WJM Sums it up Nicely

_{Barry Arrington

November 18, 2013

Intelligent Design}

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We’re telling you [i.e., materialists] what the logical ramifications of your premises are, not what your beliefs are. In other words, if you hold premise A, then you must rationally also commit to B. That doesn’t mean you actually believe B; it just means that if you do not, you’re being logically inconsistent with regards to your stated premise. We’re actually, for the most part, assuming you do not believe B, even though it is logically implied by your premise.

It’s our hope that once you realize that B is logically [implied by] your premise, you’ll question your premise.

Comments

kairosfocus:
G2, with all due respect, stop the silly rhetorical word games, take a time out and do some serious thinking.
Graham2:
KF: Get a grip. Its a blog.
Poster child.Mung_{November 20, 2013
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Thanks MF, that's extremely interesting. I'll have to put some thought into it, but my first reaction is, "That precisely describes the delineation I feel. Why didn't I think of that?"Pro Hac Vice_{November 20, 2013
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PHV #46 (in response to Brent #44) You spend some time on the difference between a preference for ice-cream and a moral judgement. I think you are quite right that there is something fundamentally different and it isn’t just that moral judgement is more important. After all some moral judgements are of little importance and having the right ice-cream can be of great importance to some people (I hear). I wrote something about this which I am pleased with and I often refer to on this forum. In summary– the key difference is that while moral judgements are subjective they logically affect other people; while judgements about ice-cream rarely affect other people. If I judge some act to be evil I not only disapprove of it but I accept that it is a reason for not only refraining myself but for preventing others doing it other things being equal. This is one of the aspects of morality that gives it an objective flavour although there is a subjective element a core. In my little document I try to illustrate this by taking something which appears purely subjective – is a film funny – and showing how in a context where your judgement of whether it is funny affects others it takes on an objective feel and is more like a moral judgement.Mark Frank_{November 20, 2013
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Brent, No problem, take your time. Hope all is well.Pro Hac Vice_{November 20, 2013
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PHV & G2, I'm sorry, but I cannot respond now or very soon; maybe tomorrow. I appreciate your comments and responses.Brent_{November 20, 2013
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PHV: Heres my take on all this: The entire discussion is pointless because we are talking about different things. The crew at UD just believe. Gods/demons/angels/soul/heaven/mind/objective-morality/etc etc etc. They just believe. Evidence is not required, faith is enough. If people were able to make up their mind on moral questions, then it would leave their god with nothing to do. The heathens on the other hand, prefer to see some evidence before accepting stuff, its a totally different approach. You cant really have a rational discussion between these 2 partys.Graham2_{November 19, 2013
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Brent, Thanks, I think? I'm sorry if you were uncertain that I believe my moral beliefs are subjective--I certainly thought I was extremely open about that from the very beginning. First, I'd ask you to compare your "preference" for ice cream to your "preference" that genocide not happen. But do those things feel the same to you? At all? I assume that they don't. They don't to me, either. Subjectivists really, truly aren't sociopathic monsters. Nor are we logically required to be by our premises. So the first difference is that they feel enormously different. Why do they feel different? I think an objectivist would say that it's because they represent universal standards. But I can't reconcile that with objectivists' absolute, echoing failure to actually define those standards, propose a working tool with which to identify them, explain why they change over time, etc. So I believe, instead, that those feelings arise from my upbringing, culture, personal past, etc. So if nothing else, I suppose you could say it's a question of magnitude. This skirts the is/ought distinction, to which I pointed in an earlier answer, but as I've been thinking about it I'm not sure that was a good answer. The ought still depends on what you could call "preferences" - freedom is good, suffering is bad, etc. As a side note, I don't see how objectivists escape that reduction. Even if there is an objective good, isn't your decision to adhere to a matter of preferring good over bad? Isn't that a "preference"? Second, my moral principles derive from what I consider to be first principles--freedom is good, suffering is bad, etc. You could call those preferences, too, but I think that's true for everyone. We all think liberty, as an abstract concept, is good, right? Again, I think this is a product of my personal context and history; objectivists would disagree. I'm sure I'll think of some other reasons later; it's such an odd question. I cannot understand how this can be the position of someone trained in law. What is the connection, in your mind, to my position and legal training? In my opinion, it runs quite the other way. In law school (and certainly in practice) you very quickly learn that you cannot simply appeal to "objective" standards to win a debate or establish a fair rule of law. Because people don't agree on what those "objective" standards are. Even for dyed-in-the-wool objectivists, the practice of law is about operating in a relativist world: applying agreed-upon mortal rules, rather than some ethereal and objective moral standard. Do you not believe that when you call an act unethical that you are saying that act is wrong? Yes. Well, sort of. I can conceive of unethical acts that aren't morally wrong, like underbilling a client in desperate financial need. But I think that's neither here nor there. I have no problem calling certain acts "wrong." None. I do so according to my subjective standards, which I prefer to the standards of others. So I feel free to apply that judgment even though someone else might disagree with me. It works the same way for everyone, all the time--the key difference is that I think my underlying moral principles are subjective, while others think theirs are objective. Do you not believe that to say that something is wrong is to immediately be in need of an objective standard that shows it is wrong? No. I think I need a standard, but it can be subjective. Using a subjective standard renders the judgment subjective, rather than objective. I'm OK with that. It doesn't make a practical difference, as it doesn't preclude me (logically or practically) from acting on my beliefs. If you say my measurement of twelve inches is wrong, it is because you can use a ruler to check. Why does this not apply in ethics? Your measurement is a physical thing, to which we can apply a truly objective measure. If I ask, "What is the objective measurement", you can say, "Here. It's this ruler." I can see it, touch it, test it. Critically, I can compare it to Allan's ruler and Bob's ruler and Cindy's ruler. If those rulers don't agree, then we don't really have an objective standard until we figure it out. Your value measurements don't have physical, empirical dimensions. When I ask, "What's the ruler?", I get silence or incoherent statements like, "It's just self-evident, and it doesn't need to be tested or proved." Without a real objective test, I can't call your value measurements (or mine) "objective." Critically, I can't directly compare yours to Allan's to Bob's to Cindy's. I can quite easily see that they're different, though. Allan's a racist, Bob's in an interracial relationship. There's no objective standard to compare their respective values to. I can, however, compare Allan's and Bob's values to my values. Which I think are the right values; that's virtually a tautology, because they wouldn't be my values if I didn't think they were right. (Again, according to my upbringing, culture, past history, etc.) And when Allan's values don't measure up to mine, there's no logical reason I can't condemn him. Nor is there any logical reason I can't put my preferences into action by, say, voting for equal protection laws. What standard, for example, do you appeal to to say that my mass murdering of people is wrong? If that ‘standard’ you appeal to is only subjective, why should I or anybody else care about it? I can say, validly, it is just your opinion, and nothing more. Thanks, prefer working with practical hypos like this. I think it sharpens the discussion. I apply my standard. I think mass murder is wrong. I think that is a subjective standard. If I'm trying to get you to adopt my standard, I use the same tools an objectivist would: persuasion and coercion. Let's say I'd start by identifying our commonalities. Do we both think life overall is good? Maybe you don't--obviously this is hypothetical. But maybe you love your mother. So I'd try to appeal to that to create a principle we could build on: killing all these people will make their mothers sad, will be killing mothers, etc. If that didn't work, I'd go to coercion. I'd vote for more funding for the police, or stricter anti-mass-murder laws, or I'd just go all Batman on you. The stock phrase for this sort of thing is: "There are three boxes. Soap box, ballot box, ammo box. Use them in that order." Obviously this omits one tool that objectivists can use in theory, the appeal to objective standards. (I could try it too, but I want to stay with tools that are consistent with my worldview.) But that's a non-starter when the stakes are high. The Union didn't free the slaves by telling the South, "Hey! God really doesn't like slavery, your opinions to the contrary are objectively wrong!" The Allies didn't stop the Holocaust by citing objective moral principles of life and liberty. If that ‘standard’ you appeal to is only subjective, why should I or anybody else care about it? Here's where I think you've lost sight of the real world. Whenever you cite an objective value that's different from someone else's, they think it's just your opinion. Why, then, should they or anybody else care about it? It's on you to persuade or coerce them. Works the same way for everybody, including objectivists. I can say, validly, it is just your opinion, and nothing more. Yes you can. And you will, if you disagree with my opinion. Just like any objectivist who disagreed with your version of "objective" standards would say to you. The other day on the AM radio, I heard three or four guys debating the meaning of Romans 13. They disagreed vehemently with one another and the callers. Every party to that conversation believed that he knew the objective truth, and felt no need to abandon that truth just because some other guy's got an opinion. And if it doesn’t apply, how can you really say anything is wrong? I saved this question for last. Can I ask you a favor? It will require some work on your part, but I think it will be interesting. Feel free to decline, of course. I think I've answered this many times. It's not sinking in. I don't mean you--no one on your side of this discussion seems to have heard a word I've said. Possibly I'm just a terrible communicator, but possibly we're just in one of those internet spats where people are more interested in talking than listening. Would you mind answering that question for me? I'd like to see how you think I would answer it. Not how I should answer according to your analysis of my principles, but how you think I'd actually answer it if I were to do so right now. I'm very curious how you see my side of this discussion. (This, by the way, is a version of the Ideological Turing Test. I don't ask to test you, though, but because I'm curious as to whether I'm communicating effectively at all.)Pro Hac Vice_{November 19, 2013
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Brent: One more time: Show us the standard. There is no standard. You insist there is some moral-standard-in-the-sky, but, where is the evidence for such a standard?. The heathens like me would accept such a standard, if only there was some evidence for it. What we see is exactly what you would expect in a world with no objective morality: Huge numbers of people believe different things. Sure, when pushed to some extreme limit (the holocaust etc) we tend to group together, but, eg, how many people used to believe slavery was OK ? How many now believe its not OK ? Were we right then ? Are we right now ? Brent: Could you cite just one moral question whose result derives from objective morality (easy) then give us the evidence to support your claim. (not so easy). If pushed, I actually find the idea of a god-given (I presume this is what its all about) standard rather repulsive. I dont want to think that every time I make a moral judgement, I am being manipulated by some sky-fairy.Graham2_{November 19, 2013
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PHV, Thanks for the response. Though I couldn't possibly disagree with your position any more than I do, I do respect that, finally, you are honest that your "morality" is subjective. It is deceptive to call a subjective system of ethics actually ethics, however, and if you don't see a clear problem with this already I'm not going to be able to help you. My question to you is simply: What is the crucial difference between what you call ethics and preferences --- preferences on the order of preferring a certain flavored ice cream? My challenge to you is to show how there is any meaningful difference between what you call morality and simple preference. I cannot understand how this can be the position of someone trained in law. Do you not believe that when you call an act unethical that you are saying that act is wrong? Do you not believe that to say that something is wrong is to immediately be in need of an objective standard that shows it is wrong? If you say my measurement of twelve inches is wrong, it is because you can use a ruler to check. Why does this not apply in ethics? And if it doesn't apply, how can you really say anything is wrong? What standard, for example, do you appeal to to say that my mass murdering of people is wrong? If that 'standard' you appeal to is only subjective, why should I or anybody else care about it? I can say, validly, it is just your opinion, and nothing more.Brent_{November 19, 2013
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“I think there are people that ..” .. “I can see people that …” In other words, you’re using imaginary people to help you obfuscate the meaning of “self-evidently true” by attributing to those imaginary people a misguided concept of what “self-evidently true” means. Why don’t you just start flinging feces? Mr. Murray, I don't believe that you're prepared to have a conversation that stretches outside your preconceived notions. I'm sorry that our discussion was neither interesting nor productive for you. I will consider the matter closed between us with your crass rejoinder.Pro Hac Vice_{November 19, 2013
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Nowhere have I said, argued, or implied that you cannot prefer you morality, or that you have no grounds to “disapprove” of the Nazis, whether on is a moral objectivist or relativist. You might ask yourself why you stubbornly cling to this misconception even though I’ve corrected you.
I’m having trouble reconciling this with what you wrote in the first piece, that in the eyes of moral relativists, “only moral good was likely happening, since the Nazis believed what they were doing was right” and that we “must hold that we should not have interfered with the Nazis.” How can I both be free to disapprove of the Nazis and be forced, under your fiat declaration, to conclude that “only moral good was likely happening”? It also seems like you’re drawing a distinction between approval and action. I can, according to your summary declarations, sort of disapprove of the Nazis, even though I have to conclude that they were likely doing moral good. But I can’t act on that disapproval? The wall between those two seems entirely constructed out of convenient assumptions. If I disapprove of them, and my disapproval outweighs my desire to respect the sovereignty of others, then why can’t I take action based on my own beliefs? The fact that the Nazis had their own beliefs just doesn’t enter into the logical calculation—my actions are predicated on my beliefs, not theirs.
So, when you say “what Hitler did was wrong”, it carries no more meaning than when you say “I dislike banana pudding” or “I hate banana pudding”. Unless you are willing to go to war with the manufacturers of banana pudding to get them to stop, morality must have some quality that distinguishes it from “personal preference”, or else you’d treat moral issues the same way you treat other personal preference issues.
Once again, you’re starting with enormous assumptions and calling them logical necessities. In this case, you’re assuming that my “preference” against genocide carries equal weight as my “preference” for banana pudding. That is self-evidently (!) absurd. Someone else used an interesting analogy: I prefer not to have dog poop in my living room. I will immediately take action to enforce that preference. I do not feel anything near the same compulsion to rid my living room of the smell of banana pudding. How much more import, then, do you think my preference against genocide has? Even if we grant that all relativist moral principles are a matter of preference, I hope you can acknowledge that those preferences can differ enormously in terms of urgency and weight.
What is the difference between moral issues and other personal preference issues, under moral subjectivism/relativism, that justifies the qualitative behavioral differential?
(It just occurred to me, seeing your construction here, that I’ve been using “relativism” as a synonym for “subjectivism.” That’s probably inaccurate. It doesn’t seem to have caused any confusion so far, but just in case.) A moral issue implies a question of “ought.” I ought to prevent genocide. I want pudding. Those are different notions. I acknowledge that you can call the ought there a matter of preference, since it assumes that I have a preference against genocide, and indeed this distinction may itself be subjective—I don’t know whether other people characterize their moral beliefs in the same way. If you prefer, we can call it all a matter of preference, so long as we acknowledge also that those preferences can be astronomically different in terms of significance. My preference not to see innocent people tortured far outweighs my taste for any particular food. You keep assuming otherwise, despite clear evidence that, in fact, subjectivists can and do consider moral “preferences” more important than hedonistic preferences. You keep using “pie!” and “pudding!” to trivialize subjectivists’ moral preferences, the way you use “Nazi!” to try to shame us. These rhetorical devices do not substitute for actual logical analysis.Pro Hac Vice_{November 19, 2013
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Thank you, that’s a useful addition to the discussion. I ask it because I think there are people who believe that resisting lawful authority is categorically, self-evidently wrong. I can also see people who would think the exact opposite, that it would categorically never be morally wrong to resist the wrongful exercise of lawful authority.
"I think there are people that .." .. "I can see people that ..." In other words, you're using imaginary people to help you obfuscate the meaning of "self-evidently true" by attributing to those imaginary people a misguided concept of what "self-evidently true" means. Why don't you just start flinging feces?William J Murray_{November 19, 2013
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I think you misunderstood me. I am trying to frame the logical argument you’re making from the perspective of a relativist. I understood that to be, “You can’t prefer your own morality to another’s without objectivity, therefore you have no ground to disapprove of the Nazis.” Please let me know if that’s incorrect.
If you're serious about having a meaningful debate, then you might want to do some introspective analysis about what you just wrote above. Nowhere have I said, argued, or implied that you cannot prefer you morality, or that you have no grounds to "disapprove" of the Nazis, whether on is a moral objectivist or relativist. You might ask yourself why you stubbornly cling to this misconception even though I've corrected you. You are free to prefer whatever you want; you are free to disapprove of whatever you want. You require no "grounds" other than "personal proclivity" or "subjective feelings" to "prefer" or "disapprove" of virtually anything.
But saying is not the same as proving it, logically or empirically. Your statement is trivially wrong. I can absolutely justify beliefs, reactions, and acts according to subjective standards: I believe that genocide is wrong. Hitler is committing genocide. I should stop Hitler. I might also stop to acknowledge, Hitler thinks genocide is right, but so what? Why do his beliefs trump my own?
Under moral relativism, "wrong" only means the that thing in question contradicts your personal preferences - and that is ALL it means. Under moral relativism, "right" and "good" are synonymous with "what I prefer", and "wrong, evil" are synonyms for "things I personally dislike". So, when you say "what Hitler did was wrong", it carries no more meaning than when you say "I dislike banana pudding" or "I hate banana pudding". Unless you are willing to go to war with the manufacturers of banana pudding to get them to stop, morality must have some quality that distinguishes it from "personal preference", or else you'd treat moral issues the same way you treat other personal preference issues. What is the difference between moral issues and other personal preference issues, under moral subjectivism/relativism, that justifies the qualitative behavioral differential?William J Murray_{November 19, 2013
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WJM,
Let’s note the litany of straw man diversions that PHV is attempting:
A. Everyone has their own moral beliefs. B. Everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent. A is not, and does not logically entail, B. I hold to A, but not B.
Nobody claimed that “everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent” because everyone has their own moral beliefs.
I think you misunderstood me. I am trying to frame the logical argument you’re making from the perspective of a relativist. I understood that to be, “You can’t prefer your own morality to another’s without objectivity, therefore you have no ground to disapprove of the Nazis.” Please let me know if that’s incorrect.
What has been said, repeatedly, is that one cannot rationally justify certain beliefs and/or reactions and/or acts from the premise that morality is entirely subjective in nature. This is a relatively trivial observation; not every conclusion can be extracted from every premise.
But saying is not the same as proving it, logically or empirically. Your statement is trivially wrong. I can absolutely justify beliefs, reactions, and acts according to subjective standards: I believe that genocide is wrong. Hitler is committing genocide. I should stop Hitler. I might also stop to acknowledge, Hitler thinks genocide is right, but so what? Why do his beliefs trump my own?
Here PHV is trying to broaden and water down the meaning and usefulness of identifying self-evidently true moral statements as if someone claimed that every or most moral claims are supposed to be self-evidently true.
No, what I’m doing is what I was trained to do in law school and legal practice, which is to use progressively more difficult hypotheticals to flesh out nebulous propositions. It’s working! We’ve already established something we hadn’t before: not every moral claim is self-evidently true. Next I’d like to know, how do you tell one that’s self-evident from one that’s not? What if two people disagree about that?
The question is preceded by a lengthy set-up description of the events and situation, ostensibly offered up so we could make a better decision about whether or not the statement is self-evidently true. PHV has had this explained to him/her several times – if you need evidence and argument and additional information to make a decision about the moral truth of a statement, it is by definition not a self-evidently true moral statement.
Hypos are hypos because they set up a hypothetical fact pattern. The facts matter! Apparently not for you, but I suspect your definition of “objective” moral standard is, ironically, not shared by all. You’ve brought us back to the Grand Because. Why is WJM right? Because! What is his evidence or argument? He doesn’t need any! Because! Because it’s self-evident? Why is it self-evident? Because! This would be more persuasive if people agreed on the set of self-evident moral truths. But they don’t! Conservative, Bible-believing Christians have differed on questions such as: Is abortion wrong? Is it wrong if the life of the mother is in jeopardy? Is it wrong if the baby is certain to die anyway? Is it wrong if the baby 51% likely to die anyway? Is slavery wrong? Is capital punishment wrong? Are those self-evident moral truths? I dunno. WJM hasn’t given us a tool to tell, other than that if there’s any argument required, it’s not self-evident. Fine, but that leaves us with essentially no self-evident moral truths other than the questions on which we can reach total consensus—for example, torturing children for pleasure is wrong. But what practical use is an objective moral standard if it only applies where everyone already agrees anyway?
PHV has apparently gone into full propaganda mode, not only disinterested in actual debate, but actively obfuscating and misrepresenting the arguments and explanations that have already been repeated several times.
I’m honestly sorry that this discussion has been difficult for you. I would like to suggest to you that you’re a very combative person, and that people can and do disagree in good faith. This is a complex conversation. If you can’t navigate it without personalizing it and accusing those who disagree with you of evil motives, you might consider taking a few hours to decompress. Is your goal here to persuade, or to demonize the opposition?
“Resisting arrest is immoral” is not a self-evidently true moral statement. I can immediately think of scenarios where resisting arrest is the moral thing to do. There are no scenarios where torturing children for personal pleasure could be a good thing to do.
Thank you, that’s a useful addition to the discussion. I ask it because I think there are people who believe that resisting lawful authority is categorically, self-evidently wrong. I can also see people who would think the exact opposite, that it would categorically never be morally wrong to resist the wrongful exercise of lawful authority.Pro Hac Vice_{November 19, 2013
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Brent,
So, your arbiter is better than others’? BASED ON WHAT!? You have nothing AT ALL to base that on (all the while decrying those who say “self-evident”!!!???).
I don’t understand why you’re making this assumption. Isn’t it a matter of plain, empirical fact that I think my beliefs, and therefore my ‘arbiter,’ is better than others’? I would adopt their beliefs if I was incapable of preferring my own, wouldn’t I? Of course I can prefer my own beliefs over others’! I base my preference on the sources of my moral beliefs, which in my opinion are not universal objective standards but common inputs like my upbringing, cultural context, etc. I acknowledge that others are brought to different conclusions, but that does not entail any obligation to regard their beliefs as equal to my own.
Either everyone’s internal arbiter is equal by virtue of being the exact same means of deriving their moral beliefs, or you MUST logically have an external standard by which to judge one’s moral beliefs better than another’s.
You keep using the word “logically,” but I don’t think you’re actually applying any logic here. This is what you’re saying: A. Everyone’s internal arbiter is equal; or B. They are inequal because of some external standard. But this doesn’t actually reflect the real world, or any logical standard. Partly I think the word “equal” in A is tripping you up. I acknowledge that I can’t use objective standards to prove that my “arbiter” is better than anyone else’s. But that does not mean that I consider my “arbiter” to be equal to everyone else’s. Practical example, using our previous hypo: I think to myself, Allan wants to fire Bob because he’s Jewish. I think that’s wrong. Allan thinks that’s right. The key phrase is, I think that’s wrong. The fact that Allan disagrees does not override my moral beliefs. I don’t put his beliefs on an equal footing with my own, because I disagree with them. I have evaluated them and found them wanting, according to my own subjective standards.
Go ahead and say there is no standard. Fine. In that case, B is necessarily entailed by A; everyone’s moral beliefs must be equivalent because you have no standard by which to judge.
That would only be true if an objective standard were the only way to discriminate between arbiters. But it’s not—I can use my own subjective beliefs to evaluate my arbiter against someone else’s.
If you say you judge by your own standard, then you are just misusing the word ‘standard’.
Only if you a priori define “standard” to be “objective standard.” But I really, really don’t want to get bogged down in a war of definitions. Can we leave this one simply as a mutual understanding, without fighting over what “standard” means? You can say that I mean “preference” if you want, I suppose. And if you are judging by your own ‘standard’, and I am judging by my own ‘standard’, and Barry by his own and so on, then you HAVE to be saying that everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent. For what distinction, in that case, would there be??? NONE! This is where I really don’t understand the leap you’re making. Yes, I’m judging by my standard. Yes, you’re judging by your standard. (This seems to be empirically true, or else people wouldn’t disagree over moral truths, no?) But that only means that all moral truths are equivalent if you mean objectively equivalent, and remember that I don’t think there’s any objective standard, so that’s an incoherent statement to me. I judge moral truths through the lens of my own subjective beliefs, and they are not all equivalent in that analysis. In other words, I think this is a fair summary of our discussion—please let me know if I’m wrong. You’re saying that A entails B because without an objective standard, I can’t assess different moral “truths” against one another. I think that means that you’re looking for an objective assessment, though, which I don’t believe is possible. I say that I assess different moral “truths” using my own beliefs as a subjective standard. We agree that my position does not result in any objective evaluation of moral beliefs—I cannot and would not say that my beliefs are objectively better than anyone else’s. But I can and do say they’re better than others’ according to my own lights, and that’s enough for me to act on. (And, again, I think that’s true for everyone, since even objectivists have to admit the possibility of error in their assessment of “objective” standards.)Pro Hac Vice_{November 19, 2013
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PPS: MF seems to misunderstand the warning on the alternatives for enforcing justice: laws, backed by community consensus that refrains from promoting chaotic absurdities and the clan blood feud in defence of its members. A simple, straightforward man who predictably would lash out at someone so uncaring and unfeeling as to insult the appalling and wantonly wicked death of his child is acting by the principles of the blood feud. Specifically, a man must defend his family and its members. I gave the concrete example, not to endorse the blood feud, but to point out that if laws are carelessly undermined, the instinctive alternative WILL emerge. In short, the rhetorical games of the seminar room have real life consequences, in this case again revealing the absurdities implied in denying human dignity and our being under the governing force of OUGHT. And if you doubt that such a loaded question carries that import, there is some Caribbean beach front property for sale in Alberta, Canada, available at special rates for you.kairosfocus_{November 19, 2013
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MF: X is all too real, and his son -- a bit mischievous as ever so many active boys are -- was victimised as described. facts forever riveted in my memory. As is the wail of a neighbour's 5 yo son when he realised that his father would never be coming home again (having been stabbed on the way to work that morning by a delusional mad man for reasons that don't make sense . . . here, not in JA). Now, the issue is, why do we respond as we do as conscious, self-aware, feeling, judging persons, to such events. Knowledge, awareness and judgements are always subjective, as we are . . . subjects. But that gives us no more right to infer that the judgement that such acts are wrong or that the mad man in the second incident has a somewhat diminished (but specifically not nil) responsibility are simply subjective, than we have to infer that the judgement that two incidents appear simultaneous to us is simply subjective and can be dismissed at whim without consequence. (The latter being of course a major concept in the Special Theory of Relativity, a point where the observer implicitly enters the scene. And s/he never leaves.) In short, what is really driving the subjectivism or relativism is not the brute fact of subjectivity. Instead, the driver is the imposition of the a priori assumption of evolutionary materialism or its fellow traveller views, or the spreading influence of that view or its fellows. Such a view, having in it no IS that can ground OUGHT, and being presented wearing the Lab Coat, leads many of us to blindly accept its implications. But such an ideology also implies the utter unreliability of mind and the reduction of insightful, reasoned thought to computation by a processor substrate that -- without empirical warrant for imagining such a leap -- somehow came about and became self-aware by blind chance and mechanical necessity, regardless of the search space challenge imposed by the FSCO/I involved. In short, we have no good empirically grounded reason to accept it. It cannot properly claim to be observationally grounded science. Never mind the imposing presence of the lab coat. Or should that be, The Lab Coat. Likewise -- absent the force of the hard lesson of Nazi Germany, we know that the view drastically undermines the concept of human equality, worth, value and dignity; as say that student of Huxley, H G Wells pointed out so strongly in the opening chapter of War of the worlds, in 1897. Thus, when it is unchecked by externally imposed constraints, it further undermines the concept of equal, quasi-infinite value and dignity that naturally attaches to a human being by reciprocity rooted in our self-awareness and recognition that others are as we are. So then, we have every good reason to challenge this view and its fellow travellers: provide a credible worldview foundational IS that grounds OUGHT, or else be seen as amoral and opening the gates of the city to the chaos-force of nihilism. To which, as a rule, there is simply no answer but to try to distract, undermine and rhetorically attack. Big, red warning flags. So, we come back to intuitions we have excellent reason to trust and the insights they consistently deliver. They tell us of our own worth and that of those we care about. They tell us of our common roots, and thus fundamental equality and worth as persons. So, we understand to view and value neighbour as self. And we see from how we quarrel by invariably appealing to the binding nature of ought, that by common consent, we are morally governed by the force of ought. Which gives us very good reason indeed to hold that we live in a world where ought is grounded and binding. And if that strongly points to common creation by an inherently good God as the best explanation, so be it. Where also, shocking cases like that man X and his son, or even Y and his father point to us that murder, torture of helpless innocents and rape violate the worth and dignity we instinctively recognise in one another without formal proof, and recognise that if such is GENERALLY violated so that it breaks down as a norm, will lead to utter disintegration of the community we all need for survival. (And yes, I am knowingly invoking the CI, being aware of equivalent forms. Evil is recognisable from parasiting off others and exploiting the fact that it is essentially exceptional.) Such, in short, are self-evident. And to demand "proof" apart from the chaotically absurd impact of abandoning or denying such as a community, is itself absurd. Which brings us to your no 4:
You say that you can tell if something is self-evidently true because denying it results in absurdity. You also hold that it is self-evidently true that it is evil to torture an infant for personal pleasure. What absurdity results from holding it is not evil to torture an infant for personal pleasure?
Do you see how this has been answered -- many times in fact -- from the absurdity of undermining canons of human dignity and the duty of justice, especially to innocent life? Do you also see how the presumption of the superiority of dismissive skepticism also tends ever so strongly to lead us astray? KF PS: Note also, that I have answered you on the subject of the self evidence of the parallel lines axiom, in the other thread, here on. In a nutshell, the denial of the premise leads to a shifting of the subject from a plane space to something else. In a plane space the postulate holds, necessarily holds and will lead to absurdity if violated. Spaces where it does not, are not plane spaces. (This can be extended to 3-d spaces by using i, j and k as three-fold roots of unity that give a 3-d Cartesian vector space. And yes that is part of why I used j as sqrt - 1. Resort to such is needed to clarify just what I mean by the type of space. Of course, whether our world in the large is such a space is doubtful, but that is besides the point. On the small, it is at least approximately Euclidean, and that opens the door to the insights.)kairosfocus_{November 19, 2013
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KF #10 I have no idea who X is. But if his child was tortured to death for pleasure then I absolutely condemn the action. It is an awful, awful thing way beyond my experience. I don't think any of us disagree that such a thing is terribly wrong. But I thought we were having a philosophical debate about the justification and meaning of that judgement which (we all agree on). I don't suppose any of our arguments here (yours or mine) make any difference to that poor man. You seem to think that holding my philosophical position on ethics would justify this man in being violent to me. This is a nice example of how ideology can lead to justifying violence.Mark Frank_{November 19, 2013
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As far as I can see Barry his still failed to respond to my repeated challenge in #4 (KF for some reason thinks it is a “cute rhetorical trick” but that does not answer the question). Now I know how easy it is not to notice challenges amongst all the many comments that are posted so I will repeat it. And take the opportunity to explain it a bit more. Barry and WJM amongst others have stressed that it is self-evidently true that it is evil to torture an infant for personal pleasure and therefore morality is objective. Now I think we all agree that is obviously true that it is evil to torture an infant for personal pleasure. But things can be obviously true and subjective e.g. dog shit smells bad, Charlie Chaplin is funny, the Mona Lisa is a beautiful picture. When challenged to ask how we can tell the difference between self-evidently true and obviously true Barry was quite specific – if you deny something is self-evidently true then it leads to absurdity. All I want to know is what absurdity results from holding it is not evil to torture an infant for personal pleasure? I have never seen an answer to this question. I am beginning to wonder if I ever will.Mark Frank_{November 18, 2013
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F/N: Before going back to sleep,one has a perfect right to resist arrest when it is the 4 am break down the door attack of the torture police. And if enough had done so in good time, Nazi Germany, Stalin's Russia etc would have been impossible. But then, that is part of why such make sure the public are disarmed (save for kitchen knives and broom sticks . . . ), confused, divided and intimidated first. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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No, G2, It is a civilisation being undermined through the amoral absurdities of evolutionary materialism and its fellow travellers again let loose. This blog, among other fora, is a place where the ideological contest for the survival of our civilisation is being carried out. Your lack of situation awareness, rude and silly rhetorical games and flippancy all show signs of the underlying problem. (And BTW, all the way up to comment 10, it is blatant that you had no excuse to misread or twist the situation, which I made clear is real world up to concealed names.) Let me again remind you and your ilk of Plato's grim, history-backed, paid- for- in- blood, warning in The Laws, Bk X. Here he is, speaking in the voice of the Athenian Stranger, ghost of Socrates hovering just to the right:
Ath. . . . [[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [[i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order-earth, and sun, and moon, and stars-they have been created by means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain affinities among them-of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of opposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. [[In short, evolutionary materialism premised on chance plus necessity acting without intelligent guidance on primordial matter is hardly a new or a primarily "scientific" view! Notice also, the trichotomy of causal factors: (a) chance/accident, (b) mechanical necessity of nature, (c) art or intelligent design and direction.] . . . . [[Thus, they hold that t]he Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [[Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [[ Evolutionary materialism leads to the promotion of amorality], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [[Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles; cf. dramatisation here], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others [[such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless tyranny], and not in legal subjection to them.
My dad used to remind me of the old saying that experience is a very good teacher, albeit his fees are very dear. Alas for fools, they will learn from none other. But subsequently, I have learned that there is a yet worse class of fools who refuse to learn from experience, whether personal or that institutionalised as sound and sensible history. (And the silly notion that history is nothing but the propaganda of the victors, is one of the strongest signs of what has gone wrong.) It is Marx of all people who warned that History repeats itself twice, the first time as tragedy, the next as farce. We have passed farce and are headed for blatant absurdity, folly and it looks like collective suicide through the march of folly. I only hope we can wake up and turn back before it is bloodily too late. Blood, rivers of blood, is the most awful price of all. One, I shrink from with revulsion and outright horror. (And right now, unless things change real soon, it looks like the Mullahs are setting about collecting on the rent in blood that is fast becoming past due.) KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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5for: Pardon, spell that blood feud revenge and uprisings of the oppressed vs justice expressed in sound law and credible -- legitimate -- institutions, reflect on concrete reality [similar to the case I have cited], then look at the debates over what justice is in the Plato dialogues with a fresh eye, and you will see that your silly theory is rooted in underlying sound intuition and rational principles leading to institutionalisation of the underlying logic. Let me bring this back to focus by citing again how Locke reasoned at the pivotal point where he cited Hooker in Ch 2 sec 5 of his second essay on civil gov't, to ground what would become modern liberty and democracy:
. . . if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men . . . my desire, therefore, to be loved of my equals in Nature, as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward fully the like affection. From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant . . . [[Hooker then continues, citing Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 8:] as namely, That because we would take no harm, we must therefore do none; That since we would not be in any thing extremely dealt with, we must ourselves avoid all extremity in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong we are utterly to abstain, with such-like . . . ] [[Eccl. Polity,preface, Bk I, "ch." 8, p.80]
These principles and premises are the root of justice systems, insofar as they bear moral legitimacy. The problem we face is that in our time, thanks to the dressing up of the ancient chaos-force of evolutionary materialism in the lab coat, elites and fellow travellers have been busily digging away at the foundations of the dam that restrains the barbarism of the clan blood feud. It is time to wake up and realise what can ever so easily be unleashed if the dam should fail. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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KF: Get a grip. Its a blog.Graham2_{November 18, 2013
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G2, with all due respect, stop the silly rhetorical word games, take a time out and do some serious thinking. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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AF: You too? FYI, objecting to a specific real life case of pedophile kidnapping, rape, torture and murder that happens to be male homosexual -- girls do not leave semen deposits, etc.[as in, they don't have the equipment to do so . . . ] -- is not to exhibit a presumed IRRATIONAL fear of homosexuality. [I could have used a female case of kidnap- rape- murder, but I only know of such by news, the personal acquaintance with the now murdered boy and his still grieving father deprived of justice are an important part of the matter. Remember, this is reality here of a nightmare that started when a young boy did not report home from school and could not be found . . . , not some concocted story.] Just so, objecting to intentional destruction of the foundational morally tinged institution of civilisation (marriage and the family) under false colours of equality -- and with a patent intent onwards to impose unjust law over principled conscience and freedom of worship an integral part of the game plan -- is not an IRRATIONAL fear. No, I am giving a duly weighted threat assessment and a response that says: wake up from silly seminar room pipe dream games and face reality in the face of X and his remaining sons, and frankly the majority of the community who would back X to the hilt, literally. KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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KF: I will retract my first objection: I understood that you were threatening violence, now I see you were warning of violence. It was so badly worded, it was hard to tell. The remaining 2 points remain. Barry Arrington was the first to raise the issue (#52 in the previous OP). Why didnt you object then ? The rest of your screed is incoherent.Graham2_{November 18, 2013
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G2: Stop being a silly sophomoric rhetorical game-player. I gave you and your ilk a dose of reality. Sad, painful concrete reality. Reality you are trying to dodge and divert attention from. You see, the tortured, raped, murdered -- as in school sock in the mouth causing asphyxiation -- case for me is not theoretical. I know a man who lost his young son in just this way to it looks like a gang of pedophile predators, who kidnapped him near the aqueduct that runs on the back side of my uni campus, took him up along the bushy right of way and, had their way with him, leaving him dead. I knew the boy and his father. I am simply telling you that if you try your nice seminar room clever absurdities in the presence of a simple, straightforward, and very physical man like X, he is -- for cause -- going to go for you. And, knowing the man, even in his must be seventies now, he is going to do serious damage before anyone could pull him off. And frankly, if you were unwise enough to do the sort of silliness in that man's presence, you would deserve the physical cost. And in my homeland, there is not a police sergeant, or magistrate who would do anything more than a wrist-slap in such a case. Do you understand that one of the functions of justice and law is to appropriately channel deep moral intuitions about the need to pay for wrong and harm done and the implications of clan blood feuds [especially in defense of the clan's women and children], by interposing justice as principle and process leading to appropriate degree of punishment? Which needs to be supported by the people as a whole, in order to obtain and preserve legitimacy? Do you realise that by undermining that process through silly seminar room games, you are destroying that consensus and again unleashing that blood feud process, including settling matters of insult and outrage by physical exchange of blows? In short, I am pointing to a deeper level of the absurdities and chaos implicit in those silly games. And in your sophomoric gotcha attempt above, you utterly revealed the absurdity and failure of situation awareness that mark you and ilk as out of contact with reality. Wake up, man! KFkairosfocus_{November 18, 2013
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Let's note the litany of straw man diversions that PHV is attempting:
A. Everyone has their own moral beliefs. B. Everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent. A is not, and does not logically entail, B. I hold to A, but not B.
Nobody claimed that "everyone's moral beliefs are equivalent" because everyone has their own moral beliefs.
Think about WJM’s original post–if you’re a relativist, you’re on the side of NAZIS! Sensationalist or “gotcha” hypos are bad hypos. Bad facts make bad law.
Only, that wasn't my argument. My argument was that moral relativism necessarily leads to that conclusion, not that those who claim to be moral relativists actually believe the Nazis were behaving morally. What has been said, repeatedly, is that one cannot rationally justify certain beliefs and/or reactions and/or acts from the premise that morality is entirely subjective in nature. This is a relatively trivial observation; not every conclusion can be extracted from every premise. Mutually exclusive and contradictory premises will likely lead to very different conclusions, inferred beliefs and worldviews that come with different sets of reactions to events. It is also a trivial observation that humans often hold irrational and logically irreconcilable beliefs. Because one believes that morality is relative doesn't necessarily mean they accept that what the Nazis did was good; it just means that if they restricted their beliefs to what was logically extractable from their premise, that is what they would have to accept.
I think it’s more useful to use hypos that cover cases where people disagree over what might be a “self-evident” moral principle.
Here PHV is trying to broaden and water down the meaning and usefulness of identifying self-evidently true moral statements as if someone claimed that every or most moral claims are supposed to be self-evidently true. Note his trivializing use of "self-evident" in this question:
Whether or not it’s a good idea, is it self-evidently morally wrong to resist arrest?
The question is preceded by a lengthy set-up description of the events and situation, ostensibly offered up so we could make a better decision about whether or not the statement is self-evidently true. PHV has had this explained to him/her several times - if you need evidence and argument and additional information to make a decision about the moral truth of a statement, it is by definition not a self-evidently true moral statement. PHV has apparently gone into full propaganda mode, not only disinterested in actual debate, but actively obfuscating and misrepresenting the arguments and explanations that have already been repeated several times. "Resisting arrest is immoral" is not a self-evidently true moral statement. I can immediately think of scenarios where resisting arrest is the moral thing to do. There are no scenarios where torturing children for personal pleasure could be a good thing to do.William J Murray_{November 18, 2013
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PHV, From the other thread:
Just one quick note, because I have poor impulse control:
Once again, these are two different statements: A. Everyone has their own moral beliefs. B. Everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent. A is not, and does not logically entail, B. I hold to A, but not B.

If you don’t believe everyone’s moral beliefs are equivalent, then you necessarily need an arbiter.
Yes!
You are only left with your “arbiter within”, though, just like me and everyone else.
Yes!
So, yes, you must believe everyone’s moral beliefs are either equivalent (because our “arbiters” are equal), or there actually is a real objective right or wrong.
No! Why do you think this? What’s the link you’re relying on? Our arbiters aren’t equal. I think my beliefs are better than other peoples’. This is almost a tautology–if I thought their beliefs were better than mine, I’d adopt them.
Oh boy! So, your arbiter is better than others'? BASED ON WHAT!? You have nothing AT ALL to base that on (all the while decrying those who say "self-evident"!!!???). Either everyone's internal arbiter is equal by virtue of being the exact same means of deriving their moral beliefs, or you MUST logically have an external standard by which to judge one's moral beliefs better than another's. Go ahead and say there is no standard. Fine. In that case, B is necessarily entailed by A; everyone's moral beliefs must be equivalent because you have no standard by which to judge. If you say you judge by your own standard, then you are just misusing the word 'standard'. And if you are judging by your own 'standard', and I am judging by my own 'standard', and Barry by his own and so on, then you HAVE to be saying that everyone's moral beliefs are equivalent. For what distinction, in that case, would there be??? NONE! On your professed understanding, B is either necessarily entailed by A, or you invalidate your position by needing a standard to keep B distinct from A.Brent_{November 18, 2013
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Barry: Are you going to ignore KF @10 ?Graham2_{November 18, 2013
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