> Our focus here is on 4, and the point is that as 49 summarised, evolutionary materialist mechanisms are asserted to be dynamically capable of achieving each of the four big bangs, on an inference to best explanation basis. --> In short, EM must stand on its own two feet, before we can even properly ask whether it is a better explanation than one that does not in effect a priori for worldviews commitment reasons, rule out agency -- the ONLY known, empirically observed and massively confirmed source of functionally specified, complex information -- as a possible source of the information and fine-tuned co-adaptation we see in the four big bangs. --> on the evidence of the thread and onward discussions as reflected in part above, plainly EM is in serious trouble on 4. And that in turn implicates it in self-referential inconsistency. Hilary Putnam, as cited and summarised by Willard, is trenchant:
We would still want to know if our belief is "true," "correct," "right." Putnam asks: "Why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that we aren't thinkers, that our thoughts aren't really about anything, noumenal or phenomenal, that there is no sense in which any thought is right or wrong (including the thought that no thought is right or wrong) beyond being the verdict of the moment , and so on? This is a self-refuting enterprise if there ever was one!"
2] On Dismissing “notions of transcendent reality” . . . The heart of DK's strawmen arguments, as P points out, is that he tries to push into an analysis on whether EM mechanisms are dynamically credibly capable of giving us the minds that we must use to even think EM thoughts, the debate on the credibility of metaphysical entities unacceptable to materialists. But of course in so doing he misses a major issue, namely that assumptions about the nature of reality are inevitable on all worldviews – EM ones as much non-EM ones, so the difficulties on factual adequacy, coherence (dynamical as well as logical!) and explanatory elegance vs either simplisticness or ad hocness. But, such a dismissal by prejudice in favour of EM obviously begs the question at ontological levels – cf. Willard on that. Howbeit, tha tis besides our point. That point is that EM has to have dynamical coherence and credibility on the origin of mind, or it becomes self-defeating through logical self-undermining. And plainly, it does not. (Thus the attempted change of subject or the assertion of magical “emergence” of unaccounted for properties, or the writing of yet another blank cheque on an account with a now decades long track record of bouncing on promises to account coherently for mind.) So, let's really get down to business! GEM of TKIkairosfocus
September 5, 2007
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I asked you to condense your entire argument to a single syllogism, based on my understanding that you are attempting to make a deductive argument, in which a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, as alluded to in kairosfocus #144. If your argument is not deductive, but inductive, please set me straight.
The argument is deductive. That should be clear. Though I did think your original request was a bit pedantic, I complied for clarity's sake. At this point, however, I am a bit confused about what could possibly motivate you to suggest that a reductio ad absurdum argument showing through a logical series of conclusions how the original premise was flawed must be reduced to a single syllogism. How does this not go beyond pedantic to being arbitrary and even absurd?
Premise flawed, but not too much. This is a statement of the conclusion of argument III, and I accept it, provided that “thinking” be substituted for “thought.” Since your argument is aimed at proving that my beliefs are incoherent, I think it is only fair that my beliefs be presented as I actually hold them.
Again, I find this a rather confusing manner of looking at a reductio ad absurdum argument. Only the first premise rests on your beliefs. The rest follows logically (although you are, of course, free to demonstrate how it does not). One suspects that you are not so much interested in clarifying your beliefs here as you are in changing my argument. Evidence abounds in this thread that you prefer this tact mightily over actually addressing arguments. In fact, one need not look further than later down in this same posting for more evidence of this.
Flawed premise. OK up to “ability,” but then it gets off track with notions of a transcendent reality. I would say, “There is nothing deterministic about random mutation and natural selection that would inevitably have brought about the existence of human beings, to say nothing of beings that possess thinking brains.” Again, it is my beliefs and suppositions that are proposed to be questionable.
After throwing out an unsupported assertion, you once again spell out what you [think I should have argued? | wish I had argued? | would prefer to address as an argument?] ??? This is the same tact you took with KF. Could you humor me here, and attempt to address arguments without restating them? Just try it for once? I mean, I don't mind if you offer up a restatement when asking for clarification about what someone is arguing, but the continued resort to restating arguments without the permission on the person making the argument might reveal a deep insecurity about your ability to address them. You do realize, do you not, that making unsupported assertions while restating an opposing argument into some arbitrary form that you prefer isn't the same thing as addressing an argument? You asserted that "notions of a transcendent reality" somehow get the premise "off track." To your credit, you then put forward an illustration to try to prop up this assertion. I've addressed this in my previous post. Note that I did not change your illustration so that it was more in line with what I wish you were arguing. I also deal with what I believe to be an accurate representation of your position regarding truth as what a witness would tell under oath. If I have misrepresented your position in regards to either of these, then please clarify. Hopefully we can make some progress by proceeding in this manner.Phinehas
September 4, 2007
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Not sure where to begin. :P Let's start with the "transcendent reality" issue, since surely every part of the argument must hinge on our understanding regarding this. You gave the following helpful illustration.
Tom: I saw you downtown last week with a strange woman. Dick: It couldn’t have been me, because I was in Paris last week. Tom: But I saw you. Dick: Here is a dated photo of my wife and me standing before the Eiffel tower, and here is my wife who will confirm my account. Tom: I guess I was mistaken.
In your illustration, it seems clear to me that Tom and Dick are both arguing as though there is an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. They are arguing as though there is a truth about whether Dick was downtown or not. The truth about whether or not Dick was downtown is not defined by perception, or else how does Tom's perception about Dick being downtown not make it true? Given you previous field goal posts for truth (as in, "I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth..."), if Tom were to go to court and tell a Judge that he saw Dick downtown with another woman on this particular date, how would this not meet your standard of truth, since Tom, to the best of his ability, would be giving an accurate accounting of his experience? In other words, you seem to be suggesting that Tom's perception and experience fall short of actual truth, but if truth does not transcend perception and experience, how is this possible?Phinehas
September 4, 2007
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Phinehas # 174: Thank you for waiting upon my reply.
I hope that Phinehas will not mind if I ask that he reduce his five points to a syllogism, consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion (if memory of what constitutes a syllogism serves).
On further inspection I see that you have not been entirely responsive to my request above. Whereas I asked if you would reduce your five points to one syllogism, instead you proceeded to expand them towards five syllogisms. I asked you to condense your entire argument to a single syllogism, based on my understanding that you are attempting to make a deductive argument, in which a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, as alluded to in kairosfocus #144. If your argument is not deductive, but inductive, please set me straight. I hasten to add that the work you put into clarifying your mental journey to conclusion III (which is the first premise of syllogism IV) was not wasted. It has enhanced my understanding of the gulf that separates us. Now I want to move on to an analysis of what you so helpfully presented as syllogism IV. In doing so, I will temporarily skip your clarification of the meaning of "truth," and will return to it later in this post. I think we both recognize that IV is the crux of your position. So, assuming that you are presenting a deductive argument, let's examine your premises. 1. Thought evolved via the forces of random mutation and natural selection. Premise flawed, but not too much. This is a statement of the conclusion of argument III, and I accept it, provided that "thinking" be substituted for "thought." Since your argument is aimed at proving that my beliefs are incoherent, I think it is only fair that my beliefs be presented as I actually hold them. 2. There is nothing inherent in the forces of random mutation and natural selection that suggest they will result in the ability to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. Flawed premise. OK up to "ability," but then it gets off track with notions of a transcendent reality. I would say, "There is nothing deterministic about random mutation and natural selection that would inevitably have brought about the existence of human beings, to say nothing of beings that possess thinking brains." Again, it is my beliefs and suppositions that are proposed to be questionable. 3. Therefore, thought cannot be trusted to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. This conclusion is moot, because I never claimed to be able to discern an ideal or fundamental reality, and it does not follow necessarily from your premises. I offer for your consideration the hypothesis that your entire argument derives from the unstated assumption that Evomat can't be true because it is not deterministic. Is it not correct that the theistic model of existence is deterministic?
In other words, when beginning with the Evomat premise, one ends with self-refuting incoherence. Strangely enough, however, the materialists will continue to argue as if there is an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience; that they know what this reality is; and that those who don’t believe this reality are ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked, but they’d rather not consider that).
Back to the notion of an "ideal or fundamental reality." I do not deny the existence of a real world. It bumps into me repeatedly. However, the only tools that I have available in perceiving that world are my senses. So, when you asked earlier:
...it would seem incoherent to argue over perceptions. How could one possibly convince another that the other didn’t perceive what he purported to perceive?
One would do that by providing evidence that the belief arising from other person's perceptions is incorrect. To illustrate, a scenario: Tom: I saw you downtown last week with a strange woman. Dick: It couldn't have been me, because I was in Paris last week. Tom: But I saw you. Dick: Here is a dated photo of my wife and me standing before the Eiffel tower, and here is my wife who will confirm my account. Tom: I guess I was mistaken. (Curtain) To conclude: I doubt that materialists argue that there is a transcendent reality (independent of what we can perceive). There are some persons, mainly writers of books attacking theism, who claim that theists are "ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked...)." If those claims are based on evidence, they should be addressed. If they are not, they should be derided. Although theists have nothing to fear from Evomat, some do fear it. Why? Their disbelief in evolution is unlikely to have a direct impact on their lives. I personally need to rely on Evomat for my work as a biologist, because at this moment in history there is no better paradigm to explain all of the available data, including the data that are my work product. If and when a better paradigm comes along, I will embrace it wholeheartedly. My thanks again for your patient and courteous involvement in this discussion.Daniel King
September 4, 2007
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Enjoy your weekend! --PhinPhinehas
September 1, 2007
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Phinehas, I see that have posted a reply that on first glance looks responsive and helpful. I'm off for a Labor Day break and I hope that you will enjoy one too. See you Tuesday, September 4 if not sooner. Best wishes, DanielDaniel King
September 1, 2007
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I hope that Phinehas will not mind if I ask that he reduce his five points to a syllogism, consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion (if memory of what constitutes a syllogism serves).
The five points will actually require multiple syllogisms to express them, but I will be happy to attempt to break them down if you think it will help.
...I argued that those formative forces of evolution are believed by scientists to underlie a plausible account of the origin of the human brain.
I think this statement pretty much stipulates to the first few syllogisms. Let me know if you think otherwise. According to the Evomat position: I. - Nothing exists that has an immaterial component. - Thought exists. - Therefore, thought does not have an immaterial component. II. - Thought does not have an immaterial component. - The brain is the material component of thought. - Therefore, the brain is all that exists of thought. III. - The brain is all that exists of thought. - The brain evolved via the forces of random mutation and natural selection. - Therefore, thought evolved via the forces of random mutation and natural selection. Is this a fair rendering of your beliefs as reflected in your statement above? If so, then this perfectly reflects what I was saying in my earlier points I - III. Before moving on to the fourth syllogism, allow my to clarify as requested.
Another point of clarification concerns the word “truth.” Is this another metaphysical entity or a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience (as in “I swear to give the whole truth and nothing but the truth”)?
This is a good question. I would define truth as the ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. Is this what you mean by a metaphysical entity? It certainly goes beyond mere perception in that it recognizes the difference between a witness' truthful perception of what occurred and what occurred in actuality. It is the whole reason for having discussions such as the one in which we are currently engaging, since it would seem incoherent to argue over perceptions. How could one possibly convince another that the other didn't perceive what he purported to perceive? So, moving on. IV. - Thought evolved via the forces of random mutation and natural selection. - There is nothing inherent in the forces of random mutation and natural selection that suggest they will result in the ability to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. - Therefore, thought cannot be trusted to discern an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience. In other words, when beginning with the Evomat premise, one ends with self-refuting incoherence. Strangely enough, however, the materialists will continue to argue as if there is an ideal or fundamental reality apart from and transcending perceived experience; that they know what this reality is; and that those who don't believe this reality are ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked, but they'd rather not consider that).Phinehas
August 31, 2007
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I don't mean to intrude but I would like to point out some empirical evidence for the mind existing separate from the brain: Next, we will look at the consciousness of man's mind and consider the basis of its reality. How the consciousness relates to the body has two prevailing schools of thought challenging each other for the right to be called the truth. The first school of thought is Theistic in its philosophy; consciousness is a independent and separable entity from the brain. This school of thought implies it is possible to live beyond the of our brains. The second school of thought is Materialistic in its philosophy; consciousness is an dependent and inseparable product of the brain. This school of thought implies we die when the brain dies. Knowledge has recently come to light, establishing the first school of thought as the truth. Neuro-physiological (brain/body) research is now being performed, using a new scientific tool, trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). This tool allows scientists to study the brain non-invasively. TMS can excite or inhibit normal electrical activity in specific parts of the brain, depending on the amount of energy administered by TMS. This tool allows scientists to pinpoint what is happening in different regions of the brain (functional mapping of the brain). TMS is wide-ranging in its usefulness; allowing the study of brain/muscle connections, the five senses, language, the patho-physiology of brain disorders, as well as mood disorders, such as depression. TMS may even prove to be useful for therapy for such brain disorders. TMS also allows the study of how memories are stored. The ability of TMS for inhibiting (turning off) specific portions of the brain is the very ability which reveals things that are very illuminating to the topic we are investigating. Consciousness and the brain are actually separate entities. When the electromagnetic activity of a specific portion of the brain is inhibited by the higher energies of TMS, it impairs the functioning of the particular portion of the body associated with the particular portion of the brain being inhibited. For example; when the visual cortex (a portion of the brain) is inhibited by higher energies of TMS, the person undergoing the procedure will temporarily become blind while it is inhibited. One notable exception to this "becoming impaired rule" is a person's memory. When the elusive "memory" portion of the brain is inhibited, a person will have a vivid flashback of a past part of their life. This very odd "amplification" of a memory indicates this fact; memories are stored in the “spiritual” consciousness independent of the brain. All of the bodies other physical functions which have physical connections in the brain are impaired when their corresponding portion of the brain loses its ability for normal electromagnetic activity. One would very well expect memories to be irretrievable from the brain if they were physically stored. Yet memories are vividly brought forth into consciousness when their corresponding locations in the brain are temporarily inhibited. This indicates that memories are somehow stored on a non-physical basis, separate from the brain in the "spiritual" consciousness. Memory happens to be a crucially integrated part of any thinking consciousness. This is true, whether or not consciousness is physically or spiritually-based. Where memory is actually located is a sure sign of where the consciousness is actually located. It provides a compelling clue as to whether consciousness is physically or spiritually-based. Vivid memory recall, upon inhibition of a portion of brain where memory is being communicated from consciousness, is exactly what one would expect to find if consciousness is ultimately self-sufficient of brain function and spiritually-based. The opposite result, a ening of memories, is what one would expect to find if consciousness is ultimately physically-based. According to this insight, a large portion, if not all, of the one quadrillion synapses that have developed in the brain as we became s, are primarily developed as pathways for information to be transmitted to, and memories to be transmitted from, our consciousness. The synapses of the brain are not, in and of themselves, our primary source for memories. Indeed, decades of extensive research by brilliant, Nobel prize-winning, minds have failed to reveal where memory is stored in the brain. Though Alzheimer’s and other disorders affect the brain’s overall ability to recover memories, this is only an indication that the overall ability of the brain to recover memory from the consciousness has been affected, and does not in any way conclusively establish that memory is actually stored in the brain. In other developments, Dr. Olaf Blanke recently described in the peer-reviewed science journal "Nature" a patient who had "out of body experiences (OBEs)”, when the electrical activity of the gyrus-angularis portion of the brain was inhibited by higher energy TMS. Though some materialists try to twist this into some type of natural explanation for spiritual experiences, by saying the portion of the brain is being stimulated, it is actually a prime example clearly indicating consciousness is independent of the brain; for the portion of the brain is in fact, being inhibited, instead of stimulated ! This patient, Dr. Olaf Blanke described, should be grateful that consciousness is independent of the brain. If consciousness were truly dependent on the brain for its survival, as materialist insist, then the patient would have most likely died; at least while that particular portion of the brain was being inhibited. Obviously, that portion of the brain which was inhibited in the patient, is the very seat of the brain's consciousness. In other compelling evidence, many children who have had hemispherectomies (half their brains removed due to life threatening epileptic conditions) at Johns Hopkins Medical Center, are in high school; and one, a college student, is on the dean’s list. The families of these children can barely believe the transformation; and not so long ago, neurologists and neuro-surgeons found it hard to believe as well. What is surprising for these people is that they are having their overriding materialistic view of brain correlation to consciousness overturned. In other words; since, it is presumed by Materialism that the brain is the primary generator of consciousness; then, it is totally expected for a person having half their brain removed to be severely affected when it comes to memory and personality. This is clearly a contradiction between the Materialistic and Theistic philosophies. According to Materialistic dogma, memory and personality should be affected, just as badly, or at least somewhat as badly, as any of the other parts of the body, by removal of half the brain. Yet, as a team of neuro-surgeons that have done extensive research on the after effects of hemispherectomy at John Hopkins Medical Center comment: "We are awed by the apparent retention of the child’s memory after removal of half of the brain, either half; and by the retention of the child's personality and sense of humor." Though a patients physical capacities are impaired, just as they were expected to be immediately following surgery; and have to have time to be "rewired" to the consciousness in the brain, the memory and personality of the patient comes out unscathed in the aftermath of such radical surgery. This is exactly the result one would expect, if the consciousness is ultimately independent of brain function and is spiritually-based. This is totally contrary to the results one would expect if the consciousness were actually physically-based, as the materialistic theory had presumed. In further comment from the neuro-surgeons in the John Hopkins study: "Despite removal of one hemisphere, the intellect of all but one of the children seems either unchanged or improved. Intellect was only affected in the one child who had remained in a coma, vigil-like state, attributable to peri-operative complications." This is stunning proof of consciousness being independent of brain function. The only child not to have normal or improved intellect is the child who remained in a coma due to complications during surgery. It is also heartening to find that many of the patients regain full use, or almost full use, of their bodies after a varying period of recuperation in which the brain is “rewired” to the consciousness. II Corinthians 5:1 For we know that if our earthly house, this tent (Our Body), is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. Yet, more evidence for the independence of consciousness is found in Dr. Pim van Lommels' study of sixty-two of his cardiac patients who had near experiences (NDE’s). NDE's are the phenomena of someone being physically for a short time; yet, when they are revived, they report they were in their spiritual bodies, outside of their physical bodies and taken to another dimension. Dr. Lommel's research found no weakness in the Theistic presumption of a spiritually independent consciousness. He and his colleagues published their research in the peer-reviewed journal (Lancet, Dec. 2001). Not only did their research not find any weaknesses in the Theistic presumption; their findings severely weakened or ruled out all Materialistic presumptions that had been put forth such as anoxia in the brain, release of endomorphines, NMDA receptor blockage or medications given. Their findings also ruled out suspected psychological explanations as well; such as a coping mechanism brought on by the fear of imminent or fore-knowledge of NDE. They even had a patient in the NDE study who identified the exact nurse who took his dentures while he was in cardiac arrest. This is something only someone who was conscious of the operating room, even though he was physically , could have seen the nurse doing (Many NDE report floating above their bodies, observing the operating room from the ceiling, before going to another dimension). In other similar studies, cases in which was extracted at the time of the NDE did not support the anoxia or hypercarbia theories. It is also established that the administered to the patients, such as painkillers, appeared to inhibit and confuse rather than cause the NDE. The combination of all data from recent and retrospective research provides a large amount of evidence, which can no longer be ignored or explained away. The fact that clear, lucid experiences were reported during a time when the brain was proven to be devoid of activity (Aminoff et al., 1988, Clute and Levy 1990, de Vries et al., 1998), does not sit easily with the current scientific belief system of materialism. In another fascinating study (Kenneth Ring and Sharon Cooper, 1997) of thirty-one blind people who had a NDE, twenty-four of the blind people reported that they could see while they were out of their physical bodies. Many of them had been blind since birth. Likewise, many deaf people reported they were able to hear while they were having a NDE. So, in answer to the question: "Is consciousness a physically or spiritually-based phenomena?"; we can, with the assurance of scientific integrity backing us up, reply that consciousness is indeed a spiritual phenomena capable of living independently of the brain, once the brain ceases to function. Dr. Lommel illustrates in his paper that the real purpose of the brain is as a mediator of the physical world to the spiritual consciousness. He compares the brain to such things as a television, radio and cell phone, to illustrate the point. The point he is trying to make clear is this; the brain is not the end point of information. It is "only" a conveyor of information to and from the true end point, our spiritually-based consciousness which is independent of the physical brain and able to live past the of our brains. Genesis 2:7 And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being. It is clear from these recent developments, the materialistic philosophy will only severely impede further scientific progress in this very promising area. Instead of scientists investigating how the consciousness actually interacts with the material brain, and making important discoveries of how the spiritual realm actually interacts with the material realm, scientists will be forced into blind goose chases trying to explain how consciousness arises from a purely materialistic basis. The hard evidence makes it clear that the presumptions of Materialism have been proven to be false at both the level of the universe's foundational reality and at the level of consciousness in human beings. Whereas the Theistic presumptions of the universe’s creation from a transcendent Creator, and of the consciousness’s ability to live completely separate from the brain, are both strongly supported by the hard evidences that have been brought forth by recent discoveries in science. Now, having established that Materialism has an extremely shaky foundation to begin with if indeed it can be found to have any foundation at all; let us take a hard look at a one of the more famously documented Near Experiences. The NDE of Pam Reynolds. This is the account of that NDE. A team in Phoenix specializes in an extreme form of neurosurgery called hypothermic cardiac arrest that has been created to allow operation on aneurysms deep in the brain. A 35-year-old woman undertook this surgery. Her eyes were taped shut to prevent them from drying out. They put electrodes in the auditory section of the brain stem and put molded speakers in her ears which played a constant beep, a setup designed to gauge responsiveness in the brainstem. These speakers prevented her from hearing anything in the room besides the beeps. They cooled her body to 60 degrees, which lowered her metabolic rate enough so that the surgeons could operate for a long time deep in the brain. They then rerouted her from a femoral artery into a heart-pump, though they had to switch legs because the first vessel was too small, thereby prolonging the surgery. When the EEG was flat and the brainstem stopped responding, she was by most standard medical criteria . flowed out into the heart-pump and back into the body. Next they shut off the pump and tilted the table up so that all the drained out of her brain. Only then was it safe to open her skull to clip off the aneurysm. The time of anesthetization in this procedure is about 90 minutes./// The woman reported leaving her body and hearing a D-natural buzzing sound. She watched the surgery and was puzzled by what appeared to be an electric toothbrush which one member of the team was using on her head. She also reported hearing the woman doctor say, "These vessels are too small. We can't use them for the pump." At that point, she got distracted, saw the light, went through a tunnel, saw a deceased grandmother and a few other deceased relatives who told her she had to go back. As she was coming out of the surgery, she had a cardiac arrest and they had to shock her twice to get her back. When the procedure was all over, she described to the neurosurgeon everything she saw, including the strange electric toothbrush and the box that it came in with several different attachable heads. It turned out she had accurately described a Midas Rex saw, which is used only for this procedure, and which makes a buzzing sound. So, with this case we have an example of someone who was visually and auditorally isolated, had a flat EEG, and should not have been able to think, and yet she commented that she had never thought so clearly in her life. The paragraph below is a quote of the same event from an anonymous writer in a NDE newsgroup: Such is the case of Pam Reynolds who is quite well known in the NDE community. She was having surgery performed to remove an aneurysm from her brain. Her body was cooled to below 60 degrees F. and all of the was drained from her body. Her EEG and brain stem response showed no activity, the definition of brain in many states. During all of this, she reported rising from her body and seeing the operation performed below her. She also reported contact with "The Light" and many of her deceased relatives in heaven. Remember, she had no brain activity whatsoever. Even hallucinations register brain activity. It is interesting that upon recovering she recounted accurately many details of her operation, including conversations heard and a description of the surgical instruments. It has been postulated by a NDE skeptic, that Pam overheard the sounds in the room and generated a "mental map" of things around her. What the skeptic failed to acknowledge though is that instruments were inserted into Pam's ears that generated clicks to measure brain stem response. Her brain stem response throughout the surgery was inactive. If conversations were heard, her brain stem response should have registered them. According to Pam, she was present, above her body, viewing the whole surgical operation; her consciousness, memory, personality; her whole individuality intact. She proved this with an accurate, detailed description of the instruments, conversation, and procedures used during the surgery. At the same time, science, using scientific monitoring instruments, was proving that her body was . No brain response, no heart response, no response of any kind. Obviously, the brain, nor any other organ of the body, was needed to sustain her life, and this account is just one example of the that exist in NDE literature. I believe this is as conclusive as proof gets. Clear, solid proof that man is a “spiritual” being inhabiting a physical body. To me it is clear that the philosophy that has held true in its predictions throughout all the evidences we have examined in this paper is the true philosophy we should follow as the truth. That philosophy is Theism.bornagain77
August 30, 2007
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(Addendum) On further thought, I guess point IV is not a conclusion, but another premise and that point V is the conclusion. I hope that Phinehas will not mind if I ask that he reduce his five points to a syllogism, consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion (if memory of what constitutes a syllogism serves). If he considers this to be a pedantic distraction, I understand. It's just that I believe it would help me comprehend his argument better and raise the probablity that I will give a more coherent (and hopefully more adequate) response to it.Daniel King
August 30, 2007
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Phinehas #170: Thank you for asking me to address point IV of your argument. I want to do so, but I ask you first to help me understand it better so I don't waste more of your time. Yesterday in addressing point III, to wit:
III. The physical explanation for the origin of thought relies heavily on chance plus necessity.
I thought (based on your clarifying remarks) that the slogan "chance and necessity" means "random mutation and natural selection," and so I argued that those formative forces of evolution are believed by scientists to underlie a plausible account of the origin of the human brain. I now ask for clarification because earlier in this thread (Robo #46 and kf #49) reference was made to materialists having values based on "materials made of electrons and quarks" and thoughts based on "unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains." To which interpretation does the reference to "chance and necessity" in point IV refer?
IV. There is no warrant for believing that chance plus necessity will result in accurate thinking patterns that lead to truth.
Shouldn't there be a "therefore" at the prow of IV? It looks like a conclusion to me. Another point of clarification concerns the word "truth." Is this another metaphysical entity or a descriptive term for accurate accounting of experience (as in "I swear to give the whole truth and nothing but the truth")? Your other points: You said:
Since no one is arguing against the existence of mind, but rather engaging in a discussion of its origin (either via physical methods of chance plus necessity or via intelligent design), I did not realize that this was a stumbling point. Also, I am a little confused about what this mountain of scholarship is thought to prove. Do you believe that it demonstrates that thoughts cannot possibly be metaphysical phenomena with physical manifestations?
On the contrary, it shows that there is a physical basis for mental phenomena and that increases in our knowledge have not been hampered (actually they have been made possible) by deliberately excluding metaphysical notions. Example: should one have the misfortune of having to consult a neurologist for a cognitive problem, one need not question that good person about his religious affiliation or acceptance of metaphysical beliefs about "mind." (Sorry, but I can't resist being pragmatic, though I be damned for it.)
If you would kindly allow me to represent my own premise, it would look more like this: If (and only if) there is not a phenomenon called “thought” that exists independently of the brain (i.e. the Evomat position), it follows logically that thought has chance and necessity as it origin.
Of course, Phinehas, I admit that I am sometimes overzealous, and I apologize for that example. I find your version to be logically equivalent to mine and I thank you for it. Thank you also for your honest answers to my four questions, whose relevance to this argument, to my mind, is to the theistic notion that there is something unique about human thought (and its material basis) that is absent from the rest of creation.Daniel King
August 30, 2007
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Hi DK,
DK: The scholarship relies on: observation, experiment and analysis Random mutation and natural selection address a theory of origins, not a theory of mind.
Since no one is arguing against the existence of mind, but rather engaging in a discussion of its origin (either via physical methods of chance plus necessity or via intelligent design), I did not realize that this was a stumbling point. Also, I am a little confused about what this mountain of scholarship is thought to prove. Do you believe that it demonstrates that thoughts cannot possibly be metaphysical phenomena with physical manifestations? Even if it does show such (which I'm pretty sure it does not), I'm not sure this really helps the Evomat cause tremendously, since the origin of thought via chance and necessity calls both that mountain of scholarship and your beliefs regarding its veracity into question.
Inevitably you have brought us us back to what I asserted earlier to be the gounding premise of your argument, which I will restate in the context of your premise III: If (and only if) there is a substance called “thought” that exists independently of the brain, it follows logically that naturalists have not provided a coherent explanation for its origin.
Actually, I think it is you that keeps bringing us back inevitably to this. Every time you restate the premises in this argument, they don't seem to end up being the same thing at all. One wonders why you feel the need to restate them instead of addressing them. If you would kindly allow me to represent my own premise, it would look more like this: If (and only if) there is not a phenomenon called "thought" that exists independently of the brain (i.e. the Evomat position), it follows logically that thought has chance and necessity as it origin. Of course, once the brain is assumed to be indistinguishable from thought (point II), this point is basically conceded by your assertion that the brain is the result of RM + NS (a valid rewording of point III). What this means is that your beliefs about that mountain of scholarship you referenced earlier are therefore the result of RM + NS, which brings us nicely to point IV, with points I - III very much still intact and all but conceded to. Again, did you wish to take on point IV? On the basis that there might possibly be some relevance (though I don't personally see how), my answers to your questions are as follows. Though I believe on faith that it is, I cannot see a basis for making a scientific claim one way or the other. Nope. Nope. And nope.Phinehas
August 29, 2007
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Phinehas #162 (163): You have made some clarifying points that have increased my slow-witted understanding of your position.
The essential point is whether there is a substance, which we call “thought,” that exists independently of the brain. Nope. That is what is at issue, but it is not at all the point. The point that KF made and that I reiterated is part of a logical argument relating to what is at issue, not a bare assertion of what is at issue. I’ve outlined that logical argument above, but you’ve chosen to be dismissive instead of addressing the argument on points.
Yes, please pardon my confusion at failing to give sufficient weight to what you consider to be an important distinction between "what is at issue" and "what is the point." However, I rejoice in your acknowledgment that the underlying issue is the existence of a metaphysical entity called "thought," and I take it by extension that includes related metaphysical entities called "mind" and "soul," etc. To counter the charge of being dismissive, I will address point III of your version of kf's logical argument, to wit: III. The physical explanation for the origin of thought relies heavily on chance plus necessity. We agree that a logical argument is only as valid as its premises, and point III is clearly a premise. I am especially indebted to you for fleshing out what you mean in point III as follows:
...I am not aware that there is a mountain of scholarship within evolutionary materialism that accounts for thought apart from blind reliance on chance and necessity. Exactly what does this mountain of scholarship rely on if not RM + NS?
The scholarship relies on: observation, experiment and analysis Random mutation and natural selection address a theory of origins, not a theory of mind. See below.
How does evomat account for the origin of thought? If by other than RM + NS, then please enlighten.
Precisely put. This is the kernel of the nut. Evomat I take to be an acronym of "evolutionary materialism." Current evolutionary work provides an account of the evolution of the brain, incomplete though it is, because all science is a work in progress. Inevitably you have brought us us back to what I asserted earlier to be the gounding premise of your argument, which I will restate in the context of your premise III: If (and only if) there is a substance called "thought" that exists independently of the brain, it follows logically that naturalists have not provided a coherent explanation for its origin. Some questions that you might want to consider for possible relevance: Do you claim that thought is possible without a brain to think it? Do you deny that other creatures, such as the chimpanzee, have brains? Do you deny that the chimpanzee's brain enables him/her to exhibit purposeful behavior? Do you know that a chimpanzee is incapable of thought? If so, how do you know?Daniel King
August 29, 2007
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[...] Sal Cordova responded - kind of - to my post yesterday in this comment buried deep in his post at Dembski’s place. Predictably, his response does not engage my argument; hell, it doesn’t even come close to engaging it. He was attempting to dispute NIck Matzke’s claim that the use of the phrase “intelligent design” in Of Pandas and People was the origin of that phrase as a label for the modern anti-evolution movement. Sal found an old letter where Darwin used the phrase and, for some reason, thought that actually disproved Matzke’s claim (it doesn’t, as I’ve explained several times without any substantive response). [...]Cordova's Non-Answer [Dispatches from the Culture Wars] · Articles
August 28, 2007
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Thanks Sal!Phinehas
August 28, 2007
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I just despammed 2 comments. Akismet gets "trained" by each de-spamming, and hopefully it will do a better job of recognizing you next time. Salvadorscordova
August 28, 2007
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Phineas, Sorry for the inconvenience. Askimet sometimes catches things, and we have no idea why. It might be wise to save your stuff to your computer before posting it just to be safe. It happens to me too. Do you see your comment yet?scordova
August 28, 2007
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I tried posting a comment twice to this thread, but it isn't showing up. I didn't include any links, so I'm not sure what is catching it.Phinehas
August 28, 2007
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Hmmm...last post didn't show up. Trying again. Please forgive if it is a double post. ************************************ Hi DK, Thank you for your continued cordial attitude as we look at this issue together.
DK: Both of these formulations look logically equivalent to me.
Not at all. One is an assertion and the other is a logical conclusion based on the materialist's position. You chose to misrepresent KF's statement of a logical conclusion as a bare assertion so that you could then claim it was a bare assertion. One wonders if you chose this route because you found it much easier than actually addressing KF's logical argument.
The essential point is whether there is a substance, which we call “thought,” that exists independently of the brain.
Nope. That is what is at issue, but it is not at all the point. The point that KF made and that I reiterated is part of a logical argument relating to what is at issue, not a bare assertion of what is at issue. I've outlined that logical argument above, but you've chosen to be dismissive instead of addressing the argument on points.
The jujitsu being applied in your formulation of II puts the burden of explanation on scientists.
Jujitsu? My formulation? Please help me understand what you mean by this. If the logical conclusion of the materialist's position -- namely that thought must have its origin in purely physical processes -- is to be characterized as jujitsu or my very own formulation, please first demonstrate why it is other than a logical conclusion. Again, one wonders whether it might be easier to label it jujitsu and claim it is my formulation than to actually address it. If you cannot demonstrate that point II is not a logical conclusion of point I, then point III comes into view, does it not?
A burden they have actively undertaken to carry. To deny that there are naturalistic explanations for mental activity is to deny that there are libraries full of data and analysis in neuroscience and psychology. Attempts to paint this mountain of scholarship as blind reliance on “chance and necessity” look to me like a reductionist caricature, deserving of the designation “strawman.”
If this is so, then I stand corrected. But I am not aware that there is a mountain of scholarship within evolutionary materialism that accounts for thought apart from blind reliance on chance and necessity. Exactly what does this mountain of scholarship rely on if not RM + NS? How does evomat account for the origin of thought? If by other than RM + NS, then please enlighten. If not, then point III holds, and point IV comes into view. Did you want to make an attempt at point IV?
This is why I dissected it away in my analysis.
I don't know. It may appear to some that you "dissected it away" because you don't want to address the logical argument.Phinehas
August 28, 2007
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HI DK, Thank you for your continued cordial attitude as we look at this issue together.
DK: Both of these formulations look logically equivalent to me.
Not at all. One is an assertion and the other is a logical conclusion based on the materialist's position. You chose to misrepresent KF's statement of a logical conclusion as a bare assertion so that you could then claim it was a bare assertion. One wonders if you chose this route because you found it much easier than actually addressing KF's logical argument.
The essential point is whether there is a substance, which we call “thought,” that exists independently of the brain.
Nope. That is what is at issue, but it is not at all the point. The point that KF made and that I reiterated is part of a logical argument relating to what is at issue, not a bare assertion of what is at issue. I've outlined that logical argument above, but you've chosen to be dismissive instead of addressing the argument on points.
The jujitsu being applied in your formulation of II puts the burden of explanation on scientists.
Jujitsu? My formulation? Please help me understand what you mean by this. If the logical conclusion of the materialist's position -- namely that thought must have its origin in purely physical processes -- is to be characterized as jujitsu or my very own formulation, please first demonstrate why it is other than a logical conclusion. Again, one wonders whether it might be easier to label it jujitsu and claim it is my formulation than to actually address it. If you cannot demonstrate that point II is not a logical conclusion of point I, then point III comes into view, does it not?
A burden they have actively undertaken to carry. To deny that there are naturalistic explanations for mental activity is to deny that there are libraries full of data and analysis in neuroscience and psychology. Attempts to paint this mountain of scholarship as blind reliance on “chance and necessity” look to me like a reductionist caricature, deserving of the designation “strawman.”
If this is so, then I stand corrected. But I am not aware that there is a mountain of scholarship within evolutionary materialism that accounts for thought apart from blind reliance on chance and necessity. Exactly what does this mountain of scholarship rely on if not RM + NS? How does evomat account for the origin of thought? If by other than RM + NS, then please enlighten. If not, then point III holds, and point IV comes into view. Did you want to make an attempt at point IV?
This is why I dissected it away in my analysis.
I don't know. It may appear to some that you "dissected it away" because you don't want to address the logical argument.Phinehas
August 28, 2007
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Daniel King -- II. Materialists must explain thought only in terms of the physical . . .To deny that there are naturalistic explanations for mental activity is to deny that there are libraries full of data and analysis in neuroscience and psychology. You are not refuting KF, but conceding his point. The essential point is whether there is a substance, which we call “thought,” that exists independently of the brain. Methodological materialists (scientists) haven’t found such a substance yet, as far as I know, but none would deny the possibility that it might be found, IOW, you have faith than something unseen will be revealed in the way in which you expect it too be. Faith is not materialism.tribune7
August 28, 2007
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