Since you asked

_{Vincent Torley

July 5, 2011

Intelligent Design}

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I’m generally happy to answer questions from anyone, if I think they’re interesting enough. Recently the following seven questions were brought to my attention. I thought they merited a response, so here goes. The answers given below are my own; readers are free to disagree if they wish.

1. Does a spider web, a bee hive, a mole burrow, a bird nest, a termite mound, or a beaver dam have “biological function”, and do they have “information”?

All of the above structures combine the characteristics of high probabilistic complexity (i.e. it is difficult for natural processes lacking foresight to generate them) and low descriptive complexity (i.e. they are easy to describe in a few words). Hence they all contain complex specified information (CSI). Insofar as they are useful to the creatures that make them, they could also be said to have a function. However, I wouldn’t say that these structures have a “biological function.” Biological function, properly speaking, belongs to organs or systems inside an organism’s body, which enable the organism to perform some useful task.

2. Does a tool that is made and used by a bird, a chimpanzee, other non-human primates, any other organism that isn’t human, or a human, have “information”, and does it have “biological function”.

Complex specified information, yes. Biological function, no.

3. Does the organism understand and/or generate information when building a nest, web, hive, dam, etc.?

The organism certainly generates complex specified information when building these structures. Does it understand this information? No. It cannot explain and justify its actions. It cannot say why it built these structures this way and not that way, so I’d say it lacks understanding.

4. Does the organism understand and/or generate information when making and using a tool?

Same as for question 3.

5. Apply the same questions to an organism, such as a bird, a non-human primate, or a human, but substitute tools that are not made by the organism. For instance, natural objects that the organism doesn’t modify, but does select and use as a tool.

Owing to their specificity and suitability for a particular job, these natural objects contain a certain amount of complex specified information (in most cases, a small amount). However, no new information is generated here.

6. If there’s information in any of the things I mentioned above (web, hive, dam, nest, tool, etc.) is it “functional complex specified information”?

No. None of the structures in questions 1 to 5 exhibit functional complex specified information, because they are not patterns embodied in structures that enable the structures to perform some function or useful task. Functional complex specified information can on the other hand be ascribed to systems in an organism’s body that are biologically useful.

And one more question:

7. When a cephalopod changes its shape, texture, or colors, does it understand and/or generate information (is it functional complex specified information?), and does that change of shape, texture, or colors have biological function?

I’d say this is a genuine case of functional complex specified information. The patterns are inside the organism, and they enable it to perform a biologically useful task.

Recommended reading:
here, here and here.

Comments

VJT: "But at least a day has a length." Ilíon: "Can one re-measure a specific day?" For that matter, can one even measure *this* day? And, with what shall we measure it? Or, if that is too ambitious, can one measure one minute of today and a different minute of today and lay them out, side by side, so to test the hypothesis that all minutes are of equal length? Or, if we recall that days and minutes do not really have length, but rather, duration, can we actually measure the duration of a minute and compare it to another minute’s duration? And, with what shall we measure it?Ilion_{July 9, 2011
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VJT: "Fine, but I’m not a Platonist. Aristotle would say that forms are instantiated or realized in matter. I think that solves the metaphysical problem of how a physical entity can contain something immaterial. " Plato says that the world is made of/by Unthought Thoughts. Aristotle denies this; in contrast, he says that the world is made of/by Unintended Intentions. I am a disciple of neither of these gentlemen. VJT: "… But at least a day has a length. A mind has no spatial or temporal extension per se." And the spatial and temporal extensions of information are what, again? If I build a house, do not my plans (the conception of my desired result) inform the result? Does not my labor inform the result? According to your odd, or amusing, reasoning, my plans and my labor are *in* the house, right? Not metaphorically, but actually physically present, with spatial and temporal extension, right? Or is that different, somehow? If you were to carefully disassemble my house, it must be the case that somewhere amongst all the parts that comprise the house, you can isolate and identify –and physically point to -- the Form which is instantiated in it, right? Because, if you can’t, it seems to me that you haven’t solved your metaphysical problem. And, in disassembling my house, you can find, and physically set aside, the plan/concept and labor that went into the making of it. Right? Why, I’d bet that if you were careful enough in the disassembly, you might even be able to get it to rebuild itself; for, after all, the plan/concept and labor are right there (don’t step on it!) Meanwhile, I don’t have that metaphysical problem, because I already know that information is not a material entity, and is not *in* material objects and entities.Ilion_{July 9, 2011
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"you write (#152) that “The Forms are immaterial entities (as Plato conceived them).” Fine, but I’m not a Platonist." The *point* was to point out to people that they are using the term 'form' in quite different senses.Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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"But at least a day has a length." Imperial or metric? Can one re-measure a specific day? "A mind has no spatial or temporal extension per se." And neither does information.Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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Ilion Thanks for the lively exchange. I see you scored a few good hits. Just a couple of points: you write (#152) that "The Forms are immaterial entities (as Plato conceived them)." Fine, but I'm not a Platonist. Aristotle would say that forms are instantiated or realized in matter. I think that solves the metaphysical problem of how a physical entity can contain something immaterial. Physical entities can certainly realize or instantiate forms, so there's no a priori reason why they can't embody information. You also argue (#154) that if a day can contain joy (or sorrow), then a mind can contain information, and you suggest that the usage "contain" is metaphorical. But at least a day has a length. A mind has no spatial or temporal extension per se. More later.vjtorley_{July 8, 2011
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hi vjt! I have to say I do not understand what is meant by the statement that information belongs to the domain of form. Are they just two ways to speak of the same thing? To me, a hammer has a form. The form of a hammer distinguishes it from that which is not a hammer. What is it that bestows upon a hammer it's form? What does it mean to say that one form can be distinguished from another? Distinguished by what, or by whom? And why is it not proper to speak of that which distinguishes one form from another as information? And if it is information that allows one to distinguish between one thing and another thing, in what sense do the two (form and information) belong to the same domain? And what, pray tell, is "there" to distinguish between the two, if not a mind? Thanks for the interesting topic!Mung_{July 8, 2011
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V.Torley @138: "What does it mean for a mind to contain information?" Mung @138: "My initial instinct is to say minds don’t contain information." Is it also your instinct -- which, by the way, is one of the things which is the opposite of reason -- to say that minds do not contain (or "contain," if the scare-quotes make one feel better about using metaphorical language) thoughts? Can a day contain joy (or sorrow)? Of course it can; and any sensible person understands that when one speaks of a day "containing" joy, he is using a spacial word in a non-spacial sense. Mung @138: "I conceptualize information is an active thing, rather than as passive or inert. Information brings about change. It has an effect." All by its lonesome? Information acts; there is no need for act-ors? Mung @138: "What is it that God can come to know that God did not know before?" God does not learn anything, for God always knows all (knowable) things.Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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EL @ 133: "I think myself it is best to think of mind as a verb rather than a noun (though people here will disagree!) That mind is what the brain does." Ah, yes! A charming insight: "the mind is a glandular secretion of the brain." EL @ 133: "I think myself it is best to think of mind as a verb rather than a noun (though people here will disagree!)" I agree completely! Materialists/atheists are mindless entities.Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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V.Torley @ 150: "<"We need to bear in mind that information belongs to the domain of form. That’s why they call it inFORMation. ..." Dude! The Forms are immaterial entities (as Plato conceived them, they are essentially "unthought thoughts" or "thoughts that thionk themselves").Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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V.Torley @ 134: "1. To the question, “How can matter contain something immaterial (information)?”I’d like to respond by asking a question of my own. If information is immaterial as you allege, then aren’t there two levels of immateriality now? You have to postulate immaterial information being interpreted by an immaterial mind. Isn’t that a teeny bit complicated?" In response to this truly inspired question, I'd like to ask one of my own: If thoughts are immaterial entities, as some allege, then aren't there two levels of immateriality now? You have to postulate immaterial thoughts being thought by an immaterial mind. Isn;t that a teeny bit complicated? Since it's all so "complicated," we'll just have to posit that thoughts -- and minds -- are either themselves material objects or are simply the epiphenomena of material objects. You knew, like Miss Lidde does with her amusing assertion that minds are secretions of brains (true, she declines to put it that bluntly, but that is the *meaning* of what she asserts). ==== Meanwhile, sensible persons know that there is noting complicated about immaterial minids thinking immaterial thoughts. Sensible persons *also* know that 'information' is though(s) in a context of, and in realtion to, other thought(s). ==== V.Torley @ 132: "What does it mean for a mind to contain information? It seems to me that the notion of something immaterial containing anything at all is a nonsensical one, being based on a physical metaphor." Dude! I'm pretty sure that everyone is being fastidious to put quote-marks around those spacial metaphors to indicate that we must speak in metaphor. In any event, there is no other "place" where information can exist, but "in" a mind.Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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Hi everyone, We need to bear in mind that information belongs to the domain of form. That's why they call it inFORMation. I think Allanius hit the nail on the head with his post on the subject of form. In particular, I liked this passage:
Maybe Aristotle would say that “meaning” derives from the mean. That is, “meaning” is found in the ratio of form (intellect) and matter that brings the sensuous universe into being. In this view both meaning and information can be inherent in things. Not in matter itself, but in things like DNA that are produced from matter by the action of an informing mind. Information and meaning are immanent through the action of the mind that produces the thing. ... It doesn’t really matter what we call the nucleobase sequences found in DNA, “information” or otherwise. The reality is that a specific sequence leads to a specific result. This suggests that the sequence has a purpose; ie, is the product of a mind and therefore meaningful.
I would also endorse what StephenB says when he writes:
The information associated with the cell machinery works whether we think about it or not. Because this information exists outside the realm of the human mind, however, does not mean that it exists as a material reality. Its reality is not “in the matter” but rather in the configuration. We have two bloggers who argue that the DNA molecule does not contain information because, as they would have it, information exists only “within the mind.” Their error consists in believing that anything that exists outside the mind must necessarily be imbedded in matter. If that was the case, they would have a point. But the reality we are discussing is not material. The reality manifests itself as alternative sequences, and these sequences perform a function, which means that they are more than mere mental concepts.
At the same time, I would like to add that Mung did a very good job of recasting Stephen Meyers' argument to fit his own understanding of information. That suggests it is metaphysically resilient. Be back later.vjtorley_{July 8, 2011
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Information - Material or Immaterial
We have two bloggers who argue that the DNA molecule does not contain information because, as they would have it, information exists only “within the mind.” Their error consists in believing that anything that exists outside the mind must necessarily be imbedded in matter. If that was the case, they would have a point. But the reality we are discussing is not material.
Well, first, I'm not (yet) of the opinion that information exists. ;) And, I'm not (yet) of the opinion that if information exists, it exists "only within the mind." But that's neither here nor there at the moment. [HT: Ilion] If the reality we are discussing [information] is not material, then how on earth is it not the case, given what you have said, that we don't have a point!? If there is information which is neither within a mind, nor within matter, where is it? Is it just "out there" somewhere? Doing what? Nothing? Then by your own definition it's not information. And if it is the case, as you have now asserted, that information is not material, how is it also the case that information is "a sequence of characters or arrangements of something that produce a specific effect." Is that sequence immaterial? Perhaps it's the effect that is immaterial.Mung_{July 8, 2011
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Information - Specified and Unspecified To assert that there is information that is not specified information is absurd.Mung_{July 8, 2011
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Ilion:
Grr, yourself, Mung. Did you read those three posts?
Indeed I did. You were accused of coming up with your own private definition of information in #39. That accusation was leveled by the same individual who had previously written what I posted in #41. And your post beat mine to come in at #40. :) That was the reason for the grr. Your post got in the way, lol. Nothing more.Mung_{July 8, 2011
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Does a library which stores more information weigh more than a library which stores less information? How about a brain. The more information stored in a brain the more it weights? Is there more information contained in a hammer than in a spider web? Why is information theory a mathematical theory? What physical/material quantity are we measuring when we measure information?Mung_{July 8, 2011
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http://math.ucsd.edu/~crypto/java/ENTROPY/Mung_{July 8, 2011
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Stephen Meyer:
Consider two sequences of characters: “Four score and seven years ago” “nenen ytawoi jll sn mekhdx nnx” Both of these sequences have an equal number of characters. Since both are composed of the same 26 letter English alphabet, the amount of uncertainty eliminated by each letter (or space) is identical.
If the message is sent in English, the amount of uncertainty eliminated by each letter is not identical. Am I wrong, if so, why?
The probability of producing each of these sequences at random is identical. Therefore, both sequences have an equal amount of information as measured by Shannon’s theory.
If I receive those two messages, and as I receive each symbol I calculate the amount of Shannon information of each symbol, and at the end of the receipt of each message I then add together the Shannon information for each symbol, the Shannon information of the two messages will not be equal. Am I wrong, if so, why? [I had to correct your quote Elizabeth, the number of characters was not the same in both lines!]Mung_{July 8, 2011
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How much does information weigh? And what are it's dimensions? What happens to information as one approaches the speed of light?Mung_{July 8, 2011
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Mung:
p.s. Information is not something that can be stored.
WHAT? (Tell that to a librarian, then run, fast! :))Elizabeth Liddle_{July 8, 2011
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If information is immaterial as you allege, then aren’t there two levels of immateriality now?
Wasn't there always? symbols, representations, information, etc... Perhaps I don't understand what you mean about levels of immateriality.
You have to postulate immaterial information being interpreted by an immaterial mind.
Is it the information that's being interpreted, or something else? I have in mind the concept of a "bit." Is a bit a material entity? I have in mind a system whereby a sequence of bits can encode a symbol (character). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASCII Is the encoding a material entity? I have in mind a system whereby a sequence of symbols (characters) can be used to represent a concept. etc...
Isn’t that a teeny bit complicated?
Yes. But it seems to happen, regardless of how complicated it is. :)Mung_{July 8, 2011
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p.p.s. Information is not something that can be stored, even in a mind.Mung_{July 8, 2011
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p.s. Information is not something that can be stored.Mung_{July 8, 2011
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It seems to me that the notion of something immaterial containing anything at all is a nonsensical one, being based on a physical metaphor.
Wait, didn't I ask what it meant for a physical medium to contain something immaterial, lol?
What does it mean for a mind to contain information?
My initial instinct is to say minds don't contain information. I conceptualize information is an active thing, rather than as passive or inert. Information brings about change. It has an effect. So I question whether it even makes sense to speak of God being informed about something. What is it that God can come to know that God did not know before?Mung_{July 8, 2011
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VJT: "If information is immaterial as you allege, then aren’t there two levels of immateriality now? You have to postulate immaterial information being interpreted by an immaterial mind. Isn’t that a teeny bit complicated?" Is it "complicated" that material entities act upon other material entities?Ilion_{July 8, 2011
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Maybe Aristotle would say that “meaning” derives from the mean. That is, “meaning” is found in the ratio of form (intellect) and matter that brings the sensuous universe into being. In this view both meaning and information can be inherent in things. Not in matter itself, but in things like DNA that are produced from matter by the action of an informing mind. Information and meaning are immanent through the action of the mind that produces the thing. To be honest, we never really realized the full implication of Aristotle’s concept of being until we read this thread. If “God is dead,” there is no mean and no meaning. There is only nothingness. But then DNA becomes a stumbling block to the materialist, since it gives every indication of being meaningful. It doesn’t really matter what we call the nucleobase sequences found in DNA, “information” or otherwise. The reality is that a specific sequence leads to a specific result. This suggests that the sequence has a purpose; ie, is the product of a mind and therefore meaningful. The “meaning” of the sequence, in this line of thought, is that it was brought into being in order to produce a specific effect. This seems a perfectly reasonable conclusion. The harder challenge, it seems to us, is to the materialist, who has to explain how nature obtained the appearance (form) of information and meaning without the informing influence of a mind. It is a two-fold problem. Matter, per se, has no form; eg, nucleobases in themselves. Nor are there any self-existent forms in nature. In that case, the materialist has to provide a reasonable explanation of how nucleobases informed themselves into the sequences found in DNA by purely natural processes, also accounting for the problem of probability. Our sense is that they are a long way from providing this proof based on objective observation, which is why they have a taste for symbolic representations, particularly the seductive metaphor of deep time. But that is not all. They must also account not only for the existence of the cause but its relation to the effect and the highly purposeful amino acid sequence it produces—in other words, they must account for the reality of its apparent meaning, which is obvious to all but by no means inherent in nature itself. Cause and effect leads in a straight line to mind and intention. Nature cannot select a cause like DNA without a pre-specified effect. Or can it? And how? And more important, why? Hume understood that the way to get rid of God and meaning was to break the link between cause and effect. And yet there it is, staring us in the face in nature itself, and not invented by men; an unbreakable link between specific nucleobase sequences and amino acid sequences; a link that makes Hume’s billiard balls look like a rather childish example of hypersymbolic scrawling. Meaning, it seems, is on its way back.allanius_{July 8, 2011
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I guess it depends how you are defining "meaning". At it's simplest, I'd say that the "meaning" of message lies in the difference it makes to the actions (real of virtual) of the receiver. In other words if what the receiver does is contingent on the content of the message, then the message has meaning for the receiver. Under that definition, "meaning" arises fairly simply in my scheme of things, in a way, because every mental event has repercussions for the next mental event, so each mental event has "meaning". However, with human brains we have an additional "virtual" layer in the form of symbolic, or abstract meaning. I don't think that's problematic, though - it just adds a very complex set of layers to the information transmission process.Elizabeth Liddle_{July 8, 2011
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Hi everyone, Two more quick questions. 1. To the question, "How can matter contain something immaterial (information)?"I'd like to respond by asking a question of my own. If information is immaterial as you allege, then aren't there two levels of immateriality now? You have to postulate immaterial information being interpreted by an immaterial mind. Isn't that a teeny bit complicated? 2. Granted that "If A means B, then A is about B", the converse does not necessarily hold. The fact that DNA is about making proteins, by virtue of its functionality, does not imply that DNA means making proteins. But if the criterion for immateriality is inherent meaningfulness and not "aboutness" (a vague and woolly term), then why should the "aboutness" of DNA's instructions preclude their being material? Elizabeth: interesting answer! But where does meaning arise in your scheme of things? Really must fly now; back later.vjtorley_{July 8, 2011
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I think myself it is best to think of mind as a verb rather than a noun (though people here will disagree!) That mind is what the brain does. So no, I don't think a mind "contains information", except metaphorically (and it's a good metaphor - we can "bring something to mind"). I'd say that "mind" is what we call it when the brain does something and that something includes a repertoire of past behaviours (always with some novel tweak) and that memory is the "re-enaction" of past behaviours. So the brain itself is a repository of information about what has happened in the past, in the form of a repertoire of firing behaviours, and when we "recall it" (an act of mind) we are triggering such a re-enactment, modified by new input (either externally or internally generated).Elizabeth Liddle_{July 8, 2011
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Hi everyone, A quick question: What does it mean for a mind to contain information? It seems to me that the notion of something immaterial containing anything at all is a nonsensical one, being based on a physical metaphor. Back in a few hours.vjtorley_{July 8, 2011
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Mung @ 126: "In the current context I’m inclined to say that information specifies the thing and that the specification of the thing is not an aspect of the thing itself." Ilíon: "Isn't the sense of 'specification' you have in mind the same as 'description'? ... Sometimes, information describes a thing, sometimes it doesn’t And, if you wish to say that by ‘specification’ you mean something different than ‘description,’ I reply that sometimes, information specifies a thing, sometimes it doesn’t." Mung: "ok, all well and good. But, is it possible to specify a thing without information?" Not in the sense you're using the word; quite possibly in no other sense, either. Perhaps the seeming difficulty between your use of 'specification' and WJM's use of 'description' is that 'specification' is necessarily 'information,' but that 'information' is not necessarily 'specification' (or 'description', either). Mung: "Is there a way to quantify “how much information” is required to specify a thing?" Ultimately? I don't think so; how does one *quantify* the immaterial? However, one can quantify the symbols needed to represent, in a given system of representation, some information or other, and compare that against the symbols needed to represent some other information in that same system. Of course, there is also the problem/question (the answer to which is almost always "No!") of whether one has symbolically represented *all* the information necessary to specify either thing.Ilion_{July 7, 2011
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