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UB Sets It Out Step-By-Step

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UD Editors:  No one has come close to refuting UB’s thesis after 129 comments.  We are moving this post to the top of the page to give the materialists another chance.

I take the following from an excellent comment UB made in a prior post.  UB lays out his argument step by step, precept by precept.  Then he arrives at a conclusion.  In order for his argument to be valid, the conclusion must follow from the premises.  In order for his argument to be sound, each of the premises must be true.

Now here is the challenge to our Darwinist friends.  If you disagree with UB’s conclusion, please demonstrate how his argument is either invalid (as a matter of logic the conclusion does not follow from the premises) or unsound (one or more of the premises are false).  Good luck (you’re going to need it).

Without further ado, here is UB’s argument:

1.  A representation is an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system (e.g. written text, spoken words, pheromones, animal gestures, codes, sensory input, intracellular messengers, nucleotide sequences, etc, etc).

2.  It is not logically possible to transfer information (the form of a thing; a measured aspect, quality, or preference) in a material universe without using a representation instantiated in matter.

3.  If that is true, and it surely must be, then several other things must logically follow. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. In other words, if one thing is to represent another thing within a system, then it must be separate from the thing it represents. And if it is separate from it, then it cannot be anything but materially arbitrary to it (i.e. they cannot be the same thing).

4.  If that is true, then the presence of that representation must present a material component to the system (which is reducible to physical law), while its arrangement presents an arbitrary component to the system (which is not reducible to physical law).

5.  If that is true, and again it surely must be, then there has to be something else which establishes the otherwise non-existent relationship between the representation and the effect it evokes within the system. In fact, this is the material basis of Francis Crick’s famous ‘adapter hypothesis’ in DNA, which lead to a revolution in the biological sciences. In a material universe, that something else must be a second arrangement of matter; coordinated to the first arrangement as well as to the effect it evokes.

6.  It then also follows that this second arrangement must produce its unambiguous function, not from the mere presence of the representation, but from its arrangement.  It is the arbitrary component of the representation which produces the function.

7.  And if those observations are true, then in order to actually transfer recorded information, two discrete arrangements of matter are inherently required by the process; and both of these objects must necessarily have a quality that extends beyond their mere material make-up. The first is a representation and the second is a protocol (a systematic, operational rule instantiated in matter) and together they function as a formal system. They are the irreducible complex core which is fundamentally required in order to transfer recorded information.

8.  During protein synthesis, a selected portion of DNA is first transcribed into mRNA, then matured and transported to the site of translation within the ribosome. This transcription process facilitates the input of information (the arbitrary component of the DNA sequence) into the system. The input of this arbitrary component functions to constrain the output, producing the polypeptides which demonstrate unambiguous function.

9.  From a causal standpoint, the arbitrary component of DNA is transcribed to mRNA, and those mRNA are then used to order tRNA molecules within the ribosome. Each stage of this transcription process is determined by the physical forces of pair bonding. Yet, which amino acid appears at the peptide binding site is not determined by pair bonding; it is determined  by the aaRS. In other words, which amino acid appears at the binding site is only evoked by the physical structure of the nucleic triplet, but is not determined by it. Instead, it is determined (in spatial and temporal isolation) by the physical structure of the aaRS. This is the point of translation; the point where the arbitrary component of the representation is allowed to evoke a response in a physically determined system – while preserving the arbitrary nature of the representation.

10.  This physical event, translation by a material protocol, as well as the transcription of a material representation, is ubiquitous in the transfer of recorded information.

CONCLUSION:  These two physical objects (the representation and protocol) along with the required preservation of the arbitrary component of the representation, and the production of unambiguous function from that arbitrary component, confirm that the transfer of recorded information in the genome is just like any other form of recorded information. It’s an arbitrary relationship instantiated in matter.

Comments
Correction: As for this committing the fallacy of ad hominem, are you suggesting *all* theories of knowledge were developed before the enlightenment? Are you suggesting the great majority of [pre-enlightenment] conceptions were not non-authoritative and non-justifcationist in nature? Are you suggesting there are no significant differences between those theories and post-enlightenment theories of knowledge, such as Popper’s?critical rationalist
September 6, 2012
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UB: So you have concluded that I am a justificationist who has misconceptions about Popper, who doesn’t recognize that my conception of human knowledge is an idea that can be criticized, so I should remember what Popper said about Darwinism. Which is yet another strawman. Again my criticism it that your argument is parochial. What do I mean by that? It means an argument that has a limited or narrow outlook or scope. For example, you could be a Larmarckian that (in addition to "use" and "disuse") includes the idea there is some universal law that mandates organisms become more complex and that we only still see less complex organisms because a continuous stream of them are being spontaneously generated (As Lamarck did). This too includes a form of justificationism in that it assumes the knowledge of how to improve organisms was already present at the outset in some law of physics. Again, this is counter to Darwinism, in which the knowledge of how to build adaptations is genuinely created. If you prefer a more formal approach, take the following argument.. P01. John has a favorite ice cream flavor. P02. John has a favorite ice cream shop. P03. John just ordered his favorite ice cream flavor at his favorite ice cream shop. C01. John just ordered vanilla ice cream. Does the conclusion follow from the premises? No. Why not? Because there is an implicit premise that John's favorite ice cream shop only serves one flavor of ice cream: vanilla. Furthermore, all one needs to do is point out John's favorite ice cream shop offered him significantly more than one flavor. If you are suggesting there is something unique Darwinism, (the day John bought his favorite ice cream flavor they were out of every flavor but vanilla), then I've already addressed this in that you appear to be confused about the underling explanation behind Darwinism itself, which is a higher-level explanation. As for this committing the fallacy of ad hominem, are you suggesting *all* theories of knowledge were developed before the enlightenment? Are you suggesting the great majority of post-enlightenment conceptions were not non-authoritative and non-justifcationist in nature? Are you suggesting there are no significant differences between those theories and post-enlightenment theories of knowledge, such as Popper's? Furthermore, are you suggesting there are no conflicts between your expressed views and common misconceptions of Popper - especially in regards to justiifcationism? IOW, your response of "ad hominem" further suggests you do not recognize your conception of human knowledge as an idea that would be subject to criticism. Again, was there something in my brief outline of authoritative, justiifcaitonist conceptions of human knowledge that you disagreed with? If so, please be specific.critical rationalist
September 6, 2012
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@UB RE: 224... Again, it's unclear what you mean by "arbitrary". When attempts to clarify this failed, I asked what consequences it would have for Darwinism in hope it would shed much need light on the term. You replied
It is only a “problem” to the extent that evolutionary theory (specifically Darwinian theory) is fully dependent on the arrangements of matter being described here, which I have referred to as “representations” and “protocols”. It is their material existence that is being observed and presented (by extension) as the necessary material conditions for evolution to occur. Therefore evolution cannot be the source of their existence.
I then pointed out …
Is the conclusion is that existence of abstractions requires some ultimate arbiter? If so, this represents justificationism and is parochial. It also assumes that all high-level explanations should be reductionist in nature. However, this simply isn’t the case. Nor is it necessary or even desirable to do so for us to actually make progress.,
So, some kinds of phenomena can be explained in terms of themselves alone – without direct reference to anything at the atomic level. In other words, they are quasi-autonomous (nearly self-contained). Resolution into explicably at a higher level is emergence.
Rather than address this, your response can be summarized as …
My argument doesn’t even mention Darwinism.
If by "mention Darwinism" you mean nothing more than contain the word "Darwinism" then it seems I've satisfied your objection to my criticism by removing the word "Darwinism" and replacing it with "all explanatory theorires" On the other hand, as pointed out in 200 [not 203], Darwinism is an explanatory theory. If by "mention Darwinism" you mean Darwinism the explanatory theory, then your argument does refer it by nature of Darwinism being an explanatory theory of the specific biological complexity we observe. This includes an explanation for how the knowledge of how to build biological adaptations, which is found in the genome, was created. From your ongoing conversation with Clavidivs, you wrote:
To make this a non-trivial argument you must recompose it so that this ‘conclusion’ is instead a premise, combined with another premise establishing the significance of semiotic states.
However, you've ignored the following from my 210 [originally 202]...
Justification is impossible. For example, conclusions of an argument are not proven unless the premises are proven, which is impossible. You either have to assume that you've proven them, which isn't' the same as actually proving them, or you are faced with an infinite regress.
One could just as well object on the ground it was necessary to make that premise a conclusion, combined with another premise establishing whatever established the the significance of semiotic states, etc.critical rationalist
September 6, 2012
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CLAVDIVS,
All this is irrelevant to your argument, as we have just agreed. Since it is irrelevant, then you cannot treat the irreducibility of the arrangement C-T-A as one of your premises.
I don’t treat it as a premise - and you know it. This comment is disconnected from reality.
If you think the irreducibility of the arrangement C-T-A is important to your argument, please say so. Then we can discuss whether it can be granted or whether it needs to be defended.
Establishing the irreducibility of symbol structures is not a requirement to make the observations contained in my argument, just as I have said from the start. However, it would certainly come into play in establishing the type of mechanism capable of creating the system.
But please don’t continue bringing it up and then saying it’s irrelevant.
Clavs, did you not ask me to “bring it up”? Did you not say that you wanted a categorical distinction for the irreducibility of genetics to physical law?
Not at all. I granted that conclusion only for the purpose of discussing that, even if that’s true, it appears to be either trivial or tautological.
Merriam-Webster defines “trivial” as commonplace and ordinary. So by your estimation, an argument which establishes that the TRI in genetics is accomplished by the use of arbitrary representations and systematic operational rules is commonplace and ordinary. Or more precisely, that view of genetics is commonplace and ordinary. If that is true, then as a logical consequence, such an argument would receive uncontroversial agreement, right? The question then becomes; is your estimation of triviality actually reflected in the real world or not? I can assure you that it is not.
No. It is your conclusion that is trivial; namely, that “the transfer of recorded information from the genome demonstrates a semiotic state, and therefore its origin will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state.”
Again, if the conclusion that ‘genetic information transfer is semiotic’ is trivial, then it is commonplace and ordinary, correct? But that is not the case, is it? Isn’t it a fact that such a conclusion is vehemently resisted in the real world? And as for the requirement of a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state, that would be a logical consequence of a non-trivial conclusion, would it not? Or does it suit your sensibilities more to refer to it as a trivial consequence of a vehemently resisted (non-trivial) conclusion?
The concept “semiotic state” as applied to genetics in your argument is not trivial in my view, and, yes, its significance needs to be established. You have raised some points in favour of that but I believe that discussion is premature whilst the conclusion appears trivial.
Physics has demonstrated that symbolic representations are not reducible to the physical laws that govern their make-up. This is not merely raising “a point in favour” of establishing the significance of semiosis; it is a physical reality. Yet in your view, the recognition of this physical reality can be viewed as “premature” until we resolve the question of whether we should refer to the need for a semiotic-capable mechanism as a trivial observation or a logical consequence.
To make your argument non-trivial your conclusion has to be something other than “system X has property Y, therefore at some point in its history it required the introduction of property Y.”
Does this view of triviality stand up if the property Y is vehemently resisted as a requirement of system X? If not, is it the system X, or the property Y, or the claim of triviality that is unsupportable?
I do agree that biology exhibits semiotic states, at the level of human consciousness, for example. But I am not persuaded this is established at a biomolecular level. However, my mind is open to the possibility.
Thank you for your input CLAVDIVS. The semiotic process at the heart of genetic TRI was functioning to create living systems long before we human beings appeared on this planet. This is logically supported by the fact that a) we are here to observe it as a consequence of its operation, b) we have no evidence of there being any other system, and c) it is conceptually not possible to transfer recorded information by any other method.Upright BiPed
September 6, 2012
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Upright BiPed,
My first question is for clarification of this definition. How exactly can information be measured? Does it have standard units? Does your definition correspond to any standard definitions?
A measured content of information is of no consequence here, only the material conditions of the transfer.
Why do you use the word "measured" in your definition then? D2. Information: a) the form of a thing b) a measured aspect c) a measured quality d) a measured preference Nothing in your definition of "information" mentions "material conditions of the transfer", so I'm confused by your response. Could you please clarify this definition further or replace it with a standard definition of "information" that matches yours?
Is my restatement of this premise accurate?
Yes, I have stated it in an abbreviated form as well, but only after I’ve explained it. For instance, among other things, you’ve left out the disambiguation of “information”, i.e. the form of a thing, as well as the qualifier “recorded information” to distinguish it from “physical information”. Otherwise, I’m happy you were able to discern the data, given that the text you so carefully revised came from nothing more than a conversational blog post, not a formal paper.
My restatement of your premise comes directly from your item 2:
2. It is not logically possible to transfer information (the form of a thing; a measured aspect, quality, or preference) in a material universe without using a representation instantiated in matter.
I don't see the terms "recorded information" or "physical information" in that. If you consider my restatement accurate, though, this isn't an issue.
D3. Arbitrary: ? This word seems important to your argument, so a precise definition is required. Does it simply mean “separate”? What does the qualifier “materially” add to “arbitrary”?
Did you read the text after you cut and pasted it?
Indeed I did. Here it is again, as I quoted it:
3. If that is true, and it surely must be, then several other things must logically follow. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. In other words, if one thing is to represent another thing within a system, then it must be separate from the thing it represents. And if it is separate from it, then it cannot be anything but materially arbitrary to it (i.e. they cannot be the same thing).
The only definition of "arbitrary" I can get from that is that you seem to be using it as a synonym for "separate" in one sentence. That seems incomplete, at best, given how important the term appears to be to your argument. Could you please define it precisely?
P2. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. This is where my understanding starts to break down. There are too many concepts packed into this sentence for me to parse it. By “representation of form” do you mean “information” (I am guessing at that based on D1 and D2)?
Yes, “representation of form” refers to those things you cut out from the previous sentences. Information is the ‘form of a thing’ instantiated in matter by means of a representation.
I didn't cut anything. I have quoted your numbered paragraphs in full. The phrase "instantiated in matter by means of a representation" is unnecessarily verbose and potentially confusing. As I noted previously, you already defined "representation" as "an arrangement of matter", so the whole phrase is redundant. In any case, based on your response the best restatement of your premise that I can come up with is: P2'. If there is an arrangement of matter that constitutes information, that arrangement is necessarily arbitrary to the thing to which the information refers. Is this close to what you mean? I am basing this in part on the next bit of your response:
What does “consequence of its own material arrangement” mean? What does “necessarily arbitrary to” mean
This is what you missed when you said you couldn’t understand that a) for the arrangement of one thing to b) represent the form of another thing, two things will be needed. That means they won’t be the same thing. I know in the information age it’s sometimes hard to imagine a distinction between a medium and information, but that is exactly what this passage is about.
You didn't directly answer my question regarding the meaning of "consequence of its own material arrangement", so I dropped that out of my restatement of your premise. I'm still not entirely clear by about what you mean by "necessarily arbitrary" and "two things will be needed". Could you please either precisely define "necessarily arbitrary" or modify P2' to eliminate those words while still making your point?
I’m too lost at step 3 to get anything out of step 4, but what do you mean by “material component” as opposed to “arbitrary component”? What do you mean by “reducible to physical law”?
If the making an tangible distinction between a material medium (which might contain information), and the information itself (contained within material medium), causes a conceptual problem for you; then I am simply not going to be of any help to you. Sorry.
I am simply trying to understand your argument. The best way I know of to do so is to ask questions, then restate my understanding in my own words and confirm with you that my restatement reflects what you meant. In this case you have only further confused me by not answering my questions about the terms you are using and by adding in what appear to be assertions or definitions regarding information, representation of information, and physical laws. I'd like to figure out what you're talking about, but I need good faith responses from you. If you aren't interested in having me understand your argument, please just say so.onlooker
September 6, 2012
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Upright BiPed @ 226
CLAVDIVS @ 183: That’s fine. I understand you are stipulating that at no point in your argument do you rely upon either the irreducibility or the reducibility of any elements of genetics to physical laws. UB @ 189: Good, you now understand that my argument is not dependent on a reduction to physical law. CLAVDIVS @ 214:Nor is it dependent upon an irreducibility to physical law – let’s not forget that part. UB @ 226: Hardly forgetting it, I’ve repeated it several times already.
Great, now we are crystal clear on this point.
UB @ 226: I told you that my argument was not dependent on such knowledge, but I also highlighted the fact that the existence of the arrangement C-T-A (as a local discrete causal structure within protein synthesis) is not reducible to physical law, and happens to be the very source of biological function. Unhindered by that material fact, you then asked me to go ahead and grant a priori that the system and its mechanism of origin are reducible anyway.
All this is irrelevant to your argument, as we have just agreed. Since it is irrelevant, then you cannot treat the irreducibility of the arrangement C-T-A as one of your premises. If you think the irreducibility of the arrangement C-T-A is important to your argument, please say so. Then we can discuss whether it can be granted or whether it needs to be defended. But please don't continue bringing it up and then saying it's irrelevant.
CLAVDIVS @ 183: Let’s acknowledge, just for this discussion, your conclusion that genetics exhibits semiotic states, and therefore the origin of genetics requires a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state. So what? CLAVDIVS @ 214: Again, so what? UB @ 226: Is this your agreement that the genetic system demonstrates a semiotic state and its mechanism of origin will require the ability to establish that semiotic state?
Not at all. I granted that conclusion only for the purpose of discussing that, even if that's true, it appears to be either trivial or tautological.
UB @ 226: So the semiotic state in protein synthesis is a trivial observation, which needs something else in order to establish its significance?
No. It is your conclusion that is trivial; namely, that "the transfer of recorded information from the genome demonstrates a semiotic state, and therefore its origin will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state." In other words, if system X has property Y, therefore – however system X came about – at some point it required the introduction of property Y. The concept "semiotic state" as applied to genetics in your argument is not trivial in my view, and, yes, its significance needs to be established. You have raised some points in favour of that but I believe that discussion is premature whilst the conclusion appears trivial. To make your argument non-trivial your conclusion has to be something other than "system X has property Y, therefore at some point in its history it required the introduction of property Y."
UB @ 226: And if I should – as you say – recast my conclusion as a premise, then I take it that you agree with that premise?
No - see above. Right now I am just critiquing your conclusion as trivial. I do agree that biology exhibits semiotic states, at the level of human consciousness, for example. But I am not persuaded this is established at a biomolecular level. However, my mind is open to the possibility. CheersCLAVDIVS
September 6, 2012
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CLAVDIVS,
Nor is it dependent upon an irreducibility to physical law – let’s not forget that part.
Hardly forgetting it, I’ve repeated it several times already. You stated that you had no problem understanding what 'materially arbitrary' meant, but you wanted me to satisfactorily establish that genetics was “categorically” not reducible to physical law. I told you that my argument was not dependent on such knowledge, but I also highlighted the fact that the existence of the arrangement C-T-A (as a local discrete causal structure within protein synthesis) is not reducible to physical law, and happens to be the very source of biological function. Unhindered by that material fact, you then asked me to go ahead and grant a priori that the system and its mechanism of origin are reducible anyway. And the stated reason for this request (as should be obvious to any rational observer) is because I already said it was irrelevant to my argument. Hello? Quite frankly Clavd, your comments show every indication that you might have thought one thing, then found out another, and now it doesn’t matter.
Again, so what?
Is this your agreement that the genetic system demonstrates a semiotic state and its mechanism of origin will require the ability to establish that semiotic state?
Nature is rife with apparently arbitrary configurations of matter, where we do not understand the causes that bring about that particular configuration rather than another one. Why does an electron have a rest energy of 5.11 MeV? Why do quadrupeds have four legs and not six?
Configurations of matter are not the issue here, nor is the source of physical law. Configurations of matter which are arbitrary to the unambiguous function they produce in a formal system (as described in the argument) – that is what is at issue.
Either the evidence is not available to us or, if it is, we have not figured out its significance.
The evidence of what, exactly? That the thing conforms to a prior assumption? Is that the evidence we are missing?
To base any kind of argument on this is a classic appeal to ignorance, and is fallacious – as I have been pointing out.
Let us say there is a system we wanted to understand, and we were capable of observing its operation. Would it then be a fallacy to discount the evidence of its operation which we’ve already observed (and know exists), in favor of evidence that we haven’t observed (and don’t know exists) because the evidence we’ve observed doesn’t conform to someone’s prior assumption? And if we choose to discount it entirely, do we then create yet another fallacy by insulating our prior assumptions from any test to the contrary? And would it not also be a fallacy to mis-label valid observations as “ignorance” in order to substantiate doing so? What do you think?
All this conclusion states is that system X has property Y, therefore – however system X came about – at some point it required the introduction of property Y.
Basically correct.
This is at best trivial, at worst tautological.
If you think it's tautological for someone to state that the sufficient and necessary conditions of a thing’s existence must exist in order for that thing to exist, then so be it. As far as being trivial, I take that as your tacit agreement that the genetic system is semiotic and its origin will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state.
To make this a non-trivial argument you must recompose it so that this ‘conclusion’ is instead a premise, combined with another premise establishing the significance of semiotic states.
So the semiotic state in protein synthesis is a trivial observation, which needs something else in order to establish its significance? And if I should - as you say - recast my conclusion as a premise, then I take it that you agree with that premise?Upright BiPed
September 6, 2012
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CR,
Most people do not realize they are justificationists. And there are many misconceptions regarding Popper’s universal theory of the growth of knowledge because people do not recognize their own conceptions of human knowledge as as an idea that would be subject to criticism. For example, in 011 you seem to consider yourself a Popperan. However, Popper explicitly rejected justificationism and elaborated as to why at length in several books. Having been a justificationist myself, I held several misconceptions about Popper. And those are just the ones I’ve discovered to date. One of Popper’s key points is that the grown of knowledge occurs when we correct errors. And what did Popper say about Darwinism and design?
So you have concluded that I am a justificationist who has misconceptions about Popper, who doesn’t recognize that my conception of human knowledge is an idea that can be criticized, so I should remember what Popper said about Darwinism. And reading your other statements, it seems you’ve also concluded that I have a pre-enlightenment, authoritative conception of human knowledge, who only objects to Darwinism because I think the biosphere can only come about by an authoritative source, or there can’t be any knowledge, er something. That’s a whole lot of individual distinctions. May I ask a question? Have you justified these assumptions of me, or is this one of those positions you hold open because “no position can be positively justified”? Perhaps it’s even an “untrue unbelief [that is] unjustified because of the non-existence of good reasons”. Which is it, exactly? One other question, are you familiar with the fallacy of ad hominem? How about Roseman's theory of appraisal?Upright BiPed
September 6, 2012
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CR
While I’ve already clarified it at 203…. it’s really quite simple: your argument implicitly assumes [explanatory theories] should be reducible to some mechanical system. As such, it’s parochial in nature. My criticism doesn’t use the word “Darwinism”
What? Your criticism as stated in #191: It’s really quite simple: your argument implicitly assumes Darwinism should be reducible to some mechanical system. Then your edited "clarification": it’s really quite simple: your argument implicitly assumes [explanatory theories] should be reducible to some mechanical system. And then your follow-on remark: My criticism doesn’t use the word “Darwinism”Upright BiPed
September 6, 2012
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Onlooker, These are your questions:
My first question is for clarification of this definition. How exactly can information be measured? Does it have standard units? Does your definition correspond to any standard definitions?
A measured content of information is of no consequence here, only the material conditions of the transfer.
Is my restatement of this premise accurate?
Yes, I have stated it in an abbreviated form as well, but only after I’ve explained it. For instance, among other things, you’ve left out the disambiguation of “information”, i.e. the form of a thing, as well as the qualifier “recorded information” to distinguish it from “physical information”. Otherwise, I’m happy you were able to discern the data, given that the text you so carefully revised came from nothing more than a conversational blog post, not a formal paper.
D3. Arbitrary: ? This word seems important to your argument, so a precise definition is required. Does it simply mean “separate”? What does the qualifier “materially” add to “arbitrary”?
Did you read the text after you cut and pasted it?
P2. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. This is where my understanding starts to break down. There are too many concepts packed into this sentence for me to parse it. By “representation of form” do you mean “information” (I am guessing at that based on D1 and D2)?
Yes, “representation of form” refers to those things you cut out from the previous sentences. Information is the ‘form of a thing’ instantiated in matter by means of a representation.
What does “consequence of its own material arrangement” mean? What does “necessarily arbitrary to” mean
This is what you missed when you said you couldn’t understand that a) for the arrangement of one thing to b) represent the form of another thing, two things will be needed. That means they won’t be the same thing. I know in the information age it’s sometimes hard to imagine a distinction between a medium and information, but that is exactly what this passage is about.
I’m too lost at step 3 to get anything out of step 4, but what do you mean by “material component” as opposed to “arbitrary component”? What do you mean by “reducible to physical law”?
If the making an tangible distinction between a material medium (which might contain information), and the information itself (contained within material medium), causes a conceptual problem for you; then I am simply not going to be of any help to you. Sorry.Upright BiPed
September 6, 2012
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UB: I was motivated by my pre-enlightenment authoritative concept of knowledge. So clearly, I need to become a exponent of critical rationalism. Strawman. I'm contrasting the two as a means to point out why your argument is parochial. And, just so I'm clear, are you denying that you hold a pre-enlightenment, authoritative conception of human knowledge? For example, from another comment on another thread...
Specifically, the fundamental flaw in creationism (and its variants) is the same fundamental flaw in pre-enlightenment, authoritative conceptions of human knowledge: its account of how the knowledge in adaptations could be created is either missing, supernatural or illogical. In some cases, it’s the very same theory, in that specific types of knowledge, such as cosmology or moral knowledge, was dictated to early humans by supernatural beings. In other cases, parochial aspects of society, such as the rule of monarchs in governments or the existence of God, are protected by taboos or taken so uncritically for granted that they are not recognized as ideas.
While empiricism is an improvement it still depends on inductivism, so it still shares the same fundamental flaw. Is there something in the above you disagree with? Better yet, wouldn't such a conception explain objections to Darwinism? And not just any objections, but specific objections that we see here and elsewhere? If someone thought the knowledge of how to build the biosphere could only come from some ultimate authoritative source, would it come as a surprise they would conclud the biosphere cannot be explained without a designer? And if Darwinism were true would, would they not then conclude there could be no knowledge? Everything would simply be meaningless and random and astronomically unlikely, which is a commonly argued strawman of evolutionary theory. Finally, since everything is not random and meaningless, would they not conclude Darwinism must be false? I don't know about you, but this sounds vaguely familiar. However, this is parochial in that it doesn't take into account our current, best explanation for the growth of knowledge.critical rationalist
September 5, 2012
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vu- :) vu who?Joe
September 5, 2012
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Okay, let me try to analyze the first few steps of your argument.
It's like deja vue all over again (cue twightlight zone music)Joe
September 5, 2012
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Upright BiPed, Okay, let me try to analyze the first few steps of your argument.
1. A representation is an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system (e.g. written text, spoken words, pheromones, animal gestures, codes, sensory input, intracellular messengers, nucleotide sequences, etc, etc).
I'll try to put this in something like the form used by keiths. This line item becomes ('D' for "definition"): D1. Representation: An arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system. Examples include: Written text Spoken words Pheromones Animal gestures Codes Sensory input Intracellular messengers Nucleotide sequences
2. It is not logically possible to transfer information (the form of a thing; a measured aspect, quality, or preference) in a material universe without using a representation instantiated in matter.
D2. Information: a) the form of a thing b) a measured aspect c) a measured quality d) a measured preference My first question is for clarification of this definition. How exactly can information be measured? Does it have standard units? Does your definition correspond to any standard definitions? ('P' for "premise"): P1. It is not logically possible to transfer information in a material universe without using a representation instantiated in matter. This seems redundant because you've already defined "representation" as an arrangement of matter. That means we should be able to simplify P1: P1'. It is not logically possible to transfer information in a material universe without using a representation. I'm not sure of the need for the "in a material universe" qualifier. That seems to unnecessarily involve discussions of dualism and other topics unrelated to the matter at hand. We can simplify P1 even further: P1''. It is not logically possible to transfer information without using a representation. Finally, the word "representation" has baggage associated with it from normal, everyday usage. P1 might be more clear like this: P1'''. It is not logically possible to transfer information without using an arrangement of matter which evokes an effect within a system. Is my restatement of this premise accurate?
3. If that is true, and it surely must be, then several other things must logically follow. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. In other words, if one thing is to represent another thing within a system, then it must be separate from the thing it represents. And if it is separate from it, then it cannot be anything but materially arbitrary to it (i.e. they cannot be the same thing).
D3. Arbitrary: ? This word seems important to your argument, so a precise definition is required. Does it simply mean "separate"? What does the qualifier "materially" add to "arbitrary"? P2. If there is now an arrangement of matter which contains a representation of form as a consequence of its own material arrangement, then that arrangement must be necessarily arbitrary to the thing it represents. This is where my understanding starts to break down. There are too many concepts packed into this sentence for me to parse it. By "representation of form" do you mean "information" (I am guessing at that based on D1 and D2)? What does "consequence of its own material arrangement" mean? What does "necessarily arbitrary to" mean (this may be answered when D3 is more detailed)?
4. If that is true, then the presence of that representation must present a material component to the system (which is reducible to physical law), while its arrangement presents an arbitrary component to the system (which is not reducible to physical law).
I'm too lost at step 3 to get anything out of step 4, but what do you mean by "material component" as opposed to "arbitrary component"? What do you mean by "reducible to physical law"? I think you've got several more definitions and premises residing in steps 3 and 4. It would be most helpful to extricate them and make them explicit.onlooker
September 5, 2012
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UB: My critique is that you haven’t harnessed any novel manner of knowing. When you come out from being up in your head, you’ve transcended nothing. Where did I say it was novel? Most people do not realize they are justificatioinists. And there are many misconceptions regarding Popper's universal theory of the growth of knowledge because people do not recognize their own conceptions of human knowledge as as an idea that would be subject to criticism. For example, in 011 you seem to consider yourself a Popperan. However, Popper explicitly rejected justificationism and elaborated as to why at length in several books. Having been a justificationist myself, I held several misconceptions about Popper. And those are just the ones I've discovered to date. One of Popper's key points is that the grown of knowledge occurs when we correct errors. And what did Popper say about Darwinism and design?
[Darwin's theory of adaptation was the first nontheistic one that was convincing; and theism was worse than an open admission of failure, for it created the impression that an ultimate explanation had been reached. [Popper 1976, p. 172]
[What Did Karl Popper Really Say About Evolution?] An abstract designer with no defined limitations doesn't stick its neck out in a way that allows significant criticism - in the sense that allows us to make progress.critical rationalist
September 5, 2012
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CR, Your 202 did not received a facepalm from me because of the formatting errors. I was motivated by my pre-enlightenment authoritative concept of knowledge. So clearly, I need to become a exponent of critical rationalism. Perhaps I'll have time this weekend.Upright BiPed
September 5, 2012
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CR: “Idea X is not justified” is a bad criticism, as it applies to all ideas. Mung: Perhaps it is a bad criticism, but not for the reason you give. I'm not following you. "Idea X is not justified" does not apply to all ideas? Mung: I can’t help but notice how you insulate your own ideas from criticism. Not following you here either. How does pointing out it's impossible to justify any idea, including my own, represent insulating my ideas from criticism?critical rationalist
September 5, 2012
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CR to UB: It’s really quite simple: your argument implicitly assumes Darwinism should be reducible to some mechanical system. As such, it’s parochial in nature. UB to CR: My argument doesn’t even mention Darwinism. CR to UB: While it’s not limited to just biology, darwinism is an explanation the origin of the knowledge … the assumption that Darwinism … needs something capable of “establishing a semiotic state” … that would be the source of that knowledge represents a gross misunderstanding of Darwinism. While I've already clarified it at 203.... it’s really quite simple: your argument implicitly assumes [explanatory theories] should be reducible to some mechanical system. As such, it’s parochial in nature. My criticism doesn't use the word "Darwinism"critical rationalist
September 5, 2012
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Upright BiPed @ 189
CLAVDIVS @ 183: That’s fine. I understand you are stipulating that at no point in your argument do you rely upon either the irreducibility or the reducibility of any elements of genetics to physical laws. UB @ 189: Good, you now understand that my argument is not dependent on a reduction to physical law.
Nor is it dependent upon an irreducibility to physical law - let's not forget that part.
UB @ 189: When I pointed out that physicists can demonstrate that symbol structures (like nucleic triplets) are indeed not reducible to physical law, you shrank from that observation by minimizing it as being unsatisfactory to you.
As you say, all this is irrelevant as you've stipulated that your argument at no point relies upon the reducibility or irreducibility of anything in genetics to physical laws.
CLAVDIVS @ 183: Let’s acknowledge, just for this discussion, your conclusion that genetics exhibits semiotic states, and therefore the origin of genetics requires a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state ... So what? UB @ 189:You mean…”other than that Mrs. Lincoln, how was the show?” If you are a Richard Dawkins pumping out best-sellers – waxing over the effervescent elegance of the Darwinian mechanism to the throngs of non-curious patrons of scientific imagination – you sure don’t want to start talking about the critical requirements for that mechanism to exist, particularly if those requirements include arbitrary representations and transfer protocols.
Again, so what? Nature is rife with apparently arbitrary configurations of matter, where we do not understand the causes that bring about that particular configuration rather than another one. Why does an electron have a rest energy of 5.11 MeV? Why do quadrupeds have four legs and not six? Either the evidence is not available to us or, if it is, we have not figured out its significance. To base any kind of argument on this is a classic appeal to ignorance, and is fallacious - as I have been pointing out. In any case, the conclusion of your argument - which you took pains to spell out @ 181 - does not even mention the significance of genetic semiotics or its apparently arbitrary nature. Here it is again:
UB @ 181: The conclusion of the argument is that the transfer of recorded information from the genome demonstrates a semiotic state, and therefore its origin will require a mechanism capable of establishing a semiotic state.
All this conclusion states is that system X has property Y, therefore - however system X came about - at some point it required the introduction of property Y. This is at best trivial, at worst tautological. To make this a non-trivial argument you must recompose it so that this 'conclusion' is instead a premise, combined with another premise establishing the significance of semiotic states. At this stage I concur with Onlooker @ 209 that it is quite unclear to me what your argument is supposed to demonstrate. I urge you to recompose it into syllogistic form to make this clear. CheersCLAVDIVS
September 5, 2012
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onlooker- Start with this:
1.In this material universe, is it even conceivably possible to record transferable information without utilizing an arrangement of matter in order to represent that information? (by what other means could it be done?) 2.If 1 is true, then is it even conceivably possible to transfer that information without a second arrangement of matter (a protocol) to establish the relationship between representation and what it represents? (how could such a relationship be established in any other way?) 3.If 1 and 2 are true, then is it even conceivably possible to functionally transfer information without the irreducibly complex system of these two arrangements of matter (representations and protocols) in operation?
Joe
September 5, 2012
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Onlooker, my argument is at the top of this page. You can indicate what words you are having a hard time with, and I'll be happy to explain.Upright BiPed
September 5, 2012
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UB: CR at 202,facepalm The blogging software I'm used to using doesn't allow posts with unclosed tags and lets you delete posts. Wordpress does neither. While it's not hard to figure out where the formatting errors are, I've reposed it in case you're having difficulty.critical rationalist
September 5, 2012
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Reposting to fix formatting errors: CR: The second of your bolded text states: “According to the critical rationalists, the exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one (or more) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests.” CR: I see that you present this tidbit of wisdom as the hood ornament of your movement. But the remainder of humanity has pretty much been doing this all along. We don’t typically step in front of speeding buses, because we’ve calculated what outcomes from that action are more ‘quite likely’ than others. All in all, it’s not a particularly new way of viewing the world. Which is a strawman. Specifically, the sections I quoted begins not with one but three attitudes.
In the light of the dilemma of the infinite regress versus dogmatism, we can discern three attitudes towards positions: relativism, “true belief” and critical rationalism
Are you suggesting there is no difference between these attitudes as presented? Furthermore, I bolded the parts of the third attitude, which points out you are projecting your problem, by virtue of your pre-enlightenment, authoritative, justificationist conception of human knowledge, on me. From the quote…
True believers embrace justificationism. They insist that some positions are better than others though they accept that there is no logical way to establish a positive justification for an belief. They accept that we make our choice regardless of reason: “Here I stand!”. Most forms of rationalism up to date have, at rock bottom, shared this attitude with the irrationalists and other dogmatists because they share the theory of justificationism.
Justification is impossible. For example, conclusions of an argument are not proven unless the premises are proven, which is impossible. You either have to assume that you've proven them, which isn't' the same as actually proving them, or you are faced with an infinite regress. Critical Rationalism is neither justificationism or relativism, as outlined in the excerpt from the paper which can be found in it's entirety here. So, your argument is parochial in that is assumes a dichotomy of either relativism or dogmatism / “true belief". From the Wikipedia entry on Critical Rationalism….
Critical rationalism rejects the classical position that knowledge is justified true belief; it instead holds the exact opposite: That, in general, knowledge is unjustified untrue unbelief. It is unjustified because of the non-existence of good reasons. It is untrue, because it usually contains errors that sometimes remain unnoticed for hundreds of years. And it is not belief either, because scientific knowledge, or the knowledge needed to build a plane, is contained in no single person's mind. It is only available as the content of books.
William Warren Bartley compared critical rationalism to the very general philosophical approach to knowledge which he called "justificationism". Most justificationists do not know that they are justificationists. Justificationism is what Popper called a "subjectivist" view of truth, in which the question of whether some statement is true, is confused with the question of whether it can be justified (established, proven, verified, warranted, made well-founded, made reliable, grounded, supported, legitimated, based on evidence) in some way. According to Bartley, some justificationists are positive about this mistake. They are naïve rationalists, and thinking that their knowledge can indeed be founded, in principle, it may be deemed certain to some degree, and rational. Other justificationists are negative about these mistakes. They are epistemological relativists, and think (rightly, according to the critical rationalist) that you cannot find knowledge, that there is no source of epistemological absolutism. But they conclude (wrongly, according to the critical rationalist) that there is therefore no rationality, and no objective distinction to be made between the true and the false. By dissolving justificationism itself, the critical rationalist regards knowledge and rationality, reason and science, as neither foundational nor infallible, but nevertheless does not think we must therefore all be relativists. Knowledge and truth still exist, just not in the way we thought.
critical rationalist
September 5, 2012
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Upright BiPed,
Apparently my comment at #188 has provoked Keith (at TSZ) into challenging me once again to respond to his revised version of my argument. This is a revision where he first adds language to my argument that appears nowhere in the original, and then he victoriously attacks the very language he’s added.
I noticed keiths' TSZ post earlier today and was hoping you'd respond here or there. I think you deserve a lot of credit for discussing your argument in what, despite Lizzie's best efforts, could easily be considered a hostile venue. Even when people are on their best behavior, trying to answer points from a dozen or more different individuals without anyone assisting you is difficult. Leaving aside the observations and logic of your argument, though, I must confess to having considerable difficulty following it, both when you were commenting at TSZ and here at UD. Please don't take this criticism as an insult, it is entirely possible that the fault is completely mine, but your prose is simply too dense for me to easily analyze. For that reason alone, I for one would very much appreciate it if you would take the time to respond to keiths' challenge and either correct his summary or provide an equally clear and concise one. Whether or not one agrees with keiths, his breakdown of definitions, premises, conclusions, and overall logical flow is remarkably direct. If you could provide something similar, with explicit definitions of all important terms, short sentences with few if any conjunctions, and clearly labeled premises and conclusions, it would go a long way to making your argument more understandable. You've obviously spent a lot of time developing this argument. With just a little more effort you could make it available to a much broader audience. I hope you will consider doing so.onlooker
September 5, 2012
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CR at 203
“Idea X is not justified” is a bad criticism, as it applies to all ideas.
“Idea X is not justified” is not my critique of your input here. My critique is that you haven’t harnessed any novel manner of knowing. When you come out from being up in your head, you’ve transcended nothing. And no offense, but I personally find the conversation boring.Upright BiPed
September 5, 2012
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CR at 202, facepalmUpright BiPed
September 5, 2012
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CR at 200,
CR to UB: It’s really quite simple: your argument implicitly assumes Darwinism should be reducible to some mechanical system. As such, it’s parochial in nature. UB to CR: My argument doesn’t even mention Darwinism. CR to UB: While it’s not limited to just biology, darwinism is an explanation the origin of the knowledge … the assumption that Darwinism … needs something capable of “establishing a semiotic state” … that would be the source of that knowledge represents a gross misunderstanding of Darwinism.
My argument doesn’t even mention Darwinism.Upright BiPed
September 5, 2012
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Apparently my comment at #188 has provoked Keith (at TSZ) into challenging me once again to respond to his revised version of my argument. This is a revision where he first adds language to my argument that appears nowhere in the original, and then he victoriously attacks the very language he’s added. (geez…) Among other things, Keith wants to revise my argument by adding “design” to the premises of the argument (he begins by adding it to the very first line of his revision) thereby making the argument assume its conclusion. Why he thinks I would feel obligated to defend his revision is a complete mystery. Furthermore, why he thinks I am on the end of his chain is an even bigger mystery. In actuality, none of this is a mystery at all. The details of my argument had already been fairly well tested in front of specialists, so I knew going in that the material observations were supported and that the logic was valid. The only question was negotiating a nest of emotional and belligerent ideologues. Knowing up front that the group at TSZ could not advance any material objections, the only option that would be left to them was to redirect the argument and seek a better position, which is exactly what Keith (and others) have been attempting to do. Mankind’s strategic godfathers have been writing about this tactic for over 2500 years, and it was a safe bet that the gurus at TSZ were not going to invent any new methods of engagement. - - - - - - - - - - - - Keith, Allow me to explain to you what happened. I intentionally maintained direct competitive contact with a single opponent at TSZ and didn’t allow that single conversation to get out of hand. I simply paced the hogwash coming from the gallery, and managed to maintain this central conversation long enough to defeat the specific objections of my target. That target was Reciprocating Bill, who by his own words deflated both of his key objections. (Pushing RB into defeating his own arguments took entirely too long, and that was my fault for unrelated reasons). In any case, the attempts to dislodge this central conversation were all destined to fail for the very reason that it was all too obvious. The acrimonious boo-hoo-ing over ‘not understanding the argument’ could not have been more transparent. People who pretend not to understand concepts should not then turn around and use those same concepts in their subsequent objections. All of you should try to be more like Patrick, who has ‘playing stupid’ down to an art form. If he was not so careless as to reveal himself by constantly lying in the midst of a recorded conversation, one could honestly think he was a complete idiot. The bottom line is that you’all were unable to identify any flaws in the material observations (or the logic) after two months of trying. You lost. Get over it. If it makes you feel any better, it was not ID, or me, or strategy that beat you – it was the material evidence itself. Since all of you give lip service to being empiricist, the identity of your victor should help you swallow the loss a little easier. :)Upright BiPed
September 5, 2012
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“Idea X is not justified” is a bad criticism, as it applies to all ideas.
Perhaps it is a bad criticism, but not for the reason you give. I can't help but notice how you insulate your own ideas from criticism.Mung
September 5, 2012
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UB: Here you say that you hold all your positions open to criticism, which you are quick to point out is not taking a position, but other people must think it is, and these other people criticize it as being useless, but in the end that’s okay, because when you get around to the real world of speeding buses, you are allowed to take a position anyway. "Idea X is not justified" is a bad criticism, as it applies to all ideas.critical rationalist
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