Has anyone ever wondered why Darwin’s followers …

_{Denyse O'Leary

April 7, 2015

Culture, Darwinism, Peer review}

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… have a really hard time figuring out why anyone tries to be good?

The carriers of the evolutionary process are populations. Populations consist of reproducing individuals, such as cells, viruses, plants, animals, and people. Offspring inherit fundamental information from their parents. This information is encoded in genomes, if we focus on genetic evolution. Occasionally modifications arise. These new genetic variants are called “mutants.” Mutation generates new types, new molecular ideas. This constitutes the first half of the evolutionary process.

The second half is “natural selection.” The mutations might affect reproductive rates. Some mutant genes spread faster in the population than others. Nature becomes a gigantic breeder selecting for advantageous traits. Survival of the fittest is the underlying theme of natural selection. The world is fundamentally competitive. So it seems.

Depending on where you live, you may be paying for school systems that force this stuff down kids’ throats, thanks to the Darwin in the schools lobby.

Comments

WJM
(1) Is the moral system logically consistent including a logically sound basis for supporting it;

(2) does it correspond to how (sane) people actually behave (or **can** actually behave in terms of being logically consistent with the moral system proposed);
Well which is it? Mind you it is possible to behave logically consistently with almost all moral systems.
(3) if there is any significant or sound reason to care about what is morality at all (under which I offered the reason one would have to care about behving morally in my NLM sysetm: necessary consequences).
Other than just wanting to be compassionate etc? I think the only thing you offer is the carrot and stick which strikes me as an immoral reason for sticking to a moral code – just looking out for the interests of oneself – wouldn’t be moral if could get away with it etc.
Utilitarianism is entirely circular thinking; “IF” we define morality as X, then pursuing X is moral.
It is true that all objective systems have this problem that they are not clear whether they are defining “moral” or telling you to be moral. That’s because “X is moral” is not in essence a description of X but an exhortation to encourage X (based on a specific type of motive)
NLM doesn’t use definitional fiat to justify itself. … It tells you were morality is (baked into all of existence, a part of the landscape we exist in and are part of), a way to access it (conscience), and a means by which to examine it (logic). That doesn’t provide a conclusion about “what is moral” built into the premise.
So how do you define moral?
Obviously, there are no necessary consequences under Utilitarianism; what you do may or may not result in an increase in the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, and since Utilitarian is a consequentialist perspective, you can spend your whole life doing things with the belief and intention of creating the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, but if the results of your behavior actually result in a net reduction in happiness, then you have behaved immorally regardless of your intention.
Utilitarianism is not that crude! In most formulations you are moral if you behave with the genuine intention of greatest happiness of greatest number and of course there are variations on that. But anyway I only accepted a consequentialist code as an example. Take Kantian categorical imperative as an alternative.
Under my NLM, you are not morally responsible for the apparent consequences; you are only responsible for acting either in accordance with or in contradiction to your conscience. Whether that makes more people happy or less is not your concern, because under NLM “happiness” is not itself necessarily a binding moral obligation – your or that of others.
I think most moral systems say you are responsible for acting according to your conscience. What they are doing is educating or guiding your conscience.
This is why corresponding necessary consequences are required. If you do what is moral, then good must be the result regardless of what appears to be the outome; if you do evil, then negative consequences must be the result, regardless of if it appears otherwise; otherwise there’s no real way to determine what act will cause what eventual outcome, and so no way to determine how to act.
I am still confused by what you mean by necessary consequences and also how you judge the consequences to be good or bad.Mark Frank_{April 14, 2015
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seversky said:
Is the principle, I feel that way, immoral intrinsically?
The principle "because I feel like it" is, IMO, self-evidently immoral because it can be used to justify any behavior at all as moral. It think that it is also obviously immoral as a justification. If you are saying that "because I say so" and "because I feel like it" are valid moral principles, further argument is irrelevant as far as I'm concerned. I'm happy to stand aside and let observers judge based on what they've read so far.
It is logically consistent and does not reduce down to immoral principles by definition.
"Because I say so" is also a logically consistent form of moral subjectivism. However, if X can be moral one minute and immoral the next because some entity says so, it's logically incomprehensible. Unless god is talking to us directly, there's no way to determine which supposed words of god actually come from god. As such, it's not a morality worth caring about because there's no rational means by which to make any determinations whatsoever. If you had bothered to read my comments here not addressed to you, you wouldn't be asking me to repeat things I've already said several times in this thread alone.
What is the origin and basis of the authority of NML if not divine authority? Could NML exist without a God?
Once again, reading what I've already written would be helpful. My NML is the form that "good" is an immutable, absolute aspect of god, and thus necessarily a part of anything god creates and an intrinsic aspect of existential purpose. Morality, then, refers to an aspect of existence even god cannot change. Thus, no "authority" has "decreed" what good is; good is what it is and nothing can ever change it. Not even god. Just as god cannot change 1+1=2, and god cannot create a 4-sided triangle, god cannot make gratuitous child torture a good thing. BTW, I should have said "My argument is that it is the only logically consistent form of morality that doesn’t logically digress to immoral principles (because I feel like it, because I can); corresponds to how people actually act; and is worth caring about.William J Murray_{April 14, 2015
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Necessary good or bad consequences. This is the bit where it gets circular and I think you are trying to explain with the paragraph above which I could not understand. We are trying to decide why NML is better than say utilitarianism. They both lead to logical consequences. How do you decide that NLM’s consequences are better than utilitarianism’s consequences without using NLM to make the decision?
(1) Is the moral system logically consistent including a logically sound basis for supporting it; (2) does it correspond to how (sane) people actually behave (or **can** actually behave in terms of being logically consistent with the moral system proposed); (3) if there is any significant or sound reason to care about what is morality at all (under which I offered the reason one would have to care about behving morally in my NLM sysetm: necessary consequences). Utilitarianism, generally speaking, asserts that happiness is the purpose of morality, that one should engage in activities that appear to have the best chance of acquiring the most happiness for the most people. Originally, Utilitarianism was a form of NLM that derived happiness as a moral maxim from an assumed characteristic of god (god's happiness). As such, it might have a leg to stand on, but in it' modern incarnation, the only foundation Utilitarianism can have is definitional; if you define morality as "greatest happiness for greatest number of people", then of course Utilitarianism would be by definition the correct form of morality. Utilitarianism is entirely circular thinking; "IF" we define morality as X, then pursuing X is moral. Well, you could substitute anything for X and have the same validity. NLM doesn't use definitional fiat to justify itself. It doesn't say "morality is whatever is the greatest happiness, so you should do whatever leads to the greatest happiness". It tells you were morality is (baked into all of existence, a part of the landscape we exist in and are part of), a way to access it (conscience), and a means by which to examine it (logic). That doesn't provide a conclusion about "what is moral" built into the premise. Obviously, there are no necessary consequences under Utilitarianism; what you do may or may not result in an increase in the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, and since Utilitarian is a consequentialist perspective, you can spend your whole life doing things with the belief and intention of creating the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, but if the results of your behavior actually result in a net reduction in happiness, then you have behaved immorally regardless of your intention. That doesn't even make any sense. We live in a largely chaotic system; nobody can control the ultimate consequences of their actions because there is too much stuff interacting in unforeseen ways. Any form of moral consequentialism ultimately requires us to just be lucky in that our actions just happen to ultimately produce greater net happiness. Under my NLM, you are not morally responsible for the apparent consequences; you are only responsible for acting either in accordance with or in contradiction to your conscience. Whether that makes more people happy or less is not your concern, because under NLM "happiness" is not itself necessarily a binding moral obligation - your or that of others. The fact is that you cannot know what the eventual material or physical ramifications might be of any act you commit, whether of good intentions or bad. This is why corresponding necessary consequences are required. If you do what is moral, then good must be the result regardless of what appears to be the outome; if you do evil, then negative consequences must be the result, regardless of if it appears otherwise; otherwise there's no real way to determine what act will cause what eventual outcome, and so no way to determine how to act.William J Murray_{April 14, 2015
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Wjm: No, the only advantage is that it is logically consistent and doesn’t reduce down to immoral principles. Is the principle, I feel that way, immoral intrinsically? Divine authority is not a good basis for a moral system, as I’ve said many times. It is logically consistent and does not reduce down to immoral principles by definition. What is the origin and basis of the authority of NML if not divine authority? Could NML exist without a God? I never said I had any evidence that it is true. My argument is that it is the only logically consistent form of morality that doesn’t logically digress to immoral principles (because I feel like it, because I can). If premises of logical argument are based on personal feelings then the result even in logical form is derived from" immoral principles" As I’ve said several times, the alternative is if conscience is a sensory and not intuitive/emotional capacity Sorry I missed that but now your line of argument about nihilism makes sense. All others senses require a mind to process the information, is the conscience different?velikovskys_{April 14, 2015
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WJM You may recall my interest in this debate is not defending subjectivism which has been done many, many times – whether you think it successful or not. I am concerned for a change to explore your defence of NML. So I am going to skip some stuff and get straight back to that.
There are no “criterion”; I’m not judging what is good in this part of the argument, but rather premising that whatever the good purpose of existences is, doing good helps fulfill that good purpose. That would be why, in fact, doing good is good in the first place. The consequences would be good by definition.
I am afraid I truly cannot understand this paragraph and I think it obscures a key point. Perhaps you can provide a few examples.
I haven’t been making an argument that the good in my moral system is better than the good in other moral system; I’ve been making the argument that my NLM is logically sound and that moral subjectivism is logically unsound and not worth caring about anyway.
NLM may be logically sound but so are many other objective systems. The key question remains – on what basis do you decide that NLM is the best of all the logically sound objective systems? Earlier you offered three reasons: 1) Logically consistent. That’s what we have just been talking about. There are many such systems. 2) Corresponds to how people behave. People actually behave in a wide variety of ways but most moral systems account for their actual behaviour reasonably well. 3) Necessary good or bad consequences. This is the bit where it gets circular and I think you are trying to explain with the paragraph above which I could not understand. We are trying to decide why NML is better than say utilitarianism. They both lead to logical consequences. How do you decide that NLM’s consequences are better than utilitarianism’s consequences without using NLM to make the decision?Mark Frank_{April 14, 2015
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MF:
The whole point of subjectivism is that there is no ultimate logical justification for any particular moral view
Prezactly. There is no IS on evolutionary materialism that can ground OUGHT. It is therefore not a moral system but an AMORAL one, which inherently opens the door to nihilism with might/manipulation makes 'right,' 'good,' 'truth' etc. And -- with all due respect -- if that does not get the attention of any sane person bigtime, the sanity of such a person is in question. Plato had it right, 2350 years ago:
Ath. . . .[The avant garde philosophers and poets, c. 360 BC] say that fire and water, and earth and air [i.e the classical "material" elements of the cosmos], all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art . . . [such that] all that is in the heaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only [ --> that is, evolutionary materialism is ancient and would trace all things to blind chance and mechanical necessity] . . . . [Thus, they hold] that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made.- [ --> Relativism, too, is not new; complete with its radical amorality rooted in a worldview that has no foundational IS that can ground OUGHT.] These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might [ --> Evolutionary materialism -- having no IS that can properly ground OUGHT -- leads to the promotion of amorality on which the only basis for "OUGHT" is seen to be might (and manipulation: might in "spin")], and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine; and hence arise factions [ --> Evolutionary materialism-motivated amorality "naturally" leads to continual contentions and power struggles influenced by that amorality], these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is,to live in real dominion over others [ --> such amoral factions, if they gain power, "naturally" tend towards ruthless abuse], and not in legal subjection to them.
It is time to wake up and get out of the cave, to see the real world beyond the befuddling smoke and bewitching shadow shows of the materialists' cave! KFkairosfocus_{April 14, 2015
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MF said:
You are criticising subjectivism for not being objectivism.
I'm pointing out that your particular description of some inner attributes of moral subjectivism are not entailments of moral subjectivism per se, but are (apparently) only your personal experience of morality. Other moral subjectivists are not bound to experience morality like you do, or as you describe.
The whole point of subjectivism is that there is no ultimate logical justification for any particular moral view.
As I've said repeatedly.
You justify NML because it necessarily leads to good consequences. But what is your criterion for good in this case?
There are no "criterion"; I'm not judging what is good in this part of the argument, but rather premising that whatever the good purpose of existences is, doing good helps fulfill that good purpose. That would be why, in fact, doing good is good in the first place. The consequences would be good by definition.
What moral system are you using to arbitrate between your objective system and other objective systems?
I haven't been making an argument that the good in my moral system is better than the good in other moral system; I've been making the argument that my NLM is logically sound and that moral subjectivism is logically unsound and not worth caring about anyway.
Subjective morality proposes that to be moral is to follow the promptings of your conscience (understood as a set of motives as described above).
No, it does not. You are the one attempting now to put de facto objective constraints on "moral subjectivism" that apparently conform to your own personal experience. Other moral subjectivists are not bound at all, by any reason, to listen to the conscience or only consider "deep" feelings as moral urgings.
It would appear to follow directly that being moral leads to a clear conscience. Please explain why that does not follow.
Because under moral subjectivism, one needn't consider conscience at all. Their moral perspective may be that conscience is an emotion that gets in the way of proper behavior, such as ensuring the success of you, your loved ones and/or family. Moral Subjectivism doesn't entail listening to your "conscience" at all. Some people prefer empathy as the source of their morality; others prefer to be more practical and put self-survival and self-success above all other considerations. A logically consistent moral subjectivist cannot tell others how to define and arbit their morality as you are attempting to do. Mark Frank, you are apparently constructing a subjective version of a kind of moral subjectivism that you personally adhere to, but the problem is that your category of morality doesn't allow for the claim that your personal view can be "the one true form" of subjective morality - because that form must be considered entirely subjective in nature. While what you have described is certainly allowable under moral subjectivism, it is not entailed by it. But, even so, lets admit arguendo that you could present your "cleared conscience satisfaction" case to the hypothetical immoral criminal in our example; do you think he doesn't already know that if he does what his conscience is indicating he will have a clear conscience? Isn't he already choosing to sacrifice a clear conscience for other perceived gains? What you are offering him provides no reason for him to change his behavior because his behavior already accounts for his lack of a clear conscience. He has traded it willingly for other things. Whether he acts on it or not, at least my NLM gives him a reason to change his behavior.William J Murray_{April 14, 2015
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p.p.s. I realize I may have delivered an off-hand compliment in the past. I just wanted to show my appreciation before signing off. I find this forum unhelpful at best, tedious/unpleasant at worst. Take care good sir never forget joyJD Welbel_{April 14, 2015
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William J Murray I love your writing. It's been stimulating and thought provoking beyond compare. Your words, at times, have seemed transcendentally inspired, and, in turn have inspired me to think, to write, even to share the joy and wonder they've directed me towards. truly, thank you I wish you all the happiness, joy and wonder in the world for your contribution to mine P.S. sorry for the public (and blatantly off topic) effusion as I have no idea how to contact you privatelyJD Welbel_{April 13, 2015
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WJM
You are confusing what you actually feel, and what you actually think, with what is logically consistent with moral subjectivism.
I don’t think so.
You have no logical justification under moral subjectivism to be claiming what is moral for others, or even what kinds of feelings count as morals in the first place. By so doing, you are holding your own feelings and views as the de facto objective standard.
You are criticising subjectivism for not being objectivism. The whole point of subjectivism is that there is no ultimate logical justification for any particular moral view. I can only respond to my own conscience (which is as I say a combination of non-selfish motives such as compassion, sense of fair play etc). As I said:
X judges Y to be immoral in certain respects. Y judges X to be immoral in certain respects. They debate, give reasons, and often come to some understanding. Sometimes there an unbridgeable chasm and if X cares deeply enough and has the means he may even attempt to inflict his morals on Y’s behaviour by force. That is human nature.
My point is that you are no better off. You justify NML because it necessarily leads to good consequences. But what is your criterion for good in this case? What moral system are you using to arbitrate between your objective system and other objective systems?
Satisfaction from a clear conscience is not an entailment of subjective morality;
Subjective morality proposes that to be moral is to follow the promptings of your conscience (understood as a set of motives as described above). It would appear to follow directly that being moral leads to a clear conscience. Please explain why that does not follow.
necessary good and bad consequences is an entailment of the NLM I’ve outlined. Only one system **provides** (entails) a reason to listen to one’s conscience and start behaving better
See above – on what basis do you decide if the consequences are good or bad? It may help to recognise the distinction between evaluating something according to a standard (NLM, Utilitarianism, virtue ethics etc) and evaluating the standards themselves. Clearly you cannot use the standards as part of the process of deciding between standards. Subjectivism recognises that there is no way round this but luckily there is a lot of agreement about standards.Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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Mark Frank @ 131, You are confusing what you actually feel, and what you actually think, with what is logically consistent with moral subjectivism. You have no logical justification under moral subjectivism to be claiming what is moral for others, or even what kinds of feelings count as morals in the first place. By so doing, you are holding your own feelings and views as the de facto objective standard. You can't have your cake and eat it, to. Mark Frank @ 132: Satisfaction from a clear conscience is not an entailment of subjective morality; necessary good and bad consequences is an entailment of the NLM I've outlined. Only one system **provides** (entails) a reason to listen to one's conscience and start behaving better.William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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Joe: "Compassion is irrational in a materialistic world…" I am sure that you can provide a relevant reference for this claim.lack of Focus_{April 13, 2015
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WJM
Moral subjectivism in and of itself doesn’t provide a reason to care about your conscience.
Appreciating the satisfaction you will get from a clear conscience is a reason.
In fact, not caring about your conscience is a perfectly valid form of morality under moral subjectivism.
As I said in #125 and again in #131 - what makes a judgement moral is the motive. One way of describing this is - a moral judgement is a judgement made out of conscience (conscience being a convenient way to sum up the promptings of compassion etc). So by definition it is not moral not to respond to your conscience.Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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WJM
Under moral subjectivism, you have no capacity to define what the criteria are for morality for everyone else. If a person calls a whim “moral”, it is by definition. If a person prefers their morals to be based on deep-seated, considered compassion and reason, then they are by definition. Whatever one prefers to be the basis of their morality is the factual basis of what is right and wrong for them.

It all boils down to personal preferences and subjective feelings under moral subjectivism, whether they are deeply compassionate and reasoned or whims. Both are equally moral. Attempting to continually paint it as otherwise seems to indicate that you are uncomfortable with some of the entailments and potentials of moral subjectivism.
1) As described in #125 not every whim counts as a moral motive. What makes a judgement a moral judgement is the type of motive (they are a loosely related set of motives – compassion, sense of duty, sense of equity etc ) not the particular behaviour that is being endorsed. The weights we give to these motives and the conclusions we come to as to how to behave vary. The point is that there is no need for some external standard to tell us those motives are moral. They are part of human nature. 2) I can and do define what I think is moral behaviour for others and myself. So I do have a capacity to judge with I think is moral for others – as they do for me. 3. You say that under subjectivism X’s views and Y’s views are equally moral. You are looking for a higher criterion to choose between them. But I recognise that there is no higher criterion. X judges Y to be immoral in certain respects. Y judges X to be immoral in certain respects. They debate, give reasons, and often come to some understanding. Sometimes there an unbridgeable chasm and if X cares deeply enough and has the means he may even attempt to inflict his morals on Y’s behaviour by force. That is human nature. The activity we call morality. I am not attempting to paint it otherwise and I am comfortable with it in the sense of being sure it is right (Please don't get into Barry's habit of telling me about my inner psyche). What I think I have demonstrated is that you are in exactly the same situation. You prefer NLM but there is no superior standard that says NLM is more moral than any other objective morality. How could there be? That would be a moral standard that was above NLM. Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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Mark Frank said:
On the other hand as a subjectivist he might realise that the prompting of his conscience are real desires based on human nature and responding to them might give him deep satisfaction.
There are any number of things he **might realise** which could push his behavior toward more moral or even less moral activity **after his adoption of the system**; the question was not what he **might realise** on his own, but rather which system by itself gave him a reason to listen to his conscience and act more morally. Moral subjectivism in and of itself doesn't provide a reason to care about your conscience. In fact, not caring about your conscience is a perfectly valid form of morality under moral subjectivism.William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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WJM #127 Sure the carrot and stick might give him a reason to listen harder to his conscience. The fact that it is objective doesn't seem to have mich significance unless there is a reason for doing what that objective code dictates - which brings us back to the carrot and stick. On the other hand as a subjectivist he might realise that the prompting of his conscience are real desires based on human nature and responding to them might give him deep satisfaction.Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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Mark Frank:
We have been over this so many times. It is not just any old “because I feel like it”. It is preferences based on deep seated motives such as compassion as suggested above. These motives are deep felt and based on reasons.
Under moral subjectivism, you have no capacity to define what the criteria are for morality for everyone else. If a person calls a whim "moral", it is by definition. If a person prefers their morals to be based on deep-seated, considered compassion and reason, then they are by definition. Whatever one prefers to be the basis of their morality is the factual basis of what is right and wrong for them. It all boils down to personal preferences and subjective feelings under moral subjectivism, whether they are deeply compassionate and reasoned or whims. Both are equally moral. Attempting to continually paint it as otherwise seems to indicate that you are uncomfortable with some of the entailments and potentials of moral subjectivism.William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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MF, I'd like you to think about a couple of hypothetical situations and respond to a question about them. Let's say Bob is an immoral criminal and he is enjoying his criminal life - let's say he forces women into prostitution, sells drugs to minors, and extorts protection money from local businesses. Let's also say Bob has never thought much about morality, much less entertained any deep examination of the concept. Let's also stipulate that Bob isn't a sociopath and does have some pangs of conscience about what he does. Let's say that you can convince Bob that morality is subjective in nature; that ultimately, whatever we prefer is, in fact, moral, and that there are ultimately no in-kind necessary consequences to anything we do. Being convinced of this, does Bob have any reason at all to pay increased attention to his conscience and stop his immoral, criminal activities? Now, let's say that I convince Bob that morality is an objective commodity that one can sense with their conscience, and that there are necessary, in-kind consequences Bob cannot escape - both good and bad - depending on the moral quality of his behavior. Being convinced of this, does Bob have any reason at all to pay increased attention to his conscience and stop his immoral, criminal activities? Note: I'm not saing Bob would likely change his behavior; I'm just asking, in your honest opinion, which belief provides at least a reason for Bob to consider changing his behavior.William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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Compassion is irrational in a materialistic world...Joe_{April 13, 2015
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#124 WJM
I’ve presented here and other places lengthy arguments about this. Subjectivists do not behave as if moral subjectivism is true; they behave as if their moral views are objective in nature. I understand that you disagree with this, but this is the main reason that moral subjectivism fails IMO.
People behave to further what they perceive to be good. But I won’t go over it again.
3) Necessary consequences.

This is just a part of the “worth caring about” differentiation of a sound vs unsound moral system. Perhaps I should have said “necessary good consequences for moral behavior and necessary negative consequences for immoral behavior.” It’s not enough for a moral act to have a necessary consequence; we must assume it has a necessarily positive consequence, in some way, even if we cannot see it.
Good, positive, bad, negative according to what moral code? You can’t use NML to judge if the consequences are good or bad if you are saying that having good or bad consequences is what defines NML.
Second, if morality = personal preferences, why should I bother with a moral system at all? Why not just do what I prefer to do and don’t do what I prefer not to do? What is the point of a moral system if it is not used to arbit between what one prefers to do vs what one should do? If they are the same thing, who needs morality?
Morality is not a difference between what one prefers and what one ought. It is a difference between two kinds of preferences. Preferences to do things like relieve suffering, see fair play and preferences to do things like eat well and have sex. The first are moral – the second concerned only with personal satisfaction. Like all preferences we sway between one and the other.
I’ve always admitted there is a logically consistent form of subjective morality – the “because I feel like it, because I can” version. However, the problem is that if these are the fundamental principles of morality, it renders morality irrelevant. The answer to every moral challenge is “because I feel like it”, and the justification for moral interventions is “because I feel like it and because I can”. Also, of course, there are no necessary in-kind consequences; there are only the consequences that happen to follow, and those consequences could be anything.
We have been over this so many times. It is not just any old “because I feel like it”. It is preferences based on deep seated motives such as compassion as suggested above. These motives are deep felt and based on reasons.Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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2) Corresponds to how people behave.
I've presented here and other places lengthy arguments about this. Subjectivists do not behave as if moral subjectivism is true; they behave as if their moral views are objective in nature. I understand that you disagree with this, but this is the main reason that moral subjectivism fails IMO.
3) Necessary consequences.
This is just a part of the "worth caring about" differentiation of a sound vs unsound moral system. Perhaps I should have said "necessary good consequences for moral behavior and necessary negative consequences for immoral behavior." It's not enough for a moral act to have a necessary consequence; we must assume it has a necessarily positive consequence, in some way, even if we cannot see it. First, there must be necessary (inescapable and significant) in-kind consequences (postive or negative) - arbitrary consequences do not meet the necessary standard, even if those arbitrary consequences are the apparent, physical results of your own moral activities. IOW, if bad results come from good moral intentions, and that's all there is to it, that's not good enough. Why bother, if that's all there is to it, and bad things keep happening if your intention is good? One must have motivation to keep doing good in the face of personal peril and even death, and to not do immoral things even it appears outcomes for doing immoral things are desirable. Second, if morality = personal preferences, why should I bother with a moral system at all? Why not just do what I prefer to do and don't do what I prefer not to do? What is the point of a moral system if it is not used to arbit between what one prefers to do vs what one should do? If they are the same thing, who needs morality? I've always admitted there is a logically consistent form of subjective morality - the "because I feel like it, because I can" version. However, the problem is that if these are the fundamental principles of morality, it renders morality irrelevant. The answer to every moral challenge is "because I feel like it", and the justification for moral interventions is "because I feel like it and because I can". Also, of course, there are no necessary in-kind consequences; there are only the consequences that happen to follow, and those consequences could be anything.William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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#122 WJM So it doesn't matter if it is true as long as it is logically consistent, corresponds to how people behave and has necessary consequences. Presumably any other system that satisfies those conditions would be equally morally valid. I would argue that subjectivism has all these properties – at least as much as NML if not more. 1) Logically consistent. In the past you have accepted that subjectivism is logically consistent given that morality is a just a matter of preferences (I would like to qualify that – but I don’t need to for my argument) 2) Corresponds to how people behave. Our preferences on moral matters are largely consistent so it does correspond to human behaviour at least as much as NML does. 3) Necessary consequences. I am bit confused by what you mean by this, but subjectivism means expressing what you want to happen morally from which it follows logically you will try to do what you consider to be right because that is what you want to happen. This is a truly logical and necessary connection between morality and action. You seem to be saying that under NLM the only connections between deciding something is good and performing it are either an inclination to faithfully serve a good existential purpose for all for its own sake (i.e. a preference) or a carrot and stick – but of course a carrot and stick can be applied to any morality that a sufficiently powerful force happens to want to enforce – so it is hardly a logical feature of NLM.Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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I agree with much of this but I am really surprised to learn that you don’t care if the NML is true! So would any moral system that was logically consistent, corresponded to how people behaved and had necessary consequences do?
I think so.
But why should anyone bother to fulfil that purpose?
Carrot and stick if one isn't inclined to faithfully serve a good existential purpose for all for its own sake. To avoid the personal negative consequences of immoral behavior at least for themselves, and to acquire the positive personal consequences of moral behavior - again, at least for themselves. If they don't care about such consequences, they are of course free to behave immorally.William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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WJM
It would be if I had ever claimed it was the truth. I’ve never made that claim – only that it is the only logically sustainable form of morality that (1) corresponds to how people behave anyway, and (2) is worth caring about. As I have said repeatedly, a morality without necessary consequences isn’t worth caring about in the first place. An ought without a sound, substantive reason why I ought is not a morality worth caring about.
I agree with much of this but I am really surprised to learn that you don’t care if the NML is true! So would any moral system that was logically consistent, corresponded to how people behaved and had necessary consequences do?
Because, as I have said, in my version of NML it is postulated there are necessary consequences to moral and immoral behavior, both for yourself and for the world around you. Oughts exist in relation to an objectively good, existential purpose; doing good necessarily promotes towards the fulfillment of that good purpose whether one can see and understand it or not.
But why should anyone bother to fulfil that purpose?Mark Frank_{April 13, 2015
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Mark Frank said:
Surely your obligation is to show that NLM is the truth and Kantianism is wrong – not just that there is more motivation to pursue it?
It would be if I had ever claimed it was the truth. I've never made that claim - only that it is the only logically sustainable form of morality that (1) corresponds to how people behave anyway, and (2) is worth caring about. As I have said repeatedly, a morality without necessary consequences isn't worth caring about in the first place. An ought without a sound, substantive reason why I ought is not a morality worth caring about.
Continuing to pretend to be a Kantian objectivist I would respond in two ways: 1) I am defining what people ought to do – not what they are motivated to do – some people are moral and do what they ought to do, other do not. That is a well known fact.
That doesn't answer the challenge of why anyone should care about it in the first place. Unless there are necessary consequences, the "oughts" are entirely empty and ultimately beg the question - why ought I treat others according to the categorical imperative? The answer is logically circular "you ought because you ought".
2) Anyway why bother conforming to the NML?
Because, as I have said, in my version of NML it is postulated there are necessary consequences to moral and immoral behavior, both for yourself and for the world around you. Oughts exist in relation to an objectively good, existential purpose; doing good necessarily promotes towards the fulfillment of that good purpose whether one can see and understand it or not.
(As it happens Kant did propose a logical reason for being a Kantian. To do otherwise would be to treat myself as different from all other people and that is logically inconsistent. I don’t think it is adequate but it is more logical than any reason I have heard for conforming to the NML.)
It's only logically inconsistent given the assumption you should treat others the same as you would have yourself treated. It's entirely circular and it hangs out there without any reason to do so. It's like saying someone ought do X and then telling them there's no reason why they ought do it, then saying that if you assume you ought do it, it would be logically inconsistent not to do it, and that is the reason you ought do it. Say what??William J Murray_{April 13, 2015
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WJM #117
My obligation is only to show that my NLM is superior logically to objective Kantianism. I think I can do that with one question: Under the premise that Kantian morality is objectively true, why should I bother with trying to behave in a moral fashion?
Surely your obligation is to show that NLM is the truth and Kantianism is wrong – not just that there is more motivation to pursue it? Continuing to pretend to be a Kantian objectivist I would respond in two ways: 1) I am defining what people ought to do – not what they are motivated to do – some people are moral and do what they ought to do, other do not. That is a well known fact. 2) Anyway why bother conforming to the NML? (As it happens Kant did propose a logical reason for being a Kantian. To do otherwise would be to treat myself as different from all other people and that is logically inconsistent. I don't think it is adequate but it is more logical than any reason I have heard for conforming to the NML.)Mark Frank_{April 12, 2015
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ZachrielThere is little doubt that some child-sacrificing priests enjoyed their work, and derived religious satisfaction.
You can find sociopaths who would agree with that practice. That's a trivial fact. That doesn't equate to a society at large.
In any case, we can imagine a universe of gods that requires such a sacrifice, so it is clearly within the realm of imaginable.
I can imagine a universe of pink unicorns too. Not everything imaginable is worth imagining, if we're considering the realm of reality. Show me a universe where societies at large actually embrace child torture for pleasure. Otherwise, you're spouting idle gas. I'd rather think about pink unicorns.mike1962_{April 12, 2015
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Mark Frank said:
Suppose I am a true Kantian who holds the categorical imperative is the objective moral code to which all humans are necessarily bound. How do you prove me wrong?
My obligation is only to show that my NLM is superior logically to objective Kantianism. I think I can do that with one question: Under the premise that Kantian morality is objectively true, why should I bother with trying to behave in a moral fashion?William J Murray_{April 12, 2015
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velikovskys said:
How is the decision of what the basis of the “objective standard” is not a personal subjective preference?
The question is if an objective standard holds up to logical scrutiny, not if one prefers it.
So the advantage of your system is not its morality,since you have no evidence it leads to more moral behaviour, but its enforcement of the subjective morality.
No, the only advantage is that it is logically consistent and doesn't reduce down to immoral principles.
You ,on the other hand, are using the seal of approval of a subjective preferenced divine authority as evidence of universality of natural law if such thing exists as a reason.
I have no idea what this means. Divine authority is not a good basis for a moral system, as I've said many times.
I understand completely, my view is you have no non subjective evidence that is true beyond pleasure alone is not a good reason to cause pain in babies therefore all morality is objective.
I never said I had any evidence that it is true. My argument is that it is the only logically consistent form of morality that doesn't logically digress to immoral principles (because I feel like it, because I can).
I could be wrong, please provide the alternative if it is not an intuitive appeal
As I've said several times, the alternative is if conscience is a sensory and not intuitive/emotional capacity/sensation.William J Murray_{April 12, 2015
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Seversky said:
Whatever an individual thinks is moral is moral by his or her beliefs. Other individuals may judge it immoral by their lights. How do we decide between them? On what grounds can we decide which view should prevail?
The argument is about what a logically consistent moral subjectivist (LCMS) has grounds to judge as moral or immoral.The LCMS cannot say what is moral for others, but can only say what is moral for himself. The LCMS must agree to this because it is the very nature of subjective morality.
Barney is perfectly entitled to judge Fred’s actions wrong by his own moral beliefs.
Not if Barney is supposedly an LCMS. If morality is by nature subjective, only Fred can tell if what he is doing is moral for him; Barney cannot judge if what Fred is doing is moral or not because Barney doesn't know what Fred thinks about it. If Barney is going to say "I can judge Fred's actions by my own moral views", then Barney is using his own views as a de facto objective standard by which the actions of others can be judged. Simply saying "I, Barney, subjectively believe that Fred's actions are immoral .." doesn't indemnify him against the explicit implication and use of his own moral code as objectively applicable to others. IOW, Barney doesn't get to have his cake and eat it too.
If Barney believes that it is immoral, as a general principle, for anyone to be beaten with a club against their will then he is entitled to make that claim about Fred’s action.
But Barney, our LCMS, cannot have such a belief that it is wrong "for anyone" to be beaten with a club against their will because then the belief would be serving as a de facto objective morality belief. Barney's beliefs must be consistent with the logical entailments of moral subjectivism.
He is perfectly entitled to claim that what Fred is doing is wrong just as Fred is entitled to claim that what he is doing is right.
No. Subjectivists must phrase all of their moral judgements in personal terms. Saying what Fred should and shouldn't do is like saying what flavor of ice cream Fred likes and dislikes. You don't get to say what ice cream Fred likes and in the same fashion you cannot say what Fred should and shouldn't do. What morality is for Fred is necessarily determined by Fred under moral subjectivism. Thus, Barney cannot say "Fred's behavior is wrong" any more than Barney can say "Fred's favorite flavor is vanilla". It's a non-sequitur. Barney cannot make a judgement that Fred's favorite flavor is the wrong flavor. Barney may not like vanilla; it may repulse Barney when he sees other people eating vanilla; but Barney simply cannot say that the favorite flavor of other people is not vanilla and then swoop in to stop them from eating it.
The question, as before, is at what point or under what circumstances or if at all is Barney entitled to take action to prevent Fred doing something he believes is wrong.
No, actually the question is: what kind of condemnation of what Barney is observing is logically justified under moral subjectivism? Barney cannot say that the act itself is universally wrong for everyone, because that implies an objective morality, even if it is Barney's own morality that he is applying as a de facto universal rule. Barney cannot say that the act is immoral for Fred because only Fred can say what is moral or immoral for Fred. Under LCMS, the immorality of what Barney observes must be tied only to Barney's perspective in order for it to be subjective in nature.
No, absolutely not. Fred may believe that is moral for him to beat his wife and Barney may concede that Fred believes it is moral but there is no logical requirement at all for Barney – and certainly not Wilma – to agree that it is moral.
If they are all LCMS, then yes, they must agree that what Fred is doing is moral. If Fred says "My favorite flavor of ice cream is vanilla," it is a statement of fact about his subjective preference. Fred and Wilma must admit this; they cannot say "No, his subjective preference is not vanilla". Under moral subjectivism, that's all "right" and "wrong" is; it is entirely, factually a subjective preference or view or feeling by the individual - nobody else has any say in the matter of what is moral for Fred to do. Seversky, your terminology is what is tripping you up. You are using the terms "right" and "wrong" in a way that is not derivable from moral subjectivism. A little exercise will help you here: Let's substitute "vanilla" for "beat your wife". Let's substitute "like" and "dislike" for "right" and "wrong". Fred says he likes vanilla; this translates into "It is moral for me to beat my wife". Your response is: you don't like vanilla, but then, nobody asked you to beat Fred's wife. You don't get to say that Fred doesn't like vanilla. You don't get to say that nobody likes vanilla. You must admit that Fred likes vanilla (it is right for fred to beat his wife). What would it mean to say, "Well, Fred shouldn't find it moral to beat his wife?" That is again making a reference to some arbiter serving as a de facto objective standard. You don't get to disagree with what Fred says his favorite ice cream is; you can only say that you don't like vanilla, and that you don't like to see Fred eating vanilla; but you cannot say that Fred liking vanilla is wrong without referring to some de facto objective standard as arbiter.William J Murray_{April 12, 2015
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