Dawkins on arguments pointing to God

_{kairosfocus

January 14, 2016

Atheism, Fine tuning, rhetoric, Sciences and Theology, worldview}

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Ran across this clip at Christian Post:

Atheist author and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins says the best argument for God he’s ever hard has to do with a deistic God as the fine-tuner of the universe . . . .

Dawkins prefaced his answer by making it clear that he is not “in any sense admitting that there is a good argument,” and insisted that “there is no decent argument for the existence of deities.” . . . .

“It’s still a very, very bad argument, but it’s the best one going,” he added, noting that a major problem with the argument is that it leaves unexplained where the fine tuner came from.

As for evolution, however, he said there is simply no argument at all that he can consider.

“There are reasons why people don’t get it, such as the time scale involved is so huge. People find it difficult to grasp how long a time has been available for the changes that are talked about,” the evolutionary biologist asserted . . .

What do we think, why? END

PS: Kindly cf the discussion below, and particularly 24 (also 42) and 64. What we see here is a rhetorical attempt to push ethical theism beyond the BATNA windows of the conventional wisdom on what is acceptable thinking by posing on confident manner as a celebrity intellectual (without having to account for the — on fair comment — puerile, strawmannish character of his own anti-theistical arguments):

Comments

PS: In the sense of Behe, that is. I agree that one needs to be conservative.daveS_{January 19, 2016
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Hmm. I'm not sure the term "irreducibly complex" fits here.daveS_{January 19, 2016
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DS, mathematics, post Godel, is irreducibly complex as no set of coherent and complete, or just known coherent axioms can be constructed for a reasonably complex system. One therefore has to be very conservative in claims. I am confident of the natural numbers and that an active mind can build structures and quantities on them such as the continuum and the like. KFkairosfocus_{January 19, 2016
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KF,
DS, I think Lloyd is not necessary, he wants to convert the cosmos including energy into processors. Try David Abel with his workmanlike 2009 calc on plausibility bounds: http://www.tbiomed.com/content/6/1/27 KF
Thanks, I'll take a look. Tbh, I've never been able to make heads or tails of Abel's stuff. The Lloyd paper seems quite accessible, however.
PS: Nowhere do I imply that every mathematical entity is a necessary being, I simply showed that the natural numbers are on a simple conceptual process of successive instantiation, though in fact all are present at once.
Well, if it has been established that each natural number (and the set of natural numbers) are all necessary beings, where do we stop? My understanding is that all of mathematics can be reduced to set theory. I don't know why, assuming your argument shows that 2 is a necessary being, we can't also say that universal sets are necessary beings.daveS_{January 19, 2016
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EugenS, Thanks for the information. I can't read Russian, but I will look at the recurrence paradox paper. The algorithmic approach you describe does seem a little more to the point to me, but maybe it's just a matter of preference to me.daveS_{January 19, 2016
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What is required for a minimal complete set of instructions to appear? Does it require a processor that must parse and understand those instructions? Speaking of David Abel... Primordial Prescription: The Most Plaguing Problem of Life Origin ScienceMung_{January 19, 2016
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DS, I think Lloyd is not necessary, he wants to convert the cosmos including energy into processors. Try David Abel with his workmanlike 2009 calc on plausibility bounds: http://www.tbiomed.com/content/6/1/27 KF PS: Nowhere do I imply that every mathematical entity is a necessary being, I simply showed that the natural numbers are on a simple conceptual process of successive instantiation, though in fact all are present at once. From these we can construct all sorts of other entities and work out structural, logical consequences for what are elaborate mental models. Feed in some fire into the eqns and you get physics. That goes to the intelligible reality challenge raised above. Before I took up Hume and Kant.kairosfocus_{January 19, 2016
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Dr Selensky I agree, algorithms etc are semantic and meaningful, language based. However, we deal with those who doubt the reality of minds, and who used to routinely cite the apocryphal story of monkeys at keyboards to say in effect evantually random typing pays off as a string is a string is a string and the semantic ones are reachable in the config space. My point is, were every atom a monkey with the equivalent of a 1,000 coins to toss every pico second or 100 times that, they could not search any reasonable fraction of the space of possibilities. So, we see that there MUST be another force at work to account for text and for the node-arc wiring diagrams of FSCO/I. Intelligence directing configurations on intent, as is so familiar. Design. But there is none so blind as one full of Plato's cave shadow shows with BATNA walls pushed here and there by spinmeisters. KF PS: Anywhere to get English for that book? While I am at it is there any way to get some of the old MIR books in English? (Went out of business 2009) E.g. I want vol 2 of Savelyev's General Physics.kairosfocus_{January 19, 2016
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DaveS, "I mean if there are calculations showing that 10^17 seconds is far too short a time, what do they show the minimum time required would be?" Can I suggest as an upper bound an analysis akin to Poincare and Zermelo recurrence paradox. http://goo.gl/3MmWxg On a different note, your question is a good illustration of why the kind of statistical calculations KF presents are missing the point, IMO. The point of all biology is that it is algorithmic, not just something very improbable/implausible. In fact, I am reading now a very interesting old book by two Russian mathematicians Uspensky and Semenov: "The theory of algorithms: basic discoveries and applications" (1987). They are followers of Kolmogorov from what I can tell. http://goo.gl/AojDzl (for those who can read in Russian :) ) In the preface they state that one of the distinguishing features of algorithms as a mathematical object, is that they are semantically loaded. One of the key properties of an algorithm is that it has meaning. So syntactically (that is, with a maximum of abstraction from semantics), meaning is a still recognised as a key feature of an algorithm. This was realized as early as in 1987. So the whole thrust of ID, in my humble estimation, is not in statistics but in that biology is algorithmic and consequently is semantically loaded. The key question therefore is not 'what is the max time for something to self-assemble?', but 'where is the source of the first set of instructions for the cell to execute a complete metabolic/replication integrated cycle?' Can this be done by fluke, frozen accident or such like? What is required for a minimal complete set of instructions to appear? Does it require a processor that must parse and understand those instructions? Does the minimal complete set of instructions for the cell to sustain and reproduce reduce to the mechanical laws of particle motion? Does it reduce to chemistry? Or does it require intelligence to set up? Can we glean possible answers from our own human technology? And what does our experience suggest in this regard?EugeneS_{January 19, 2016
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KF, I don't have an answer to your post #68. I will take a look at the Seth Lloyd paper & further discussion, but I expect it will take me some time. You are also welcome to consider whether every mathematical object we can dream up is in fact a necessary being, as your argument appears to imply.daveS_{January 19, 2016
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F/N: F H Bradley and Hugo Maynell help us tame the tendencies of thought let loose by Hume and given much weight by Kant. (This is what energises an extreme nominalism that tends to dismiss inconvenient explanatory constructs not given imprimatur of methodological naturalism driven by a priori evolutionary materialistic scientism.) First, Maynell in his Hume, Kant and Rational Theism. I quote in extenso to help us see what we have been led not to see and to invite reading in depth of one of those sleeper papers in phil that we should all find useful:
It is very commonly held that there are no sound arguments for the existence of God . . . . In claiming that there are no such arguments, those who reject faith in God as irrational, and those who would cling to faith in spite of reason, commonly appeal to the authority of David Hume and Immanuel Kant.[1] In what follows, I shall try to show that the case made by these philosophers against some at least of the traditional arguments for the existence of God can be refuted. By "rational theism," I shall mean the view that there are sound arguments for the existence of God, which do not either overtly or surreptitiously assume what they set out to establish. Now it is often stated or presupposed that the aspersions by Hume and Kant on rational theism have no connection with those implications of their thought which are generally rejected out of hand, like Hume's scepticism,[2] and Kant's confining of human knowledge to a merely seeming world of "phenomena" as opposed to the real world of "things in themselves." I shall try to show that such an assumption is quite mistaken. Science and common sense both presuppose that by means of our experience we can get to know about a world which exists, and largely is as it is, prior to and independently of our human existence, let alone our enjoyment of the relevant experience. For example, it was not until the late eighteenth century that William Herschel, by making the relevant observations and using his intelligence, discovered the planet called Uranus. But there was such a planet long before the discovery was made . . . . There is a great truth which Plato discovered, with some assistance from the Pythagoreans; this is, that there is a real intelligible world which underlies the sensible world of our experience and which we discover by asking questions about that sensible world.[3] This truth is at once presupposed and copiously illustrated by science; it is parodied by the mechanistic materialism which some suppose to be the metaphysical implication of science.[4] Now there is a crucial division in thought about the world, and one fraught with consequences, between those who maintain that the intelligible aspect of reality apparently discovered by Plato is intrinsic to it, and those who are convinced it is a mere subjective device evolved by human beings for describing or controlling it . . . . According to Hume, all human knowledge is based on and confined to "impressions" of experience and "ideas" which are faint copies of these . . . . But Hume's demonstration that, while causality is utterly crucial to our understanding of the world, a consistent empiricism[10] cannot justify belief in causality,[11] is a tribute to his genius and an indication of his permanent importance for philosophy. It was Hume's failure (on either interpretation of the bearing of his thought) to justify causal reasoning which particularly impressed Kant; and he brought about his so-called "Copernican revolution" in philosophy largely to meet the difficulty. It was not the case, as previous philosophers had thought, that our minds must or could conform to a world existing prior to and independently of themselves; on the contrary, the world so far as we can know it must conform to our minds.[12] The significance of Hume, as Kant saw it, was that he had shown that the former route was impossible to follow . . . The only solution to these problems, as Kant saw it, was that our minds impose the causal connection upon events, rather than, as earlier philosophers had supposed, somehow reflecting a real causal relation which obtains between events prior to and independently of the apprehension of them by our minds. Kant saw that causality is not the only aspect of the world for which the problem arises. The "categories" (to use his own term) of thing and property, necessity and contingency, unity and plurality, and so on, are also imposed by the mind upon phenomena.[14] Even space and time are rather modes of our apprehension of things, than aspects of things as they really are.[15] What can we say, then, of "things in themselves," or things prior to and independently of the apprehension of them by our senses and our minds? All we can say of them is that they do somehow give rise to the phenomenal world by impinging on our subjectivity;[16] we are necessarily and forever debarred from real knowledge of them . . . . The traditional arguments for God's existence all make, from Kant's point of view, what is fundamentally the same mistake; they assume that the intelligible structure or framework which the human mind imposes upon things, in the course of gaining knowledge of them, belongs to things prior to and independently of human knowledge. Those who try to argue for the existence of God on the usual traditional types of ground are like people who gaze on the heavens through a telescope, and confuse what is in fact a piece of dust within the telescope with a star or a planet. For example, to argue that a God must exist as cause of the world, as very many have tried to do, is to overlook the fact that causality is one of the categories and so inapplicable to things in themselves, and furthermore that it is to be applied within the world of phenomena, rather than to the world as a whole. [--> F H Bradley, cf. below, has somewhat to say to this "little error at the beginning"] But the believer in God should by no means be discouraged by this; Kant regarded himself as destroying the pretensions of knowledge in order to make room for faith [--> thus enters a redefinition of faith that has led to much mischief] . . . . But it is a presupposition both of common sense, and of science as usually understood, that a real material world exists and is as it is prior to and independently of the human mind at least, and that the human mind can come to know about this independently existing world. There were rocks, trees, and rivers before human beings arrived on the scene to perceive them, and there were hydrogen and oxygen, electrons and protons, before scientists first theorized to the effect that there were . . . . If one accepts the strength of the case which the idealists developed by making Kant's philosophy self-consistent, that the material world is derivative from mind; but also admits that the world exists and is as science progressively discovers it to be, prior to and independently of the human mind; then one is driven to the conclusion that the world depends on a mind or minds which are other than the human. The idealists argue persuasively that the material universe is dependent on mind; their opponents rightly insist in effect that it is absurd to suppose that the mind or minds it depends on are human. That the world exists and develops on the basis of a single self-consistent set of laws seems to suggest that theism is a more rational option than polytheism . . . . A modification of empiricism which may be felt to meet these objections is this. While we can properly be said sometimes to know what is not and cannot be the direct object of our experience, we can be said to know only what commends itself as the best explanation of our experience. While no-one has ever seen a positron, very many have seen experimental results of which the best available explanation is that there are such entities. I cannot perceive another's feelings of anger or boredom; but I can certainly perceive evidence in her attitude or speech or gestures of which the best explanation is that she is bored. No-one can now perceive the death of Abraham Lincoln by shooting; but they can perceive a vast amount of evidence, in records surviving from that time, which can hardly be explained except on the assumption that he did die in such a manner. However, if the basic principles of empiricism are expanded to take account of such awkward cases in the way I have just described, it is by no means clear that they any longer rule out rational theism. For it may be insisted that the existence of something like God is needed to account for a very general fact which is a matter of experience in a wide sense-that the universe is intelligible. Alternative explanations, or claims that no explanation is needed, may well be held to be less satisfactory . . . . the points raised by Hume and Darwin in this connection [teleological reasoning] are simply not relevant to the argument that I have been setting forward, which infers creative intelligence from the intelligibility of the world, not design from its order . . . . I conclude by summing up the argument which I have put forward in this article. Plato discovered the real intelligible world which lies behind the merely sensible world, and which (as Aristotle emphasized after him) is to be found by inquiry into the sensible world. The whole subsequent development of science is a massive vindication of this discovery. Plato's Christian successors soon caught on to the fact that one intelligent will, which conceives and intends it rather as human beings conceive and intend their own actions and products, is ultimately the only satisfactory explanation for the existence and nature of such an intelligible world. Hume, as a consistent empiricist, in effect denied the world's intelligibility, and his account of knowledge, which has proved a fruitful source of atheism, leads just as ineluctably to scepticism. Kant, who was impressed by the sceptical conclusions which followed from Hume's premisses, strongly reasserted the intelligibility of the world as apprehended both by common sense and by science; but wrongly inferred that, since such apprehension plainly involves mental creativity, the world thus apprehended must be a merely seeming world of appearances dependent on human minds, and not, as would be held by all who are not subjective idealists, existing and being as it is largely prior to and independently of those minds.[34] The right conclusion is (following the idealists, and Kant's objections to Hume) that the world shows signs of mental creativity, but (following common sense and materialist objections to idealism) that it is absurd to say that this mental creativity is human. The creativity is consequently to be attributed to a Mind (or minds)[35] other than the human.
F H Bradley is no less stinging for all his gentle tone, as he opens his argument in his 1897 2nd edn of Appearance and Reality:
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole. Any such pursuit will encounter a number of objections. It will have to hear that the knowledge which it desires to obtain is impossible altogether ; or, if possible in some degree, is yet practically useless ; or that, at all events, we can want nothing beyond the old philo-sophies . . . . To say the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality ; to urge that our know-ledge is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we distinguish them, must ob-viously be some acquaintance with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts, himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise.
In short, there are fairly serious short-comings in Hume's arguments, and in Kant's ugly gulch between the inner world of phenomena and the outer noumenal one of things in themselves as they actually are. In that context, it is entirely in order to essay on the project of a reasonable faith, grounding a worldview on a set of first plausibles (our faith-point) that on comparative difficulties will come out as a superior understanding or explanation i/l/o factual adequacy, coherence and balanced explanatory power. Here, it is crucial to recognise that our minds do recognise and discern an at least partly intelligible ordering of the world, tot he point where even random statistical phenomena often follow orderly and stable patterns of probability. One of those points is, we find it reasonable on noticing some thing, why is it so (or possible or not so), to ask: why, what is the sufficient or at least adequate explanatory reason for this? And if someone would object, the answer is patent: simply ask and pursue the inquiry. The weak form of the principle of sufficient reason just given is enough. Granting, that we are responsibly free rational beings who find ourselves in a world that on track record is at least partially and powerfully intelligible. An intelligibility antecedent to our own thinking or experiencing and inquiring. That already puts mind on the table as a serious candidate explanation for the grand structure of the world. (Blend in our being under moral government, and that points to a mind that is good and properly stands as the IS that grounds OUGHT, at world root level. For sure, Hume's guillotine argument on being "surpriz'd" to see is-is then suddenly is-ought, can only be comprehensively answered if the roots of existence and those of responsible, rationally free intelligence are one and the same.) We have no good reason to lock ourselves into Kant's version of Plato's cave; surely the diffused light from the outer world streams in to invite us to ponder whether something is there beyond the shadow shows in our heads or in our communities on our screens and in the Overton Window conventional wisdom hemmed in by various "don't go there or else" BATNA points. I therefore find the project of rational, ethical theism to be a reasonable and responsible endeavour. In that light, on pondering the issue of being, I find that we can distinguish between impossible and possible beings, and of the latter, those that are contingent and those that are necessary due to being embedded in the framework required for any given possible world to exist at all. (For instance, I find that two-ness [thus the abstract entity, the number two] must exist is undeniably so and that it is central to any concept of distinct identity, as say a bright red ball on a table effects a world partition, W = {A|~A}, and such then entails the immediate corollaries that A is not in the same sense and circumstances ~A also, and that any entity x will be -- per dichotomy of identity -- A or ~ A but not both and not neither. Without this, the whole project of rationality collapses, and r cannot communicate to discuss it. Just think: I vs ~I and T vs ~T just to get to the word "it." In short we here look at core aspects of the intelligibility of the world.) Once such is seen, we can also see that nothing, true non-being is by contrast with being, and that many things follow from there being something -- a world -- rather than nothing, not a world. For, pondering on say a fire leads to the immediate recognistion of enabling, on/off causal factors such as oxidiser, fuel, heat and a chain reaction [Halon extinguishers fight the chain]. Contingent beings depend for the support of these factors, and the sufficient cluster of factors for a given instance of a fire must include at least its on/off enabling factors. Contingent beings then will be in some possible sets of world circumstances, and not under others. They exist in some possible worlds and not in others. Impossible beings will not exist in any possible world, as there will be contradictions in core characteristics so they beings cannot be instantiated at all. Classically, the square circle. Trying to be squarish or trying to be circular are in mutual opposition and cannot be resolved in an actual object. The necessity of two-ness then points to another class of beings: necessary beings, which must be in any possible world, as such are connected to the framework for a world to exist. Once any reality other than utter nothingness exists [and surely that is the case], such will be there, do not have a beginning and cannot cease. Obviously, one cannot simply arbitrarily assert that X is a necessary being, there are basic criteria that have to be met for something to be a serious candidate. For instance, nothing made up by bringing together separate parts and assembly or interaction can be necessary. Bye bye Flying Spaghetti Monster. Nor can something that has a beginning at a finitely remote point or which can cease from being as there are on/off enabling factors that can be off, more generally. Similarly, utter nothingness is not a good candidate, as it is non-being. Going further, were there ever once utter nothing, as non-being has no causal powers [that is a postulate that commends itself on grounds of there being nothing to exert effects], such would forever obtain. But, a world is, indeed a world in which we find ourselves as responsibly free and rational beings sitting here to have a discussion that presumes we are free to follow facts and logic and are responsible to seek a true understanding: one that -- per Aristotle's apt summary in Metaphysics 1011b -- says of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not. God -- by contrast with spaghetti monsters and utter nothingness -- is a serious candidate, as the inherently good creator, a maximally great and necessary being at the root of reality. This then leads to the implication of necessity of being, that such a serious candidate will either be impossible as a square circle is impossible, or else actual. (And no atheist has ever properly shown God is impossible of being, indeed there is every good reason to think him possible. Start from the millions whose lives have been transformed for the good by him, then ponder the astonishingly intelligible world without and our own minds, hearts and consciences within.) Where, with the sort of thought that traces to Hume and Kant at least held in check, it is at minimum not unreasonable to see God as the necessary being root of reality. Indeed, to identify him as the Mind behind reality, the necessary being cause that is its root -- source and sustainer, the governor who is the IS who grounds OUGHT as inherently good. Now, I do not demand assent to God as real, but do beg leave to point out that if you would dismiss him, you have at least some responsibility to show that God is credibly impossible as a being, and to show a good ground for the OUGHT that governs us, apart from might and manipulation filtered through survival of the fittest or the like, make 'truth' and 'right' etc. In closing for the moment, I think the anonymous author of the Ep Heb (likely Apollos or possibly Barnabas) has somewhat to say to us:
Heb 11:1 Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen. 2 For by it the people of old received their commendation. 3 By faith we understand that the universe was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made out of things that are visible . . . . 6 And without faith it is impossible to please him, for whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him. [ESV]
So now, whose report will we believe, and why? KFkairosfocus_{January 19, 2016
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KF, Thanks, I'll look at your calculation in #68 this evening. Gotta run now. Are universal sets necessary beings?daveS_{January 18, 2016
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DS, take 10^80 atoms as observers. !0^12 - 14 observations of the state of 1,000 coins/s ot via Mandle a string of 2-state paramagnetic atoms in a weak aligning field so parallel or antiparallel. Run for 10^17 s. Compare to the 1.07*10^301 possibilities for 1,000 bits. 125 bytes. On rough calcs that's 1 straw to a haystack that dwarfs the observed cosmos. For a minimal life form just genome is 100 - 1,000 kbases. For each additional bit the config space doubles. We need proteins, cell wall organelles etc all organised and effecting the metabolic system of reactions, etc etc. Able to reproduce on an embedded self replication facility, Codes and comms systems, control systems, etc. Cosmos scale resources applied to an exceedingly generous pond etc, will not be enough to begin to scratch the surface of the blind search required. And of course chaining AAs and bases is highly contingent. KF PS you have enough to see why numbers will be present in any world.kairosfocus_{January 18, 2016
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KF,
DS, the time line since the big bang is 13.7 BY, 10^17s is (to order of magnitude) the same, in seconds.
Yes, I noticed that. I'm asking why it is a lower bound for the time required until OOL.
Second, I simply lay out that numbers will be present in any possible world as abstract entities, by starting with the set that collects nothing, and proceeding to create a successive collection that we can identify as N, the natural numbers.
And this is usually done using the restricted comprehension and pairing axioms in ZFC. If this is a valid move, then I should be able to use any axiom systems, including those that admit a universal set, no? And hence any object constructed by such means, including a universal set, must be a necessary being.daveS_{January 18, 2016
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DS, the time line since the big bang is 13.7 BY, 10^17s is (to order of magnitude) the same, in seconds. Whip out a calculator and do the calc, no need to play the oh is it in peer reviewed literature game -- here, not even a letter or a a paper but a Monograph . . . something that would be book length! Second, I simply lay out that numbers will be present in any possible world as abstract entities, by starting with the set that collects nothing, and proceeding to create a successive collection that we can identify as N, the natural numbers. I then proceeded to show how 2 + 3 = 5 will be self evidently and undeniably, necessarily so in any possible world as a consequence. From this, we see the reality of necessary beings by simple demonstration. And, we learn something about the character of such: they will be embedded in the framework for a world to exist, that is how we cannot have a world W without such necessary beings. I need not expound on grand elaborations and debates in Mathematics to do that. Again, an irrelevancy to be set aside. What is relevant, is that God is a candidate necessary being, and is a serious one, not something like the parody of putting up a flying spaghetti monster. Such a serious candidate will either be impossible in the way something like a square circle is -- its core attributes stand in mutual contradiction -- or else it will be actual. All this, in the context where we do want to find a NB at reality's root. For, first, stepwise traversal of an infinity of discrete finite causes is absurd (e.g. we cannot count up to or down from infinity one step at a time, we point to it or we propose a set that delivers the whole at once), and were there ever an utter non-being -- a true nothing -- as such has no causal capacity, that is what would forever obtain. If something now is, something always was. Something not part of the sort of stepwise sequence we just saw. 100 year ago, the physical cosmos as a whole in some form was hoped to be that, i.e. the steady state model. But that has long since collapsed and we now see the big bang at a finitely remote start point driving a dynamic causal succession down to today. Finitely remote beginning, credibly, on simple back projection of widely observed expansion, dating us to 14 BYA or thereabouts. Stellar patterns are also consistent with that, starting with branch from main sequence in globular clusters. Thus, contingent, as the nature of atomic matter itself would lead us to more or less expect. Crying out for a begin-ner. Even in the face of a multiverse proposal. Not, on religious traditions etc, but on the empirical evidence. The logic of being is therefore very relevant. KFkairosfocus_{January 18, 2016
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KF, Re #63: Has anyone written a detailed monograph on this 10^17 second bound? The details I've seen so far seem rather scant. To #64:
(Where we can start with the set that collects nothing and compose the natural numbers etc, {} –>0, {0}–> 1, {0, 1} –> 2, etc.)
It appears you are using at least the axioms of restricted comprehension and pairing from the ZFC system. Are all axiom systems, and hence all of mathematics, available in all possible worlds? If so, do universal sets (sets which include (as elements) all objects, even themselves) exist in all worlds?daveS_{January 18, 2016
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F/N: Let me elaborate at 101 level, in further response to Dawkins' assertions as clipped in the OP. First, CRD may be well advised to address the evident self-falsification by self-referential incoherence of his favoured evolutionary materialism: https://uncommondescent.com/atheism/fyi-ftr-the-self-falsification-of-evolutionary-materialist-scientism/ Next, as the spaghetti monster parody is now so often trotted out by atheistical advocates of the new atheist ilk to try to win by ridicule (i.e. the key point is to be lost in the scornful laugh . . . ), its ill-informed failure needs to be highlighted: https://uncommondescent.com/education/fyi-ftr-addressing-the-flying-spaghetti-monster-fsm-parody-on-the-idea-of-god-in-philosophy-of-religion-and-systematic-theology/ Going further, we need to ponder the nature of being and implications for the causal root of our world. I clip: ______________ https://uncommondescent.com/education/the-reasonableness-of-god-as-world-root-being-the-is-that-grounds-ought-and-cosmos-architect/ >>The core challenge being addressed . . . is the notion that belief in the reality of God is a culturally induced, poorly grounded commonplace notion. An easily dismissed cultural myth or prejudice, in short . . . . No, we are not here claiming certain proof of the reality of God that once dismissed can lead to an assumed atheistical default. Instead, ethical theism starts as a responsible worldview with substantial evidence and reasoning so that proper education will respect it as a serious option and will address the comparative difficulties challenge . . . — factual adequacy, coherence (logical and dynamical) and explanatory adequacy — faced by all worldviews . . . . we briefly reflect on modes of being and the significance of such for world-roots given functionally specific complex organisation, cosmological fine tuning and our patent status as under moral governance as pointers. First, an in-brief:
>>Our observed cosmos — the only actually, indisputably observed cosmos — is credibly contingent. That points beyond itself to adequate cause of a fine tuned cosmos set to a locally deeply isolated operating point for C-Chemistry, aqueous medium, cell based terrestrial planet life. Life which BTW is based on coded information . . . language! right from the origin of cell based life . . . used in exquisitely intricate cybernetic systems that run the smart gated, encapsulated metabolic automata with integral code using von Neumann kinematic self replicators we find in cells. That in the end through even multiverse speculations, points to necessary, intelligent, awesomely powerful being as source. Design by a creator beyond the cosmos. One intent on life like ours. Mix in moral government and we are at the inherent reasonableness of a creator capable of grounding ought. Just one serious candidate, the inherently good Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being, worthy of our loyalty and the reasonable service of doing the good in accord with our evident nature. No, we are not talking about poorly supported popular notions here, but of course, when the evolutionary materialist lab coat clad magisterium controls and censors what gets into the curricula they can make it seem that way.>>
Now, we can think of possible vs impossible beings (you, me, a unicorn vs a square circle). The latter cannot be in any possible world as the cluster of core requirements (a) squarishness and (b) circularity stand in mutual contradiction and cannot all be actualised in one and the same thing at once under the same circumstances. The former, can exist in at least one possible world, whether or not they are actual in this world (the only generally observed actualised world). Also, try to imagine a world in which the truth asserted in: 2 + 3 = 5 is false or was not so then came into being at some point or can cease to be so. No such world is possible, this proposition is a necessary though abstract being. That is, it is so anchored to the roots and framework for a world to be actualised that it will be so in any possible world: || + ||| –> ||||| (Where we can start with the set that collects nothing and compose the natural numbers etc, {} –>0, {0}–> 1, {0, 1} –> 2, etc.) This allows us to understand that of possible beings some are contingent, some are necessary. Contingent beings will exist in some actualisable worlds but not in all such possible worlds. Necessary beings, by contrast are foundational to any actualisable world existing. Contingent beings, then, depend on what I have termed external, on/off enabling causal factors (strictly, dynamically necessary causal factors), much like a fire depends for its beginning and sustained existence on heat, fuel, oxidiser and an un-interfered- with combustion chain reaction: Fire_tetrahedron [Image] By contrast, necessary beings do not have that sort of dynamical, causal dependence. This has a major consequence, especially when we see that we live in a world that per the big bang and fine tuning considerations, is credibly contingent and in fact credibly finitely old, typically 13.7 or 13.8 BY being a conventional estimate: The Big Bang timeline -- a world with a beginning [Image] Typically the talk is of a singularity and perhaps a fluctuation. But the point is, finitely remote, changeable, composite, contingent. Caused, requiring a sufficient cluster of underlying dynamical antecedents/ factors that include at minimum all necessary factors. But there is more. For by contrast with being we can have non-being, a genuine nothing (and no a suggested quantum foam with fluctuations, etc, is not a genuine nothing, regardless of clever talking points). vNSR [Image] Illustrating a von Neumann, kinematic self replicator with integral universal computer Non-being can have no causal capabilities, and so if there ever were a genuine nothing, such would forever obtain. That is, if a world now is (and a credibly contingent one) it points to something that always was, a necessary, independent, world-root being dynamically sufficient to account for the world that now is. A world with evident beginning at a finitely remote point, with evident fine tuning that sets its physics to a locally deeply isolated operating point that sets it up for C-chemistry, aqueous medium terrestrial planet, cell based life. Life, that is based on smart gated, encapsulated metabolic automata that enfold an integral code using — language! communication and control systems! — von Neumann kinematic self replication facility. A class of machines we know how to conceptualise and initially analyse, but not at all how to design and implement. Worse, where we are conscious, intelligent, morally governed life forms in this cosmos that require a bridge between IS and OUGHT. [--> Think here of CRD and fellow New Atheists moralistically pointing accusing fingers at theists and expecting to be taken seriously] Already, we see that a very reasonable worldview stance would be that the cosmos comes from a necessary, highly intelligent, designing world root being who is a necessary being, and thus would be immaterial and intelligent, so minded. Even, through a multiverse speculation (which is spectacularly in violation of requisites of empirical substantiation and the multiplication of entities without clear necessity). Moreover, as one scans the debates on worldviews foundations across the centuries, it is clear that there is just one credible place for there to be an IS that also grounds OUGHT in a reasonable way: the roots of reality. There is just one serious candidate to be such a necessary being — flying spaghetti monsters et al (as we already saw) need not apply, they are patently contingent and are material — namely,
THE GOD OF ETHICAL THEISM: the inherently good and wise Creator God, a necessary and maximally great being; one worthy of our loyalty and of the reasonable and responsible service of doing the good in accordance with our evident nature and circumstances.
That is, ethical theism is a reasonable, and intellectually viable worldview stance. It is also a descriptive term for the underlying worldview of the Judaeo-Christian Faith and theological tradition that is core to our civilisation and the foundation of that tradition, God. Where the God of Scripture says of himself c 1460 BC, I AM THAT I AM, i.e. necessary, eternal being, something not understood as to significance until many centuries later. And in that context, it is the Christian tradition that this same God has come among us, as Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ who fulfills the prophecies in that scriptural tradition and now sends forth his apostles and disciples into the world who are to be as wise as serpents but harmless as doves . . . . So, let us ponder Stroebel on Jesus . . . >> ______________ In such a context, it seems clear that CRD was sadly mistaken to give a blanket dismissal to the case for ethical theism as a reasonable and informed worldview and way of life. KF PS: A somewhat more detailed. worldviews framed discussion is here: http://nicenesystheol.blogspot.com/2010/11/unit-2-gospel-on-mars-hill-foundations.html#u2_bld_wvukairosfocus_{January 18, 2016
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DS, That is one reason (not the only one) we see talk of quasi-infinite multiverses; the degree of functionally specific complexity of life and the degree of isolation of the operating point of our cosmos in parameter etc space -- as we have seen -- put us to a point where that begins to look like where alternatives to design as the best explanatory causal process have to go. Only to run into Boltzmann brains and wall carpeting flies vs lone ones swatted by a bullet. Design is a very reasonable view on its own. Multiply by the other converging lines of evidence and it may point to how hard one has to work not to go there. Then, bring in the issue that God is a serious candidate necessary being root of reality and the issue atheists face is not whether God seems implausible to them based on the perspectives imposed by their worldview but that such a NB candidate is either impossible or real. (Where parodies such as flying spaghetti monsters immediately fail the serious candidate test, being composite so contingent.) Multiply by our finding ourselves inescapably under moral government -- e.g. when (as is so often seen, not least with Dawkins) atheists point accusing fingers at theists, they imply an appeal to such moral government -- and the challenges to atheism and fellow traveller views exponentiates. KF PS: Recall, our observed cosmos gives us ~ 10^17 s, 10^80 atoms (with carbon a fairly small proportion and C on the surface zones and/or atmospheres of suitable terrestrial planets in star system and galactic habitable zones therefore far more rare) with 10^12- 10^14 chemical type interactions/s as a realistic limit.kairosfocus_{January 18, 2016
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KF,
PS: DS, 10^17 s or so is all we have got.
I mean if there are calculations showing that 10^17 seconds is far too short a time, what do they show the minimum time required would be?daveS_{January 17, 2016
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F/N: Those inclined to take Mr Dawkins' views on the soundness or otherwise of theistic arguments may well find it helpful to read here as a starter: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/books/review/Holt.t.html?_r=0 (Not to mention, the list of materials here: http://www.proginosko.com/2009/04/responses-to-the-god-delusion/ ) Clipping:
The least satisfying part of this book is Dawkins’s treatment of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. The “ontological argument” says that God must exist by his very nature, since he possesses all perfections, and it is more perfect to exist than not to exist. The “cosmological argument” says that the world must have an ultimate cause, and this cause could only be an eternal, God-like entity. The “design argument” appeals to special features of the universe (such as its suitability for the emergence of intelligent life), submitting that such features make it more probable than not that the universe had a purposive cosmic designer. These, in a nutshell, are the Big Three arguments. To Dawkins, they are simply ridiculous. He dismisses the ontological argument as “infantile” and “dialectical prestidigitation” without quite identifying the defect in its logic, and he is baffled that a philosopher like Russell — “no fool” — could take it seriously. He seems unaware that this argument, though medieval in origin, comes in sophisticated modern versions that are not at all easy to refute. Shirking the intellectual hard work, Dawkins prefers to move on to parodic “proofs” that he has found on the Internet, like the “Argument From Emotional Blackmail: God loves you. How could you be so heartless as not to believe in him? Therefore God exists.” . . .
Craig on the who designed the designer/ the designer is complex argument here is also a useful side-light. I add the note that in the case of God as candidate designer, it seems there is a want of understanding of necessary and eternal being as well as of mindedness as not being constructed and assembled out of bits and pieces. There is therefore an aura of flailing at parodies or caricatures there. Unfortunately, this is an era in which that may easily be missed. More to come. KF PS: DS, 10^17 s or so is all we have got.kairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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KF, 10^17 seconds is definitely too short of a time for the OOL to occur? What's the tightest estimated lower bound?daveS_{January 17, 2016
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DS, just for completeness, 1 MY would be far too small for any proposed model of OOL and of body plans, much less the naturalistic versions of cosmology to get a solar system. What is the shocker is that -- apart from people being persuaded of it through the sort of a priorism Lewontin so frankly spoke of and applying methodological naturalism to lock out consideration of alternatives, 10^17 s or thereabouts is also hopelessly too short for OOL etc. KFkairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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KF, I don't believe you demonstrated that. As far as I am concerned, design is always on the table in discussions here, so your point is moot. I think any reasonable person would say that positions 1 and 2 above are wildly inconsistent. Anyway, I think this topic has been exhausted.daveS_{January 17, 2016
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DS, What I showed is that debates over YEC views are irrelevant and therefore a distraction. KFkairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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KF, First, I don't think it's possible for me or anyone to take design off the table, regardless of the age of the universe, and that has nothing to do with what I'm arguing. My point consists of the first sentence in my post #4. Let me summarize two positions I believe you hold, and which I find so hard to understand. Correct me if I'm wrong: 1) The evidence against YEC is not persuasive enough to cause you to declare that YEC is false. 2) If the universe is about 13.8 billion years old, then you do find the density example cited above to be at least as persuasive as real-time evidence collected in a lab setting.daveS_{January 17, 2016
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F/N: Smith Craig Debate 2003, in effect the other end of the debate spectrum: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-god-exist-the-craig-smith-debate-2003 QS Opening clip: >>The question [of whether] God exists may sound as if the atheist knows that she does not exist, which is no positive theory about what does exist. You know, this has been true of traditional atheism. Well, I believe here that there should be a new form of atheism, one that presents a positive theory of what exists and that this positive theory has a logical consequence that God does not exist. 1. One form of the existence question is this: did God create the universe? I reject the traditional atheist response, as well as the theist response. The traditional atheist response is that the universe does not need an explanation of why it exists and therefore does not need a divine Creator to give an explanation. I reject this since I think the universe's existence does need and does have an explanation. The universe created itself. After this I argue that atheism, but not theism, explains humans' moral behavior. Scientists have been saying for a long time that the universe began about 15 billion years ago with an explosion they call the Big Bang. Bill believes the Big Bang was caused by God and I believe it both caused itself to exist and caused the later states of the universe to exist. At the Big Bang there is a line of simultaneous causes and effects. This is implied both by a Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics and by the EPR correlations - for those of you in the audience who are science majors - which imply - you don't need to understand either of the sciences to understand my talk - and these theories imply that there are instantaneous causal relations between simultaneous events . . . . The first state of the universe consists of an indefinitely or infinitely long chain of simultaneous events that are causally connected to each other . . . . 2. OK, my second major argument is about morality, about the foundation of objectivity of morality. But first I'll talk about the foundation of morality. Now theists, including Bill, have a moral argument for God's existence. They say we need God in order to have a foundation or ground of morality and moral behavior. We need God, they say, to explain why moral behavior exists. Well, I think this is false. Biologists have already explained how moral behavior came into existence and its ground or foundation. The explanation is that in mammals living millions of years ago, the mother wanted her offspring to survive and reproduce. This means the mother selected for her sex partner the male mammal who is most likely to care for the offspring. By selecting caring men, the genetic trait of caring and helping became the predominant trait of our ancestors. Caring and helping is the genetic trait we inherited, both from mothers and fathers caring for their children . . . >> Craig: >>Now in the debate tonight, we need to ask ourselves two fundamental questions: I. Are there any good arguments against God's existence? and II. Are there any good arguments for God's existence? I. Well, what about that first question: Are there any good arguments against God's existence? Quentin thinks that there are, and he presented two arguments to prove that God does not exist. 1. His first argument is that there cannot be a divine cause of the universe because there is an infinite regress of simultaneous causes. Now, I'm not sure, frankly, what Quentin is talking about here. I assume that he's talking about a simultaneity class of events, quantum events, perhaps, that are simultaneously related. But I think that we can avert this question by simply considering what is the cause of the initial cosmological singularity that spawned the universe. For the initial singularity is part of the universe. The universe is comprised of all its space-time points and its boundary points. The initial singularity is the beginning of the universe, the first state of physical reality. As Stephen Hawking explains, “All the matter and energy [were] compressed into a single point, or singularity . . . . the entire observable universe . . . started out compressed into such a point.”1 And since that point is not governed by quantum laws of physics, there cannot be this infinite regress of simultaneous causes at the singular state. So the real question is, where did the singularity come from? Did it just pop into being out of nothing? The theist claims that God created the initial singularity and thereby caused the universe to exist. Now in order to rule out this possibility, Quentin in his most recent work has to stipulate that the initial singularity exists both necessarily and a se.2 That is to say, it exists not only in every possible world, but it does so independently of any other reality. But now the problem is that there's just no evidence whatsoever that the initial singularity has such extraordinary properties. Nothing in classical or quantum cosmology even suggests that the singularity is metaphysically necessary. In fact, there's no evidence to suggest that the singularity is even nomologically necessary. That is to say, it's not even necessary according to the laws of nature. The laws of nature permit all sorts of non-singular cosmological models. Thus, the singularity cannot be metaphysically necessary. Moreover, there's no reason to think it exists a se either. Quite the opposite is true: the singularity is the boundary of the space-time manifold; so if the manifold didn’t exist, neither would its boundary points. Quentin, in his written work3, admits that the space-time universe did not have to exist; but he imagines that its singular boundary point, like the smile of the Cheshire cat in Alice in Wonderland, would still continue to exist even in the absence of the reality it bounds! But there is no physical reason to believe such a remarkable assertion. Now, if this is correct, then not only is there no inconsistency in the theist's view that God created the singularity, but Quentin's supposed argument for atheism actually turns out to be an argument for God's existence. We can formulate such a contingency argument as follows: 1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in some external cause. 2. The universe (including any singular state) exists. It follows from (1) and (2) that the universe has an explanation of its existence. Premiss (3) states: 3. The universe (including any singular state) does not exist by a necessity of its own nature. 4. Therefore, the universe has an external cause. The explanation of the universe must be found in a being which transcends space and time, is metaphysically necessary ,and is changeless and immaterial. Now the only things we know of that can exist in that way are either abstract objects, like numbers, or a mind. But abstract objects don't stand in causal relationships and so cannot be the explanation of the universe. So the explanation of the universe is most plausibly a transcendent Mind, which is minimally what everybody means by "God". So thank you, Quentin, for the first argument! . . . . 2. Well, that now brings us to Quentin's second argument for atheism, which is that God cannot be the foundation of moral values and duties. He gives two reasons for this. a. First of all, he says that if moral values are grounded in God, then this is subjective because it's just God's opinion. Well, I think not. On the theistic view, the Good is identical to the moral character of God. God's character is necessarily holy, loving, just, kind, etc. And these attributes are constitutive of the Good. Now God's moral nature in turn expresses itself toward us in the form of certain divine commands, which become for us, then, our moral duties. And thus these commands are not arbitrary or subjective, but they flow necessarily from God's nature. As the prominent philosopher William Alston says, “If God is essentially good, then there will be nothing arbitrary about his commands; indeed it will be metaphysically necessary that he issue those commands.”6 b. What, then, about the problem of evil? Well, I would simply say that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering and evil in the world. Quentin knows philosophy of religion well enough to know that no atheist has ever been able to shoulder the tremendous burden of proof of showing that God does not or cannot have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world . . . . I think Quentin's argument for atheism supplies the materials for an argument for God's existence. For if there is no God, then it's plausible that the moral values and duties which have gradually evolved among homo sapiens are not really objective. By “objective” I mean “valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not.” For example, to say that the Holocaust was objectively wrong is to say that it was wrong even though the Nazis who carried it out thought that it was right, and it would still have been wrong even if the Nazis had won World War II and succeeded in brainwashing or exterminating everyone who disagreed with them. Many atheists and theists alike agree that if God does not exist as a transcendent anchor point, then the moral values and duties that have evolved in human society are not objective in that way. In other words, 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. Now this first premiss seems eminently plausible. For on the atheistic view, human beings are just animals, relatively evolved primates; and animals don't have moral obligations. When a lion kills a zebra, it kills it, but it doesn't murder it. When a great white shark brutally forces a female into submission, it copulates with her, but it does not rape her. For animals are not moral agents with moral duties to observe. But on the atheistic view, human beings are just animals. Their morality is just the result of socio-biological evolution. Just as members of a troupe of baboons will exhibit altruistic behavior because it is advantageous to the species in the struggle for survival, so human beings have evolved certain behavior patterns which enable us to cohabit in society and so are beneficial for the species. But there’s nothing objective about this herd morality. Now if you find such a view morally abhorrent, then I agree with you. It’s evident, I think, that objective values do exist, and deep down we all know it. Quentin and I, in fact, agree on this. Actions like rape, cruelty, and child abuse aren’t just socially unacceptable behavior; they're moral abominations. Some things are objectively wrong. Similarly love, equality, and self-sacrifice are really good. Accordingly, we can affirm: 2. Objective values and duties do exist. But then it follows logically and inescapably that: 3. Therefore, God exists. God thus provides a foundation for the moral values which the atheist just has to accept by faith. In summary, then, far from giving us good reasons to think that God does not exist, Quentin has provided us with three positive arguments for God's existence, namely, the contingency argument, the teleological argument, and the moral argument. II. In effect, then, we've already answered the second question that we put ourselves tonight, namely: Are there any good arguments for God's existence? We've already got three! But in my remaining time let me add one more: the cosmological argument. We have good reasons, philosophically and scientifically, to believe that the universe is not eternal in the past, but had an absolute beginning. But something cannot come into being out of nothing. Therefore, there must be a transcendent cause of the origin of the universe. We can formulate this argument as follows: 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. Now by “begins to exist” I mean “comes into being,” and the idea here is that things don’t just pop into being uncaused. Now in his written work, Quentin claims that certain cosmological theories, like the Hartle-Hawking theory, can explain how the universe comes into being without a cause.9 But the fundamental problem with Quentin's objection is that his interpretation of the Hartle-Hawking equations is, I think, incoherent. For Quentin interprets them to give an unconditional probability, say, 99%, that the universe would come into being uncaused out of absolute nothingness. And it’s important to appreciate that by “nothingness” we mean not a physical void or empty space, but absolute non-being. But how can being arise from non-being, especially with a 99% probability? What explains the origin of the universe in this lawful way? Well, you might be tempted to say that the laws of nature explain why the universe comes into being out of nothingness with 99% probability. But that can’t be right because, as Quentin himself said in his first speech, the laws of nature are simply propositions in a certain mathematical form describing the regular behavior, potentialities, powers, and dispositions of things in the natural world. The laws of nature are at most abstract entities which can’t cause anything. But the origin of the universe can’t be explained in terms of the potentialities, powers, and dispositions of things in the natural world because those factors don’t exist until the natural world exists, and we’re trying to explain the origin of the natural world. So it seems that the powers, potentialities, and dispositions must belong to nothingness itself. Nothingness must possess some disposition to spawn a universe with 99% probability. But this is clearly incoherent. For nothingness, absolute non-being, has no properties whatsoever--no dispositions, no potentialities. Such properties inhere only in actual things . . . . So premiss (1) seems necessarily true. If the alternative to theism is the claim that the universe popped into being uncaused out of nothing, then it takes more faith to be an atheist than a theist! Now, premiss (2) is that: 2. The universe began to exist. Recall, by “the universe” we mean all physical states, including whatever exists at any point in, or on the boundary of, space-time. And Quentin and I agree that the universe is not infinite in the past but began to exist. From the two premises it follows that: 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence. Conceptual analysis of what it means to be a cause of the universe enables us to deduce that as the cause of space and time, this cause must be an uncaused, timeless, changeless, immaterial, personal agent of enormous power which created the universe. So in conclusion, then, we’ve seen no good arguments, I think, to believe that atheism is true. And we have seen four reasons, namely, the contingency argument, the teleological argument, the moral argument, and the cosmological argument, to think that God does exist. Therefore, it seems to me that theism is the more rational world view.>> KFkairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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DS Assume for the moment, the world (sense: observed cosmos) is ~ 10 or 100 or 1,000 kY old. That would certainly imply it is designed. Not relevant. Assume for the moment it is 13.75 BY old, the last current typical number I have seen. The beginning points to a begin-ner, in a context where contingency points -- even through multiverse speculations -- to a necessary being root of reality. Yes that's phil, but the phil of being and of cause is a basis for science. Next, go to 1 ns post singularity, the general era on a typical BB timeline in which we move from electrons, quarks etc to baryons relevant to atoms. The mass density at this stage, to 2 parts in 10^24, leads to gravitational fine tuning that puts us to dissipation or crunch already. This too points to design, putting us at a deeply isolated operating point. Along with dozens of other factors. So, on either fork, design is seriously on the table. KFkairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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KF,
And so* . . . ?
I certainly didn't say it was irrelevant or useless to "explore" this issue. But with the issues of inflation, dark matter, and dark energy still unresolved, I tend to take any claims about what was going on 1 billionth of a second after the Big Bang as tentative. Especially in comparison with evidence collected in real time in the lab. And again, you have yet to take a position on whether the age of the universe is ~10,000 years or ~13.8 billion years. You should be at least as skeptical as me in this particular instance of "fine-tuning".daveS_{January 17, 2016
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F/N 2: Newdow's opening arguments -- remember, this is an atheism spokesman who has made claims that US Constitutional law should be changed in favour of the atheistical agenda, so he bears a significant responsibility to have his ducks in a row: ______________ >>Argument 1: Dr. Newdow's first argument was to dismiss the terms of the debate and claim that he had nothing to prove since he was not making a statement about existence, but about non-existence. In other words, he argued, the burden of proof is on the one who affirms that something or someone (in this case "God") exists, not on the one denying such an existence. He declared that he could not be construed to have lost the debate simply because he could not prove that God doesn't exist. [summariser's comment:] Both debaters agreed on the resolution to be debated, Atheism vs. Christianity, (and the question of which way the evidence points) several months before the debate. Now is not the time for Dr. Newdow to attempt to change the resolution . . . . Argument 2: Dr. Newdow's second argument was to make a new debate resolution: Using empirical methods alone, the existence of God cannot be established. Dr. Newdow declared that the only evidence he would accept for the existence of God would be empirical evidence, that is, evidence that can be tested by the senses, such as is done in scientific experiments. "Show me God," he said, "and I'll believe in him." Based on these two premises (he doesn't have to prove anything; and any existence can only be proved empirically), Dr. Newdow declared that he had no evidence that God exists and so he has won the debate by default. Dr. Newdow tried to limit areas of proof to the empirical, as though empiricism is the only way to affirm the existence of anything . . . . Argument 3: Dr. Newdow reviewed what he considers to be the necessary elements of a good scientific test: (1) randomness (test subjects must be of a great enough number over a wide enough spectrum to allow for random results dictated by the sample pool rather than the medication); (2) control conditions (nothing extraneous to the experiment can be introduced); (3) double blind (neither the subjects nor the experimenters can know who gets the drug and who gets a placebo); and (4) prospective (it must be repeatable with future testing). Applying these four criteria to the existence of God, Dr. Newdow says God fails. In other words, he concluded, there is no scientific data establishing the existence of God. One can't use statistical abnormalities to prove one's case. Evidence for God is a case of statistical abnormality; His existence is not actually supported by the evidence . . . . Argument 4: Belief in God, according to Dr. Newdow, is as credible as belief in faith healers, UFOs, crop circles, astrology, psychics, or the miracle fat-burning product available on cable TV. Belief in God is as supported by the evidence as belief in any other mythical creature such as the Easter Bunny or Santa Claus . . . . Argument 5: Dr. Newdow pointed to a variety of factors to account for why so many people believe in God: (1) they respect their elders or previous generations; (2) they feel better if they believe in God and it seems to give their lives transcendent meaning; (3) they twist the data to serve their belief; (4) they are gullible and believe what they want to believe, regardless of the data; (5) they re-interpret every event as supporting belief in God, whether it does or not (e.g., if Aunt Mary recovers, God healed her; if Aunt Mary dies, it must have been God's will); (6) they continue to believe what they have been raised to believe (e.g., Muslim children grow up to Muslims, Buddhists to be Buddhists, etc.); (7) they enjoy the social and personal benefits they receive from believing in God; (8) they are unwilling to criticize or closely examine what they already believe . . . . Conclusion: Dr. Newdow posed a challenge to the mostly Christian audience: How many of you pray? How many of you believe God hears your prayers? How many of your believe God answers your prayers? When most people raised their hands to all of the questions, Dr. Newdow said, "Then all of you pray right now that God will appear to me on this stage so that I can believe in him." He waited a few seconds and concluded, "God didn't appear, so I guess he doesn't exist." This was Dr. Newdow's main point and he returned to it repeatedly throughout the debate. He really seemed to believe that if God did not appear to him as commanded, he had won the debate . . . [Contrast Rom 1:18 - 25 and 1 Cor 1:18 - 25] >> _________________ Later, we go on. KFkairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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F/N: Let us note Dawkins in the clip cited in the OP:
Dawkins prefaced his answer by making it clear that he is not “in any sense admitting that there is a good argument,” and insisted that “there is no decent argument for the existence of deities.” . . .
Of course an argument for deities -- small-g gods -- is not the focal issue, God as inherently good creator, the necessary being root of reality and a maximally great being, i.e. the God of ethical theism, is. I find it interesting that after a day or two, we still do not find any atheistical objectors standing up to defend Dawkins; core contention. (We can take the balance of the above i/l/o a live case of what fine tuning is as a result of sensitivity analysis, on the fine tuning issue, given say what was pointed out at 24.) To begin to take up this issue, I think the introductory remarks on theistic arguments in a debate between atheistical media personality Michael Newdow and former IVCF Apologetics spokesman and Christian Pastor Cliffe Knechtle in 2002 will be a useful start-point: ______________ http://answers.org/atheism/debate.html >>Pastor Knechtle began by summarizing what each debater should be able to produce in defense of his position. He said that Dr. Newdow should present a positive case for the atheist viewpoint. Pastor Knechtle was prepared to present a positive case for Christian theism. Pastor Knechtle offered 5 arguments for the truth of Christian theism:[3] Argument 1: The origin of the universe demands an uncaused, timeless, very, very powerful Source that we call the Christian God. He proposed three alternatives to explain the existence of the universe: (1) Something came from nothing; (2) The universe itself is eternal; or (3) The universe was created by something (or someone) eternal. Pastor Knechtle argued that whatever begins to be has a cause; the universe began to be; therefore, the universe had a cause. This is called the cosmological argument for the existence of God. There are various forms of this argument used by different philosophers, the Thomistic, the Leibnizian, and the Kalam.[4] Argument 2: The intricacy and complexity of the universe on both a macro and a micro level indicates an Intelligent Designer. [--> I would take this in two distinct stages: design as best explanatory causal process, then candidate designers] Pastor Knechtle pointed out that if oxygen levels on earth were higher or lower, animal, human, and plant life couldn't exist. If the earth were closer to the sun it would be too hot to support life; if it were farther away it would be too cold. [--> these are rather simple cases, the issue is a much bigger interlocking set of fine tuning instances cf Kreeft's argument no 8 cited in 24 above] He argued that the inter-dependent complexities of the cell, the human eye, and the eco-system displayed intelligent design that could only come from an Intelligent Designer, such as the Christian concept of God. [--> a designer of life on earth needs not be God, but put fine tuning of the cosmos with it and a much stronger frame of intent comes out] He gave the classic analogy of the watch: If you find a watch on the sidewalk, you assume it was made by a watchmaker, that it did not come to be as a product of accidental combination of atoms over time. In the same way, the universe displays even greater evidence of design, so we can logically infer an Intelligent Designer (God). [--> In addition, for life, I would point to Paley's self-replicating, time keeping watch] This is called the teleological argument for the existence of God. The focus on the exact conditions necessary for human life is often called the anthropic principle.[5] . . . . Argument 3: The existence of moral absolutes (such as justice, truth, good, etc.) can only be explained by an infinite Moral Lawgiver, or God. Pastor Knechtle argued that ethics are not merely a matter of convention, agreement, intuition, or genetic programming, but instead reveal the existence of a Moral Lawgiver whose ethical nature provides an adequate foundation for moral absolutes in human society. He argued that, for example, the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews was not merely subjectively wrong or evil, but objectively and absolutely evil. He argued that individuals might consider it evil through intuition, societies might judge it by its social destructiveness, and communities might agree that it is evil because the majority of people agree; but none of those subjective, human-based ethics can adequately account for the absolute ethic that it is always and absolutely wrong to do these things - or, for example, to torture innocent children. Such absolute ethics are not dependent on human thought or conscience, but on the Moral Lawgiver who is beyond the limits of the universe in which we live. [--> we are under moral gov't and the only level where an IS that can ground OUGHT for that to be so is at the world-root. There is just one serious candidate, God as already explained.] This is called the moral argument for the existence of God. The moral argument can be used not only to show that God must be the source of absolute ethics, but also to justify the Christian understanding of why there is injustice, evil, and suffering in the world. One can apply moral absolutes grounded in God to justify our outrage at the injustice we see in the world around us. At the same time, since moral absolutes are grounded in God, we can be assured that there is meaning in suffering and that justice will ultimately prevail in God's provision for the future.[9] Argument 4: Humanity's desire for meaning and value in life presupposes the existence of God. [--> C S Lewis' hunger for Joy beyond what this world can offer] Pastor Knechtle argued that every human society throughout history and around the world has a belief in God, even though their understanding of God may differ. He argued that our innate desire to experience the transcendent, to have value and meaning even after death, can only be accounted for if there is a God who implanted these beliefs and desires in us. He quoted the early Christian church father Augustine, who said, "Our hearts are restless until they find their meaning in God." Pastor Knechtle contrasted this search for significance with the atheist world view in which life has no transcendent meaning and there is no significance beyond the biological. He quoted the existentialist Camus, who argued for existential meaninglessness. Pastor Knechtle characterized the atheist world view as "life is nothing more than a cosmic joke." Pastor Knechtle used the analogy of the headstone: between your birth date and your death date is the sum total of your life: a mere dash between life and death. On the contrary, he argued, we are created for the purpose of knowing and loving God, and God loves us so much he sent his Son to die for us. In the atheist world, according to Pastor Knechtle, atheist Michael Newdow's love for his daughter is nothing but a bio-chemical reaction, it cannot be justified or grounded as a real value without God. Argument 5: The bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ is so verifiable historically that it passes any reasonable test for history or ancient literature. It can be accepted as not only reasonable, but a true historical event.[10] This argument ties in with the previous four arguments in two ways. First, it is itself an argument for the existence of God because it argues that only God could do what Jesus did, raise himself from the dead. Second, the one who rose from the dead has demonstrated the credentials necessary to tell us that God exists and what God is like. Now Jesus' words in the New Testament document become more than just historical statements. They have risen above or out of mere history to be revealed as God's words speaking about reality. Pastor Knechtle continued, if Jesus rose from the grave, then this validates his claims to be the Son of God, and we can know that God exists, that he loves us, and that we can have a relationship with him because of Jesus Christ. Pastor Knechtle argued that our first accounts of the bodily resurrection (found in 1 Corinthians 15) date from within 20 years of the actual event. At this point, Pastor Knechtle is using the New Testament books as historical documents reporting an historical event. Elsewhere he shows the historical reliability of the documents that make them valid historical sources. That the New Testament is God's Word is an entirely different issue that goes beyond the scope of this debate. Interestingly, while Pastor Knechtle gives a range of 20 years, even some liberal scholars agree that the content of the opening verses to 1 Corinthians 15 represent material adopted by the first Christians within a decade of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ. This account of the resurrection appearances relates that more than 500 people were eyewitnesses of the resurrected Christ. He provided the evidence that Jesus actually died on the cross and that the tomb was empty after three days. He argued that the resurrection accounts have the ring of authenticity, especially in that those who became believers had started out as disillusioned disciples who were not expecting a resurrection. There is also a ring of authenticity in the record that women were the first witnesses of the resurrected Christ. Since women in that time were not considered reliable witnesses, someone merely inventing a resurrection would not have concocted their story in a way that had the risen Jesus witnessed first by those who could not testify in court. Because of the physical demonstrations the risen Christ made and the life-changing impact those had on his followers (whose hopes had been dashed at his death), we can be assured that this resurrection was physical and bodily; it was not an illusion, mysticism, wish fulfillment, or spiritual projection. British scholar and Christian author C. S. Lewis noted, "If Christianity was something we were making up, of course we could make it easier. But it isn't. We can't compete, in simplicity, with people who are inventing religions. How could we? We're dealing with fact. Of course anyone can be simple if he has not facts to bother about."[11]>> _________________ Now, let us proceed. KFkairosfocus_{January 17, 2016
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