Recent epistemology has seen an explosion of interest in disagreement and other related questions in social epistemology. While much progress has been made on abstract and general epistemological issues relating to disagreement, there has been surprisingly little discussion of how, if at all, these lessons can be applied to disagreement within science in particular. Furthermore, several aspects of the topic go beyond merely applying lessons from analytic epistemology. For example, scientific disagreement is unlike many ordinary cases of disagreement in that there is often little reason to think that the disagreement is due to a simple mistake by one of the parties of the type often appealed to in the epistemology of disagreement literature. Rather, if there is disagreement among two or more groups of scientists, it is most commonly grounded in a more fundamental difference in their methods, background assumptions, or scientific outlooks.
The special issue [of philosophy journal Synthese] will focus on philosophical questions raised by disagreement within science or particular scientific disciplines. Appropriate topics for contributions include (but are not limited to):
· How, if at all, should scientists reevaluate their theories and models upon realizing that their scientific peers have a contrary opinion? How should scientific disagreements be resolved?
· Is there such a thing as “peer disagreement” in science – i.e. disagreement between equally well informed and equally competent scientists – or is this too much of an idealization from actual scientific practice to tell us anything worthwhile about scientific controversies?More.
Deadline October 18, 2018.
Just reading Uncommon Descent could help a potential submitter identify many topic areas.
See also: Science historian on Darwinist Ken Miller’s new book, The Human Instinct: Asserting consensus in the midst of growing conflict