Correcting Trollish errors, 2: AK’s “A/Mats are skeptical of extraordinary claims . . . ” (selective hyperskepticism rises yet again)

It is clearly time to hammer selective hyperskepticism again. Here is AK at 49 in the Answering thread:

A/Mats are skeptical of extraordinary claims. And I don’t apologize for that.

BA, UD President (and a lawyer familiar with correcting fallacies) duly hammered the fallacy:

BA, 50 – 53 : >>50: . . . Like the extraordinary claim that a bag of chemicals configured in just the right way suddenly becomes subjectively self-aware?

Funny, I’ve never met an A/Mat who was skeptical of that extraordinary claim. Can you point me to one?

51: . . . Like the extraordinary claim that non-living chemicals spontaneously combined in just the right way to become living things?

Funny, I’ve never met an A/Mat who was skeptical of that extraordinary claim. Can you point me to one?

52: . . . Like the extraordinary claim that everything came from nothing? Or the universe created itself? Or “because we have something (e.g., gravity), the universe can and will create itself from nothing?

Funny, I’ve never met an A/Mat who was skeptical of those extraordinary claims. Can you point me to one?

53: . . . Like the extraordinary claim . . .

Well, you get the picture. I could go on all day.

AK is typical of A/Mats who would impose super heavy evidentiary burdens on theists for what the A/Mats label “extraordinary claims” while at the same time swallowing their own extraordinary claims down with nary a thought for the fact that they lack even the slightest evidentiary support.>>

LM, in 54, focusses on some of the particular claims:

LM, 54: >>I can’t recall any proper skeptics who’ve identified as atheistic materialist. What I see is Epicureans who’ve surrendered skepticism, if they could even find it in the first place.

Materialism as a creed is generally a failure to come to terms with epistemology.

Personally, I think “Forgive thine enemies” would have been more appropriate.

That’s in there, too. But it goes a step further, in actually considering and acting to further the welfare of folks you aren’t getting along with.

I agree that it would require extraordinary wisdom, but I don’t see where the faith in a higher being is necessary.

Hence the junction “or”.

For example, it would have been easy after WWII to severely punish the Germans and Japanese. But cooler (and smarter) heads prevailed. They realized that if you want to prevent recurrence, you don’t do something that will just ingender continued hatred from those who were your enemies. The US approach of providing aid and support to get its enemies back on their feet and prospering is something that took guts. But it was the smart thing to do if the goal was long term peace. And this did not require the faith in a higher being to realize this.

The conflict proceeding immediately in historical terms from the conclusion of “The Great War” and the punitive treaty with Germany, I don’t even know if it could be properly called hindsight.

I very much like your example for the principle, though.>>

AK chooses to reply to LM:

AK, 55: >>LocalMinimum,

I can’t recall any proper skeptics who’ve identified as atheistic materialist.

Look closer.

That’s in there, too. But it goes a step further, in actually considering and acting to further the welfare of folks you aren’t getting along with.

For who’s benefit? If I communicate with and provide support to my past enemies, they are less likely to be future enemies.

[–> BTW, not at all well grounded historically, cf. the consequences of the 1930’s policy of Appeasement, and note the post-WWII generosity came after Germany and Japan were utterly smashed and devastated]

A purely self-serving and manipulative strategy, a strategy that I happen to support.

[–> How do you know that this was “purely” self serving and manipulative? Surely, that’s an extraordinary claim!]

But the bigger question is, why aren’t we using this strategy more often before they become enemies? Rather than take this approach, we invoke sanctions.

I very much like your example for the principle, though.

Thank you. I’m obviously not the complete {SNIP — language, thread owner] that some here would project. I’m looking at you Barry. 🙂>>

I made a response on the underlying principle as to why Cliffordian evidentialism (as popularised by Sagan et al) is fatally flawed:

KF, 56: >>I see your:

A/Mats are skeptical of extraordinary claims,

Which seems to be a compressed form of a common epistemological error, descriptively termed selective hyperskepticism. To see why it is a gross error, simply reflect on the correction:

extraordinary claims require extraordinary [–> ADEQUATE] evidence

In short, the selectively hyperskeptical assertion is a clever-sounding way to announce selective closed-mindedness. What “I” am inclined to agree with is of course not “extraordinary.” But, equally of course, what “I” am disinclined to believe must meet extra-stringent standards, usually calibrated to be beyond the evidence that is available on the question, which is usually a pressing issue.

Such a self-serving double standard on warrant is patently fallacious.

Instead, what is needed is a reasonable, responsible standard, which duly and consistently weighs the sort of evidence and argument that are likely to be available and the near and far, immediate and cumulative consequences of rejecting truth or accepting error on relevant matters.

Greenleaf had something significant to say:

Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [–> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. [–> that is, his focus is on the logic of good support for in principle uncertain conclusions, i.e. in the modern sense, inductive logic and reasoning in real world, momentous contexts with potentially serious consequences.]

Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. [–> the issue of warrant to moral certainty, beyond reasonable doubt; and the contrasted absurdity of selective hyperskepticism.]

The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. [–> moral certainty standard, and this is for the proverbial man in the Clapham bus stop, not some clever determined advocate or skeptic motivated not to see or assent to what is warranted.]

The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. [–> pistis enters; we might as well learn the underlying classical Greek word that addresses the three levers of persuasion, pathos- ethos- logos and its extension to address worldview level warranted faith-commitment and confident trust on good grounding, through the impact of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in C1 as was energised by the 500 key witnesses.]

By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind [–> in British usage, the man in the Clapham bus stop], beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal [–> and responsible] test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [= definition of moral certainty as a balanced unprejudiced judgement beyond reasonable, responsible doubt. Obviously, i/l/o wider concerns, while scientific facts as actually observed may meet this standard, scientific explanatory frameworks such as hypotheses, models, laws and theories cannot as they are necessarily provisional and in many cases have had to be materially modified, substantially re-interpreted to the point of implied modification, or outright replaced; so a modicum of prudent caution is warranted in such contexts — explanatory frameworks are empirically reliable so far on various tests, not utterly certain. ] [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]

I suggest, you need to take an inventory of how you have approached warrant on a list of significant issues that have come up here at UD, and on broader issues in general. Selective hyperskepticism tends to become a destructive, self-serving habit of mind.>>

Now, observe AK’s response and what it inadvertently exposes:

AK, 57: >>KairosFocus,

Which seems to be a compressed form of a common epistemological error, descriptively termed selective hyperskepticism.

Those are big words that appear to preclude an illuminating prognostication that present a counter-argumentative rebuttal of… OK, as the youth say [SNIP-language]? What are you trying to say?

Are you saying that I am being hyperskeptical because I don’t blindly accept your claim that god-did-it?>>

Notice, the invidious projection and implied appeal to “ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked,” when the substantial and quite serious error of selective closed mindedness has been corrected from three directions. Note, too, that BA’s similar correction was turned into you are suggesting that I am a whatever.

At no point has the substantial issue of a key fallacy been actually responsibly, much less adequately, addressed.

I responded further at 58 and 59:

KF: >>58:  I already took time to explain the error and to correct it. If you had even bothered to look at the specific one line correction to Sagan’s form of Cliffordian evidentialism [yes, that is a technical name] — which is the popular one nowadays, you would have seen the corrections in a nutshell by use of strike and insert. I amplified and took time to cite a longstanding corrective from Greenleaf’s Treatise on Evidence. I have done my job, now it is time for you to do yours.

59:

Let me continue from where you so cleverly cut off citation:

>>Which seems to be a compressed form of a common
epistemological error, descriptively termed selective hyperskepticism.
To see why it is a gross error, simply reflect on the correction:

extraordinary claims require extraordinary
[–> ADEQUATE] evidence

In short, the selectively hyperskeptical assertion is a
clever-sounding way to announce selective closed-mindedness. What “I”
am inclined to agree with is of course not “extraordinary.” But,
equally of course, what “I” am disinclined to believe must meet
extra-stringent standards, usually calibrated to be beyond the evidence
that is available on the question, which is usually a pressing issue.>> >>

The response is again inadvertently revealing:

AK, 60: >>I honestly don’t understand what you are on about.

[–> Nope, THREE people have corrected the key error — four if you count Simon Greenleaf (a distinguished jurist on Evidence), this is personalising and targetting, insinuating that I have not made good sense.]

All I said is that I am skeptical of extraordinary claims.

[–> Doubling down, refusing to acknowledge cogent correction]

I am skeptical of Bigfoot, alien abductions,

[–> Notice, the silly examples]

and

[–> And joins equals, so note the fallacy of invidious association. Here, by setting up a string of ill founded claims then appending a far weightier one as though it were of the same order. A strawman tactic.]

the existance of god.

[–> AK cannot even summon enough respect to correctly spell: God. That is itself revealing. And of course, he was long since invited to seriously examine the 101 on warranting a theistic worldview here on, and a similar 101 on the more specifically Christian case here. He gives little sign of any serious engagement, even at 101 level. Okay, God is a serious candidate to be the world-source, a necessary and maximally great being worthy of loyalty and the reasonable, responsible service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. Where, a serious candidate necessary being will either be impossible of being (cf. a square circle) or else possible. If possible, in at least one world. But, as framework to any world existing, a necessary being that is possible will be in all worlds; thus actual in this one. E.g. try to imagine a world without distinct identity, thus two-ness etc.  So, it is not enough to announce that one is selectively hyperskeptical on the reality of God and dismiss it with a fallacious quip. No, the would-be atheist has taken up the epistemological burden to show that either God is not a serious candidate NB, or else that God is impossible of being. A tough row to hoe in either case. AK has shown no evidence of shouldering such, and in an earlier sneer that “evil is a concept fabricated by religion” he has shown that he has not done his homework before using the fallacy of confident manner to rhetorically brush aside serious matters of literally eternal weight.]

At no point did I say

[–> you directly implied, through the known provenance of the quip you used]

that I needed extraordinary evidence to convince me otherwise. Those are words that you put in my mouth, took offence to, and then berated me for.

[–> there is no taking offence or berating, that is projection. There is correction, a very different thing. Now we know how AK views being corrected in an error.]

And you talk about others raising strawmen.

[–> turnabout accusations and projections. As just noted, AK half-cited a popular quip, knowing that the blank would be filled in. As Ari pointed out, in rhetoric, enthymemes are persuasive. This is in part as they induce the audience to participate, filling in missing parts by inference. And, often, unreflectively accepting the claims. No, the correction, from FOUR sources, is on target.]

For any claim, extraordinary or otherwise, all I am looking for is compelling evidence to support them. I haven’t seen any compelling evidence for the existance of god,

[–> have you showed evidence of having seriously interacted with the evidence already presented or linked? No. The pattern speaks louder than the clever talking points.]

or the evils of sex education, contraceptives, homosexuality or same sex marriage. Or for the existance of objective morality, or for the decline of morality and civilization. Maybe compelling evidence exists for all of this, but you certainly have not presented any.

[–> Here, we see a real case of piling up weak claims that are mutually reinforcing in error. The linked worldviews 101 context goes on to address several of them, and of course, these are not addressed by AK. Given the pattern already in evidence, we have no good reason to take AK’s claims seriously. If AK wishes, in addition, to imagine that by word magic, aggressive enemies of civilisation can culturally appropriate marriage and twist it into a counterfeit under false colour of law then imagine that tampering heedlessly with a core institution the family will not have devastating consequences, we have good reason to see that this is just part and parcel of a pattern of reckless behaviour that is just one curlicue of sawdust. But, cumulatively, zip zip zip, he and many others are busily sawing away at the branch on which we all must sit. CRAACK-crash is a serious concern. As for “sex education,” Augustine in City of God long since pointed out the destructive impact of teaching the techniques of vice, i.e. of undermining moral fibre. AK went on a long run on contraception, imagining that I must be Roman Catholic. My mother was a public health educator who dealt with real, responsible family planning and I took time to point out how different forms of contraception are of different merits — I add, not just effectiveness (esp. in the hands of immature and irresponsible teens) some are little more than disguised very early term abortions. I could also point to the

dangers of encouraging risky behaviour with but dubious benefits so that sound cost benefits analysis would counsel, go in another direction. And more, but this is a day when many are hell-bent on folly. It is enough to highlight key examples of the pattern of fallacies.]

When you do, I will reassess my opinions.

[–> Nope, on evidence in hand, you will not do homework, you will not acknowledge correction, you will project and double down. Grade: F.]>>

One slice of a cake has in it all the ingredients. END