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Philosopher of physics: If there are no multiverses, an intelligent designer is not the only option

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In “What Happened Before the Big Bang? The New Philosophy of Cosmology” (The Atlantic, January 19, 2012), Ross Andersen explains,

In December, a group of professors from America’s top philosophy departments, including Columbia, Yale, and NYU, set out to establish the philosophy of cosmology as a new field of study within the philosophy of physics.

One of the founding members of the American group, Tim Maudlin, was recently hired by New York University, the top ranked philosophy department in the English-speaking world.

And of course Andersen asked Maudlin about fine-tuning:

Now let me say one more thing about fine tuning. I talk to physicists a lot, and none of the physicists I talk to want to rely on the fine tuning argument to argue for a cosmology that has lots of bubble universes, or lots of worlds. What they want to argue is that this arises naturally from an analysis of the fundamental physics, that the fundamental physics, quite apart from any cosmological considerations, will give you a mechanism by which these worlds will be produced, and a mechanism by which different worlds will have different constants, or different laws, and so on. If that’s true, then if there are enough of these worlds, it will be likely that some of them have the right combination of constants to permit life. But their arguments tend not to be “we have to believe in these many worlds to solve the fine tuning problem,” they tend to be “these many worlds are generated by physics we have other reasons for believing in.”

If we give up on that, and it turns out there aren’t these many worlds, that physics is unable to generate them, then it’s not that the only option is that there was some intelligent designer. It would be a terrible mistake to think that those are the only two ways things could go. You would have to again think hard about what you mean by probability, and about what sorts of explanations there might be. Part of the problem is that right now there are just way too many freely adjustable parameters in physics. Everybody agrees about that. There seem to be many things we call constants of nature that you could imagine setting at different values, and most physicists think there shouldn’t be that many, that many of them are related to one another. Physicists think that at the end of the day there should be one complete equation to describe all physics, because any two physical systems interact and physics has to tell them what to do. And physicists generally like to have only a few constants, or parameters of nature. This is what Einstein meant when he famously said he wanted to understand what kind of choices God had –using his metaphor– how free his choices were in creating the universe, which is just asking how many freely adjustable parameters there are. Physicists tend to prefer theories that reduce that number, and as you reduce it, the problem of fine tuning tends to go away. But, again, this is just stuff we don’t understand well enough yet.

Comments
felipe, I don't follow your argument. In what way does the "origin of other worlds with different laws" depend on the idea that physical laws have "real ontological existence"?champignon
January 21, 2012
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Fundamental physics alone can not explain the origin of other worlds with different laws. The reason is very simple. All these assumptions, including Hawking´s and Krauss´s claims about the origin of a cosmos from “nothingness” are grounded on a philosophical (metaphysical) assumption; the existence of gravity and physical laws in general as entities with real ontological existence as “forces” that act on matter from without. New Essentialists, on the contrary, defend the idea that physical laws have no existence at all as true entities independently of the things that we observe. The behaviour of things should be explained, they claim, just inherent properties of matter. The existence of laws of Nature is not then a scientific fact but a philosophical interpretation of what we observe in the Universe. In an “essentialist” scenario, “things” as we know them, could not be otherwise, no physical laws could change without things loosing their essence. Other words could not be an alternative for a naturalistic explanation of what we can not explain in this world. Hawking boldly argued that “The Grand Design” could be explained away and announced the death of any philosophical approach to understanding reality. He did not understand that his own scientific approach was based on an inescapable philosophical interpretation of experimental observations.felipe
January 21, 2012
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Another important point made by Maudlin:
Part of the problem is that right now there are just way too many freely adjustable parameters in physics. Everybody agrees about that. There seem to be many things we call constants of nature that you could imagine setting at different values, and most physicists think there shouldn’t be that many, that many of them are related to one another. Physicists think that at the end of the day there should be one complete equation to describe all physics, because any two physical systems interact and physics has to tell them what to do. And physicists generally like to have only a few constants, or parameters of nature. This is what Einstein meant when he famously said he wanted to understand what kind of choices God had –using his metaphor– how free his choices were in creating the universe, which is just asking how many freely adjustable parameters there are. Physicists tend to prefer theories that reduce that number, and as you reduce it, the problem of fine tuning tends to go away. But, again, this is just stuff we don’t understand well enough yet.
To successfully make the fine-tuning argument, even assuming only one universe, it is not enough for ID proponents to identify physical constants whose values must be restricted in order to make life possible. They also need to show that the probability of those constants having life-supporting values is small. We only have one universe to observe, so this can't be done empirically. You need a plausible account of the mechanism by which universes are generated before you can make a reasonable estimate of the probability distributions.champignon
January 20, 2012
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Maudlin makes an important point that ID proponents tend to miss:
...none of the physicists I talk to want to rely on the fine tuning argument to argue for a cosmology that has lots of bubble universes, or lots of worlds. What they want to argue is that this arises naturally from an analysis of the fundamental physics, that the fundamental physics, quite apart from any cosmological considerations, will give you a mechanism by which these worlds will be produced, and a mechanism by which different worlds will have different constants, or different laws, and so on. If that’s true, then if there are enough of these worlds, it will be likely that some of them have the right combination of constants to permit life. But their arguments tend not to be “we have to believe in these many worlds to solve the fine tuning problem,” they tend to be “these many worlds are generated by physics we have other reasons for believing in.”
On another thread, bornagain77 claimed that atheists had concocted the multiverse hypothesis as a way of avoiding theistic interpretations of physics. I replied:
Brian Greene discusses nine distinct multiverse hypotheses in his excellent book, The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and the Deep Laws of the Cosmos. All nine of them emerge from the mathematics of existing theories. None were invented to explain away God, no matter how much BA77 would like to pretend otherwise.
champignon
January 20, 2012
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