L&FP, 67: So-called “critical rationalism” and the blunder of denying [defeat-able] warrant for knowledge

_{kairosfocus

March 25, 2023

Academic Freedom, Agitprop, knowledge, Logic and Reason}

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“Critical Rationalism” is the name Karl Popper (1902-1994) gave to a modest and self-critical rationalism. He contrasted this view with “uncritical or comprehensive rationalism,” the received justificationist view that only what can be proved by reason and/or experience should be accepted. Popper argued that comprehensive rationalism cannot explain how proof is possible and that it leads to inconsistencies. Critical rationalism today is the project of extending Popper’s approach to all areas of thought and action. In each field the central task of critical rationalism is to replace allegedly justificatory methods with critical ones.

A common summary of this is that it replaces knowledge as justified, true belief, with “knowledge is unjustified untrue unbelief.” That is, we see here the ill advised privileging of hyperskepticism.

The quick answer is to update our understanding, based on how well informed people of common good sense generally use “knowledge.” Knowledge is a term of the people, not some abstruse, rarefied, dubious philosophical notion. And it is a term that is sound,

Namely, and following Plantinga, Gettier and others, knowledge is warranted, credibly true [and reliable] belief, i.e. it includes strong form cases where what is known is absolutely certain, AND a wider, weaker sense where what we claim to know is tested and found reliable, but is open to correction for cause. Newtonian dynamics counted as knowledge before the rise of modern physics and with modification to recognise limitations it still counts as knowledge. This is a paradigm case.

But doesn’t that come down to the same thing as critical rationalism and its focus on what is hard to criticise as what counts for now as “knowledge”?

Not at all.

First, the confident but open to correction spirit of warrant and tested reliability is utterly different from the cramped, distorted thought that naturally flows from the blunder of privileging selective or even global hyperskepticism.
Second, inference to the best explanation and wider observational, inductive approaches — the vast majority of common, day to day knowledge and professional practice — is not put under the chilling effect of dismissive, undue suspicion.
Third, knowledge is accepted as a commonplace phenomenon, not a privilege of the elite few, undermining the subtext of contempt that reeks out of far too much of skeptical discussion.

And if you imagine these considerations are of little weight, that is because you are part of the problem. END

Comments

@Ori I seem to have missed the comment when you explained how you've infallibly achieved each of the steps listed in #140? Inquiring minds want to know. Actually, since you seem incapable of keeping track of positions you find objectionable beyond a comment, if even that, I'll just list them here for you.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we assume there are infallible sources, how do we have infallible access to them in a way that their supposed infallibility can actually help us? – How could you infallibly identify a supposed infallible source, out of all possible sources? – If you managed that, how could you infallibly interpret that infallible source? – And if you manage that, how could you infallibly determine when to defer to that infallible source? IOW, any infallibly in a proposed infallible source cannot help us before our fallible human reasoning and problem solving has had its say. [...] After all, a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. So, assuming a source is infallible at the start doesn’t help [if you lack infallible access to it]. Right?
critical rationalist_{March 31, 2023
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@146
It’s a definition, not a theorem.
The sentences of arithmetic, including "2+2=4", are deduced from the Peano axioms. Russell and Whitehead demonstrated how to deduce the Peano axioms from set theory. In that sense, every sentence of arithmetic is a theorem of set theory. @147
No one has suggested, that what is certain is an infallible source of itself. Rather the existence of certain knowledge logically implies the existence of the distinct infallible source of that knowledge. Put differently, what is certain, that is an item of certain knowledge, can only result from a distinct infallible source.
Firstly, I deny that there's anything rightly called "certain knowledge". There are things of which we are certain, but they cannot count as knowledge for precisely that reason. (Cf my argument in 145). Secondly, I don't see how there could be a logical argument that takes the fact of certainty as a premise and has an infallible source of knowledge as a conclusion. But that is precisely what you committed yourself to when you said "the existence of certain knowledge logically implies the existence of the distinct infallible source of that knowledge". If the fact of certainty logically implies that there are infallible source of knowledge, then what's the deductively valid argument that has the fact of certainty as a premise and infallible sources of knowledge as the conclusion?PyrrhoManiac1_{March 31, 2023
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PM1@
PM1: I fully agree that there are no infallible sources of knowledge and that ….
Ori: It follows that you do not infallibly know that you exist. In your view, it is possible that you do not exist. Also, you do not know for certain that 2+2=4, that A=A, truth exists, and error exists. Correct?
PM1: I did not deny that there are some things about which I am certain. I only denied that there are any infallible sources of knowledge. I think it is a profound error to think that what is certain can be an infallible source of knowledge.
That would be a profound error, but this is confused. No one has suggested, that what is certain is an infallible source of itself. Rather the existence of certain knowledge logically implies the existence of the distinct infallible source of that knowledge. Put differently, what is certain, that is an item of certain knowledge, can only result from a distinct infallible source.Origenes_{March 31, 2023
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But 2+2=4, like all theorems of mathematics, is proven.
It's a definition, not a theorem.jerry_{March 31, 2023
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@144
It follows that you do not infallibly know that you exist. In your view, it is possible that you do not exist. Also, you do not know for certain that 2+2=4, that A=A, truth exists, and error exists. Correct?
I did not deny that there are some things about which I am certain. I only denied that there are any infallible sources of knowledge. I think it is a profound error to think that what is certain can be an infallible source of knowledge. My chief reason for thinking this is that one can be certain of that which it makes no sense to doubt: that doubt is simply unintelligible. But knowledge and doubt are intelligible contraries: it makes sense to doubt what one thinks one knows, or to doubt what someone else claims to know, or to respond to doubt with a demonstration of what is known. In short: it makes sense to doubt in the context of knowledge. Doubt has an intelligible foot-hold here. But doubt has no intelligible foothold when it comes to certainty. Hence, certainty and knowledge live in different 'boxes', if you will. The one has nothing to do with the other. And so nothing that is certain can serve as an infallible source of knowledge. There is also a difference, which you seem to overlook, between what cannot be doubted and what has been proven. I cannot conceive of doubting my own existence whilst engaged in the activity of conceiving of it, and I cannot conceive of my being impervious to correction about whatever is not certain ("error exists"). But 2+2=4, like all theorems of mathematics, is proven. It follows with deductive necessity from the axioms of arithmetic. Can I conceive of the possibility that future mathematicians could call those axioms into question? I don't know what that would look like. Then again, the axioms of Euclidean geometry seemed unquestionable for thousands of years until it was demonstrated that equally consistent systems could be constructed without the Parallel Postulate.PyrrhoManiac1_{March 31, 2023
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PM1 @143
I fully agree that there are no infallible sources of knowledge and that ....
It follows that you do not infallibly know that you exist. In your view, it is possible that you do not exist. Also, you do not know for certain that 2+2=4, that A=A, truth exists, and error exists. Correct?Origenes_{March 31, 2023
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@142 I fully agree that there are no infallible sources of knowledge and that fallibilism (about both empirical and formal knowledge) is the right way to proceed. I come to fallibilism via American pragmatism (Peirce, Dewey, Quine, Sellars) rather than via Popper, but the spirit is much the same. That said, I think I am still genuinely puzzled as to why justification is paired with infallibilism. It seems plausible enough to say that a scientific theory is warranted, justified, etc. if it has been tested numerous times and been revised in light of failures in the direction of more comprehensive and more productive explanations. (Maybe this is where I follow Lakatos and his idea of "progressive research programs" more than Popper.) In any event, the association between infallibilism and justification doesn't make sense to me -- I'm happy enough to reject infallibilism root-and-branch, but why throw away the baby with the bathwater?PyrrhoManiac1_{March 31, 2023
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The interesting question for me is why Popper would say that having survived iterated testing does not count as a form of justification. That is perhaps where I find myself resisting to how Critical Rationalist is presenting Popper’s views.
From this article, yet again....
Fallibilism has practical consequences for the methodology and administration of science, and in government, law, education, and every aspect of public life. The philosopher Karl Popper elaborated on many of these. He wrote:
The question about the sources of our knowledge . . . has always been asked in the spirit of: ‘What are the best sources of our knowledge—the most reliable ones, those which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn, in case of doubt, as the last court of appeal?’ I propose to assume, instead, that no such ideal sources exist—no more than ideal rulers—and that all ‘sources’ are liable to lead us into error at times. And I propose to replace, therefore, the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely different question: ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’
It’s all about error. We used to think that there was a way to organize ourselves that would minimize errors. This is an infallibilist chimera that has been part of every tyranny since time immemorial, from the “divine right of kings” to centralized economic planning. And it is implemented by many patterns of thought that protect misconceptions in individual minds, making someone blind to evidence that he isn’t Napoleon, or making the scientific crank reinterpret peer review as a conspiracy to keep falsehoods in place.
So, its not that knowledge doesn't exist, it just doesn't take the form you think it does. Again, this is why this discussion will go nowhere because you’ve defined knowledge as justified, true belief, even if in some weaker attempt at salvaging it in form of warrant, credences, etc.
Consider this: if there are no valid sources of knowledge, then we have no access to knowledge. I worry about this assumption.
As you should. This is not critical rationalism, BTW. This a false dilemma. And a rather problematic one.
The theory of knowledge is a tightrope that is the only path from A to B, with a long, hard drop for anyone who steps off on one side into “knowledge is impossible, progress is an illusion” or on the other side into “I must be right, or at least probably right.” Indeed, infallibilism and nihilism are twins. Both fail to understand that mistakes are not only inevitable, they are correctable (fallibly). Which is why they both abhor institutions of substantive criticism and error correction, and denigrate rational thought as useless or fraudulent. They both justify the same tyrannies. They both justify each other.
critical rationalist_{March 30, 2023
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@139
Remember that, according to Popper, there is only unjustifiable conjecture. I take it that you would agree with me, that conjecture is not knowledge.
Bearing in mind that I am no Popperian -- I would of course agree that mere conjecture is not knowledge. But of course it is not Popper's view that all we have is mere conjecture. His view is that empirical knowledge consists of those conjectures that, having been tested, have not yet been refuted. The fallibilism is that any claim of empirical knowledge may be refuted, if we were to be clever enough to devise a test that shows it to be false. (I am restricting myself to empirical knowledge because the a priori knowledge of logic and mathematics would seem to be in a different category. But if you had asked mathematicians before Goedel if arithmetic is complete, I am sure they would have said yes. And for all we know, mathematicians in the future may invent the tools they need to prove Goldbach's Conjecture.) The interesting question for me is why Popper would say that having survived iterated testing does not count as a form of justification. That is perhaps where I find myself resisting to how Critical Rationalist is presenting Popper's views. Critical Rationalist is saying that knowledge consists of conjectures that have been tested and which have survived testing up to now -- those conjectures that are testable, that have been tested, and which have up to now survived testing (perhaps iterated testing). I myself would want to say that knowledge claims are more reliable if they have survived multiple rounds of testing -- though I am not sure Popper would allow for that. But, more importantly, Critical Rationalist thinks that having survived iterated testing does not count as justification. And that is what I find puzzling. Why not?
Consider this: if there are no valid sources of knowledge, then we have no access to knowledge.
I worry about this assumption. If we needed "valid sources of knowledge" in order to have "access to knowledge", then we have the sources of knowledge prior to having knowledge. Now we want to consider if these sources are "valid". How are we to do so? If testing these sources for validity requires knowing anything at all, then we are in trouble. Either we can test their sources for validity because we do have some knowledge prior to being granted access to knowledge, or we cannot test these sources for validity because we do not have the knowledge that would be needed for doing so. So, either we are assuming that we already have knowledge, in which case there is no need to access it in the first place -- or else we cannot test these sources for validity, and so we cannot know anything at all. On this line of reasoning, the very idea that we need valid sources of knowledge in order to have knowledge collapses into sheer incoherence. Put otherwise, if one must already know that a source of knowledge is valid in order to use that source to test for validity, then we cannot escape the logical fallacy of begging the question.PyrrhoManiac1_{March 30, 2023
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If critical rationalism is true, what do we know? What knowledge do we have?
This discussion will continue to go nowhere because you’ve defined knowledge as justified, true belief, even if in some weaker attempt at salvaging it in form of warrant, credences, etc.
If there are no valid sources of knowledge, then we have no access to knowledge.
CR says sources are liable to lead us into error, not invalid. Also, invalid for what? Positivity justifying things? But CR doesn't suggest that either. IOW, it seems that you've concluded fallible sources are invalid, not CR. We find ourselves faced with fallible sources all the time. Are we suck and have to throw up our hands? Even if, for the sake of argument, we assume there are infallible sources, how do we have access to them in a way that its supposed infallibility can actually help us? - How could you infallibly identify a supposed infallible source, out of all possible sources? - If you managed that, how could you infallibly interpret that infallible source? - And if you manage that, how could you infallibly determine when to defer to that infallible source? IOW, any infallibly in a proposed infallible source cannot help us before our fallible human reasoning and problem solving has had its say. Also, note that this is effectively the same approach someone would take who didn't believe in the infallibility of a source. Assuming it's infallible doesn't allow you to skip any of those steps. After all, a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. So, assuming a source is infallible at the start doesn't help. Right? If you don't have infallible access to a source, then how could its proposed infallibility help us?critical rationalist_{March 30, 2023
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PM1 @138
As I see it, the solution to this puzzle lies in shifting the focus from the sources of knowledge (a notion that I find terribly problematic in itself) to the consequences of knowledge: what do we do with knowledge?
If critical rationalism is true, what do we know? What knowledge do we have? Your question "what do we do with knowledge?" makes little sense if we do not have knowledge. Remember that, according to Popper, there is only unjustifiable conjecture. I take it that you would agree with me, that conjecture is not knowledge.
“all knowledge is hypothetical” [OKN 30]; alternatively, “All knowledge remains… conjectural” [RASC xxxv]. In other passages it is “all theories” which are conjectural [eg OKN 80]. “Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading …” (UNQ 24). He summed up with an oft-repeated aphorism: “We never know what we are talking about” (UNQ 27).
Consider this: if there are no valid sources of knowledge, then we have no access to knowledge.Origenes_{March 30, 2023
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@85
It is not true that the fact that our senses are theory-laden implies that we are cut off from objective reality.
Agreed, though here one would need to be careful with what exactly "our senses are theory laden" means, and what "objective reality" is (as well as what it would mean to be "cut off" from it). It would be a mistake to begin with the idea of our senses as barriers between our mind and the world. That mistake has a long history (beginning at least with Locke) and it should be rejected wholesale. Instead, we should begin with a conception of "the senses as perceptual systems" (to quote Gibson): animals are agents that actively exploring their environments and use their senses to detect, track, measure, and classify the features of their environment that are relevant to satisfying their needs. With a conception of the senses that is based in Gibson's ecological psychology (which has significant roots in William James's radical empiricism) rather than in the classical empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, one arrives at a whole different way of seeing the nature of the problem to be solved. In this light, it is no great threat that our senses are theory-laden -- because every animal will have a host of embodied habits that are modulated by its sensory-guided interactions with its environment, and those habits are constrained by the cognitive maps that the animal has of itself in relation to its environment. What we call "theories" are our symbolic articulations of the material scientific practices that we use as the habits of the specific kind of symbol-making, word-smithing animals that we are.
More broadly the problem is this: all sources of knowledge are flawed in some respects, so how can we ever learn anything?
As I see it, the solution to this puzzle lies in shifting the focus from the sources of knowledge (a notion that I find terribly problematic in itself) to the consequences of knowledge: what do we do with knowledge? How do we use what we claim to know? Of particular importance here, I think, is the role of language and other forms of symbolic communication to make explicit and allow us to resolve differences between various perspectives. I think that the problems of knowledge, truth, justification, and reality take on a quite different shape when understood in terms of a bio-social approach to rational cognition.PyrrhoManiac1_{March 29, 2023
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@Origenes
These are merely conjectures that can never be justified.
And lack of justification is a problem, again, how? Oh that's right. It's a problem for you, which you keep projecting on me.
Bartley does provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for dogmatists who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, not for exponents of critical preference.
critical rationalist_{March 29, 2023
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In #128 you are misquoting me. This is a nonsensical response and you know it. You understand perfectly well, that, in #127, my statements are aligned with critical rationalism.
I do? For example.
There is no knowledge only unjustifiable conjecture.
This isn't CR. So, where else did it come from? After all, this is exactly the opposite of what you quoted, which is supposedly part of, you guessed it, CR. Right?
More broadly the problem is this: all sources of knowledge are flawed in some respects, so how can we ever learn anything?
You keep appealing to sources being flawed, then abandon the remainder of CR when it's convenient for you. When this is pointed out to you, you just do it again. IOW, those conclusions are what you keep injecting this into the context implicitly. For example... Again, this discussion will continue to go nowhere because you’ve defined knowledge as justified, true belief, even if in some weaker attempt at salvaging it in form of warrant, credences, etc. Furthermore, your claim is not just a negation. It reflects an implicit argument that we are expected to accept. If this were true, then in real world scenarios where we find ourself faced with a number of leaf sources that are fallible, all we can do is just throw up our hands. But CR is not just a prediction, it's an description / explanation. As I've pointed out...
Fallibilism, correctly understood, implies the possibility, not the impossibility, of knowledge, because the very concept of error, if taken seriously, implies that truth exists and can be found.
What you seem to think is impossible is actually...
what counts is not whether any particular piece of information we get is flawed. Rather, what matters is whether we can correct those flaws. We can do this by comparing different sources and trying to come up with an explanation of the underlying objective reality that explains what all of the sources say. They will not all be flawed in the same way and so we can try to work out which ones are giving us bad information on any particular issue.
I then gave examples of how the approach of merely being wrong is problematic in real world scenarios. We can make progress despite our sources being fallible. We do it all the time. Witnesses are fallible. Suspects don't always tell the truth. The lack of DNA evidence can be explained by wearing gloves, etc. Multiple suspects need to get their lies straight, etc. Despite this, we can make progress. All of those sources will not be flawed in the same way. But, apparently, you think we cannot? Hence... Thank Zeus we’re not limited to whatever Origenes thinks is possible. Again, this is a case where you apparently cannot take an idea you find objectionable seriously for more than a comment, if even that. Specially error, if taken seriously, does imply the possibility of knowledge. But this was nowhere to be found in your comment. Taking it seriously does not suit your purpose. Note how this is the opposite to my approach, in the other thread.critical rationalist_{March 29, 2023
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~ Critical Rationalism Applied to Itself ~ From the Elliot Temple website https://criticalfallibilism.com/debate-criticism-argument-strengths-and-intuitions/ :
Every criticism (decisive refutation) of an idea must be refuted or else the idea is refuted.
A “decisive refutation” of an idea, must contain certain knowledge. In the context of theory of critical rationalism (henceforth TRC), the problem is, of course, that there is no certain knowledge. So, according to TRC, there can never be a decisive refutation of any theory.
It can be useful to divide refutation of criticism (counter-criticism) into two types. First (standard type), you can point out a flaw (error, mistake) in a criticism.
According to TRC the claim that a criticism contains a flaw can only be unjustified conjecture, so, there cannot be valid counter-criticism.
Second, you can say how a criticism is compatible with its target succeeding at its goal(s).
According to TRC the wild conjecture that “a criticism is compatible with its target succeeding at its goal(s)” can never be justified.
In other words, even if the criticism is correct, the idea it criticizes still isn’t refuted. The criticism is indecisive. The criticism doesn’t contradict its target.
According to TRC, wild conjectures such as “criticism is indecisive” or “criticism doesn’t contradict its target” are claims of having certain knowledge that simply does not exist. These are merely conjectures that can never be justified.
Many alleged criticisms are not really criticisms because they are compatible with the thing they criticize.
According to TRC, the claim that certain criticisms are “compatible with the thing they criticize” is merely unjustified conjecture .... …. and so on, without end.Origenes_{March 29, 2023
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CR
Also, this is exactly how I solve problems when tracking down bugs when developing software. Where the problem is is itself often reflects a possible bug in ether code in the OS, a third party API when you can’t see the code. “..trying to come up with an explanation of the underlying objective reality that explains what all of the sources say.” is the approach that senior developer use on a regular basis.
There is no point in discussing common sense approaches that have no relationship with critical irrationalism. A senior developer who is a true critical rationalist cannot even positively identify a problem as a “problem.” Because, under critical rationalism, to say that something is a “problem” would be a claim to knowledge that one cannot have. A true critical rationalist doesn’t trust his senses nor his conjectures, and cannot arrive at any certainty that there is a problem. So, under critical rationalism, there is no way, to positively justify the “wild” conjecture that something is a problem in the first place, let alone solve it.
For example, when I get a non-technical report of some application, API or system providing a “wrong result”, I ask “Find out exactly how is it wrong.”
A true critical rationalist would point out to you that your question "Find out exactly how is it wrong” is bonkers. Because you are asking for certain knowledge that does not exist. As Popper put it:
“Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading...” [UNQ 24].
Also, why do you uncritically accept “wrong result” to be true? A critical rationalist would know that the claim “wrong result” is mere unjustifiable conjecture.Origenes_{March 28, 2023
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CR In #128 you are misquoting me. And you follow up with:
Thank Zeus we’re not limited to whatever Origenes thinks is possible. (....) .... apparently Origenes would just throw up his hands and we’d all die?
This is a nonsensical response and you know it. You understand perfectly well, that, in #127, my statements are aligned with critical rationalism. When I write nonsense like "there is no knowledge, only unjustifiable conjecture" and "all sources are fallible", it is because that is the case according to Popper. It does not reflect my opinion at all. The fact that you misquote me and your response are both disappointing.Origenes_{March 28, 2023
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“..trying to come up with an explanation of the underlying objective reality that explains what all of the sources say.” is the approach that senior developer use on a regular basis.
To explain this in more detail, it's not unusual to find documentation for a third or first party API which is wrong, unclear or even absent. And that if that API is proprietary, you can't look at the source code to see how it actually works, or doesn't work in some cases. One solution is to conjecture how the API works, under the hood, to generate its output. From there you can carefully craft various input values, then feed them into the API to attempt to see what values cause the issue, which does not, etc. IOW, this is an attempt to refute that underlying model of how the API works. Again, this is a high-level, senior developer technique used to making progress when most people, apparently like Origenes, would throw up their hands and say "I don't know how to make progresses."critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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@KF Already addressed here: https://conjecturesandrefutations.com/2013/07/ Did you get those quotes from Dykes?critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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For example, when I get a non-technical report of some application, API or system providing a "wrong result", I ask "Find out exactly how is it wrong." Specifically It's not just that a result is wrong, in some generic sense. Exactly how it is wrong is instrumental in deducting out where the problem is. Or, more importantly, were it isn't. You can spend days trying to track down an issue, only to get an update from a customer on exactly how the result is wrong, which allows you to find the problem in 5 minutes. I've taught this to every intern I worked with and mentored. And they tech it to people they mentor, etc. Another maximum: Make the smallest change you can make to a system that could rule out the biggest piece of the pie as being the cause of an issue. If the issue remains, make the next smallest change, and then the next, etc. This systematically rules out where the issue is not. until you're left with where the problem must be. Even if you only get a different wrong result, that tells you something. If you propose that sub system z plays role q in problem x, change z to see if that even makes a difference, even if it's just to get a different wrong answer. If it doesn't change in a way that you'd expect, had in actually played role q in reality, then z didn't play the role you thought it played. These kind of scenarios are common in specific fields. Hopeful I never have to depend on Origenes in any of these cases to make progress.critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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CR, kindly note the problems in the wider cite, not to mention my own in extenso cite from the preface to Conjectures and Refutations. Observe, as I highlight and note:
when we propose a theory, or try to understand a theory, we also propose, or try to understand, its logical implications; that is, all [--> sets up a strawman, no we generally look at key implications and predictions for testing etc, not an impossible transfinite supertask] those statements which follow from it. But this, as we have just seen, is a hopeless task [--> strawman knocked over] : there is an infinity of unforeseeable nontrivial statements belonging to the informative content of any theory, and an exactly corresponding infinity of statements belonging to its logical content. We can therefore never know or understand all the implications of any theory, or its full significance [--> which precisely no one set out to do, and indeed, this comes right back to Popper through self-reference]
So, we are back to the concerns such as "“Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading …” (UNQ 24) . . . . “We never know what we are talking about” (UNQ 27)." Going to 105 above, cited with context from Conjectures and Refutations, and to your own arguments commented on in 94 and 96, there are similar breakdowns. Try your: "Knowledge is not true because all ideas are incomplete and contain errors to some degree." Such as || + ||| --> ||||| ? Or, the like? No, even, error exists is an undeniably true and self evident truth, free from error and not requiring an infinite regress of warrant. And more as can be traced above. KFkairosfocus_{March 28, 2023
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@Origenes
Second, what counts is not whether any particular piece of information we get is flawed. Rather, what matters is whether we can correct those flaws.
We cannot.
We can do this by comparing different sources …
It would be to no avail. All sources are fallible.
… and trying to come up with an explanation of the underlying objective reality that explains what all of the sources say.
It would be to no avail. All sources are fallible.
Thank Zeus we're not limited to whatever Origenes thinks is possible. For example If I found myself in a life or death situation, in which there were multiple options that disagreed with each other in different but specific ways, apparently Origenes would just throw up his hands and we'd all die? Also, this is exactly how I solve problems when tracking down bugs when developing software. Where the problem is is itself often reflects a possible bug in ether code in the OS, a third party API when you can't see the code. "..trying to come up with an explanation of the underlying objective reality that explains what all of the sources say." is the approach that senior developer use on a regular basis.critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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CR
It is not true that the fact that our senses are theory-laden implies that we are cut off from objective reality.
You are mistaken, it is true.
More broadly the problem is this: all sources of knowledge are flawed in some respects, so how can we ever learn anything?
We cannot.
First, knowledge can have implications beyond the problem that it was invented to solve.
There is no knowledge only unjustifiable conjecture.
Our eyes can be used to do things they did not evolve to do like looking at readings on scientific instruments: they are limited by the content of the knowledge instantiated in them not by the problem they originally evolved to solve.
Nice try, but there is no escape route here:
Popper: “All observations (and even more all experiments) are theory impregnated: they are interpretations in the light of theories. We observe only what our problems, our biological situation, our interests, our expectations, and our action programmes, make relevant. Just as our observational instruments are based upon theories, so are our very sense organs without which we cannot observe” [TSIB 134]. “there is no such thing as an unprejudiced observation” [UNQ 51]. “neither the dryness nor the remoteness of a topic of natural science prevent partiality and self-interest from interfering with the individual scientist’s beliefs… if we had to depend on his detachment, science, even natural science, would be quite impossible” [POH 155]. “theories come before observations”

Second, what counts is not whether any particular piece of information we get is flawed. Rather, what matters is whether we can correct those flaws.
We cannot.
We can do this by comparing different sources …
It would be to no avail. All sources are fallible.
… and trying to come up with an explanation of the underlying objective reality that explains what all of the sources say.
The baseless idea that the majority of sources is correct, is merely unjustifiable conjecture. You have got nothing.
They will not all be flawed in the same way and so we can try to work out which ones are giving us bad information on any particular issue.
There is no way of knowing which sources give bad information and which do not. All attempts to figure that out would amount to unjustifiable conjecture.Origenes_{March 28, 2023
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KF's on Willard vs Popper.
Other clips from Popper cannot even be rescued to that extent: Popper: “Precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain and therefore dangerously misleading …” (UNQ 24). Popper: “We never know what we are talking about” (UNQ 27) These are irretrievably self defeating, hopeless monsters. Instead, Willard and heirs stand up much better.
But, if you actually care to put that in context...
“I have in lectures often described this interesting situation by saying: we never know what we are talking about. For when we propose a theory, or try to understand a theory, we also propose, or try to understand, its logical implications; that is, all those statements which follow from it. But this, as we have just seen, is a hopeless task : there is an infinity of unforeseeable nontrivial statements belonging to the informative content of any theory, and an exactly corresponding infinity of statements belonging to its logical content. We can therefore never know or understand all the implications of any theory, or its full significance
Excluding the rest of the paragraph is disingenuous at best. This is yet another example of how KF's claim of hyper-skepticism is a false dilemma. Either he knows this quite well, if he intentionally omitted it, or he's so utterly uninterested in actually presenting Popper's views accurately that he didn't look for the actual context of that sentence. Actually, it's not even a full sentence. Neither bode well. How does this reflect the behavior of someone trying to present an accurate representation of Popper's view? What gives? KF, how do you explain this? What else are we supposed to conclude? What will I find if I look for the context of the first quote? Also, note how this correlates with "All ideas contain errors to some degree and / or are incomplete."critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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Origenes, solid question. I suspect, that in the ideas climate of 1962, with scientism dominant, Popper sounded very different from how he does now. The preface, outlining his thesis, has not worn well. This becomes yet another example of why we need to be careful of self referentiality and its potential for incoherence. And while Popper did emphasise science, something like
"The way in which knowledge progresses , and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures" [etc]
. . . can only embrace or invite embracing of knowledge in general in his strictures. We can build a better balanced account of knowledge, indeed, but that will look a lot like Willard and heirs. Unsurprising, there is fifty years of progress in that. KFkairosfocus_{March 28, 2023
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@Origenes: More wack-a-mole? See #85 and #112. Bonus: The logic of experimental tests, particularly of Everettian quantum theory See 2. Explanations of explicandacritical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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CR @ Given that criticisms are mere unjustifiable conjectures and tests are not neutrally interpretable due to our untrustworthy senses and untrustworthy instruments (see #97), how does one, under critical rationalism, establish the validity of a specific criticism or test? - - - - -
CR: Hyper skepticism is a claim that we know nothing. I’m not a hyper skeptic. This a false dilemma.
Ori: What, according to you, do we know? What is above and beyond unjustifiable conjecture?
CR: ...... uh ....
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CR, it is clear that something is very wrong with the frame we are seeing from Popper et al. Only an account of knowledge that allows knowledge as a concept to belong to the people will work.
Yes. it is clear that, if you're a justificationist, you will find something very wrong with the frame seen from Popper, et all. That's literally what it means to be a justificationist. Right? That's literally what it means to say that knowledge is justified, true belief, even if in some weaker. There must be some positive direction, otherwise something is very wrong with it. Yet, I just gave a thought example of Popper’s thought experiment (#102:16), which you completely ignored. Again, this discussion will continue to go nowhere because you’ve defined knowledge as justified, true belief, even if in some weaker attempt at salvaging it in form of warrant, credences, etc.critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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@Origenes
How then do you establish the validity of a specific criticism or test?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=folTvNDL08A
So, being proved wrong by observation and changing their theory accordingly still wouldn't have got the ancient Greeks one jot closer to understanding seasons, because their explanation was bad -- easy to vary. And it's only when an explanation is good that it even matters whether it's testable. If the axis-tilt theory had been refuted, its defenders would have had nowhere to go. No easily implemented change could make that tilt cause the same seasons in both hemispheres. The search for hard-to-vary explanations is the origin of all progress. It's the basic regulating principle of the Enlightenment. So, in science, two false approaches blight progress. One's well-known: untestable theories. But the more important one is explanation-less theories. Whenever you're told that some existing statistical trend will continue but you aren't given a hard-to-vary account of what causes that trend, you're being told a wizard did it. When you are told that carrots have human rights because they share half our genes, but not how gene percentages confer rights -- wizard. When someone announces that the nature-nurture debate has been settled because there's evidence that a given percentage of our political opinions are genetically inherited, but they don't explain how genes cause opinions, they've settled nothing. They're saying that our opinions are caused by wizards, and presumably, so are their own. (Laughter) That the truth consists of hard-to-vary assertions about reality is the most important fact about the physical world. It's a fact that is itself unseen, yet impossible to vary.
But the conjectured criteria of being hard to vary isn't limited to just science. It's a universal. It has reach. Criticism, in science takes the form of empirical tests. Science is a special case of good explanations applied to the physical world. See Deutsch's contribution on the topic "Can Science Provide Ultimate Answers".critical rationalist_{March 28, 2023
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CR, it is clear that something is very wrong with the frame we are seeing from Popper et al. Only an account of knowledge that allows knowledge as a concept to belong to the people will work. This will require weak as well as strong senses, and it must not be self referentially incoherent or deploy deflective devices to block others from pointing this out as an issue. Willard, c 2013 is manifestly far more on target than Popper was, c 1962. KFkairosfocus_{March 28, 2023
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