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L&FP 40: Thoughts on [neo-?] Reidian Common Sense Realism

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We live in a civilisation haunted by doubt and by hyperskepticism. One, where skepticism is deemed a virtue, inviting hyper forms in as champions of intellect. The result has gradually led to selective hyperskepticism that often uncritically takes the word of champions or publicists for Big-S Science, while doubting well founded but unfashionable analyses or even self-evident truths.

H’mm, just in case someone is unclear about or doubts that Self-Evident Truths exist, here is one . . . with an extra one for good measure:

(Of course, I also have argued that there are self-evident truths regarding duty; particularly, inescapable first duties of reason that actually govern responsible reason, argument and discussion, starting with duties to truth, right reason, warrant and wider prudence, etc. Thus, that there are MORAL SETs. For, example, not even the most ardent objector can avoid appealing to these principles to try to give his arguments rhetorical/persuasive traction. Inescapable, so true and self-evident. I just note that for the moment.)

How, then, can we exorcise the ghosts of acid doubt and restore a better balance regarding knowledge claims?

I think, Thomas Reid and other champions of “[refined] common sense” have some sound counsel. That is, I wish to champion a principle of responsible, common sense guided credulity:

PRINCIPLE OF “MODERATE” CREDULITY: It makes good sense to accept that our conscious self-awareness, sense of rational, responsible freedom (with first duties of reason) — “common sense,” so-called, and sense of being embodied as creatures in an objectively real physical world are generally warranted though they may err or have limitations or oddities in detail

Magenta (used in CMYK printing), violet and purple. Notice, Magenta seems a modified pinkish Red, Violet a modified Blue, Purple a reddened modified Blue

A case in point helps to clarify. Here, colour vision. There are two related but somehow distinct colours, violet and purple. The former is spectral [i.e. a “pure” colour coming from certain wavelengths of light], the latter is not. [Generally, purple is seen as a mix of red and blue, e.g. the Line of Purples on the CIE tongue of colour framework.] Why, then, the similarity, despite the difference?

The answer turns out to depend on our colour sensors and onward processing in our eyes and visual system. Simplifying, it turns out that our Red response system has a secondary peak towards the high frequency end of the visible spectrum, near Blue:

Colour response of our visual system, as modelled. Notice the secondary peak for “Red”
Blue Jeans are Indigo

The result is that at the Blue, short wavelength end, we distinguish Blue-Green [e.g. Cyan], Blue, Indigo [cf. dark Blue Jeans], Violet. And the relationship with Purple becomes obvious, Purple superposes Red and Blue colours, which is typically going to be significantly redder than Violet.

So, we see here how our perception of colours is shaped by our embodiment and specifics of our bodily tissues and cells, but corresponds to objective phenomena. Indeed, the colour screen you are most likely using to view this on, works by superposing tiny pixels with Red, Green and Blue. If you were to print off on a modern colour printer, it will most likely blend dots of Cyan, Magenta, Yellow and Black, with the paper providing White.

I add, on metamerism, so we can see how two closely similar colours can be composed in quite distinct ways:

Here we see two ways to a brassy amberish colour. One is spectral, with a suitably low light level that excites our LMS cones in a certain pattern. The other uses Red and Green light sources that yields a similar stimulation. So, a simple look at the objects might not tell the difference. This is of course part of how RGB displays work [HT Wikipedia]

There is no good reason to airily sweep such away as being beyond some ugly, impassable gulch between what we can access internally through consciousness and a dubious external world of appearances. That is why we can take the principle that yes, we may err on particular points or details but on the whole there is no good reason to dismiss our conscious awareness — we symbolise C:( ) — and what it immediately presents, the self [= I] embedded in the world [We].

Let us symbolise:

C:(I UNION We)

So, we notice that it is our consciousness that carries everything else and instantly presents us with our sense of ourselves embedded in the world beyond our bodies. Our bodies, of course, are part of the physical world. Where, our reasonings are part of that self-awareness and are inextricably entangled with perceptions and language describing what we are aware of and perceive. The union is used as our bodies are embedded in the world and we are somehow present within it.

I have often pointed to Eng Derek Smith’s two-tier controller, cybernetic loop model as a context for discussing how that can be, esp. with quantum influence:

The Eng Derek Smith Cybernetic Model

In this light, the Plato’s Cave type shadow-show world of grand doubts or delusions can be set aside as self-defeating:

Plato’s Cave of shadow shows projected before life-long prisoners and confused for reality. Once the concept of general delusion is introduced, it raises the question of an infinite regress of delusions. The sensible response is to see that this should lead us to doubt the doubter and insist that our senses be viewed as generally reliable unless they are specifically shown defective. (Source: University of Fort Hare, SA, Phil. Dept.)

For, there is no natural firewall, so to give a general challenge to our consciousness, self awareness, sense of the self or perception of the world is to undermine the whole process. That is as opposed to having errors in detail or to recognising processes and limitations of sensing, neural network computation etc and the quantum physical substructure associated with that awareness. As, Violet vs Purple indicates.

In short, the point is to recognise limitations without falling into hyperskepticism or reductionism. This is of course a part of the old philosophical problem of the one and the many. In a sense, there is nothing new under the Sun.

In this context, I find Michael Davidson helpful as he discusses what he terms Reid’s Razor, in effect a manifesto of defeasible but heuristically generally effective common good sense reasoning:

[Reidian Common good sense as definition and razor, 1785:] “that degree of judgement which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business”

Davidson shrewdly points out, how the Razor shaves:

Take a philosophical or scientific principle that is being applied to a particular situation: ask yourself whether you would be able to converse rationally and transact business with that person assuming that principle governed the situation or persons involved. If not dismiss the principle as erroneous or at least deeply suspicious. For example, suppose someone proposes that things-as-they-appear-to-be are not things-as-they-really-are. I do not think I would buy a used car from this man.

That seems a fair enough test of habitual adherence to first duties of reason — or otherwise. Y’know: to truth, right reason, prudence, sound conscience, neighbour, fairness and justice, etc.

In that context, he abstracts from Thomas Reid, a list of defeatable, default rules of thumb for credulity vs skepticism:

REID’S RULES OF COMMON SENSE REALISM

1) Everything of which I am conscious really exists [–> at minimum as an object of conscious awareness, and often as a particular or abstract entity, the presumption is, if I perceive a world with entities, it is by and large real]
2) The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person.
3) Events that I clearly remember really did happen.
4) Our personal identity and continued existence extends as far back in time as we remember anything clearly.
5) Those things that we clearly perceive by our senses really exist and really are what we perceive them to be.
6) We have some power over our actions and over the decisions of our will.
7) The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not deceptive.
8) There is life and thought in our fellow-men with whom we converse.
9) Certain features of the face, tones of voice, and physical gestures indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind.
10) A certain respect should be accorded to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
11) For many outcomes that will depend on the will of man, there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.
12) In the phenomena of Nature, what happens will probably be like what has happened in similar circumstances.

Davidson comments:

According to Reid, anyone who doubts these principles will be incapable of rational discourse and those philosophers who profess to doubt them cannot do so sincerely and consistently. Each of these principles, if denied, can be turned back on the denier. For example, although it is not possible to justify the validity of memory (3) without reference to premises that rest on memory, to dispense with memory as usually unreliable is just not philosophically possible. Reid qualifies some of these principles as not applying in all cases, or as the assumptions that we presume to hold when we converse, which may be contradicted by subsequent experience. For instance with regard to (10) Reid believes that most men are more apt to over-rate testimony and authority than to under-rate them; which suggests to Reid that this principle retains some force even when it could be replaced by reasoning.

I endorse Reid’s principles as normally true and what we must assume to be true to engage in argument and discussion. But, as Reid acknowledges, not all may be true all the time. I thus see Reid’s principles as epistemological rather than metaphysical. Psychologists might point to such things as optical illusions, false memory, attentional blink, hallucinations and various other interesting phenomena which might throw some doubt over some of Reid’s assertions. But these are nonessential modifiers that if entertained as falsifications of these principles would lead to the collapse of all knowledge. Very few philosophers have not acknowledged that the senses can deceive us or that reason is fallible, but to say the senses consistently deceive or that reason is impotent is too big a sacrifice. That the senses can deceive and reason is fallible is good reason to be cautious in our conclusions but not a good reason to dispense with observation and reason all together.

That seems to me to be a useful backgrounder and 101, if not quite a Manifesto. I think it deserves a place in the ongoing UD series on Logic and First Principles of Reason. END

PS: It seems helpful to append on how on Opponent Processes, sensors and signal processing can use LMS sensors to generate four colour channels — Red, Yellow, Green, Blue — via suitably scaled subtraction:

Thus, we can see economising of types of sensors, enhancing resolution by keeping effective pixels in only three types and gaining enhanced colour sensitivity.

U/D Apr 17: For completeness, I add a view of the Munsell, colour spindle type colour model with gradation from Black to White as level, hue on a wheel model and saturation as a radius vector:

Where, we may envision one branch, at the hue that involves the classic artist’s earth pigment colour, Yellow-Ochre:

Further to such, observe the classic 1931 CIE tongue of colour model, with the line of purples bridging blue/violet and red along the spectrum locus arc, also with various colour gamuts for display or printing systems marked:

Such an approach, further allows us to understand how the visual system, with limitations and possibilities for error, exhibits high quality design giving us a veridical perception of an important dimension of the world, colours tied to chemical composition, chemical-physical interactions and linked quantum processes in a key octave of the electromagnetic spectrum associated with energy transitions of 1.65 – 3.10 eV, a bit short of the damaging actinic range starting with UV. Illustrating:

It seems further advisable to provide an overview of the visual system:

Such then allows us to use Reidian Common Sense to find safe sailing between the Charybdis of poor design fallacies and the Scylla of imagining ourselves into grand doubt/grand delusion on alleged ugly gulches regarding ourselves as conscious, minded, conscience guided, responsible, rational significantly free creatures credibly embodied and participating in a common physical world. (See here on the Mythological reference.)

Comments
That was good - I read the whole thing. Good commentary.
We evaluate a person’s beliefs (more exactly, her believings) as warranted, or justified, or rational, or reasonable, contrasting them with beliefs that are unwarranted, unjustified, irrational, unreasonable. The evidentialist objector to theistic belief, for example, claims that a theist who believes in God without evidence or argument is so far forth unwarranted and unjustified in that belief; he offers a negative appraisal of the belief or its holder.
Warranted, to me, is more like "reasonable" and somewhat different than "justified". I'd put "reasonable" on the softest side and something like "validated" or "verified" on the hard side (actually "proven" is the hardest in that scale). Plantinga talks of the "evidentialist". That's the person saying "there's no evidence". In discussions about God, this almost always resolves into someone asking for physical, scientific-based, observed evidence. But if the question is "warranted", then as said - is atheism in any way a reasonable position to hold? Theism is supported by multiple arguments for the existence of God. Clearly, theism is a reasonable position. In light of that, the denial of a reasonable position (or calling it unreasonable) is unwarranted.Silver Asiatic
April 17, 2021
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I suspect this thread will die so I will use it on going to help understand the term Kf uses constantly, namely “warrant.” So feel free to ignore these posts. From the article by Plantiga
whatever precisely warrant is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. (Difference between knowledge and true belief not explained) More specifically, my topic is contemporary views of warrant. I shall begin by looking briefly at the twentieth-century received tradition with respect to warrant; but first, how shall we initially pin down, or locate, or characterize this property or quantity I propose to discuss? (There seems to be a difference in quality as well as quantity that comprise a warrant) It is that which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief, of course; but note also that there is obviously something normative or evaluative about warrant. To attribute warrant to a belief is to appraise that belief, and to appraise it favorably; and we use such terms as ‘warranted’, ‘justification’, ‘justified’, and the like as “terms of epistemic appraisal.”1 To say that a belief is warranted or justified for a person is to evaluate it or him (or both) positively; his holding that belief in his circumstances is right, or proper, or acceptable, or approvable, or up to standard. (it seems warrant applies to all of our beliefs and is used to assess which are valid or more likely valid by using some process that evaluates the belief. We frequently hear the comment, in my opinion this is so. But the real question is do we have a good basis for that opinion or do we have a valid warrant for that opinion) whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. More specifically, my topic is contemporary views of warrant. I shall begin by looking briefly at the twentieth-century received tradition with respect to warrant; but first, how shall we initially pin down, or locate, or characterize this property or quantity I propose to discuss? (sounds like how do we evaluate the level of the warrant to justify the belief or opinion) It is that which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief, of course; but note also that there is obviously something normative or evaluative about warrant. To attribute warrant to a belief is to appraise that belief, and to appraise it favorably; and we use such terms as ‘warranted’, ‘justification’, ‘justified’, and the like as “terms of epistemic appraisal.”1 To say that a belief is warranted or justified for a person is to evaluate it or him (or both) positively; his holding that belief in his circumstances is right, or proper, or acceptable, or approvable, or up to standard. We evaluate a person's beliefs (more exactly, her believings) as warranted, or justified, or rational, or reasonable, contrasting them with beliefs that are unwarranted, unjustified, irrational, unreasonable. The evidentialist objector to theistic belief, for example, claims that a theist who believes in God without evidence or argument is so far forth unwarranted and unjustified in that belief; he offers a negative appraisal of the belief or its holder. (Perhaps he claims that in believing in God in that way she is flouting some duty, or (more charitably) is suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction, or (still more modestly) that the module of our cognitive establishment that issues in theistic belief is not aimed at truth but at something else.) (is this being turned around on the atheist who traditionally claimed that beliefs in God were unwarranted because they were just superstitious while today the belief there is no God is really the unwarranted belief and the atheist is the superstitious one) We evaluate a person's beliefs (more exactly, her believings) as warranted, or justified, or rational, or reasonable, contrasting them with beliefs that are unwarranted, unjustified, irrational, unreasonable. The evidentialist objector to theistic belief, for example, claims that a theist who believes in God without evidence or argument is so far forth unwarranted and unjustified in that belief; he offers a negative appraisal of the belief or its holder. (Perhaps he claims that in believing in God in that way she is flouting some duty, or (more charitably) is suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction, or (still more modestly) that the module of our cognitive establishment that issues in theistic belief is not aimed at truth but at something else.)
I’m trying to use Kf’s frequently used term to assess just what an opinion means. Is it a warranted opinion or not? My guess is that a lot of people who say my opinion is just as good as yours don’t want the scrutiny implied by the concept of warrant. Actually some opinions are more valid than others. The term “warrant” is the evaluation of that opinion or belief. So is belief in a naturalistic system of evolution unwarranted? That is really turning the tables on a lot of people who thrived on making this claim against those who believed in ID or its equivalent throughout history. Is the term “warrant” best replaced by the term “justified.?”jerry
April 17, 2021
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EDTA, glad that that phrasing by SA helped. My own summary is the denial of "Error Exists" automatically means -- note, means not "states" -- that it is an error to assert "Error Exists." So, "Error Exists" cannot be effectively denied as the attempt confirms that indeed error exists. It is undeniably, inescapably, self-evidently true. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2021
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WJM, enough has been said and one current side tracked thread is enough. There is no need whatsoever to resort to schemes of thought that imply or assume or invite inference of the non veridicality of our embodiment and participation in our common world, thus of our self-awareness and consciousness. Down that road lies chaotic undermining of rationality in general, i.e. absurdity. KFkairosfocus
April 17, 2021
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KF, You're like a materialist holding onto materialism against conclusive evidence to the contrary, or a Darwinist insisting on unguided evolution against conclusive evidence to the contrary. The way you believe all of what you have written above is instantiated and occurs - specifically, that we are experiencing states of things that exist in and of themselves (1) outside of our experience and (2) prior to our experience of them - has been conclusively demonstrated false. I understand that you have probably spent a lifetime constructing your model about what is going on, and it seems obvious to you that it is only through your model that we can be rational beings well-guarded against delusion. That model represents a huge investment of time and commitment, a big portion of self-identity and confidence. It's obviously difficult to let go of such a worldview or to even consider that it might be wrong. Unfortunately for you, science has incontrovertible evidence to the contrary: things we experience do not have innate states or qualities outside of that experience. This is why so many quantum physicists have stated that consciousness is fundamental to reality, and reality cannot be divorced from our conscious observation/experience/measurement of it. Reality - whatever it is - resides in experience, not in things outside of experience causing the experience. This is actually good news because we do not have to rely on rube goldberg contraptions we hope bring a high-fidelity approximation of reality into our experience. Our experiences are the reality itself.William J Murray
April 17, 2021
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Addedkairosfocus
April 17, 2021
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WJM (& attn Jerry), it seems that part of the issue is causation. That tips the balance in favour of a further addition to OP on the visual system as a case study of embodiment and participation in the physical world, drawing on the properties of a key octave of the EM spectrum i/l/o the photochemistry just short of damaging actinic UV etc bands. Where, on a related issue, our oxygen rich, biosphere-influenced [terraformed] atmosphere filters out much of that destructive band. In that context, physical-chemical cause-effect patterns, complex functional structures manifesting high quality design and linked signal processing in the visual system give us high confidence in the veridicality of the vision system and sense of sight as successfully informing us of the world we live in. Confidently, per Reidian common sense, we acknowledge that there is a world well warranted as objective, independent of our own individual and collective minds, and we may responsibly accept that that world [showing cosmological fine tuning and high quality complex design in the world of life including ours] reflects the design and sustaining work of the root mind, the root of reality. KFkairosfocus
April 16, 2021
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F/N: I have further added on light, the visual spectrum, colour spindle models and the fitness for purpose of our visual system informed by actinic radiation effects. This is relevant to further understanding the subtle, high quality design and veridically oriented proper function of our visual system towards a Reidian safe passage between poor design fallacies and ugly gulch despair of the veridicality of our common world. KFkairosfocus
April 16, 2021
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It's just more of your do-goodery. Remember, it's an intelligent design blog. We should discuss the creationist ideas, that are basic to the logic of intelligent design theory. Creationist conceptual scheme of reality. 1. Creator / chooses / spiritual / subjective 2. Creation / chosen / material / objective Emotions, personal character, feelings, the soul, the spirit, God all belong in category 1. They can only be identified with a chosen opinion. The physical universe, fantasy, concepts, language, mathematics, they all belong in category number 2. A fact is obtained by evidence of a creation, forcing to produce a one to one corresponding model of it, in the mind. Evolutionists generally use a different conceptual scheme of reality. 1. Material / Objective 2. See 1 Which is why evolutionists generally lack morality, a good judgement. They have simply thrown out that entire category. That lack of good personal judgement, may then lead to them botching up objective issues as well. That their science is taken over by prejudices working behind the scenes of their argumentation, because they have no clue about how to prime their emotions for honesty. Also their science about decisionmaking processes is completely absent.mohammadnursyamsu
April 16, 2021
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SA @ 45, >The statement: “Error exists” is necessarily true. Obviously, to say it is false is to confirm that error exists. That made it clear. Thanks for the rephrasing.EDTA
April 16, 2021
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It's amazing that we live in a time where idealism of some sort has been scientifically proved, and materialism has been scientifically disproved. Who would have even thought that was a possibility?William J Murray
April 16, 2021
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When your philosophy of what a well-warranted worldview requires that which has been demonstrated to not exist (the causation of experience by specified states existing independent of observation/measurement), it's time to figure out a "well-warranted" worldview that takes that into account. Or, it's time to change the "well-warranted" playbook. External-of-mind reality has been disproved. Time to put on our big-boy pants and move on.William J Murray
April 16, 2021
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Jerry, the Gifford Lectures are world famous, for cause. KFkairosfocus
April 16, 2021
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F/N: Plantinga's summary of a multi-volume discussion, offered for record:
The question is as old as Plato's Theaetetus: what is it that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief? What further quality or quantity must a true belief have, if it is to constitute knowledge? This is one of the main questions of epistemology. (No doubt that is why it is called 'theory of knowledge'.) Along with nearly all subsequent thinkers, Plato takes it for granted that knowledge is at least true belief: you know a proposition p only if you believe it, and only if it is true. But Plato goes on to point out that true belief, while necessary for knowledge, is clearly not sufficient: it is entirely possible to believe something that is true without knowing it . . . [Skipping over internalism vs externalism, Gettier, blue vs grue or bleen etc etc] Suppose we use the term 'warrant' to denote that further quality or quantity (perhaps it comes in degrees), whatever precisely it may be, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Then our question (the subject of WPF): what is warrant? My suggestion (WPF, chapters 1 and 2) begins with the idea that a belief has warrant only if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly, subject to no disorder or dysfunction—construed as including absence of impedance as well as pathology. The notion of proper function is fundamental to our central ways of thinking about knowledge. But that notion is inextricably bound with another: that of a design plan.37 Human beings and their organs are so constructed that there is a way they should work, a way they are supposed to work, a way they work when they work right; this is the way they work when there is no malfunction . . . We needn't initially take the notions of design plan and way in which a thing is supposed to work to entail conscious design or purpose . . . Accordingly, the first element in our conception of warrant (so I say) is that a belief has warrant for someone only if her faculties are functioning properly, are subject to no dysfunction, in producing that belief.39 But that's not enough. Many systems of your body, obviously, are designed to work in a certain kind of environment . . . . this is still not enough. It is clearly possible that a belief be produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly in an environment for which they were designed, but nonetheless lack warrant; the above two conditions are not sufficient. We think that the purpose or function of our belief-producing faculties is to furnish us with true (or verisimilitudinous) belief. As we saw above in connection with the F&M complaint [= Freud and Marx], however, it is clearly possible that the purpose or function of some belief-producing faculties or mechanisms is the production of beliefs with some other virtue—perhaps that of enabling us to get along in this cold, cruel, threatening world, or of enabling us to survive a dangerous situation or a life-threatening disease. So we must add that the belief in question is produced by cognitive faculties such that the purpose of those faculties is that of producing true belief. More exactly, we must add that the portion of the design plan governing the production of the belief in question is aimed at the production of true belief (rather than survival, or psychological comfort, or the possibility of loyalty, or something else) . . . . what must be added is that the design plan in question is a good one, one that is successfully aimed at truth, one such that there is a high (objective) probability that a belief produced according to that plan will be true (or nearly true). Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment [both macro and micro . . . ] that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. We must add, furthermore, that when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the firmness with which S holds it. This is intended as an account of the central core of our concept of warrant; there is a penumbral area surrounding the central core where there are many analogical extensions of that central core; and beyond the penumbral area, still another belt of vagueness and imprecision, a host of possible cases and circumstances where there is really no answer to the question whether a given case is or isn't a case of warrant.41 [Warranted Christian Belief (NY/Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp 153 ff. See onward, Warrant, the Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function; also, by Plantinga.]
This is excerpt, there is a multivolume discussion engaging all sorts of factors and issues at world class level, from Plato et al forward. Along the way for instance, Thomas Reid's common sense puts in an appearance including why credible testimony and reasonable authorities are valid sources of adequately warranted knowledge. It should be obvious that I am not going all the way with truthful belief, given that particularly in science, there is room for possible error. That is why I have spoken of warranted, credibly true [thus, reliable] belief. Such soft form, weak sense knowledge can be defeated, but the burden to provide the defeat rests on the objector. There is no presumption that there is a hyperskeptic's veto. And yes, this may be derided as long, complex, a cut-paste, TLDR etc etc. At this point, if you are so disinclined to recognise a responsible answer on a significant technical subject for what it is, offered in the teeth of a fairly dismissive and frankly condescending objection [is is reasonable to suggest, given track record, that I would use a fairly unusual term on a technical matter without very good reason?], I cannot help you further. For record, KFkairosfocus
April 16, 2021
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VL
it’s disrespectful and non-productive to tell someone “You don’t really mean that, you mean this.”
You misunderstood what I said and you're saying it was disrespectful (?). Eliminative materialism is a distinct idea. It means something. It is an idea that carries consequences. When a person professes the belief in that, but then denies the consequences there is a problem. It is not disrespectful to correct someone when they're mistaken. Just because someone has a personal opinion, does not mean that we have to accept that opinion as being correct. If the person can defend the opinion, then that's what dialogue is all about. I accept Jerry's warning that certain discussions are, as you say, "non-productive". If there is not an attempt to make one's views clear, accept the consequences of one's views, or attempt to understand the issues (or what others are saying), then that's non-productive. If we saw, for example, someone admitting that the ID inference stands unrefuted, but will not accept the consequences of that admission., then that needs to be corrected. If a person does not accept the correction, and at the same time has no further argument by which to defend his view -- then that's just being obstinate.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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I just want an acknowledgement after all these years that there is a certain segment of the atheist/materialist/progressive/statist tribe that just comes here to oppose ID. They have nothing to offer by way of new ideas or insightful thinking or anything other than stale tribal narratives. Hostility to Christianity. We get it already. Not holding my breath. Andrewasauber
April 16, 2021
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. JVL,
We are all looking at the same physical evidence.
Your issue is not about physical evidence. It is the blatant double-standard you apply to that evidence, and then refuse to address it.Upright BiPed
April 16, 2021
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I do like to fully understand what ID’s position is so I ask questions because I want to know what the ID proponents here think.
This is not the place to ask or answer this. It has been explained a zillion other places. Go to one these OPs and ask.jerry
April 16, 2021
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Jerry: But some have been exposed thousands of times and have not budged even to acknowledge the evidence is accurate and the logic is good. They are committed to their sports team no matter what. We are all looking at the same physical evidence. We come to different conclusions. I do not expect to 'convert' anyone to my point of view. I do like to fully understand what ID's position is so I ask questions because I want to know what the ID proponents here think. The comment about being committed to one's team can be applied to both sides of the debate. Which is why I don't expect to nor am I trying to change anyone's mind.JVL
April 16, 2021
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The link Kf pointed to is one of a long series of lectures that if anyone read or understood they would be a wiz on current philosophy. His link to a Plantinga lecture is part of the Gifford lectures which appear to be philosophically dense. https://www.giffordlectures.org/lectures There are several on evolution and cosmology and areas relevant to ID. I will try to understand Plantinga as he describes the concept of "warrant" but I expect it will be tough sledding. The first few paragraphs were difficult. It seems to focus on how much we can assess something we believe as true or close to true. And how to evaluate that relationship. Maybe Kf should make this lecture which is almost 30 years old the subject of an OP.jerry
April 16, 2021
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I strongly disagree when SA says, "But we’re trying to show that their viewpoint actually does mean that, so they should say it." That's a conversation breaker from the beginning. It's one thing for you to try to understand another point of view and say "I don't agree with you," but it's disrespectful and non-productive to tell someone "You don't really mean that, you mean this." I think I'll bow out of trying to discuss things with you folks, as you're idea of discussing with good will and mine obviously aren't in harmony.Viola Lee
April 16, 2021
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I have no idea who Rosenberg is. I was just referring to people who post here. Also, there is a solid tradition in philosophy that the reality we experience. mediated by our senses, is not thing in itself. Kant, for instance, believed " that while "things-in-themselves" exist and contribute to experience, they are nonetheless distinct from the objects of experience.' [Wikipedia]. And quantum theorem certainly says that in some sense everything is an illusion: there really is no table. So there is genuine, nuanced philosophy to discuss on this topic, FWIW.Viola Lee
April 16, 2021
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VL
BA often claims that atheist materialists believe that, but people here on this forum don’t say that, I don’t think.
I think you're right that ID-opponents don't say that. But we're trying to show that their viewpoint actually does mean that, so they should say it. BA gives an argument from consistency, or something like that. If you're worldview is that everything is reducible to physicality (particles, etc) and there is no God but only blind, unintelligent matter and forces - then just be consistent. There can be no "reality" since blind particles cannot be aware of such a thing. A combination of particles does not become "aware of anything" - there are only particles.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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Jerry
But some have been exposed thousands of times and have not budged even to acknowledge the evidence is accurate and the logic is good. They are committed to their sports team no matter what.
True. We see some of those being banned for bad-faith arguments like that, or just disruption, but then coming back with a new user name. We should be able to ban by IP address. There's the rare chance that a banned individual has changed his ways and is willing to learn, but again - very rare.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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This is an article very worth reading in its entirety for an understanding of what atheism professes. Reviewing Alex Rosenberg's book. https://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/11/scientia-ad-absurdum
The Atheist’s Guide to Reality is refreshingly and ruthlessly consistent. It is also utterly incoherent”and precisely because it is so consistent. In drawing out its absurd consequences, Alex Rosenberg, an atheist professor of philosophy at Duke University, has written a compelling refutation of modern atheism. That is not what he planned to do. In fact, he didn’t plan to do anything, since there are in his view no plans, designs, or purposes of any sort at all. But I’m getting ahead of myself, or I would be if there were “selves” to get ahead of”Rosenberg assures us that there are none of those either. But Rosenberg is just getting started. Since what is real is only what is reducible to physics, there are no meanings, purposes, designs, or plans of any sort, not even at the level of the human mind. Our thoughts only seem to be “about” things. And if they have no meaning, we cannot really have any plans and purposes at all. Indeed, the self that appears to think meaningful thoughts, to form plans, and to persist through the continual rewiring of the neural circuitry of the brain is also an illusion. Yet we are repeatedly assured by Rosenberg that there are no purposes or meanings of any sort whatsoever. But then, how can there be illusions and falsehoods? For that matter, how can there be truth or correctness, including the truth and correctness he would ascribe to science alone? For these concepts too are normative, as they presuppose the realization of a purpose and the accuracy of a meaning or representation.
The last paragraph above restates the argument that Jerry presented. We cannot know that everything is an illusion unless reality exists. It's the same as KF's reference to the "existence of error". The statement: "Error exists" is necessarily true. Obviously, to say it is false is to confirm that error exists. On the contrary, "everything is false" - is the same as "everything is an illusion". We cannot affirm "everything is false" without contradicting that (since the statement would be true by affirmation. This is the simplest refutation of the denial of truth, but many academics, even do not understand or realize it.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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The same is with our arguments with ID-opponents here. We should assume they have good faith and then try to convince them.
I agree and don't agree. Do it once, maybe twice in a thread but that is it. There will be other threads to do it again if needed. If the person is sincere, they will see the logic and evidence. But some have been exposed thousands of times and have not budged even to acknowledge the evidence is accurate and the logic is good. They are committed to their sports team no matter what.jerry
April 16, 2021
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Plantinga https://www.giffordlectures.org/books/warrant-current-debate/1-justification-internalism-and-deontologykairosfocus
April 16, 2021
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VL
Who is arguing that everything is an illusion?
Alex Rosenberg - the Atheist's Guide to Reality. The whole book argues this. also, just recently:
The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman uses evolutionary game theory to show that our perceptions of an independent reality must be illusions. https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-evolutionary-argument-against-reality-20160421
Professor Hoffman is saying that everything is an illusion. "Reality" is an illusion - and that's incoherent and self-contradictory.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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Viola
And who says there is no truth? Again, we may differ both about what constitutes truth (is it truth or Truth), and about whether something is true or not, but I don’t see anyone arguing that there is no truth.
Yes, but we're talking about the Origin of things. Many will say "of course truth exists", but when asked about where it came from, that's the problem. Is truth a function of physicality alone? If not, then scientism is false.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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Jerry
This argument has been made several times to answer such nonsense by Kf and others but during each thread it should be used just once and then contrary opinions ignored.
That's a strong point - I can't argue against it. In fact, it's a difficult truth maybe as I think about it. Alex Rosenberg, for example, wrote perhaps the perfect book on atheism "The Atheist's Guide to Reality". It's perfect because the entire book is focused on arguing for that one, single point, "everything is an illusion". By the end, Rosenberg talked himself into a contradictory and confused mess - so bad, that many prominent atheists didn't like is work. But Rosenberg was just giving the unvarnished view. He was letting the cat out of the bag. But then what happened was, pro-IDists or Theists of every kind, argued against Rosenberg. Theistic philosopher, Ed Feser, did a 4-part, detailed rebuttal of the book. But in the end, all Feser was saying, and all he had to say was your statement here:
The logic to answer this is if everything is an illusion then this comment is also an illusion and logically there must exist things that are not an illusion. The same is used to those who say there is no truth. It is self contradictory.
That's it. Done. So I ask myself, what was going on here? - and perhaps we do the same here on UD. Well, Rosenberg is the easiest of all targets. He is totally lost in a confusion of babble, that starts and ends with his unwillingness to face the simplest logic, as given. The idea "everything is an illusion" which is the core of atheism (in his "Atheist's Guide") is just stupid an absurd. No number of academic degrees, PhD's or scholarly awards can overcome that problem. Then, what is the problem with prolonged arguments against such? For a guy like Dr. Feser - he set is target very very low. That is really shooting fish in a barrel (or not even as hard as shooting them, but just using a net). Feser was criticized for attacking the "lowest of the new atheism", but Feser rightly said that Rosenberg represented exactly what atheism is. And why not expose the numerous fallacies and idiotic, absurd results that come from this? But isn't there a risk of elevating something that is total nonsense, to the level of a serious proposition? Do we do the same thing with multiverse opinions which are unverifiable and incoherent in either scientific or philosophical terms? Ok, I conclude. The tough-love position is that you simply and clearly refute the nonsense and do not address it again. However, there is a belief (which I have) that people need to see the extreme absurdity of their arguments, and also we can and do actually win people over and convince them that they are wrong. It happens frequently that people leave atheism aside. People are converted to the pro-ID view all the time. This happens because they see, again and again, that atheism-evolutionism-materialism (etc) does not work on multiple levels. All that was required, strictly speaking, was the one argument. However, with multiple arguments of every kind - we see the idea failing again and again. People who hold this irrational belief system will always run for some shelter from the barrage of reason (and from God). They'll hang on to the tiniest scrap of possibility, even when their arguments have been devastated by multiple lines. So, I think it's worthwhile to try to eliminate even that tiny little possibility they hang on to. The risk is, that we elevate an irrational argument to the level of seriousness that it does not deserve. But the payoff is that maybe we will discover an argument that really does change things - that totally destroys any possibility. That's really what ID tries to do. That's why it speaks in the terms that Darwinists can understand. There are many design arguments that use just philosophical proofs, but people who believe in scientism will reject them out of hand. The genius of ID is that it uses the exact methodology and terminology and observations that evolution (or any branch of science) uses. This is done for the sake of science, but also to make the design inference palatable for people who think only in scientific terms. The same is with our arguments with ID-opponents here. We should assume they have good faith and then try to convince them.Silver Asiatic
April 16, 2021
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