In the PZM on the state of atheism thread, some key fundamental issues have emerged:
JDK, 12: >>to both ba[77] and kf: because I think your belief in the power and importance of metaphysical philosophy is excessive and misguided . . . >>
Sev, 17: >>[to BA77,] You consistently ignore the possibility that a consensus morality can be achieved through inter-subjective agreement.>>
Both of these deserve notice, and I responded. This, I now headline, as it goes to the core of the many vexed debates that are going on not only in and around UD but across our civilisation. Pardon, JDK, I here redirect to the correct source:
A summary of why we end up with foundations for our worldviews, whether or not we would phrase the matter that way}
KF, 26: >>a long time ago now, I realised that if one asks the why of warrant in succession for a claim, say A, an interesting chain occurs: A as B, B as C, C as . . . (Long before I ever heard the term, Agrippa Trilemma.)
Thus, we face three options: infinite regress, ultimate circularity, finitely remote terminus. Infinite regress is absurdly impossible, warrant vanishes poof. Circularity at such a level is begging a question. So, we face a finite chain to a set of first plausibles, only a relatively few of which can be self-evident. Thus, worldviews are inevitable, the issue is, to have a responsible and reasonable faith-point. This brings to bear comparative difficulties analysis and grand inference to the best current explanation.
That process of comparative difficulties on factual adequacy, coherence and balanced explanatory power [neither simplistic nor an ad hoc patchwork quilt] is an exercise in metaphysics. Which can be termed critical analysis of worldviews. In this context, ontology [the study of being], logic [including in principle, logic of structure and quantity, i.e. Mathematics], epistemology [knowledge], ethics [critical assessment of morality], wider axiology [e.g. aesthetics, study of beauty], political philosophy [study of governance and justice] and of course meta-study of domains of scholarship and praxis [education, science, law, religion etc] also naturally emerge.
So, philosophy is a mother-lode and controlling discipline.
Indeed, much of our framing of the intellectual disciplines comes from branches of Aristotle’s inquiry. Metaphysics, literally was studies in the volume following that on nature, phusis. Which last is the root of my home discipline, physics.
The importance of philosophy, then, is not to be dismissed. At least, if we intend to be responsible and reasonable.
(And yes, I am very aware that “Philosopher” is often a dismissive epithet. That points to some of the mess our civilisation is in. And of course, education is deeply shaped by philosophy, or else it will be shaped by ideology and will end in propagandistic agit prop and indoctrination. Resemblance to current trends is not coincidental.)
Coming back to your specific appeal to inter-subjective consensus implying cultural relativism as a way to address ethics without taking on the IS-OUGHT gap at world-root level, SM is right and so is ES58 when he points to the coerced consensus of Nazi Germany. Let me clip SM in 18:
[JDK Sev:] “You consistently ignore the possibility that a consensus morality can be achieved through inter-subjective agreement.”
[SM:] Discounting it as useless is not ignoring it. You’re making the very error you’re accusing BA[77] of.
A consensus morality is about as useful as any other consensus. There was once a scientific consensus that the Earth was the centre of our universe.
It was wrong.
The problem with a consensus morality formed by flawed people ought to be obvious but just to make it plain:
It is guaranteed to be wrong.
I again point to the caution by Lewis Vaughn:
Excerpted chapter summary, on Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism, in Doing Ethics 3rd Edn, by Lewis Vaughn, W W Norton, 2012. [Also see here and here.] Clipping:
. . . Subjective relativism is the view that an action is morally right if one approves of it. A person’s approval makes the action right. This doctrine (as well as cultural relativism) is in stark contrast to moral objectivism, the view that some moral principles are valid for everyone.. Subjective relativism, though, has some troubling implications. It implies that each person is morally infallible and that individuals can never have a genuine moral disagreement
Cultural relativism is the view that an action is morally right if one’s culture approves of it. The argument for this doctrine is based on the diversity of moral judgments among cultures: because people’s judgments about right and wrong differ from culture to culture, right and wrong must be relative to culture, and there are no objective moral principles. This argument is defective, however, because the diversity of moral views does not imply that morality is relative to cultures. In addition, the alleged diversity of basic moral standards among cultures may be only apparent, not real. Societies whose moral judgments conflict may be differing not over moral principles but over nonmoral facts.
Some think that tolerance is entailed by cultural relativism. But there is no necessary connection between tolerance and the doctrine. Indeed, the cultural relativist cannot consistently advocate tolerance while maintaining his relativist standpoint. To advocate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value. But if tolerance is an objective moral value, then cultural relativism must be false, because it says that there are no objective moral values.
Like subjective relativism, cultural relativism has some disturbing consequences. It implies that cultures are morally infallible, that social reformers can never be morally right, that moral disagreements between individuals in the same culture amount to arguments over whether they disagree with their culture, that other cultures cannot be legitimately criticized, and that moral progress is impossible.
Emotivism is the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can disagree only in attitude, not in beliefs. People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. Emotivism also implies that presenting reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influence someone’s attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most far-reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is actually good or bad. There simply are no properties of goodness and badness. There is only the expression of favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward something.
In the end, starting with our minds governed by duties to truth, rationality, fairness, prudence etc, we are forced to face moral government of our lives as more or less responsible, reasonable, significantly free agents. Indeed, without that, reasoning and knowing, etc fall to pieces. And so, the IS-OUGHT gap is central.
This means we face the challenge of bridging (which is only possible at world-root level, post Hume). Put up any candidate you like: ______ . After centuries of debates, we will readily see why on comparative difficulties assessment we will come back to there being just one serious candidate: the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being, worthy of loyalty and trust, thus of the responsible, reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature.
But we live in a day of those who find God irksome and wish to remove him from any reference in serious thought or action. The moral incoherence, chaos and irresponsibility of our day are readily explained on that attempt to saw our civilisation off from its life-giving root.
Perhaps, we should first reassess why we are so inclined, and where it will predictably end, once the most ruthless nihilists fully seize power?
That has happened before, indeed within living memory.
And, in part, that is why I will not cede the God-despisers a veto over the substance of ethical and general discussion.>>
And yes, on ethics (as well as many other subjects), on many points there is broad consensus. That is a sign that there is an objective core that is intelligible enough to be accessible. But that is not the same as, the general authority of consensus secures truth.
That’s why SM was right to point out that if the world agrees the earth is [U/D: the “centre” — really, sump — of the universe, or as we can add,] flat, that does not make it so. BTW, c. 1492, the debate with Columbus was not over roundness but size, and the critics (relying on work tracing to Eratosthenes c. 300 BC) were right.
How Eratosthenes got Earth’s circumference more or less right c. 300 BC
[U/D: It took some serious work to establish heliocentrism and onward to realise we live in one galaxy among many. Mere consensus does not establish truth, and mere controversy does not overthrow it.]
In short, we do need to ground ethics and we do need to take philosophical considerations seriously. END
Comments
as to:
"thinking that one’s beliefs are the irrefutably correct ones is unjustified."
So is that belief unjustified?
Of related note: ferreting out which "metaphysical" beliefs are true and which are false is what science is suppose to ultimately be about. Too bad Darwinists prefer their materialistic religion over science.bornagain77
May 29, 2018
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Taoism
Buddhism
A metaphysics which has a creator God similar to that of Christianity, but which is disinterested in the specific behavior of any of the creatures which exist in that universe.
A metaphysics where a cosmic consciousness is embedded in the world, but that creatures which manifest that consciousness are truly responsible for creating their own meanings, values, and norms of conduct (a non-materialistic existentialism)
The issue is not whether you agree with these metaphysics (I imagine you don't), but that they exist.
However, this list is not to the main point, which is, as I wrote to kf, "I think your belief in the power and importance of metaphysical philosophy is excessive and misguided"
No one knows the true metaphysical nature of the world, so thinking that one's beliefs are the irrefutably correct ones is unjustified.jdk
May 29, 2018
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jdk:
I have done this before, and am not going to do it again, especially because of the point I am trying to make here, which is that you have an unwarranted dogmatic belief that the metaphysics you offer is the only valid metaphysics possible.
Can you give an example of a metaphysics that is not ultimately grounded in the one provided by kf?Mung
May 29, 2018
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I have done this before, and am not going to do it again, especially because of the point I am trying to make here, which is that you have an unwarranted dogmatic belief that the metaphysics you offer is the only valid metaphysics possible.
I believe, on the other hand, that there are many different metaphysical beliefs that are possible and have been offered by thoughtful and well-informed philosophers, famous and otherwise, and that there is no certain way of resolving which, if any, are true.
Therefore, we discuss philosophy in order to examine our own beliefs so as to make choices about which ideas we want to help guide us in our attitudes and actions, but not to prove someone else wrong, or prove ourself right.
This is why I wrote the sentence that you quoted in the OP: "I think your belief in the power and importance of metaphysical philosophy is excessive and misguided."jdk
May 28, 2018
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JDK, I spoke to one very specific point, root of ethics, and simply invited an alternative. If you have one that can stand the comparative difficulties test, let us hear it: _____. That is an opening not an imposition; though the continued absence of a serious alternative speaks for itself. The Agrippa dilemma is a general challenge to warrant, it leads to alternative worldviews that then face comparative difficulties and more. To point it out is by no means an imposition. KFkairosfocus
May 28, 2018
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Thanks, kf.
Small point: I once discussed panpsychism as a view that I had never heard of before, and found interesting, but it's not a metaphysics that I lean towards.
Second, you say you have "not imposed your own view" or "any particular worldview", and yet you imply that your position is the only "serious candidate on the table". This implies a large, unjustified faith that your position is the only possible metaphysics worth considering.
In particular, in your OP you write that,
[the only serious candidate] is the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being, worthy of loyalty and trust, thus of the responsible, reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature.
It seems to me there is a huge contradiction, and a great deal of cognitive dissonce, for you to say that and yet claim that you are not offering your own views, or imposing a worldview.
I'm not interested in discussing the details of your view with you again, as we have in the past. But I wanted to add some more context for the quote that you used in your OP, "I think your belief in the power and importance of metaphysical philosophy is excessive and misguided," and why wrote what I did in #2 above.jdk
May 28, 2018
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JDK,
Fair enough that you wanted more context, I thought the clip was right to the heart of the matter.
I do appreciate that you distance yourself from evolutionary materialism, and see where you have suggested panpsychism, to which I responded some time back.
Evo mat happens to be a dominant view in many influential circles and its adherents and fellow travellers need to know its self-falsification through self-referential incoherence. They also need to know its lack of a credible basis for morality, which leads to radical relativism, subjectivism, amorality and nihilism, or at minumum leads to critical weaknesses and confusion on matters of morality and prudence.
Now, further, in pointing out the structure of warrant, I have not put up a fallacious argument or imposed my own view. The chain of warrant challenge is real and longstanding. The recognition of worldview consequences is also pretty evident once that is on the table. Comparative difficulties is a main approach to deal with such views and it is a reasonable position to say we end up at a grand inference to best explanation.
None of this imposes any particular worldview.
Going on, it is a case of the genetic fallacy to suggest that we make up stories (at worldview level) to "beliefs that are really deeply embedded in our biological, psychological, and cultural nature." and indeed, to the extent that determinism or near determinism and/or radical relativism are intended, this is self-referentially incoherent, undermining responsible, rational freedom thus logic, warrant and knowledge.
Yes, there are biases, there are errors, but there is also reasonable warrant.
When it comes to ethics, it is clear that even our thought life is morally governed by duties of care towards truth, fairness, logic, justice, prudence and more. Absent that being binding, mind becomes just another weapon of manipulation, which is self-referentially incoherent. And if it is held that the perception of such binding duties is a biologically [etc] rooted delusion, that is again self-referential and incoherent by way of reducing mindedness to grand delusion driven by non-rational factors.
So the ethical cannot be severed from the rational.
It is reasonable to acknowledge that we are really bound by moral duties, starting with in our thought life.
From this, we then face the resolution of how such OUGHT attaches to reality, the IS. Which, post Hume, can only be done at world-root level. Or else we are in the problem of ungrounded OUGHT. Reasoning IS-IS then suddenly a poof magic step, OUGHT-OUGHT.
That points to core philosophical issues, regardless of how irksome they may seem to us.
I have often put on the table an instructive and unfortunately real world test case: it is self-evidently evil to kidnap, sexually assault and murder a young child for one's pleasure. From this, many answers on key principles can be drawn forth and doubtless we can work towards a consensus on the intuitions drawn out by the case.
But, this still lacks that root-level solution.
So, we are back to that level, and duly note that there is still but one serious candidate on the table. Dismissing it with a label and a suggestion of question-begging imposition -- especially in a context of invited comparative difficulties analysis -- does not answer the core issue.
So, let us proceed: _______
KFkairosfocus
May 28, 2018
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I would have appreciated it if you had quoted me more fully.
For the record, from the other thread:
#8
Because I am strongly agnostic about metaphysics, and believe that our nature comes more from our biological nature than it does from our philosophy (which is an abstract overlay over beliefs which are much more deep-seated), I can support anyone who beliefs in social responsibility and moral obligation. I don’t think philosophical beliefs are nearly as important as one’s practical beliefs about how we should act.
#12
I think your belief in the power and importance of metaphysical philosophy is excessive and misguided.
There are many issues involving social responsibility and moral obligation for which I agree with a whole range of people, from theists to Buddhists to materialists.
As I’ve often explained, we make up stories–religious and metaphysical–to support beliefs that are really deeply embedded in our biological, psychological, and cultural nature. They’re interesting to think about, and can help express large, abstract ideas, but they are artifacts and effects, not causes, of our beliefs.
So I pay no attention to your comments like “And exactly how is it possible for material particles to anticipate anything?” or “Pray, tell us how they propose to soundly bridge the IS-OUGHT gap on evolutionary materialistic scientism based presuppositions?”.
This is “bogus philosophizing”, an external manifestation of your highly dogmatic commitment to a particular cultural expression of theism.
Philosophy is important as a guide to our understanding of the world, but it is only a part of our humanity, and as I said above, it follows more from our larger nature than it leads it.
Both you and ba are fixated on the idea that "evolutionary materialistic scientism based presuppositions" (which I have repeatedly pointed out don't apply to me) lead to a totally invalid belief system upon which a person cannot in any way justify a commitment to social responsibility and moral obligation.
That is "bogus philosophizing". It is elevating your own philosophical beliefs to a supreme position, and denying the validity of other respected belief systems within the field of philosophy.
If you were truly respectful of the field of philosophy you would have a more balanced view of how your preferred beliefs fit in the larger context of the many different perspectives that have been offered by noted philosophers over the ages and different cultures.jdk
May 28, 2018
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Sev, JDK, the value of philosophy [esp. metaphysics] and addressing the intersubjective consensus challengekairosfocus
But we live in a day of those who find God irksome and wish to remove him from any reference in serious thought or action. The moral incoherence, chaos and irresponsibility of our day are readily explained on that attempt to saw our civilisation off from its life-giving root.
