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WJM on Talking to Rocks

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UDEditors:  WJM’s devastating rebuttal to Aleta’s materialism deserves its own post.  Everything that follows is WJM’s:

Aleta said:

William, I know that your view is that unless morality is somehow grounded (purportedly) in some objective reality to which we have access, then it is merely subjective, and that then people have no reason not to to do anything they want: it’s not just a slippery slope, but rather a black-and-white precipice to nihilism.So actually discussing this with you, which we did at length one other time, is not worth my time.

It’s odd that you say that it is not worth your time apparently because you already know my position. If the only thing that makes a discussion “worth your time” is finding out the other person’s position on a matter, then surely most of what you write here is “not worth your time” because you already know the views of most of the participants here you engage with. Correct?

Is it “not worth your time” to engage in a discussion in order to demonstrate to onlookers (and this site has quite a few thousand onlookers) the rational soundness of your views?

1. I believe human beings have evolved to have moral nature, and that this has been part of our evolution as a social animal.

But I believe we are materially-based biological organisms, and that there is no non-material dualistic aspect to our existence.

There are questions here, right off the bat, to consider about your worldview. First is the question of if whether or not a being produced entirely from unliving, material forces and necessarily, entirely obeying the naturalistic forces of chemistry and physics can even meaningfully be said to have a “moral” nature at all. This depends on what one is using the term “moral” to mean.

If one uses the classic definition, then morality is about how one ought behave; but under the naturalist view of human behavior, humans always act how they must act – according to what physics and chemistry demands. Indeed, under the naturalist view, there is no other available cause for any thought or behavior.

The idea that an entirely physics and chemistry-driven being ought do something other than what physics and chemistry actually drive that entity to do cannot, to my knowledge, be rationally supported. Care to give it a try?

Also, you appear to definitionally link morality to the social aspect of human interaction, when the classic definition of morality draws no such parameter around what “morality” entails. You’re free to believe that, of course, but the rest of us have no reason to consider that limitation valid.

2. I believe that our moral belief system, and our desire to behave morally (which varies among individuals), develops just as many other aspects of us do: through a combination of developmental biology (nature) and learning from our surroundings (nurture.)

So morality is a combination of innate tendencies to judge right from wrong with a great deal of cultural influences about the particular details of right and wrong.

Here you have terminologically strayed from your original premise of humans being the result of the evolutionary processes of material forces acting in biology. IMO, re-labeling “physics and chemistry” as “innate tendencies”, “nurture” and “cultural influences” serves to obfuscate what is actually going on in your worldview: physics and chemistry generating effects via the interaction of various physical commodities.

So, when you say: “judge right from wrong”, it invokes a classical perspective that is unavailable to you. Perhaps you mean it in a different way, but the problem is what the terms appear to mean. Under your worldview, it is perhaps more accurate to say that a physical entity is driven by physics and chemistry to feel it ought do one thing, and ought not do another, and that you are calling this aspect of physics & chemistry driven activity “morality”.

However, also people mature, and just as children go from concrete to abstract thinking, morality goes from being primarily influenced by feeling pressure from the judgments of adults and the desire to avoid punishment (external sources) to an internalized sense of willful choice informed at least in part by reason and education.

Under your naturalism, all of the above is nothing more than terminological re-characterizations of the same fundamental, exclusive driving force of human behavior (energies and particles interacting according to physics and chemistry) in order to gain conceptual distance from the naturalist facts of your view of morality.

In other words, calling some group of those forces interacting “nurture” and “judgement” and “morality” and an “internalized sense of willful choice” doesn’t change the fact that what is going on is nothing more than the brute, ongoing effects of the processes of physics and chemistry.

For example, because I might terminologically refer to what computer-generated characters do in a video game as their “judgement” and “internalized sense of choice” and “nurture” doesn’t change the fact that everything in the video game is just acting as the code dictates. I can say the code is “making a choice” or “making a judgement”, but under the classic understanding of those terms, it is no more making a “choice” or a “judgement” than river water makes a choice or a judgement about which way to go; the outcome is dictated by physics (and/or chemistry).

You go on through your statements furthering your re-characterization of “physics and chemistry” in broader terms to make it seem like something else is going on, but the problem is that everything you say later is rationally laid to ruin by the nature of your premise: naturalism ultimately insists that all human behavior is generated by physics and chemistry and not by a locus of consciousness that has any top-down free will power. The terms you use throughout your statements to re-characterize your naturalist premise are terms that deeply implicate, classically and traditionally speaking, metaphysics your naturalism doesn’t have access to.

So, what you must mean by them boils down to “the cause and effect of physics and chemistry”, which ruins renders the moral judgement of humans equitable to the moral judgement of rocks rolling down hills or the choice of river water about where to flow. That physics and chemistry happen to also make humans feel as if they have some sort of top-down choice and feel as if they are responsible and feel as if they have a conscience and moral obligations is irrelevant because all of those sensations are also physics and chemistry driven instances of physical cause and effect, just like the actions of rocks rolling down hills and river water taking any particular curve.

You say in your statement that you think I and others are “wrong” about where we think morality comes from and what it is. Why should I care what a physics and chemistry-driven biological automaton utters? Like anyone else under your paradigm, you would think and say whatever physics and chemistry commands; you would feel and believe whatever physics and chemistry dictate. If chemistry and physics dictate that you bark like dog and believe you have said something profoundly wise, that is what you will do. If physics and chemistry dictate that you rape little boys and mutilate little girls an believe that to be a good, moral thing, that is what you will do. Period.

If those things are what physics and chemistry commanded, that is what you would be doing and arguing for today, and there would be absolutely no external standard by which you, let alone anyone else, could judge your behavior and beliefs wrong, nor would you have any objective, top-down access or capacity for making such a judgment even if such a standard existed, let alone change your behavior.

That is the sad dilemma you find yourself in, Aleta, whether you know it or not. Under your paradigm, you and KF and Stephen and Gandhi and Obama and George Wallace and everyone else are just streams of water going wherever physics and chemistry dictates – yet here you are, arguing as if any of us could do anything other than what physics and chemistry commands.

Do you also try to argue rivers out of their course, or try to convince the weather to change?

Comments
If an emergent property does not imply being caused by, and is not fully constrained by, the lower level from which it arises, how is emergence any different from the supernatural? The naturalist, having loudly declared to have breakfasted on supernatural cake, somehow still has it afterwards.Andere Stimme
May 5, 2016
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Phinehas #125, Again very well said :) Isn't it ironic that the materialists desperately want to flee the desolate barren lands of naturalism in order to reach freedom and that we are forced to act as border patrol?Origenes
May 5, 2016
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Phinehas: Unless someone offers you a million bucks, and then we’ll suddenly see whether you have a will over and above the PAV version of the TAS2R38 gene. If you remember, there is no compulsion, but a simple food choice. Phinehas: Salt, so magic, eh? Not at all. But there is more to salt than sodium and chlorine. The difference is the relationship between sodium and chlorine, which results in new emergent properties that are not entailed in the individual atoms. Phinehas: Salt has emergent properties, so it is therefore possible for anything to happen unconstrained by individual causes? No. Phinehas: How does one go about determining which fantastical things make it onto the list above and which do not? It's called science.Zachriel
May 5, 2016
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Origenes: I have argued in #69, #71 and #94 that these are fully constrained by the lower level from which they arise and that they are therefore irrelevant to freedom. Not per your definition of freedom, that is, "acting in accord with oneself." A robot can act in accord with itself. Origenes: Emergent properties are either caused by or fully constrained by the lower level from which they arise. Unfortunately for naturalism there is no third option. You keep thinking that naturalism necessarily implies determinism. Origenes: Freedom is neither being fully determined by natural law nor being fully constrained by items that are fully determined by natural law. Do we agree? Not particularly. You are defining freedom as non-naturalistic, then will beg the question by arguing that freedom debunks naturalism.Zachriel
May 5, 2016
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Zachriel: First of all, a single example does not disqualify every member of the set.
You are correct. I should have said: That immediately disqualifies those emergent properties as being relevant to freedom.
Zachriel: It’s also important to note that some forms of emergentism do not imply causality or determinism.
You are referring to the alleged “uncaused” emergent properties. I have argued in #69, #71 and #94 that such properties are fully constrained by the lower level from which they arise and that they are therefore irrelevant to freedom.
Zachriel: Other emergentists note that some phenomena are so far removed from their substrates as to totally obscure any chain of causation.
Emergent properties are either caused by or fully constrained by the underlying lower level from which they arise. Unfortunately for naturalism there is no third option. But feel free to offer one anyway.
Zachriel: Meanwhile, your own definition of freedom, (…)
I don’t want to hijack this thread with discussions about my definition of freedom. For the discussion resulting from the OP it suffices to reach agreement on what freedom is not. You never did answer my question:
it may be hard to reach agreement on a definition of freedom. However I think we can agree upon what it is not. Freedom is neither being fully determined by natural law nor being fully constrained by items that are fully determined by natural law. Do we agree?
Origenes
May 5, 2016
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Z:
Phinehas: Certainly not if their “choice” is fully determined by physics and chemistry.
Z: Well, it turns out that if you are homozygous for the PAV version of TAS2R38 gene, then you almost certainly refuse to eat your Brussels sprouts.
Unless someone offers you a million bucks, and then we'll suddenly see whether you have a will over and above the PAV version of the TAS2R38 gene. As I said in my last post, the fact that there are influences that may even make choices predictable doesn't disprove free will. On the contrary, the ability of the will to choose to overcome those influences or not reinforces its existence.
Origenes: Only if that underlying cause is oneself.
Z: The self, in this view, is more than the sum of the individual causes.
Salt, so magic, eh? That sounds like what you are saying to me. Salt has emergent properties, so it is therefore possible for anything to happen unconstrained by individual causes? Even things that, by all accounts, defy the underlying physics and chemistry? * Salt, so transmutation? * Salt, so spontaneous generation? * Salt, so a magic hat that spawns bunnies? * Salt, so consciousness? * Salt, so free choice? How does one go about determining which fantastical things make it onto the list above and which do not? Doesn't it boil down to which things you want to include in the list so that you can continue pretending that your view of life isn't wildly inconsistent and entirely faith-based?Phinehas
May 5, 2016
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Origenes: That immediately disqualifies emergent properties as being relevant to freedom. First of all, a single example does not disqualify every member of the set. It's also important to note that some forms of emergentism do not imply causality or determinism. Other emergentists note that some phenomena are so far removed from their substrates as to totally obscure any chain of causation. Meanwhile, your own definition of freedom, “Freedom is not about being unpredictable, but rather about acting in accord with oneself. Freedom is being able to do what one wants to do, not being able to do what one does not want to do" is consistent with determinism. Origenes: Only if that underlying cause is oneself. The self, in this view, is more than the sum of the individual causes.Zachriel
May 5, 2016
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Zachriel:
Origenes: Let’s assume, for instance, that the properties of salt are emergent in a strong sense and cannot be said to be explainable or caused by the constituents sodium and chloride.
It’s not just sodium and chlorine that makes salt, but the *relationship* between them which results in something new that is not entailed in either the sodium or chlorine alone. Salt is more than the sum of its parts.
You say that, in the case of salt, "emergent properties" are caused by sodium, chlorine and the relationship between them. That immediately disqualifies emergent properties as being relevant to freedom. Because if emergent properties are fully explainable/caused by/determined by a lower level of chemistry, then they (obviously) have no relevance to freedom.
Zachriel: (...) if your actions are determined by some underlying cause, that is not inconsistent with being able to act according to oneself, (...)
Only if that underlying cause is oneself.Origenes
May 5, 2016
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F/N: Compatibilist accounts of freedom fail. Unless we are sufficiently responsibly and rationally free mindedness collapses, and much else with it. freedom is not equivalent to not being consciously aware of constrains and controls. KFkairosfocus
May 5, 2016
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Not advisable o give out personal info online.kairosfocus
May 5, 2016
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mike1962: Hey, what’s your phone number? Let’s talk Feel free to email us, but no matter what you say, Led Zeppelin is objectively the best rock band in history. Truth Will Set You Free: You would appeal to their morality? Since their is no such thing as an objective standard of morality (in your worldview), you are really just appealing to their “opinion” of what morality is, which, as you know, is completely different from yours There are many areas of commonality, which you would know if you had bothered to read our previous comments. Bin Laden shared many of the same values as Americans, including a belief in justice, the future of his people, and a desire to rid his land of what he considered to be alien invaders. Truth Will Set You Free: (assuming you do not approve of blowing up innocent people to make a political statement).
Bin Laden, 2004: God knows it did not cross our minds to attack the Towers, but after the situation became unbearable—and we witnessed the injustice and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people in Palestine and Lebanon—I thought about it. And the events that affected me directly were those of 1982 and the events that followed—when America allowed the Israelis to invade Lebanon, helped by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. As I watched the destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust the same way: to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we were tasting and to stop killing our children and women.
Even when values differ, you can only make a convincing argument by addressing those differences. In any case, the vast majority of people do share many values, and it makes for common ground. Origenes: Let’s assume, for instance, that the properties of salt are emergent in a strong sense and cannot be said to be explainable or caused by the constituents sodium and chloride. It's not just sodium and chlorine that makes salt, but the *relationship* between them which results in something new that is not entailed in either the sodium or chlorine alone. Salt is more than the sum of its parts. Origenes: If it is the case that everything is determined by something else, then freedom does not exist. You said "Freedom is not about being unpredictable, but rather about acting in accord with oneself. Freedom is being able to do what one wants to do, not being able to do what one does not want to do." Even if your actions are determined by some underlying cause, that is not inconsistent with being able to act according to oneself, meeting your definition of freedom. See discussion of Brussels sprouts.Zachriel
May 5, 2016
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Seversky #115,
Seversky: Anything that exists in a form other than chaotic motion, that has a form that persists over time, must be constrained to retain that form by some sort of law or law-like regularities and I would argue that must be true whether that thing be physical or non-physical.
Are you saying that anything that exists has an external cause for its existence?
Seversky: Moreover, those laws or law-like regularities or whatever you want to call them are by their nature restrictions on freedom and that also must be true whether we are talking about the physical or some non-physical domain, so appealing to non-physicality doesn’t allow you to escape the problem of determinism.
If everything has an external cause, then freedom does not exist. Sure. The question is if “everything has an external cause ” is a coherent state of affairs. Hint: Aquinas does not think it is.Origenes
May 5, 2016
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Daniel King:
Origenes: Emergent properties may not be explainable/predictable from the parts from which they arise, but, to my knowledge, no one has claimed that emergent properties are not fully constrained by what underlies them.
Who, besides yourself, has claimed that emergent properties are “fully constrained” by what underlies them?
No one has, to my knowledge. However I hold that I have merely stated the obvious
Daniel King: Who, besides yourself, understands what you mean when you say “fully constrained”?
Allow me to explain. Many argue that the concept of emergent properties does not make sense and I’m inclined to side with them. However, for the sake of argument, I’m willing to assume, arguendo, that emergent properties — the volume of a gas, wetness of water, functional properties of a computer, number of molecules of a gas and so forth — are not explainable from the lower level from which they arise. IOWs I’m willing to assume the existence of unpredictable emergent properties which are in a true sense uncaused by the lower level from which they arise. However those emergent properties do arise from a lower level and not on their own. So, if we are, wrt emergent properties, not allowed to say that those properties are caused by the underlying lower level, then, at the very least, we are allowed to say that those emergent properties are fully constrained by the underlying lower level. Let’s assume, for instance, that the properties of salt are emergent in a strong sense and cannot be said to be explainable or caused by the constituents sodium and chloride. Again, many will argue that this is nonsense, but let’s assume it anyway. Okay. But “uncaused” in this sense cannot mean that the emergent properties of salt are independent from the lower level of interacting sodium and chloride. “Uncaused” here does not mean that emergent properties are free from the lower level of chemistry. Emergent properties cannot cut off their roots, veer off into space and start making plans for their unconstrained existence.
Daniel King: Citations, please.
I cannot provide them. However I maintain that I have merely stated the obvious.Origenes
May 5, 2016
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Zachriel@113: You would appeal to their morality? Since their is no such thing as an objective standard of morality (in your worldview), you are really just appealing to their "opinion" of what morality is, which, as you know, is completely different from yours (assuming you do not approve of blowing up innocent people to make a political statement). Anyway, below is a revealing link that shows (I think) why atheists/Darwinists are losing these debates in the public forum. Their arguments just don't make sense. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkx0CRHxaYQ&list=TLcps86fvQ_4gwNDA1MjAxNgTruth Will Set You Free
May 4, 2016
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Origenes:
Emergent properties may not be explainable/predictable from the parts from which they arise, but, to my knowledge, no one has claimed that emergent properties are not fully constrained by what underlies them.
Who, besides yourself, has claimed that emergent properties are "fully constrained" by what underlies them? Who, besides yourself, understands what you mean when you say "fully constrained"? Citations, please. Looking forward to learning.Daniel King
May 4, 2016
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Origenes @ 109
Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is logically committed to the premise of physical causal closure: every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, assuming it has a cause at all. IOWs if everything is physical then everything that has a cause has a physical cause, how can it be otherwise? From physical causal closure, as an element of naturalism, it follows that everything is determined and hence there can be no freedom.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories. The word ‘materialism’ is very old, but the word ‘physicalism’ was introduced into philosophy only in the 1930s by Otto Neurath (1931) and Rudolf Carnap (1959/1932), both of whom were key members of the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians active in Vienna prior to World War II. It is not clear that Neurath and Carnap understood physicalism in the same way, but one thesis often attributed to them (e.g. in Hempel 1949) is the linguistic thesis that every statement is synonymous with (i.e. is equivalent in meaning with) some physical statement. But materialism as traditionally construed is not a linguistic thesis at all; rather it is a metaphysical thesis in the sense that it tells us about the nature of the world. At least for the positivists, therefore, there was a clear reason for distinguishing physicalism (a linguistic thesis) from materialism (a metaphysical thesis). Moreover, this reason was compounded by the fact that, according to official positivist doctrine, metaphysics is nonsense. Since the 1930s, however, the positivist philosophy that under-girded this distinction has for the most part been rejected—for example, physicalism is not a linguistic thesis for contemporary philosophers—and this is one reason why the words ‘materialism’ and ‘physicalism’ are now often interpreted as interchangeable. Some philosophers suggest that ‘physicalism’ is distinct from ‘materialism’ for a reason quite unrelated to the one emphasized by Neurath and Carnap. As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist” (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, par. 9). But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense (Lange 1865, Dijksterhuis 1961, Yolton 1983). So it is tempting to use ‘physicalism’ to distance oneself from what seems a historically important but no longer scientifically relevant thesis of materialism, and related to this, to emphasize a connection to physics and the physical sciences. However, while physicalism is certainly unusual among metaphysical doctrines in being associated with a commitment both to the sciences and to a particular branch of science, namely physics, it is not clear that this is a good reason for calling it ‘physicalism’ rather than ‘materialism.’ For one thing, many contemporary physicalists do in fact use the word ‘materialism’ to describe their doctrine (e.g. Smart 1963). Moreover, while ‘physicalism’ is no doubt related to ‘physics’ it is also related to ‘physical object’ and this in turn is very closely connected with ‘material object’, and via that, with ‘matter.’
Anything that exists in a form other than chaotic motion, that has a form that persists over time, must be constrained to retain that form by some sort of law or law-like regularities and I would argue that must be true whether that thing be physical or non-physical. Moreover, those laws or law-like regularities or whatever you want to call them are by their nature restrictions on freedom and that also must be true whether we are talking about the physical or some non-physical domain, so appealing to non-physicality doesn't allow you to escape the problem of determinism.Seversky
May 4, 2016
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Zechriel, Hey, what's your phone number? Let's talkmike1962
May 4, 2016
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Origenes: Freedom is not about being unpredictable, but rather about acting in accord with oneself. Freedom is being able to do what one wants to do, not being able to do what one does not want to do. Your definition, then, is consistent with materialism. Phinehas: Certainly not if their “choice” if fully determined by physics and chemistry. Well, it turns out that if you are homozygous for the PAV version of TAS2R38 gene, then you almost certainly refuse to eat your Brussels sprouts. Phinehas: Saying that “wet” is an emergent property of water doesn’t get you any closer to moral choices. What is does do is refutes the claim that materialism necessarily implies there is nothing over and beyond elementary particles. Some phenomena can only be described in terms of emergence. Truth Will Set You Free: My question was not whether you would be successful at dissuading bin Laden or Dahmer, but rather HOW you would try to dissuade them. What would you appeal to if given the chance? With bin Laden, you might attempt to show how his means will not achieve his ends, though it's doubtful he would be convinced. Dahmer could presumably not be persuaded short of coercion as there is points of commonality. Truth Will Set You Free: My guess is that you would appeal to your “opinion” of what morality is and how people “should” behave. Quite the contrary. We would appeal to their sense of morality, as well as practicality. Origenes: From physical causal closure, as an element of naturalism, it follows that everything is determined and hence there can be no freedom. That is not correct. Physicalism does not necessarily imply determinism. Zachriel: It doesn’t have to be objective, there just has to be a common basis. mike1962: In a universe with only people without eyes, what common basis can there be that leads to a disagreement over “sight” and “blindness”? There would be no basis. If people have no sense of beauty, then there's nothing to discuss. However, people do generally have a sense of beauty, but this doesn't imply that beauty is objective. Origenes: Unfortunately pointing out the glaringly obvious boundaries of materialism is a necessary exercise when so many prefer to pretend that they don’t exist. It's amazing that philosophers still consider physicalism to be a valid philosophy when its debunking is so "glaringly obvious".Zachriel
May 4, 2016
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StephenB, Thank you. My formulations are obviously up for improvement. For instance: "From physical causal closure, as an element of naturalism, it follows that everything is physically determined and hence there can be no freedom." It's quite a struggle to state the glaringly obvious (bordering tautology) and still say something meaningful. Unfortunately pointing out the glaringly obvious boundaries of materialism is a necessary exercise when so many prefer to pretend that they don't exist.Origenes
May 4, 2016
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Origenes
Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is logically committed to the premise of physical causal closure: every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, assuming it has a cause at all. IOWs if everything is physical then everything that has a cause has a physical cause, how can it be otherwise? From physical causal closure, as an element of naturalism, it follows that everything is determined and hence there can be no freedom.
A splendid summary--and incontestably true.
A “holistic being” that produces moral choices on its own accord — not produced by physical law — cannot exist according to naturalism. A so called “non-reductionist naturalist” who holds that some things are not subject to natural law — that some things act on their own accord, unbothered by physical law — believes in stuff that naturalism expressly denies.
Another home run.StephenB
May 4, 2016
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Zachriel: Most people are not morally blind, and many share the same moral values. However, not every person has a moral sense, and among those with a moral sense, there is still significant variation in moral values. Like Aleta, you don't understand the question. Astonishing. Re-read and try again.mike1962
May 4, 2016
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I have argued that freedom is a prerequisite to personal accountability and morality. In response Aleta has suggested that emergent properties may provide naturalism an opportunity to ground freedom. In posts #69, #71 and #94 I have argued that emergent properties, since they are fully restrained by the parts from which they arise, are irrelevant to freedom of choice. Here is a second, more general, objection to Aleta’s suggestion: Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is logically committed to the premise of physical causal closure: every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, assuming it has a cause at all. IOWs if everything is physical then everything that has a cause has a physical cause, how can it be otherwise? From physical causal closure, as an element of naturalism, it follows that everything is determined and hence there can be no freedom.
Aleta: we do have a different type of organically grounded ability to make choices that are a product of our holistic being.
A “holistic being” that produces moral choices on its own accord — not produced by physical law — cannot exist according to naturalism. A so called “non-reductionist naturalist” who holds that some things are not subject to natural law — that some things act on their own accord, unbothered by physical law — believes in stuff that naturalism expressly denies.Origenes
May 4, 2016
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Zachriel
As it is difficult to convince some otherwise intelligent people about facts that are strongly supported by science and scientists (e.g. evolution), it is doubtful one could have convinced a committed partisan, such as bin Laden, to desist from his chosen path. Believe it or not, bin Laden shared many of the same values as Americans, including the importance of truth, children, and the future of his people. However, he was confronted with what he considered alien powers invading his home. He watched as the U.S. toppled towers in Beirut, killing untold numbers of civilians, and from that, he decided he had to inflict a similar injury on his enemies.
You are not taking into account the fact that humans have two faculties involved in making choices--Intellect and Will. The intellect provides the target (what you should do), the will shoots the arrow (what you decide to do). The intellect is a faculty for knowing the truth. The will is a faculty for choosing and loving the right things. Morality consists in following the light one has been given. Nothing more. In fact, each faculty can exert influence on the other: The alcoholic knows (intellect) that he should stop drinking, but his decides (will) that he doesn't want to because change is painful. The intellect intervenes and says, "its worth it." The will fights back and says, "I don't care." And so it goes. The intellect, which contains a mixture of truth and error, is wise insofar as it knows the truth; the will, which can be strong or weak, is free insofar as it is strong enough to follow the truth. Accordingly, the intellect can be illuminated to know what is right and the will can be trained to love the right things. Sadly, it is also possible that the will can be strong in the wrong direction and trained to follow error with a vengeance. Such was the case with Bin Laden. Because of his intelligence and privileged background, he had been given enough light to question his murderous impulses, redirect his perverted will, and pursue moral truth to the fullest. He chose not to do that.StephenB
May 4, 2016
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Zachriel@101: Evolution is actually NOT supported by science (and certainly not by all scientists). It is only supported by pseudo-science undergirded by atheistic philosophical assumptions. But let's not dwell on that for now. I am more interested in your points (concessions?) about the futility in trying to dissuade bin Laden. My question was not whether you would be successful at dissuading bin Laden or Dahmer, but rather HOW you would try to dissuade them. What would you appeal to if given the chance? My guess is that you would appeal to your "opinion" of what morality is and how people "should" behave. You would likely argue that your opinion is better than other opinions based on a variety of different reasons. But you would still be appealing to mere opinion. I say "mere" because we all know that opinions generally change from person to person, even on issues such as genocide and "just war" theory. So, from an evolutionist/Darwinist perspective, how does this situation get resolved? Which group will be "selected" out. My guess is that you adhere to the idea that humanity will evolve to some future utopian state, but that would be a statement of faith, not science. What I want to know is WHY should bin Laden not commit mass murder of innocent people? WHY should Dammer not kill, chop, and eat people for the thrill of it?Truth Will Set You Free
May 4, 2016
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Z: Silver Asiatic makes a great point @97 which you seem to have brushed over. Saying that "wet" is an emergent property of water doesn't get you any closer to moral choices. If water could actually choose to be wet or not, you'd have taken a step in the right direction. I maintain that you can only hang onto emergence as a pathway to moral choice if you avoid thinking too deeply about the issues. Avoidance must be your strategy if you are to have any hope. If you avoid the real issues and maintain bind faith in the magical unknown, you may just manage to preserve your religious adherence to the right kind of thinking. The funny thing about this is that it is itself an act of the will.Phinehas
May 4, 2016
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Z:
If we give a person a choice of eating Brussels sprouts or not, would you say they have free choice in the matter?
Certainly not if their "choice" if fully determined by physics and chemistry. In what way could they possibly have "free choice" in that case unless you redefine "free choice" to mean its exact opposite? But I would say that a person has free choice when given the opportunity to eat Brussels sprouts or not. That doesn't mean the choice is free from influences, whether internal or external, that could have a significant or even predictable impact on it. It simply means that, by an act of will, the person may choose to allow those influences to shape their decision or not. You may see this more clearly in cases where people refuse to recant their beliefs on pain of torture and even death.Phinehas
May 4, 2016
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Zachriel, The person has a free choice to eat or not to eat. BTW my definition of freedom/ free choice is in a sense unorthodox. Freedom is not about being unpredictable, but rather about acting in accord with oneself. Freedom is being able to do what one wants to do, not being able to do what one does not want to do. It follows that a person who knows me completely will be able to predict most, if not all, of my choices. Freedom, in my book, is about self-determination as opposed to being determined by external (in space or time) forces. p.s. do we agree on what freedom is not; see #102?Origenes
May 4, 2016
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Origenes: Is the person’s body in desperate need for food? Is Brussels sprouts the only food available? That sort of information. No. It's just a food choice. There's no compulsion. (It's not a trick question, though there is a follow-up.)Zachriel
May 4, 2016
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Zachriel: If we give a person a choice of eating Brussels sprouts or not, would you say they have free choice in the matter?
I need more information, because it depends on context of course. Is the person's body in desperate need for food? Is Brussels sprouts the only food available? That sort of information. --- // BTW it may be hard to reach agreement on a definition of freedom. However I think we can agree upon what it is not. Freedom is neither being fully determined by natural law nor being fully constrained by items that are fully determined by natural law. Do we agree?Origenes
May 4, 2016
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Truth Will Set You Free: “Given the chance, how would you try to dissuade people like Osama bin Laden, Jeffrey Dahmer, etc. to not commit their notorious crimes?” As it is difficult to convince some otherwise intelligent people about facts that are strongly supported by science and scientists (e.g. evolution), it is doubtful one could have convinced a committed partisan, such as bin Laden, to desist from his chosen path. Believe it or not, bin Laden shared many of the same values as Americans, including the importance of truth, children, and the future of his people. However, he was confronted with what he considered alien powers invading his home. He watched as the U.S. toppled towers in Beirut, killing untold numbers of civilians, and from that, he decided he had to inflict a similar injury on his enemies. If you asked bin Laden, though, he was happy to explain what he thought was required to cease his activities — the withdrawal of all alien forces from Muslim lands. Not so familiar with Jeffrey Dahmer, but presumably he was amoral, so there would be no basis for discussion. This is much different than the case with the highly moral bin Laden with whom you had lumped him.Zachriel
May 4, 2016
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