Has anyone ever wondered why Darwin’s followers …

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April 7, 2015

Culture, Darwinism, Peer review

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… have a really hard time figuring out why anyone tries to be good?

The carriers of the evolutionary process are populations. Populations consist of reproducing individuals, such as cells, viruses, plants, animals, and people. Offspring inherit fundamental information from their parents. This information is encoded in genomes, if we focus on genetic evolution. Occasionally modifications arise. These new genetic variants are called “mutants.” Mutation generates new types, new molecular ideas. This constitutes the first half of the evolutionary process.

The second half is “natural selection.” The mutations might affect reproductive rates. Some mutant genes spread faster in the population than others. Nature becomes a gigantic breeder selecting for advantageous traits. Survival of the fittest is the underlying theme of natural selection. The world is fundamentally competitive. So it seems.

Depending on where you live, you may be paying for school systems that force this stuff down kids’ throats, thanks to the Darwin in the schools lobby.

Comments

Zachriel said:
Assuming the subjectivist believes in enforcing their morality on others, then {A}, of course. They see someone, Fred, beating someone else with a club, Wilma, and they may intervene without first asking Fred his opinion on metaethics.
In a debate like this you cannot skip the salient part or else onlookers might draw an equivalence between a subjectivist engaging in unilateral moral interventions and an objectivist doing the same; the same terminology doesn't imply the two are the same conceptually or have the same logical consequences under each worldview. Under subjectivism, the rationally consistent subjectivist must agree that they are unilaterally forcing what are nothing more than personal, subjective views/inclinations on others because they feel like it and because they can. Under the objective perspective, the objectivist can logically justify their interventions as something other than "because I feel like it" and "because I can". Zachriel said:
In English, the idioms “because I feel like it” and “because I can” imply trivial momentary impulses.
Unfortunately for Zachriel, his diversion about"trivial momentary impulses" is irrelevant. Under moral subjectivism, intervening due to trivial momentary impulses is as moral as any other action as long as the individual considers them to be moral. Logically consistent moral subjectivism fully embraces trivial impulses as "moral" as long as the individual feels like such actions are "moral".
Instead, most people have moral sensibilities, and because most people have moral sensibilities, they have a shared language of morality, and a set of behaviors that most people find acceptable that tempers the trivial momentary impulses.
Because people have a shared moral language and shared moral sensibilities doesn't mean they are (1) moral subjectivists, and (2) if they are, behave in accordance with the logical consequences of moral subjectivism. Most people would not agree that if you enjoy gratuitously torturing children then doing so is moral for you; IMO, for most people, such an act is self-evidently, absolutely, objectively wrong in all possible worlds and they would react with moral disgust towards anyone even considering the possibility that such behavior is moral "for those that feel like doing it."
Most subjectivists don’t advocate enforcing every whim on others.
It doesn't matter what "most subjectivists" advocate or agree to; the logical ramifications are clear.
Some moral imperatives are stronger than others.
What difference does that make under subjectivism? If a subjectivist wishes to consider every whim equally moral, then for that person, every whim is equally moral, defines his "good", and moral subjectivism logically endorses it as a perfectly valid morality.
And even then, the moral imperative may be to convince rather than control. It depends on the individual morality, and the balance people strike between the different values of liberty and moral rectitude.
None of the above matters at all to the point. How some or most individual self-described moral subjectivists actually behave has nothing to do with admitting the logical entailments of moral subjectivism and whether or not, upon realizing the logical entailments, most moral subjectivists would still consider themselves such. IOW, if a moral subjectivist truly realized that their morality boiled down to the fundamental principles of "because I feel like it, because I can", would they still be comfortable calling themselves moral subjectivists? If they had to admit that their moral views are the exact equal in principle to **any other behavior**, including the views/behavior of serial killers and child rapists, and that their interventions to prevent such things were the same in principle as the actions of the person committing such atrocities, would they find any value in referring to any sets of behaviors as "moral"? I don't think so, and I think it is obvious by the way you and other scramble around trying to erect semantic and irrelevant moral differences between your actions and the actions of any child rapist or serial killer. Because, under moral subjectivism, there is no and can be no meaningful distinction. There's no reason to call anything moral at all, under moral subjectivism, other than to generate some empty sense of justification and self-satisfaction. It's like patting yourself on the back for choosing vanilla over chocolate - a completely arbitrary method of feeling good about doing what you prefer to do anyway.William J Murray_{April 9, 2015
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Barry - it appears that you cannot identify anything that WJM has asserted that Z failed to address. You can of course refute that by indicating the sentences WJM wrote that were not addressed. Instead you assure us all that everyone sees it. I guess this is a variant of one of your favourite arguments: "I am right because I am obviously right"Mark Frank_{April 9, 2015
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Mark @ 51, That would, of course, be redundant with WJM's work. Everyone sees it, and "everyone" includes you. You only pretend that you don't. If that's what it takes to cope with your cognitive dissonance, I suppose you have to do it. I just have to think it would be so much easier to finally admit the obvious to yourself.Barry Arrington_{April 9, 2015
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#50 Barry I am glad you know so much about our inner psyche's and that it gives you so much amusement. I guess it is more satisfying than identifying the point that Z failed to address.Mark Frank_{April 9, 2015
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It is also amusing to watch Mark Frank jump to Zachriel's defense, because he too cannot face the moral contradictions entailed by his metaphysics.Barry Arrington_{April 9, 2015
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Barry Zachriel has addressed WJM's points with remarkable concision and accuracy as he has done many times before. It would be interesting to see which statement of WJM's you think he has not addressed.Mark Frank_{April 9, 2015
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It is amusing watching Zachriel intentionally miss WJM's point. He is obviously not able to bear the moral contradictions of his metaphysics, so he pretends they don't exist. If I had to pretend the moral contradictions of my metaphysics do not exist in order to live with myself, I hope I would reevaluate them. That's just me though.Barry Arrington_{April 9, 2015
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William J Murray: my argument is two-fold; one either admits that {A} their morality endorses unilaterally forcing what they hold to be nothing more than personal, subjective views/feelings on others, OR {B} they are behaving hypocritically wrt logically consistent moral subjectivism. Assuming the subjectivist believes in enforcing their morality on others, then {A}, of course. They see someone, Fred, beating someone else with a club, Wilma, and they may intervene without first asking Fred his opinion on metaethics. William J Murray: because I feel like it / because I can fundamentally immoral and not viable as their fundamental moral principle. In English, the idioms "because I feel like it" and "because I can" imply trivial momentary impulses. Instead, most people have moral sensibilities, and because most people have moral sensibilities, they have a shared language of morality, and a set of behaviors that most people find acceptable that tempers the trivial momentary impulses. William J Murray: In any event, however, I’m happy to leave the argument at the point where you agree that subjective morality necessarily entails (logically speaking, if you interfere at all in the behavior of others under moral pretense) unilaterally forcing what you believe to be nothing more than personal, subjective feelings/views on others because you dislike/disagree with what they are doing. No. And we corrected this above. Most subjectivists don't advocate enforcing every whim on others. Some moral imperatives are stronger than others. And even then, the moral imperative may be to convince rather than control. It depends on the individual morality, and the balance people strike between the different values of liberty and moral rectitude.Zachriel_{April 9, 2015
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Zachriel said:
Sure. But if your moral code doesn’t make that prohibition, then it’s not hypocritical, which contradicts your statement above.
No, it doesn't, because my argument is two-fold; one either admits that their morality endorses unilaterally forcing what they hold to be nothing more than personal, subjective views/feelings on others, OR they are behaving hypocritically wrt logically consistent moral subjectivism. If they admit it, which you do, then they can be logically consistent, non-hypocritical moral subjectivists; the problem with that, I suggest, is all sane, rational people who consider themselves moral should find the principle because I feel like it / because I can fundamentally immoral and not viable as their fundamental moral principle.
As shown, your argument is fallacious. Someone can hold to subjective morality, with that subjective morality not only allowing interference with others, but compelling interference with others.
I'm sorry, I should have said:
my argument is that moral subjectivism has logical entailments, and that no sane, reasonable person can (1)accept those entailments as a valid morality AND (2) live as if they are true.
Yes, a person can be logically consistent and hold to subjective morality by agreeing that their fundamental, operational moral principle is "because I feel like it, because I can" and live their life as if whatever they felt like doing was by definition "morally good" and they had the right to unilaterally force their likes on others because they feel like it and because they can. People can and do live as if whatever the feel like doing is justifiable as "good" and that feeling like doing it gives them the right to do it. However, we call those people sociopaths. We don't consider them sane or reasonable. In any event, however, I'm happy to leave the argument at the point where you agree that subjective morality necessarily entails (logically speaking, if you interfere at all in the behavior of others under moral pretense) unilaterally forcing what you believe to be nothing more than personal, subjective feelings/views on others because you dislike/disagree with what they are doing. And that moral subjectivism necessarily means that gratuitously torturing a child is as moral as saving a child from gratuitous torture, depending on your role in the scenario. If a/mats are agreeable to that, then God help us.William J Murray_{April 9, 2015
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As the identical debate takes place here approximately once a month – maybe we can save some time by recording the main points somewhere we can easily go back and replay them?Mark Frank_{April 9, 2015
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William J Murray: It’s also hypocritical if your moral code prohibits you from ever unilaterally pushing what you believe to be are entirely subjective, personal views onto others, because you’ve agreed that’s what morals are under subjectivism. Sure. But if your moral code doesn't make that prohibition, then it's not hypocritical, which contradicts your statement above. William J Murray: my argument is that moral subjectivism has logical entailments, and that no sane, reasonable person can (1)accept those entailments as a valid morality or (2) live as if they are true. As shown, your argument is fallacious. Someone can hold to subjective morality, with that subjective morality not only allowing interference with others, but compelling interference with others. Here is a famous statement of relative morality, by Charles James Napier.
Be it so. This burning of widows is your custom; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them, and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to national customs.
Zachriel_{April 8, 2015
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Zachriel said:
It’s not hypocritical unless your moral code prohibits ever pushing your moral code on others.
It's also hypocritical if your moral code prohibits you from ever unilaterally pushing what you believe to be are entirely subjective, personal views onto others, because you've agreed that's what morals are under subjectivism.
In a democratic society, there is typically a process by which the people can express their moral views. Most people in a culture share many beliefs, so there is the possibility of consensus, or at least compromise.
None of that makes their moral views any less hypocritical or logically consistent.
We can deduce entailments, including instrumental tests, from the notion of bricks and then independently test those entailments. The strength of those entailments provide confidence in our brick hypothesis.No such tests are possible for moral or aesthetic sensibilities. The best you can do is take a poll.
If I were making a case that objective morality was independently verifiable, this might be germane to the argument. However, I'm not making that case. I'm not attempting to prove that objective morals factually exist; my argument is that moral subjectivism has logical entailments, and that no sane, reasonable person can (1)accept those entailments as a valid morality or (2) live as if they are true. One of those entailments would be that gratuitously torturing child can be a morally good act. Another of those entailments is that moral interventions are ultimately based on the principle of "because I feel like it" and "because I can".William J Murray_{April 8, 2015
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William J Murray: The problem I’m addressing is that the moral subjectivist must either admit (1) their hypocrisy in holding moral views to be entirely subjective juxtaposed against their willingness to force their moral views on others It's not hypocritical unless your moral code prohibits ever pushing your moral code on others. Maybe your moral code allows you to do so in some circumstances, or maybe your moral code requires it in all cases. William J Murray: (2), as you have stated, the foundational principles of their subjective morality are in fact because I feel like it and because I can. Of course. If someone is dictator, they can impose their moral views on others. In a democratic society, there is typically a process by which the people can express their moral views. Most people in a culture share many beliefs, so there is the possibility of consensus, or at least compromise. William J Murray: There is no independent measure of brick walls “outside of human sensibility”. We can deduce entailments, including instrumental tests, from the notion of bricks and then independently test those entailments. The strength of those entailments provide confidence in our brick hypothesis. No such tests are possible for moral or aesthetic sensibilities. The best you can do is take a poll. William J Murray: My alternative solution (to the problem I’ve actually been addressing, not the one you seem to think I’m making) is to premise that morality refers to an objective, immutable, natural law commodity which no entity can change, and that there are necessary consequences to both moral and immoral activities, and that we have the imperfect capacity to subjectively perceive and interpret this objective commodity (as with any other perceptive sense). That's nice, but you can provide no independent scientific evidence of that. All you have are your moral sensibilities, which you insist are objective.Zachriel_{April 8, 2015
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Zachriel said;
Pointing to a moral code, even if you claim it is divinely inspired, doesn’t eliminate the problem.
It doesn't eliminate the problem of people disagreeing with you and it doesn't eliminate the problem of getting into conflicts over their disparate moral views. But then, as I've said repeatedly, those are not the problems I'm addressing. The problem I'm addressing is that the moral subjectivist must either admit (1) their hypocrisy in holding moral views to be entirely subjective juxtaposed against their willingness to force their moral views on others (while simultaneously holding that forcing your subjective views on others because you feel like it and because you can is immoral), or (2), as you have stated, the foundational principles of their subjective morality are in fact because I feel like it and because I can. Your next question implicitly admits this:
What is your alternative position when it’s clear there is no independent measure of morality outside of human sensibility?
There is no independent measure of anything outside of human sensibility. What a trivial category to place morality in! There is no independent measure of brick walls "outside of human sensibility". Perhaps you mean "outside of human emotional feelings"? If that's what you mean, how can it possibly be "clear" that morality only exists there? My alternative solution (to the problem I've actually been addressing, not the one you seem to think I'm making) is to premise that morality refers to an objective, immutable, natural law commodity which no entity can change, and that there are necessary consequences to both moral and immoral activities, and that we have the imperfect capacity to subjectively perceive and interpret this objective commodity (as with any other perceptive sense). This premise gives us the rational justification (grounds) for us to, on certain occasions, force our moral views on others (for their own good, whether they realize it or not), consider some things to be moral obligations for everyone (in light of necessary consequences for ourselves and others); consider some things to be moral unalienable moral rights for everyone; humbly consider our own fallibility when it comes to perceiving and interpreting the moral landscape; so that we can act without being hypocrites; so that we can have moral principles that are not themselves self-evidently immoral (because I feel like it, because I can). It gives us a logical foundation from which to hope that we can rationally debate morality from self-evident moral truths (such as: it is wrong to torture children gratuitously) to logically necessary moral truths and so on, without it merely being a "might makes right" scenario. If morality is merely "because I want to" or "because I like it", moral debates are nothing but bartering, badgering and manipulation.William J Murray_{April 8, 2015
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:-) @ Axel. If you keep watching it, maybe something interesting will form. Although I wouldn't want you to stay in the salt cellar that long. Air, water, salt combining ... plus Axel. Maybe some totally new properties will emerge.Silver Asiatic_{April 8, 2015
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Zachriel @37, Congrats. You are the king of the non-sequitur.mike1962_{April 8, 2015
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'...Chemicals don’t create their properties, and for chemical-compounds it’s the same. The moon and tides didn’t rely on mutations and selection. Molecules and physical forces self-organized (as it is claimed) to create the solar system. When certain chemicals come together to form human beings, those chemicals have the properties of all the behaviors we see.' Are you sure about all that, Silver Fox? Only a few minute ago, I stopped watching a lump of salt in my salt-cellar to see if it had been caused by moisture, or if it was the beginnings of some ambitious construction project.Axel_{April 8, 2015
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William J Murray: I’m not attempting to make the case that athesits/materialists behave differently than theists. I’m making the case that atheists/materialists (1) cannot rationally justify their behavior wrt morality, and (2) cannot provide a rationally coherent, principled basis for their morality that is anything other than “because I feel like it, because I can”. Moral sensibility is innate to humans. Those who share values may then create an ethical code as an expression of those sensibilities. If someone doesn't share those sensibilities, they may reject the code. Pointing to a moral code, even if you claim it is divinely inspired, doesn't eliminate the problem. William J Murray: That doesn’t make their morality any more valid than the morality of the person they have banded together against. It's valid for them, but perhaps not for those who reject the code. Some will go to war over which side of the egg to break. What is your alternative position when it's clear there is no independent measure of morality outside of human sensibility?Zachriel_{April 8, 2015
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Zachriel said:
Let’s look at your statement again.
That was your statement which I quoted and just attached the worldview from which we agree it is drawn. In any event, it doesn't change the fact that I'm not attempting to make the case that athesits/materialists behave differently than theists. I'm making the case that atheists/materialists (1) cannot rationally justify their behavior wrt morality, and (2) cannot provide a rationally coherent, principled basis for their morality that is anything other than "because I feel like it, because I can".
And people who don’t like murderers (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath) band together and enact rules against murder (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath).
That doesn't make their morality any more valid than the morality of the person they have banded together against. In any event, Zachriel provides the money quote. After I ask:
what principle gives you the right to intervene in the affairs of others, such as when you find someone gratuitously torturing children?
He responds:
Presumably because they feel a compulsion to do so.
IOW, "because I feel like it / because I can" is the "moral principle" that justifies intervening in the affairs of others. I'm happy to leave it at that for all onlookers.William J Murray_{April 8, 2015
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Zachriel Enough with the twaddle, chemical reactions don't give a crap how you feel.Andre_{April 8, 2015
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MF
Evolution does not cause chemicals to want to eat any more than the moon causes a water molecule to have a tide – tides are a property of collection of water molecules organised in a certain way.
It seems to me that this is a simpler and more coherent idea than the evolution hypothesis. Molecules organized in a certain way become planets, oceans, tides, pine trees, earthworms and human beings. When the chemicals are combined to form those things, then the chemicals have certain properties. So it would be the combined-chemical properties of antelope to eat grass. The chemical-combination that formed human beings has the property of having arms and legs, various styled haircuts, doing good deeds, watching TV or committing murder. Chemicals don't create their properties, and for chemical-compounds it's the same. The moon and tides didn't rely on mutations and selection. Molecules and physical forces self-organized (as it is claimed) to create the solar system. When certain chemicals come together to form human beings, those chemicals have the properties of all the behaviors we see. To me, that's a more coherent story of origins, although I find it very unbelievable. At least it seems more consistent in my view.Silver Asiatic_{April 8, 2015
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William J Murray: It’s a good thing then that I’m not making a case that there is a difference between the behaviors of atheists/materialsts and religious people. Let's look at your statement again. William J Murray: Atheism/materialism morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances. Religious morality: You commit as many murders as your nature demands given your circumstances, circumstances which include your religious outlook. William J Murray: Moral subjectvism categorically defines morality as what one “subjectively thinks”; this means that only the individual can know what is, by definition moral for him or herself. That's right. And people who don't like murderers (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath) band together and enact rules against murder (or adultery or doing business on the Sabbath). William J Murray: Who is Zachriel talking about when he says “Some might think …”? Torturers, per your original scenario. Zachriel: Obviously, if someone thinks some act is morally good, then that person thinks it is morally good. Some might think it is morally wrong, but do it anyway due to some compulsion; while others may simply have no moral sensibility, in which case it is neither moral or immoral to them. William J Murray: Certainly not moral objectivists, because they would think he’s wrong because his actions are in contradiction to an objective good. So? People often do things they think are wrong, whether they are moral objectivists or not. Some do things that you might think are morally wrong, but they think are morally right, whether they are moral objectivists or not. William J Murray: I’d like to ask so-called moral subjectivists: what principle gives you the right to intervene in the affairs of others, such as when you find someone gratuitously torturing children? Presumably because they feel a compulsion to do so. Andre: Why would we want to be altruistic? Usually it's due to a feeling of empathy that compels action. If you have no feelings of empathy, then you will probably not feel compelled to help others.Zachriel_{April 8, 2015
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Advice to a candidate who is asked "Do you believe in Evolution?": Render unto Darwin the things that are Darwin's, and unto God the things that are God's Teachings of Jesus are timeless:)ppolish_{April 8, 2015
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Mark Frank..... Why would we want to be altruistic? And if I like being selfish is it morally wrong and does it decrease my fitness?Andre_{April 8, 2015
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Zachriel said:
Turns out that religious people also commit murder.
It's a good thing then that I'm not making a case that there is a difference between the behaviors of atheists/materialsts and religious people. Now, Zachriel attempts to walk back the implications of subjective morality with some distracting semantics: Zacrhiel said:
Obviously, if someone thinks some act is morally good, then that person thinks it is morally good.
No, Zachriel. Moral subjectvism categorically defines morality as what one "subjectively thinks"; this means that only the individual can know what is, by definition moral for him or herself. ONLY he/she knows what his personal, subjective view is. Thus, for that individual, gratuitously torturing children is moral. Zachriel continues:
Some might think it is morally wrong, but do it anyway due to some compulsion; while others may simply have no moral sensibility, in which case it is neither moral or immoral to them.
Who is Zachriel talking about when he says "Some might think ..."? Certainly not moral objectivists, because they would think he's wrong because his actions are in contradiction to an objective good. So, Zachriel must be talking, at least hypothetically, about moral subjectivists, and if Zachriel is trying to make the case for the logical validity of that perspective, he must be talking about hypothetical, logically-sound moral subjectivistis. But, why would a logically-consistent moral subjectivist (LCMS) consider what person X is doing "wrong"; when the only arbiter of "what is wrong" is the individual committing the act themselves? Under the perspective of subjectivism, the LCMS must realize others are going to have different moralities than he; he cannot assess if it is wrong for person X to gratuitously torture children; all the LCMS knows is that if he were to do it, it would be immoral. So, the LCMS has no logical means by which to consider the behavior of person X "wrong"; all the LCMS can do is make the judgment that if he himself engaged in the behavior, it would be wrong.
We are altruistic because we like to help others. Knowing the cause of that desire makes no difference.
This means that altruistic behavior and gratuitous child torture are equally moral, depending on what the individual likes. Once again, I'd like to ask so-called moral subjectivists: what principle gives you the right to intervene in the affairs of others, such as when you find someone gratuitously torturing children?William J Murray_{April 8, 2015
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Dr. Dean Radin And Dr. Roger Nelson Respond to Global Consciousness Project Criticisms - audio http://www.skeptiko.com/74-radin-nelson-global-consciousness/ Roger Nelson and Dean Radin Defend 9/11 Global Consciousness Claims http://mindpowermasters.blogspot.com/2009/06/roger-nelson-and-dean-radin-defend-911.htmlbornagain77_{April 8, 2015
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SA I will try to be clearer. I am very happy to accept your correction that evolution does not cause us to want to be altruistic. It cause us to be altruistic part of which is wanting to do things like help people. Just as hunger is wanting to eat. You seem to be concerned by fact the chemicals don’t want to do things while people do want things. It is not uncommon for a collection of things to have properties that the individual things do not – a wave is not a property of a water molecule, a traffic jam is not a property of a car, Dennet in “Freedom Evolves” gives a particular good account of how objects in Conway’s Game of Life have properties (such as moving) even though they comprise pixels that do not have those properties. In the same way we have all sorts of properties that our individual components – cells, chemicals, atoms, subatomic particles – do not. Evolution does not cause chemicals to want to eat any more than the moon causes a water molecule to have a tide – tides are a property of collection of water molecules organised in a certain way.
It’s a selfish ideology, as I see it. It’s very destructive of human life and culture. I consider it anti-human — an enemy to human life.
It is not an ideology. An ideology is a motive, a reason for acting. Evolution is just a proposed cause for the motives we observe people having. That is my point. Mark Frank_{April 8, 2015
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Unguided Evolution stumbles upon altruism, nice. Theistic Evolution predicts altruism. Predicts evil also. Theistic Evolution is a more complete version of Evo Theory. ID is better science than both Unguided or Theistic Evo however. Mountains of evidence.ppolish_{April 8, 2015
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BA77,
Mass Consciousness: Perturbed Randomness Before First Plane Struck on 911 – July 29 2012 Excerpt: The machine apparently sensed the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre four hours before they happened – but in the fevered mood of conspiracy theories of the time, the claims were swiftly knocked back by sceptics. But it also appeared to forewarn of the Asian tsunami just before the deep sea earthquake that precipitated the epic tragedy.,, Now, even the doubters are acknowledging that here is a small box with apparently inexplicable powers. ‘It’s Earth-shattering stuff,’ says Dr Roger Nelson, emeritus researcher at Princeton University in the United States, who is heading the research project behind the ‘black box’ phenomenon. http://www.network54.com/Forum.....uck+on+911
8O That link isn't working for me---do you have an alternate source? Edit: Nevermind, I was able to get to it.daveS_{April 8, 2015
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MF I found your explanation confusing.
Evolution (and other things) cause us to want to be altruistic because in the long run that increases our biological fitness.
I would simplify that to "Evolution causes us to be altruistic". Adding "want to" adds another element that is not explained. If altruism increases fitness, then evolution would make us be altruistic, and not merely "want to be altruistic". Creating the desire, which could be unfulfilled, is an unnecessary problem. It points to free-will. We "want to be altruistic" but we're not. Why would evolution provide that option? It's the same with food. Evolution supposedly caused earthworms to eat organic material. They don't "want to" eat that, they just do. This has to be traced back chemically. Supposedly, chemical compounds form into organisms we call earthworms, and those chemicals need organic matter for some unexplained reason. If these chemicals don't get food, they die. So, evolution had to create "hunger". Apparently, there were organisms that didn't have hunger pains, and they died because they didn't know they had to eat, or something like that. But as far as we can tell, chemicals aren't hungry. They don't need to eat anything. So, evolution does not explain why chemical compounds we call "life" have to eat anything at all. But then to add on to it, that evolution cause chemicals to "want to" eat, is more of a problem. Beyond, that we have the evolutionary origin of "liking" things. Again, it doesn't appear that bacteria like or dislike anything. They just do what evolution supposedly cause them to do. In the same way, evolution causes altruism. As the author of the OP explained, it's a self-seeking property of all organisms. "I love you because evolution caused me to, and you have some benefit for me". "You are my friend because you are a principled cooperator in the evolutionary process, and that is an overall benefit to me." It's a selfish ideology, as I see it. It's very destructive of human life and culture. I consider it anti-human -- an enemy to human life. The "it" I refer to is the ideology, and not any particular individuals who defend it or claim to uphold it.Silver Asiatic_{April 8, 2015
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