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VIDEO: The Feb 1, 2013 Craig- Rosenberg debate: “Is Faith in God Reasonable?”

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Thanks to Bornagain 77’s diligence, we are able to bring to UD’s readership, this important debate on the reasonableness (or otherwise) of theistic faith in an era dominated by Science, with Scientism an influential worldview rooted in the prestige of science:

[youtube bhfkhq-CM84]

(NB: The debate proper begins at 4 10 mins 27 48 seconds in, with the moderator’s introduction.)

Let us watch, let us reflect, let us discuss. END

PS: I have also put up the Dawkins-Williams Jan 31st 2013 debate here. (HT: SG.)

PPS: I think it worthwhile to add this David Wood video on the argument from reason:

[youtube xKX-QtEo2fI]

Comments
KF: Yes, that really hits the mark. This is the answer to why the physical world is orderly at the macro or appearance level, but when you examine it very closely it begins to break down into quantum potentials (as BA77 so often reminds us) that require mindful observation to realize form and pattern as realities. A lot of my philosophy is based on the examination of the dream state and its analogous relationship to our existence. I consider us all instantiated, individualized children of god, populating a world within god, capable of accepting our connection with god (grace) that is the very power that creates the universe. Accepting ones capacity for free will, IMO, is like becoming lucid in a dream state, where you understand (more or less) your relationship to the creator and use your will towards the purpose of the creator. This is one of the things I think atheists fail to properly understand; they interpret the god/human relationship as a master/slave relationship, where humans are given "free will" but then punished when they don't do what the master says. There is no "master/slave" relationship. Even the "parent/child" analogy is insufficient and too prone to misunderstanding. I usually explain the god/individual relationship as a dreamer/dreamed relationship; becoming lucid, or moving away from the "biological automaton" or dream NPC (holographic projection) state means becoming closer to the dreamer, realizing your own deeply personal relationship with the dreamer, accepting yourself as god's agent in this world. This is why succumbing to god, so to speak, is the true liberation; it's like becoming lucid in a dream and understanding that you are a part of the creator of reality. I think atheists deeply misunderstand what "faith" is, and childishly equate it with blind, fearful superstition. Faith, IMO, is an active, creative use of free will. You get to choose what you have faith in, and that faith draws you towards manifestation. If you have faith in your own eventual annihilation from existence, then that is your willful journey. You are not forced by god to believe that; god has given us all the capacity to believe, and have faith in, whatever we want.William J Murray
February 5, 2013
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Mr. Kantian Naturalist, I was being sloppy. The argument is called ‘Kim's metaphysical argument’. This two-stage argument contains a ‘downward causation argument’ and a ‘causal exclusion argument’. Earlier (post 137) I was intending to refer to the latter - incorrectly by ‘CCP’. The book is “Making Sense of Emergence” (1999), by Jaegwon Kim. It is discussed shortly hereBox
February 5, 2013
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Kairosfocus' (136) misses the point of "the embodied mind" thesis by a fairly wide margin. If there's interest in this, I can come back to it. If not, I'll leave it be. Box, thank you for reminding me of that Kim article. It's "The Myth of Non-Reductive Naturalism", right?Kantian Naturalist
February 5, 2013
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WJM, pardon my sloppy writing. Good catch, I will correct and credit [done, you will love the cites, try guessing their source!]. You are right, as Paul cited the pagan poets at Athens, "In him we live and move and have our being." I meant instantiated as a physical reality that he everywhere maintains in existence. There is a subtle sense in which "external" may be used -- i.e that this is not all a fictional simulation in the mind of God, we are real and have real minds etc, but it is probably too misleading. KFkairosfocus
February 5, 2013
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As far as a cognitive mind existing without external objects, one need look no further than the dream state. The only thing I disagree with as far as KF's #136 is that God externalized its internal reality; externalized it where? IMO, there is no place for reality to exist except within God, which fits nicely with the propositions of divine omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience.William J Murray
February 5, 2013
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@Kantian Naturalist (134) You are welcome. CCP, as a raised objection by J.Kim, constitutes a huge problem for emergentism. In fact I’m of the opinion that it did spell the end of emergentism.
Wiki: Addressing emergentism (under the guise of non-reductive physicalism) as a solution to the mind-body problem Jaegwon Kim has raised an objection based on causal closure and overdetermination. Emergentism strives to be compatible with physicalism, and physicalism, according to Kim, has a principle of causal closure according to which every physical event is fully accountable in terms of physical causes. This seems to leave no "room" for mental causation to operate. If our bodily movements were caused by the preceding state of our bodies and our decisions and intentions, they would be overdetermined.
Another huge problem for emergentism is the ‘poofery’-aspect; that is, the idea is based on the speculative idea that mental properties somehow emerge by a totally unknown process. The idea itself is an admission of the impossible leap from matter to mind.Box
February 5, 2013
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KN: I see your attempt to argue per link that embodiment is a condition of cognition. Thus, to infer the impossibility of a non-embodied mind, thence of God. Actually, the real challenge runs the other way. We know that -- despite limitations and errors -- knowing, accurately perceiving, reasoning, consciously aware, intentional minds [as in what is it like to be appeared to redly . . . ] are possible, from our own experience. (I hardly need to do more than name the hard problem of consciousness on materialistic premises, noting that the challenge is not on "reducing" mind to body, but to lead up to and base mind on bodies without begging questions and without self-refuting absurdities.) In addition, on pain of serious self referential incoherence, we know that minds cannot properly be merely bodies in combined action, and thence reduced to the ladder of blind chance and mechanical necessity driven evolutions from hydrogen to humans: cosmological, chemical, bio-macro, socio-cultural. Down that road, lies the sort of conundrum that we find some mechanism that discredits the mind, with Haldane giving a capital example:
"It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. In order to escape from this necessity of sawing away the branch on which I am sitting, so to speak, I am compelled to believe that mind is not wholly conditioned by matter.” [["When I am dead," in Possible Worlds: And Other Essays [1927], Chatto and Windus: London, 1932, reprint, p.209.]
That is, mind transcends matter, or else we have the problems of incoherence as seen. Per the Smith model, we see that a cybernetic entity can be viewed as having an I/O loop controller and using also a higher order supervisory controller. It has been suggested that a level of quantum influence can be used to provide a relevant interface, crossed informationally. Even, computers, are not minds, they are processing engines shaped by minds and using structured interactions on the forces, materials and laws of nature to achieve goals external to the system. As one who has had to design and build in effect embedded systems, I can testify that a processor will happily execute rubbish until it crashes. {ADDED: As in, GIGO.} It seems from your cite that the essential claim being made is: It seems to me that theism (at least, any theism that maintains a mind is responsible for the creation of the Universe) necessitates the idea that a mind can exist without anything else; this seems fundamentally false. On this highly questionable assertion, the following is laid out as case 1:
CIGEC.1: For all entities designated God, that entity had conscious mental states and there were no external objects. CIGEC.2: Representational content is a necessary condition of conscious mental states. CIGEC.3: The existence of external objects is a necessary condition of representational content. CIGEC.3.1: NOTE - Strict internalism about representational content seems challenging given the further state of the discourse. However, a dispute would be possible to challenge (3). CIGEC.4: The existence of external objects is a necessary condition of conscious mental states. (Hypothetical Syllogism; 2, 3) CIGEC.5: Necessarily, for all entities/states of affairs, either there are no external objects or there are conscious mental states. (Material Implication; 4) CIGEC.5.1: Since this is operating in a modal system, the extraction of the necessity operator is important. This seems justified (on with the exclusive 'or' operator) by fact that we are concerned with a necessary condition in (4). CIGEC.6: It is not possible that there is some entity that had conscious mental states and there were no external objects. (Modal Equivalence; 5) CIGEC.7: Therefore, there are no possible entities designated God.
Claim 3 is false and patently false, begging the question. To see why I confidently say this, consider the system of numbers. You are doubtless aware of the barber paradox etc and the dilemmas of naive set theory. In response, the whole project was reconceptualised. Defining, the empty set {} = 0, we then proceed to {0} = 1, {0, 1} = 2, etc. SO, WE HERE HAVE A COUNTABLE INFINITY OF ENTITIES THAT NEEDS NO EXTERNAL REFERENCE. Indeed, that lack of concrete reference is the key to locking out the sort of paradox of indefinability put up by Lord Russell. As in who shaves the barber if he only shaves those who do not shave themselves, in a village where men fall into the classes A: self-shavers, B: barber-shaved, with in addition the stipulation that one cannot be both. Going farther, we define the relationship of equality and the operation of addition, such that for instance we have the truth asserted in 3 + 2 = 5 = 1 + 4 or {***|**} = {*|****}, the | denoting grouping; i.e we have a set of operations and relationships resulting that are in principle wholly internal and provide an example of a necessary being, independent of external causal factors. That is in all possible worlds, this truth obtains, never began and cannot cease. It is eternal. And, obviously, this points to an infinity of such entities. Going on, we can now identify that succession leads to rank ordering. Defining that we can have differing numbers expressed and ranked, we may identify a scale that is first ordinal, then interval, then via appropriate extensions of natural numbers to integers, rationals and irrationals, we may see the continuum as defined on between any two given entities a, c in the chain, there is a third b that is in the relation a LT b LT c. We have continuum, thence we may define sqrt -1 = i, and get to a plane. From a plane we have vectors. From vectors, we have the i,j,k vector system, and a definition of space. From space we may use the succession concept and define time on successive states. We may define points in the space and successive locations, and see that we have kinematics of particles that move in space. We may define concepts of inertia and momentum, thence force and energy, as well as extended bodies with properties and states and trajectories etc. And so forth, all without needing to go outside of a mind. In short, we can have an infinitely rich virtual space with necessary and contingent beings in it, all internal to a mind. Indeed, we do a crude version of this when we create a virtual world by programming. The careers of blind mathematicians would be an analogy to what I am talking about. similarly, the concept of the proverbial IMAGINARY numbers, rooted in sqrt - 1. with -1 already a very abstract entity. Symbolic representation patently can be internal, and it is at least plausible that it can be erected into an infinite virtual cosmos. That, post village barber paradox, is what mathematics is forced to do. The creative genius and power of God, is that he is able to externalise -- oops, INSTANTIATE, where "in him we live and move and have our being" and also "in Him that all things were created, in heaven and on earth, things seen and things unseen . . . all things were created and exist through Him [by His service, intervention] and in and for Him . . . in Him all things consist (cohere, are held together)" as well as that He is "upholding and maintaining and guiding and propelling the universe by His mighty word of power" [Thanks WJM for catching my sloppiness] -- the internal [conceptual] world [as the physical one we observe and experience], freely give it physical existence ex nihilo by act of volition. And of course the empirical data in hand points that way: a singularity at a finitely remote point that then expands into a cosmos, a stretched out thinness, in which we live, move and have our being. And, this wonder holds even through a multiverse speculation. Going beyond, the essential issue is that we do exist as going minded concerns in a physical world, where it is deeply problematic as outlined, to try to deduce or construct mind from strictly material entities. Somewhere along the line, we invariably see a sort of poof-magic, whereby at least some minds and cognitions are held proof to the self-referential challenges. This is the fatal ungrounded exception problem highlighted by Johnson in his reply to Crick's Astonishing Hypothesis discussed in the already linked. We are in addition contingent beings, this being explained in light of the example of a match. As outlined, we have good reason to see that the observed cosmos, and any multiverse that lies beyond it, would be contingent, and fine tuned in ways that facilitate our possibility of existence starting from the living aqueous medium cell in a terrestrial planet. The logical concept of the necessary being is explicable on the lighted match and its on/off factors. That is, what about the possibility of beings that have no such on/off enabling factors? That is non-contingent being? No beginning, no end, live in all possible worlds. Serious candidate no 1, the truth in 3 + 2 = 5. Not impossible, actual, so in all possible worlds, even [physically] empty ones per derivation from the empty set. But this proposition is an abstract, mental object. It points to a mind to hold it, which is what was implicit in the outline on a virtual world above. (And BTW, a mathematically grounded virtual world is one in which obviously mathematics will be pervasive and powerful. As in, behold the "unreasonable" effectiveness of Mathematics.) Going back, we have got to the level of seeing what it means to be a serious candidate necessary being. In that context, let us think on the idea of possibility/impossibility and actuality. A serious candidate is one that we have no good reason to see as contingent, i.e. no on/off switches in sight. Nothing assembled form components, which can therefore be broken up by splitting them up, can be necessary. Including, when those components are atoms. Similarly, nothing that begins or may cease is a candidate. That evidently includes our observed cosmos as not a candidate. Spaghetti monsters, pink unicorns etc -- too often cited as though they were serious counter examples -- all fail these tests. As Craig pointed out, eternal minds and abstract entities are the best serious candidates. Where the point of necessity is, that if something is a serious candidate the issue is now: is this thing possible or impossible, i.e is its existence an inherent absurdity, or is there at least one possible world in which such could be. Once that is so, then there is no possible world -- including the actual one -- where such a being would not be present. As in, e.g., there is no possible world in which there is a falsehood of: 3 + 2 = 5. If a serious candidate necessary being is possible, it is present in all possible worlds and thus the actual one we inhabit. The one who denies the existence of God -- not, just doubts or questions it -- therefore has the challenge to show that it is credible that such a being, involving an eternal mind, is impossible. Philosotroll recognises that and tried. Credibly, failed. Yes, there may be mysteries about how could God create the cosmos or interact with it, bu that does not stop us from seeing tha tit is highly reasonable to accept that such a necessary being is possible and actual. Which comes long before the most direct reason ever so many of us have for accepting the reality of God: we have come to know him through repentance and trust in him, and have had our lives transformed. Indeed, were it not for his intervention at a specific point about 40 years ago that guided my parents to the right doctor, I would not be here to type this today. And there are thousands or millions today and millions across the ages, who have a similar report. I have no more reason to doubt the eternal mind known as God than the mind and heart of my mom, whose willingness to be led to the right doctor ever so many years ago now, saved my life. And, onwards, yes, I think I can cite some reasons to identify him as breaking into our history in redemptive and transforming ways, cf here. KFkairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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F/N: I have put up the Dawkins/Williams debate vid here, courtesy SG. I also wrote a PS to the OP noting that.kairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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By ‘extremely, holistic systems of particular kinds’ you were referring to life – organisms – right? If so, I have a problem with your answer. ‘A universe without such systems (e.g. without the physical laws that permit such systems to emerge) wouldn’t have any life, let alone the sort of life that undergoes Darwinian evolution.’ An universe without organisms wouldn’t contain life? Can you elucidate your point?
I'm more inclined to think that organisms are a special class of complex, holistic systems. Not all complex, holistic systems are autopoeitic. I took it, though, that it's just self-evidently true that every alive is an organism of some kind or other (even micro-organisms like bacteria, right?). (OK, so I don't know what to say about viruses -- I guess they are "quasi-alive"?)
So the emergent mental properties of ‘living animals’ do not disrupt the physical CCP? IOW these properties have no causal effects in the world?
You know, that's a really good point. I might have to severely qualify my defense of the CCP in light of my views about animal agency. Thank you for forcing me to confront this issue head-on!Kantian Naturalist
February 4, 2013
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Q (B): Can ‘extremely, holistic systems of particular kinds’ be explained by Darwinism? A (KN): No, I don’t think that they can be explained by Darwinism — on the contrary, I think that Darwinism presupposes that there are such systems in nature. A universe without such systems (e.g. without the physical laws that permit such systems to emerge) wouldn’t have any life, let alone the sort of life that undergoes Darwinian evolution.
By ‘extremely, holistic systems of particular kinds’ you were referring to life – organisms - right? If so, I have a problem with your answer. 'A universe without such systems (e.g. without the physical laws that permit such systems to emerge) wouldn’t have any life, let alone the sort of life that undergoes Darwinian evolution.' An universe without organisms wouldn’t contain life? Can you elucidate your point?
Q (B): What do you think of physicalism and the causal closure principle? A (KN): On the CCP, I’m torn. On the one hand, I have no reason to deny it and every reason to affirm it. On the other hand, the history of philosophy is littered with the corpses of good science turned into bad metaphysics. So I endorse the CCP, but with some hesitation.
So the emergent mental properties of ‘living animals’ do not disrupt the physical CCP? IOW these properties have no causal effects in the world?Box
February 4, 2013
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I found this really neat little argument while searching for color commentary about the Craig-Rosenberg debate. Context: a couple of times here Kairosfocus has raised the stakes of the theism/atheism debate by giving us Goedel's version of the ontological argument. Like Leibniz's version, it takes as a premise that the existence of God is possible and concludes that the existence of God is necessary. So, KF concludes, the burden is on the atheist to show that the existence of God is impossible. Well, here's a nice little argument that purports to do just that: The "Consciousness" Version of the IGEC Argument, where "IGEC" stands for "the Impossibility of God from Embodied Cognition". This is a much more well-developed version of an argument I tried making here last month. (No, it's not my argument.) The key move concerns mental content externalism: the idea being that our mental contents are partly constituted by our environments. (There's both physical externalism and social externalism. I myself think that physical externalism is true for non-conceptual mental representations, e.g. sensations and perceptions, and that social externalism is true for conceptual mental representations, e.g. beliefs and desires.) If mental content externalism is true, then there could not be a mind which has nothing external to it, and hence nothing like God as traditionally conceived. If it is possible that God exists, then mental content externalism must be false. But, we have some really good reasons to think it's true! Alternatively, it could be that mental content externalism is true for all finite minds, just not true of the infinite mind. But while that's not unattractive, it's problematic for orthodox religion, because it undermines our confidence that we could know what the divine mental states are -- i.e. what it is that God intends, believes, desires, etc. Pushing on that a bit further: if finite minds, for which mental content externalism is true, are the only kinds of minds we can really get a firm handle on, conceptually speaking, then we might be forced to say that the mind of God is a mind only in an analogical sense. (Or, as I would prefer to say, in a metaphorical sense, but ok.) But that too should undermine our confidence that we really know what we're talking about when we talk about God, and while those of mystical bent might welcome that result, those who want a tougher, more demanding metaphysics of the divine might well be out of luck.Kantian Naturalist
February 4, 2013
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In re: Box @ 89:
So what is not reducible to atoms and void?
About "reducibility": I'm generally hesitant to say that anything 'reduces' to anything else. I think of reduction as an epistemological notion, where what is 'reduced' is a theory to another theory. (Sometimes this involves positing a new set of entities, sometimes it doesn't, and the differences matter.) Seen this way, I think that "reduction" is a very high standard to meet, and that cases of successful reduction are rare. For inter-theoretic reduction to succeed, we would need to be able to derive all the statements of the reduced theory from the statements of the more basic theory. But it's not even clear to me that we can, for example, derive the truths of basic chemistry from the truths of atomic physics. Sure, we can explain chemistry in terms of physics -- to some degree! -- but that's a long way from being able to reduce chemistry to physics. As Leiter and Weisberg point out in their review of Nagel, we can't even reduce population genetics to molecular genetics! The really interesting question is, why aren't there more successful reductions in science? Here there are a couple of different answers. It could just be because different theories are partly shaped by different technologies, different techniques of intervening or experimenting, such that the natural phenomena disclosed by a particle accelerator and by an electron microscope are just apples and oranges. Or, it could be because there is real, ontological emergence. Or (as I think) both -- that is because there is real emergence that no one set of techniques and methods will work across the board. (On a related note: is there really such a thing as "the scientific method"? Or is there just a whole bunch of scientific methods? And if the latter, what makes them all scientific? As Richard Rorty once put it, "is natural science a natural kind?")
Living animals have mental and physical properties. The question is: what is your ‘living animal’? Is it itself both non-mental and non-physical but does it have (emergent) physical and mental properties? Or is the living animal itself just physical and are only the mental properties emergent?
I would say that the living animal is just that which perceives, moves, digests, hunts, grazes, mates, etc. -- whatever it does -- and that some of those activities are classed as its "psychological properties" and others as "biological properties". Maybe this is what you want me to say: yes, I do think that, at the end of the day, all of its properties -- psychological, biological, etc. -- do supervene on its physical composition. (Same with rational animals, too.) But that's not going to help us understand much about what it is for something to be a psychological property. The main ones I'm interested in are consciousness, intentionality, and care. These supervene on the physical composition of the whole animal -- I don't think that we can locate them in just the brain all by itself.
You say that mental properties are emergent properties of ‘extremely complex, holistic systems of particular kinds’. Are ‘extremely complex, holistic systems of particular kinds’ mere physical systems subjugated to natural law? Can ‘extremely, holistic systems of particular kinds’ be explained by Darwinism? What do you think of physicalism and the causal closure principle?
Taking these in order: (1) I wouldn't say "subjugated to natural law". I would say that the laws of physics permit the emergence of complex systems, but I'm hesitant to say that the emergence itself is law-governed. Our notion of the laws of nature is based on work done with very simple systems -- balls rolling down-hill, pendulums swinging, and the like. Complex systems just might not have laws. But I don't know. It's a complicated question and I haven't done the research into it that I'd like. I know others have, I know there are answers out there to these questions, but I don't have them on tap. (2) No, I don't think that they can be explained by Darwinism -- on the contrary, I think that Darwinism presupposes that there are such systems in nature. A universe without such systems (e.g. without the physical laws that permit such systems to emerge) wouldn't have any life, let alone the sort of life that undergoes Darwinian evolution. (3) On the CCP, I'm torn. On the one hand, I have no reason to deny it and every reason to affirm it. On the other hand, the history of philosophy is littered with the corpses of good science turned into bad metaphysics. So I endorse the CCP, but with some hesitation.Kantian Naturalist
February 4, 2013
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KN: I think -- and, frankly, with some reluctance -- debates have a very valid place; including in the academy. The Oxbridge tradition (last seen Jan 31, with Dawkins losing) is a testimony to that. Ironically, here, I have the opposite problem, they are seen as an intellectual game and a be all end all. But then I should remember the pendulum lesson on swinging between opposite extremes, with the balance point opposed to all such! KFkairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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Mr. Kantian Naturalist, I do hope you will answer my questions to you in post 89.Box
February 4, 2013
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It is an art, but in the United States these days, it's a rare one. In any event, I offered this only as an explanation of Rosenberg's poor performance, not as an excuse. As Bill Munny said in Unforgiven, when it was pointed out that he just shot an unarmed man, "He should have armed himself if he's going to decorate his saloon with my friend." Well, Craig may have shot an unarmed man, in terms of the clarity of his exposition and argumentative precision, but Rosenberg should have armed himself if he's going to agree to a debate at Biola.
And it seems to me that the form of secularist view that is common out there these days and is rampant per the New Atheists, is scientism.
Yes, and Rosenberg makes his defense of "scientism" quite explicit. (At one point he says he's re-claiming the word as a badge of honor, as gays and lesbians have with "queer".) But, to forestall confusion: one can be a secularist without being an atheist; one can be an atheist without being a naturalist; one can be a naturalist without being scientistic. And even amongst the scientistically-minded, Rosenberg speaks only for himself. Here's an exchange that some of you might find interesting, between Rosenberg and Timothy Williamson (a non-naturalist atheist). Williamson starts off with his "What is Naturalism?", to which Rosenberg replies and on which Williamson then comments.Kantian Naturalist
February 4, 2013
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It's no coincidence that it matches the gospel accounts of Christ's passion and crucifixion to the letter _______ Cf. just above. KFwallstreeter43
February 4, 2013
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Jm , you couldn't be more wrong about the catholic church' and the shroud. The church publicly takes a neutral stance on the shroud because they rightly say that it isn't a need prerequisite to our faith. Privately the last 2 popes have said that they believe in its authenticity,and for good reason, there is a preponderence of evidence in favor of its authenticity. You should read the over 300 peer reviewed research papers on it before you form an opinion on it. _________ WS, pardon but for cause I have asked JM to leave this thread pending an apology and commitment to do better. KFwallstreeter43
February 4, 2013
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KN: Pardon, but I was not speaking of apologetics. Has the academy in North America, much less ordinary schools, lost the art of the debate? (Out here no sixth former would have completed his upper high school education who has not at least seen a few debates. I here remember the debate where the advocate of a certain side had on the back of his prep sheet" "Free cokes!" [Meant as a joke.]) While I am more inclined to the panel type discussion, the debate is a well known and respected form, even a minor art. And it seems to me that the form of secularist view that is common out there these days and is rampant per the New Atheists, is scientism. Which is what AR just wrote a book to explain and promote. KFkairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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Maybe it's "standard" in apologetics, but it's not standard in professional philosophy -- that was the only point I was trying to make there. A much more interesting issue raised in the debate, and one near and dear to my own heart, is the question of intentionality. Rosenberg is an eliminativist about intentionality, which is a pretty extreme view even among naturalists -- most naturalists think that intentionality can be naturalized, although there are a lot of disagreements about how this is to be done (e.g. Churchland vs. Fodor). I found it striking that Craig's view requires that he agree with Rosenberg's arguments -- if intentionality cannot be naturalized, and if we cannot dispense with intentionality, then the case for non-naturalism looks pretty good. Likewise for consciousness, free will, purpose, moral evaluation, etc. In these respects, Rosenberg is the perfect antithesis to Craig. A naturalist who thinks that naturalism can accommodate intentionality, consciousness, and/or agency would be a very different opponent for a non-naturalist or theist, and perhaps a more difficult one.Kantian Naturalist
February 4, 2013
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"Do not give what is holy to the dogs; nor cast your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you in pieces." I don't wish to gainsay the words of scripture, but it looks as if, in this particular public context, God looks with particular care and affection on this his, surely most urbane and avuncular of attack-dogs, the said Professor W L Craig!Axel
February 4, 2013
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KN: Pardon, but I would think that the format had to have been agreed beforehand and is fairly standard. Though, normally, a second would take up some of the slack on the onward phases. But the one on one debate like this is also standard and should be familiar. Where, the issue of precis is there, and that of currency and cogency. Please, don't tell me that Christian answers to Euthyphro, which go back to who, Augustine or before, are not known? Please, the dilemma is fatally handicapped by not properly addressing the sort of being that the God of theism is. Similarly, the case with the problem of evil, deductive form, is astonishing. Even web debaters nowadays know not to go there by and large. As to the ad hominems etc, that speaks for itself. What this all comes across to me as, with all due respect, is that there is a want of understanding that the ideas on such matters have passed on beyond the days of Hume etc. Which speaks volumes, given that we are dealing with a phil prof here who just wrote a work on the atheistical worldview. It looks to me like scientism has so dominated that people have not adequately thought through its foundations and implications, and do not think that serious and informed people can come from a different view. Much less, explored the comparative difficulties analysis at a really serious level. KFkairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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Odious? There's a wonderful expression to describe the response of the whiney new atheists, to the consummate mastery of his subject of the good Professor W L Craig of this parish: 'They're squealing like stick pigs.' Way to go, Bill! Go get 'em!Axel
February 4, 2013
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Perhaps Rosenburgh just saw it as a good opportunity to promote his book? End of.PeterJ
February 4, 2013
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In re: 115,
What is this telling us?
It suggests to me that Rosenberg under-estimated Craig and was under-prepared for a debate format. The latter is not surprising, actually -- professional philosophers never have debates like this. Usually one person will give a lecture for about an hour or so, then there will be a Q&A. Side-by-side lectures-and-responses have been known to happen but they are extremely rare, and they are never as structured as this was: opening remarks I, opening remarks II, rebuttal I, rebuttal II, closing remarks I, closing remarks II. For good or ill, that's not a format that professional philosophers know how to work with. That Rosenberg under-estimated Craig's philosophical acumen -- and the BIOLA audience's education -- is pretty disappointing -- though I can't say that I'm surprised. For example, I'd be willing to bet that most professional philosophers just assume that divine command theory cannot be rescued from the Euthyphro dilemma. And I'm be willing to bet that Rosenberg just doesn't care enough one way or another to examine the details of Craig's response to the Dilemma. What I found utterly baffling is why Rosenberg agreed to the debate in the first place. He clearly did not want to be there. I wonder if he had very different expectations as to what it would be like.Kantian Naturalist
February 4, 2013
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Removed as further derailing. JM knows what he is free to do if he wishes to debate on the subjects he wants to debate, and he knows what he needs to do to return to good standing in threads I own. KFJoeMorreale1187
February 4, 2013
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F/N 2: The second lesson drawn by Weitnauer -- noting that the common adjective now being commonly used by the New Atheists to characterise Dr Craig, as though it were established and undeniable fact that disqualifies him from discussion is "odious." The contrast in the debate gives the lie to this [whatever difficulties on points at issue Dr Craig may or may not have], but the following raises sobering issues for us all:
Dr. Rosenberg started off his opening speech by attacking Dr. Craig’s character! He claimed Dr. Craig doesn’t listen to others, that he doesn’t care about the truth, and that his debate expertise was irrelevant to finding truth. He then claimed that because an overwhelming majority of members in the National Academy of Science are atheists, Dr. Craig’s presentation of important theories in the field are illegitimate. Later, Dr. Rosenberg claimed that if Dr. Craig answered the problem of evil in a certain way, he would be dishonoring his ancestors, who lost their lives in the Holocaust. Wow – does Dr. Rosenberg really believe that Christians cannot even discuss science? And if the case against Christianity is so obvious, why didn’t he just explain it to us? Or is it that there is an intolerant, unreasonable prejudice against Christians in the academy? Beyond the personal attacks, though, was the strangeness of Dr. Rosenberg repeatedly promoting his book. At one point, he propped it up in front of him to make sure it was highly visible to the audience and the cameras. By contrast, Dr. Craig was kind and charitable. He simply ignored the personal attacks. He showed that he had carefully read Dr. Rosenberg’s book and quoted from it many times. He had read Dr. Rosenberg’s interview in the campus newspaper. He explained his opponent’s position with the utmost of clarity, perhaps more clearly than Dr. Rosenberg did, and explained his reasoned objections to those ideas. He looked for places of agreement and acknowledged this common ground. He rose above the pettiness and offered a mature, gracious response. It was clear that Dr. Craig’s worldview has strengthened his character and given him the confidence to be kind and respectful of others, even in a debate format. By contrast, Dr. Rosenberg lacked decency, attacking his opponent’s character and hawking his own book. People notice these differences. Our character is on display. What will it say about our worldview?
I think this is quite relevant too. What are our onward thoughts? What about on the substance? KFkairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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I understand your stricture concerning disrupting the thread, even to digress on the subject of the Shroud, KF, and apologise. However, I would be very grateful if you would permit me to clarify a half-baked musing I posted earlier concerning the terrorist killings of civilians in Africa. While it is true that the prelate I referred to stated that we don't always give out the whole truth, and that in his country, (Kenya, I believe it was) more Moslems had been killed by Christians than vice versa, I don't think there can be the least doubt that such murders would have been in response to unprovoked murderous attacks by militant Moslems in that country, perhaps Taliban. Moreover, while in the past, both religions were spread 'at the edge of the sword' in the Middle Ages, since Vatican II, the Catholic church has acknowledged its shameful and perverse anti-Semitism, as well as expressing profound respect for Islam, as another monotheistic, Abrahamic religion, believed in by millions in good faith, and by no means without producing devout and holy men and women. I remember an old Iraqi whose whole family had been wiped out, replying to the TV interviewer, 'It is the will of Allah. Allah be praised.' However, while the religions of Christianity and Islam have been tainted in the past by the cultures that espoused them, I don't believe that it has ever been an article of their faith for Christian civilians to proselytize by killing anyone of another faith - which, apparently, cannot be said for Islam. Yes, I know, Joe, that any amount of the current Moslem terrorism will have been fomented by the most brutal Western imperialism, but what has been inflicted upon Moslem countries by barbarians in the name of Christianity, in no wise ensues from the tenets of the Christian faith. ____________ Axel, allowed to stand as a final statement, hopefully closing the matter. KFAxel
February 4, 2013
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F/N: In 111 above, BA77 has draw our attention to some lessons drawn from the debate at Reasons for God. Let me clip his first lesson:
Throughout the debate, Dr. Rosenberg presented a wide variety of terrible arguments. (This is probably why he lost the debate: 4-2 by the formal panel, 1390-303 by the audience, 734-59 online). For instance, Rosenberg continued to insist that the logical problem of evil was a substantial problem for Christian theism. However, contemporary philosophers (e.g., Paul Draper and Peter van Inwagen) have pretty widely agreed that the free will defense, pioneered by Alvin Plantinga, has provided a satisfactory rational resolution to the logical problem of evil. Similarly, Rosenberg insisted that there is no way for theists to handle the Euthyphro dilemma. He seemed genuinely perplexed by the substance of Dr. Craig’s divine command theory and perfect being theology. Where did he get the idea that Christians have no answer for these elementary questions? Reddit? The God Delusion? Perhaps he has just gotten away with these caricatures in conversations with Christians at Duke. There is no good reason that high school students headed to college cannot explain why the logical problem of evil is passé or why the Euthyphro Dilemma is a false dilemma. High school youth groups need to set aside the time to study these arguments. I wonder: how many people have lost their faith because of bad arguments? What do you think the secular society is more concerned about? That the Christian youth group has free pizza and electric guitars? Or that they have mastered sound arguments and are known for their love of reason? If you lead a ministry, where is your money, time and energy going? Perhaps they already do, but I challenge the Christians in Dr. Rosenberg’s philosophy classes at Duke to come highly prepared to class, ready to graciously challenge their professor’s naive positions. May this be true of Christians at colleges and workplaces around the world.
What is this telling us? KFkairosfocus
February 4, 2013
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Stephen B; You have corrected nothing my son. Paul by his own admission admitted that his vision could have been from a devil in disguise and is also on record as having practiced the so called Taqiyya that u accuse Muslims of when he said to the Gentile he became a gentile , to the Jew a Jew etc etc Muhammad saws who was illiterate through the envied and unrivalled isnad/ chain of transmission which the compilation of the Bible totally lacks was witnessed on many occasions LIVE by dozens of companions receiving revelation in an inimitable Arabic which is completely different to his speech recorded in the Hadiths. [--> Cf here and here, as well as here. KF] Because I am not allowed to respond anymore on here and my comments will be deleted I invite and challenge you by email where I will refute whatever you have to say point by point If you do not take up the challenge I will have no option but to conclude that you know that your ignorant and convenient distortions and misconceptions will be exposed . __________ I have let this stand, in light of its being a "final" response from JM to SB; there are adequate corrections that are easily accessed above where such accusations were already raised. In addition, this documents the manner in which Dawah advocates too often argue. There are more than sufficient reference sources above to correct what is stated. Beyond this, I will now remove further distractive comments by JM. He knows what he has done, why it is not acceptable, and what he should do in self correction, pretences and projections otherwise notwithstanding. KFJoeMorreale1187
February 4, 2013
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KF: Once again you have showed your discomfort , hatred and intolerance for the truth _______ JM, on the contrary, sadly, it is you who have shown scant regard for basic courtesies and have been unable to do other than put up well-worn talking points that have serious and thoughtful counters that you have never once engaged on the merits with any cogency or substance. I repeat, if you want to debate Dawah talking points and shoot ad hominems [as you again did, and remember it was similar behaviour that led me to intervene with you in the previous thread when you falsely accused some one of fraud then proceeded to accuse missionaries of being liars and seducing manipulators . . . ], you are not welcome to do so in threads I own. You may return to such threads on an apology and a promise to do better. I will let this stand as a token of of your insistence on unreasonable behaviour even at this late stage. The duplicate, I have removed. KFJoeMorreale1187
February 4, 2013
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