Someone please send Barbara Forrest a thesaurus

_{February 9, 2009

Intelligent Design}

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Barbara Forrest responds to David DeWolf in The News Star.

Early in the article Forrest puts forth a false dichotomy which undermines all that follows. My emphasis:

DeWolf’s portrayal of ID as scientific is falsified by his defining it as involving the “actions of an intelligent agent as the cause of phenomena that natural processes are unlikely to produce.” If phenomena are not naturally caused, they are supernaturally caused. There is no other alternative.

Not only are there other alternatives but supernatural isn’t even an antonym for natural. If we go to a thesaurus and look up the word natural we find listed among the antonyms the words technological and artificial. Notably we do not find the word supernatural listed as an antonym.

Maybe Babs should spend more time improving her vocabulary and less time disproving the assertion that ID is science.

Of course there’s an alternative explanation here. Perhaps Forrest is well aware that natural/supernatural is a false dichotomy and she’s just an unapologetic liar. In fact that makes more sense as you usually can’t get a PhD without at least a college entrance-level vocabulary.

Comments

---JayM: "You still haven’t even begun to make your case that human intelligence is “non-natural”, whatever that may mean." Sorry, but I have made it. You simply shrug it off possibly because you prefer not to accept the testimony of reason. That is why you continually avoid my references to the written paragraph. If you saw the words, "JayM rejects the obvious for ideological reasons," written in the sand on the planet Mars, you would know that it was a function of human agency.StephenB_{February 20, 2009
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StephenB:
Rob, first, I explained that materialists don’t believe in “minds,” and then you ask for examples.
I asked, as you quoted in your response: "Can you cite a materialist who denies the existence of minds and wills? (As they define the terms, not as you define them.)" Are you seriously asserting that Dennett and Pinker are denying the existence of minds as they define the terms, not as you define them?R0b_{February 20, 2009
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Onlookers: THIS, stripped of prettyfying, is the "Meth Nat" perspective:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. ,b>It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [Lewontin, 1997, NY Review of Books]
In case you didn’t get the memo that this is now official dogma, courtesy the US NAS acting as friendly local magisterium, let me cite:
In science, explanations must be based on naturally occurring phenomena. Natural causes are, in principle, reproducible and therefore can be checked independently by others. If explanations are based on purported forces that are outside of nature, scientists have no way of either confirming or disproving those explanations. Any scientific explanation has to be testable — there must be possible observational consequences that could support the idea but also ones that could refute it. Unless a proposed explanation is framed in a way that some observational evidence could potentially count against it, that explanation cannot be subjected to scientific testing. [Science, Evolution and Creationism, 2008, p. 10]
Translating: (i) explanations must either be in terms of chance + mechanical deterministic forces or else reducing on origin (through materialistic, unguided evolutionary models) to the spontaneous action of such, and (ii) the only possible contrast to “natural” is “supernatural” — strictly verboten! And, that of course comes right back, full-circle, to DaveScot above in the original post:
supernatural isn’t even an antonym for natural. If we go to a thesaurus and look up the word natural we find listed among the antonyms the words technological and artificial. Notably we do not find the word supernatural listed as an antonym. Maybe Babs should spend more time improving her vocabulary and less time disproving the assertion that ID is science. Of course there’s an alternative explanation here. Perhaps Forrest is well aware that natural/supernatural is a false dichotomy and she’s just an unapologetic liar. In fact that makes more sense as you usually can’t get a PhD without at least a college entrance-level vocabulary.
So, JM, what do you have to say to that observation by DS? GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 20, 2009
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StephenB @180
I wrote, So, do you accept that fact that human “flintknapping” constitutes human agency?” —-Rob: “Absolutely. Again, that’s according to my understanding of the term “human agency”. Well, then you are able to distinquish intelligent agency from law and chance, which is the point of contention.
You assume too much. If we reason from the methodological naturalist perspective, Rob has simply shown that he can distinguish between the results of one natural process and another, in some instances. You still haven't even begun to make your case that human intelligence is "non-natural", whatever that may mean. JJJayM_{February 19, 2009
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----Rob: "Are you saying that Dennett believes that brains don’t exist, and Pinker believes that neural activity doesn’t exist? Those guys certainly are wacko." Rob, first, I explained that materialists don't believe in "minds," and then you ask for examples. So, I followed up with examples of four materalist/Darwinists, all of whom reduce mental activity to brain activity. That means, of course, that they are saying that brains exist and minds don't. Still, you ask this: "Are you saying that Dennett believes that brains don’t exist, and Pinker believes that neural activity doesn’t exist?" These men, mistakenly I belive, are saying that brains and neural activity not only exist, but that they can explain all mental activity. That is another way of saying that there are no "minds," which is the original point that I made and the one you chose to contest. Question: Are you aware of the distincion between the "brain" as a physical organ and the "mind" as a non-material faculty? Are you acquainted with the mind body/problem in any of its formulations? Are you aware of the larger but related problem of dualistic theism and atheistic monism?StephenB_{February 19, 2009
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Rob: Kindly examine the logic of the explanatory filter. While you are at it, do so for the logic of the statistical form of the second law of thermodynamics -- why it is that we confidently predict a trend towards higher entropy per comparative statistical weights of accessible microstates. And, there are two known classes of non-deterministic processes, leading to [a] undirected contingncies [chance and resulting statistical distributions], and [b] directed contingency [design]. If you want to argue in context that there are laws of nature that channel the chemistry of prebiotic environments towards origin of life, and onward towards the body-plan level biodiversity thereof, what you are saying is that nature is front-loaded and programmed on the grandest level. The best explanation for that is . . . design. Finally, while we have not seen the origin of life forms, we HAVE seen the origin of the parts of life forms that are of relevant interest -- i.e. digital information systems and storage subsystems as are in the heart of the cell. They are -- per massive observation -- the known product of intelligence. So, on inference to best, empirically anchored explanation . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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Rob: THIS is an example of how the materialist concept of being "natural" is used in this general context, by a leading evolutionary mateialist:
“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules . . .[Sir Francis Crick, 1994, The Astonishing Hypothesis]
Do you see the self-referential incoherence problems here? [Cf discussion here & onward.] As to the question of natural vs supernatural, vs natural vs artificial [i.e intelligent], it is sufficient to note that the former is notoriously being used by Lewontinian a priori materialists -- including the US's NAS -- to carry through a programme of censorship on origins science; in the further context that, immemorial, we OBSERVE that three main causal factors act in our world: [1] chance, [2] mechanical law, [3] design. We have no good reason to exclude any such possibility on origins, and so the trend a la Barbara Forrest to slanderously project inference to supernatural cause where it is easily seen that the actual inference is a differential, inference to best explanation, one across mechanical ones [chance +/or necessity] vs intelligent ones, should be terminated. If in a particular context the empirical evidence points to intelligence and a supernatural intelligence is a candidate for the whudunit aspect, that is no business of science qua science. So, let us have done with loaded language like the following:
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. The eminent Kant scholar Lewis Beck used to say that anyone who could believe in God could believe in anything. To appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen. [Lewontin, 1997]
In fact, Lewontin here shows his utter ignorance of say Newton's views on why there is an intelligible natural order, shown in the laws -- meant quote literally by N -- emplaced by Pantokrator, in his General Scholium in his epochal Principia. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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kairosfocus:
When sufficient storage capacity is required to hold this, that the config space explodes to a point where the islands of function are v. hard to find on random search [per needle in a haystack], it is reasonable to accept that the routine ability of intelligence to get to the islands is a sign of intelligence at work.
Hardly. Just because a target is hard to find with a random search doesn't mean that it's hard to find with a nonrandom or partially random process. A river would have a hard time finding the sea if it randomly sampled the universe, but it has no problem when gravity directs it.
4 –> Thus, we see that FSCI is a sign of intelligence, one that is in fact per test cases, routinely exemplified by known intelligences and NOT exemplified by random search strategies or deterministic laws. (Take this as a testable hyp, a point of potential but not actualised so far falsification.)
Ah, there's the crux. First of all, I could just as easily say that we've never observed anyone intelligently design complex biological features like brains and life itself, and challenge the ID community to come up with a falsifying counterexample. More importantly, at what point does "we've never observed X" justify the tentative conclusion that "X never happens"? That's subjective, and there's usually lots of data besides "we've never observed X" that can be taken into account. I personally disagree with the ID community's implicit assumption that we understand the limits of nature well enough to say that intelligence is irreducible to "C+N". I don't think we can say that with any degree of confidence from a scientific standpoint. Even if we restrict ourselves to known natural laws*, nature is certainly Turing equivalent, and nobody has ever made a reasonable (IMHO) case that human intelligence is non-computable. * The issue really starts to dissolve when we realize that "natural laws" are descriptive, not prescriptive. They are nothing more than compressed descriptions of data from observations. In that sense, everything we observe falls under natural law, by definition. So Dembski's term "unbroken natural laws" is both redundant and exhaustive. I have yet to see an ID proponent come up with a rigorous definition of "nature" or "chance+necessity" that leaves room for anything else. Dembski defines natural causes thusly:
Natural causes, as the scientific community understands them, are causes that operate according to deterministic and nondeterministic laws and that can be characterized in terms of chance, necessity, or their combination (cf. Jacques Monod’s Chance and Necessity).
Given that scientific laws are descriptive, and that determinism and nondeterminism are logically exhaustive, the idea of "non-nature" is logically incoherent.R0b_{February 19, 2009
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StephenB:
Human intelligence is “non natural” by definition.
I'm going to ask more questions about this, because it cuts to the heart of the quagmire we're in. 1) Where did you get this definition? 2) Do all ID proponents define human intelligence and non-natural this way? Most of them? The questions also apply to Barry's definitions of non-natural and supernatural in the FAQ.R0b_{February 19, 2009
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attn: Moderators My posts are being delayed for some reason, despite them being far more polite and on topic than DaveScot's latest screeds. Since I am actively involved in several discussions, I would appreciate you letting me know wh this is the case and the expected length of the delay. At a minimum, please make a note in the threads to which I'm contributing so that my correspondents don't think I'm being deliberately rude. Thank you, JayJayM_{February 19, 2009
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—-Rob: “Can you cite a materialist who denies the existence of minds and wills? (As they define the terms, not as you define them.)” Try these: From Daniel Dennett: “The mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain…” From Steven Pinker: “Nothing in the mind exists except as neural activity” (1997b, emp. added).
Are you saying that Dennett believes that brains don't exist, and Pinker believes that neural activity doesn't exist? Those guys certainly are wacko.
I ask, Do you assert that human intelligence is natural or non-natural? ...
Let me just ask you straight up: Are you asking him to assert a definition or a belief?
So, do you accept that fact that human “flintknapping” constitutes human agency?
—-Rob: “Absolutely. Again, that’s according to my understanding of the term “human agency”. Well, then you are able to distinquish intelligent agency from law and chance, which is the point of contention.
And how do you know that the category of law and chance does not include human agency according to my understanding of the term?
No, it explains that a scientist or, for that matter, a philosopher needs to define his terms prior to making statements about them. That way everyone can follow his arguments.
Did DeWolf define the word "natural" before using it so that Forrest would know that supernatural is not its complement? I confess that I still don't know exactly what ID proponents mean when they say natural, material, law+chance, and contingency. I've read pretty much all of Dembski's ID work and I have yet to find anything approaching rigorous definitions for the above. Maybe you can refer me to some literature that provides such definitions? To complicate it even further, the words are used inconsistently by different people, and sometimes by the same person at different times. Dembski switches back and forth between different usages of the word "chance". Barry Arrington insists that contingency means something different than Dembski's usage.
You misunderstand the entire point. ID’s whole argument is that non-natural CANNOT be restricted to the Divine. Human intelligence is “non natural” by definition.
By your definition. How is Forrest supposed to know that? Where, even in the ID literature, is that stated as a definition rather than an assumption?
I cannot honor Barbara Forrest’s definition because it was conceived as a redefinition for purposes of confusion and obfuscation.
"Conceived as a redefinition"? Are you saying that Forrest redefined the word ad hoc? Do you think that nobody uses the term supernatural as a complement for natural?R0b_{February 19, 2009
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I ask, Do you assert that human intelligence is natural or non-natural? =---Rob, (speaking for JayM:) ----"Given the statement below, that question is analytic rather than synthetic." You have been reading too much Kant. Burn the book and start reading G. K. Chesterton. -----"If ID has its own definition of human intelligence, then that explains a lot of miscommunications." No, it explains that a scientist or, for that matter, a philosopher needs to define his terms prior to making statements about them. That way everyone can follow his arguments. ----"Perhaps Barabara Forrest’s definition of supernatural includes non-natural phenomena. Most people don’t restrict the term to include only the divine, as ID does. So will you honor Forrest’s definition?" You misunderstand the entire point. ID's whole argument is that non-natural CANNOT be restricted to the Divine. Human intelligence is "non natural" by definition. I cannot honor Barbara Forrest's definition because it was conceived as a redefinition for purposes of confusion and obfuscation. Either that, or she is very dull of mind. I have no way of knowing which is the case.StephenB_{February 19, 2009
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I wrote, So, do you accept that fact that human “flintknapping” constitutes human agency?" ----Rob: "Absolutely. Again, that’s according to my understanding of the term “human agency”. Well, then you are able to distinquish intelligent agency from law and chance, which is the point of contention.StephenB_{February 19, 2009
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----JayM: "The fact that some ID proponents simply define human intelligence non-natural is the problem that Forrest is pointing out. Whether or not human intelligence is non-natural is a fact, not a matter of definition. From Forrest’s methodological naturalism point of view, human intelligence is clearly a natural phenomena. If you want to refute her natural / supernatural dichotomy, you need to show the difference, not merely repeatedly assert it." I have pointed out the illogical texture of that comment in the past. Reasserting it does not make it any less logical. If Forrest changes the definition of "natural," then intelligent design is already ruled out in principle. With regard to showing the difference, I have done it several times with the example of the written paragraph and the sand castles. I didn't choose those examples because of their sophistication, I chose them to illustrate the point that you would reject even the most obvious facts rather than submit to a reasoned argument. That is why you avoid them and that is why I keep bringing them up.StephenB_{February 19, 2009
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PS: on a misunderstanding: When SB says that intelligence of humans is non-natural he means in effect that our minds REASON, they are not driven by blind deterministic forces and/or random chance that cause ands control the neural networks in our brains in such a way that the PHYSICS or CHEMISTRY not the reasoned logic and/or personal, active decisions control outcomes. [Recall here Sir Francis Crick's blunder on the point.]kairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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Rob: Re: according to my understanding of “intelligent agency”, which to me entails the ability to make choices and act on them. Note that this definition is functional, not metaphysical. Now, let's add a few steps and see where that takes us: 1 --> Such observed intelligent choices impose a directed contingency on finite arrangements of matter. 2 --> Where the choices make a functional difference to an entity, they identify islands [and archipelagos] of function in a config space. (E.g. ASCII text in a para in English, not either a single letter of short sequence recycled, or a random text string.] 3 --> When sufficient storage capacity is required to hold this, that the config space explodes to a point where the islands of function are v. hard to find on random search [per needle in a haystack], it is reasonable to accept that the routine ability of intelligence to get to the islands is a sign of intelligence at work. 4 --> Thus, we see that FSCI is a sign of intelligence, one that is in fact per test cases, routinely exemplified by known intelligences and NOT exemplified by random search strategies or deterministic laws. (Take this as a testable hyp, a point of potential but not actualised so far falsification.) 5 --> Now, we have no reason to believe that we exhaust actual or possible intelligences, or that other intelligences would never produce FSCI. 6 --> Now, consider cases where we see FSCI, e.g. DNA digital data strings, but for which humans are not possible creators. 7 --> per inference to best explanation as described in outline above, ID thinkers conclude provisionally that DNA is an artifact of intelligence, but note that we do not have sufficient data otherwise to infer who, what or whether within or beyond the physical cosmos. [This last has ALWAYS been true of ID thought on this, ever since TBO in 1984.] 9 -- On another candidate case, ID thinkers observe that the physics of the cosmos is so structured on multiple dimensional fine-tuning that there is a fine-tuned, complex and evidently intelligent order to set up a C-chemistry based life facilitating cosmos. this is also in a context where on evidence that cosmos has had a beginning. 10 --> So, it is reasonable to infer to an extra-cosmic designer of a cosmos in which life in general is possible. (Observe, this is an INFERENCE, not an assumption, and it is an inference per inductively identified signs of intelligence.) So, it seems your apparent inference that there is an a priori metaphysical assumption of the nature and existence of intelligence is a mischaracterisation of the design inference and of the process of reasoning used by design thinkers. In short, you have put up a strawman and have been insisting that it is the real man, despite our many corrections and explanations of why it is not accurate, above. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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I'm going to rudely butt into JayM's conversation, and make a few comments. StephenB:
Do you assert that human intelligence is natural or non-natural?
Given the statement below, that question is analytic rather than synthetic.
ID defines human intelligence as a non-natural phenomenon, so I hardly need to prove that ID’s definition is ID’s definition.
If ID has its own definition of human intelligence, then that explains a lot of miscommunications.
Barbara Forrest’s breach is in refusing to honor ID’s definition, revising it, and the criticizing ID for not verifying it.
Perhaps Barabara Forrest's definition of supernatural includes non-natural phenomena. Most people don't restrict the term to include only the divine, as ID does. So will you honor Forrest's definition?R0b_{February 19, 2009
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PS: On TA's Fig 4: 1] X-Axis -- complexity -- OSC is low-end, RSC is hi end, FSCi s neasr but less than RSC. 2] Y-Axis -- Algorithmic compressibility: OSC -- HIGH, RSC v low, FSC -- intermediate, but nearer to RSC. 3] Z-Axis -- Algorithmic function: OSC & RSC low, FSC -- by observation, high.kairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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When you distinguish the sand castle from the other elements on the beach, you have distinguished agency from law and chance. Just as when you separate the written paragraph from lucky noise, you have distinguished between human agency and law/chance. I can’t imagine why you would call that a dispute.
So we're still at square 1.
Do you believe that you can discern intelligent agency from a written paragraph?
Yes, according to my understanding of "intelligent agency", which to me entails the ability to make choices and act on them. Note that this definition is functional, not metaphysical. That is, it's independent of any materialism vs. immaterialism and liberatianism vs. compatibilism issues. I imagine that your usage of the term is different -- thus the impasse.
So, do you accept that fact that human “flintknapping” constitutes human agency?
Absolutely. Again, that's according to my understanding of the term "human agency".R0b_{February 19, 2009
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3 --> Durston et al, 2007:
The measure of Functional Sequence Complexity,denoted as Z, is defined as the change in functional uncer-tainty from the ground state H(Xg(ti)) to the functional state H(Xf(ti)), or Z = [delta]H (Xg(ti), Xf(tj)) . . . Eqn 6 [Using Z for zeta] [P. 4] . . . . Consider that there are usually only 20 different amino acids possible per site for proteins, Eqn. (6) can be used to calculate a maximum Fit value/protein amino acid site of 4.32 Fits/site [NB: - log2 (20) = 4.32]. We use the formula log (20) - H(Xf) to cal-culate the functional information at a site specified by the variable Xf such that Xf corresponds to the aligned amino acids of each sequence with the same molecular function f [putt he chains in parallel with aa codes laid out in cols by corresponding sites]. The measured FSC for the whole protein is then calcu-lated as the summation of that for all aligned sites. The number of Fits quantifies the degree of algorithmic chal-lenge, in terms of probability, in achieving needed meta-bolic function . . . . A high Fit value for individual sites within a protein indicates sites that require a high degree of functional information. High Fit values may also point to the key structural or binding sites within the overall 3-D structure. Since the functional uncertainty, as defined by Eqn(1) is proportional to the -log of the probability, we can see that the cost of a linear increase in FSC is an exponential decrease in probability.
note, this table gives 35, empirically based FSC measurements in Fits; in a peer-reviewed context. 4 --> Simple approach (KF):
a] Let contingency [C] be defined as 1/0 by comparison with a suitable exemplar, e.g. a tossed die. [If 0, you have an ordered not a random or functional sequence, e.g. a crystal.] b] Let specificity [S] be identified as 1/0 through functionality [FS] or by compressibility of description of the information [KS] or similar means. [A functionally specified sequence will be OBSERVED as functioning, e.g. text in English, DNA coding for protein. If 0, observed as non-functional.] c] Let degree of complexity [B] be defined by the quantity of bits to store the relevant information, with 500 - 1,000 bits serving as the threshold for "probably" to "morally certainly" sufficiently complex to meet the FSCI/CSI threshold. [How many bits info storage capacity are used in carrying out the observed function? E.g. DNA in life sysrtems that are independent, 300 - 500 k bases up, or minimum 600 k bits. if less t5han the suitable threshold, say 1,000 bits, set B = 0, otherwise B = no of functional bits.] d] Define the vector {C, S, B} based on the above [as we would take distance travelled and time required, D and t], and take the element product C*S*B [as we would take the ratio D/t to get speed]. e] Now we identify: C*S*B = X, the required FSCI/CSI-metric in [functionally] specified bits.
--> this crude but practical metric in effect will have to be functional and non-contingent, and above 500 - 1,000 bits to count. --> A post in this thread of more than 143 ASCII characters will qualify as relevantly functionally specific and complex. A fgreat many cases of such that are produced by intelligence exist; nil have been seriously put that arte known not to be produced, directly or indirectly by intleligence, and are of KNOWN origin. --> FSCI is both sufficiently well defined to be measured in several ways, and it is a known artifact of intelligence. ______________ BOTTOMLINE: repeated insistence on denial does not turn a fact into a falsehood, JM. Same for the FACT that "natural vs artificial" is at least as reasonable a contrast as "natural vs supernatural." So, to insist that FSCI is insufficiently defined to be useful is selective hyperskepticism. And, to insist that by claiming that the only "real" contrast to "natural" is supernatural, is to impose materialist censorship on science. That LEWONTINIAN MATERIALIST CENSORSHIP subverts origins science from being an unfettered investigation of the truth on origins based on empirical evidence and well-warranted inductions applied to inferences to best explanation -- no questions are being begged, just we refuse to allow improper censorship of factors -- in light of the known relevant causal factors: chance, lawlike necessity, design. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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H'mm: Re JM @ 167: FSCI is not a rigorously defined concept . . . of course, LIFE is not a rigorously defined concept, which does not prevent us from recognising, working with and even scientifically sudying cases thereof, but . . . 1 --> OOL research circa 1970's - 80's:
Living organisms are distinguished by their specified complexity. Crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; mixtures of random polymers [i.e. tars] fail to qualify because they lack specificity.6 [Source: L.E. Orgel, 1973. The Origins of Life. New York: John Wiley, p. 189.] Yockey7 and Wickens5 develop the same distinction, that "order" is a statistical concept referring to regularity such as could might characterize a series of digits in a number, or the ions of an inorganic crystal. On the other hand, "organization" refers to physical systems and the specific set of spatio-temporal and functional relationships among their parts. Yockey and Wickens note that informational macromolecules [e.g. DNA] have a low degree of order but a high degree of specified complexity. In short, the redundant order of crystals cannot give rise to specified complexity of the kind or magnitude found in biological organization; attempts to relate the two have little future. [TBO, TMLO Ch 8, 1984, summarising OOL researchers
2 --> Trevors & Abel, 2005 -- BB peer-reviewed:
Three qualitative kinds of sequence complexity exist: random (RSC), ordered (OSC), and functional (FSC). [Cf TA's fig 4] FSC alone provides algorithmic instruction. [e.g. DNA, text strings in a blog post . . . ] Random and Ordered Sequence Complexities lie at opposite ends of the same bi-directional sequence complexity vector. Randomness in sequence space is defined by a lack of Kolmogorov algorithmic compressibility. A sequence is compressible because it contains redundant order and patterns. Law-like cause-and-effect determinism produces highly compressible order. Such forced ordering precludes both information retention and freedom of selection so critical to algorithmic programming and control. Functional Sequence Complexity requires this added programming dimension of uncoerced selection at successive decision nodes in the string . . . FSC is invariably associated with all forms of complex biofunction, including biochemical pathways, cycles, positive and negative feedback regulation, and homeostatic metabolism. The algorithmic programming of FSC, not merely its aperiodicity, accounts for biological organization. No empirical evidence exists of either RSC of OSC ever having produced a single instance of sophisticated biological organization. Organization invariably manifests FSC rather than successive random events (RSC) or low-informational self-ordering phenomena (OSC).
[ . . . ]kairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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StephenB @163

Methodological naturalists such as Forrest, by definition, claim that human intelligence is the result of natural processes. If you want to demonstrate that Forrest’s arguments are invalid, you must show that human intelligence is not a natural phenomena. You keep asserting it, but have provided absolutely no support for your assertions.
ID defines human intelligence as a non-natural phenomenon, so I hardly need to prove that ID’s definition is ID’s definition. Barbara Forrest’s breach is in refusing to honor ID’s definition, revising it, and the criticizing ID for not verifying it.
The fact that some ID proponents simply define human intelligence non-natural is the problem that Forrest is pointing out. Whether or not human intelligence is non-natural is a fact, not a matter of definition. From Forrest's methodological naturalism point of view, human intelligence is clearly a natural phenomena. If you want to refute her natural / supernatural dichotomy, you need to show the difference, not merely repeatedly assert it. JJJayM_{February 19, 2009
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Adel DiBagno @158
I find this discussion fascinating. I ask that Paul Giem and JayM please ignore me if I am intruding on their dialog,
Jump in, the water's fine!
but I was wondering what issue was at stake in Paul’s question:
The question which I asked still stands. Once we reach agreement on it, we can move on. Can humans do things that nature without humans is for all practical purposes incapable of doing?
To me, for the little that it may be worth, the answer is obviously ‘yes.’ I doubt that nature without humans is capable of producing an aircraft carrier or a Honda Accord. I hope that helps.
I went into this in more detail in my response to Paul, but the short version is that of course some results of human intelligence can be distinguished from other natural processes. That does not mean that human intelligence is somehow non-natural (although it may be), nor does it mean that human intelligence is the only way to achieve those results. Within the strictures of methodological naturalism, human intelligence is assumed to be a natural phenomena, so there is no reason to assume that other natural phenomena couldn't result in other forms of intelligence. This is why none of the claims regarding human intelligence thus far refute Forrest's natural / supernatural dichotomy. JJJayM_{February 19, 2009
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Paul Giem @157
I can point out that MET (which I interpreted as mechanistic evolutionary theory, although there probably isn’t any difference) mechanisms do not preserve neutral mutations, without using a strained meaning of “preserve”. You simply deny it, and ask me to look up genetic drift and related topics, as if I were not familiar with them.
With all due respect, if you were familiar with them you would not have made the incorrect claim you did. Further, I did not simply deny it, I pointed you to the correct search terms to rectify your misunderstanding. I also suggest the term "fixation of neutral mutations" which brings up some good references. JJJayM_{February 19, 2009
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Paul Giem @157
The question which I asked still stands. Once we reach agreement on it, we can move on. Can humans do things that nature without humans is for all practical purposes incapable of doing? The question is not intended to assume any judgments about whether humans are or are not a part of nature in some technical sense. Nor is it intended to assume the nature of intelligence, or, for that matter, even its existence. Nor does it assume methodological or philosophical naturalism or their negations. All it assumes is that (a) humans exist and (b) nature without humans exists. As I noted, at a maximum of some 6 million years ago, the latter was universal. It is still true for much of the solar system. So neither (a) nor (b) is hypothetical.
In fact, though, your question as phrased does make some metaphysical assumptions. It cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. I will attempt, again, to explain my view. Please note that I am trying to address the issues raised by the original post in this thread, namely Barbara Forrest's natural / supernatural dichotomy. In order to do that, I am accepting methodological naturalism for the sake of argument, since that is her world view. This thread is already long enough without getting into a separate debate on that issue. So, can humans do things that nature without humans cannot? The two possible answers in this metaphysical context are "No." and "I don't know." The first comes from the fact that human intelligence is presumed to be a natural phenomena, so there is no reason to presume that other natural phenomena, or other forms of intelligence, that can accomplish the same goals as human intelligence do not exist. The "I don't know." answer is based on the fact that we don't know of any other natural phenomena that produce the same results as human intelligence, but such phenomena are not ruled out a priori by methodological naturalism. After all, we have one example of human-like intelligence, why should there not be more? Now, if your question were "Can we detect the results of human intelligence, even if that intelligence is purely a natural phenomena?" then the answer is, of course, yes. Anthropologists do this all the time by drawing on their understanding of humans to distinguish between natural rocks and arrowheads, for example. It is obviously possible to distinguish between the results of natural phenomena like earthquakes and volcanos as well. We'll make more progress in this discussion if you drop the pseudo-Socratic approach you're attempting and just state your case. That approach is fun for the person playing Socrates (until the hemlock moment) but in practice it is a rhetorical trick to attempt to assume a position of authority. Let's instead treat one another as colleagues discussing interesting ideas. What, exactly, are you trying to get at here? How do you refute Forrest's dichotomy? JJJayM_{February 19, 2009
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Upright BiPed @156
Neither chance nor necessity have never been observed creating FSCI - trying to push into evidence that we can see it in biology is assuming your conclusion.
You keep repeating this, without ever addressing the core problems with your claim: 1) FSCI is not a rigorously defined concept. 2) If human intelligence is a natural phenomena (note carefully the word "if" -- you frequently overlook it) then FSCI has been observed to be the result of natural phenomena ("chance and necessity" in your words). 3) Even if you manage to rigorously define FSCI, and demonstrate that it exists in biological systems, you still need to prove that it is uniquely the product of intelligence. The fact that it, supposedly, is generated by humans and exists in the genome suggests that it is not unique to human intelligence. You are assuming your conclusion, again.
By the way, do you intend to continue to ignore the research paper I posted. You had made the comment that you knew of no such research, so I was just wondering about the integrity of your claim.
Thank you for the reference. My original request for a cite was based on your claim that:

A rational interpretation of the EVIDENCE shows that an input of organization at the nucleic level is a virtual necessity, and is (far and away) the explanation of living tissue that carries the greatest parsimony with all other evidence on the matter.
I suspect that this is what the evidence will show when more research is done into the “edge of evolution” but I am unaware of any significant evidence that shows intelligence is a “virtual necessity.”
The paper you cite doesn't provide any evidence whatsoever to support that claim. In fact, I found the paper to be full of unsupported assertions and precious little math. The authors even admit that quantifying their information measures is difficult, and they make no effort to address this difficulty. Frankly, that paper makes me question the peer review process at Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling. I also noted that, even though this article was published in August of 2005, it has only one cite by other articles in the PubMed database, and that by Kirk Durston. Clearly it hasn't had any real impact. You mentioned when you provided the reference that "there are others." Could you please provide those others? This one is unimpressive. JJJayM_{February 19, 2009
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8 --> Building a model of the past. If we use Newton's uniformity principle -- a nice, Creationist Principle at the heart of his Principia in the General Scholium) i.e. God's universal dominion leads to universal LAWS of nature (mechanical and moral like . . . ) -- we expect that C,N, D are also all possible causal factors in the past. So, we naturally look to the EF to discern where aspects of the past that leave traces in present objects and processes were shaped by C, N, D. 9 --> But, Bible-thumping Creationists -- Newton too? -- are "theocratic, terroristic, deceitful fundy dummies who are anti-science"; so let's look instead to Lewontin and the US NAS adn NSTA for guidance. For we want to be "well-prepared for the rigors of higher education or the demands of an increasingly complex and technologically-driven world":
[KSES, 2001 and 2007:] "Science is the human activity of seeking natural explanations for what we observe in the world around us."
10 --> H'mm: So, can we consider all three empiriclaly established causal factors on origins, to try to find the uncensored truth about the cosmos' origin? 11 --> A: Not unless you can show ahead of time that designers came about by C + N, i.e., in a materialistic world! 12 --> Q: But, what if we have presently observed signs of intelligence in the origin of life [DNA code and code-executing machinery and algorithms etc] and in the fine-tuned physics and the cosmos to facilitate C-chemistry based life? [Doesn't that on inference to best explanation point to design, per our experience of such FSCI and function-enabling IC?] 13 --> A: the opposite of "natural" is "supernatural" and you have tried to inject the supernatural into science, you creationist in a cheap tuxedo, you! 14 --> Q: But, doesn't Mr Dave Scot's thesaurus that he wants to send to Ms Forrest tell us that "If we go to a thesaurus and look up the word natural we find listed among the antonyms the words technological and artificial. Notably we do not find the word supernatural listed as an antonym"? Doesn't that mean that artificial or technological or intelligent or design are empirically observed alternatives to natural in the sense of "tracing to chance + necessity spontaneously acting in our world"? 15 --> A: here is the ruling of the official NAS-approved Magisterium: "You are hereby expelled!" ____________ See my point, gentlemen? GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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Rob and JM: Please, please. Stop playing at turnabout rhetoric; it only implicates you both further in self-referential absurdity. 1--> We have certain facts in hand that are puzzling. Alternative explanations are on offer,and we need to see which is best,a cross factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory power. 2 --> In this case, we know, per direct observation and experience, that intelligence [cf Glossary] exists. And, that intelligence produces artifacts, which often manifest characteristic signs, e.g. FSCI, IC, oracular and algorithmically active information, etc. 3 --> We also know that three categories of causal factors exist and may affect a given situation, chance, necessity, design. [The example of a dropped, tumbling then settling die that you both made such heavy weather of, simply and familiarly shows this. The situation of the dropped die also shows that C, N, D are not simply and directly reducible the one to the other.] 4 --> We are dealing with directly and reproducibly observable situations and facts now. No assumptions or assertions have been made on ultimate origins, so no Q's have been begged. (And, have you built Johnson counters and the like and played with feedback networks to get PRBS's? I have. they are a case of directed contingency, so, design. yes, if of sufficient length and if the tests of randomness are not on sufficiently long strings to see the repeat or the pattern, they will look random, and can be used as random for a lot of useful pruposes. but that has to do with focussign on a specific aspect,and the point that the ID EF will -- by its design -- give false NEGATIVES, but is reliable when it rules positively, i.e. this is an irrelevancy.) 5 --> So far we have the idea that: [a] necessity produces natural, low-contingency regularities, [b] undirected contingency or chance produces randomness (which can be tested within reason), [c] intelligence can mimic a and b but often produces certain signs, e.g. FSCI. (And, this post is an example of FSCI. Cf glossary and WAC list for more.) 6 --> Now, let us shift frame, from [i] natural philosophy producing well-warranted though provisional knowledge of the present per inference to best explanation across competing hyps on C, N, D, to (ii) models of natural history, i.e from operations to origins science. 7 --> Key shift: we were not there, so we do not directly observe, and the past is unrepeatable as well. Warrant shifts in its strength, downwards. Explanations of the remote past of origins, are inherently less well warranted than models of the present, where we can do predictions and tests with observations at will. [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{February 19, 2009
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----Rob: "Can you cite a materialist who denies the existence of minds and wills? (As they define the terms, not as you define them.)" Try these: From Daniel Dennett: "The mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain...” From Steven Pinker: “Nothing in the mind exists except as neural activity” (1997b, emp. added). From B.A. Farrel: “A human being is a modulator of pulse frequencies, and nothing more” From: Jerome Elberta: “I do maintain that ‘mental events can be reduced to brain events’StephenB_{February 18, 2009
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-----JayM: “Your willingness to leap to assumptions based on your biases is showing. I have never claimed that human intelligence is either natural or non-natural.” Well, we can certainly clear that up right now. Do you assert that human intelligence is natural or non-natural? -----“Methodological naturalists such as Forrest, by definition, claim that human intelligence is the result of natural processes. If you want to demonstrate that Forrest’s arguments are invalid, you must show that human intelligence is not a natural phenomena. You keep asserting it, but have provided absolutely no support for your assertions. ID defines human intelligence as a non-natural phenomenon, so I hardly need to prove that ID’s definition is ID’s definition. Barbara Forrest’s breach is in refusing to honor ID’s definition, revising it, and the criticizing ID for not verifying it. -----"As noted in that discussion, I find the refusal to discuss the nature of the designer scientifically indefensible and ethically questionable. I would like to see the ID movement take the high ground. That’s far more supportive of the goals of ID than your preference for us to be disingenuous." There is nothing disingenuous about making a design inference. On the other hand, asking ID to provide a mechanistic model for an innovative phenomenon is misguided. -----“For the record, I do think that design can be detected in principle. but CSI and other measurements currently being suggested are not sufficiently rigorous to do so. Again, I am supporting ID by encouraging the improvement of these tools, not just whining about how the real scientists won’t take us seriously.” Why do you think that design can be detected? -----“Excellent, we’re finally back on topic. Please provide the proof, or at least support for the idea, that human intelligence is not a natural phenomena. The methodological naturalists have thousands of peer reviewed papers published annually regarding new discoveries of the natural mechanisms underlying intelligence. We need to do more than simply claim “No, it isn’t.” Let’s start with the written paragraph and the sand castle. Do you agree that (either) or both are the product of human agency? What do you think of the 500 or more information bits in this paragraph and the probability that it could be a chance event? Do you think that 300 information bits would be less likely or more likely to occur by chance? What do you think of the idea that a 2,000,000 grain sand castle is less likely to occur from natural forces that say, a 1,000,000 grain sand castle?StephenB_{February 18, 2009
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