William J Murray at #130:
Wow! A lot of interesting stuff here. :)
I still think that we agree on more things that you expect, but there are certainly differences too. For me, it is really difficult at this point to clarify the differences, because the discussion is too big, and includes many different planes.
However, I will try to add some ideas (to the many that you have already expressed).
A real difference is that you insist that we should have a shared general worldview to make science together in a good way. As already said, I don't agree.
The difference between science and philosophy is a big issue. Very humbly, however, I will say that IMO a difference exists. Those two forms of human cognition are in no way antagonistic, indeed, if well applied, they support one another. But they are still different things.
Deciding what is the final nature of reality, of mind, of matter, and so on, remains, always IMO, a philosophical issue. However convinced we may be of our ideas, I think that we shoud remain humble in philosophy. There has never been any philosophical consensus about the big questions, and frankly I am afraid that never there will be one.
Final choices in these issues are not only a matter of facts or reason or logic: they involve our whole being, our free will at many different levels. Our personal desitny strictly depends on them. So, I believe that we should accept that different people have different worldviews, and stick to them. We should respect that, even if we don't like it (of course, there are worldviews that need to be opposed, in the measure that we can realistically do that: but we cannot oppose all worldviews that are different from ours).
Science is slightly different: while there is certainly an effect of our personal worldview, a cognitive bias that cannot be erased completely, good science has wide margins that are shareable. Not all (I am rather a Polanyite), but much is shareable.
That derives from the "limitation" of science as mainly deroived from observable facts and good inferences. Observable facts are usually shareable, and good inferences can be discussed with some objectivity, when people are not too committed to their personal philosophies.
That's why I believe, unlike you, that good scientists can work together constructively in the search for scientific truth, and still have completely different ideas about the ultimate nature of reality. It's only when they betray that empirical comiitment that communication becomes impossible (that's what happens now with physicalist reductionists).
So, while I apprecite your philosophical ideas, many of which I certainly share, I cannot accept your idea that some general worldview should be accepted as the foundation of science. That is not good epistemology, IMO, But, as said, we can certainly differ,
Personally, I feel no need to depend on any general ideas (and I have many of them) when I try to make science. I really do my best to stick to facts, and to good inferences. Even when I discuss consciousness in a scientific context (not in a wider context, like in this thread), I try to remain wholly empirical.
There are things that are part of my general worldview, but that cannot be explained or inferred scientifically. Free will is one of them. I have defended libertarian free will passionately here, for years, but I have never stated that it is supported by scientific arguments. It is, certainly, supported by good philosophical arguments that make a good use of what science knows.
Also, my refusal of solipsism is neither scientific nor philosophic. Solipsism cannot really be refuted. I am simply sure that it is a wrong idea about reality. If one considers himself a solipsist, I have nothing to discuss with him. But I am confident that very few people would believe that way.
A scientific approach has no limitations: it can well consider platonic forms, simple objects, individual minds, anything, as possible observables. And study those things that can be observed, trying to build good inferences about them.
In my discussions about Intelligent Design in biology, I have always stated that available facts show with absolute empirical strength that biological objects are designed. That the logical scientific consequence of that is that some form of conscious, intelligent and purposeful agents must exist who have designed them. These are scientific statements, IMO. They have nothing to do with a general worldview. This is science, and that science can be accepted by all who accept the priority of empirical facts in science.
Philosophicall, I agre with you on more things that you can expect. I will simply list here some of your staments in your last post with which I philosophically agree:
"a practical model of mental monism is contingent upon a useful theory of mind that categorizes and takes into account all forms of mental experience – including the experience of what appears to be other people with what appears to be independent consciousness (not the same thing as an independent mind) and what appears to be, in a large part of our experience, a consensual external world."
"People are far more interested in that hypothetical external world than in better understanding the factual root of all experience: mind."
"There is a difference – as you and others have written about – between different categories of consciousness, which might roughly be subdivided into a “now” awareness, observation, intentionality; a subconscious, which I agree is extremely important and powerful; and an unconscious which I consider to be the “deep space” portion of our existence. One might consider alert “now” awareness the surface of the Earth; the subconscious the entire rest of the planet and atmosphere, and the unconscious the rest of the universe – at least in terms of our investigation and discovery."
"Similarly, the necessary universality of platonic forms and values fundamentally discoverable in the “external world” simply cannot be accounted for other than via some vague proposed “connection” of the external world to the platonic. Jeez, how much more efficient and easier is it to just admit that what we are experiencing is itself some kind of manifestation of platonic forms and values?"
"Platonic laws, like that of identity, or platonic forms, like circles, or math, like 1+2=3, are directly experienced as absolute, real and eternal – more real and absolute than any experience of any supposed external physical world phenomena. Critical thought – that by which we find true statements about anything – lies entirely within the mind."
"If we cannot trust mental experience as both consensual and real (at least in some categories) , the game is lost before it even begins. Ergo, a consensual mental experience of physicality is not only possible, it is a necessity whether or not any supposed external world exists."
"Because, even if a consensual external world existed, without the consensual mental experience, we’d all be practicing solipsists by logical necessity. The consensuality of mental experience (at least in some categories) is a necessity regardless of whether or not worlds might exist “outside of mind”.
Now, a few statements about I want to comment:
it is a false dichotomy to say that we either accept the existence of an objective reality outside of mind, or we are necessarily talking about solipsism;
But I have never said that. I have said that the possibilities are (excluding physicalist monism that we are not interested in here):
a) You accept the existence of an objective reality outside of mind (both your personal mind and others'minds), and different in nature from mind. Then you are an ontological dualist.
b) You accept the existence of an objective reality outside your personal mind, that includes both other personal minds and the apparently objective world, but you beleiev that all that is some form of mind. That you are a mental monist.
c) You don't accept the existence of any reality outside your personal mind. Then you are a solipsist.
As you can see, it's not a dichotomy.
I’m not talking about an individual’s mind, but rather mind,, as in “the platonic realm”;
OK. But if you read carefully what I said in comment #129, you will see that I was referring to this statement of yours:
" We know the realm of mind exists; it’s the only thing we directly experience."
I agree. There are things that we know by direct experience and others that we infer.
Our personal menatl experiences are the only things that we experience directly. You derive from that tha we experience "directly" the realm of mind. That is true only is you limit it to "the realm of our personal mind".
My point is that we cannot limit our conepts to what we directly experience. Because both the minds of others and an external world that is not mind are inferences, not direct experiences.
So, if you refute inferences, you have to refute both the minds of others and the external objective world, And I can't see how you can derive the idea of a "realm of mind" that is not just our personal realm of mind. Because, to do that, you need to believe in the minds of others. And that is an inference.
My ony purpose here is that our good knowledge is made of both direct experiences and inferences. You cannot refure the possibility of an external world that is not mental only because it is an inference, and not a direct experience. You need other arguments.
Regarding physics, quantum mechanics, entanglement and so on. I agree with you that modern physics speaks of an external world that is very different from ehat it was believed to be. Certainly less "objectual". It is true that the possibility that the external world is is some way mental is strongly supported by moders physics. But I don't agree that modern physics inevitably implies that everything is mind. Maybe we will get to that. Physicists are much less biased toward reductionism than biologists. They are constantly trying new ideas. But it is not easy. Because in physics you cannot simply believ something, you have to show scientifically that it is really the best explanation of known facts.
Finally, I am rather surprised by the following statement of yours:
If I remember correctly, a few threads ago hazel was having difficulty in accepting that although she would be discovering the algorithmic results of some future program she writes, that meant that the information already existed in the platonic realm. That would mean that the platonic realm has in it all information that is discoverable. Yet, the scientific evidence (even if ignored) demonstrates this, which contra-indicates a classic ID trope: humans do not create information. We discover it and use it.
Because:
1) I can agree, philosophically, that we discover information, rather than generating it from scratch. IOWs I agree, philosophycally, that all ideas probably already exist in a platonic realm.
2) However, I would never say that this is a scientific statement. IMO, at present, it is wholly philosophical. You will disagree, but it's exactly what I believe.
3) Whatever may be, the surprising statement is that you say that the above idea would:
"contra-indicate a classic ID trope: humans do not create information. We discover it and use it."
Why do you say that?
In my discussions about ID, I have always passionately affirmed that complex functional information, if observed in objects, allows to infer safely that the object is designed.
I have also cleraly defined what I mean by "designed": it means that the specific complex functional information we observe in the configuration of the object was inputted into it by some conscious intelligent purposefule agent, from his conscious representations.
IOWs, the whole point of design is that conscious representations of the form precede the implementation of the form in the object.
I have also stated that the ability to design, and therefore to generate complex functional information, is linked to the conscious experiences of meaning and purpose.
I have said those things many times, always in the same form.
But I have never debated the philosophical issue of how understanding meaning and having purposes make the generation of information possible. And I have never debated the philosophical issue of what understanding and feeling are.
Because, you see, I try to stay empirical, and to avoid philosophical aspects in my scientific discussions.
So, either the understanding of meaning and the ability to have purpose are independent qualities, or they are linked to the paltonic realm, makes no difference to ID theory. The point is simply: complex functional information can only be observe in objects that have beem designed by a conscious, intelligent, purposeful agent. That remains true in all cases, whatever our general philosophy.
Your two final questions:
1) God exists, and everything else exists in Him. I don't think that is the same as being a solipsist. I believe He is well aware of all that He has created. And He knows exactly how real or not real different planes of existence are. Better than me, certainly.
2) Yes, many times. I simply don't know. If I should bet, I would say: mostly not, but sometimes maybe.gpuccio
January 5, 2019
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gpuccio,
I've been trying to follow your interesting discussion with WJM here in this thread.
It's interesting to see you so deeply engaged in this kind of philosophical discussion, while one of your purely scientific discussion threads still remains among the most popular the last 30 days. :)
Should all scientific discussions be based mainly on observed facts? How about philosophical discussions?
Should serious scientists refrain from making the observed facts mean more than what they really mean? How about serious philosophers?
Do these questions somehow relate to what you have stated lately in this discussion?
Thanks.PaoloV
January 5, 2019
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Gpuccio,
As I've said before: (1) it is a false dichotomy to say that we either accept the existence of an objective reality outside of mind, or we are necessarily talking about solipsism; (2)I'm not talking about an individual's mind, but rather mind,, as in "the platonic realm"; and (3) a practical model of mental monism is contingent upon a useful theory of mind that categorizes and takes into account all forms of mental experience - including the experience of what appears to be other people with what appears to be independent consciousness (not the same thing as an independent mind) and what appears to be, in a large part of our experience, a consensual external world.
Also, I'd like to point out as I did to KF, disliking the consequences of a logical argument based on the evidence (inescapable evidence and logic, in this case) is a fallacy. Essentially, you're saying "let's stick in a whole other, entirely superfluous and unavailable realm to avoid a distasteful conclusion." (Which, by the way, is entirely ideological in nature, which proves my point. Ideologically, you're committed against solipsism. What else are we going to do when it comes to forming a hypothesis and constructing experiments in order to serve that ideological position? It's no different than materialist scientists going out of their way to come up with theories and explanations to avoid the intelligent design conclusion.)
However - fortunately - we're not even talking about solipsism; our theories of mind are generally so vague and poorly thought out that most people just lump it all into a single category that only serves as a kind of minor companion to the real work which concerns some hypothetical world external to mind. Do you see how horribly, wrongly lop-sided that is? Theories of mind are so weak and vague that people immediately leap from "mental monism" to "solipsism" as if that is the only possible perspective under mental monism.
Even though it is blatantly obvious that there are universal, objective values and forms in mind (note: I didn't say "my" mind or "your" mind), along with what appears to be completely personal, subjective mental phenomena (which we often call "imagination"), and even though all critical thought is entirely mental, and even though we recognize a distinction between intentionality and whatever is derived from or caused by that intentionality, all these concepts are pretty much just mashed together as an afterthought because the supposed real work is about some hypothetical world external to mind.
People are far more interested in that hypothetical external world than in better understanding the factual root of all experience: mind.
There is a difference - as you and others have written about - between different categories of consciousness, which might roughly be subdivided into a "now" awareness, observation, intentionality; a subconscious, which I agree is extremely important and powerful; and an unconscious which I consider to be the "deep space" portion of our existence. One might consider alert "now" awareness the surface of the Earth; the subconscious the entire rest of the planet and atmosphere, and the unconscious the rest of the universe - at least in terms of our investigation and discovery.
You bring up an interesting point about "other consciousnesses"; but that is poorly framed in my opinion because it suffers from the "mashing-up" of what should be carefully thought-out categorizations of mental experience (at least, in any proper theory of mind). This goes back to what I've lamented as a materialist mindset utilized by non-materialists when considering the mind: they try to frame it with the same basic concept forms that materialists use in describing the world.
BA77 often posts summaries of scientific research that obliterates "external (to mind) world" conceptual norms. Consider the fact that observing a photon here on Earth not only instantaneously collapses a current, enormous wave potential that probably exceeds the size of the entire solar system; it defines the path of that "photon" backwards through perhaps millions of years of time. This causality-redefining fact has been demonstrated in quantum eraser experiments.
What is the outcome of such research? The attempt to protect the ideology of an actual, physical external (to mind) world, usually by cobbling together monstrous ad-hoc theories attempting to undermine or explain away the inevitable conclusion that "time" and "causality" are not what we think they are. Information travels instantaneously through both time and space. How can any external-world paradigm account for that? Answer: it cannot.
Similarly, the necessary universality of platonic forms and values fundamentally discoverable in the "external world" simply cannot be accounted for other than via some vague proposed "connection" of the external world to the platonic. Jeez, how much more efficient and easier is it to just admit that what we are experiencing is itself some kind of manifestation of platonic forms and values?
In physics, the natural computational results of quantum potentials results in an undesirable answer: there is infinite mass, and thus infinite energy, at every point (zero-point energy). Due to ideology, this computational fact is largely ignored because it is "unreasonable". However, mass and energy are ultimately nothing more than descriptions of behavior and potential behavior. We don't know what "mass" or "energy" is; we can only describe observational behaviors and provide mathematical predictions of behavior. So, what does infinite mass/energy mean? It means infinite information in terms of behavioral potential. Where does information exist? In mind.
If I remember correctly, a few threads ago hazel was having difficulty in accepting that although she would be discovering the algorithmic results of some future program she writes, that meant that the information already existed in the platonic realm. That would mean that the platonic realm has in it all information that is discoverable. Yet, the scientific evidence (even if ignored) demonstrates this, which contra-indicates a classic ID trope: humans do not create information. We discover it and use it.
It may seem (and it may be) that I'm meandering a bit, but as I intentionally pointed my conscious attention at potential information concerning this discussion, "things occurred to me" (meaning: I discovered information and interpreted it into coherent thoughts) that I wanted to write down here - if nothing else, then for my own reference.
However, the point to this was to show how the ideology of an external world affects everything we do and think. If something we discover contra-indicates the idea of an external world, we consider that either an error or a novelty-style useless artifact of the math or the experiment which will later be cleared up with a "better" or "more complete" theory still rooted in dualism (or, in the case of materialism monists, a better theory of matter/physicality).
Solipsism is what mental monism looks like from an external-world paradigm, or IMO from a sloppy, vague mash-up of categories of mental experience. Platonic laws, like that of identity, or platonic forms, like circles, or math, like 1+2=3, are directly experienced as absolute, real and eternal - more real and absolute than any experience of any supposed external physical world phenomena. Critical thought - that by which we find true statements about anything - lies entirely within the mind.
Neither you or I invent or simply imagine these things. We discover them by directly accessing them in mind. We experience other varieties of "external world-ish" phenomena, like dreams or daydreams in the same superset (mental experience) as the absolute, eternal reality of platonic forms, laws and values and critical thought. This is all experienced as if internal. The idea that our mind cannot house a consensual physical experience (like it does with those platonic ideals) or that critical thought cannot be used to discern the difference between the categories, or that without the externalization of consensual experiences we necessarily devolved into "solipsism" or "delusion" is nonsense. If we cannot trust mental experience as both consensual and real (at least in some categories) , the game is lost before it even begins. Ergo, a consensual mental experience of physicality is not only possible, it is a necessity whether or not any supposed external world exists.
Because, even if a consensual external world existed, without the consensual mental experience, we'd all be practicing solipsists by logical necessity. The consensuality of mental experience (at least in some categories) is a necessity regardless of whether or not worlds might exist "outside of mind".
Which, again, shows the utter uselessness (I'll go one further: foolishness) of adopting a paradigm that anything exists outside of mind.
Couple of questions:
Is god a solipsist?
Have you ever wondered if the "other people" in your dreams are consciously aware from their perspective?William J Murray
January 5, 2019
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William J Murray:
OK, I understand your position, and there is no problem if we differ slightly in our ideas. Essentially, I think we agree on almost everything.
But just to be practical, I can agree with you that: "We know the realm of mind exists; it’s the only thing we directly experience". It's absolutely true. But are you saying that accepting some objective reality out of our personal consciousness, whatever its nature, is adding "a second hypothetical realm we cannot ever access"?
There is a problem here. As far as we know, even another person's consciousnes is "a second hypothetical realm we cannot ever access", because empirically we have access only to our personal consciousness.
So, if we apply literally your criteria, we should deny not only matter, but also others'consciousness. IOWs we should accept solipsism.
I cannot agree with that. It is true that the only things we know directly are those in our personal consciousness, but we can certainly make reasonable inferences about the rest of reality.
The inference that other people are conscious is very legitimate, and practically all share it. That seems not to be a problem for you, because your worldview (like mine) easily accepts an outer reality that is mental.
The inference that there exists an outer objective reality with which our personal consciousness interacts, and that does not apparently behave as some conscious agent (physical objects), seems reasonable too, and most people definitely share it. Most people tend to believe that, as physical matter is perceived by us as behaving differently from conscious contents, it may have a different nature.
Of course, you and I can probably agree that the final source of both the subjective and the objective world could be consciousness, mind, or an ideal world. That is a reasonable philosophical position, certainly shared by some very good people, but obviously not by most people.
I don't think that convincing others (the majority of people, indeed) to share our personal (even if very good) philosopical worldviews can be considered as a pre-requisite to make good science. That is not a good philosophical position in my philosophy of science where, as said, the empirical approach should be the prevalent attitude.
But, as said, we can certainly differ on one point, however important it may be to each of us. :)gpuccio
January 4, 2019
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Gpuccio,
I disagree with you on one key point. You say that, properly used, methodological dualism doesn't require bringing in ideology. I disagree. IMO, the addition of a second hypothetical realm we cannot ever access - even theoretically - is itself bringing ideology into the process. That's all the proposed existence of something outside of mind can ever be - an ideological framework. We know the realm of mind exists; it's the only thing we directly experience. You agree that M. Dualism brings nothing of additional value to the table - something I said to start with. That makes it 100% superfluous.
IMO, in scientific research and critical thinking, it's impossible to defend adding an entirely superfluous 2nd realm.William J Murray
January 4, 2019
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Good post, Gpuccio.hazel
January 4, 2019
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William J Murray at #124:
Well, my idea is simply that when we study reality form a scientific point of view, we should stick as much as possible to facts and good inferences, and we should not allow our general worldviews to interfere "too much" (it's impossibel to avoid it completely) with our procedures.
My idea is that both convinced dualists and convinced idealistic monists should have no problems communicating about scientific issues. As said, I am myself more of a monist, but I have no problems to consider scientific issues independently from my more general beliefs.
Physicalist monism is more a problem, instead, because it denies just from the beginning the independence of consciousness as a different empirical reality, and relies on the lie that it can be explained in terms of matter configurations. That is not a good start, even for the most sincere physicalists. Moreover, they still have the big power, and that makes them cognitively arrogant, more or less knowingly.
When I proposed, a few days ago, the term "methodological dualism", I did it with a little bit of irony, imitating the common and very bad concept of "methodological naturalism". But while physicalists definitely cheat with that concept, because their methodological naturalism is always the same as ontological naturalism (and of course "naturalism" mean really nothing), I am very serious about my ironic proposal: my "methodological" means really what it should mean.
It means that we are not necessarily convinced that we are "studying two entirely different realms", and in the same way we are not necessarily convinced that we are studying "categories of a single realm". Very simply, we acknowledge that what we can observe has the features of two different manifestations, either of one realm or of two realms. So, we have the methodological duty to understand, without any prejudice, how those two manifestations differ in properties and laws, and how they interact one with the other. And draw good and impartial inferences from the observed facts about both "manifestations".
I see it a little like the problem of Grand Unified Theories in physics. It's a beautiful idea to try to unify al known forces in one great mathematical theory, but as long as nobody succeeds in doing that, we must live with 3 or 4 different forces that behave, for some reason that we don't really understand, in different ways. We cannot just pretend that they are one, we must really find the scientific approach that explains them as one.
So, when we study gravitation or the strong force, we study them as separate forces, even if we are really convinced that they are manifestations of one basic principle.
You ask: "What advantages, if any, are there in using methodological dualism as opposed to methodological mental monism".
Well, no advantages at all as regards our personal general convictions. As said, if we behave as good scientists, there will be no differences, or at least no big differences, if we are convinced dualists or convinced monists. But in relation to our scientific approach, we must be empirical: we must neither assume that there are two realms, nor that there is one. But we must certainly acknowledge that we can observe two apparently different (empirically) manifestations, two different kinds of facts. That's where we must stick "methodologically" (IOWs, until facts or good scientific inferences do not allow us to adopt a new perspective) to studying them as separate and interacting phenomena.gpuccio
January 4, 2019
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Hazel at #123:
OK, fine. This has been a good discussion: respectful and precise. Many thanks! :)gpuccio
January 4, 2019
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Gpuccio,
You asked me what I thought were the potential inadequacies of utilizing methodological dualism when compared to methodological mental monism. IMO, while an ideal implementation of methodological dualism might be able to perform as you say, the fundamental concept that we are studying two entirely different realms, instead of categories of a single realm, presents issues that would inevitably appear in actual use. But, we can agree to differ on that.
Now, if you don't mind answering a question for me: What advantages, if any, are there in using methodological dualism as opposed to methodological mental monism?William J Murray
January 4, 2019
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Thanks, gpuccio. Yes. I think we have covered the ways in which we agree and disagree (or perhaps have different metaphors for what we agree about) concerning the nature of consciousness. We agree on a lot of the empirical and experiential issues, but diverge the more we get to philosophy. I appreciate your comments at f) above, and think that is probably a good place to leave things.
So, once again, thanks for the thoughtful, civil, detailed conversation.hazel
January 4, 2019
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Hazel at #121:
OK, I'll try to be brief, because I think that most things have already been said.
a) I think that the concept of "subjective representations of the self" should be clear enough. I mean that if something is in my subconscious mind, it means that it is being represented by me (the subject, the self) now, even if at some deep background level. IOWs, it is, now, part of what I am aware of, even if I am aware of it in a way that is different, and less prominent, than what is in the "conscious", waking mind.
I am afraid that the methaphor of vision is more useful here, even if you don't like it. Peripheral vision is vision just the same. We are seeing the things that are in peripheral vision, but we are not distinctly aware of that, because macular vision has most of our attention. But there is a definite difference between the things that we are seeing, even if only in the background of our mind, and the things that are not in our field of vision, but that could come into it if we, for example, moved our eyes. That's my distincion between subconscious and unconscious.
I also believe that our subconscious mind could be much bigger than we can expect. Many things could be really represented in our subconscious at a very deep level, at any moment.
The distinction is important for me. For example, it explains why subconscious contents and reactions can definitely contribute to the expression of our free will, without denying its free nature: because it's still us, our conscious self, that is operating in both minds.
It also explain how the subconscious mind can certainly generate complex functional information (see dreams, for example), and also, very often, contribute important intuitions to our conscious reasonings (see the example of the solution that comes after we sleep).
b) You ask: "Is my lecture on the quadratic equation in my subconscious, or in my unconscious and just stored physically in my brain?" Well, it could be in your subconscious at certain times, and just stored physically at other times.
The metaphor of the hard disk and the RAM is more useful here, even if you don't like it. The contents in the hard disk can be the same that are retrieved by the RAM, but they are not working until they are loaded into the active memory. Remember, we don't really know how information is stored in the physical brain. Of course it is stored there, but we don't know how much of the stored information is perceived by our self at any moment.
You speak of "a vast, interconnected web of contents with tendrils that touch (through the unknown interface) the vast interconnected web of neurons in our body". That's fine, but the point is: as long as those "contents" are only objects (stored information), they can only undergo objective processes, like algorithmic computations. IOWs, at most they can contribute to non cosncious algorithmic procedures, like in a computer that has no "mind". But, as soon as those contents are represented consciously, be it in the conscious or in the subconscius mind, the conscious categories of understanding and feeling and purpose and free will can act on those contents. Free cognitive reactions and free feelings can be associated to those contents. New original complex functional information can be generated, and new free actions can arise.
Those things are impossible as long as the brain works only objectively, like a computer.
c) You say:
So at all times, my conscious experience is a combination of external stimulation (which includes stimulation from my own body), which is mostly automatic, and internal stimulation over which I have control and choice about both my actions and my access to the vast store of subconscious content that my self has accumulated.
Yes and no. I would say that we are exposed to external inputs and internal inputs, constantly, that both are mostly automatic, but that we have some control (for example in our new original reactions) on both of them. Our free will can be expressed in how we react to something we are seeing, as much as in how we react to something we are "remembering" in our inner "flux of consciousness". Many of the contents of our inner flux of consciousness are as automatic and as out of our control as many of the external perceptions.
To be more clear, I think that our inner flux of consciousness is similar to the outer flux of perceptions (that, in the end, become of course part of the inner stream). In both cases, we are somewhat passive, but in both cases we also have some control: we can move our eyes, and we can focus on different parts of our inner flux of consciousness.
d) you say:
And, to repeat, at all times there is some correlation between the mind and the body. I don’t think I can have a thought or other kind of conscious experience without there being a correlated state of my body. However, as my flashlight metaphor is meant to imply, the direction of causation runs both ways: body influences mind and mind influences body.
I completely agree with that. I think it is certainly true of human consciousness.
However, it does not mean at all that consciousness is necessarily linked to the body and brain. Human consciousness, in its normal state, is certainly linked to body and brain, as you say. But our normal state as humans is not all that exists.
First of all, there is the "small" problem of what happens to our cosnciousness when the physical body dies. As far as we can judge from what we know of NDEs, consciousness does express itself beautifully and in a very complex and deep way in the process of dying, and very likely even when there is no brain activity. Of course those who don't like the idea try to rationalize it in any possible (and often silly) way, but IMO that's exactly what the facts of NDEs tell us.
Second, there is the important issue of mystical experiences. In a different, but very deep way, they tell us the same thing. Many could not be interested in that aspect, but I think it is a very important source of information for those who are really convinced of how important these problems are. Even an atheist like Bertrand Russell admitted in one of his books the relevance and interest of mysticism.
e) You say: "Yes, I have a pervasive sense of self. The sense of self is is the mind, but for me includes my body as “me” in a way that the rest of the external world is not."
But a "sense of self" is a conscious representation ("sense"). Does it include your hair or your nails after they have been cut?
An arm is certainly an important part of our self. But many have lost an arm, and their self still goes on. Your body is part of your self because you perceive it as such. You certainly know that one of the recurring experiences in NDEs is the OBE, don't you?
f) Finally, you chose the first option, as I expected. And feared.
OK, no problem. It's your choice. But I am a little disappointed.
You see, I certainly believe that the ultimate source of all reality is transcendent. And we cannot say anything of what is trancendent, by definition. And we need transcendence, to explain what is immanent.
But the source of something must certainly have some connection with that something, at some level.
In your reasoning, IMO, you are invoking some form of force/god/principle as the source of reality. That's fine. But you are also saying that we cannot know anything about that source, both scientifically and philosophically and religiously. Or in any other possible way.
Because we "cannot pierce the quantum curtain".
OK, I respect your position. But I don't like it.
Not a problem, of course, Your position is your position. But my position is different. As a guy who is passionately interested in science and in many other things, I do believe and feel and hope that getting a personal and deep understanding of that source, in all possible ways, is the most important thing in my life.gpuccio
January 4, 2019
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To gpuccio at 118:
That’s a good clear post. I appreciate this joint attempt to draw out distinctions.
1) Consciousness
First, I’ll go along with iceberg metaphor. I am less fond of the hard drive/RAM metaphor, or the central/peripheral vision metaphor. I’m not sure that it is important to figure the pros and cons, though, so I’ll understand whichever you use.
You delineate three aspects, and differentiate the subconscious (“the contents that are represented in my consciousness, but of which I am not distinctly aware”) from the unconscious (“resources stored in the brain, but not represented at the moment, to which consciousness can get access if and when necessary.”)
Then you say,
I say that the subconscious mind is part of consciousness because I believe that its contents are really represented in our consciousness, even if not in a distinct way. … [T]hey are conscious contents by all standards: they are subjective representations of the self.
I don’t think I understand this distinction. Is my knowledge of the capital of France, or my lecture on the quadratic equation in my subconscious, or in my unconscious and just stored physically in my brain? Since I don’t know what you mean by “subjective representations of the self”, I don’t know which you mean. Perhaps you could give some example.
I think what I think is that all aspects of my mind, both conscious and subconscious, have correlates in the brain. The metaphor/image I have is that my mind, at it base, is a vast, interconnected web of contents with tendrils that touch (through the unknown interface) the vast interconnected web of neurons in our body.
Then consciousness is sort of like a two-way flashlight (how’s that for a metaphor!) whereby information from the external world (the sensory information I am receiving right now) is presented to my consciousness, and at the same time I can turn my attention internally to whatever part of the subconscious I want to access: thoughts about what I want to do today and how long I can spent on this post, what the capital of France is, or whatever.
So at all times, my conscious experience is a combination of external stimulation (which includes stimulation from my own body), which is mostly automatic, and internal stimulation over which I have control and choice about both my actions and my access to the vast store of subconscious content that my self has accumulated.
And, to repeat, at all times there is some correlation between the mind and the body. I don’t think I can have a thought or other kind of conscious experience without there being a correlated state of my body. However, as my flashlight metaphor is meant to imply, the direction of causation runs both ways: body influences mind and mind influences body.
2) The self.
Yes, I have a pervasive sense of self. The sense of self is is the mind, but for me includes my body as “me” in a way that the rest of the external world is not.
3) Philosophy:
I wrote,
I have said that perhaps consciousness and matter are both manifestations of one underlying oneness, but I don’t think one is more primary than the other. My thought ...is that they are two aspects of reality, each of which helps support and nurture the other.
You replied, “Well, that would be a form of monism. But I am afraid that you still have to clarify”. You then offer this interesting and useful list:
1) You leave the nature of the fundamental “reality” completely undefined. Possible, but not very satisfying. Of course, that leaves you “off the hook”: if you say nothing, you cannot be contradicted.
But, if you want to give some idea of what this basic reality could be, you should at least specify one of the following possibilities:
2) The basic reality is “an object”. IOWs, it is not conscious, and it does not represent anything. It does not understand meanings, it has no feelings or purposes. I suppose that this would be just another form of physicalist monism. Among other things, it leaves no room for free will.
3) The basic reality is “a subject”. IOWs, it is conscious, and it can represent things. It can understand meanings, it can have feelings and purposes. Of course there is room for free will. That’s what I mean when I say that I believe that consciousness is the final reality.
Of course, you could also propose that the final reality is a mix of 2 and 3, just like an human being. I think that is too anthropomorphic for my taste, but it is a possibility. So, let’s say 4 possibilities.
I think I opt for 1). Let me try to explain why.
First, I don’t think I need to be “on the hook” to have thoughts about what the underlying oneness “really” is, or to be unsatisfied with that position. That’s sort of what “underlying oneness” means: a source of both mind and matter that is beyond my, or anybody’s, ability to comprehend. This is a common religious belief: that the ultimate nature of reality is unknowable to the limited mind of human beings, and thus indescribable. I see this from a philosophical point of view, not religious, but it seems satisfactory to me to accept that this is the case.
Therefore, I don’t think that it is correct to say that basic reality has to be either an object or a subject. (I also don’t think saying that an anthropomorphic “both” is at all accurate: I agree strongly with you about that.)
My feeling (and this is extremely speculative philosophy, but it makes the most sense to me), is that the quantum world of which we have become aware in the past century is the part of some underlying oneness that broaches the “quantum curtain” (a phrase I like of a friend’s) that produces (or manifests as) the material world, and that, as we have speculated, some other aspect of the underlying oneness manifests as mind. Mind and matter arise from the underlying basic reality that is neither mind nor matter, but the source of both.
But human beings, being a mix of mind and matter, cannot pierce the quantum curtain from either the matter or the mind side. Therefore, I am satisfied to remain incapable of describing what’s on the other side. Just living with the mind/body self I have is enough for me.hazel
January 3, 2019
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William J Murray:
Thank you, I appreciate your time too. :)
The strange thing here is that I can agree with the things you say (well, amost all of them), and still I find no problem in adopting what I call "methodological dualism" in the scientific approach.
Let's see. I agree with you that our consciousness and mind can change the physical reality, not only through the regular interaction that connects our personal consciousness to our individual brain, but also through the other, less regularly observed ways that you mention, including prayer and all the rest.
And I can agree, at least in principle, that matter is not what it seems to be, and that in the end the reality of matter can be dreamlike. I am very fine with that.
But still, the laws that we observe in science (let's say gravitation, the basic forces of physics, even quantum mechanics) have certainly a definite reality, because our observation and intepretation of them certainly works, at many levels, and allows us to change and somehow "control" the outer world, whatever its final nature.
The important point is: they are not, certainly, the only laws operating in reality, as physicalists think.
Let's say that we agree that reality is dreamlike, that it is directly related to consciousness and ideas. OK, then the law of gravitation, as we can observe it in its many regularities, is still a component of that dreamlike reality. Now, whose dreaming "generates", for the whole observable universe, that kind of "law" or regularity? That's a legitimate question, even if we think that the law of gravitation is not necessarily an objective absolute. Who is "dreaming" that law in the general dream?
Not me, I would say. Probably not you. Even if we are in some way dreaming it, we are passively dreaming it. We are certainly active parts of the general dream, bur our role does not seem to be to decide the very general aspects. Maybe we can even modify those aspects in our personal experience and life. Maybe we can in some way violate some rules by our consciousness, or by prayer. Gravitation is not probably the easiest thing, but apparently it has been done (Saint Giuseppe da Copertino, maybe?).
However, the general law, if it is a dream, is not our personal dream: it is, at most, the dream of God.
So, after all, we still have a methodological dualism: we have to observe how our personal consciousness, which is part of the dream, can interact with the general dream, which has its apparent rules and regularities.
I don't see any problem with that approach. You seem to believe that a dualistic approach, even if only methodological, should limit our perspectives about what the mind can really do in its apparent relationship with matter. But why?
The limitations you mention are all due to the dogmatic prevalence of physicalist monism in our current culture: those who believe that only matter exists of course deny that consciousness can really change matter in any way. They even deny free will, because for them it cannot exist. So, not only my mind cannot defy gravitation (or even less drastic laws), it cannot even move freely my own hand. If I move my own hand, that cannot be due to my intention, but only to some complex working of physical laws, on which "I" cannot act in any way.
But those are only the lies of physicalist monism, a theory that consistently tries to deny the existence of a fundamental part of reality, consciousness. A theory denies that we really exist an consscious and free beings. A very bad theory indeed.
But once we accept the existence of consciousness as an independent part of reality, a part that cannot be explained in physical terms only, then there are no such limitations. We know that consciousness can interact with matter. It does that on a regular basis in our personal brains. That means that the laws we know about physical reality, whatever it is, are not enough. There are other, deeper laws. As consciousness can interact with the "apparent" physical reality in the common, "local" way, linked to our personal mind/brain connection, so it can, in principle, act in other ways. Like prayer and so on. The only problem is that we don't understand the deeper laws that allow that interaction. Beacuse, even if laws are only patterns of the mind, still patterns must obey some deeper laws, otherwise ntohing would make sense, and no regularities would exist, neither in so called "physical" reality or in the inner reality.
Just as a simple example, let's consider prayer. Let's say that we agree that prayer can get observable physical results (I certainly agree). But still, there are laws. I wil just make this simple observation: do you believe that an insincere prayer can get the same results as a sincere one? Do you believe that a short, distracted, opportunistic prayer can get the same results as a deep, intense, altruistic one?
Those are laws, too. Laws that in some way connect the inner world to the outer world, whatever they are, laws that connect our personal experience to the more general experience shared with others.
OK, I think that can be enough for the moment. Again, thank you for you attention.gpuccio
January 3, 2019
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Gpuccio,
Please pardon the time it took me to respond to you.
If I understand your question (in light of previous and further conversation), you are asking what functional difference it makes whether we proceed from a "methodological dualism" or a "methodological mental monism" perspective. From further reading of your following comments, (and those of Axel), it is still a matter of empirical investigation, gathering consensually-verifiable data, and drawing useful conclusions in terms of making consensually serviceable, predictive models. By "consenual" I mean "universal" - anyone can conduct the same experiment and get the same results, and anyone can use the resulting model.
I've tried to frame your question in the best possible light.
In response, first I want to say that I believe we agree that what we roughly call consciousness-intention level mind has a huge impact on our experience of what we call an objective, exterior world. The mainstream way of seeing this would be that if mind was immaterial (and I think most of here agree that it is), then it somehow interfaces with the physical brain (I think one theory is via microtubules) in order to introduce its intentionality in a top-down fashion to control or influence the activities of our physical body. To characterize this, we might say the intentionality of our consciousness searches through the mind/platonic realm to find information; it is translated into language/imagery, which is then (perhaps via quantum-level effects) translated into action/behavior. And so, subjective and platonic information transforms the physical world through physical references we call human beings. (Or, use another poetic description for the process, it doesn't really matter.)
This is the sort of framework that "methodological dualism" assumes; an exterior physical world, a mind/consciousness immaterial world, and localized interfaces in the brain of human beings.
Methodological mental monism, however, is fundamentally difference in that there is no need for an interface system. The physical "world" is entirely generated by mind, just like physicality in a dream.
The functional difference this potentially makes (if true) in terms of empirical research and in creating useful models would be beyond staggering - the difference is complete. It transforms everything for many reasons, but all those reasons stem from the fundamental component of all empirical research and usefulness: causation.
In the mental monism perspective, physical matter and forces don't cause anything to happen; in fact, they don't even really exist (they are just patterns mind causes). Mind causes everything - just like in a dream. Mind would be causing the behavioral patterns we (misguidedly, IMO) call "physical laws" and force/energy values.
Furthermore, in mental monism methodology, universal consensuality is no longer a necessary aspect of empirical research (in the pure definitional sense of the word "empirical, not in the scientific-community, ideological sense which requires universal consensuality). What are the experiential limitations of individual, group and societal impact on the reality they experience, given mental monism and the power of subjective, individual consciousness-intention to directly impact what we perceive as external physicalism?
If you are familiar with lucid dreaming, it differs from normal dreaming in that you are aware that you are occupying a mental world and so you can directly affect it. Would we have similar capacity in what we call our waking state?
There is considerable research into this very thing that indicates that yes, we can directly affect what we normally call the external, physical world. I'm not going to debate the validity of such research (such as, the effect of various individuals or groups when intentionally trying to mentally affect random number generators, or various research into mentally-directed/centered healing techniques on others, or the power of meditation on peace and harmony to reduce local crime rates), but you can see the theoretical implications ... if mental monism is (1) our true existential state, and (2) how it provides avenues of research and practical value unavailable to standard dualistic models.
Let's look at various affirmation and intentionality perspectives that have a very large, worldwide advocacy which insist that we can "manifest" things into our lives. Look at prayer. Look at so how many successful people using visualization and imagining techniques. Self-help gurus teach the same. One might roll their eyes at such things, but I will say this: since gravitating towards mental monism and empirically experimenting with such techniques, I've experienced things (and many others have) that defy external-world explanation.
I mention all that not to debate the validity, but rather just to answer what the potential problems are when adopting non-mental monist methodology models.
It may be that most of what an individual experiences as an external physical world does not need to be universally consensual. It may be that the imposition of the universality-model of empirical research is, in fact, a self-imposed prison of experiential capacity. By submitting to it as the arbiter of our reality experience, we may be causing that very model to be our experience.
Just some thoughts for consideration. I appreciate your time.William J Murray
January 3, 2019
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Hazel at #117:
Thank you for all these good thoughts. As you, I am really enjoying the discussion! :)
I think that, in the end, we really agree on more things than expected. And you have clearly listed them. So, I will not go back to the things we agree upon (which are a lot).
You have also clearly detected a few things on which we have probably slightly different ideas. That's perfectly fine, of course, so I will comment briefly (I hope! :) ) on those few points, with no intention to convince you, but just for the sake of clarity.
1) Consciousness
As you correctly say, there is certainly a problem of language here: I call consciousness "the whole iceberg" (bear with me, I have to use the metaphor a little further), while you call consciousness "the tip", and "subconscious mind" the iceberg, OK, that would not be a real problem. Just words.
But there is more, I am afraid. I get the feeling, from what you say, that you use the word "subconscious mind" to denote "the stuff that is available to us but not immediately present".
Now, to clarify a possible difference between our ideas, I am afraid that I have to introduce a further distinction that is very important to understand what I believe. For me, there are three components:
a) The waking consciousness: the contents of which I am distinclty aware in my waking state. That would be the tip of the iceberg. Or, in my other metaphor, my macular or central vision.
b) The subconscious mind (or, more in general, any other state of cosnciousness): the contents that are represented in my consciousness, but of which I am not distinctly aware. That would be the rest of the iceberg. Or, in my other metaphor, my peripheral vision.
c) Unconscious resources stored in the brain, but not represented at the moment, to which cosnciousness can get access if and when necessary. More or less like contents stored in the hard disk, but not read in the RAM at the moment, just to add my third metaphor :) ! That component is not part of the iceberg of consciousness, but of course those contents can become part of it at any appropriate occasion. In my "vision" metaphor, those are the things that I am not seeing at the moment, but that I could easily see, either in my peripheral vision or in my macular vision, if I move slightly my eyes.
So, that brings us to one possible important difference in our views: when I say that the subconscious mind is part of consciousness, I say it because I believe that its contents are really represented in our consciousness, even if not in a distinct way. They are the peripheral vision, not the things that we at present cannot see. So, they are conscious contents by all standards: they are subjective representations of the self.
This is an important difference, and I would just like to know what you exactly think of the issue. Because some of your statements (like "holistic feeling of understanding or meaning that is larger than an expression in word") seem more in line with what I think, while others point to a different perspective.
2) The self.
For me, the definition of self is clear enough. It is the "subject" that represents all represented things. It is the thing that does not change, the "Persistence of Self-Identity", indeed identity itself. It's what we are.
As we are now in a more philosophical mood, I will add that, in my worldview, the self is transcendental and not formal. But I will stop here about that.
You say: "my sense of self includes my body." Of course it does, because you perceive your body, in many ways, both conscious and subconscious (in my sense). IOWs, it is continuously represented in your consciousness.
You say: "the pervasive presence of my body is there". That's true. But just try to specify: where is "where"? What is it? For me, it is the perceiving self, and nothing else. Because, out of subjective representation, we are nothing, we have no identity. Our perceiving self, our ""Persistence of Self-Identity"", is our only "identity".
You also say: " I see myself as a mind/body whole". That's fine. May I humbly emphasize: "I see"?
3) Philosophy:
I am happy that you like my concept of "philosophical dualism". Maybe it can become popular! :)
You say:
I have said that perhaps consciousness and matter are both manifestations of one underlying oneness, but I don’t think one is more primary than the other. My thought (remember, this is speculative philosophy) is that they are two aspects of reality, each of which helps support and nurture the other.
Well, that would be a form of monism. But I am afraid that you still have to clarify. IMO there are three possibilities (if there is any other, please explain what it is):
1) You leave the nature of the fundamental "reality" completely undefined. Possible, but not very satisfying. Of course, that leaves you "off the hook": if you say nothing, you cannot be contradicted.
But, if you want to give some idea of what this basic reality could be, you should at least specify one of the following possibilities:
2) The basic reality is "an object". IOWs, it is not cosncious, and it does not represent anything. It does not understand meanings, it has no feelings or purposes. I suppose that this would be just another form of physicalist monism. Among other things, it leaves no room for free will.
3) The basic reality is "a subject". IOWs, it is conscious, and it can represent things. It can understand meanings, it can have feelings and purposes. Of course there is room for free will. That's what I mean when I say that I believe that consciousness is the final reality.
Of course, you could also propose that the final reality is a mix of 2 and 3, just like an human being. I think that is too antropomorphic for my taste, but it is a possibility. So, let's say 4 possibilities.
My position is very clear. What about yours?
The problem of the platonic world is a separate problem, IMO, and I will not discuss it here. I accept that you don't believe that way. I think that there are interesting aspects in that problem, but what I have already said will suffice for the moment.gpuccio
January 3, 2019
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Hello Gpuccio, et al.
Let me organize this by topics, and point to places that I think we are in basic agreement about. The main issue that we disagree about, which may be a matter of semantics, is what the word “consciousness” refers to.
To start, you wrote,
The real line, the real hard problem of consciousness, is: why is there a subjective world, and how does it interact with the objective world?
Yep, that’s the big issue! :-)
Experiential vs Ontological thoughts
I mostly agree with you when you write,
Even if I have some ontological views (as probably have you), my discussions here, even about such subtle issues like consciousness and free will, are always essentially empirical. So, I treat consciousness for what we can observe of it, and I am not interested, at least at this level of discussion, in debating ontological issues. … That’s why I never refer to consciousness and matter as “substances”, for example, and I am not a big fan of concepts like dualism and monism. IOWs, I want to stay as empirical as possible, and not get too philosophical, at least in this context.
However, I’ll note that the conversation has turned more ontological this morning, which I’d like to discuss later, but not distract me from this approach with you.
The mind/body interface
There has to be an interface between the mind and the body. A working speculation is that this involves the quantum world somehow. Also, such an interface would violate no physical laws, although there might be physical laws we have not discovered yet that are involved.
In fact, my view is that ultimately the mind and the physical world, including our body may be two manifestations of some underlying quantum oneness.
Free will
Free will is not completely free. You say that thinking so is a severe misunderst anding, but I don’t think I’ve ever heard someone claim that. We are constrained by external circumstances, obviously, and by the body in ways. In fact, sometimes the main thing we are free to choose is just our attitude about the situation we are in.
I also think we agree that our will is exercised by our larger self, and not just our waking consciousness.
An external world
We believe there is an external world, which includes our physical body. Irrespective of what the true quantum nature of “matter” is, from a practical point of view, our mind resides in a material body that exists in a material world of things. We also believe that other people have minds and consciousness, just as we do, even though we are the only people who can experience our own consciousness, and we can’t experience theirs.
Consciousness
The key issue here for us is that we are using the word “consciousness” differently. You are using the word to include all that mind encompasses, I think, and I am differentiating our immediate awareness in the moment as consciousness from all the stuff that is available to us but not immediately present, the subconscious. I am conscious of the screen and words in front of me, of my fingers typing, of the words I am saying to myself internally that I am typing, of the music I am listening to, etc. I am not conscious (or at least wasn’t until I had this thought) of a lecture I could easily give about how to derive the quadratic formula, even though I know that lecture is “in there” and I could give it at a drop of a hat.
I think we have to have words to make this distinction, and I think, from a bit of reading I’ve done today, that consciousness usually refers to the awareness, in the moment, of all that is immediately present in our mind. The part of the “iceberg underneath” (which is not my preferred metaphor) is the subconscious.
I can probably understand what you write by the context, and maybe your using “waking consciousness“ to mean what I am calling just consciousness. I don’t think we have disagreement about our thoughts here, just about the words we use.
Thinking
I think we agree that there is a difference between the immediate awareness (that is, conscious in the sense I use the word) of an internal monologue where we articulate a thought in a stream of words and a more holistic feeling of understanding or meaning that is larger than an expression in words. This is hard to describe… because we have to do it in words - the Catch 22.
The self
You write, as a distinction, that:
Everything perceived is a conscious representation. As I have already explained, I call the sum total of conscious representations “mind”. However, the mind and the subject are two different things, because even if mental representations are not physical objects, they are anyway “objects” perceived by the self, the common subject of all personal representations.
So, just to simplify, we have:
a) The subject, which is one and remains the same
b) The mental objects, that are not physical, but are only representations in the subject’s consciousness
c) The physical objects, including the body, which are inferred as existing independently outside us and outside our consciousness, even if we perceive them through our mind.
These good paragraphs bring up a key point: We think, and feel, that there is a “self”–the core of who we are– that has access through our consciousness to both the external and internal world.
Not only that, at least for me , my sense of self includes my body. The mental part of self does all these things we’ve been talking about, but the pervasive presence of my body is there: I see myself as a mind/body whole, not a “self in a body.” You may think of this differently.
But the idea of self is central, and, FWIW, the central mystery of the Eastern approach to these issues, which asks who is this “I” that is conscious?
Philosophy
We tried to talk about these issue from a experiential perspective as opposed to a philosophical, ontological perspective, but the subject has come up.
At 89, after some posts by wjm, you wrote,
I really think that you, WJM and I are probably in greater agreement than it seems.
I’m not sure I want to mix wjm’s thoughts in with all this, but I don’t think what you wrote is true about me and him.
However, I like your phrase of “methodological dualism”, and your idea that there is
little practical difference, for the discussions we have here, between true dualism and some form of idealistic monism. I am probably more a monist philosophically (I think that consciousness is the final reality), but I have no difficulties to reason in terms of true dualism for all practical purposes, especially for scientific purposes. I really see no differences.
But, no, I don’t think I believe that consciousness is the final reality. I have said that perhaps consciousness and matter are both manifestations of one underlying oneness, but I don’t think one is more primary than the other. My thought (remember, this is speculative philosophy) is that they are two aspects of reality, each of which helps support and nurture the other.
Also, and this comment maybe takes us farther afield than I want to go, but believing that consciousness is an aspect separate from matter, and that we live as a dualistic mind/body creature, is not the same as thinking that the content of our minds somehow extends out to some Platonic realm that exists outside, and overarches the world, so to speak.
But this is philosophy and beyond the experiential perspective we’ve been trying to take.
I think this concludes my survey of all your posts to me the past few days, which I very much appreciate. I’ve really enjoyed the discussion, and the process of putting this long post together.hazel
January 2, 2019
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John_a_designer at #104:
Well, I am not a philosopher, but I have no problems with your comments. I will just offer a few personal comments, in my role of amateur. :)
I was probably intepreting intentionality in the common sense of having purposes. I apologize for the mistake. But, even worse, I must say that I don't really understand the specific philosophic meaning at least from the quotes you gave. OK, that's probably no big problem.
I was simplifying the basic definition, at least for my purposes, to qualia and the subject, because I think that, very simply, if I observe a red wall and nothing else, and in that moment I am mainly focused on the perception itself, I see essentially a representation (the red wall) and a subject (I). And yet I am certainly conscious at that moment.
However, I am not trying to ignore all the other interesting aspects. Indeed, I have also suggested that each representation, however simple, has always at least two intertwined aspects: cognition and feeling. So, if I see a red wall, I have a very basic cognition of it as an object, or at least as a sensation, and that is a very simple cognition, and at the same time I always have some simple reaction to that representation (good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant), and that is a feeling.
Intention, in the common sense, comes into the scenario as soon as I have a desire and try to realize it. But probably we always have desires associated to representations.
Free will is more difficult, because it is not directly perceived, at least IMO, but rather intuitively asserted. So, in a strict sense, it is not an observable.
Rationality, as I see it, is a more structured form of cognition. But I am not sure that it is inherent in all forms of consciousness. I think that some beings can be conscious without necessarily being able of rational thoughts (for example, animals). Usually rationality requires some form of abstract thought.gpuccio
January 2, 2019
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Bornagain77 @ #5
Hi BA. Great to see that encyclopaedic mind of yours still as busy as ever.
'With contextuality we find, “In the quantum world, the property that you discover through measurement is not the property that the system actually had prior to the measurement process. What you observe necessarily depends on how you carried out the observation” and “Measurement outcomes depend on all the other measurements that are performed – the full context of the experiment. Contextuality means that quantum measurements can not be thought of as simply revealing some pre-existing properties of the system under study. ”
In the light of that, does this quote of Niels Bohr seem to you to be on the same page as Anton Zellinger :
' We must be clear that when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creating images and establishing mental connections.
In his first meeting with Werner Heisenberg in early summer 1920, in response to questions on the nature of language, as reported in Discussions about Language (1933); quoted in Defense Implications of International Indeterminacy (1972) by Robert J. Pranger, p. 11, and Theorizing Modernism : Essays in Critical Theory (1993) by Steve Giles, p. 28
Although, he also made it clear, as I quoted to Gpuccio above, that this was not intended as an invitation to wander off the 'reservation' of empirical experimentation, renouncing that discipline inherent in classical physics..Axel
January 2, 2019
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Axel:
Nice to hear from you. QM is always a fascinating topic.gpuccio
January 2, 2019
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LoL! @ bornagain77- No, not Oprah and Shirley. Good one, though.
There are many people who have made the case that Jesus’s teachings go hand in hand with those of the eastern mystics. There are many who claim that the “halo effect” is due to the energy radiations of all seven chakras being all on, in-sync and no SWR- ie the “Christ consciousness”. And that is the true goal of humanity- achieve that level of consciousness.ET
January 2, 2019
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Hazel:
Please, take your time. You will not be forgotten. :)gpuccio
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I have been unable to sleep since comment 99 because I could not figure out what was meant by that comment. Now that it has been clarified in comment 108 I can finally rest.- the body will rest. The mind will be out exploring...ET
January 2, 2019
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"You need to read more because what you posted has nothing to do with it."
Oprah and Shirley MacLaine perhaps?
https://www.crosswalk.com/faith/women/the-oprahfication-of-eastern-mysticism-11569798.html
https://www.womenofgrace.com/blog/?p=37541
No thanks.bornagain77
January 2, 2019
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Gpuccio @ 94
'Maybe I am wrong, but could you please make some realistic example of how that attitude could be a problem in scientific inquiry?
Good day to you, Gp. We haven't spoken for yonks. If I may interject here, Gp (Broadway Danny rose style...), 'that monocular, empirical demarche certainly served Maximilian Planck well, didn't it ? Apparently, he was very conservative, and really didn't care for what he was discovering concerning the quantum world. A really nasty bout of the 'collywobbles', by the sound of it.
Also, re the point you make, here :
'My point is that at present our observables are of two different kinds: objects and subjective experiences. That’s why I proposed a “methodological sualism”, at least as long as it works well with facts. Because it is a fact that objects perceived and our subjective representations of them behave differently, as far as we can understand from what we know of reality. I am not relying on any final idea about what they are, about sunstances and so on. I am remaining completely empirical, and I have no prejudices or expections. I want only one thing: truth, or as much of it as it is possible.'
Was Niels Bohr seeking to address the issue, here, do you think ?
'However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is that simply by the word "experiment" we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of the results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics.
Niels Bohr, "Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist (1949) pp. 199-241.
His Wikiquotes page gives a fascinating insight, even to a Noddy like me, into the epistemological revolution that QM brought about, .Axel
January 2, 2019
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My goodness: I ought to be able to read short sentences: At 99 I obviously meant
"to Gpuccio et al. FYI: I’m working on a well-organized (I hope) reply to the various posts of the last day, but real life [not like] has intervened and time is short [not sort]. Hopefully I will not be forgotten."
I know anyone who thought about this knew what I meant, but I hate seeing those mistakes!hazel
January 2, 2019
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There are many people who have made the case that Jesus's teachings go hand in hand with those of the eastern mystics. There are many who claim that the "halo effect" is due to the energy radiations of all seven chakras being all on, in-sync and no SWR- ie the "Christ consciousness". And that is the true goal of humanity- achieve that level of consciousness.ET
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bornagain77:
From what little I have read of Eastern mysticism, it is a wishy washy philosophy in which you can read all sorts of faces in the clouds as you can possibly imagine.
You need to read more because what you posted has nothing to do with it.ET
January 2, 2019
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Hazel
Ed, according to Wikipedia, Sting’s “album’s title was inspired by Arthur Koestler’s “The Roots of Coincidence”, which was influenced by Jung. Sting has a long history of being interested in Eastern ideas, and he has practiced serious yoga for years.
I remember when Sting joked about having tantric organisms that would last for several hours. Some people took him seriously and did research in the quest for the never-ending orgasm.Ed George
January 2, 2019
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Gpuccio @ 80,
I agree with what you say.
Well, it’s not primarily my thought or even my opinion. The list above is Dr. Egnor’s list and it’s a list of properties we find being discussed in the literature which is really quite extensive. As an example, just take a look at David Chalmers site. (Use with caution. I get the warning “not secure.”)
However, in the basic sense, my definition of consciousness, as I have explained in my previous comments to Hazel, requires only the existence of subjective representations, of any form.
So, it just requires a subject that represents something in a subjective way.
Are you aware that what you are talking about there is intentionality? (more below)
Therefore, of all the important aspects you quote, only two are really necessary to define consciousness:
a) Qualia
b) Persistence of Self-Identity
All the others are important dimensions of subjective experiences, but not really necessary to define the existence of a conscious experience.
If you look at the literature there is a lot of interest and discussion about Intentionality and Qualia. Intentionality is something you “unintentionally” left of your short list. However, I don’t see how we can really discuss consciousness without considering so-called intentionality. The term intentionality as used in the literature is not to be confused with common everyday English word. SEP defines it this way:
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb intendere, which means being directed towards some goal or thing…
Contemporary discussions of the nature of intentionality are an integral part of discussions of the nature of minds: what are minds and what is it to have a mind? They arise in the context of ontological and metaphysical questions about the fundamental nature of mental states: states such as perceiving, remembering, believing, desiring, hoping, knowing, intending, feeling, experiencing, and so on. What is it to have such mental states? How does the mental relate to the physical, i.e., how are mental states related to an individual's body, to states of his or her brain, to his or her behavior and to states of affairs in the world?
Why is intentionality so-called? For reasons soon to be explained, in its philosophical usage, the meaning of the word ‘intentionality’ should not be confused with the ordinary meaning of the word ‘intention.’[emphasis added]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
The word aboutness is often used to clarify what we mean by uncommon meaning of the word intentionality. It answers the questions: ‘what am I thinking (or conscious) about?’ Or, ‘what am I thinking of?’ Rocks, trees, the sun or moon etc. do not have intentional thoughts. We and apparently many animals do. As I wrote earlier ontologically we can divide the world basically into two kinds of things: things that perceive (humans and animals) and things that ARE perceived.
Ed Feser, a professor of philosophy, who has written a book the philosophy of the mind divides the consciousness pie into three parts: intentionality, qualia (subjective experience) and something no one else (including Egnor) has brought up in this discussion rational thought or rationality. He argues that it is our capacity for rational thought (not something we really share with animals) that is the best evidence that conscious thought is immaterial.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/01/revisiting-ross-on-immateriality-of.html
So, if we defer to the experts (not other amateurs like you and me) I come up with the following short list:
a) Qualia
b) Persistence of Self-Identity
c) Intentionality (which usually gets listed at the top most of the expert’s lists)
d) Rationality.
However, you and Hazel have also discussing Free will-- which is actually derived from the other meaning of intention. Why isn’t that important?
So culling Egnor’s original list I come up with five after appending the list with Feser’s argument for rationality. The other two properties on Egnor’s list Restricted Access and Incorrigibility are pretty self-evident when we consider those five.
PS Here is a quick link to Egnor's list which i posted @ 75
https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/three-knockdown-proofs-of-the-immateriality-of-mind-and-why-computers-compute-not-think/#comment-670560john_a_designer
January 2, 2019
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Only in so far as Eastern Mysticism is compatible with Theism, i.e. Mind first, and renounces some of the overt panpsychist presuppositions within it is it compatible with quantum mechanics. To reiterate, Bohm failed to harmonize the two.
From what little I have read of Eastern mysticism, it is a wishy washy philosophy in which you can read all sorts of faces in the clouds as you can possibly imagine.
Post hoc rationilization at it worst to try to say it in is line with QM,, IMHO.bornagain77