The Upside of Amazon Manipulation

_{William Dembski

December 20, 2007

Intelligent Design, The Design of Life}

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THE DESIGN OF LIFE is being shamelessly manipulated by the Darwinists at Amazon (go here). Not only are they posting negative reviews that give no indication that the reviewers have read the book but they are also voting up their negative reviews so that these are the first to be seen by potential buyers.

The following 1-star review, posted 8 hours ago, illustrates the Darwinists’ level of discourse at Amazon:

By E. Duran (San Jose, CA USA) – See all my reviews
I just finished reading this book without vomiting. I had to go back and read Darwin’s “Origin of Species” again to remove the bad taste out of my mouth.

This is the whole review, unedited and unabridged. Even more pathetic is that “44 of 50 people found the following review [i.e., Duran’s review] helpful.” (As of 4:10pm CST, 20Dec07)

While such behavior by Darwinists may seem unjust, there are two upsides:

(1) As the saying goes, there’s no negative publicity. Sales are brisk, especially through www.thedesignoflife.net.

(2) I’ve been talking with the producers of EXPELLED (www.expelledthemovie.com) about making this book a companion volume to Ben Stein’s film.* Thanks PZ Myers, Wesley Elsberry, Peter Irons, and others for strengthening my hand in these negotiations.

———————
*Recall that Carl Zimmer’s THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION was the companion to the 2001 PBS Evolution Series.

Comments

Hi Trib [And Q . . .]: Many happy returns to you. And. a prosperous new year! To you all . . . [including lurkers; that includes you, IDC]. Now, on a follow-up point:
Q in 44: If you instead mean that we directly see things that we infer are caused by agents in action, etc, then we could agree . . .
I must disagree, for several reasons: 1] Agent casusation is one of our most direct experiences: --> Q, let's begin with the effort you made to reply at 44 etc. Inter alia, you read and thought about what had been posted earlier, then registered to post, typed up and submitted your own reply. --> You acting as agent, therefore were a CAUSE of the response at 44. 2] Indeed, the full apparatus of agent causation as analysed by say Aristotle et al, was in play:
a] A Purpose. You wanted to reply to promote your own view. Final cause, in classical terms. b] You required and used material means [materials and forces of nature] to be able to do so. Namely, PC, keyboard and mouse, internet connection, etc. Material cause, a necessary but not in this case sufficient, condition. (This has in it of course, the natural regularities and the chance based processes embedded in such technological systems; e.g. the springiness required by keys for them to make temporary contact and return to rest so we can type messages, and the diffusion that is so integral to the workings of solid state transistors, diodes etc.) c] Actuation. The keys you pressed in sequence triggered keyboard scanning circuits and software, to feed the keystrokes into buffers, thence the wordprocessing subroutines that display on the screen, etc. Efficient cause. d] You, as a conscious, intelligent actor who created a message that exhibits FSCI well beyond the 500 - 1,000 bit threshold where, on the gamut of the cosmos we observe, there would be only a maximally unlikely probability that lucky noise in the PC and/or internet, or random actuation of keys, could have generated such a message. First cause.
3] I put it to you, that this is no mere "inference" based on sensations and phenomena, it is a reliable contact with the real world as it is, one that I daresay you routinely rely on. --> One that, moreover, relies for its effect, that you have a decision-making mind that can trigger the natural actuators, your hands and speech centres, leading to the messages that we observe. 4] Furthermore, you also see through the process, that you OBSERVE reliable material chains of cause-effect through the actuation required for the message to be typed in and eventually posted. 5] Thus, considering the PC as a system tied to a network, we see inputs of energy and information-bearing messages that were processed through carefully and complexly organised, finely tuned, functional, information-bearing elements, which trace to agents also. [That is why you paid the agents for the privilege of licensing their software and owning their hardware. Your actions betray quite real beliefs and knowledge, which conflict with your professed ones . . .] 6] Thus, agency and its causal power is a matter of your direct experience. So are causal patterns tracing to mechanical necessity and chance processes. 7] In short, the experience in our little die-tossing example is not an easily brushed aside "exception," but a part of a reliable, repeatable picture of how the world works:
heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes!
8] is the inference to agency on observing other people in action [and possibly Kzinti or Vulcan or or residents of Area 51 (wondered where Uncle Sam is getting all that high tech from?) or demons or gods or God] therefore a suspect, dubious, ill-founded act of reasoning? --> Plainly, not. --> For, we have by direct experience of it, got an insight on the possibility and actuality of agency, and indeed to act into the world as reasoning entities, we rely on our own agency. --> When therefore we see other entities exhibiting creative, reasoning -- as opposed to merely biologically or socio-culturally programmed action [cf the breakdown of evo mat on this as discussed in 41 point 3 above and in onward linked threads and web pages] -- we have excellent reason to hold that the belief in their intelligent agency is sufficiently well-warranted and credibly true that we may confidently term it knowledge. --> In short, we KNOW cause fromt he inside out, and that chance, natural regularities and agent actions are three commonly encountered causal factors. 9] One thing I confidently affirm we have never seen: a caused entitiy or situation that has happened based on NOTHING [no space, time, matter, energy, information, or mind etc] as a causal factor. 10] Likewise, the ascription that there are other vague and undefined potential factors out there is a resort to counter-experiential assertion in the teeth of reliable and abundant, indeed unexceptioned experience of the three easily observed causal factors. Namely, [a] chance, [b] lawlike natural regularities tracing to mechanical necessity, [c] agents. 11] Likewise, it is easy to confirm that organised -- especailly fine-tuned -- complexity, showing itself in functionally specified, complex information, is a regularly observed, reliable characteristic empirical trace of agents in action. 12] So, to infer on best explanation to such agents on observing FSCI is not a dubious philosophical move, it is a plain and well-warranted application of a central aspect of scientific methods. --> Of course, that has in it philosphical issues and aspects. The same ones that obtain for any significant piece of scientific work. --> So to make the objection that the reasoning employed in the design inference is suspect because it infers to best current, empirically anchored explanation is selective hyperskepticism. --> the inconsistency in thought thus exposed, leads to self refutation of such selective skeptical objections. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 26, 2007
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1] Who designed the designer? What was before the Big Bang? Prove it. Where did the multiverses come from? Show conclusive empirical proof. There is a limit to the mind of man and faith is required to function. Those who understand this are much more productive (compare Kelvin to Sagan) and more pleasant. "Do not be afraid of being free thinkers! If you think strongly enough you will be forced by science to the belief in God, which is the foundation of all religion. You will find science not antagonistic but helpful to religion." --William Thomson, 1st Baron Kelvin. And a belated Merry Christmas, KF.tribune7_{December 26, 2007
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Q, terminological exactness- "an inference" I agree. Yet inferences carry as much weight when we are discussing the unknown as deductions do when we are discussing the known- While I agree I would only ad that calling it all an inference is moot when dealing with the unknown- in that if the weight of the total evidence heavily supports one premise or conclusion- that inference should be taken into consideration in the full weight of its importance and integrity. Just calling somthing "metaphysics" or "philosophy" of sorts is moot when a discussion has real philosophical aims (be it the seach for truth or synthesis etc). And this conversation is very much philosophy as just about all discussions of all things are- While the evidence points in one direction- I agree that a free mind has the privlege to adopt alternative perspects especially when dealing with arguments, observations or conclusions that lie in the realm of, I would say "moderate", induction.Frost122585_{December 25, 2007
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Footnote: On the way back to bed . . . and seeing that insomnia has company on Christmas night . . . 1] Who designed the designer? ANS: If the designer was CAUSED -- i.e is a contingent being with a beginning, and exhibits FSCI, the designer was in turn designed. But, ANS 2: we have only addressed one class of possible being. There is an other class to be reckoned with. That is, . . . 2] What about a necessary being? As just captioned, there is the whole issue of the chain and matrix of contingent beings in our observed cosmos pointing to a NECESSARY BEING, as discussed previously. Thence . . . 3] Empirically anchored inferences on the cosmis scale . . . On the further issue that the observed cosmos shows empirical signs of agency in its origin, we should consider that the empirical evidence suggests that the cosmogenetic agent is just that, an agent. Also, since we are interested in worldview level questions, not just scientific ones, we may then look at the possibility that such an agent, may well be the necessary being pointed to by the chain and matrix of causality and contingency in our observed cosmos. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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Frost12285, if the discussion is limited to the real world, I agree with you. If the discussion expands into the philosophical domain regarding what we can "know", as I understood the theme of kairosfocus posts, then the observation of causality must be understood to be an inference. I didn't really mean to enter into the WDTD discussion. However, as you said, analysis based on real world observation leads one way, but purely philosophical analysis may allow other options that do not depend upon causality.Q_{December 25, 2007
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Q,
must we assume that an intelligent designer’s existence was the result of causal actions?
You are asking a very different question now. Now you have gone from ultimate and impractical skepticism of our ability to understand or infer design or agency- to - the "who the designed the designer" question. Here is why (and I suspect you know that you did but if not here is why) When it comes to physics you say "Ok. No problemo. I agree that causality is realistically an inevitable existing necessity" - and you are right to say this because the only other way one can explain the universes (or anything for that matter) is to say it just “is” or “has” always existed. Unfortunately the scientific evidence for the big bang and particle physics shows that all things are in a constant state of relative motion. In other words, there is no ether- no reason to suspect singularity can exist without causality some prior causality up until the big bang which is the mysterious first cause.. Now, given that we can establish that causality is at least in this universe a necessary condition for the adequate explanation of any known event- baring hyper skepticism or the problem of induction which neither is evidence for or against agency- you have merely pushed the problem of inferring agency back by begging the unanswerable question of the causality of the designer- or the who designed the designer question- As in the WDTD question, there is no way of knowing unless you can specify who or what properties the designer is composed of. Design inferences (on the contrary) are based upon the physical known universe and its cause and effect structure, not the speculative or transphysical or metaphysical reality that exists solely in the mind’s conceptions of all possibilities. Thus this is the biggest problem with Darwinism, that once we leave the realm of real experience (what we know objectively or highly probabilistically) and venture exclusively into the imagination of the skeptic we loose all touch with reason. Now, however, instead of dodging the question- I will answer the “can we know what caused the designer” question. The answer is that given that all KNOWN cases of SC in the KNOWN universe are the result of greater SC and an ID - we can thus deduce that the unknown designer would more than likely have a designer- or be the result of greater SC- than to have no causality. To push the problem back does not eliminate our experience or our evidence. While the likely answer based upon direct observation is "the designer must have had a designer" the fact that that designer could or probably would (given the mystery of the big band) exist outside of the universe would then logically open the possibility that it does not obey the laws we are familiar with and is thus not held up to the same scrutiny that we apply to “interuniversal” or known physical phenomena - in which case the designer may not ever be compatible with the concept of causality. This is logically consistent. To posit that there is good reason to think that the known universe (or things inherent in it) are the product, ultimately, of non-causality would go against all of the evidence. ID is about what we can infer about the physical universe using our brains- not what we can infer about the unknown universe and no regress no matter how infinite is going to change it.Frost122585_{December 25, 2007
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PS: Ironically, the head of IDC's review at Amazon reads: 169 of 188 people found the following review helpfulkairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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7] IDC, commenting on his post at Amazon: Kairosfocus makes the same mistake as other ID proponents, namely claiming that agency is a separate category from chance and regularity. Of course, IDers are free to make such claims but when looking at scientific applications of agency we notice how it involves chance and regularity explanations such as means, motives, opportunity, and eye-witnesses, circumstantial evidence and physical evidence to build a compelling case. In other words, agency is nothing different from chance and regularity. See the direct parallel failure? Also, observe how neatly IDC side-steps explicitly addressing the key "circumstantial evidence" and "physical evcidence" issue that agents routinely leave empirical traces of their actions, i.e. organised complexity, often seen as FSCI. For, it is precisely the presence of functional, information-bearing patterns towards credible goals that would otherwise be vastly improbable that fingers agent action in forensic, archaeological or similar scientific situations. In that context, motive, means, and opportunity are obviously factors relating to purpose. On the nanotech of the cell, we can see: --> MOTIVE: the goal to be acheived; creation of life. --> MEANS: using the forces (natural regularities and chance phenomena such as diffusion) and materials of nature [especially carbon chemistry] to design and implement the DNA- RNA- enzyme- ribosome- metabolism and associated technologies of life. --> OPPORTUNITY: for one instance, for the sake of argument, time -- say 3.8 BYA, place: the earth. --> Empirical evidence: the observed resulting otherwise maximally improbable [on the gamut of the observed cosmos] nanotechnology. ONLOOKERS: Observe as well the highlighted question-begging at the end, and the associated failure to address the precise point of the explanatory filter, i.e that it helps us see empirically that we are dealing with FSCI which is otherwise maximally improbable on undirected chance + necessity. 8] Ignoring the fallacious claims of materialism being impotent to account for a credible mind . . . Okay, then why not simply show us HOW this claim is "fallacious,"? [In short, this is a dismissal not a cogent rebuttal, and on a subject where in fact the materialists are as a matter of easily observed fact unable to account for or even in many cases simply admit to the reality of mind.] 9] Kairosfocus understands that his position is not one of science but philosophy. Onlookers, observe: I have put the science in its philosophical context,and have explicitly identified that the explanatory filter is an application to a "novel" case of a well-proved, commonly applied mechanism of inference used in scientific contexts. In short, a red-herring, leading out to an oil-soaked strawman that is about to be ignited to cloud and poison the atmosphere . . . 10] In other words, the claim by ID that design is that which remains once we have eliminated known (and unknown) processes of regularity and chance, fails to show that the remainder is either the empty set (when all known and unknown processes have been eliminated), or 'false positives' when not all unknown processes have been eliminated or 'the supernatural' which cannot be captured by natural processes of regularity and chance. --> H'mm: observe 1: the actual fact that we routinely see chance, necessity and agency in action is dodged, to try to cloud the atmosphere with the burning smoke of the philosophical strawman. --> Notice, 2: how we see not trace of the little die example, much less the more relevant one of the nanojets-assembly by chance plus necessity vs agency [i.e a version on Maxwell's Demon], from my appendix 1 section 6, which I explicitly and repeatedly have pointed to and even sometimes linked.] --> See, 3: the resort to the promissory note to subvert the inference to the best current, empirically anchored explanation, and the onward implication. Namely, that so soon as empirical evidence does not suit the evo mat cause, the threadbare claim that their reasoning is firmly anchored in science is abandoned. --> And see again, 4: we see the idea that nothing [i.e the empty set] is an effective causal force. --> Look at 5: the notion of a false positive on the explanatory filter is trotted out, without being able to give a single case in point where we directly know the causal story and can see that agency was not involved in generating FSCI. Empirical data being inadequate to support evo mat, it is hastily abandoned in favour of burning handy, favourite strawmen. --> Which brings us to 6: " 'the supernatural' which cannot be captured by natural processes of regularity and chance." (Oh, we cannot allow a Divine foot inthe door! Or, any sign of agency -- i.e of mind.) --> Indeed, it seems that "mind" here neatly fits IDC's stricture against "the supernatural" i.e irreducibility to chance + necessity. --> So, in effect he is forced to deny the mind and its characteristic feature, real, thinking, logical and creative AGENCY. And once we do that, we are right back at the self- stultifying nature of evco mat on accounting for the emergence of the mind evo mat advocates have to use to think evo mat thoughts and hold them to be credible not the mere noise thrown off by chance plus necessity in action. All this, because IDC cannot see that agency is an empirically observed cause not reducible to chance plus necessity as is easily observed and as has again been discussed by way of a very reasonable thought-experiment above. 11] [going back to the original "review," to respond to a challenge, on no 29 above, point 5]: Dembski argues that if something can be explained as a regularity, its probability becomes close to 1 and the information goes to 0. But the same applies then to intelligent design. If something can be explained as intelligently designed, the amount of information is zero. Now, we have here a long blog thread, and over at Amazon, 55 or more by now reviews, that may reasonably be inferred to be the product of agents in action. So, let us analyse:
a] Is it reasonable to infer that these constitute intelligently designed actions? YES. b] Is it reasonable to infer, then, on IDC's interpretation of Dembski's remarks, that "the amount of information is zero" in these remarks? OBVIOUSLY, NO. c] Indeed, we can estimate the number of bits required to store the information, and it vastly exceeds the 500 - 1,000 bits that make the information sufficiently complex that on the gamut of the cosmos, the odds that such FUNCTIONALLY specified, complex information could arise by chance + necessity only are negligibly different from zero. d] Thus, the "interpretation" of Dembski's explanatory filter is obvious nonsense. And it is produced by the confusions and contradictions in IDC's mind, not an objective ands fair reading of Dembski.
In short, contempt is here the father of absurdity and self-refutation for IDC. His very own work reflects the precise sort of functionally specified complex information that agents routinely produce and which in ICT contexts we routinely use to infer to intelligent agent originated signal/message, not “lucky noise.” But, in his contempt for ID thinkers and haste to score rhetorical points, he cannot see that he has twisted what Dr Dembski wrote into an utterly unrealistic strawman. Triumphalistically and insistently burning that strawman only serves to show up the absurdity in IDC's own position. And, again, that's enough for now . . . the absurdities of the evo mat view on the inference to design are more and more apparent as they, however reluctantly, are forced to actually articulate and try to defend their position. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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All: (Esp. Q & ICD): After some fun with presents, and family time, including photo sessions, and a bit of ugly sleep, I decided to take a look here and at IDC's attempted reply in a comment on his Dec 21 "reviuew" over at Amazon. I see there is considerable rhetorical overlap between Q's and IDC's remarks, and will make a note or two to both. 1] Q, 44: I argue that we see events, and infer that they were caused by agents, or chance, or natural regularities (or other causes, perhaps, but I’ll limit the discussion to these three.) Let's see:
It's Christmas Day, and LKF takes out a brand new Monopoly set, and in taking it out, out tumble the dice, rolling to a 7. Then, a little later, his Uncle G in playing with him -- all of this is fictional but in principle possible, of course -- and in playing tosses the dice and oops, a 7 lands him on Park Place, with three Hotels on it. Triumphantly, LKF cries out "RENT!"
Onlookers, I contend that we have seen agents in action here as causal factors [and chance and natural regularities], on good old fashioned common sense. I further contend that Kantian-style stuff on phenomena shaped by our minds so that we can never access the world of things in themselves is self-contradictory and self-defeating. For, to have the claimed knowledge that we cannot access the world of things in themselves, is to immediately imply direct knowledge of that allegedly inaccesible external world. Thirdly, we plainly do see events, and in so seeing these events, we can see causal factors in action, as just described. Of course, as GP hinted at above, some evo mat advocates infer that our minds are in the end playthings of unconscious, material forces, ultimately tracing through chance and necessity back to the origin of the cosmos. But, as I showed in 41, that boils down to self-refutation of evolutionary materialism. 2] . . . or other causes, perhaps, but I’ll limit the discussion to these three I note under a second head, that Q raises the ghostly prospect of causal factors not analysable to chance and/or necessity and/or agency. It suffices to comment, that he has not exemplified such, and to note that this is for the excellent reason that he evidently cannot do so but hopes to rhetorically cloud the analysis with vague unknowns. Well, it is an empirical commitment of the ID position in science, that we may reduce causal factors to chance, necessity and agency, Q. It is also a long since observed commitment of many philosophers, and in more recent times, it is an underlying framework for statistical inference. This, I have elaborated in the discussion of the explanatory filter. So, feel free to empirically and credibly identify a counter-example. [That is, here is a point of falsifiablility for design as a theory of inference to causal pattern!] 3] We can never prove to the exclusion of all other options which is the cause of the event. Instead, we must limit the answer to that which best provides an answer, according to whatever criteria we choose to define “best”. This is true of all science, as an exercise of fallible men. Indeed, this is part of why falsifiability and more broadly testability are held to be epistemic virtues of scientific theorising, observation and experimentation. To cite this as a specific objection to design thought accomplishes two things: [a] it shows just of ill-founded is the commonly encountered slogan that "ID is not falsifiable/testable," and [b] it shows Q resorting to selective hyperskepticism. 4] Should we assume that the pips somehow change based upon the intent of the actors surrounding them? If this were not so sad, I would laugh. For, we have a simple, plain, easily observed case of chance, necessity and agents in action, and Q cannot simply and directly address what his "lying" eyes [and the mind/common sense his evo mat views tells him is a delusion] are telling him. Namely, that agents are capable of manipulating the natural regularities and chance processes of the world in the pursuit of their meaningful ends. In so doing, they generate meaningful patterns of data, structured into informational frameworks that fit functional patterns. Just think of the information stored on the board, much less inferrable from the patterns of structured behaviour and creative action of the agents playing the game! Not to mention, their reliance on the ability to accurat5ely perceive the external world and to think logically and act to one's purposes in a coherent and logical fashion as say Game Theory will allow us to analyse. Here, FSCI and its source are visible in the playing of a game, including in the tossing of the dice to control how the moves are made and their consequences. Surely, this is functionally specified and complex information! In a more serious case, like a heat engine, the generation of motive power from the random thermal agitation of suitable gaseous molecules heated through combustion of a fuel, and fitted into the natural regularities harvested to structure an energy converter. And, in so doing, we repeatedly and routinely see FSCI showing itself as a characteristic sign of agency in action. If your car engine is giving trouble, you may also see irreducible complexity in action the expensive way. In each of these cases, we see organised complexity in action, and observe its close connexion to agents. So, now, ecxtend to the three main situations addressed in my always linked, and more broadly by design theorists: the highly informational nanotech of life at cellular level, the increments in such FSCI required for body-plan level biodiversity,a nd the organised, fine-tuned complexity of the observed cosmos. 5] I mean if the die is not loaded, and the roll is not controlled, so that the results cannot be predicted from the roll, then the agency (i.e the player’s action) is no longer relevant to the result . . . it may seem nice to keep chance and agent separate, but randomness means that the results cannot be inferred from the agents actions. Onlookers, observe the subtle difference between what I noted and how Q cited that 'when the die is rolled [omitted, crucial context: TO PLAY A GAME] “the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance”' Let's roll the tape, yet again:
For instance, heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes!
In short, we again see selective hyperskepticism, to try to blunt the obvious: we see chance, necessity AND agency in action, and each is not reducible to the other two. In particular, here we observe that agents use chance and regularities to fit situations to their PURPOSES, i.e a functional, evidently goal-oriented pattern. I leave it to the astute reader to see that it should be plain that there is a very different situation when the same dice are dropped, by LKF or anyone else for that matter, "by accident." (We can play a very old courtroom game: accident, suicide or murder . . .] 6] randomness means that the results cannot be inferred from the agents actions. But, that is a materialistic/mechanical explanation. And, in context, the agents USE that randomness to fit into their own purposes. The materialistic focus on the fact of an effectively random result -- as per Laplace criterion -- blinds one to the otherwise obvious context, of agent action. With this background, let us turn to IDC . . . [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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kairosfocus mentioned in 41 "First, we directly observe agents in action, chance in action and natural regularities in action." I disagree with this statement as written. I argue that we see events, and infer that they were caused by agents, or chance, or natural regularities (or other causes, perhaps, but I'll limit the discussion to these three.) We can never prove to the exclusion of all other options which is the cause of the event. Instead, we must limit the answer to that which best provides an answer, according to whatever criteria we choose to define "best". For some scientists, the "best" answer could be that which most matches the set of data collected. For philosophers, the "best" answer may be that we will never know. If you instead mean that we directly see things that we infer are caused by agents in action, etc, then we could agree. I'm unsure why you are saying that the number on a die is somehow different if simply dropped from a box, or if rolled in a game. Aren't you mixing the people's interpretation of pips on the die with the actual pips on the die? Should we assume that the pips somehow change based upon the intent of the actors surrounding them? When you say that when the die is rolled "the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance" aren't you referring to the cause of the roll and not its results? I mean if the die is not loaded, and the roll is not controlled, so that the results cannot be predicted from the roll, then the agency (i.e the player's action) is no longer relevant to the result. Random chance is all that relates to the result. Of course, it may seem nice to keep chance and agent separate, but randomness means that the results cannot be inferred from the agents actions. But, that is a materialistic/mechanical explanation. Philosophically they may be considered separately, and the argument made that a change in the agent's action would have caused a different result. However, at the same time, the definition of randomness, i.e. of unbiased chance, says otherwise. If the roll is truly random, consistent arguments about agency and random chance indicate that no inference can be made on the result from the actor's events. Do you want to suggest that no true randomness exists, and that the results of everything always has some bias to the chance? Also, I appreciate your interest in the many things you inferred from my post, i.e. your questions about worldview level consequences, hyperskepticism, origins of the mind, morality, etc. But, I don't think that ID is so monolithic that all such topics need be addressed at the same time. Maybe we could address other points at a different time. Although you suggest that I "have some serious answering to do, on both logic and premises", I'd rather focus on the premises about agency, chance, and regularity for now.Q_{December 25, 2007
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PPS: at 5:10 am LKF got up, and opened up his present from Uncle G! ;->)kairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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4] Frosty has raised a very interesting point at 39:
all it a cause, call it an origin, but, nonetheless, at some point the laws of physics show that somthing set that chain dominos into action.
That brings up the basic worldview level issues posed in the following candidate inference to best explanation - and note this is now deep into Lakatos' worldviews core at the heart of the way scientists working on a research programme's belt of theories are thinking; these days, too often without having even a first base in serious phil of sci much less general phil:
B. Cosmological inference: (NB: This appears out of the classical order, as IMHO it makes A far more clear if this is done, by distinguishing and rationalising "contingent" and "necessary" beings. This is an example of a cumulative argument.): 1. Some contingent beings exist. (E.g.: us, a tree or a fruit, an artifact, the planets and stars, etc. -- anything that might not have existed, i.e. is caused.) 2. Contingent beings do not exist by themselves – that is in part what “contingent” means - so they require a necessary being as their ultimate cause. [note, here we are not committing to a finite temporal sequence, we need for instance a floor and a gravity field as well as a trigger for the chain of dominoes. Causes are at least simultaneous with the caused, and may act as sufficient conditions or necessary conditions. For the former, set them up and trigger , and the chain goes. For the latter, if they are absent, the chain cannot go. E.g. how we fight fires in light of the fire triangle: remove one or more of oxidiser, heat and fuel and the fire fails.] 3. If any contingent being exists, then a necessary being exists. ________________ 4. Thus, [i,e by inference to best explanation, IBE for short]there exists a necessary being, the ultimate cause of the existence of the many contingent beings in the cosmos. A. Ontological: 1. If God exists, his existence is necessary. (NB link to B.4 just above. God is here viewed as a candidate for the necessary being underlying the observed hugely contingent cosmos. This step can only properly be ruled out ahead by showing that his existence is impossible on logical grounds and/or across all possible worlds. Cf 2 immediately following.) 2. If God does not exist, his existence is impossible. 3. Either God exists or he does not exist. 4. God’s existence is either necessary or impossible. 5. But, God’s existence is possible (i.e. not impossible). _________________ 6. So, [on IBE] God’s existence is necessary. C. Teleological/design: 1. Highly complex objects with intricate, interacting parts are produced by intelligent designers, at least so far as we can determine from cases where we do directly know the cause. [Q, kindly show us a counter example within our direct observation of its origin, where an entity exhibiting organised complexity involving functionally specified, fine-tuned, complex information [at least 500 - 1,000 bits of information storage created de novo] as a key component of its functioning has come to be by chance + necessity only without agent action. Event his thread alone is adequate to instantiate abundant illustrative cases of agent produced FSCI as a commonplace, regular observation.] 2. The universe (and/or a specific part of it[3]) is just such a highly complex object. [Cases: the nanotechnology of cell-based life systems, the increments in FSCI required for origin of the sort of body plan diversity we see in the fossil record and currently, the organised, fine-tuned complexity of the physics of the cosmos as we observe it. Cf. my always linked for a discussion.] _____________ 3. Probably [i.e IBE no 1], it is the result of intelligent design. 4. But, the scope/complexity of the universe [note this is tied to the genesis of the COSMOS, not to OOL, save by the link that the universe was set up to be a fit habitation for life so it is reasonable but a weaker inference to infer that life as we observe it on Earth probably directly traces to the Agent responsible for the cosmos] is such that only God could be its designer. _____________ 5. Probably [IBE no 2], there is a God.
--> Now, this is not a claimed proof, it is a claimed inference to best explanation on comparative difficulties across competing live option worldviews. Above on the problems of evo mat shows in part why. --> To respond, it is not good enough to say that the premises are disputed – just about everything in phil is, starting with the definition of phil itself; one needs to point out what he credible alternatives are and how they stand up on factual adequacy, coherence [dynamical and logical] and explanatory elegance vs simplisticness or being an ad hoc patchwork. 5] Q, at 40: I would prefer discussions of ID to stick with the observable laws of physics, and not invoke the philosophical arguments unless absolutely necessary. I think it unnecessary, and possibly counter productive, to build arguments of ID regarding what is happening in the real world by invoking arguments that are built upon questionable foundations. That is why I was questioning kairosfocus’ premises. As Lakatos pointed out aptly, scientific research programmes follow an architecture: a belt of theories, models and entities, surrounding a worldviews level core. And in a day when methodological naturalism is being used to imporoperly beg the question on inference to design, we have no responsible choice but to cogently address that phil-level core. [Cf my always linked, esp. the FAQs and primer articles at the end of the introduction.] Further to this point, I have at every stage in my participation in this blog, as just noted, ALWAYS linked to a regularly updated, responsible, detailed discussion of the issue across the domains of science ands onward into the phil issues, step by step. I therefore feel justified to state that I find it quite annoying to be dismissed as excerpted and highlighted above without a fair response on the merits to that. Nevermind. Happy Christmas to all, and a prosperous new year. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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All, I accidentally cross posted the first of these to the textbooks thread, pardon. I try to repost it here now, hoping the filter lets it though . . .: ++++++++++ Greetings at Christmas! Look, today is a very special day, and I have on the sofa behind me an eager-beaver of a Little Kairosfocus (his own self-chosen title!), who is just napping and waiting for dawn to open his present from his indulgent "uncle" G. [I will be giving him and his older sister rather more pedestrian, though unusual, gifts!] And, the morrow is my wife's birthday! So, any serious response is the day after that. (And, I think that we should all be having family time now . . .) I simply note briefly: 1] I see that IDC has evidently responded to my note, over at Amazon. --> I will get around to it, but GP's points are devastatingly revealing, once we apply basic principles of comparative difficulties across worldviews and address the usual selective hyperskepticism that such evo mat rhetoricians routinely use. 2] I see Q is trying to challenge my "premises." --> First, we directly observe agents in action, chance in action and natural regularities in action. So, I would love for him to analyse my case of a die tossed to say play a turn at Monopoly! (A great Christmas gift, that.) --> E.g., from the always linked and as already excerpted in its context:
For instance, heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes!
--> I think that this illustrates just how complex cause is. And, that agent action is sigificant and qualitiatively different from chance and necessity. --> Think of the difference if the box has just been opened under the tree, and oops, it spills out, and the dice tumble out to a 7. --> That is very different from the case where in playing a game a bit later that day, that same relatively highly probable 7 would put you at Park Avenue with three hotels on it! "RENT!!!!!" --> Second, on in effect asserting and/or implying that agency reduces to/emerges from chance plus natural regularities in action, Q opens himself up to the major comparative difficulties challenge of the dynamical incoherence of evo mat in accounting for the origin and trustworthiness of the mind. --> This, I and others debated at length in the Aug 20 Charles Darwin, originally humourous, thread; cf. 48 on. So, Q cannot simply say he is challenging my premises and assume that that is good enough -- or else he is simply committing selective hyperskepticism, aka intellectual suicide. [Onlookers, I think you will love the new appendix on the Lucy Pevensie school of epistemology!] 3] In short, the issue does not go away so easily as playing selective hyperskepticism, but leads straight into a major comparative difficulties challenge for evo mat, as my note on the subject linked in the CD thread observed long since:
materialism . . . argues that the cosmos is the product of chance interactions of matter and energy, within the constraint of the laws of nature. Therefore, all phenomena in the universe, without residue, are determined by the working of purposeless laws acting on material objects, under the direct or indirect control of chance. . . .
--> Q, does this not fairly state your [for argument's sake?] position? If so, cf below. [If not, kindly distinguish, with at least and outline explanation. Consequences and CD issues follow.] --> Continuing . . .
But human thought, clearly a phenomenon in the universe, must now fit into this picture. Thus, what we subjectively experience as "thoughts" and "conclusions" can only be understood materialistically as unintended by-products of the natural forces which cause and control the electro-chemical events going on in neural networks in our brains. (These forces are viewed as ultimately physical, but are taken to be partly mediated through a complex pattern of genetic inheritance and psycho-social conditioning, within the framework of human culture.) Therefore, if materialism is true, the "thoughts" we have and the "conclusions" we reach, without residue, are produced and controlled by forces that are irrelevant to purpose, truth, or validity. Of course, the conclusions of such arguments may still happen to be true, by lucky coincidence [NB my always linked, section A, on lucky noise . . .] — but we have no rational grounds for relying on the “reasoning” that has led us to feel that we have “proved” them. And, if our materialist friends then say: “But, we can always apply scientific tests, through observation, experiment and measurement,” then we must note that to demonstrate that such tests provide empirical support to their theories requires the use of the very process of reasoning which they have discredited!
--> Worldview level consequences follow:
Thus, evolutionary materialism reduces reason itself to the status of illusion. But, immediately, that includes “Materialism.” For instance, Marxists commonly deride opponents for their “bourgeois class conditioning” — but what of the effect of their own class origins? Freudians frequently dismiss qualms about their loosening of moral restraints by alluding to the impact of strict potty training on their “up-tight” critics — but doesn’t this cut both ways? And, should we not simply ask a Behaviourist whether s/he is simply another operantly conditioned rat trapped in the cosmic maze?
--> Bottomline:
In the end, materialism is based on self-defeating logic, and only survives because people often fail (or, sometimes, refuse) to think through just what their beliefs really mean. As a further consequence, materialism can have no basis, other than arbitrary or whimsical choice and balances of power in the community [aka "might makes 'right' "], for determining what is to be accepted as True or False, Good or Evil. So, Morality, Truth, Meaning, and, at length, Man, are dead.
--> Q, methinks you have some serious answering to do, on both logic and premises. [. . . ]kairosfocus_{December 25, 2007
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Frost122585, must we assume that an intelligent designer's existance was the result of causal actions? If not, then we have the conclusion that at least something could result without causality. If so, then we have nudged the origin, and actions, of the designer into the physical domain. If we are talking laws of physics, then I fully agree that causality is legitimately part of the process. But, Kairosfocus was delving beyond the laws of physics to the deeper understanding of chance, regularity, and agency, so I followed where it lead. Just as you indicate, and as I mentioned a few posts ago, I would prefer discussions of ID to stick with the observable laws of physics, and not invoke the philosophical arguments unless absolutely necessary. I think it unnecessary, and possibly counter productive, to build arguments of ID regarding what is happening in the real world by invoking arguments that are built upon questionable foundations. That is why I was questioning kairosfocus' premises.Q_{December 24, 2007
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--- call it a cause, call it an origin, but, nonetheless, at some point the laws of physics show that somthing set that chain dominos into action.Frost122585_{December 24, 2007
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Q, the idea that causality must be taken as faith is really not true. We know what the casue is that sets off the collapse of a long row of dominos for instance. The question that you claim is faith is the idea of ultimate cause- yet mondern science points to a big bang and indeed a singuar original cause. The point is that there had to be a prior entity that initiated that cause- if this conclusion is correct we can only imagine a casue that transcends the physical universe. This is not a mattr of fact it is a mater of specuation based on sound evidence- the leap towards an all mighty or intelligent God would require faith- and would require deduction in part through theology- but faith is not required to accept scienitifically the reality of causeality. All things once were- except to a point when all things ceased to exist.Frost122585_{December 24, 2007
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In #35, kairosfocus asks "Kindly, respond on the laid out logic,.." I don't want to challenge your logic. I'm questioning your premises. You limited the query to what "we routinely and generally observe." I suspect that we don't agree on what it is that we routinely and generally observe. There was no additional scope or detail, so it is possible that we are interpreting that claim differently. The next premise I don't fully agree with regards how far to drill down to gather our knowledge about causality. You asked "whether or not what we routinely and generally observe stems from one or more of the causal factors..." I claimed that many, if not most, of our observations can be explained with simple material causality. As you point out, and with which I fully agree, as we delve into those eplanations, we learn that our explanations are based upon assumptions that can't be "proven" through "causal" means. In effect we learn that we don't "know" what we know. That philosophical insight makes it clear that we can't really claim that chance or regularity are the "true" causes of events. I also suggest that the same insight shows that we can't know that this leaves agent as a cause either. In fact, the simple premise that "causality" even occurs is simply taken as faith. Philosophy shows that we can't even prove that Descartes was right with his causality claim of "I think, therefore I am". We are simply left with knowing that we don't know nothin' about nothin'. As you might see, once we remove the premise about how far to dig down in the philosophy, we learn that we simply can't claim to know anything about causality. Even, I claim, whether an agent was involved. BTW, I wasn't wanting to take up the mantle of arguing directly about your other points starting in post 29.Q_{December 24, 2007
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kairosfocus: thank you for giving such a complete and brilliant answer to ID Critic's posts at Amazon. I had read them, and I have read your answer and his "answers" to your answer, and my only reaction is frustration: ID Critic has at least the merit of trying to discuss, instead of just comdemning ID and an unread book out of mere arrogance. But his arguments are, indeed, mere arrogance, and they would require a long and detailed analysis which I have not the time or will to do. Luckily, you have answered the most important points. I want only to briefly comment about IDC's idea of unjustified assumptions. Practically, he criticizes Dembski for assuming that agency exists, while he gives for certain that science has completely explained consciousness and intelligence as a mere combination of chance and necessity. From this "simple" assumption he derives all his absurd arguments, declaring confidently that if something is the product of agency, then it is the product of necessity and contains no information, and similar nonsense. I think we should inform Mario Beauregard that, as IDC states, agents are a mere combination of chance and necessity, and that science has demonstrated that, so that he can apologize for his brilliant book demonstrating the contrary. In the meantime, I will put an end to this "randon-necessary" post, and go back to my personal illusions of consciousness and why not, sometimes, intelligence. By the way, a merry Christmas to all!gpuccio_{December 24, 2007
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PPS: In 30 above, Q, I explicitly addressed the explanatory filter, step by step. I therefore find your comment on situations commonly enountered in nature but not filtering out to exhibiting FSCI, puzzling in that light. Kindly, respond on the laid out logic, the OOL and body plan level biodiversity cases, the organised complexity of the physics of he cosmos as discussed in my always linked, and the parallels in [a] hypothesis testing and [b] inference to signal not lucky noise. Then we can move the matter forward productively in about three days -- Boxing Day is my Wife's birthday!kairosfocus_{December 24, 2007
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PS: Oops, the causal factors excerpt is here, in my always linked.kairosfocus_{December 24, 2007
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Hi Q: I excerpt my linked on the observation of the three causal factors: _______________ . . . the decision faced once we see an apparent message, is first to decide its source across a trichotomy: (1) chance; (2) natural regularity rooted in mechanical necessity (or as Monod put it in his famous 1970 book, echoing Plato, simply: "necessity"); (3) intelligent agency. These are the three commonly observed causal forces/factors in our world of experience and observation. [Cf technical, peer-reviewed, scientific discussion here. Also, cf. Plato's remark in his The Laws, Bk X, excerpted below.] Each of these forces, clearly, stands at the same basic level as an explanation or cause, and so the proper question is to rule in/out relevant factors at work, not to decide before the fact that one or the other is not admissible as a "real" explanation: CASE STUDY ON CAUSAL FORCES/FACTORS -- A Tumbling Die: For instance, heavy objects tend to fall under the natural regularity we call gravity. If the object is a die, the face that ends up on the top from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is for practical purposes a matter of chance. But, if the die is cast as part of a game, the results are as much a product of agency as of natural regularity and chance. Indeed, the agents in question are taking advantage of natural regularities and chance to achieve their purposes! This concrete, familiar illustration should suffice to show that the three causal factors approach is not at all arbitrary or dubious -- as some are tempted to imagine or assert. However, some evidently believe, based on Kant and Hume, that in effect there is an unjustified worldview level basic assumption at work, rooted in the idea that in effect we can never know things as such [the noumenal world] but only as our senses and thought-world shapes them [the phenomenal world]: --> First, such a concept is self refuting; for, as F. H. Bradley aptly showed in his gentle but stinging opening salvo in his Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edn: “The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is impossible has . . . himself . . . perhaps unknowingly, entered the arena [of metaphysics] . . . . To say that reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is to claim to know reality.” [(Clarendon Press, 1930), p.1.] (The reader may also wish to peruse Mortimer Adler's essay on "Little Errors at the Beginning," here, on the underlying pervasive problem of such errors in modern philosophising.) --> Second, the idea that the design inference unwarrantedly assumes the existence of a designer at the outset is simply wrong-headed. For, we observe only that cause-effect patterns in general trace to one or more of chance, necessity, agency; i.e. the only assumption is that agents are POSSIBLE, not excluded before we look at the empirical data -- we merely refuse to beg the question ahead of the facts. --> Then, we see that a highly contingent situation (such as: which face of a die is uppermost) is either chance or agency, not necessity. For, the outcome can take on a range of values, and we can observe the frequency distribution in that range. After that, we test for whether the observed outcome is (1) sufficiently improbable -- i.e complex -- and also (2) functionally specified, to warrant inference that it is caused by agency not chance. (For instance if the die in our game keeps on coming up sixes, to the benefit of one player, that strongly suggests sleight of hand and loading.) --> Fourth, on the broader issue of Fisherian vs Bayesian inference testing and Hume vs Reid on inference to design, Dr Dembski has presented compelling arguments here and here respectively. In desperately compressed summary, we go looking for alternative hypotheses only when we already have seen that there is reason to be suspicious [i.e Bayesian testing in effect assumes Fisherian as its context], and the explanatory filter provides a tool for objectively deciding that "suspicious enough." --> Also, the inference to design is not simply a weak analogy, it is an inference to best explanation relative to what we know agents routinely do: generate FSCI, which in every observed case where we know the causal story directly is not the product of chance but of agency. --> For instance, DNA is a complex and functionally specified digital bit-string, just like the underlying code for this web page. The odds of getting to a functioning DNA string by chance, on the gamut of our observed universe, are negligibly different from zero. It is therefore reasonable to infer -- absent imposition of arbitrary selective hyperskepticism or philosophically question-begging, historically unwarranted rules such as so-called methodological naturalism -- that it is designed. Then also, in certain highly important communication situations, the next issue is whether the detected signal comes from (4) a trusted source, or (5) a malicious interloper, or is a matter of (6) unintentional cross-talk. (Consequently, intelligence agencies have a significant and very practical interest in the underlying scientific questions of inference to agency then identification of the agent -- a potential (and arguably, probably actual) major application of the theory of the inference to design.) __________________ And, Plato: Ath. . . . we have . . . lighted on a strange doctrine. Cle. What doctrine do you mean? Ath. The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many. Cle. I wish that you would speak plainer. Ath. The doctrine that all things do become, have become, and will become, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance. Cle. Is not that true? Ath. Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as well follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them and their disciples. Cle. By all means. Ath. They say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of nature and of chance, the lesser of art, which, receiving from nature the greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are generally termed artificial . . . . . fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance . . . The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them . . . After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only . . . . Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul [i.e. mind], especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body? . . . . if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise. ___________________ Monod, of course, wrote a book on Chance and Necessity. That'll have to be all for the moment! It's Christmas Eve . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 24, 2007
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kairosfocus, in 29 said, "H’mm. IDC, kindly tell us whether or not what we routinely and generally observe stems from one or more of the causal factors: [a] chance, [b] natural regularity tracing to mechanical, law-like necessity, [c] agency? Or, did Plato et al or in more modern times, Monod et al get it wrong?" My first, and less important, comment is that the answer is unnecessarily overloaded with the question about Plato et al. That is, the first question isn't right simply because Plato et al say it is, and the answer wouldn't be more wrong simply because it conflicts with Plato et al. My next point, however, directly addresses your query. How can that even be answered with confidence? You specifically mentioned "routinely and generally observe". That includes quite a lot of events that can typically explained with simple mechanics. For instance, we can see glass break when it falls. That breakage doesn't necessarily require agency (even if mechanical explanations don't exclude agency.) We also observe tides, diffraction, weight, color, erosion, planets, stars, etc. It is quite reasonable to claim that many (or most, depending upon how counted) don't depend upon agency. What we can confidently claim is that agency isn't excluded as a possibility, but other reasonable explanations exist for what we routinely and generally observe, barring, perhaps, some specific events. Did you mean something other than what I read from your point?Q_{December 23, 2007
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kairosfocus: Great work on #29 and #30. It's too bad that you don't live in the United States. That way we could claim you as one of our national treasures.StephenB_{December 22, 2007
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6] perhaps we can define the amount of information as the likelihood that the item arose under uniform probability? Under that scenario, something is `designed' if it has a function and if its pure chance probability is too low. But then we still do not know if designed means `designed by regularity/chance' or `designed by an intelligence' IDC, please, first of all, read some basic materials on information theory, perhaps even my modest summary in my always linked, section A, as just linked. If you had submitted something like the just excerpted in my Comms classes, you would have been given 0. [Let's just say my students had a saying when I turned up in class: "More work, sir!" I freely confess to being of the heavy workload school of thought on learning in college.] In the bolded part, IDC sets the essence of the EF in a context that is confused, the better to dismiss it. So, let us disentangle: --> We see an object which is functional, and evidently information-bearing. --> We ask, 1: is it contingent or the product of law-like natural regularity tracing to mechanical necessity of nature? If not contingent, then obviously necessity explains it and the object is not designed. --> On the alternative that the object manifests contingency [multiple possible outcome states for a given event], we ask 2: Is the object complex, i.e does the configuration space taken up by the set of possible outcomes require at least 500 - 1,000 bits to store? If so, it is complex in the sense relevant to the ID inference. --> We ask, 3: is the outcome specified, especially in a message-oriented or information-processing, functional sense. If so, the object exhibits functionally specified, complex information [FSCI, a relevant subset of CSI, and the subset IDC addresses] beyond the reasonable reach of chance acting alone on the gamut of the observed cosmos. --> We conclude, provisionally (as is true of all scientific reasoning) but confidently (and IMHCO, reliably):
SINCE: [p] in all cases of directly observed origin of such FSCI the cause is intelligent agency, AND [q] on excellent grounds tracing to the principles of statistical thermodynamics [cf my always linked, app 1 section 6], this is likely due to the impotence of random-walk searches [including those functionally filtered before moving on to the next stage] on the gamut of the cosmos to find such islands or archipelagos of functionally specified complexity, THEN [r] We are well-warranted, on solid empirical and logical bases, to infer that such FSCI is the result of intelligent agent action, even in cases where we do not see the causal process in action directly.
7] if chance alone does not explain it and if regularities cannot explain it (yet) then we have to accept `design' as the default explanation. So `design' includes anything from `intelligent designer' to `an unknown regular process'. Let's see: on this proposal, there is an unknown regularity of nature at the cosmic level that forces the emergence of FSCI-based life. That sounds like a very serious bit of organised, fine-tuned complexity at cosmogenetic level to me. What sort of agent could possibly be responsible for such? [And if the alternative chance across a quasi-infinite multiverse of proffered, we note that this is now an unobserved, empirically unanchored inference, at worldview level. So it has no right to censor out the alternative that an agent has made the cosmos as a fit habitation for life.] More seriously, we note that all scientific inferences are provisional. So, we will observe that we KNOW that agents routinely produce such FSCI. The inference to agents as the best, current, empirically anchored explanation for the nanotech of life as we see it, and thus also for the macro-level biodiversity as we see it, is an inference based on what we do know. What then, does IDC offer as a better explanation? A hypothetical natural regularity that forces the emergence of life. Without any empirical warrant. What sort of desperation in defence of a worldview-level commitment does this sort of blind faith and promissory note reveal? 8] given Dembski's logic, natural selection matches his definition of an intelligent designer. Once again we notice how ID fails to distinguish between apparent and actual design Of course, NS is in effect the fact that certain already functioning organisms survive and differentially reproduce better on average in their environment than competitor organisms. That explains the survival of the fittest, but not their arrival, which was the key issue in the first place. NS simply cannot be the DESIGNER. [Has IDC ever had to design and develop a serious system that used say a machine-language programmed microcontroller at its core?] 9] since ID refuses to propose positive hypotheses, it is thus doomed to be unable to deal with the issue of apparent versus actual design in any scientifically relevant manner In fact, the design inference is a positive hypothesis,and provides a step by step process for inferring to agent action that is familiar to anyone who has ever had to do even a first course in statistical inference testing. Such as, say, those having at least a first degree in biology. So, the ever so prevalent willful obtuseness on this topic is inexcusable. But, perhaps, IDC means here that ID so far does not allow us to infer to the identity of the designer. The best away to look at that is to go back to IDC's cite of Nichols' excerpt from Dembski.
WD: "even though in practice inferring design is the first step in identifying an intelligent agent, taken by itself design does not require that such an agent be posited. The notion of design that emerges from the design inference must not be confused with intelligent agency" (TDI, 227)
In short, we use the design inference to recognise the credible existence of design. Now, in our background knowledge, design comes form the action of intelligent agents, without exception where we directly know the cause. But, epistemically, we are first inferring to design, then inferring onward to the agents that are the observed cause of the designs that exhibit FSCI. And, we may then onward ask about the candidates to be the designer, and what intents such candidates may have had. We could go on and on ad nauseum, but let's cap off with this stunning bit of turnabout rhetoric: 10] science has shown that information can in fact increase in a cell under purely natural processes of regularity and chance. Unable to eliminate chance and regularity, the design inference remains quite powerless. But all hope should not be abandoned, one can always move the origin of `information' to an earlier time in history, such as the `first cell' or if that does not work, to the origin of the universe. Here IDC first conflates mere increase of information storage capacity [easily done thought chaining of discrete state elements, e.g. a random polymer] with increments in functionally specified complex information beyond the UPB, 500 - 1,000 bits [e.g. the increment on the order of 100 mn functional DNA bases required to get the information to code for an arthropod at the Cambrian revolution, as Meyer aptly pointed out in his famous PBSW article]. In fact, directly opposite to IDC's second assertion in the teeth of the facts, the EF based on FSCI is fully and reliably capable of discriminating agency [as the presumed source of design] from chance and necessity on EVERY case where we do directly observe the source of the FSCI. To give just one instance, is IDC committed to the notion that this and all other posts here at UD in this thread, and in the Amazon reviews on DOL are the result of lucky noise, save of course his own? As my always linked, Section B shows in summary and with suitable excerpts, the third assertion here is the ultimate in chutzpah. For, in fact, it is notorious and plain that it is the evo mat OOL researchers who have found themselves in ever deeper despondency as they see more and more how complex the nanotech of life is, and they have not got ANY credible, robust model that passes the muster of the principles of statistical thermodynamics and information theory relevant ot the matter. [Cf also my always linked, App 1, esp. section 6.] CONCLUSION: Dembski wins, by a knockout. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{December 22, 2007
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H'mm: I took a follow-up look at the reviews. The story is still the same as before: reactive negative reviews on one side, substantial ones that are recognisably actually book reviews -- cf old Ms Green or whoever was your favourite English teacher -- [and some responses to the reactions] on the other. Telling. ID Critic, IDC, tries to take opportunity to make a "devastating" case against ID. Let's take up a few excerpts, as -- though it does not actually address a review of the book, it is the closest to a substantial addressing of the book by a critic that I came across before giving up on the noxious smoke from burning strawmen: 1] Intelligent Design (ID) starts with an unfounded assertion that design is that which remains once natural processes of regularity and chance have been eliminated. H'mm. IDC, kindly tell us whether or not what we routinely and generally observe stems from one or more of the causal factors: [a] chance, [b] natural regularity tracing to mechanical, law-like necessity, [c] agency? Or, did Plato et al or in more modern times, Monod et al get it wrong? 2] available empirical evidence and logic suggests that there is nothing necessarily supernatural about intelligence. In fact, intelligent behavior seems quite well reducible to regularities and chance . . . The first part is right: empirically based inference to intelligence in action is not inference to the supernatural. H'mm, didn't Dr Dembski say something like that, somewhere, sometime . . .
Intelligent design begins with a seemingly innocuous question: Can objects, even if nothing is known about how they arose, exhibit features that reliably signal the action of an intelligent cause? . . . Proponents of intelligent design, known as design theorists, purport to study such signs formally, rigorously, and scientifically. Intelligent design may therefore be defined as the science that studies signs of intelligence.
Unfortunately, the second statement is not at all an empirically anchored fact, but an unproved core worldview level assumption, that of the self-refuting system of thought known as naturalism, or more descriptively evolutionary materialism. [Cf the discussion on this in the Darwin Thread, Aug 20, from 48 on. See how the materialist scheme of thought becomes dynamically impotent to account for a credible mind, and thence self-refutes.] We can simply ignore -- as obviously inane -- IDC's reference in the rest of the second sentence to "polling, profiling, advertising and many other arenas." 3] Intelligence is in other words predictable and since intelligence has the ability to make choices given multiple options, there will be a certain level of variation or uncertainty present. H'mm I always thought Napoleon used to say that when you have an opposing general pinned down to one of two options, each bad, he will "predictably" choose the third one. That is the unpredictable option. IDC, FYI, the essence of intelligence is that it is rational, and so will follow logic in general, but also creative, and so is able to do the utterly unexpected and unforeseen. 4] Since Dembski also argues that science as it exists right now rejects the design inference a-priori, it seems clear that Dembski's design is different from the design detected by the sciences. A neat but futile attempt at the rhetoric of turnabout. In fact, IDC, inference to design is -- as my own discussion identifies, as common as inference to signal/message in the face of noise. Where things get interesting is when the otherwise obviously valid inference to intelligence may cut across the agenda of the evo mat advocates. They they impose a radical, philosophically unjustifiable and historically ill-founded attempted redefintion of sicnece that says that in effect only entities compatible with the evo mat view may be adverted to in scientific work. In short, they are begging worldview level questions -- as you exemplify. 5] Dembski argues that if something can be explained as a regularity, its probability becomes close to 1 and the information goes to 0. But the same applies then to intelligent design. If something can be explained as intelligently designed, the amount of information is zero. This simply reflects the erroneous assertion already addressed under 3. In short the "contradiction" IDC sees in WD is of his own making, and reflects on his own erroneous logic, misunderstandings and evident disconnect from the real world of intelligent actors, especially those of us who have had to design complex things that have to WORK. [ . . . . ]kairosfocus_{December 22, 2007
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I believe controversy and the resulting publicity tends to boost sales more than it hurts sales, especially if people sense that the negative/positive reviews are given more because it conficts with the reviewer's personal beliefs than any serious attempt to evaluate the work in question.WinglesS_{December 21, 2007
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Amazon.com offers a choice of two different orders of listing the reviews: "Most Helpful First" and "Newest First." The order pre-selected by Amazon.com is "Most Helpful first." Amazon.com is obviously placing too much faith in the scores on answers to the question, "Was this review helpful to you?".Larry Fafarman_{December 21, 2007
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funny, i wonder how many e.durans there are in sj, ca, cause i live there and happen to have grown up with one.rswood_{December 21, 2007
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I have just ordered myself a new copy of this book. Hint: Do not under any circumstances order a "used" copy!!.. "..while reading this waste of what could have been fine toilet paper." -- C. Kerstann - Amazon reviewer.William Brookfield_{December 21, 2007
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[...] UD complains of Amazon review fraud. Anyone with a book at Amazon criticizing Darwin knows the rigged game that goes on. I can understand the frustration at Uncommon Descent over Design of Life. [...]» Loss of integrity at Amazon review system_{December 21, 2007
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