>>ALL morals that we have, regardless of the source, regardless of whether they are objective or subjective, are filtered through humans. As such, we can never be absolutely sure that they are free from error. All of your “moral governance”, “reasoning and responsibility“, “self referential”, “IS-OUGHT” talking points are just that. Talking points. They are not arguments against what I have said about the fact that ALL purported moral actions are open to be questioned. Unless, of course, you suggest that we shouldn’t use the reasoning capabilities that we were given. >>
This is of course reflective of common views and agendas in our civilisation and so it is appropriate to reply, taking time to address key issues at worldviews level:
KF, 32: >>Pardon, but it is now further evident that you have not seen the significance of self-evident truth in general.
Could you be in error that you are conscious?
If so, what is there that is aware to regard the possibility of error? (And this is about the bare fact of consciousness, you could be a brain in a vat manipulated by electrified probes to imagine yourself a man in the world and you would still be undeniably certain of the bare fact of your own consciousness.)
Speaking of, that error exists is also undeniably true. Let E be that claim, then put up the attempted denial ~E. In other words ~E means it is an error to say that error exists. So, E is undeniable.
2 + 3 = 5 is also self-evident and undeniable:
|| + ||| –> |||||
In general, SET’s are truths that — once we are able to understand i/l/o our experience of the world — are seen to be so, and to be necessarily so on pain of patent absurdity on the attempted denial.
Such lie at the heart of rationality, through the manifest fact of distinct identity. Take some distinct A like a bright red ball on a table, so the world W is:
W = {A|~A}
From this world partition, we instantly see that A is itself, and no x can be (A AND ~A), also that any x is (A X-OR ~A). That is, from distinct identity, the three first principles of right reason are immediately present: Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle.
Likewise from distinct identity two-ness is a direct corollary and from that the natural counting numbers and much of the logic of structure and quantity follows — i.e. Mathematics (which is NOT primarily an empirical discipline). As a start, I use the von Neumann construction:
Much more can be said, but the above is sufficient to show that there are literally infinitely many things that we may know with utter certainty, starting from a few that are self-evident. But also, such SET’s are insufficient to construct a worldview; they serve as plumbline tests for worldviews.
In particular, that something like E is knowable to utter certainty on pain of patent absurdity on attempted denial means, truth exists as what says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Similarly, this is warranted to utter certainty and so some things can be known to utterly, absolutely cretain degree. Therefore any worldview that imagines that such knowledge is impossible collapses in fatal, central error. Subjectivism, relativism and post modernism, I am looking straight at you.
Going further, following the Kantians, many have been induced to imagine that there is an ugly gulch blocking us from knowledge on the external world of things in themselves. Ever since F H Bradley over 100 years ago, this is known to be false. For, the claim to know of such an ignorance gap is to claim to know something of the outside world, i.e. the claim is self referential and incoherent.
A plumbline
We may then infer freely, that we may and do know things about reality external to our interior lives. Though, as error exists is equally certain, we must be careful in warrant. As a first test, plumbline truths will help us. And for many things a lesser degree of warrant is more than good enough. For example on serious matters, we may have moral certainty, that it would be irresponsible to act as though some A were false, on the evidence to hand or reasonably accessible. For yet other things — including science by and large — plausibly or possibly so and reliable i/l/o the balance of evidence is good enough. And so forth.
I am taking a little time to show you that I am not just talking from empty talking points, there are grounds of warrant for what I have to say. And, speaking for this blog, on worldview matters we have spent years thinking through such core matters. As, they lie at the heart of how our civilisation is in the state it is.
Now, too, you will notice that in speaking of moral certainty, I highlighted responsibility, moral government. We intuitively know that we have duties to truth, care in reasoning, fairness, justice, neighbour who is as we are, and more.
All of this reflects how our life of reason is inextricably entangled with responsibility, duty, moral government. And, dismissive hyperskepticism seeking to sweep that away is manifestly a failure of such duties.
Were our rational faculty utterly unrestrained by responsibility, duty, moral government, it would fall into the cynical nihilism of utter manipulativeness and imposition by force: might and/or manipulation make ‘right,’ ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘justice’ and more. That is suicidally absurd. And you know better, as you know that the very force that energises dispute such as in this thread is duty to truth, sound reason and more.
Yes, the mere fact that we inescapably find ourselves trying to justify ourselves and show others in the wrong immediately reveals the massive fact of moral government, and that this is critical to governing ourselves in community. On pain of mutual ruin.
But then, that surfaces another point you wished to brush off with dismissive talking points: the IS-OUGHT gap. That IS and OUGHT are categorically distinct and hard to resolve and unify. That has been known since Plato and beyond. Since Hume, we have known it can only be resolved at world-root level, or else we fall under the guillotine of ungrounded ought. Reasoning IS-IS, then suddenly from nowhere OUGHT-OUGHT. Where, if OUGH-ness is delusion, it instantly entails grand delusion, including of the life of responsible reason itself.
Your root challenge is, there is only one serious candidate that can soundly bridge the gap: the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being; worthy of loyalty and the reasonable, responsible service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature.
This is not an arbitrary imposition, we are dealing with worldviews analysis on comparative difficulties across factual adequacy, coherence and balanced explanatory adequacy (neither simplistic nor an ad hoc patchwork). If you doubt what I just said, simply put up a successful atlernative: ________ . (Prediction: v. hard to do.)
So, we are at world-root level, looking at generic ethical theism and the central importance of moral government in our life of reason.
The easy hyperskepticism that sweeps all before it on sheer rhetorical audacity is not good enough.
And, it is interesting that so far you have not readily found significant fault with the central Christian ethical teaching (which is of course profoundly Hebraic in its roots). It is there above, laid out in full. Kindly, tell us why those who acknowledge themselves to be under its government and will readily acknowledge that it is a stiff life-challenge are to be instantly, deeply suspect with but few exceptions.
And, tell us why a civilisation deeply influenced by such a teaching is to be branded with a scarlet letter instead of found to be in the sort of struggle to rise to excellence in the face of our finitude, prone-ness to error, moral struggle and too often our ill-will that are the anchor-points of genuine progress for our world.>>
I should add an earlier remark on two example of self-evident moral truth:
KF, 15: >>[I]mplicit in any contested argument is the premise that we have duties to truth, right and soundness in reasoning. On pain of twisting our intellectual powers into nihilistic weapons of cynical deception. In short X objects to Y, on the confident knowledge of in-common duties of intellectual, rational and epistemic virtue. The attempt to challenge ALL moral obligation would be self-referential and incoherent, undermining good faith reasoning itself.
I would go so far as to say this duty of care to truth, right and sound reasoning is self-evident and is typically implicitly accepted.
So, no, we cannot challenge ALL moral claims without undermining even the process of argument itself. No, we cannot dismiss general moral reasoning as suspect of being a blind appeal to authorities. No, mere consequences we happen to imagine (ever heard of the doctrine of unintended consequences?) or motives we think we read in the hearts of others (you are the same who seemingly views Christianity in general as though we are automatically suspect . . .) cannot ground such a broad-brush skepticism about moral reasoning.
We are already at self-referential incoherence.
Infinite regress comes out of the insisted on ALL and the inextricable entanglement of reasoning and moral duties as were outlined. Claim A is suspect so B must be advanced but implies another ought, so B requires C, and oops, we are on to infinity and absurdity.
General hyperskepticism about the moral brings down the proud edifice of reason too by fatally undermining its own self.
Selective hyperskepticism ends in inconsistency, exerting a double standard: stiff rules for thee, but not for me when such are not convenient to where I want to go . . . .
we need plumbline, naturally straight test cases.
One of these, as I outlined, is the inextricable entanglement of reason and duty to truth, right and soundness of logic.
In that light, we can then look at sound yardstick cases and clear the rubble of the modernist collapse of rationality and responsibility away.
For example,it is self-evidently wrong, wicked, evil to kidnap, bind, torture, sexually violate and murder a young child for one’s sick pleasure. (And, sadly, this is NOT a hypothetical case.)
Probe this case and you will see that such a child hath neither strength nor eloquence to fight or plead for himself or herself. And yet, were we to chance on such a demonic act in progress we are duty bound to try to rescue or at least bawl for help.
We are inescapably under moral government.
Which implies that IS and OUGHT must be bridged in the root of reality, on pain of reducing moral government to grand delusion that takes down rationality itself in its collapse.>>
Food for thought. END
Comments
subliterary theories in constructor theory explain which constructor tasks are possible and why.
As I’ve said, it is a new mode of explanation because Initial conditions do not play a special role in constructor theory.critical rationalist
January 21, 2018
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CR:“Constructor theory is a new mode of explanation”
O:”What does constructor theory (CT) explain?
CR: “A new way of explaining things is not a concrete explanation.”
What does CT not concretely explain? (sigh)
CT explains A. What is A? And my next question would be: if CT explains A with B, what is B?Origenes
January 12, 2018
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@origenes
Is there some reason you keep quoting me incompletely, then asking questions based on the incomplete quote?
CR:“Constructor theory is a new mode of explanation”
O:”What does [Constructor theory] explain?
A new way of explaining things is not a concrete explanation.
Singing is a mode of communication. A song is sung. Songs are concrete examples of singing.
Explanations in constructor theory are subsidiary theories, such as the CT of life.
However, I did write...
The “theory” part of Constructor theory is the idea that it’s possible to express all fundamental scientific theories [possible or impossible construction tasks], along with a notation of how to formally express it. However, subsidiary theories are what explain things in constrictor theoretic terms, such as the constructor theory of life.
From the summary...
The principles of constructor theory that I have proposed may be false. For instance, the composition principle, in the form stated in Section 1.2, may only be an approximation. But if the idea as a whole is false, something else will have to remedy the deficiencies of the prevailing conception. Something else will unify emergent-level laws such as the Turing principle and the principle of testability with the other laws of nature. Something else will provide an exact statement of the second law of thermodynamics, and a full statement of the content of conservation laws. A different approach will generalise the theory of computation and von Neumann’s constructor theory, and support laws about substrate-independent quantities such as information. And incorporate into fundamental physics the fact that the most significant quantity affecting whether physical transformations happen or not is knowledge.
So, constructor theory could be thought of as an explanation for how we can explain things at a more fundamental level than the current conceptions of physics.
CR: “But constructor theory is more fundamental …”
O:More fundamental then what?
The current conception of physics, which is based on initial conditions and laws of motion.
CR: .. because some aspects of physical systems are about what can, or cannot, be made to happen, not about what happens to it given initial conditions and laws of motion.
O: Why is that “more fundamental”? By what standard? Why isn’t it the case that “what happens to it given initial conditions and laws of motion” is the most fundamental?
If you can explain something in one mode, but not another, then that mode is more fundamental. Quantum mechanics is more fundamental than classical physics because it is an approximation. We do not have a theory of quantum gravity, so we know that either general relativity, quantum mechanics or both are false, in that they are incomplete to some degree. Then again, all theories are false in this sense. We just look for theories that are less incomplete than the ones that came before them, etc.
What we can explain with the current conception of physics is a subset of what you can explain with constructor theory. And you can recover the current conception of physics from constructor theory. Not, vice versa. It underlies both Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity, which is our current most fundamental theories in the current conception of physics.
On what basis does CT hold that anything other than what happens can happen?
First, there can be many explanations for the same phenomena. For example, the constructor theory of life was directed at the claim that, due to specific aspects of quantum mechanics, the design of replicators had to be ready present in the laws of physics since they replicated with high fidelity. So, despite being possible because, well we are concrete examples, there were questions regressing what transformations are necessary for it to occur and why. Part of that explanations includes the dichotomy that some transformations are impossible as well. For example, digital information refers to constraints on specific transformations that cause them to "snap" into place, which helps prevent an error catastrophe.
Cells are constantly reproducing in our body, what we want is to bring that process into fundamental physics. And that's not just saying it's possible.
Second, "what happens can happen" sounds like the future will resemble the past, in that what has already happened can be made to happen again. However, constructor theory is about what can be made to happen, even if it hasn't happened before.
To use an example, imagine a contrived scenario where we had yet to build any kind of Turning machine, but aliens drop on off a modern day computer as part of some defense system to ward of some other alien attack.
If we took it apart without understanding the theory of computation, we might assume that silicon plays some special, exclusive role in how it works. Therefore, we would have no idea that computers could also be build with vacuum tubes, or even wooden cogs. However, once we again develop the theory of computation, we know that silicon doesn't play a exclusive role and we would expect something happen that had never had happened in the past: a computer made out of cogs, etc.
So, no, it's not just about "what happens can happen" it's about what can be made to happen, even if it's never happened before.
From the paper....
The prevailing conception regards the initial state of the physical world as a fundamental part of its constitution, and we therefore hope and expect that state to be specified by some fundamental, elegant law of physics. But at present there are no exact theories of what the initial state was. Thermodynamics suggests that it was a ‘zero-entropy state’, but as I said, we have no exact theory of what that means. Cosmology suggests that it was homogeneous and isotropic, but whether the observed inhomogeneities (such as galaxies) could have evolved from quantum fluctuations in a homogeneous initial state is controversial.In the constructor-theoretic conception, the initial state is not fundamental. It is an emergent consequence of the fundamental truths that laws of physics specify, namely which tasks are or are not possible. For example, given a set of laws of motion, what exactly is implied about the initial state by the practical feasibility of building (good approximations to) a universal computer several billion years later may be inelegant and intractably complex to state explicitly, yet may follow logically from elegant constructor-theoretic laws about information and computation (see Sections 2.6 and 2.8 below).
The intuitive appeal of the prevailing conception may be nothing more than a legacy from an earlier era of philosophy: First, the idea that the initial state is fundamental corresponds to the ancient idea of divine creation happening at the beginning of time. And second, the idea that the initial state might be a logical consequence of anything deeper raises a spectre of teleological explanation, which is anathema because it resembles explanation through divine intentions. But neither of those (somewhat contradictory) considerations could be a substantive objection to a fruitful constructor theory, if one could be developed.
critical rationalist
January 11, 2018
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CR:“Constructor theory is a new mode of explanation”
O:"What does it explain?
CR: "What theory?"
Constructor theory
CR: "But constructor theory is more fundamental ..."
More fundamental then what?
CR: .. because some aspects of physical systems are about what can, or cannot, be made to happen, not about what happens to it given initial conditions and laws of motion.
Why is that "more fundamental"? By what standard? Why isn't it the case that "what happens to it given initial conditions and laws of motion" is the most fundamental?
So constructor theory does not explain what happens, but instead what can happen or not happen. But if one knows what happens, or rather, can predict what will happen, then, isn't it a given what can and cannot happen?
On what basis does CT hold that anything other than what happens can happen?Origenes
January 10, 2018
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Okay, so you can define things in some idiosyncratic terms, but what does the theory explain? Please be specific.
What theory? Constructor theory itself of the constructor theory of information? Please be specific.
CR: if your goal was to arrive at a particular destination, you want to know where you car can be made to go, not where it will go if you do nothing.
O:Where the car goes in case I do nothing is part of the possible destinations, so, again, why is it that I do not want to know about that?
The car isn't going anywhere soon because it's in a snowbank. And you're not at your destination because your car slid off the road while driving there.
I guess you could change your mind, but you cannot arrive somewhere you already are.
Furthermore, as I stated, constructor theory supplements the current conception of physics. This doesn't mean the current conception hasn't been successful. And, in many cases you can recover the traditional initial conditions and laws of motion. But constructor theory is more fundamental because some aspects of physical systems are about what can, or cannot, be made to happen, not about what happens to it given initial conditions and laws of motion.
CR: … [incoherent anti-agent-causality-rant]
Can you point out what you think is incoherent or factually incorrect in what I wrote? Merely saying it is a "anti-agent-causality-rant" is extremely vague criticism.
Your comment was anti-constructionist-rant. So there! (See how that works? Or should I say, how it doesn't work, actually)
So, what does agent causality and intentionality have to do with constructor theory?
You asked me that already. If you didn't get what you wanted previously, why do you think repeating the exact same question again would be helpful?
Why do you keep mentioning an intelligent agent who intents things, does things and want to know certain things & not other things?
I keep mentioning them to distinguish those specific aspects from Knowledge, significant quantity affecting whether physical transformations happen.
For the same reason I mentioned the medical community, which consist of intelligent agents who intend things, does things, whats to know certain things, and not other things, etc. cannot merely choose some arrangement to matter to contain the treatment for all cancers, etc.
For the same reason I said that unless something is prohibited by the laws of physics, the only thing that would prevent us from achieving it knowing how (knowledge.)
If you only have the plans or knowledge to build a car and a boat, you cannot just choose to build a third option. Your desire or intent to build some other option, like a helicopter, is insufficient. Raw materials will only be transformed into a helicopter if the requisite knowledge is present there.
Perhaps you mean how does knowledge grow? Variation controlled by criticism. And what role does people have in the creation of it? People and nature can create non-explanatory knowledge, but only people can create explanatory knowledge by noticing a problem, conjecturing theories about how the world works, and then testing those theories to find errors and discard them.
Knowledge is information that plays a causal role in being retained when embedded in. a storage medium. This includes books, brains and the genomes of organisms. Knowledge that doesn't play a causal role as well or at all, can be replaced by other knowledge that does.critical rationalist
January 10, 2018
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CR @350
CR: For example we can define information based on what physical transformations of systems are possible and which are impossible.
Okay, so you can define things in some idiosyncratic terms, but what does the theory explain? Please be specific.
CR: if your goal was to arrive at a particular destination, you want to know where you car can be made to go, not where it will go if you do nothing.
Where the car goes in case I do nothing is part of the possible destinations, so, again, why is it that I do not want to know about that?
O: What does agent causality and intentionality have to do with constructor theory?
CR: … [incoherent anti-agent-causality-rant]
So, what does agent causality and intentionality have to do with constructor theory? Why do you keep mentioning an intelligent agent who intents things, does things and want to know certain things & not other things?Origenes
January 10, 2018
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An intelligent agent cannot merely choose to arrange some bits on a flash drive in such a way that it would be knowledge of how to treat all forms of cancer, right?
This is why I keep pointing out either ID's designer is a complex, knowledge laden entity, or it depends on some external knowledge which it just copied there from "somewhere". In both cases, an explanation is needed for that knowledge, because it is the most significant quantity that explains the functionality in question.
So, you're stuck with the same problem, that ID claims must be explained by a designer, etc. All you've done is push the problem up a level without improving it because you have the equivalent of that same knowledge in some well adapted physical system.
Or ID's designer isn't really "just abstract", but also has the specific ability to make knowledge spontaneously appear out of nothing, while creating the cells of an organism. If so, when will that be added to the "scientific" theory of ID?
The origin of any biological feature is the origin of that knowledge.
Some designer that "just was", complete with that knowledge, already present, doesn't serve an explanatory purpose. This is because one could more efficiently state that organisms "just appeared", complete with that knowledge already present.critical rationalist
January 10, 2018
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“You don’t want to know where your car will go if you do nothing.” Why is it that I do not want to know that?
There are some aspects of physical reality that cannot be captured using the traditional conception of physics. Why? Because they are about what can, or cannot, be made to happen to a physical system; not about what happens to it given initial conditions and laws of motion.
It is in this sense that constructor theory supplements traditional physics. If your goal was to arrive at a particular destination, you want to know where you car can be made to go, not where it will go if you do nothing.
See this video, which contrasts the traditional conception of physics.
of what? What exactly does it explain? Please be specific.
The role transformations in physical systems play in fundamental scientific theories, like information, living things, etc. For example we can define information based on what physical transformations of systems are possible and which are impossible.
From the abstract....
Constructor theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations - those that can be caused to happen and those that cannot.
For example, copying information is a transformation of a physical system.
See this video for details on construction tasks.
The "theory" part of Constructor theory is the idea that it's possible to express all fundamental scientific theories in this way, along with a notation of how to formally express it. However, subsidiary theories are what explain things in constrictor theoretic terms, such as the constructor theory of life.
See this video for details.
“You want to know where your car can be made to go. Preferably to your intended destination.” What does agent causality and intentionality have to do with constructor theory?
As I've stated elsewhere, the medical community consists of free, intelligent agents. They intend for their actions to treat and cure all diseases, such as cancer. Yet, we still do not have a treatment for all cancers. Why? Because a patient will only be successfully treated when the knowledge of how to kill cancer cells, without killing the patient, was present there. Causing just those cells to die is a transformation of a physical system.
Any such treatment would be a series of constructor tasks. And how to bring them about is knowledge. So, merely being a free, intelligent agents is insufficient as an explanation. The requisite knowledge must be present there, in some form. An intelligent agent cannot merely choose to arrange some bits on a flash drive in such a way that it would be knowledge of how to treat all forms of cancer, right?
If you were accidentally sent the plans to a boat instead of a car, and you followed them to the letter, your intention to build a care would not prevent the outcome from being a boat. Right?
Knowledge is independent of anyone's belief. So, raw materials would be transformed into a boat, rather than a car, because the knowledge of how to build a boat was present there. Your belief that it would result in something else doesn't change this fact. Nor can you just choose that it should result in something different.
So, in constructor theory, "the most significant quantity affecting whether physical transformations happen or not is knowledge." This is what it means when I say, unless something is prohibited by the law of physics, the only thing that would prevent *us* from achieving it is knowing how. However, knowledge, in constrictor theory, isn't limited to knowing subjects.critical rationalist
January 10, 2018
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CR @348
Some questions about (1):
“Constructor theory is a new mode of explanation” of what? What exactly does it explain? Please be specific.
“You don’t want to know where your car will go if you do nothing.” Why is it that I do not want to know that?
“You want to know where your car can be made to go. Preferably to your intended destination.” What does agent causality and intentionality have to do with constructor theory?Origenes
January 10, 2018
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Your claim is that laws, as statements about what is possible, are explanations.
Words are shortcuts for ideas. So, it’s helpful if you read the paper on constructor theory itself, where it expands on what is meant by that phrase. I can try to summarize it for you….
Deutsch: It provides a new mode of explanation(1), expressing all laws(2) as statements(3) about which(4) transformations(5) are possible(6), which are impossible(7) and why(8).
(1) Constructor theory is a new mode of explanation because it does not start with initial conditions, then apply laws of motion, as in the current conception of physics. Explanations come from subsidiary theories. If your car slides off the road and stops in a snow bank, you don’t want to know where your car will go if you do nothing. You want to know where your car can be made to go. Preferably to your intended destination. Getting there would represent a network of physical transformations on your car.
So, is it a explanation in the current conception of physics? No, it’s not. Is it a completely reductionist theory? No, it’s not, either. Does that mean it’s not a new mode of explanation, no it does not. Constructor theory puts reductionist and emergent explanations on the same level. Again, this is because it doesn’t treat initial conditions as having priority.
(2) What is being expressed? Laws in the current conception of physics. They are reformulated in constructor theoretic terms.
(3) What kind of statements? Principles about laws, similar to how the laws of thermodynamics are principles.
(4) With transformations? This refers to a very specific set of task or set of tasks, not just some vague idea of something being possible, in reference to some scientific theory, such as quantum theory, or information, etc. They can be combined in a network of tasks. Constructor theory is developing an algebra of tasks that can be use to combine networks, etc.
(5) Transformations refers to Tasks (short for Construction Task). They are defined as a substrate, inputs / outputs and an abstract constructor, which might be a composite.
(6) Some construction tasks are possible. That is to say, a constructor can cause the substrate to be transformed in a specific way, given the right inputs / outputs. etc. And the task can be repeated because the constructor part of the system does not undergo net change.
(7) Otherwise, such a task is impossible. It is prohibited by the laws of physics. There is no in-between. This dichotomy is a key aspect of constructor theory. The constructor cannot undergo net change, or it’s not a “constructor” in the sense of constructor theory so it’s an impossible constructor task.
(8) The “why” is also found in subsidiary theories. And, in the case of the constructor theory of life, it includes Neo-Darwinism. The entire gradient from primitive, highly inaccurate replicators to high-fidelity, programmable replicators can be modeled as a network of construction tasks, with substrates, inputs / outputs, etc. Furthermore, the appearance of design and no-design laws can also be specified exactly in constructor theoretic terms, which are referenced as part of the explanation.
critical rationalist
January 9, 2018
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CR:
Deutsch: It provides a new mode of explanation, expressing all laws as statements about which transformations are possible, which are impossible and why.
This is not a naive claim that something is “possible”.
Well, yes, it is exactly that.
Your claim is that laws, as statements about what is possible, are explanations.
They are not.Origenes
January 9, 2018
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First you fail to quote what the problem in question that the paper was directed at. Then you make assumptions about what the relevance is in respect to possible and impossible tasks. And then you suggest this somehow means Deutsch is mistaken.
For example,
The general idea seems to be: if A is shown to be possible, then A is explained.:
That's a mistaken interpretation of constructor theory.
von Neumann finally produced a viable toy model, [15], within cellular automata, but at the cost of severing the connections with actual physics. That model is thus inadequate to address the current problem - whether self-reproduction is compatible with the actual laws of physics un-augmented by any design of adaptations.
The prevailing conception also forces a misleading formulation of the problem, as: what initial conditions and laws of motion must (or must probably) produce accurate replicators and self-reproducers (with some probability)? But what is disputed is whether such entities are possible under no-design laws.
More generally, it cannot express the very explanation provided by evolution- ary theory – that living organisms can have come about without intentionally being designed. It would have aimed at proving that they must occur, given certain initial conditions and dynamical laws.
To overcome these problems I resort to a newly proposed theory of physics, constructor theory. [16, 17, 18]. It provides a new mode of explanation, expressing all laws as statements about which transformations are possible, which are impossible and why.
This is not a naive claim that something is "possible".
This brings counterfactual statements into fundamental physics, which is key to the solution. The explanation provided by the theory of evolution is already constructor-theoretic: it is possible that the appearance of design has been brought about without intentionally being designed; so is our problem: are the physical processes essential to the theory of evolution - i.e., self- reproduction, replication and natural selection - possible under no-design laws?
I shall show that they are (in section 2-3) provided that those laws of physics allow the existence of media that can instantiate (digital) information (plus enough time and energy). Information has an exact physical characterisation in the constructor theory of information [17].
I also show that under no-design laws an accurate self-reproducer requires an accurate (i.e., high-fidelity) replicator, and vice versa. Thus, the replicator- vehicle logic von Neumann envisaged is here shown to be necessary for accu- rate self-reproduction to be possible under such laws. This provides physical foundations for the relation between “metabolism” and replication (as defined by Dyson, [10]). In addition, that vehicles are necessary to high-quality replicators under our laws of physics (despite replicators being the conceptual pillar of evolutionary theory), informs the current debate about the necessity of organisms. The latter was recently doubted by Dawkins [19]: “ Just as life did not have to become multicellular [...] so living materials did not have to become packaged into discrete, individual organisms [..] behaving as unitary, purposeful agents. The only thing that is really fundamental to Darwinian life is self-replicating, coded information - genes, in the terminology of life on this planet.”.
Constructor Theory’s mode of explanation also delivers an exact physical expression of the notions of the appearance of design, no-design laws, and of the logic of self-reproduction and natural selection.(5)Finally, Wigner’s argument implies that accurate self-reproduction is incom- patible particularly with quantum theory, thus challenging its universality - a claim that others, with different motivations, have also made [20, 21, 22]. I shall demonstrate (in section 4) a quantum-mechanical (kinematical) model of the logic of self-reproduction, updating von Neumann’s, thus rebutting those claims. This, incidentally, clarifies how self-reproduction differs from cloning a quantum state (which has occasionally caused some confusion [20]). It also vindicates that self-reproduction - and even (possibly artificial) self- reproducers employing quantum coherence - are compatible with quantum theory.
...
These claims, stemming from the tradition of incredulity that living enti- ties can be scientifically explained, [14], highlight a problem. The theory of evolution must be supplemented by a theory that those physical processes upon which it relies are provably compatible with no-design laws of physics. No such theory has [yet to be] proposed; and those claims have [yet to be] been properly refuted.
Constructor theory supplements Neo-darwnisms.critical rationalist
January 8, 2018
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CR, you make so many uninformed and anthropocentric statements, I do hope you’ll acknowledge reality so that I can correct you on them.
Why don't you start by correcting me on how to subdivide a physical system into a semiotic triad?critical rationalist
January 8, 2018
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While we all wait for CR to provide an example of using a quantum storage medium that is not semiotic …, it is perhaps a suitable moment to reflect on one of the many misconceptions that underpin constructor theory.
CR: So, the actual laws of physics we do have are no-design. That is, they do not already contain the design of replicators or specific organisms, already present there. Yet we do not need to add anything to our laws of physics for life to be possible.
The general idea seems to be: if A is shown to be possible, then A is explained. We can find this mistaken idea often Deutsch's writings, e.g.:
I conclude that self-reproduction, replication and natural selection are possible under no-design laws ...
A tornado sweeping through a junkyard might assemble a Boeing 747. Indeed, it is possible, but CR & Deutsch needs to be informed that it is nowhere near an explanation.
In a way it is saddening that there is a need to point these things out.Origenes
January 8, 2018
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CR, you make so many uninformed and anthropocentric statements, I do hope you'll acknowledge reality so that I can correct you on them.Upright BiPed
January 7, 2018
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@UB
It's unclear how a deficiency I've been referring to from the beginning, and has yet to be addressed, is somehow a "I don't know what you're taking about" defense. You have yet to present a theory of information that scales to quantum systems. In fact, many people have attempted to bring information into fundamental physics and have been unsuccessful. Von Neumann attempted to bring his replicator vehicle into fundamental physics and was unsuccessful as well.
What I’m suggesting is that we can bring information into fundamental physics via constructor theory. And we can do so because it is a new mode of explanation which is not limited by the current conception of physics. This is nothing new.
Just looked at the referenced OP. Found this…
1) a sequence of representations in a medium of information.
This does't tell me how to subdivide *any* physical system into "representations' How does a representation actually perform the role it plays in *any* physical system? How does it scale?
2) a set of physical constraints to establish what is being represented.
This doesn't tell me which constraints must be possible or impossible to establish what is represented. In the absence of this, it's unclear if those necessary constraints are available in quantum systems.
3) a system of discontinuous association between representations and referents, based on spatial orientation (i.e. a reading-frame code)
Is spatial orientation the only way to associate between representations and referents in the translation system, or just classical systems, or any semiotic system?
Again, it's unclear how to subdivide any physical system into these roles, which would include a quantum system as well.
As I’ve pointed out, Newton’s laws predict the same outcome as general relativity when it comes to launching rockets into space. Yet, general relativity suggests someone thing completely different is happening there, in reality. Newton’s laws are an approximation and general relativity is a more fundamental theory.
I’m suggesting the same thing in the case of semiotic systems. This doesn’t mean I’m suggesting symbols are impossible in quantum systems. Rather, I’m suggesting that you need a more fundamental theory to achieve them. Perhaps a constructor theory of semiotic systems, which would reformulate semiotic system into constructor theoretic terms?
The point being made is that we already have an example of a transition from replication specific to non-replications specific constructor tasks. Constructor theory allows us to model the entire gradient because it scales from primitive replicators to high fidelity replicators, including semiotic systems. It is this feature of constructor theory is what allows us say in exact terms that the design of replicators is not already present in the laws of physics.
Are you suggesting that they are present in the laws of physics? Last time I checked you didn’t seem to think that was the case.
4) functional coordination (semantic closure) between two sets of sequences; the first set establishes the constraints that are necessary to interpret the representations, and the second set establishes a system whereby the representations and their constraints are brought together in the specify way required to produce a functioning end product – an autonomous self-replicator. Coordination is required because changes to the first set affect the second set.
This doesn't seem to be applicable as I don't think you're claiming a quantum storage medium, such as a hypothetical future room temperature superconducting "quantum thumb drive" could replicate itself.critical rationalist
January 7, 2018
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Ah yes, the return of the “I don’t know what you’re talking about” defense, where you suddenly pretend to not understand what has been presented, and then just as sudden, you go back to dissembling about quantum memory and all the rest of it. We’ve been through this several times over the course of several months.
The last time you pulled this defense, I answered your question in detail (which was headlined here), and so, you clearly already have these answers.
In your response at the time, you stated: ”it’s not that I “do not follow” what UB presented. It’s very much the opposite.”
Thus, I don’t intend on going through the game again.Upright BiPed
January 7, 2018
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In response, UB has asked you to provide an example of a quantum storage medium that is not semiotic.
And I've asked UB how one goes about subdividing a physical system into something that "is semiotic". How can I give an example of what something is not without an example of what that something is?critical rationalist
January 6, 2018
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@UB
CR, when you acknowledge that a “quantum storage medium” is part of a semiotic system we can move on to the rest of your misconceptions.
I've asked you a specific question about how to subdivide a physical system into a semiotic triad. And I asked it based on one of you attempts to clarify what you mean by rate-independence, in which you referred to a claim about the role that thermodynamics plays in subdividing such a system. However, if there is no constant way to divide a physical system into a semiotic triad then what does it mean to say 'a “quantum storage medium” is part of a semiotic system'?
At which point, all you're left with is a claim of irreducible complexity, which again you still haven't addressed.critical rationalist
January 6, 2018
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CR@
CR (to UB): Just as the scope of Newton’s laws does not scale to very high velocities required to build GPS satellites, your “theory of information” does not scale to the level of quantum storage mediums.
UB: You sure appear to be saying that semiotic descriptions do not scale to the use of a quantum storage medium.
Okay.
Provide an example of using a quantum storage medium that is not semiotic …
CR: Just so I understand you correctly …
What is there to understand CR? The situation is perfectly clear: you claim that descriptions of semiotic systems do not scale to quantum storage mediums. In response, UB has asked you to provide an example of a quantum storage medium that is not semiotic.
So, why not support your claim with an example of a quantum storage medium that is not semiotic?
That’s all you have to do. Any example of such a storage system will do the job. What are you waiting for?
There is no reason whatsoever for your continuous postponement.Origenes
January 6, 2018
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CR, when you acknowledge that a "quantum storage medium" is part of a semiotic system we can move on to the rest of your misconceptions.Upright BiPed
January 6, 2018
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@UB
If this was actually relevant to the issue, then you’d be offering me an example of a quantum storage medium that was not semiotic. But its not, and so you don’t. And here we are.
Just so I understand you correctly, the process of subdividing a physical system into a semiotic triad - I.E. which part is the representation, object, interpretant, etc., - does not depend on a dichotomy of which aspects of that physical system are rate-independent vs which parts are not rate-independent, or any other classical only attributes?
Is that what you're telling me?
Because, at a minimum, I pointed out that there was no theory of thermodynamics that actually scaled. Specifically, there were well known problems below the scale of molecules. So, it's unclear how you could subdivided a physical system without devising a new way to subdivide a quantum system that handles the scale dependent issues with thermodynamics / rate independence, etc., and correlates with a semiotic triad
IOW, it would seem that someone would need to significantly reformulate the means by which to subdivide physicals systems that works for both classical and quantum systems. Right?
For example, most people here seem to think that quantum mechanics is non-local, which results in this spooky action at a distance, etc. How can something non-local be any part of the triad? If you take an instrumental approach, then all you get are possibilities, not actuals. Or you might say that we scan simulate quantum systems using classical systems, so that's not a "problem". But, mere predictions are based on probabilities, and need not say anything about what's happening there in reality. Classical simulations are, well, classical, which means they are approximations, etc.
Again, I'm not suggesting we cannot have symbols in quantum systems. I'm saying that it's unclear how, based on any current semotic explanation, we can subdivide any physical system that isn't an approximation and can be better explained with a more fundamental theory.
This is why I've repeatedly stated that this argument is no stronger than any other claim of irreducible complexity, with all of its warts and problems.
Of note, you haven't even acknowledged this for some reason. Apparently, it's out of style these days, and you don't want to associate with it anymore?critical rationalist
January 6, 2018
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Origenes at 331.
It is becoming more and more apparent that CR is at an all-out war with reason on every level.
Yep.
To CR on Sept 26, 2017
Read John Von Neumann on the threshold of complexity for prescriptive synthesis. Ask Turing if his system needed anything on the tape. Ask him if it needed a way to read that tape. Ask Peirce if representation and interpretation are not complimentary parts of a system. Ask Pattee if that system requires complimentary physical descriptions as well. Ask Crick if his adapter hypothesis was necessary. Ask Nirenberg if he could have calculated the code instead of demonstrating it. The problem is not that you don’t have anything to go on; the problem is that you ignore it. For all intents and purposes, you appear to be at war with it.
Upright BiPed
January 6, 2018
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In him we live and move and have our being, like it or lump it.kairosfocus
January 6, 2018
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KF,
Perhaps it is comforting for CR — but not for us — to know that he is nowhere near the only one.Origenes
January 6, 2018
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Sadly, yes.kairosfocus
January 6, 2018
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KF
It is becoming more and more apparent that CR is at an all-out war with reason on every level. Now that we learn that even the law of identity is on his hit list, it can no longer be a surprise that any text by CR — any text at all — is confused and riddled with fundamental mistakes.Origenes
January 6, 2018
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Origenes (attn CR), the pivot is, identity. A is itself and will act as itself in accord with its core nature. That may be manifest so that it is readily seen that a thorn bush does not produce grapes, and a grape is not thorny. This extends to subtler cases, up to the world having a nature that exhibits consistent behaviour that can be identified from sufficient observations, to high empirical reliability. This is the basis of inductive reasoning, which CR is desperate to discard. KFkairosfocus
January 6, 2018
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CR,
with all due respect, you have created such a grab-bag sense of the term "criticism" that it makes it hard for a serious discussion to proceed. The fatal ambiguity you have created has been noted by others.
Now, at no time has anyone equated moral certainty with necessary, infallible truth. Just the opposite, the issue you asked me to explain further has been, how does one decide on matters of great moment in the face of residual uncertainty; and Greenleaf answers on centuries of courtroom experience, with survival of civil society in the stakes. That is worlds apart from there being self-evident truth in general, which is so to utter certainty, beyond any prospect of reversal.
You will note that above I spoke to certainty beyond reasonable, responsible doubt . . . stage I . . . then went on to indeed, utter, self-evident certainty . . . stage II. The OP demonstrates the latter over and over for general truths.
Where, such truths are such that the attempt to deny immediately lands in patent absurdity, in various ways.
This, you need to acknowledge instead of holding in reserve the tactic of a hypothetical onward challenge, reflecting the fatal error of selective hyperskepticism.
If you disagree then your job is to overturn the cases on the table, which you cannot -- showing just how empty your continued objections are.
Then, on moral truths, we find that our whole life of reason is pervaded and inextricably entangled with duties to truth, sound logic, fairness, prudence and more, showing moral government. This is normally manifested through an aspect of consciousness, conscience. If that sense is false, it is delusional, and we face grand delusion spreading across our reasoning, perceiving, claiming to know, everything.
This is absurd, it cannot be seriously sustained.
We are then left to conclude that we are under moral government, and we must take where that leads us as we bridge the IS-OUGHT gap at world-roots level. There being only one serious candidate -- if you doubt, kindly provide a coherent alternative: ______ (Predictably, fail.)
The serious candidate is: the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being, worthy of loyalty and the reasonable, responsible service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. And yes, that is densely packed, this is a big, hard question we deal with.
In that general context, I put on the table an instructive, sadly real-world, case: it is evil to kidnap, bind, sexually assault and murder a young child for sick pleasure. Like unto it, if we came across this infamy in progress, it would be our duty to try to rescue or at least bawl out for help.
The attempt to deny the evil of the substance here, will at once be absurd. And the case is instructive about much broader moral principles.
The evasions, side-tracking and disractions we have seen above therefore speak telling volumes about the mental and moral state of our civilisation at this time.
KFkairosfocus
January 6, 2018
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//follow up #327//
CR: Why do hawthorn bushes not produce grapes? That has to do with a complicated set of circumstances in its evolutionary past that ….
The question “why do hawthorn bushes not produce grapes” (obviously) assumes that hawthorns do not produce grapes. It is truly remarkable that you allow yourself to make that assumption without explaining its basis. You should have, since you have argued that it does not follow from prior observations.
BTW ‘why’ is a different question. The question up till now was: ‘Do hawthorn bushes produce grapes?’ And there is perfectly reasonable answer to that latter question that follows from what we have observed in the past: ‘No, they do not.’Origenes
KF, 32: >>Pardon, but it is now further evident that you have not seen the significance of self-evident truth in general.
From this world partition, we instantly see that A is itself, and no x can be (A AND ~A), also that any x is (A X-OR ~A). That is, from distinct identity, the three first principles of right reason are immediately present: Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle.
Much more can be said, but the above is sufficient to show that there are literally infinitely many things that we may know with utter certainty, starting from a few that are self-evident. But also, such SET’s are insufficient to construct a worldview; they serve as plumbline tests for worldviews.
