What is knowledge? (A response to Popperian)

_{kairosfocus

July 7, 2015

Logic and Reason, rhetoric, worldview}

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ID debates often bring up foundational worldview issues, and the following exchange in the current Answering P thread is also worth headlining:

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P, 62: >>Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained. This includes books, genomes and yes, brains. Furthermore, knowledge is objective in that is is independent of anyone’s belief. So, while I would agree that merely having a belief doesn’t make it true, we have a reason to suppose that our brains can genuinely contain knowledge.

What explanation do you have for the growth of knowledge? Let me guess: the reason why our beliefs may be true is because “that’s just what God must have wanted”?>>

KF, 64: >>Popperian:

Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained.

Gross error of definition.

Knowledge is not stored useful information but well warranted, credibly true belief. That is, responsibly free rational reflection is a condition of knowledge.

Knowledge comes about by a process of reflection, involving interior life and typically external experience and perception. This leads to processes of warrant on exertion of logical and/or empirical tests that lead to sufficient weight of warrant to put the stamp of credibility, knowledge, on. Though, this often comes with the proviso, that the degree of warrant is provisional, such as in science, management, law and many other practical affairs.

You have again set up and tried to knock over a strawman.

Now, of course, knowledge may often be posed in verbal forms or other representations amenable to storage, but that is secondary to what knowledge is.

Error, by contrast, often claims to be knowledge but in the end fails the test of warrant. (Let me add, following Aristotle, that truth says of what is that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.)

Knowledge is one form of reasonable and trustworthy faith.

And, I deliberately use this term to underscore that faith and reason — contrary to commonly seen skeptical notions — are not opposites that are inevitably at war with one another.>>

Box, 65: >>Popperian #62 claims to address KF’s point directly, however he does no such thing. KF’s point is about the process of rational inference. KF clearly shows that this process cannot be a chemical/mechanistic process.

Popperian again fails to address KF’s point.>>

Mung, 66: >>Popperian;

Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained.

And thus the pre-requisites for knowledge are … ?

And the knowledge to construct and integrate the required components for knowledge came from … ?

Since Popper rejected a causal theory of mind, what did he offer in it’s place?>>

C, 68: >>kairosfocus:

Knowledge is not stored useful information but well warranted, credibly true belief. That is, responsibly free rational reflection is a condition of knowledge.

I don’t think that’s the case when we humans speak of knowledge.

Just look at this debate.

If we take knowledge as being something we agree with after rational reflection, then knowledge starts to become a point of view.

For instance, at one time it was said that light travels in a straight line but it has been proved that isn’t the case.

Was the fact that light traveled in a straight line knowledge or an opinion?>>

C, 70: >> . . . The dispute is whether what we call “knowledge” changes.

Please try to understand the analogy.

What was considered “knowledge” was “error” in this case.

At one time, our pool of “knowledge” included the fact that the Earth was only a few thousand years old.

That “knowledge” has been replaced by the new “knowledge” that the Earth is billions of years old.

That previous “knowledge” was an “error”.>>

KF, 71: >>Carpathian,

do you consider scientific or historical knowledge, etc. to be knowledge?

If so, you are forced to a weak form view of knowledge that does not demand absolute certainty or incorrigibility. That is, the relevant degree of warrant for many fields of responsible practice or prudent behaviour is some type of moral certainty.

In sum, if X is warranted to this degree, it would be irresponsible or foolish to act as though it were false, never mind that you are open to possibility of correction. In short, knowledge in this sense is a certificate of reasonable, responsible trustworthiness. Not, a guarantee that what we think we know at any given point is beyond possibility of needing correction.

If instead you insist on absolute certainty, the field of knowledge would collapse to a very sparse set indeed. In particular, science, history, jurisprudence, economics and a good slice of mathematics post Godel’s incompleteness theorems would collapse.>>

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Yes, what is knowledge lurks under the debates on ID. END

Comments

PS: On emotions, kindly cf here in context from OP on: https://uncommondescent.com/ethics/science-worldview-issues-and-society/answering-popperians-challenge-why-doesnt-someone-start-out-by-explaining-how-human-beings-generate-emotions-then-point-out-how-the-universality-of-computation-does-not-fit-that-explana/#comment-570995kairosfocus_{July 8, 2015
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Popperian, please. It is easy to construct an entity where a bloc of information that is error or noise or nonsense can play a causal role in its retention, by suitable programming for instance. Cases in which such information are in fact knowledge will invariably meet the criteria for being so warranted as to be credibly true and treated as such -- i.e. believed for good reason at some level in the origin and operation of the system. KFkairosfocus_{July 8, 2015
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KF: Popperian, knowledge is simply not stored information. It may involve such but error and nonsense or noise can also be stored information and may play a role in that stored pattern being retained; such an arrangement is easy to implement and would in no wise constitute knowledge. I did not merely say stored information. I said information that, when stored in a storage medium, plays a causal role in that information being retained. For example, it solves a problem, even if my belief is otherwise, Again, you're ignoring the unification aspect. I'm not using knowledge in the traditional sense that it only applies to knowing subjects. See Popper's Objective Knowledge. Furthermore, note that you're effectively saying there are good reasons to think that knowledge represents beliefs we hold for good reasons. Rather, I'm saying the complete opposite. Knowledge starts out as a guess, and becomes less wrong over time. You're suggesting it moves in the entirely different direction, starting from some good reason. My quote referred to any sort of positive support, which includes the idea that a belief is warranted. I think what is at play here in this thread, and the thread you you derived it from, is the idea that, at least some level, there must be an infallible source that we can ultimately turn to. But it's unclear how this works, in practice. Our experiences can be mistaken. And, even when we find a criticism that shows them in error, the mistaken experience can return when the criticism is removed. For example, see the Two Tables Illusion. Even when we remove the lines that show the tables are the same length, the illusion returns. IOW, in both threads, it seems to me that people based their point of view about AI and knowledge on the assumption that their experience must be such that it cannot be incorrect. It plays that infallible role. Apparently, knowledge must be warranted because that's what we experiences doing. So, this supposedly trumps criticism of any other kind. The same can be said about emotions. It's unclear how the fact that I currently cannot experience your emotions indicates that this limitations will always be true any more than any other limitation we've faced.Popperian_{July 8, 2015
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Popperian, knowledge is simply not stored information. It may involve such but error and nonsense or noise can also be stored information and may play a role in that stored pattern being retained; such an arrangement is easy to implement and would in no wise constitute knowledge. Nor, will mere agreement or disagreement or debate change that. There is good reason, by contrast, to hold that knowledge is warranted, credibly true belief. KF PS: The specific choice of warrant rather than justification and reference to Gettier counter examples (as in, there is familiarity with Epistemology, on which you suggest a strawman by artful phrasing as though we are ignorant of this discipline . . . ) should have cued you that I am not giving a subjectivist presentation. PPS: Useful initial discussions: IEP: http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ SEP: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ Routledge: https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/epistemology --> This last has a well-posed framework:
There is a vast array of views about propositional knowledge, but one virtually universal presupposition is that knowledge is true belief, but not mere true belief (see Belief and knowledge). For example, lucky guesses or true beliefs resulting from wishful thinking are not knowledge. Thus, a central question in epistemology is: what must be added to true beliefs to convert them into knowledge?
In short, what gives you a right to certify a given belief as credibly true and trustworthy? That, is warrant.kairosfocus_{July 8, 2015
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Popperian:
Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained.
KF:
Gross error of definition. Knowledge is not stored useful information but well warranted, credibly true belief. That is, responsibly free rational reflection is a condition of knowledge.
There is an entire field of philosophy devoted to knowledge, and that is just one view of many. So, it's unclear how you can say it's a gross error of definition. Furthermore, as Popper and Bartley pointed out, there are significant problems with that view. While I don't have time to elaborate this morning, Popper suggests that people are mistaken about how knowledge grows. It may seem like you are justifying a belief but, in reality, no such principle has been developed that would allow us to do so, in practice. As such, we must be mistaken about it. From the Wikipedia entry on Critical Rationalism...
William Warren Bartley compared critical rationalism to the very general philosophical approach to knowledge which he called "justificationism". Most justificationists do not know that they are justificationists. Justificationism is what Popper called a "subjectivist" view of truth, in which the question of whether some statement is true, is confused with the question of whether it can be justified (established, proven, verified, warranted, made well-founded, made reliable, grounded, supported, legitimated, based on evidence) in some way.
As for my definition, progress can often take the form of unification. That is, seemly unrelated phenomena are explained by new or common theory that is generalized. This is what I'm suggesting Popper did in the field of epistemology; develop a universal theory for the growth of knowledge. KF:
Knowledge comes about by a process of reflection, involving interior life and typically external experience and perception. This leads to processes of warrant on exertion of logical and/or empirical tests that lead to sufficient weight of warrant to put the stamp of credibility, knowledge, on. Though, this often comes with the proviso, that the degree of warrant is provisional, such as in science, management, law and many other practical affairs.
Again, I don't have time to elaborate, but I would point you to a contrasting description from the same WP entry.
Critical rationalists hold that scientific theories and any other claims to knowledge can and should be rationally criticized, and (if they have empirical content) can and should be subjected to tests which may falsify them. Thus claims to knowledge may be contrastingly and normatively evaluated. They are either falsifiable and thus empirical (in a very broad sense), or not falsifiable and thus non-empirical. Those claims to knowledge that are potentially falsifiable can then be admitted to the body of empirical science, and then further differentiated according to whether they are retained or are later actually falsified. If retained, further differentiation may be made on the basis of how much subjection to criticism they have received, how severe such criticism has been, and how probable the theory is, with the least[5] probable theory that still withstands attempts to falsify it being the one to be preferred. That it is the least[5] probable theory that is to be preferred is one of the contrasting differences between critical rationalism and classical views on science, such as positivism, who hold that one should instead accept the most probable theory. (The least probable theory is the one with the highest information content and most open to future falsification.) Critical Rationalism as a discourse positioned itself against what its proponents took to be epistemologically relativist philosophies, particularly post-modernist or sociological approaches to knowledge. Critical rationalism has it that knowledge is objective (in the sense of being embodied in various substrates and in the sense of not being reducible to what humans individually "know"), and also that truth is objective (exists independently of social mediation or individual perception, but is "really real").
IOW, merely saying I've made a "gross error of definition" assumes there is obviously only for which everyone agrees on and for which there is no significant unanswered criticism, so I must be mistaken. But that simply isn't the case.Popperian_{July 8, 2015
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Intelligence is irreducible to matter. It is a separate causation category. Intelligence, in my opinion, is the capability of making pragmatic choices. The choice is made from among physically equivalent dynamic equilibrium states. Because physicality is indifferent to pragmatics, it cannot give rise to intelligence. Physicality can produce only order, chaos and phase transitions between the two. I think that is the gist of ID if you remove all details. Intelligence can be instantiated into matter to a degree, which enables AI. However, I see no reason for the strong AI hyper-optimism Mapou is demonstrating. All AI is doing is postpone and re-delegate decision making to a machine. A program being executed (even a non-deterministic one) just unravels the decision making already carried out by the programmer. I think that a program (machine) will never acquire an inner 'self'.EugeneS_{July 8, 2015
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Mung, a case of ROM-brains? Maybe we need to switch to EAROMs or FLASH? Surgically install a USB port? KFkairosfocus_{July 8, 2015
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F/N2: Greenleaf on the error of the skeptic:
[26] . . . It should be observed that the subject of inquiry [i.e. evidence relating to the credibility of the New Testament accounts] is a matter of fact, and not of abstract mathematical proof. The latter alone is susceptible of that high degree of proof, usually termed demonstration, which excludes the possibility of error . . . The error of the skeptic consists in pretending or supposing that there is a difference in the nature of things to be proved; and in demanding demonstrative evidence concerning things which are not susceptible of any other than moral evidence alone, and of which the utmost that can be said is, that there is no reasonable doubt about their truth . . . . If, therefore, the subject [were] a problem in mathematics, its truth [would] be shown by the certainty of demonstrative evidence. But if it is a question of fact in human affairs, nothing more than moral evidence can be required, for this is the best evidence which, from the nature of the case, is attainable. Now as the facts, stated in Scripture History, are not of the former kind, but are cognizable by the senses, they may be said to be proved when they are established by that kind and degree of evidence which, as we have just observed, would, in the affairs of human life, satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man. [Testimony of the Evangelists, Sections 26, 27, emphases added.]
With a slight generalisation, this is a good definition of selective hyperskepticism: to demand an inconsistent and unreasonable standard of warrant for what one is inclined to reject, vs what is typically acceptable for other cases of similar class. Especially as regards empirical matters or historical/forensic matters. KFkairosfocus_{July 8, 2015
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Mapou, of course we have our minds made up. We're computers after all. And not even very bright ones at that.Mung_{July 7, 2015
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Mapou,
Mapou: Ok, I now know that there is nothing left to be gained in this thread by any of us since we all have our minds made up.
Again, you are unable to provide any counter-argument. At exactly that moment you decide to leave the thread. It has become a tradition. It's pretty annoying though that the next time you will proceed as if nothing happened.Box_{July 7, 2015
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Ok, I now know that there is nothing left to be gained in this thread by any of us since we all have our minds made up. May the best intelligence hypothesis win in the end. I just have one little crackpot prediction to make and I'll be on my way. Crackpot prediction hat on. In the not too distant future, the secret of the brain and intelligence (and thus the secret of AI) will be revealed to the world. It will come from the one place that neither Christians nor atheists would suspect. It has been there for centuries, millenia even. It has been there in the open for everybody to see, all over the world. It's a scientific secret that has been translated into hundreds of languages. Millions have read it and have not understood its true meaning. It is written in a metaphorical language that could only be deciphered in our times. It is a detailed description and explanation of the functioning of intelligence, consciousness and the brain. So where is this little secret that will change the world, you ask? Answer: It is in the book of Revelation and the first six chapters of the book of Zechariah. Crackpot prediction hat off. So there you go. Take or leave it. And, by all means, laugh. Hell, it makes me laugh too. LOL.Mapou_{July 7, 2015
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I hasten to add, Mapou, that my attitude during liturgical celebrations, such as the Mass, is quite different. I see us being on a kind of military parade... where I've got to try and do a whole lot better than when I was in the army. It's not a penance for me though, as the Mass is very much alive, like the Cenacle, though, not Calvary - and I'm a little baffled when I read youngsters saying how bored they are by it. They probably need to develop their prayer life a little more.Axel_{July 7, 2015
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'The knowledge that the cerebellum uses to do its thing is acquired over a lifetime. It is unconscious knowledge. It has nothing to do with credibility or beliefs or any such thing.' I believe it is called the 'autonomic intelligence', Mapou, though I believe I saw a similar term very recently. But there is a Person you and I know who is not of this world, who designed the cerebellum, powers it, and generally oversees its functioning. Not a hair falls from our heads without His foreknowledge. I don't know whether it was here or in a Catholic blog, but I read that God was not a person, but more than a person, being transcendental. Well, that is as it may be, but the reality is not that God's 'personhood' is left behind, superseded, but rather, is all the more intensified. Although it may not be generally recognised by scholars, that is the main point Jesus is making in some of his parables. Our God's love for us is ultra personal, more like that of Irene Handel in British films than a legalistic martinet. More like that mother hen, Jesus evoked as he wept over Jerusalem, than samadhi or nirvana.Axel_{July 7, 2015
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Mapou,
Mapou: Not only do I believe that machine can be intelligent, they already are intelligent within narrow domains,
There is no “they” who are anything. Obviously there is no person in the computer and neither is the computer a person.
Mapou: and they will become just as intelligent as you and I and even more so. They will speak and understand your words.
There is no understanding, because there is ‘no one home’. Only a person can understand. Secondly there is no understanding because there can be no rationality. Computationalism cannot ground rationality for the same reason that materialism cannot ground rationality.
Reppert. . . . let us suppose that brain state A, which is token identical to the thought that all men are mortal, and brain state B, which is token identical to the thought that Socrates is a man, together cause the belief that Socrates is mortal. It isn’t enough for rational inference that these events be those beliefs, it is also necessary that the causal transaction be in virtue of the content of those thoughts . . . [[But] if naturalism is true, then the propositional content is irrelevant to the causal transaction that produces the conclusion, and [[so] we do not have a case of rational inference. In rational inference, as Lewis puts it, one thought causes another thought not by being, but by being seen to be, the ground for it. But causal transactions in the brain occur in virtue of the brain’s being in a particular type of state that is relevant to physical causal transactions.
If a computer outputs “Socrates is mortal” it will do so on other grounds than we do — not for reasons of propositional content. Not only are those ‘other grounds’ non rational they are also not to be trusted—are probably inappropriate in other contexts.Box_{July 7, 2015
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Axel, Not only do I believe that machine can be intelligent, they already are intelligent within narrow domains, and they will become just as intelligent as you and I and even more so. They will speak and understand your words. They will prepare you breakfast, lunch and dinner. They will clean the house and the yard, wash your clothes, mow your lawn and do all your work for you. I believe this, not because of some hard to decipher or impossibly nuanced reason that nobody can put a finger on. I believe it for the simple reason that intelligence has to do with changing phenomena and patterns. If it changes, it is physical. Did you know that your brain has its own robot internally that it uses all the time? You would find it impossible to function properly without this robot. It handles all kinds of complex behaviors for you automatically without you even being aware if it. This powerful unconscious robot is called the cerebellum. Without it, you would not be able to stand or even sit down at a cocktail party and carry on a conversation. Without it, you would not be able to read this comment because your would fall on the floor as soon as your mind focused on your computer screen. Your cerebellum is what maintains your balance and your posture among a myriad of other things it does in the background. It can even drive your car for you while you're fumbling with the smartphone. The knowledge that the cerebellum uses to do its thing is acquired over a lifetime. It is unconscious knowledge. It has nothing to do with credibility or beliefs or any such thing.Mapou_{July 7, 2015
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F/N: Notice how Simon Greenleaf begins his Treatise on Evidence, Vol I Ch 1:
Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [--> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]
This brings out many of the subtleties I am pointing to; in a context of the highest moment -- sometimes, with one's life or liberty on the line. This is also the context of thought that exposes what he termed the error of the skeptic, and which I have descriptively labelled selective hyperskepticism. KFkairosfocus_{July 7, 2015
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Andre, right. Cf 16 and 17 -- with added PS. KFkairosfocus_{July 7, 2015
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Mapou I think it was Plato that called it justified true belief and it has to do with believing something to be true but also having to justify why it is true.Andre_{July 7, 2015
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Box, that is why I have pointed out that we usually use knowledge in a sense that while indicating high credibility to the point of moral certainty, does not deliver incorrigible or absolute certainty. Knowledge -- especially empirically based knowledge -- is by and large a faith-venture, but a responsible one; believing and trusting for good but not absolute reason are a part and parcel of knowledge in the everyday sense; which I sometimes call a soft form. The things we can know to absolute, incorrigible or self-evident certainty, are but few. Post Godel, not even most of Mathematics will fit in there. KF PS: It is worth noting that the Gk word for rhetorical proof is the same term that appears in the NT as the term often translated "faith": Pistis. A classic context is:
2 Tim 3: 10 You, however, have followed my teaching, my conduct, my aim in life, my faith, my patience, my love, my steadfastness, 11 my persecutions and sufferings that happened to me at Antioch, at Iconium, and at Lystra—which persecutions I endured; yet from them all the Lord rescued me. 12 Indeed, all who desire to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be persecuted, 13 while evil people and impostors will go on from bad to worse, deceiving and being deceived. 14 But as for you, continue in what you have learned and have firmly believed [or, of which you are [firmly] convinced, etc: epistethes], knowing from whom you learned it 15 and how from childhood you have been acquainted with the sacred writings, which are able to make you wise for salvation through faith [--> pisteos] in Christ Jesus. 16 All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, 17 that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work.
kairosfocus_{July 7, 2015
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Mapou, Start with the classical view: justified, true belief. Add, truth is what says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Belief, here, means some relevant responsibly free intelligent subject accepts something as true. But that may not be reasonably warranted, even if true. It is possible to believe a true thing without adequate warrant. Mix in Gettier and the softening where we speak of things that are warranted to some degree of moral certainty but are open to the possibility of error. As is so for most real world knowledge. We then see that justification (as in I am personally justified . . . ) broadens to warrant in principle accessible to others. Warrant to some responsible degree of certainty [= some degree of moral certainty] then makes what one is inclined to accept as true to be credible . . . reasonable, reliable or trustworthy, worth acknowledging. So, one has good grounds to accept as true though not necessarily absolute certainty, grounds that are sufficiently broad to be beyond the Gettier issue of internally justified but on a wider view not warranted. One actually does live up to responsibility and accepts as true. One then knows in the relevant soft-form sense: warranted, credibly true belief. KFkairosfocus_{July 7, 2015
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Kairosfocus, correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't your main point that knowledge cannot exist distinct from an intelligent agent? A person who 'holds' the knowledge by 'responsibly free rational reflection'? If so, I have to say that Mapou (#11) has a point here: such a person could still be mistaken about certain things. IOW knowledge can be "bad knowledge".Box_{July 7, 2015
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'“Credibly true belief”? What the heck is that? A belief is a belief whether it is true or not and it is knowledge either way. We all walk around with false assumptions all the time. It’s bad knowledge but it’s knowledge.' This is where you err, Mapou. You so want to believe in machine intelligence you anthropomorphize. 2 + 2 = 5 is not knowledge. By equalling '5', those symbols on the left might as well not exist at all. They are meaningless. Even if the sum on the right had been '4', it would still not have been knowledge, but merely information for such as have the ability to understand the symbols, i.e. human beings - and what they represent. In 'a credibly true belief', the belief belongs to what we might call the first subject, but that it is believable to others is a matter of its general credibility. The first subject already believes it, so the question of its credibility in his regard does not arise. The first subject might be grossly mistaken, though, so that it is, in fact, neither true, nor credible to others who can see its folly.Axel_{July 7, 2015
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It is the information, necessarily intelligible to him, acquired by a person. A person, because the human soul, with it personal will, is the means of its acquisition and its repository. No person: no knowledge.Axel_{July 7, 2015
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A belief is a belief whether it is true or not and it is knowledge either way. Well, that about sums it up. And they became wise by believing a lie.Mung_{July 7, 2015
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kairofocus, Your choice of descriptive words baffles me. I'm sure you are trying to make a subtle point but it is not getting across. "Credibly true belief"? What the heck is that? A belief is a belief whether it is true or not and it is knowledge either way. We all walk around with false assumptions all the time. It's bad knowledge but it's knowledge. My speech recognition program stores sensory data in two hierarchical storage structures (memory), one for concurrent patterns and the other for sequences of patterns. Knowledge is built by observing repeated temporal data coming from multiple sensory streams. The brain reuses this knowledge to make inferences on future incoming audio data. It's knowledge any way you look at it, no? My point is this: Why complicate things with obscure, unnecessary, philosophically sounding nuances? Knowledge is a type of recording that can be played back and acted on, period. It can be recorded in books, vinyl records, computer memory or biological neurons. It's not as esoteric as you make it sound, IMO.Mapou_{July 7, 2015
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Maopu, Data and storage are not knowledge. Truth is not knowledge. Information is not knowledge. Knowledge is warranted, credibly true belief. In the case of visual information, yes there is processing and storage, but the proper sense in which what we see is valid as knowledge is when correctly working senses are operating in a suitable environment in a situation where we have high confidence [usually on experience] that the perceived world is materially true to life. Never mind that our visual response is not flat across the spectrum so that colours as perceived are not a simple match to spectral response as sensed by a more flatly responsive instrument. Likewise intensity is a roughly logarithmic response, something modelled by the Weber-Fechner law. KFkairosfocus_{July 7, 2015
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In my work, knowledge is simply a temporal representation of sensory data in a hierarchical storage structure. Since sensory data is rarely perfect, the knowledge stored is largely inferred by the cortex from previous experience. And example is the blind spot in our retina. We rarely notice it because the brain is able to do a little magic called pattern completion, which consists of filling missing data. So knowledge is inherently predictive.Mapou_{July 7, 2015
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Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained. Let's assume that this is the case. Then knowledge is singular and particular and never shared. It is not objective. There is no scientific knowledge.Mung_{July 7, 2015
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Harry: Knowledge of how to create a huge explosion and understanding the meaning of doing so are two entirely different things. Knowing how to genetically modify plants and animals we eat by inserting into their DNA the DNA of another kind of living thing is not the same as understanding the meaning of doing so.
This distinction between knowledge vs understanding and meaning doesn't seem helpful when we try to define "knowledge". IMO knowledge of DNA engineering is knowledge and implies understanding of e.g. the (functional) meaning of DNA code. No knowledge without understanding and meaning. Knowledge without understanding and meaning is something like an unknown Chinese character. Knowledge about the ethical consequences of DNA engineering is obviously also knowledge. In general: different contexts leads to different questions and answers—and therefore different knowledge.Box_{July 7, 2015
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Knowledge is information that, when embedded in a storage medium, plays a causal role in it being retained. Sounds like an attempt at an operational definition.Mung_{July 7, 2015
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