VIDEO: The Feb 1, 2013 Craig- Rosenberg debate: “Is Faith in God Reasonable?”

_{kairosfocus

February 2, 2013

Philosophy, Video, worldview}

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Thanks to Bornagain 77’s diligence, we are able to bring to UD’s readership, this important debate on the reasonableness (or otherwise) of theistic faith in an era dominated by Science, with Scientism an influential worldview rooted in the prestige of science:

[youtube bhfkhq-CM84]

(NB: The debate proper begins at 4 10 mins 27 48 seconds in, with the moderator’s introduction.)

Let us watch, let us reflect, let us discuss. END

PS: I have also put up the Dawkins-Williams Jan 31st 2013 debate here. (HT: SG.)

PPS: I think it worthwhile to add this David Wood video on the argument from reason:

[youtube xKX-QtEo2fI]

Comments

KN:
“Abstract” just means, “not existing in space and in time”
no no no Abstraction: the process of formulating generalized ideas or concepts by extracting common qualities from specific examples from Latin abstractus, past participle of abstrahere, to draw awayMung_{February 6, 2013
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kairosfocus:
PS: Am I the only one who is hearing AR try to scold and instruct WLC as in effect a particularly dumb, stubborn and bumptious fundy preacher/debater sticking his nose in the hallowed halls of academia?
Well:
...we won't treat theism as a serious alternative that still needs to be refuted. - Rosenberg, Alex. The Atheist's Guide to Reality
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Alvin Plantinga: On Christian Scholarship - CCT Conference - video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yd0GO6m6ys8bornagain77_{February 6, 2013
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“Abstract” just means, “not existing in space and in time”, and “mental” just means, “of or pertaining to some mind.”
If it is possible for something that is abstract to exist, and it doesn't exist in space or time, and it also does not exist in the mind, then where (how?) does it exist? Also, I'm wondering whether the doctrine of the Trinity might throw a wrench into the externalist argument and how it relates to God's existence.Phinehas_{February 6, 2013
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I don't dispute the conclusion, that "Mind as root of being has enormous explanatory power and elegance." What I dispute is that treating sets as mental is a premise for reaching that conclusion. More deeply, what I dispute is this:
the world of mathematics is a conceptual-logical-structured one, which is mental.
I read this as two different claims illicitly conjoined:
(1)the world of mathematics is a conceptual-logical-structured world. (2) if it is conceptual-logical, then it is mental.
(1) is fine, by my lights; it's (2) which I think is inherently problematic. (More precisely, (2) would be OK as a conclusion drawn from theism, but not as a premise for theism.) I say this because of what I take a concept to be: "a concept is an intersection in a network of implications" (that's a quote from Sellars, but he might be quoting C. I. Lewis -- I'm not sure). But the network of implications cannot be identical with the mental, because mental facts -- facts about how minds work, what they do, and so on -- are just descriptive. They cannot capture the fundamental normativity of implication, and hence, of concepts and of thought. In other words, identifying concepts with mental phenomena is a non-starter for just the same reasons as it is to identify concepts with physical phenomena. The conclusion is that the "network of implications" is not a phenomenon at all, because for something to be a phenomenon, whether physical or mental or whatever, is for it to be something that is described. But the network of implications is a system of rules, not of facts. (My stress on this point is related to the vastly different lessons we draw from "Hume's guillotine".) (The question, "how did the system of rules come into being?" is a related but still separate question.) More generally, I don't see how the argument is supposed to go from mathematical realism to theistic realism. Let's take mathematical realism as a premise, and let's grant that mathematical entities (sets, sets of sets, etc.) necessarily exist. What does that do for us, philosophically? Theistic realism could function here as an inference-to-the-best-explanation, but what exactly is it needs to be explained? And what bearing mathematical realism has on the embodied cognition thesis still eludes me.Kantian Naturalist_{February 6, 2013
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KN: I SHOWED how they are inherently abstract and mental, please don't try a rhetorical brush-off. (BTW, I updated a bit to explain.) The empty set is just that, nothing. But seeing this as a definable collection, allows us to go up the chain. And so, we can in succession define naturals, integers, rationals, reals, complex, spaces, time, kinematics. Inject dynamics and physics enters. Also, go back to your blogger, he was trying to project that concepts that are symbolic must refer externally and so a necessary mental being at the root of existence is impossible. THAT is what I countered and did so by pointing how math can be built up without external reference whatsoever, viewed from a mind of God point of view. As for the if I reject God point of view, my challenge was to address the assertion on externality, which I did. That as a consequence we see God as being the first logician-mathematician with a cosmos built on such connexions, is a bonus. As for the shadowy world of independent forms you would posit, I highlight that the world of mathematics is a conceptual-logical-structured one, which is mental. That does not mean unreal, it simply points out that Mind as root of being has enormous explanatory power and elegance. KFkairosfocus_{February 6, 2013
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I have to say, it strikes me as completely crazy to think that it's just obviously true that mathematical entities are mental entities. If God exists, then mathematical entities could exist in His mind -- but in the absence of the belief in God, identifying mathematical entities with mental entities just turns them into mere phantasms of the human imagination, and that can't possibly be right! In other words, treating mathematical objects as mental entities is not a free-standing claim that naturalists and theists can discuss. I understand why it makes sense for a theist to take it as a conclusion from theism, but it can't work as a premise for theism, because as a free-standing claim, it's just nonsense.
Do you remember the point stressed in beginning Geometry on how the sketches used are only aids to understanding, the real entities are inherently abstract: points, lines, shapes, properties, etc?
That's obviously correct, but you're missing the real point:"abstract" does not mean "mental", nor is there any logical entailment. "Abstract" just means, "not existing in space and in time", and "mental" just means, "of or pertaining to some mind." In a nutshell: if there is a divine mind, then abstracta could be mental, but if there is no divine mind, then abstracta are not mental. So you can't start off by insisting that abstract are mental and then using that as a premise to show that there is a divine mind, without begging the question.Kantian Naturalist_{February 6, 2013
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KN: I used the construction of mathematics as an abstract mental exercise to show how, internal to a mind and without reference to external entities, a world can in principle be built. Where, we do not see some weird Euthyphro dilemma-like shadowy independence of a world of forms appearing so that we have some silly dilemma like are numbers arbitrary impositions by God or are they a reality independent of, external to and binding on him, so God is seen as impossible. No, the world of reason is IN Him who is Reason Himself, just as the world of morality is IN Him who is goodness himself. (That is, OUR thinking on numbers etc is external but that is not true of the One who is the ground of being and Reason Himself.) It is in that context that I then highlighted the "IN Him . . . " principle, and implied the point that necessary eternal truths such as that in "3 + 2 = 5" can be understood as eternally held in the mind of the necessary being at the root of our cosmos. Truth, famously, is mental. As for numbers [etc], please look back again: {} = 0, {0} = 1, {0, 1} = 2 is the use of the successor principle of Peano, and in no wise implies that numbers are not real, only that they are inherently abstract; that is not psychology, it is abstraction. That step in turn is a way around naive set theory's paradoxes. though obviously, in teaching a child, the obvious gateway is through the concrete, structured towards forming the abstract through the pictorial, symbolic and representational. But, when it comes to setting up the system firmly, in a world of village barber paradoxes, the best is to start with {}. Then, notice that this is an abstract entity, which can be symbolised and assigned a numeral that represents its cardinality. Then, we move to {0} --> 1, with a successor cardinality and the property of one-ness, i.e, anything else with that cardinality can be matched to it. Then, {0, 1} --> 2, and that can be matched, etc. Indeed, the trick of counting is to notice that the sets 1, 2, 3 etc in succession have the relevant cardinalities so we just call out the names, until we exhaust an arbitrary set, That is the set in the Peano based succession that will have the same cardinality. And so forth. But do not try to teach from abstract to concrete, that is a way to confuse children! What I outlined is how we go from there to a mathematical world with all sorts of necessary connexions and onward implications for physical instantiation. Do you remember the point stressed in beginning Geometry on how the sketches used are only aids to understanding, the real entities are inherently abstract: points, lines, shapes, properties, etc? KFkairosfocus_{February 6, 2013
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Kairosfocus, your (163) suggests to me that you are using some fairly basic terminology in a way quite different from I or the anonymous blogger I'd linked to. The assertion is, "the existence of external objects is a necessary condition of representational content." Now, there is nothing in that assertion that should ruffle the feathers of anyone who insists on the reality of abstract universals, and quite frankly, I'm simply baffled as to why you think that set-theory has any bearing on this topic at all. For one thing, nowhere do I, or the proponent of embodied cognition, insist that "external" mean "concrete" or "physical."
Start with {}, then move to the numbers etc, all without external reference, all is abstract and internally symbolic.
As stated, I object to this view in the strongest possible sense. And I think that once I've explained why, you'll agree with me. For one thing, taking this view turns mathematical entities into mere psychological entities, and that destroys the normativity of logic and mathematics just as much as materialism does. (It might be pointed out that Frege and Husserl took their aim against the psychologism of Mill.) Here's the deeper issue: the question here is about intentionality, about what is required for the 'aboutness' of thought. And the externalist thesis is that, in order for there to be intentional mental contents, it must be the case that there exists something external to that mind. It needn't be the case that there exists some external thing for every thinkable content -- that would lead to well-worn problems regarding the ontology of fictional objects -- but rather it's a constraint of the following sort: in order for there to be any intentional content, there must be some external objects of some sort. Whether those external objects are concrete or abstract, particulars or universals, doesn't matter to the claim under consideration. So "external", as used here, just means, "not within my own mind," in the way that, for example, my sensations or fantasies are. It does mean "physical" (concrete & particular). And in fact, I'm really shocked that we're having this discussion at all, because I would have thought you would be among the very first to insist that when I'm thinking about "2+2=4", the content of that thought refers to the fact that 2+2=4. But when you say,
Start with {}, then move to the numbers etc, all without external reference, all is abstract and internally symbolic.
I take this to mean that there really aren't any numbers at all. To deny that our thoughts about numbers have external reference is just the same thing as saying that the thing referred to does not exist. Now, I of course know that that is not your view -- I know that you are a realist about numbers, and indeed, about abstract universals. So I conclude that you and I are using the terms "external reference" in wildly different ways. I hope that this post has clarified why I am confused by your usage of this term in this context.Kantian Naturalist_{February 6, 2013
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KN: Kindly note that (because it is the most pivotal error) I focussed on asserted premise no 3:
CIGEC.3: The existence of external objects is a necessary condition of representational content. CIGEC.3.1: NOTE – Strict internalism about representational content seems challenging given the further state of the discourse. However, a dispute would be possible to challenge (3).
This is why I highlighted the way in which set theory as a grounding for numbers and mathematics spectacularly breaks that assertion. Start with {}, then move to the numbers etc, all without external reference, all is abstract and internally symbolic. Then notice: IN Him, we live and move and have our being, i.e. the whole assertion no 3 is highly questionable. KFkairosfocus_{February 6, 2013
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A Biblical View of Science and Nature - Dr. Vern Poythress - audio lecture http://www.wts.edu/flash/media_popup/media_player.php?id=1652&paramType=audiobornagain77_{February 6, 2013
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I can see the point of endorsing the following conditional:
(1) If God exists, then abstract entities are divine mental entities.
This, after all, is the solution to the problem of universals in the entire tradition that begins with Augustine and continues through Aquinas and so on, etc. But it won't do to argue for this conditional by appealing to the claim,
(2) abstract entities are mental entities
since this is only acceptable if we first accept (1) (and that God exists). All the naturalist need do is offer an alternative account of the origins and structure of mathematical cognition. That could involve a commitment to nominalism, but it need not -- there's no reason at all why someone could be a naturalist and yet affirm realism or conceptualism about abstracta or universals. (A nice distinction worth making here is between abstract/concrete and universal/particular.) On a related point, I've come across a really elegant way of focusing in on the issue that divides pragmatists and Platonists (for lack of a better word). I came across a reference to "Contingent Transcendental Arguments for Metaphysical Principles" by Chang -- haven't found the original source yet -- but he apparently makes the following nice point: that there are what he calls "P/A pairs" (for "metaphysical principle" and "epistemic activity"), such as discreteness/counting, uniform consequences/prediction, sufficient reason/explanation, subsistence/narration, transitivity/ordering, non-contradiction/assertion. Now, here's the Big Question: do we explain the activities in terms of the principles, or the other way around? The "Platonist," as I'm using the term here, is someone who reasons as follows:
It is the metaphysical principles which are explanatorily basic, because we are only able to engage in some epistemic activity because we have an intellectual grasp of the corresponding metaphysical principle.
By contrast, the "pragmatist," if he's read not only Dewey but also Sellars, Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Brandom, will reason as follows:
It is the epistemic activities which are explanatorily basic; we are only able to refer to metaphysical principles because we have explicitly represented to ourselves what we implicitly doing when engaged in some epistemic activity.
The problem confronted by the Platonist is, how to explain our intellectual access to the metaphysical principles that ground our epistemic activities? (Is there some magical fluid in the brain?) The problem confronted by the pragmatist is, how to explain the origins of epistemic activities that are linguistically explicated as metaphysical principles? As it usually the case when very deep issues at involved, there are a lot of furtive attempts to shift the burden of proof to the other side. I'm not going to pretend that I'll convince anywhere here to abandon Platonism in favor of pragmatism. Instead, I'll confine myself to the following remarks: (1) pragmatism accommodates the P/A-pairs that are rightly insisted upon by Platonist; (2) pragmatism, unlike Platonism, is compatible with naturalism; (3) if one is to be a naturalist at all, one ought to be a pragmatic naturalist.Kantian Naturalist_{February 6, 2013
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F/N: I do not see why we should have a problem of having embodied minds, in a context of a mind as source of matter. If you want an operational suggestion, try, a Smith model cybernetic loop, with a supervisory controller that interacts with the one in the loop. That can be assigned to quantum level influences as has been put forward.kairosfocus_{February 6, 2013
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WJM: Interesting discussion, do you want to give a bit more? KFkairosfocus_{February 6, 2013
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Hi KN: I have been busy delving in my Dad's setting up of financial rules for a charity a decade ago as a model for my own work on a somewhat similar venture. I see your just above, on a pause, which is a useful beginning. I should note, however something. I primarily noted on the common variety of materialism to give a wider context. If you look closely, notwithstanding: what I did was to focus on one of the premises, no 3, and answered it directly on the issue that the chain of mathematical reasoning that begins with the empty set and erects the relevant apparatus of mathematics, is a direct counter and this suffices to decisively over- turn the "impossibility of God" argument. It also turns out to speak to one way in which the uncanny applicability of mathematics ot physical reality cna be explained, a la thinking God's thoughts after him. WJM corrected a sloppy expression on my part and I have fixed up to make explicit that the whole world is in a material sense IN God, not external to him. As in IN him we live, move and have our being, he who sustains reality and orders it by his powerful word. I have also given as a crude comparative to help make this understandable, the creation of a virtual in-computer world. Though of course I am not at all arguing that the cosmos we experience is a grand simulation exercise. And as I am arguing that the decisive overthrow of a pivotal premise breaks the grounding of the conclusion of an argument, we can reject the claimed proof of the impossibility of God. By direct counter-example with infinitely many instances. Now, at the next level it would be interesting to look at the onward laying out of your case. Though I confess, I deliberately do not have a Facebook account, not trusting that entity. KFkairosfocus_{February 6, 2013
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At my 132 above, I'd mentioned the embodied mind thesis, also known as "embodied cognition" (Wikipedia and SEP for background). Kairosfocus' reply at his 136 seemed to me to miss the point of the embodied mind thesis quite badly, in large part because he construed as a version of physicalism or materialism, which it is not. The very best article I've yet seen which explains why the embodied mind thesis is as anti-materialist as it is anti-dualist is "The Mind-Body-Body Problem" by Hanna and Thompson. (That link goes to Hanna's page on Academia.edu, which I'm guessing no one else here uses, but one can log into it if you have a Facebook account.) If not, it doesn't matter too much -- I've read Hanna's book, and some of Thompson's, so I know the view pretty well. So, there are several questions here: (1) Is embodied cognition a plausible position in philosophy of mind? (2) What is the modality of the claim -- is it that human and animal minds are actually embodied or necessarily so? (3) What does embodied cognition imply about cognition concerning abstracta and/or universals? (4) Does embodied cognition entail that God is impossible? Now, to foreshadow considerably where I'll go with this: I have a lot to say about (1) and (2), and a bit to say about (3), though not much -- though I do have strong nominalistic tendencies, I don't see much in the embodied cognition thesis which supports them. Those arguments will have to come from elsewhere. And as for (4), I actually don't have much to say. I brought it up because I thought it was a cool little argument. My personal take on things is that embodied cognition is a very attractive position because it is both anti-dualist and anti-materialist, that it is not only true but necessarily true -- on some sense of "necessary"! -- but that it does not have anti-theistic implications. (Or more precisely, it has anti-theistic implications only with regards a very crude conception of God.)Kantian Naturalist_{February 6, 2013
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WJM, I suggest that such brutal honesty, which you have a special knack for displaying as you just did in that post, is what was incompatible with your atheism in the long run. One simply cannot be that brutally honest with themselves and stay a consistent atheist.bornagain77_{February 6, 2013
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KF, My faith in god did not begin from an overview of competing worldviews based on merit; my faith in god was a willful choice I made from the perspective of a materialist atheist whom had dispensed with logic and reason as necessary arbiters of thought, action and belief. I realized that, as an atheistic materialist, I could think and do and believe whatever I wanted, regardless of if it was true or not, regardless of if it was rational, grounded, hypocritical or self-conflicting, because as an atheistic materialist, there was no inherent penalty for believing any crazy, foolish, unsupportable nonsense I felt like believing. My worldview was might makes right, and I accepted it. The only criteria I used was whether or not I enjoyed the ramifications of my beliefs and actions, not if I could defend or argue or justify them rationally. Perhaps at this point many turn to destructive nihilism, hedonism, or plot out how to kill as many innocents as possible to make themselves famous before their self-supposed meaningless existence is snuffed out. I looked into my heart and realized that what I really wanted was to be a good person, to believe in a god worth believing in, and for existence to fundamentally matter. I wanted to be able to serve a purpose that motivated me to get up in the morning and feel joy, happiness and fulfillment in serving a greater good - not just some made up personal or social good. It was at this time that I found ID materials, which exposed an opportunity towards an intellectually and spiritually satisfying theism. At that point I had none of the rational arguments or comparative worldviews; I had no sophisticated perspectives on the nature of god; I only had what my heart yearned for and the decision about whether or not to have faith in the god I wanted to be real. I chose to believe in, and have faith in, a god worth believing in, and worth having faith in, even if - at the time - I didn't know how to describe or explain that god or the logic surrounding it. Even if, at the time, the only "gods" I had any exposure to were pretty lame, cartoonish, unsatisfying or even horrific figures. That faith transformed my life, but it was an act of uninformed will on my part based on nothing more than listening to and accepting what my heart truly desired, even if I had no training or understanding about how what I desired to be true could be true. It wasn't until much later, reading books and what many of you here wrote that I realized that what I wanted to be true - a god worth believing in, an existence worth living, a purpose worth serving - was something supported by sound argument and evidence to the point of intellectual, emotional and spiritual satisfaction. Many would call that original choice of faith on my part to be blind faith; I have no problem with that. IMO it wasn't so blind that I would sacrifice virgins or blow up the innocent or dash my children against rocks; I wanted, needed, chose to have faith in a god that was better than that, that was worthy of love, awe and worship. That faith has been rewarded. So, while others may find their way to faith via sound, rational grounds and convincing evidence or argument, my faith did not rest on a solid foundation, it was a willful choice rooted simply in the yearning for something I couldn't even properly articulate at the time.William J Murray_{February 6, 2013
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F/N: I have added David Wood's video on the argument from reason to the original post. Food for thought.kairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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JoeMorreale1187 is no longer with us.Barry Arrington_{February 5, 2013
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F/N: Wintery Knight has a very interesting bit on faith, reason and evidence here. Notice the classic, three element breakdown: notitia, assensus, fiducia: content, assent/confidence, trust. (Cf. Barth here!) The quality of faith is no better than its object and the trustworthiness of that object. Reasonableness in light of first principles of right reason and solid warranting evidence eliciting trust, is pivotal, cf. here on and here on on my own faith and worldview, where my very being here 40+ years later typing this note here at UD is a testimony to a pivotal, life-saving miracle of guidance that saved my life, the very morning that my Mom, in desperation surrendered me back to God. To this day I can feel myself being half-carried by my mom out the door of that prominent med centre that had not been able to see us, and can see down the steps to the taxi sitting there, door open, with the taximan saying, "Asthma, I know just the doctor for him." A doctor we simply would not otherwise have found. That is, in the end, one must be able to say "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that He is able to keep [= guard] that which I have committed unto Him against That Day." KF PS: I have now put up an excerpt PDF document on Reason (incl 1st princs of right reason), Thought, Faith, Worldviews and Community (incl lessons fr Schaeffer) here, as well as one on the Design Inference here. Note Plato's warning here.kairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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Thanks for the link mung. ,,, You see KN it is not only practically everyone on UD that thinks your philosophy is completely incoherent as to explaining reality.bornagain77_{February 5, 2013
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KN: We are indeed interested. KFkairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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Mung: Do you mean -- and I see OUP there, with Robert C Koons as an editor -- this:
Table of Contents I. Arguments from Consciousness 1. Against Materialism , Laurence BonJour, (University of Washington) 2. Consciousness: A Simple Approach , Adam Pautz, (University of Texas at Austin) 3. Saving Appearances: A Dilemma For Physicalists , Charles Siewert, (University of California, Riverside) 4. The Property Dualism Argument , Stephen L. White, (Tufts University) 5. Kripke's Argument against Materialism , Eli Hirsch, (Brandeis University) 6. The Self-Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content , George Bealer, (Yale University) II. Arguments from Unity and Identity 7. On the Significance of Some Intuitions about the Mind , David Barnett, (University of Colorado) 8. Persons and the Unity of Consciousness , William Hasker, (Huntington University) 9. An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject-Body Dualism , Martine Nida-Rümelin, (University of Fribourg) III. Intentionality, Mental Causation and Knowledge 10. Burge's Dualism , Bernard W. Kobes, (Arizona State University) 11. Modest Dualism , Tyler Burge, (UCLA) 12. Descartes' Revenge Part II: The Supervenience Argument Strikes Back , Neal Judisch, (University of Oklahoma) 13. Nonreductive Materialism or Emergent Dualism? The Argument from Mental Causation , Timothy O'Connor, (Indiana University) and John Ross Churchill 14. Epistemological Objections to Materialism , Robert C. Koons, (University of Texas) IV. Alternatives to Materialism 15. Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness , Terry Horgan, (University of Arizona) 16. Dualizing Materialism , Michael Jubien, (University of Florida) 17. Dualistic Materialism , Joseph Almog, (UCLA) 18. Varieties of Naturalism , Mario De Caro, (Tufts University) 19. Against Methodological Materialism , Angus J. L. Menuge, (Concordia University, Wisconsin) 20. Soul, Mind and Brain , Brian Leftow, (University of Oxford) 21. Materialism Does Not Save the Phenomena -- and the Alternative Which Does , Uwe Meixner, (University of Regensburg) 22. Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian Approach , E. J. Lowe, (Durham University) Bibliography Index
Muy interesante! KF PS: Plato warned us on this 2350 years ago and made a cosmological design inference -- in the context of seeing ensouled life as a self-moved first cause --the pivot of his answer to the challenge and cultural wedge of rampant avant garde materialism and its fellow-travellers radical relativism, nihilism and ruthless "the highest right is might" factionism, cf. The Laws, Bk X as clipped here on. let us note, Dr Rosenberg is a self-declared nihilist and Dr Craig praised him for his frankness on the consequences of his beliefs.kairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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WJM: Why not lay out the essence of your worldview case on the pivotal issue for the thread, given the debate? KF PS: Am I the only one who is hearing AR try to scold and instruct WLC as in effect a particularly dumb, stubborn and bumptious fundy preacher/debater sticking his nose in the hallowed halls of academia?kairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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Don't be nasty!Axel_{February 5, 2013
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Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism and find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge. The contributors include leaders in the fields of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, who respond ably to the most recent versions and defenses of materialism. The modal arguments of Kripke and Chalmers, Jackson's knowledge argument, Kim's exclusion problem, and Burge's anti-individualism all play a part in the building of a powerful cumulative case against the materialist research program. Several papers address the implications of contemporary brain and cognitive research (the psychophysics of color perception, blindsight, and the effects of commissurotomies), adding a posteriori arguments to the classical a priori critique of reductionism. All of the current versions of materialism--reductive and non-reductive, functionalist, eliminativist, and new wave materialism--come under sustained and trenchant attack. In addition, a wide variety of alternatives to the materialist conception of the person receive new and illuminating attention, including anti-materialist versions of naturalism, property dualism, Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphism, and non-Cartesian accounts of substance dualism. The Waning of Materialism
Be sure to check out the table of contents page.Mung_{February 5, 2013
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KF: I don't know that our worldviews diverge there as much as our descriptions diverge, probably because of different roads leading to much the same place.William J Murray_{February 5, 2013
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WJM: I see where our worldviews diverge. For one instance, for me faith is first acceptance as truth, linked to trust in an object such as God. Such faith is potentially reasonable, and you are doubtless aware of my view that tracing back abstract arguments on warrant shows that we come to a faith point of accepted first plausibles for any worldview that is finitely remote. Infinite regress of warrant is absurdly impossible, not least as we cannot traverse a countable transfinite in steps. Circularity comes up when we take as plausibles things that are not truly properly basic. Serious worldview level alternativs are to be assessed on comparative difficulties across factual adequacy, coherence and elegant simplicity, as opposed to ad hocness or being simplistic. KFkairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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KN: I responded to the proof offered, laying out the key point where I think there is a defect. Remember, the focus is God, and the issue is that a mind must have something outside it. That is what I addressed. As for embodied minds, they are obviously secondary and derivative, as any object with a body is necessarily contingent. I have pointed out that such minds cannot be reasonably explained on blind chance and mechanical necessity, the dominant assertion or implication of scientism in its various forms. Now, I am aware you put forward a claim that you have a form of naturalism that escapes these points, evidently by implying an inbuilt tendency in the cosmos. Do, let us see what you have to say. KFkairosfocus_{February 5, 2013
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