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WD400 Doubles Down on Dobzhansky’s Maxim

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Readers may recall that in a recent post I quoted molecular biologist wd400 undermining Theodosius Dobzhansky’s silly maxim that “nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution” when he asserted that a lot of molecular biologists, including world-famous leader of the human genome project Francis Collins, “don’t understand much about evolution.”

I noted that it follows as a matter of simple logic that Dobzhansky was wrong if one of the world’s leading biologists can do his job perfectly well without even understanding evolution, far less depending on it to make sense of everything.

Today wd400 doubled down when he asserted that not only does Collins not understand evolution, but in fact he is dead wrong about key aspects of the theory, such as junk DNA, HGT and gene counts.

Simple logic again:  One can be dead wrong about key aspects of modern evolutionary theory and still lead to a successful conclusion one of greatest undertakings in applied biology in the history of the world.

That swirling sound you hear is Dobzhansky’s maxim circling the drain.

UPDATE:

I pointed out to wd400 that if Collins does not understand evolution and in fact is dead wrong about key aspects of the theory, Dobzhansky’s maxim implies that Collins can’t “make sense” of the human genome, even though he was the head of the human genome project.

Frankly, I expected wd400 to back down in the face of this reductio ad absurdum argument.  He did not.  He tripled down on his claim and said: “I also very much doubt Collins himself would say the genome ‘makes sense’ to him.”

Yet again we have an example of someone willing to sacrifice rationality itself for the sake of their creation myth.  wd400 please do us all a favor.  Never poke fun at those religious “fundies.”  It would be hypocritical.

 

Comments
Mung: "If ‘Zachriel’ then word_games()." :) OK, I agree. But some of his word games are smart, and I like them, even if I don't agree. Others, instead, are not smart at all!gpuccio
November 26, 2015
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gpuccio:
“Choices” as parts of an algorithm are not true choices...
Yes, that s true. When a computer executes a choice it is merely executing the will (choice) of the programmer(s). Take a simple if/then statement: If 'Zachriel' then word_games(). This doesn't offer the computer a choice. The computer has no choice in the matter. This is simply a way to represent the choice of the programmer.Mung
November 26, 2015
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gpuccio: You are using the word “choice” to mean two different things. Let's see. gpuccio: “Choices” as parts of an algorithm are not true choices, even if you like to call them that way. Ah, not a True Choice™. gpuccio: The programmer makes choices and he transforms those choices into algorithms, which will act according to the original choices of the programmer. Decision-making in neural nets isn't programmed; they learn from experience. gpuccio: Sentient beings make choices that are based on conscious representations, and their reaction to those representations. Computers make choices based on internal representations. The difference seems to be the sensation of consciousness. Not sure this represents two different definitions of choice. Computers choose, but they don't do so consciously.Zachriel
November 26, 2015
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Zachriel: You are simply playing with words. You are using the word "choice" to mean two different things. "Choices" as parts of an algorithm are not true choices, even if you like to call them that way. The programmer makes choices and he transforms those choices into algorithms, which will act according to the original choices of the programmer. Sentient beings make choices that are based on conscious representations, and their reaction to those representations. You may think that it is the same thing that is taking place in the computer, but it is not. Until you can reasonably explain conscious representations as a result of algorithms, and you can't, and you never will be able, until then conscious events cannot be equaled to non conscious nodes in a programmed algorithm. Therefore, you cannot name the passages in a non conscious algorithm with the same word which describes events in a consciousness. It is completely arbitrary. We can discuss if conscious choices are free or if they are not. But certainly we cannot equal conscious choices to algorithmic "choices", as you repeatedly try to do.gpuccio
November 26, 2015
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gpuccio: I am sure that objects which are not conscious and have no feeling cannot choose. Computers make choices. So do slugs. Slugs have desires and sensibilities, so they make decisions based on these desires and sensibilities. Computers don't have desires or sensibilities, but that doesn't mean computers don't make choices based on other criteria. Humans have desires and sensibilities, but, in addition, they have a moral sensibility. They also have the ability to model the sensibilities of others, or even of themselves. This allows for a much more nuanced choice-making process.Zachriel
November 26, 2015
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Zachriel: "So it’s not reason or choosing that defines human intelligence, but “wanting”. Slugs “want”." Feeling and desire are certainly an essential part of free will. I don't know if slugs want, but I am sure that objects which are not conscious and have no feeling cannot choose. You see, consciousness is like a coin with two faces, which can never be separated: one face is cognition, the other face is feeling. Cognition is the experience of meaning. Feeling is the experience of purpose. Both are necessary for free choices to take place, both cognitive free choices and moral free choices. Indeed, any free choice is both cognitive and moral. Non conscious systems have no trace of either cognition and meaning, or feeling and purpose. They cannot understand, and they cannot choose.gpuccio
November 26, 2015
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bFast: A computer program can weigh a bunch of inputs with an algorithm. It can even factor in a “random” if it is so programmed. But it doesn’t choose what it “wants”, because it has no sense whatsoever of “wanting” anything. So it's not reason or choosing that defines human intelligence, but "wanting". Slugs "want". bFast: And a computer never makes a “choice” which is outside of the algorithm. It's not clear, objectively, whether humans do otherwise. bFast: Humans seem quite capable of choosing what is self-defeating. As are computers. bFast: In the same way, y’all have “freedom” just like I do, yet you can’t figure out that freedom means anything. Shared experience can be convincing, but can't be argued. So you agree there is no objective criterion to distinguish the freedom of humans to choose and the freedom of computers to choose. mohammadnursyamsu: As said, a choice is to make a possiblity, WHICH IS IN THE FUTURE, the present or not. Which computers can do. A computer playing chess looks into the future, considers possibilities, and make moves to bring the anticipated future into the present.Zachriel
November 26, 2015
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kairosfocus @ 72
The common sense principle that we all accede to in praxis is that we are responsibly free rational agents. That is, we can think, weigh, reason, conclude, decide and act for ourselves. Without which, the whole life of the mind, and particularly, reasoning, is emptied of any significance.
That is certainly what we assume and it is what we seem to experience. But there are clearly problems with the notion of freedom and free will if we are shaped and influenced by past events over which we had no control and of which we often had no knowledge. It may be a case of degrees of freedom not freedom in any absolute sense.
Rosenberg’s argument boils down therefore to denying the premise of rationality, and as he is actually presenting an argument that he presumably intends to be rational, he falls into self-referential incoherence and absurdity. His argument refutes itself. And Craig is right to point that out.
Craig would have been right to point that out if he had, but he didn’t. He simply responded with the assertion that he was thinking about naturalism, in effect, a flat denial of Rosenberg’s position not a refutation.
Let me clip Pearcey:
A major way to test a philosophy or worldview is to ask: Is it logically consistent? Internal contradictions are fatal to any worldview because contradictory statements are necessarily false. “This circle is square” is contradictory, so it has to be false. An especially damaging form of contradiction is self-referential absurdity — which means a theory sets up a definition of truth that it itself fails to meet. Therefore it refutes itself . . . . An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth — which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide.
As I’ve argued before, Pearcey’s case, like all such, founders on a false dichotomy: the assumption that truth-value and survival-value are somehow different. The chances of survival in a dangerous environment must be improved by having an accurate - a true - account of its nature. If you know in advance what is dangerous and what isn’t, if you can predict where to find food and water with the least risk to yourself, then your chances of survival must be improved to that extent. You quoted Pearcey, I’ll quote Quine:
Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.
And is it really such a stretch to imagine that a capacity to construct rational and accurate accounts of what is directly observed could also be adapted and applied to more abstract or metaphysical considerations?
A few thinkers, to their credit, recognize the problem. Literary critic Leon Wieseltier writes, “If reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? … Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.” On a similar note, philosopher Thomas Nagel asks, “Is the [evolutionary] hypothesis really compatible with the continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge?” His answer is no: “I have to be able to believe … that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct — not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so.” Hence, “insofar as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on reason, it would be self-undermining.” [ENV excerpt, Finding Truth (David C. Cook, 2015) by Nancy Pearcey.]
And underlying both of those comments is the instinctive craving for certainty which is in all of us and which arguably derives from our instinct for survival. The reality, however, is there is little, if anything, of which we can be absolutely certain. It is more a question of degrees of confidence even though that is a much less satisfying position. I could say I am certain that the Sun will rise in the east tomorrow but there is always the possibility that some cosmic catastrophe could prevent that happening, so it is truer to say that I have a high degree of confidence that it will happen. We can have confidence in evolutionary biology because it has evidentiary support and because it is the product of the same rational process that has given us the scientific knowledge and technology in other fields that we take for granted.Seversky
November 26, 2015
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Z, 73:
mohammadnursyamsu: All current programs on computers work in a forced way, there is no freedom in it, the flexibility does not increase the freedom one bit. [Z:] All you have done is introduce yet another term, “freedom”, which is not well-defined in this context.
Actually, not. Absent responsible, rational freedom -- exactly what a priori evolutionary materialist scientism cannot account for -- you could not actually compose comment 73 above. In short, freedom is always there once the mind is brought to bear, and without it we cannot be rationally creative. And per observation, computation is a blind, mechanical cause effect process imposed on suitably organised substrates by mind. In fact, a fair summary of decision node based processing is that coded algorithms reduced to machine code act on suitably coded inputs and stored data by means of a carefully designed and developed . . . troubleshooting in a multi-fault environment required . . . physical machine, to generate desired outputs. At least, once debugging is sufficiently complete. (Which is itself an extremely complex, highly intuitive, non algorithmic procedure critically dependent on creative, responsible, rational freedom. [Where, this crucial aspect tends to get overlooked in discussions of finished product programs and processing.]) There really is a wizard behind the curtain. KFkairosfocus
November 26, 2015
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@zachriel "Choose a possible future" is not coherent. Choosing is to make a possibility, which is in the future, the present or not. You leave out the 'or not' part to choosing, meaning that you describe a logi of being forced. . You seem incapable to get your head around the concept of choosing as presented in creationism, and lay it side by side with other concepts of choosing, and then evaluate which one is best. It always seems to end up with word-goo, like here you repeat the right words, but the words are arbitrarily tossed about, just as previously you managed to provide an upside down representation of what creationism says. And in the end all what you write is slanted towards cause and effect, things being forced.mohammadnursyamsu
November 26, 2015
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A computer program can weigh a bunch of inputs with an algorithm. It can even factor in a "random" if it is so programmed. But it doesn't choose what it "wants", because it has no sense whatsoever of "wanting" anything. And a computer never makes a "choice" which is outside of the algorithm. Humans seem quite capable of choosing what is self-defeating. Zachriel, "All you have done is introduce yet another term, “freedom”, which is not well-defined in this context." This is one of those puzzling things that MNs (methodological naturalists) that puzzle the heck out of me. Its like that stupid argument about the "blind spot" in human vision being bad design. Y'all look out of your own eyes, and notice that the blind spot is a non-issue, yet you declare the designer "stupid". In the same way, y'all have "freedom" just like I do, yet you can't figure out that freedom means anything. Look inside man! Let yourself be part of the analysis.bFast
November 25, 2015
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mohammadnursyamsu: t is sorting, and that is basic computer logic. I have given you all definitions of terms already, and they follow common discourse definitions of terms. As said, a choice is to make a possiblity, WHICH IS IN THE FUTURE, the present or not. Computers can choose a possible future, indeed, can make those decisions based on a projection of what the future might be depending on the choice.Zachriel
November 25, 2015
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@Zachriel What computers do is sorting, not choosing, it is completely different. Some if else function is not choosing it is sorting, and that is basic computer logic. I have given you all definitions of terms already, and they follow common discourse definitions of terms. As said, a choice is to make a possiblity, WHICH IS IN THE FUTURE, the present or not. Or otherwise defined as making one of alternative futures the present. Choosing is anticipatory towards the future, while you make choosing into sorting with present variables. You have to be precise, otherwise it is word-goo. With the computer, it is simply forced the way it will turn out. Sure a computer can deal with novel situations, it can deal with a user with free will, who chooses all kinds of things for the computer to do. The computer does not perform the function of making a possibility the present, or not. It is forced to do what it does, as can just be calculated.mohammadnursyamsu
November 25, 2015
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Computers can choose from options among novel situations.
Only if they are programmed to do so.Virgil Cain
November 25, 2015
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mohammadnursyamsu: In creationism it is love that is doing the choosing Computers can choose from options among novel situations. mohammadnursyamsu: All current programs on computers work in a forced way, there is no freedom in it, the flexibility does not increase the freedom one bit. All you have done is introduce yet another term, "freedom", which is not well-defined in this context.Zachriel
November 25, 2015
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Seversky Pardon but you have it exactly the wrong way around:
Rosenberg is arguing that the belief that we are thinking about anything at all – which would include Craig’s claim to be thinking about naturalism – is an illusion. Craig’s debating tactic lies in failing to address Rosenberg’s argument which specifically attacks claims such as premise two. In effect, Craig is holding up to ridicule a strawman version of Rosenberg’s position. That’s a debating tactic not a refutation.
The common sense principle that we all accede to in praxis is that we are responsibly free rational agents. That is, we can think, weigh, reason, conclude, decide and act for ourselves. Without which, the whole life of the mind, and particularly, reasoning, is emptied of any significance. Rosenberg's argument boils down therefore to denying the premise of rationality, and as he is actually presenting an argument that he presumably intends to be rational, he falls into self-referential incoherence and absurdity. His argument refutes itself. And Craig is right to point that out. Beyond, such is the fate of any evolutionary materialist stance. Let me clip Pearcey:
A major way to test a philosophy or worldview is to ask: Is it logically consistent? Internal contradictions are fatal to any worldview because contradictory statements are necessarily false. “This circle is square” is contradictory, so it has to be false. An especially damaging form of contradiction is self-referential absurdity — which means a theory sets up a definition of truth that it itself fails to meet. Therefore it refutes itself . . . . An example of self-referential absurdity is a theory called evolutionary epistemology, a naturalistic approach that applies evolution to the process of knowing. The theory proposes that the human mind is a product of natural selection. The implication is that the ideas in our minds were selected for their survival value, not for their truth-value. But what if we apply that theory to itself? Then it, too, was selected for survival, not truth — which discredits its own claim to truth. Evolutionary epistemology commits suicide. Astonishingly, many prominent thinkers have embraced the theory without detecting the logical contradiction. Philosopher John Gray writes, “If Darwin’s theory of natural selection is true,… the human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth.” What is the contradiction in that statement? Gray has essentially said, if Darwin’s theory is true, then it “serves evolutionary success, not truth.” In other words, if Darwin’s theory is true, then it is not true. Self-referential absurdity is akin to the well-known liar’s paradox: “This statement is a lie.” If the statement is true, then (as it says) it is not true, but a lie. Another example comes from Francis Crick. In The Astonishing Hypothesis, he writes, “Our highly developed brains, after all, were not evolved under the pressure of discovering scientific truths but only to enable us to be clever enough to survive.” But that means Crick’s own theory is not a “scientific truth.” Applied to itself, the theory commits suicide. Of course, the sheer pressure to survive is likely to produce some correct ideas. A zebra that thinks lions are friendly will not live long. But false ideas may be useful for survival. Evolutionists admit as much: Eric Baum says, “Sometimes you are more likely to survive and propagate if you believe a falsehood than if you believe the truth.” Steven Pinker writes, “Our brains were shaped for fitness, not for truth. Sometimes the truth is adaptive, but sometimes it is not.” The upshot is that survival is no guarantee of truth. If survival is the only standard, we can never know which ideas are true and which are adaptive but false. To make the dilemma even more puzzling, evolutionists tell us that natural selection has produced all sorts of false concepts in the human mind. Many evolutionary materialists maintain that free will is an illusion, consciousness is an illusion, even our sense of self is an illusion — and that all these false ideas were selected for their survival value.
[--> that is, responsible, rational freedom is undermined. Cf here William Provine in his 1998 U Tenn Darwin Day keynote:
Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exists; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent . . . . The first 4 implications are so obvious to modern naturalistic evolutionists that I will spend little time defending them. Human free will, however, is another matter. Even evolutionists have trouble swallowing that implication. I will argue that humans are locally determined systems that make choices. They have, however, no free will [--> without responsible freedom, mind, reason and morality alike disintegrate into grand delusion, hence self-referential incoherence and self-refutation. But that does not make such fallacies any less effective in the hands of clever manipulators] . . . [1998 Darwin Day Keynote Address, U of Tenn -- and yes, that is significant i/l/o the Scopes Trial, 1925]
So how can we know whether the theory of evolution itself is one of those false ideas? The theory undercuts itself. A few thinkers, to their credit, recognize the problem. Literary critic Leon Wieseltier writes, “If reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? … Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.” On a similar note, philosopher Thomas Nagel asks, “Is the [evolutionary] hypothesis really compatible with the continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge?” His answer is no: “I have to be able to believe … that I follow the rules of logic because they are correct — not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so.” Hence, “insofar as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on reason, it would be self-undermining.” [ENV excerpt, Finding Truth (David C. Cook, 2015) by Nancy Pearcey.]
KFkairosfocus
November 25, 2015
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@Zachriel You are very imprecise, as also in our previous discussion you were very imprecise post after post. In creationism it is love that is doing the choosing, it is not about choosing to love, which you imply. So you turn the logic of creationism completely upside down, even after it has been explained to you about 5 times already. And creationist love, is the common discourse love. That you don't understand creationism means you really have no idea about love in general. All current programs on computers work in a forced way, there is no freedom in it, the flexibility does not increase the freedom one bit.mohammadnursyamsu
November 25, 2015
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mohammadnursyamsu: It’s still a machine designed to operate in a forced way, with a tiny little bit of freedom attached. The amount of freedom depends largely on the program. Some programs are very flexible, and others not so much. mohammadnursyamsu: So you have not engineered love or hate, you have then only engineered a structure for decionmaking. Your previous argument concerned decision-making. Computers don't love, but then again, humans don't choose to love. They're born that way.Zachriel
November 24, 2015
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@Zachriel It's still a machine designed to operate in a forced way, with a tiny little bit of freedom attached. Of course one would need to make the decisionmaking central to the whole operation of it, and then you would be well on your way to producing a frankenstein machine. This Frankenstein machine would then choose, and it would still be a matter of opinion what the agency of the decision is. So you have not engineered love or hate, you have then only engineered a structure for decionmaking. A very sophisticated structure, which in the end all it does basically, is choose A or B. It chooses between Clinton, or Huckabee, it can turn out either way. It chooses to vote or not vote. Again, this is a matter of logic. Our subjectivity that we use in daily life already has a logic attached, which is creationist logic of freedom, choosing, agency. You fail to acknowledge this logic, you fail to acknowledge the validity of the subjectivity we all use in daily life. We create the word love, so far love is a human construct, but of course the word love is not love, the word love refers to agency, that is the real love. Things can really turn out several different ways in the universe, and then it is a matter of opinion what it is that makes the decision turn out the way it does, subjectivity!mohammadnursyamsu
November 24, 2015
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mohammadnursyamsu: I meant personhood is not physics, but it must fit with physics all the same. How to recognize both physics, and beauty, love, goodness are valid, real and relevant. A naturalist would presumably see beauty, love, goodness, personhood, as human constructs. mohammadnursyamsu: Computers are designed to act in a forced way. The randomness which is used to simulate decisionmaking in games is generally pseudo-randomness, it cannot really turn out several different ways, in the event. It's easy enough to incorporate true randomness, or complex data external to the computer, into its workings.Zachriel
November 24, 2015
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@Zachriel It's not what I meant. I meant personhood is not physics, but it must fit with physics all the same. How to recognize both physics, and beauty, love, goodness are valid, real and relevant. Computers are designed to act in a forced way. The randomness which is used to simulate decisionmaking in games is generally pseudo-randomness, it cannot really turn out several different ways, in the event. A decision is to make a possibility, which is in the future, the present or not. Or also commonly defined as to make one of alternative future's the present. I presented you the solution maybe 4 times already. It's a working solution, while you've got nothing ready to go.mohammadnursyamsu
November 24, 2015
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mohammadnursyamsu: Present a formal conceptual scheme where personhood fits in with the known laws of physics. Physics really isn't the domain of "personhood". A naturalist would probably define a person as the body, including the brain, and the activities of the body, including the brain and the brain's sensibilities. mohammadnursyamsu: – A decision is made between A and B, and A is chosen. Computers make decisions.Zachriel
November 24, 2015
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@Seversky Zachriel You both still at it with the semantics and word-goo. Present a formal conceptual scheme where personhood fits in with the known laws of physics. The creationist logic is: - A decision is made between A and B, and A is chosen. - What made the decision turn out A instead of B? - This question can only be answered by choosing the answer. Meaning at least 2 answers are valid. With this conceptual scheme there is a domain for opinion (what is doing the choosing) agency, personhood, emotions, spirituality etc. and a domain for facts (what is chosen), material, mathematics, fantasy etc.mohammadnursyamsu
November 24, 2015
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bornagain @ 60
you have your own definition for naturalism that is not the common usage definition, and is thus not applicable for the points you raised.
1. Why not? 2. What, in your view, is the common usage definition of ‘naturalism’?Seversky
November 23, 2015
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Box @ 61
Let’s take a look at the first argument:
1.) Argument from intentionality 1. If naturalism is true, I cannot think ABOUT anything. 2. I am thinking about naturalism. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true.
Okay, let’s look at the first argument. I have already said I would reject the first premise and, incidentally, disagree with Rosenberg but that’s beside the point. The debating tactic lies in premise two. You very kindly quote Rosenberg writing as follows in the passage from his book:
Introspection must be wrong when it credits consciousness with thoughts about birthdays, keys, and bosses’ names. But the mistake introspection makes is so deep and so persuasive, it’s almost impossible to shake, even when you understand it. At first you won’t even be able to conceive how it could be a mistake. But it has to be. The mistake is the notion that when we think, or rather when our brain thinks, it thinks about anything at all We have to see very clearly that introspection tricks us into the illusion that our thoughts are about anything at all. Thinking about things can’t happen at all. The brain can’t have thoughts about Paris, or about France, or about capitals, or about anything else for that matter. When consciousness convinces you that you, or your mind, or your brain has thoughts about things, it is wrong.
In other words, Rosenberg is arguing that the belief that we are thinking about anything at all - which would include Craig’s claim to be thinking about naturalism - is an illusion. Craig’s debating tactic lies in failing to address Rosenberg’s argument which specifically attacks claims such as premise two. In effect, Craig is holding up to ridicule a strawman version of Rosenberg’s position. That's a debating tactic not a refutation.Seversky
November 23, 2015
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Let’s take a look at the first argument: 1.) Argument from intentionality 1. If Rosenberg is right, I cannot think ABOUT anything. 2. I am thinking about something. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true. Two problems with the argument. You haven't addressed Rosenberg's actual position, which is that thinking is an illusion. (Our response to Rosenberg is that consciousness of thinking is a sensation. It would only be considered illusory insofar as it didn't provide reliable information about the underlying thinking process. While much of the process is hidden from the consciousness, saying the entirety is an illusion is an overstatement.) See Allen, 1972. Of course the primary problem with the argument is equating Rosenberg's views with all forms of naturalism or materialism.Zachriel
November 23, 2015
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Seversky #57: Any logical argument can be attacked on two grounds. First, is it valid, in other words, does it follow the prescribed logical form? Second, are the premises sound? Are they acceptable as stated? In the case of the eight arguments quoted, the first premise in each is rejected because in none of the cases is it shown that the alleged consequences follow necessarily from the assumption of naturalism. It’s a neat debating tactic but that’s all it is.
Let’s take a look at the first argument:
1.) Argument from intentionality 1. If naturalism is true, I cannot think ABOUT anything. 2. I am thinking about naturalism. 3. Therefore naturalism is not true.
Premise 1. seems odd. Did Rosenberg actually say that given naturalism one cannot have thoughts about anything? This must be some debating tactic by Graig, right? Well, let’s have a look:
Alex Rosenberg: THE BRAIN DOES EVERYTHING WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT ANYTHING AT ALL. Science must even deny the basic notion that we ever really think about the past and the future or even that our conscious thoughts ever give any meaning to the actions that express them. Introspection must be wrong when it credits consciousness with thoughts about birthdays, keys, and bosses’ names. But the mistake introspection makes is so deep and so persuasive, it’s almost impossible to shake, even when you understand it. At first you won’t even be able to conceive how it could be a mistake. But it has to be. The mistake is the notion that when we think, or rather when our brain thinks, it thinks about anything at all We have to see very clearly that introspection tricks us into the illusion that our thoughts are about anything at all. Thinking about things can’t happen at all. The brain can’t have thoughts about Paris, or about France, or about capitals, or about anything else for that matter. When consciousness convinces you that you, or your mind, or your brain has thoughts about things, it is wrong. Physics has ruled out the existence of clumps of matter of the required sort. There are just fermions and bosons and combinations of them. None of that stuff is just, all by itself, about any other stuff. There is nothing in the whole universe—including, of course, all the neurons in your brain—that just by its nature or composition can do this job of being about some other clump of matter. So, when consciousness assures us that we have thoughts about stuff, it has to be wrong. (…) Therefore, consciousness cannot retrieve thoughts about stuff. There are none to retrieve. So it can’t have thoughts about stuff either. [A.Rosenberg, Ch.8 “THE BRAIN DOES EVERYTHING WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT ANYTHING AT ALL”, The Atheist’s Guide to Reality]
Box
November 22, 2015
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you have your own definition for naturalism that is not the common usage definition, and is thus not applicable for the points you raised.bornagain
November 22, 2015
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Box @ 28
By “naturalism” I refer to materialism or physicalism.
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical. [Stanford.edu]
Are you saying that naturalism should be defined differently?
The SEP entry claims that ‘naturalism’ has no agreed, clearly-defined meaning. I would agree that reality is exhausted by nature. But, by ‘naturalism’, I mean the position that we can best understand reality by learning the ‘natures’ of all the things that comprise reality. Nature, in this sense, means that which makes a thing itself and not something else. Thus, quantum mechanics describes the nature of matter at a sub-atomic level. It also means that a god will have a ‘nature’ which makes it a god and not an egg-and-tomato sandwich but both are part of the natural order of things in that sense. Materialism or physicalism are narrower claims. Physical reality may, at one level, be described in terms of matter and energy in their various forms or states but the nature of a particular thing will be more than just that.Seversky
November 22, 2015
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And exactly who is this person that is disagreeing with Dr. Craig? I know I exist, but 'you' could be an illusion for all 'I' know.
David Chalmers on Consciousness (Descartes, Philosophical Zombies and the Hard Problem) – video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NK1Yo6VbRoo Philosophical Zombies - cartoon http://existentialcomics.com/comic/11
bornagain
November 22, 2015
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