>>ALL morals that we have, regardless of the source, regardless of whether they are objective or subjective, are filtered through humans. As such, we can never be absolutely sure that they are free from error. All of your “moral governance”, “reasoning and responsibility“, “self referential”, “IS-OUGHT” talking points are just that. Talking points. They are not arguments against what I have said about the fact that ALL purported moral actions are open to be questioned. Unless, of course, you suggest that we shouldn’t use the reasoning capabilities that we were given. >>
This is of course reflective of common views and agendas in our civilisation and so it is appropriate to reply, taking time to address key issues at worldviews level:
KF, 32: >>Pardon, but it is now further evident that you have not seen the significance of self-evident truth in general.
Could you be in error that you are conscious?
If so, what is there that is aware to regard the possibility of error? (And this is about the bare fact of consciousness, you could be a brain in a vat manipulated by electrified probes to imagine yourself a man in the world and you would still be undeniably certain of the bare fact of your own consciousness.)
Speaking of, that error exists is also undeniably true. Let E be that claim, then put up the attempted denial ~E. In other words ~E means it is an error to say that error exists. So, E is undeniable.
2 + 3 = 5 is also self-evident and undeniable:
|| + ||| –> |||||
In general, SET’s are truths that — once we are able to understand i/l/o our experience of the world — are seen to be so, and to be necessarily so on pain of patent absurdity on the attempted denial.
Such lie at the heart of rationality, through the manifest fact of distinct identity. Take some distinct A like a bright red ball on a table, so the world W is:
W = {A|~A}
From this world partition, we instantly see that A is itself, and no x can be (A AND ~A), also that any x is (A X-OR ~A). That is, from distinct identity, the three first principles of right reason are immediately present: Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle.
Likewise from distinct identity two-ness is a direct corollary and from that the natural counting numbers and much of the logic of structure and quantity follows — i.e. Mathematics (which is NOT primarily an empirical discipline). As a start, I use the von Neumann construction:
Much more can be said, but the above is sufficient to show that there are literally infinitely many things that we may know with utter certainty, starting from a few that are self-evident. But also, such SET’s are insufficient to construct a worldview; they serve as plumbline tests for worldviews.
In particular, that something like E is knowable to utter certainty on pain of patent absurdity on attempted denial means, truth exists as what says of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Similarly, this is warranted to utter certainty and so some things can be known to utterly, absolutely cretain degree. Therefore any worldview that imagines that such knowledge is impossible collapses in fatal, central error. Subjectivism, relativism and post modernism, I am looking straight at you.
Going further, following the Kantians, many have been induced to imagine that there is an ugly gulch blocking us from knowledge on the external world of things in themselves. Ever since F H Bradley over 100 years ago, this is known to be false. For, the claim to know of such an ignorance gap is to claim to know something of the outside world, i.e. the claim is self referential and incoherent.
A plumbline
We may then infer freely, that we may and do know things about reality external to our interior lives. Though, as error exists is equally certain, we must be careful in warrant. As a first test, plumbline truths will help us. And for many things a lesser degree of warrant is more than good enough. For example on serious matters, we may have moral certainty, that it would be irresponsible to act as though some A were false, on the evidence to hand or reasonably accessible. For yet other things — including science by and large — plausibly or possibly so and reliable i/l/o the balance of evidence is good enough. And so forth.
I am taking a little time to show you that I am not just talking from empty talking points, there are grounds of warrant for what I have to say. And, speaking for this blog, on worldview matters we have spent years thinking through such core matters. As, they lie at the heart of how our civilisation is in the state it is.
Now, too, you will notice that in speaking of moral certainty, I highlighted responsibility, moral government. We intuitively know that we have duties to truth, care in reasoning, fairness, justice, neighbour who is as we are, and more.
All of this reflects how our life of reason is inextricably entangled with responsibility, duty, moral government. And, dismissive hyperskepticism seeking to sweep that away is manifestly a failure of such duties.
Were our rational faculty utterly unrestrained by responsibility, duty, moral government, it would fall into the cynical nihilism of utter manipulativeness and imposition by force: might and/or manipulation make ‘right,’ ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘justice’ and more. That is suicidally absurd. And you know better, as you know that the very force that energises dispute such as in this thread is duty to truth, sound reason and more.
Yes, the mere fact that we inescapably find ourselves trying to justify ourselves and show others in the wrong immediately reveals the massive fact of moral government, and that this is critical to governing ourselves in community. On pain of mutual ruin.
But then, that surfaces another point you wished to brush off with dismissive talking points: the IS-OUGHT gap. That IS and OUGHT are categorically distinct and hard to resolve and unify. That has been known since Plato and beyond. Since Hume, we have known it can only be resolved at world-root level, or else we fall under the guillotine of ungrounded ought. Reasoning IS-IS, then suddenly from nowhere OUGHT-OUGHT. Where, if OUGH-ness is delusion, it instantly entails grand delusion, including of the life of responsible reason itself.
Your root challenge is, there is only one serious candidate that can soundly bridge the gap: the inherently good creator God, a necessary and maximally great being; worthy of loyalty and the reasonable, responsible service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature.
This is not an arbitrary imposition, we are dealing with worldviews analysis on comparative difficulties across factual adequacy, coherence and balanced explanatory adequacy (neither simplistic nor an ad hoc patchwork). If you doubt what I just said, simply put up a successful atlernative: ________ . (Prediction: v. hard to do.)
So, we are at world-root level, looking at generic ethical theism and the central importance of moral government in our life of reason.
The easy hyperskepticism that sweeps all before it on sheer rhetorical audacity is not good enough.
And, it is interesting that so far you have not readily found significant fault with the central Christian ethical teaching (which is of course profoundly Hebraic in its roots). It is there above, laid out in full. Kindly, tell us why those who acknowledge themselves to be under its government and will readily acknowledge that it is a stiff life-challenge are to be instantly, deeply suspect with but few exceptions.
And, tell us why a civilisation deeply influenced by such a teaching is to be branded with a scarlet letter instead of found to be in the sort of struggle to rise to excellence in the face of our finitude, prone-ness to error, moral struggle and too often our ill-will that are the anchor-points of genuine progress for our world.>>
I should add an earlier remark on two example of self-evident moral truth:
KF, 15: >>[I]mplicit in any contested argument is the premise that we have duties to truth, right and soundness in reasoning. On pain of twisting our intellectual powers into nihilistic weapons of cynical deception. In short X objects to Y, on the confident knowledge of in-common duties of intellectual, rational and epistemic virtue. The attempt to challenge ALL moral obligation would be self-referential and incoherent, undermining good faith reasoning itself.
I would go so far as to say this duty of care to truth, right and sound reasoning is self-evident and is typically implicitly accepted.
So, no, we cannot challenge ALL moral claims without undermining even the process of argument itself. No, we cannot dismiss general moral reasoning as suspect of being a blind appeal to authorities. No, mere consequences we happen to imagine (ever heard of the doctrine of unintended consequences?) or motives we think we read in the hearts of others (you are the same who seemingly views Christianity in general as though we are automatically suspect . . .) cannot ground such a broad-brush skepticism about moral reasoning.
We are already at self-referential incoherence.
Infinite regress comes out of the insisted on ALL and the inextricable entanglement of reasoning and moral duties as were outlined. Claim A is suspect so B must be advanced but implies another ought, so B requires C, and oops, we are on to infinity and absurdity.
General hyperskepticism about the moral brings down the proud edifice of reason too by fatally undermining its own self.
Selective hyperskepticism ends in inconsistency, exerting a double standard: stiff rules for thee, but not for me when such are not convenient to where I want to go . . . .
we need plumbline, naturally straight test cases.
One of these, as I outlined, is the inextricable entanglement of reason and duty to truth, right and soundness of logic.
In that light, we can then look at sound yardstick cases and clear the rubble of the modernist collapse of rationality and responsibility away.
For example,it is self-evidently wrong, wicked, evil to kidnap, bind, torture, sexually violate and murder a young child for one’s sick pleasure. (And, sadly, this is NOT a hypothetical case.)
Probe this case and you will see that such a child hath neither strength nor eloquence to fight or plead for himself or herself. And yet, were we to chance on such a demonic act in progress we are duty bound to try to rescue or at least bawl for help.
We are inescapably under moral government.
Which implies that IS and OUGHT must be bridged in the root of reality, on pain of reducing moral government to grand delusion that takes down rationality itself in its collapse.>>
Food for thought. END
Comments
CR @322
CR: This argument doesn’t solve the problem at all. The problem of induction as stated by Hume is that our expectations of the future don’t follow from what we have observed in the past.
So, our expectation that the sun will rise tomorrow morning does not follow from what we have observed in the past. Okay, got it (sigh …).
CR: To see why let’s take Dykes’ example of the hawthorn, which he claims will not produce grapes. How does he know it won’t produce grapes?
Because from what we have observed in the past, Einstein.
CR: Perhaps some scientist will genetically engineer hawthorns to produce grapes.
Perhaps we can change a ball into a pillow and then it no longer bounces. What kind of argument is that? If one “genetically engineer hawthorns to produce grapes”, then you change hawthorns into something else, so they are no longer hawthorns, just like a ball that is changed into a pillow is no longer a ball.
CR: And even if he doesn’t the fact that it won’t produce grapes doesn’t follow merely from the fact that it hasn’t in the past.
Because you say so?
CR: To put this in Dykes’ language, if we were to accept that existence implies identity that would not tell us the identity of any specific entity.
No, of course not! And no sane person would claim such a thing. ‘Temperatures below zero imply frozen water’, does not tell us the specific temperature of the frozen bucket in my backyard. How could it? And more importantly: who would expect it to do that job?
CR: And indeed characterising the issue as being about the identity of the object in question is a bad way to think about it.
Ridiculous. The writer, doesn’t seem to understand, that an object without an identity cannot be thought about at all. Talking about a ‘bad way’ to think about stuff …
CR: Whatever the thing in question is we need an explanation of how it works to say what it will do next and why.
More nonsense! Obviously we first need to observe what a thing does — IOWs the thing observed in the past. Then, and only then, can we ask the questions ‘how does that work?’ “why does the earth orbit the sun?’ and so on. It is not the case, like CR suggests, that we can predict what a (natural) thing will do next, without it ever seen in action.Origenes
January 5, 2018
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When you acknowledge the facts on the table (that quantum storage requires semiosis) then we can move on to the rest of your misconceptions.
And if you think it is unfair for you to have to acknowledge the facts before I'm willing go any further (...the word "if" being a gracious replacement for the word "since") then you must have enjoyed writing the unnecessary thousands of words you've written (to avoid the facts) more than I've enjoyed wading through them.Upright BiPed
January 5, 2018
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I pointed out here, thermodynamics in the current conception of physics did not scale to quantum systems.
If this was actually relevant to the issue, then you'd be offering me an example of a quantum storage medium that was not semiotic. But its not, and so you don't. And here we are.Upright BiPed
January 5, 2018
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@KF
Your still not disagreeing with me.
This is just more reasoning about when to defer to a source.
Saying there is no reasonable doubt is to say we have no good criticism. In many cases, evidence could be planted, witnesses tampered with, etc. However, that would require some great conspiracy and we would need some good explanation as to why everyone would be in on it. We would need a good criticism of the idea that there was no conspiracy. And if we have none, then the evidence stands. But if we did have good criticism of that idea, then that evidence would be deferred to in a different way.
Furthermore, as technology advances, the way we decide whether we defer to evidence changes. What hard to vary explanations do we have for it? For example, what criticism could we level at evidence being false? Can a photo be manipulated? How about a video?
How about a witness' memory? How about all of the witness' memories, as unwilling conspiracists? If we discovered some alien species had been hiding in orbit with the capacity to implant false memories at the time of the crime, witness testimony would suddenly become suspect. We would have good criticisms of it. We suddenly have a reasonable doubt. So, this is an example where new criticism of an idea can come along which result in changing out previous decision to defer to it.
Or are you suggesting we should continue to defer to their memories of first person experiences because it's not subject to criticism?
Again, reason always comes first.
IOW, what was reasonable doubt in the past is not necessarily reasonable doubt today, Nor will it be so in the future. That entire quote is an argument about principles of criticism, not some standard that is frozen in time. At the time empiricism was in play and that represented our theory of knowledge.
The difference between an unreasonable and reasonable doubt is, well, reason itself.critical rationalist
January 5, 2018
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F/N: let us hear as a capital example of the point, the founding father of the modern anglophone school of jurisprudence, Simon Greenleaf:
Evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved . . . None but mathematical truth is susceptible of that high degree of evidence, called demonstration, which excludes all possibility of error [--> Greenleaf wrote almost 100 years before Godel], and which, therefore, may reasonably be required in support of every mathematical deduction. [--> that is, his focus is on the logic of good support for in principle uncertain conclusions, i.e. in the modern sense, inductive logic and reasoning in real world, momentous contexts with potentially serious consequences.]
Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not only that kind of evidence which is employed on subjects connected with moral conduct, but all the evidence which is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. [--> the issue of warrant to moral certainty, beyond reasonable doubt; and the contrasted absurdity of selective hyperskepticism.]
The most that can be affirmed of such things, is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them. [--> moral certainty standard, and this is for the proverbial man in the Clapham bus stop, not some clever determined advocate or skeptic motivated not to see or assent to what is warranted.]
The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but, whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved. [--> pistis enters; we might as well learn the underlying classical Greek word that addresses the three levers of persuasion, pathos- ethos- logos and its extension to address worldview level warranted faith-commitment and confident trust on good grounding, through the impact of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in C1 as was energised by the 500 key witnesses.]
By competent evidence, is meant that which the very-nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind [--> in British usage, the man in the Clapham bus stop], beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal [--> and responsible] test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest. [= definition of moral certainty as a balanced unprejudiced judgement beyond reasonable, responsible doubt. Obviously, i/l/o wider concerns, while scientific facts as actually observed may meet this standard, scientific explanatory frameworks such as hypotheses, models, laws and theories cannot as they are necessarily provisional and in many cases have had to be materially modified, substantially re-interpreted to the point of implied modification, or outright replaced; so a modicum of prudent caution is warranted in such contexts -- explanatory frameworks are empirically reliable so far on various tests, not utterly certain. ] [A Treatise on Evidence, Vol I, 11th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1888) ch 1., sections 1 and 2. Shorter paragraphs added. (NB: Greenleaf was a founder of the modern Harvard Law School and is regarded as a founding father of the modern Anglophone school of thought on evidence, in large part on the strength of this classic work.)]
We can freely assume that CR as an educated person is familiar with the legal standard, proof beyond reasonable doubt as opposed to the mere preponderance of evidence, and why the former is applied to cases of criminal law. So, the above on his part is plainly frivolous. KF
PS: Note on this, that CR has been studiously avoiding the substance in the OP and above in this thread and has instead sought to grandstand with talking points that have been repeatedly corrected for cause and has set up and knocked over strawman after strawman. Where as just one instance, he is in trouble over the first principles of right reason rooted in distinct identity. In the end, that tactic tells us more than a failed attempted substantial answer would.kairosfocus
January 5, 2018
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@KF
CR, I am not obligated to quote the dictionary to you, one definition at a time.
So, the way to create knowledge is to just define words correctly? That would be methodical essentialism, and I've referenced criticism of that elsewhere.
A word is shorthand for an idea not for some imaginary perfect definition. As such, we should be willing to change terminology to talk in ways that other people understand. That is, we should be willing to use their definitions. Furthermore, we should never try to be more precise than is necessary to address the problem we are dealing with since this will lead to loss of clarity. The best summary of his position on this issue is (Unended Quest, p. 24):
Every increase in clarity is an intellectual value in itself; an increase in precision or exactness has only a pragmatic value as a means to some definite end – where the end is usually an increase in testability or criticizability demanded by the problem situation…
and
Dykes then goes on to argue as follows:
The crux of the case against Hume was stated in 1916 by H.W.B. Joseph in An Introduction to Logic: “A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be.” Hume’s whole argument – persuasive though it may be – is, to borrow Joseph’s words, “in flat conflict with the Law of Identity.”
Existence implies identity. It is not possible to exist without being something, and a thing can only be what it is: A is A. Any actions of that thing form part of its identity: “the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is.” Thus to deny any connection between a thing, its actions, and their consequences, is to assert that the thing is not what it is; it is to defy the Law of Identity.
It is not necessary to prolong this discussion. Entities exist. They possess identity. By careful observation – free from preconception – we are able to discover the identities of the entities we observe. Thereafter, we are fully entitled to assume that like entities will cause like events, the form of inference we call induction. And, because it rests on the axiom of the Law of Identity, correct induction – free from contradiction – is a valid route to knowledge. The first premise of CR is therefore false.
This argument doesn’t solve the problem at all. The problem of induction as stated by Hume is that our expectations of the future don’t follow from what we have observed in the past. To see why let’s take Dykes’ example of the hawthorn, which he claims will not produce grapes. How does he know it won’t produce grapes? Perhaps some scientist will genetically engineer hawthorns to produce grapes. And even if he doesn’t the fact that it won’t produce grapes doesn’t follow merely from the fact that it hasn’t in the past.
To put this in Dykes’ language, if we were to accept that existence implies identity that would not tell us the identity of any specific entity. And indeed characterising the issue as being about the identity of the object in question is a bad way to think about it. Whatever the thing in question is we need an explanation of how it works to say what it will do next and why. And we won’t be able to tell what we can predict about the entity in question without such an account. Why do hawthorn bushes not produce grapes? That has to do with a complicated set of circumstances in its evolutionary past that selected against hawthorns producing relatively large fleshy fruit and refers to lots of things that are not hawthorn bushes, like human beings who did not selectively breed hawthorn bushes to get them to grow grapes. Stating this theory in terms of definitions would make it less clear because the explanation involves tying together many different entities and so the whole explanation would have to be repeated many times in slightly different ways.
Note also that Dykes’ approach to creating knowledge amounts to defining terms in the right way: that is, to the idea of methodological essentialism that I criticised in my comments on Section 1.
That does't give us infallible access either.
I will note that reasonable, responsible doubt is specifically distinct from hyperskeptical dismissal of what is not convenient or welcome.
There were questions in my comment. You haven't answered them.
...how do you define what a reasonable criticism is? That would be, well, reason. And how do we know that we considered all reasonable doubts we have today? Could one have been accidentally omitted when you criticized it? Could new doubts be proposed in the future? Will we not use reason to determine if they are, well, reasonable?
Are you suggesting those are unreasonable doubts? If so, why?critical rationalist
January 5, 2018
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CR, I am not obligated to quote the dictionary to you, one definition at a time. I will note that reasonable, responsible doubt is specifically distinct from hyperskeptical dismissal of what is not convenient or welcome. When X is warranted to this degree, it would be indefensible to act as though X were false on a matter of great moment. That is why this standard is exacted when someone's life may be on the line, or his freedom. Just last month, I saw a jury release a rape accused on grounds that there was sufficient doubt that it would be unsafe to convict. The look on his face as the judge told him to open the door to the box, he was free to leave thanks to the decision by the jury based on their life experiences, was a study itself. I trust he has learned a sobering lesson. KFkairosfocus
January 5, 2018
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@KF
You are also studiously avoiding addressing self-evident propositions that are true beyond reasonable, responsible doubt, indeed are certainly true.
"beyond a reasonable doubt" refers to idea as well. What might that be?
That we have no reasonable criticisms of them? And how do you define what a reasonable criticism is? That would be, well, reason. And how do we know that we considered all reasonable doubts we have today? Could one have been accidentally omitted when you criticized it? Could new doubts be proposed in the future? Will we not use reason to determine if they are, well, reasonable?
Again, it seems that no one has managed to actually contract what I've said. However, still think I might have missed a criticism. Or misinterpreted someone's argument or someone, including myself, might come up with a good criticism of it in the next our, or next week, next year, a century from now, or a millenia from now. etc., or possibly never at all, if we all gave up on criticizing it. Or if we destroyed ourselves in some global conflict / biological epidemic / astroid strike, etc.critical rationalist
January 5, 2018
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WJM to JS:
How does one go about testing the law of non-contradiction without implicitly relying on it to separate a success from a failure? How does one even set the experiment up without relying on the LoI?
Prezactly.
KFkairosfocus
January 5, 2018
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WJM, to CR:
Your continued insistence that the fact that we have a fallible reasoning and perceptual process necessarily means we do not have the capacity to recognize self-evident, objective truths is flawed logically because it ignores the potential that we may have other means at our disposal for recognizing self-evident truths.
I would add, and just to speak or type or think in a language, one has to use distinct identity (and would collapse into utter confusion if one were to try to avoid using it).
I have already spoken to the issue of sufficient reliability to be workable.
SET's are on the table, just studiously ignored or dismissed.
But I am sure that there is a growing recognition of the problem.
KFkairosfocus
January 5, 2018
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CR, the unpacking has been done any number of times, and with specific references in this thread just for one. Sorry, I will not go do that over and over again. Beyond, when a proposition A includes itself or its utterer in the context of its reference, it is particularly vulnerable to implying some B such that if A then A AND ~ A. For simple case, We have an English speaker saying, I cannot speak English. For other case, saying something that fatally undermines rationality when arguing about reasoning and warranting truth etc. Which is the general class of your problem and Mr Deutsch's problem. KFkairosfocus
January 5, 2018
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@KF
CR, you have failed to address cogently, self-referential incoherence.
Words are shortcuts for ideas. What Ideas are you referring to when you say "self-referential incoherence"? Unpack that for me.critical rationalist
January 5, 2018
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JS said:
Two contradictory statements. Only one is true. The law has been tested and upheld. You can repeat this in millions of different ways, lending further support to the law.
If the law of non-contradiction is to be tested, it must be tested without using the law of non-contradiction to determine the validity of the results, or else you are using the very yardstick in question to measure your results. How does one go about testing the law of non-contradiction without implicitly relying on it to separate a success from a failure? How does one even set the experiment up without relying on the LoI?William J Murray
January 5, 2018
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CR said:
I’m not saying there is no objective truth. I’m saying that we do not have an infallible way of identifying any such source of it, an infallible way of determining when to defer to any such source or it or an infallible way of interpreting it. Reason always has its way first. And we only have fallible access to it.
How can reason have it's way first? How does one "reason" one's way towards a method of reasoning without first producing an axiom or principle of reasoning? How do you go about reasoning your way towards a reasoning process?
But, by all means, feel free to present some new criticism of that idea.
Your continued insistence that the fact that we have a fallible reasoning and perceptual process necessarily means we do not have the capacity to recognize self-evident, objective truths is flawed logically because it ignores the potential that we may have other means at our disposal for recognizing self-evident truths.
Just because someone can look at a bird and think it is a lizard, or look at a bird and call it a lizard, doesn't make the bird a lizard. Not recognizing a self-evident truth, or misidentifying something as a self-evident truth, does not logically mean such things do not exist or that we have no means by which to recognize them.
A loose perceptual analogy: A man with his eyes shut may not know what the open-eyed man is pointing at, and may insist that the sighted man cannot be sure, but that doesn't mean the man with his eyes open doesn't really know what is sitting on the tree limb.
I challenge you to take a subject, like abortion or slavery or something like that, and show us an example of your process of "reasoning first" towards a conclusion about whether or not one should abort or have slaves (or whatever). I don't want your theory explained, I'd like to see an example of it.William J Murray
To use an analogy, it’s like you’re arguing for Newton’s laws of motion….
UB: What does it take to launch rocket (Newton’s laws of motion)? You’re denying established knowledge!
CR: Newton’s laws are an approximation that doesn’t hold at very high velocities. As such, you can’t use it to build, say, a global positioning system. Furthermore, Einstein’s explanation, the curvature of space time, is more fundamental. It assumes something completely different is happening, in reality, yet doesn’t require rebuilding bridges and buildings.
UB: What does it take to launch rocket (Newton’s laws of motion)? You’re denying established knowledge!
[repeat]
Even then, Newton’s laws unified the motion of the planets and falling apples. That’s one of the goals in constructor theory, including and expressing certain apparently anthropocentric attributes such as knowledge in physical terms.
From your website….
The Information Tetrahedron is a visual aid for understanding translation. It is a model of the material conditions required to translate any form of recorded information, including the information recorded in DNA. The translation of an informational medium enables the production of effects that are not determined by the material properties of the medium being translated. Instead, those effects are determined elsewhere within the system of translation. This relational architecture – with one arrangement of matter evoking an effect, while another arrangement of matter determines what the effect will be – establishes a physical discontinuity in the system. This discontinuity enables prescriptive control of effects that are not limited by local dynamics. Such effects can only be derived from the contingent organization of the individual systems that translate information.
Except, “any form of recorded information” would include quantum information mediums and this simply doesn’t apply. Is this not “accepted knowledge”?
How can your argument hold when it only applies to classical information mediums? Or are you claiming it does apply beyond classical mediums to quantum mediums as well?
Furthermore, those three things can be expressed as part of a network of tasks and subtasks in constructor theory. They represent knowledge.
Apparently, you disagree with this despite having no concrete criticism of it. What gives?
Are claiming those three things cannot be expressed in a more fundamental way as part of a network of possible tasks with subtasks, etc. as described in section 3.1 in this paper?
There is a fundamental principle within physics sometimes referred to as the minimum total potential energy principle. This principle is related to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and simply states that any physical object (regardless of its size or composition, as big as a planet or as small as a molecule) will distort and twist, and naturally orient itself to seek its lowest potential energy state.
However, I pointed out here, thermodynamics in the current conception of physics did not scale to quantum systems.
Words refer to ideas. And, if a key part of dividing a physical system into a semiotic triad depends on this dichotomy of rate independence in a classical way, then yes. that would not be possible in quantum mediums.
Again, I'm suggesting that a semiotic system can be expressed in a more fundamentally way as a network of possible tasks. And this gets around the inability to make exact statements necessary to apply semiosis to quantum systems.
Is a "semiotic system" not a way of subduing a physical system? Does it not transform some substrate? Are there not inputs and outputs? Does some aspect of the system remain the same in a net way, allowing it to perform that transformation again? The transformed substrate not the thirdness referred to in the triad?
IOW, a semiotic system is only a approximation to what constructor theory can describe in a more fundamental way.critical rationalist
January 5, 2018
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CR, you have failed to address cogently, self-referential incoherence. FYI, that is a means of falsification.You are also studiously avoiding addressing self-evident propositions that are true beyond reasonable, responsible doubt, indeed are certainly true. recall, distinct identity, consciousness, error exists and co? You have had to implicitly use these just to comment. And then there is 2 + 3 = 5. Notice, this is not a discussion about authorities as oracles of unquestionable truth, it is a question about specific truths that are self-evident i/l/o a discussion that explains what self-evidence is. You seem to be so hung up on fearing authorities beyond your favourite ones that you have pounded away at a strawman. Kindly, see again the OP and 302 above. KFkairosfocus
January 5, 2018
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@Barry
Is that proposition fallible?
I haven't preceded every statement with "This is a conjecture". So, what? Do I need to put a disclaimer at the top of every comment?
I've stated my position several times. I've quoted examples of what it means to be fallable about fallibilism. I've pointed to examples of other people being fallible about fallibilism it when they don't seem to realize their doing it. And, strangely, they still keep denying it, despite their actions not conflicting with it.
It's like some kind of wack-a-mole. When I clarify one misconception, some other previously clarified misconception gets brought up again, etc. What gives?
One way to attach an idea one finds objectionable is to present a false version of it then point out how it is false. It's disingenuous.
I'm not saying there is no objective truth. I'm saying that we do not have an infallible way of identifying any such source of it, an infallible way of determining when to defer to any such source or it or an infallible way of interpreting it. Reason always has its way first. And we only have fallible access to it.
But, by all means, feel free to present some new criticism of that idea.critical rationalist
January 4, 2018
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CR: "Every proposition is fallible"
Is that proposition fallible?
CR, if my assertions failed the "self-referential incoherence" test, I hope I would rethink my position. But I doubt that you are bothered by the self-referential incoherence of your position.Barry Arrington
January 4, 2018
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CR
Every proposition is fallible because there are no infallible sources that we can defer to by which to prevent us from falling in error. Reason has its say first.
Every human being is fallible. We are designed to fail. Our eyesight goes, our minds go and our bodies go.
The only way you can make sense out of anything -- FWIW, you basically said you can't make sense out of anything -- is to appeal to the divine.tribune7
January 4, 2018
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JS, had you but taken a moment to look at my "obtuse" comment, you would have seen that the attempt to "prove" or even play around with LNC inescapably has to implicitly use it. Just to communicate or even to think in images and language. In short, you are showing significant signs of major conceptual misunderstanding. KFkairosfocus
January 4, 2018
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SB
Go ahead and use reason, logic, and evidence to prove the law of non-contradiction.
I assume that you missed my scare quotes around "prove". The law of non-contradiction can certainly be tested.
Law of non-contradiction: states that contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time, e.g. the two propositions "A is B " and "A is not B " are mutually exclusive. [wiki]
Statement 1) 2 + 2 = 4
Statement 2) 2 + 2 = 5
Two contradictory statements. Only one is true. The law has been tested and upheld. You can repeat this in millions of different ways, lending further support to the law.JSmith
January 4, 2018
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CR at 266 responding to me at 246,
We can chalk this up as yet another example of a fallible interpretation.
There is no misunderstanding here, CR. Your claim is that descriptions of semiotic systems do not scale to quantum storage mediums. In response, you’ve been asked to provide any example of a quantum storage medium that is not semiotic. You can’t do so, and thus, any example you give will immediately refute your claim. And here we are.
Your claim is falsified by the facts, and you don’t have the intellectual integrity to acknowledge this. So, over and over and over again, you attempt to hide this refutation in mountains of words and further dissembling. There is no misunderstanding in this whatsoever. It is called intellectual dishonesty.
You (very specifically) took my claim that semiotic descriptions apply to “any form of recorded information”, and you presented a counter-claim that semiotic systems didn’t apply to “quantum storage mediums”. You stated, (quoting me) that “…“any form of recorded information” would include quantum information mediums” and then you stated “this simply doesn’t apply”.
But, it does. And thus, your further dissembling is irrelevant to that core fact.
So, there is no misunderstanding, CR. When you have the integrity to acknowledge the fact that quantum storage mediums require semiosis in order to function, I’ll then be happy to disabuse you of your remaining misconceptions on the subject. There are plenty.Upright BiPed
January 3, 2018
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SB, indeed to utter such an example or to write it out or type it out, or even to draw, will immediately and necessarily rely on it, due to the use of distinct identity to make intelligible thought or communication and action. This is an age that is not particularly humble before truth, so that irks some, who imagine that they are seeing some decree by a suspect panel (especially some imagined Magisterium backed up by an inquisition) and so they imagine themselves to be in heroic rebellion. Ironically, they are the establishment now, in the USA for sure. But all that such means is that absurdity is driving the ship of state. KFkairosfocus
January 3, 2018
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KF, the best that can be done in the form of a demonstration is to assume that LNC isn't true and then take note the absurdities that follow. But that exercise, though useful in a way, does not really prove that the principle is true. If there is nothing more basic than the principle, then their is no prior standard one can appeal to for a formal demonstration.StephenB
January 3, 2018
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SB, observe how JS has used the rhetorical excuse of my alleged "obtuse[ness]" to duck actually affirming or denying that he believes that SET's actually exist. As for the oh we can "prove" LNC, he of course fails to adequately reckon with the circularity involved in any such proof attempt. Something well known since was it Epictetus? KFkairosfocus
January 3, 2018
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CR:
Every proposition is fallible because there are no infallible sources that we can defer to by which to prevent us from falling in error. Reason has its say first.
Absurdly false and counter to facts in evidence.
Just because we are fallible does not entail that in every case there is a residual uncertainty regarding the truth of propositions. A significant number of things are necessarily true, and a relevant subset of these are self-evidently true. For instance, it has been repeatedly shown that error exists is undeniably true, Likewise, as a conscious individual, you are incorrigibly and undeniably known to yourself to be conscious as a bare fact. and that we don't have a list of all SET's or an infallible rule for grounding all truths etc etc, is utterly irrelevant to what we now have in hand. The bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
Your problem is that you have made a crooked yardstick your standard, a type of fallibilist skepticism and you have a major challenge in acknowledging its failures.
For example: in the above you have exerted great certainty about fallibilism, asserting a universal affirmative that is thus self-referential. It implies that fallibilism is uncertain also, so that what your claim boils down to is a policy declaration that you will treat all claims as fallible, with the convenient exception of the core elements of your system.
Now the oh the sources are fallible claim fails through the key issue of degree of reliability. A good car, calculator or computer will admittedly be fallible, but they are sufficiently reliable to be very effective and useful. Likewise, our reasoning process. The abstract possibility of error can be compatible with the reality of effective and trustworthy performance in many relevant cases.
And in the case of relevant SET's such as are seen in the OP and thread above, we have claimed truths that are so, are warranted to be necessarily so, and that can be confirmed by insightful inspection backed up by the examination that shows the attempted denial leads to patent absurdity. Denying that error exists directly leads to the implication that it is an error to assert that error exists, so error exists is undeniable. To try to deny one's consciousness has to use said consciousness so is self-defeating. And so forth.
So, the answer to such fallibilism is the sufficient reliability of our reason. Sufficient to function in some cases to utter certainty.
Your scheme fails the test of factual adequacy.
As for reason, your implication is, that it is a sufficiently reliable capacity to be trustworthy and respected. But, it too depends on self evident truths connected to distinct identity. For instance you are conscious and may consider the appearance of a bright red ball on a table. It matters not here whether it is instantiated physically, or is imagined, or is a computer generated graphic or is a product of electrical stimulation of a brain in a vat. The appearance is enough to distinguish ball A from rest of world ~A. The world partition is immediate:
W = {A|~A}
From this we instantly see that A is itself, also that this is distinct from ~A which is also itself. Then, no thing x in W can be A AND ~A. Any x will be A X-OR ~A. this is due to A's distinct identity as a thing.
This is not a proof, it is an instructive explanation for the willing. For, to discuss such, at every step of the way we had to rely on distinct identity. This is the root of reasoning and it is undeniably true, forced truth.
Similarly the dichotomy marks distinct things so quantity. From that we see two-ness, thence the endless chain of the naturals necessarily following.
Going on, we can consider also how 2 + 3 = 5:
|| + ||| --> |||||
This too speaks for itself so that one who understands sees that this is necessarily and undeniably so on pain of absurdity. And yes, one may construct an axiomatic scheme that leads up to this, but that scheme is less certain than the above. And we hardly need to point to Godel's incompleteness result to see that.
The end of all this is that you have put up a crooked yardstick as reference standard for straightness, accuracy and uprightness. It has failed the test of the naturally straight and upright plumb-line. So, now, whose report will you believe, why?
KF
PS: Red herrings on the Bible are obvious distractions intended to taint the discussion. They are readily addressed elsewhere and we need not end up in a pointless distraction. Sufficient is on the table, and unresponsiveness or evasion or clinging to absurdity will not help you or your claims.kairosfocus
January 3, 2018
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I didn’t say that self-evident truths couldn’t be proven. I said that they didn’t need to be. I can certainly use reason, logic and evidence based examination to “prove” the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity.
Go ahead and use reason, logic, and evidence to prove the law of non-contradiction.StephenB
January 3, 2018
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SB
So you do acknowledge that self evident truths do not require proof by reason and evidence to support them.
Yes. But, they do not lack support through reason and evidence.
Why, then, would you ask me to prove my claim that moral truths are self evident if you already know that NO self evident truth can be proven.
I didn’t say that self-evident truths couldn’t be proven. I said that they didn’t need to be. I can certainly use reason, logic and evidence based examination to “prove” the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity. And if I doubted that they were true, providing that information would go a long way to convincing me that it was true.JSmith
January 3, 2018
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SB: Let me make sure I understand you. Forget about morality for the moment. I want to discuss logic and nothing else. Are you saying that the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity are not self evident–that they require proof by reason and evidence?
No.
So you do acknowledge that self evident truths do not require proof by reason and evidence to support them. Why, then, would you ask me to prove my claim that moral truths are self evident if you already know that NO self evident truth can be proven. You might want to claim that moral truths are not self evident, but it would make no sense to ask me to prove that moral truths are self evident. Do you understand your error?StephenB
January 3, 2018
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You have admitted to not being certain that it is wrong to treat women as if they are not persons. You have admitted to not being certain it is wrong to treat black persons as if they are inferior to white persons.
What do you mean by certain? What does anyone's certainty about it have to do with it being true or not, or whether they will treat women as if they are not persons or treat black persons as if they are inferior to white persons, or if they would vigorously work to discard errors everyone might have in all of our moral ideas, including the ones above and including myself.
I don't expect anyone to come up with good criticism of those ideas. Yet, I would be surprised if 10,000 years have gone by without someone devising a relevant. significant new criticism to that we haven't thought of yet. And I have a reasonable expectation that criticism would fail as well. And when it did, it would result in a better understating as why it is true that its is wrong to treat women as if they are not persons or treat black persons as if they are inferior to white persons.
Furthermore, what's particularly frighting is the idea of anyone who thinks they have infallible access to an infallible source of moral truths, an infallible set of rules of when to defer to it and an infallible means of interpreting. That implies that morally knowledge is infallibly known, which means it can never improve and no new criticisms to improve it could ever be developed. We make progress when we discard errors from out ideas. Even the best of our moral knowledge is incomplete and contains errors we can discard. That’s how all knowledge grows, including moral knowledge.
Apparently, you think we live in some specially privileged time in which we happen to poses all moral knowledge that will ever exist. Furthermore, your assuming that human beings cannot create knew knowledge which will have an vast and significant impact beyond what we can reason about today. Jesus is coming soon? Our ability to bring about genuine, significant change must be limited, otherwise we could interfere in Gods plan? IOW, I have no good explanation as to how we could infallibly possess an exhaustively complete list of which criticisms could be applied to those ideas. If we cannot conceive of the impact of genuinely new knowledge, then how can we conceive of moral problems it will present? How can we reason about what ways it could be wrong?
What about universal income or healthcare? Future generations will likely will look back at us, wondering how we could have taken so long to implement something so basic and self-evidently true, just like we look back at slavery, etc. What about same sex marriages? Apparently, you think the love between a same sex couple is somehow inferior to that of a heterosexual couples. Is that a self evident truth?
What we if could regenerate as a person of a different race or gender as if we had been born that way from birth? That would in and of itself give us an idea about what those people experience. And that could have profound moral implications. I think the idea that it is wrong to treat a woman as if they are not a person or a black person as if they were inferior to white people would pass that criticism with flying colors. And I think it would convince some people that had not been convinced before. But do I think it would somehow mean no other revenant and valid criticism could be leveled at those ideas? No, I do not.
Having an infallible list of what we must include also implies an infallible list of what we need not include and therefore can exclude as well.
What about future sentient artificially intelligent argents? Are you certain it would be wrong to treat them as if they were not persons or inferior to human beings? Would they have the rights to profit from or to retain the rights to new knowledge they create? Can you just turn them off? What does it mean to be a person, etc.?
If we keep our own fallibility in mind, could it be that, actually, all moral truths follow logically from epistemological considerations, rather than just some of them? And it could it be that the moral imperative to not destroy the means of correcting mistakes is the only moral imperative?
Destroying our discounting that means seems like a fundamental evil that perpetuates itself.critical rationalist
KF, 32: >>Pardon, but it is now further evident that you have not seen the significance of self-evident truth in general.
From this world partition, we instantly see that A is itself, and no x can be (A AND ~A), also that any x is (A X-OR ~A). That is, from distinct identity, the three first principles of right reason are immediately present: Laws of Identity, Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle.
Much more can be said, but the above is sufficient to show that there are literally infinitely many things that we may know with utter certainty, starting from a few that are self-evident. But also, such SET’s are insufficient to construct a worldview; they serve as plumbline tests for worldviews.
