Let’s open minds, textbooks to intelligent design theories

_{David L. Hagen

December 20, 2007

Darwinism, Education, Intelligent Design}

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A thoughtful article by a perceptive engineer. A good example of priming the Origins Debate pump.

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Let’s open minds, textbooks to intelligent design theories

Intricacies of Earth life-forms, microscopes challenge evolution ideas

Gordon Rose, Letter, Indianapolis Star Dec. 15, 2007

“In our school systems today, science, with its dramatic and continual advancement in knowledge, has to be one of the most interesting as well as important subjects being taught.

Strangely enough, it is here that we are teaching unchallenged, the biggest lie in education — the theory of evolution. Not that the theory shouldn’t be taught — it should, simply because it is believed to be true by so many scientists. But the latest research with modern tools such as the electron microscope, have ruled out any possibility of life on our planet occurring by accident. Modern, competent scientists can show that the unbelievable complexity of design of the human cell, for example, demands the acknowledgement of a designer, or an intelligence far higher than anything we can imagine. . . .” See full article

Comments

Q 46. We know there ought to be a range of morphological plasticity within a species, even without any mutations. For example, you can get a chihuahua and a German shepherd from the original dog. But Gould wrote: "well represented species are usually stable throughout their temporal range, or alter so little and in such superficial ways (usually in size alone)...most of the time when the evidence is best, nothing much happens to most species." Now this is very strange. What is keeping this stability for so long? And why only a change in size?ari-freedom_{December 24, 2007
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Q: You say: "Maybe the problem is the scope of the argument that common descent isn’t observed. I still hold that both falling hammers and variation of descendents are “facts” as much as they are “inferences”. But, the more direct comment might be that variation amongst descendents is observed. Of course, not necessarily how it happens, but the variation is observed. This is similar to how the variation of the hammer’s position can be observed without knowing how gravity interacts with the hammer." I cannot agree with you. A falling hammer is a fact, because it is observed. The falling is observed. That has nothing to do with knowing why or how it happens (in more scientific terms, with having a mathematical model which can describe in abstract form what we are observing and make previsions about future observations of similar events). Common descent is a theory. You say that "variation amongst descendents is observed". That's not true. You observe fossils, or present homologies of form, or present homologies of DNA sequences, or anything else you want. You "infer" variation amongst descendents. To observe variation means to see it happening. In that case, it would be a fact. As we are talking of common descent, that is something which must have happened billions of years ago, we can only infer it, never observe it. So, common descent could be a fact, only if we had observed directly the whole process, starting with the first living being. That, obviously, would tell us nothing of the cause of common descent: facts, after all, don't explain anything. We would have anyway to infer the causes of common descent, even if it were a fact. But it is not. It is a theory. Good or bad, it is a theory. I don't know why you and other people are so obstinate in not admitting that. There is nothing wrong in being a theory. ID is a theory, and I am perfectly happy with that. The only "negative" side of being a theory is that a theory can be discussed and criticized. That's good. That's a privilege. So, I think we should try to agree on the definition of scientific facts, otherwise no constructive discussion can go on. It is not so difficult, after all: a fossil is a fact, all the interpretations about it are inferences. A DNA sequence is a fact, all interpretations are inferences. The description of a body morphology is a fact. Any similarity between bodies is a fact, provided that we just give an objective description of the similarity, which can be shared with anybody else. Any interpretation of the meaning of a similarity, or of a DNA homology, or of anything else, is an inference. An inference is an inductive process which postulates things that we have not observed. Inferences become theories if they are structured, and try to explain a vast body of observations. Theories can receive support from new observations of facts which are in accord with their previsions, or they can be falsified by the observation of facts which are incompatible with them. Facts don't receive support from anything (they don't need that), and cannot be falsified. The only problem, with facts, is if they have been observed correctly or if there is some error in the observation. Please, notice that this kind of error is completely different from the error in a theory. A theory is wrong for one of two motives: if it is logically inconsistent, or if it is empirically falsified. Problems in theories are not about the observation, but about the same nature of the theory: is it logically consistent? does it explain known facts? Darwinian evolution, indeed, is vastly successful in its complete failure on both levels.gpuccio_{December 24, 2007
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BarryA wrote above "We can be more sure that hammers drop than common descent. It is a simple, practically self-evident, statement." On this we agree. For probabilistic reasons - i.e. "more sure". Maybe the problem is the scope of the argument that common descent isn't observed. I still hold that both falling hammers and variation of descendents are "facts" as much as they are "inferences". But, the more direct comment might be that variation amongst descendents is observed. Of course, not necessarily how it happens, but the variation is observed. This is similar to how the variation of the hammer's position can be observed without knowing how gravity interacts with the hammer. Just as we assume as fact (i.e. infer to be consistently occur) that hammers will fall, we can similarly assume as fact (i.e. infer to occasionally occur) that the descendents will vary from the antecendents, even if only slightly. This is not an argument for or against front-loading. It is only that we can observe that variation of descendents can be observed, and not simply infer it from no observation.Q_{December 24, 2007
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Q (#45): I can understand, and partly share, your arguments about the subjectivity of any experience, but I am afraid that you are really being pedantic, at least in this context, which is not that of pure phylosophy, but rathet of science methodology. Indeed, what is important to the practical aspects of science is the distinction between facts and theories, and that distinction is exactly the one I have given. Fact are observable events. Obviously, the observation must be objectively shared, otherwise there is no science, but only subjective experience. And there may be errors in the observation of events, but that can usually be fixed in time. Let's go back to our hammer. From the point of science, we are not interested in speculations about the real nature of the event at the level where we are just colecting data: the important thing is that the dropping of the hammer be objectively observable by us (and for us, I mean any normal human observer) in a way whose "description" (not interpretation) may be shared. In that case, we have observed a fact. I am not saying that facts are the substance of reality: they are, anyway, objective observations of events. It is true that human observation includes a lot of automatic inferences: perception is indeed a reconstruction of reality, rather than a passive interaction. But those processe3s are shared between the observers, and are not important at the level of observation of facts for scientific purposes. All science starts with our shared observations of events. In a second moment, our inferences about those shared observations build theories about reality which include also new perspectives about how we perceive and reconstruct reality, up to the interesting and counter intuitive consequences of quantum mechanics. Therefore, I think there is no reason for being pedantic in this context. The important thing is to be able to distinguish between facts and theories "at the scientific level", not to make purely philosophical speculations which have no relevance for the scientific problem we are debating. Physics, biologists, engineers, don't usually challenge human observations: they just accept facts, provided that they are well documented, and build theories on them. That is science. But scientists must be well aware of the real, practical difference between facts and theories in science. Facts must be accepted, unless it may be proven that their observation was faulty. Theories must never be accepted dogmatically: they are inferences, and they can be challenged by other inferences. Facts are real, but they, in themselves, con't explain anything. Theories explain, but they do not necessarily correspond to reality, and can always be discussed and challenged, even if they are god theories, especially if they are good theories. The problem we are debating here is that darwinists seem not to understand these fundamentals of scientific epistemology: they affirm that evolution, common descent, natural selection, genetic drift, and so on are "facts", while they are al theories, good or bad it doesn't matter. They "can" be3 discussed. They "can" be challenged. There is nothing unscientific in challenging, or doubting, or critically discussion darwinian evolution, or even common descent or natural selection. On the contrary, that is the essence of science. Darwinian censorship is trying to equate doubting the theory of darwinian evolution with denying facts. That is a supreme lie. They are caling us unscientific, denialists, IDiots, stupid, criminal, and everything else you can imagine. That is a supreme lie. Either we are right or wrong, we are doing science, in the best of the senses. They are doing censorship, intelectual persecution, dogmatism. If we want a real progress, the restoration of helthy scientific debate about the genesis of biological information "must" take place.gpuccio_{December 24, 2007
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magnan 47 natural selection is not axiomatically a dominant force once we know genetic drift occurs. It is far more reasonable to say that most genetic change is the result of genetic drift than natural selection. In order for natural selection to work, the beneficial mutant (and we only know it's beneficial after the fact) must survive random death and take over the population. magnan 50 common descent follows from the natural mechanism that darwin proposed. Take out the natural mechanism and all you have are a bunch of "before and after" pictures. Can it still be true after ID is inferred? Perhaps but remember that we already observe intelligent design and special creation by engineers all the time. We see nested hierarchies all the time as a result of common design. I'm not "opposed" to the idea of common descent but I'm not compelled by it either. You don't have to be compelled that life was *not* the result of common descent either. We just have to be open minded when it comes to explaining unobserved history.ari-freedom_{December 24, 2007
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gpuccio #44): "So, one possible model of design implementation could be: directed and intensive random variation, restricted to the sites of interest, followed by modeling, through intelligent selection, of the random results, according to a known model or project. At both levels, a careful and very intelligent process of engineering is absolutely necessary." A very interesting conjecture, one that I had not considered before. The theorized natural NDE microevolutionary process says (grossly simplified) that in any given generation there would be multiple different small genetic changes appearing at random in different individuals in the population. Most of these are neutral or deleterious to the individual, but a few are selectively advantageous and may make it more likely that the individual reproduces and passes on this genetic change to the next generation. In any generation many such variant alleles are selectively spreading, dying out or interfereing with each other over the population. In a large free breeding population (say 100 million), with usual mutation rates over a few generations every possible single point mutation will occur in at least one individual somewhere in the population. You seem to be suggesting that the pattern of these random mutations (and other random genetic changes) could be directed toward an end so that their range is somewhat restricted (no longer totally random, but like "pink noise"), and additionally that the individuals with the desired random mutations be singled out to survive regardless of random luck factors in the wild. This would force them to be spread through the population regardless of selective fitness. This seems plausible logically, but the quasi-random source of genetic variation still doesn't really deal with the problem of irreducibly complex biological systems, or the general problem of complex interdependency. It also doesn't seem to be the most parsimonious scenario. A better scenario to me would be the purposeful direct genetic modification of a few selected individuals followed by their release in the wild. The designed modifications would improve reproductive fitness enough for the purely natural selection we have been discussing to have a good chance of fixing the new genotype in the population.magnan_{December 24, 2007
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Q writes: Anytime we make an observation, we assume that signals are transmitted - light is reflected, sound it generated, we can touch and feel things. But, can anyone prove those observations to be true descriptions of reality? Philosophy shows that you may be fully hallucinating and nothing actually occurred - ever. One’s interpretation of those events are “facts” is still based upon some inference from past experience. It’s all a matter of probability and ease of explanation. My point has been that separating “facts” from inference is a fruitless task, since no such distinction is possible.” I will let Johnson (as reported by Boswell) refute your comment: “After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it – ‘I refute it thus.’” When I wrote my original comment I knew with virtual certainty that someone would respond with a variation of hyper-skepticism about falling hammers or play semantic games with the example. You did both. If Johnson lived today he would say, “Give me a break.” For all your philosophizing my point stands unrefuted to anyone who considers it reasonably. We observe hammers drop. We infer common descent. We can be more sure that hammers drop than common descent. It is a simple, practically self-evident, statement. I don’t know why you or anyone else would dispute it.BarryA_{December 24, 2007
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PaV, in post 48, you discuss an interesting aspect of variation, in that frequencies of genes may vary, but the existance of a gene may not ever disappear. I'm trying to understand that claim in the other direction, however. It kind of seems that your position requires a constant population size to sufficiently argue against the introduction of stable genotypes, or else it requires front loading. For example, if the populations aren't consistent, we can assume some amount of population growth or at least some amount of population fluctation. If the suppressed frequency of some trait - say the gray trait of the peppered moth - falls to some low number, like 1/N moths, and the population then falls to be below N moths, then there is a very good chance that the trait will disappear. However, assume we have a growing population instead of merely a fluctuating population. Then working backwards, we would see that population can also be below the frequency of the trait. That is, if the trait is 1/N of the animals have the genotype, we could work backward to where there were much fewer than N of the animals. That would indicate that it would be very unlikely that any animals had the trait. Essentially, animals come in whole units, so we can't ever expect to have 1/100th of an animal with a trait. Of course, if front loading occurs, then all members of the population will have the trait from the origin of the population, so the growth rate doesn't matter. Would you agree that your position effectively requires front loading, since it rejects the evolution of new traits? Or, am I missing some alternative?Q_{December 24, 2007
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ari-freedom (#31), convergences are certainly intriguing, and they seem to imply some sort of common design. However, a far vaster body of evidence clearly points to common descent. One thought is that the truth could be that both models have some validity. An outside intelligence intervening in evolution could well be also reusing some designs. Or convergences could result from some aspect of genetic front loading. Finally, there seem to be a lot more alternative explanations for convergences than for all the evidences from comparative physiology, genetics and the fossil record. "It is difficult to imagine how an ape can be capable of giving birth and raising something that is not an ape." A silly example and begs too many questions to be useful. You seem to be tending toward special creation as a model. " I thought we all learned from the vestigial organs/junk dna line of argument." Darwinists predicted a lot of truly vestigial organs and a lot of junk DNA as the natural result of RV + NS. The reality is turning out very differently, somewhat discrediting RV + NS as the operative mechanism. This does not discredit common descent, since common descent is also entailed in the other possible models of evolution, which involve ID. " there are no clear cut phylogenies in the large scale. Life is mosaical and "bushy"" It does seem to be turning out that way. The evidence from comparative genetics is becoming more ambiguous. However, this and the evidence clearly pointing to common descent in comparative physiology and the fossil record still need to be accommodated by any valid model. Special creation is not a valid model as far as I'm concerned though it is not logically impossible.magnan_{December 24, 2007
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In the last post, the &#916 and &#8801 are HTML codes that work perfectly in the "preview", and then don't get compiled when I post. The first code is for "delta" in Greek, or change, and the second one is for the "defined as" symbol. So that sentence should read: 'The change in gene frequency is defined as evolution.' (Comically, as I read over the preview, the "delta" and the "defined as" are perfectly in place. Maybe someone can fix it so that we can use HTML code. It makes it infinitely easier to put in mathematical formulae.)PaV_{December 24, 2007
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Two items of interest have been discussed here: natural selection and common descent. Most IDers accept both of these notions. Behe for sure, and Dembski as well, although with some reservations about common descent. Here's my trouble with both: 1.) Natural selection. The Hardy-Weinberg Law is fundamental to population genetics. Basically it says that the number of alleles present in a large, randomly inter-breeding population will remain the same from one generation to the next. Now, due to stochastic effects, the phenotypes (dominant/recessive) will vary, but the total number of alleles won't change. So, to have "evolution" you have to have some kind of change in the alleles themselves or else the null position is one of equilibrium over time (stasis---which is, of course, what we primarily see). So Darwinists are happy to say that a change in "gene frequencies" IS evolution; that is, &#916 gene frequency&#8801 evolution. This borders on the meaningless. Someone mentioned earlier the New Scientist article about the Peppered Moth. I looked at the numbers. Accepting the numbers, the melanic (dark) frequency does indeed go down from generation to generation under slight selective predation, reaching a very low value. But, it isn't (theoretically) eliminated. Obviously the fewer melanics that exist, the harder it is to completely eliminated them. That can only happen by chance, and chance needs a long time. Likewise, when the soot was in the air, I'm sure the gene frequency of the typical moth color was quite low, but not eliminated. If we assume it was eliminated, then how did this "allele" come back to its present predominance? (If you assume the position that the "allele" has re-entered the population, then please tell us the mechanism by which this "allele" was reconstituted.) Again, population genetics has not demonstrated that in a theoretical way, these genes (either the melanic or typical) are eliminated. With the idea that these "genes" are not, theoretically "eliminated", and bearing in mind that a change in gene frequency is sufficient for Darwinists to proclaim that "evolution" has occurred, I suggest you read the article on PhysOrg.com about the "pygmies", and how they "evolved". Now I'm ready to say that I'm different, and the vast majority of the world, is different from "pygmies", but have they "evolved"? Has "natural selection" brought about this "evolution"? It seems to me that to talk about "pygmies" having "evolved" (presumably from the rest of us normal humans), then you might as well say Orientals have "evolved", Africans have "evolved", etc. To me this is meaningless talk and demonstrates how totally shallow the notion of natural selection is. Here's what the noted population geneticist, William B. Provine, once a totally comitted neo-Darwinist, now says about natural selection: "Natural selection as a natural force belongs in the insubstantial category already populated by the Becker/Stahl phlogiston or Newton's 'ether'." 2.) Common Descent: It might be "plausible" to pretend that genetic changes in DNA can bring about new "species" (though it has never been demonstrated); indeed, we have Mendelian Laws of inheritance (which, in the day of genomic surveys we're living in are becoming obsolete) that can give some sense of how genetic change may be passed on from one generation to the next. But my question is this: how does a reptilian egg become a bird egg, or a mammalian egg? So, while it's true that the genetic code and cellular components are "common" to a vast array of taxonomic groupings, just how, may I ask, does a reptile egg become a bird egg? And, if you come up with an explanation for that, then, would it still be possible to talk about "common descent" under your proposed scenario? You know, Einstein stuck to "facts"; and he let the "facts" guide his thinking. The "fact" is that there is no transitional "egg" that I know of between that of reptiles and birds. Conjectures can't make up for an absence of "facts".PaV_{December 24, 2007
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ari-freedom (#30): "There is a big difference between saying that natural selection “happens” in a few selected cases vs the idea that natural selection is a dominant force in nature." "Natural selection" by itself is axiomatic and axiomatically a dominant force. Organisms survive to reproduce or not. An organism that survives to reproduce spreads its genetic complement into the population. It must have survived to reproduce for some combination of reasons. One of these possible reasons is because it was modified by some genetic change. Or it may have survived just through dumb luck. The possible active causal factors leading to reproduction or death before reproduction include the physical environment, other organisms, and internal factors within the animal. So "natural selection" is a basic principle inherent in life. It must happen almost as a tautology - what survives is what survives, for whatever reason. The claim that is challenged by ID is that natural selection of random genetic variations is responsible for all of evolution. You point out a number of the interesting limitations of selection in the natural world. Certainly I am aware of these. They only establish and reinforce my (and most ID advocate's) position that natural selection of random genetic variations as explicated in the population genetics of the "modern synthetic theory" is capable of only trivial change. The insertion of intelligence into the process must logically be mostly in the source and timing of genetic variation rather than in the selection process, since selection, no matter how intelligent, of modified forms is inherently limited to the modifications (genetic changes) available.magnan_{December 24, 2007
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ari-freedom in 42 mentions "A horseshoe crab from 500 million years ago looks just like a horseshoe crab today. That’s what I mean by stasis." Oh, thanks for explaining what you mean by stasis. Please forgive what sounds like a smart-ass comment, but a horshow crab of 500 million years ago would look like a fossil. Do we know that all descendents of the horseshow crab still look exactly like that parent crab? Note that I'm not talking about transitional forms into some wildly new form. I'm asking you about any variation at all, even if only subtle.Q_{December 24, 2007
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gpuccio just said "Facts are observed events, no conclusion is made about them." At the risk of sounding pedantic, I'll comment that at the basest sense, that claim is not supportable. Or at least, it is not provable as true. Anytime we make an observation, we assume that signals are transmitted - light is reflected, sound it generated, we can touch and feel things. But, can anyone prove those observactions to be true descriptions of reality? Philosophy shows that you may be fully hallucinating and nothing actually occured - ever. One's interpretation of those events are "facts" is still based upon some inference from past experience. It's all a matter of probability and ease of explanation. My point has been that separating "facts" from inference is a fruitless task, since no such distinction is possible. I understand, however, your separation of data from information. Data correlates for facts, information correlates to inference. But, even that data has some subjectivity associated with it - when, how, and where it was collected - and has a finite, if not quantum, probability of error that we can never correct for. Which brings up, can you ever prove that all the material in the hammer didn't change quantum states and simply perform a quantum jump to the floor? If it did, it wouldn't have fallen, being that it wouldn't ever exist between the hand and the floor. Physically its possible, just really, really unlikely. Inference of our past experience allows us to "know" that it didn't happen, even though there is a finite possibility that it did.Q_{December 24, 2007
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Guys, why is there such a confusion about facts and inferences/theories? I thought it was simple. Again, the dropping of a hammer is a fact, the statement that any hammer, in any situation, will drop is a (wrong) inference. A collection of observations of various bodies which drop on earth is collection of facts, Newton's theory of gravitation is an inference, a very good one, I would say. There must not, and there cannot be confusion between the two categories. Facts are observed events, no conclusion is made about them. A fact, or a collection of facts, does not explain anything. Only theories "explain". Theories are never observed, and they always explain (or rather try to do that). Theories are judgements, they are logical and mathematical structures. Facts are mere observations of events. No confusion is possible, in my opinion, except (as is the case for darwinists) when you "need" confusion. Darwinists need the confusion because, if they allowed that their theory is a theory, they should naturally accept confrontation with other theories, like ID. Defining it a fact, in their contorted reasoning, gives it a status of absolute truth, and allows them to arrogantly dismiss any scientific debate about their "theory which has become a fact". As I said before, that is just epistemological dementia, a real shame for logical and scientific reasoning. By the way, almost two days ago I made a post here which has never surfaced. I attach it again here. magnan: it's beautiful to see somebody trying to intelligently reflect on the problem of the modalities od design implementation. Although the inference of design does not require knowledge of the modalities, I think that the problem of modalities comes next. I agree with your summary of the logical possibilities, although I would not a priori exclude what you call "periodic total redesign from scratch". In general, I agree with you that option 3 (periodic direct redesign from outside the “system” followed by gradual change from RV + NS) seems at present the best one. I was once mor in favour of option 2 (gradualistic and continuous design implementation), bur I find that most evidence from the fossil record, especially the cambrian explosion, stays against that. Examining more in detail the strategies which could have been used to implement design, either in a gradualistic or continuous way, I think we should concentrate on two possibilities: intelligent directed variation and/or intelligent directed selection. The only model we can look at in nature ia the very intelligent model of creation of immunological specificity (both antibodies and T cell receptors). For antibodies, in particular, we have a very interesting scenario: 1) Creation of a basic repertoir through bery intelligently engineered recombination of a few genes, in order to create a basic variety of receptors which can grssly cover most possibilities of antigens. That's interesting, because in this case the search space is very big (but not extremely big, after all haptens are small molecules), and a carefully engineered system of recombination seems to utilize directed random variation to attain a basic antibody repertoir with large sensibility, but low specificity. The interesting thing is that in this system, the variation is random and totally unaware of the specific target, although happening in a very carefully engineered context, which is probably very aware of the general "nature" of the target (natural haptens). 2) Creation and selection of highly specific antibodies "after" a primary immune response (so called "antibody maturation"). This is even more interesting, because again a mechanism of directed random variation is used, but this time it is applied to a much more restricted search space (the antibodies which have already responded to a specific antigen), and the results are very intelligently selected according to the specific affinity for the original antigen. So, in this case, the information about the specific target is already available, probably at the level of antigen presenting cells, and we are xactly in the situation of a random search with informed selection: something like the "methink it's like a weasel example", where the result to be obtained is known in advance (in reality, here it is the target which is known, while the antibody has to be modeled on the target). So, one possible model of design implementation could be: directed and intensive random variation, restricted to the sites of interest, followed by modeling, through intelligent selection, of the random results, according to a known model or project. At both levels, a careful and very intelligent process of engineering is absolutely necessary.gpuccio_{December 24, 2007
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Natural selection is operating all the time around us. It just cannot produce anything that is not in the original gene pool of the species. Dembski and Wells in the Design of Life have a great example of the effects of natural selection with the English Sparrow which was brought to the Americas and originally didn't thrive till variations popped up and now it thrives with these new variations that differ by region. No one gets anywhere arguing that natural selection does not take place. It just does not accomplish much because it is limited by the gene pool of the species. The English Sparrow is interesting but essentially shows the limitations of it. They are still English Sparrows.jerry_{December 24, 2007
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that's under the darwinist assumption that there must have been many many transitional forms that went extinct. I don't go for this darwinist stuff but some "change over time" makes sense. The problem is, species don't look like they changed much at all for hundreds of millions of years. A horseshoe crab from 500 million years ago looks just like a horseshoe crab today. That's what I mean by stasis.ari-freedom_{December 24, 2007
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Ari-freedom mentioned in 40, "The biggest problem I have is the stasis for million years with a changing environment." I don't mean to be asserting evidence that conflicts with your analysis, but common claims indicate that 95% to 99% of all species are now extinct. That doesn't lend much support for millions of years of stasis. It would indicate, at the minimum, that changes that result from genetic drift, from mutations, or from front loading, have a reasonable opportunity to thrive in a newly opened niche.Q_{December 23, 2007
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I don't have a "problem" with micro-evolution as a result of natural selection. I just don't see that much evidence for it. You may think being faster helps against the bear but someone who is very fast is not going to be very strong or have much endurance to deal with other problems. Fitness is multi-dimensional. The biggest problem I have is the stasis for million years with a changing environment. But this doesn't just affect micro-evolution as a result of natural selection but one would certainly expect to see change simply due to genetic drift. So what is going on here?ari-freedom_{December 23, 2007
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ari-freedom asks "Why should I accept natural selection at all?" Because if you and I were walking in the forest, and a bear started chasing us, how fast would you need to run? Faster than me. OK, that's not really a scientific reason. But it seemed to fit :-) But, I thought that natural selection of mutations which results in micro-evolution wasn't inconsistent with ID.Q_{December 23, 2007
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Q "That may be true. But, once the door is open to accept that natural selection happens at all, then the problem becomes identifying where it can’t occur. The trivial assertion that it can’t occur somewhere is no longer valid. Instead, that assertion must be supported with some evidetiary and logical means." - Why should I accept natural selection at all? You have to do more than bring a few selected examples that could be the result of an artifact. It is your burden to show that this is a real effect. This is a big problem especially once you throw in genetic drift and sexual selection and all kinds of other theoretical mechanisms into the bag. Then you have to be able to measure it. If it exists but it is very very weak then it is as if it didn't exist at all. "Also, when you say that “It is difficult to imagine how an ape can be capable of giving birth and raising something that is not an ape”, you basically did show the means to imagine just that, a moment later. For, when you suggest that “Life is mosaical and ‘bushy’”, you are showing that a baby ape with some small mutation is both “not an ape” while being “still an ape”. A bushy phylogeny does not allow for a clear enough demarcation to show that your suggested baby is or is not still an ape." - Life is discontinuous and mosaical with many convergences and not the gradual ladder that darwin predicted. That's not evidence for phylogeny. My other problem is logistics. A mother's immune system will kill off anything foreign. An animal with a small pelvis will not be able to give birth to a baby with a big head. In other words, in order for man to come from an ape, that ape had better be prepared for it beforehand.ari-freedom_{December 23, 2007
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I see your point, DaveScot, but it seems to depend upon a circular agument - your suggestion is that drop implies fall, so something will automatically fall if dropped. That would not at all be an argument describing observations, but instead would be a semantic argument based upon specific definitions. I doubt that BarryA is trying to make claims about "facts" based upon such a circular argument. If he meant to use "drop" as a general claim about hammers and gravity, as it "to let fall" (http://www.m-w.com/dictionary), then his claim is incomplete, because letting something fall doesn't mean that it will fall. One can release your grip on the hammer inside the ISS, just as one can on earth. Besides, I suspect that the greater argument is about claims made from observation, and whether those are "facts" or "inferences", including the observation that hammers typically fall when a grip on them is released. A subtle aspect of my point is that as we learn more about the world, our experiences are no longer complete. Related to this, we must expand our understandings about "facts" as we learn more about the real world.Q_{December 23, 2007
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Q You can't drop a hammer in zero gravity. You can throw it, you can let go of it, but you can't drop it. There has to be a direction that is "down" to drop something. So technically Barry is still correct.DaveScot_{December 23, 2007
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oops - my mistake. I should have typed the quote above as "Clearly not", instead of "of course not." sorry.Q_{December 23, 2007
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BarryA commented "I’m not sure what your point is Q." My point is that your claim about "facts" of the hammer based upon your observations in post 18 (you did not qualify on earth) is more a claim about an inference than a "fact". You observe that hammers fall, and infer that hammers always fall when dropped. But they don't, as I pointed out. I'm suggesting that "facts" as described in this thread are no more than interpretations about observations. They are, by their nature, simply inferences. "Facts" about falling hammers are fundamentally similar to "facts" about similarities amongst fossils and genes. When you ask "Is a fact we infer of the same epistimic status as a fact we infer but have not actualy observed?", you conclude "of course not." But, the facts you infer are not facts - they are inferences. Also in your reply, you mention that probability is an essential element. You mention "Because when we observe a fact directly it is highly unlikely that other data will be found that will change our conclusion about the fact." More accurately, I suggest, the claim should be "Because when we observe an event directly...", and then build the argument around the frequency that similar events versus exceptions. Your example of the hammer has clear exceptions, for instance. All of this affects your conclusion "We can never be as certain that common descent is a fact as we are that hammers drop to the ground is a fact." We can be sure that not all hammers will necessarily drop to the ground as a fact, so we gain no insight about the certainty of common descent from the description of "facts".Q_{December 23, 2007
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Q writes: "Maybe for you, but not for everybody. Hammers dropped in the International Space Station do not drop. That has been witnessed. Hammers dropped on the moon drop, but differently than you would have observed - being that they drop as slow as a feather." I'm not sure what your point is Q. Are you denying that hammers drop on earth, which, of course, was the context of my comment? If not, what is the point of your comment?BarryA_{December 23, 2007
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Ari, you said "There is a big difference between saying that natural selection “happens” in a few selected cases vs the idea that natural selection is a dominant force in nature." That may be true. But, once the door is open to accept that natural selection happens at all, then the problem becomes identifying where it can't occur. The trivial assertion that it can't occur somewhere is no longer valid. Instead, that assertion must be supported with some evidetiary and logical means. Also, when you say that "It is difficult to imagine how an ape can be capable of giving birth and raising something that is not an ape", you basically did show the means to imagine just that, a moment later. For, when you suggest that "Life is mosaical and 'bushy'", you are showing that a baby ape with some small mutation is both "not an ape" while being "still an ape". A bushy phylogeny does not allow for a clear enough demarcation to show that your suggested baby is or is not still an ape.Q_{December 23, 2007
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magnan 29 just the top of my head: * you are forgetting the many cases of convergences, even on the molecular level. This implies common design, not common descent. * It is difficult to imagine how an ape can be capable of giving birth and raising something that is not an ape. * I thought we all learned from the vestigial organs/junk dna line of argument. * there are no clear cut phylogenies in the large scale. Life is mosaical and "bushy"ari-freedom_{December 23, 2007
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There is a big difference between saying that natural selection "happens" in a few selected cases vs the idea that natural selection is a dominant force in nature. You can't use antibiotic/pesticide resistance as an example of natural selection unless you say that dog breeding and all other artificial selection are really "natural" selection. * There is evidence that animals and plants control their population and don't overexploit resources, unlike man. * Field studies find natural selection hard to detect http://www.discovery.org/a/2531 * Spetner's chapter 7 is full of examples showing that the examples of microevolution may very well be the result of change on an individual level triggered by an environmental cue. * neutralists have pointed out that most observed genetic change is the result of random genetic drift * There are many examples that compelled Darwin to come up with a theory of sexual selection that is supposedly so powerful that it trumps natural selection. This is where things can get really wacky. * paleontologists tell us that species are in stasis over 90-99% of the time. We see very little microevolution except for change in size.ari-freedom_{December 23, 2007
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ari-freedom (#25): "...while ID is certainly compatible with the idea of common descent, once you infer ID, the data used to infer common descent may just be the result of something else." Sure, this is a logical possibility, but science of necessity often resorts to abductive reasoning and the choice of the best model given all the data. I would contend that by far the best model is one that includes some form of common descent. All the leading ID theorists that I know of adhere to this view. If it weren't for all the evidence of relatedness due to comparative physiology and the fossil record, the examples of two forms sharing a genetic accident seem to be the most compelling clues. Behe brings up the case where both humans and chimps share the same "broken" hemoglobin gene (pseudogene). The defects are identical. This pseudogene is a genetic accident that is shared by both lineages. The implications are obvious. Of course, you are free to postulate that both species were created separately with the identical pseudogenes. It isn't logically impossible, but science should prefer the best explanation based on the actual evidence. "And even if you believe that everything was the result of natural causes, you can’t make a real case for common descent unless you had a theory of evolution that can make testable predictions." Not so. We can infer design without knowing the nature of the designer, as has been discussed many times here. So we can infer common descent without having detailed knowledge of the overall mechanism of common descent, how it is produced by the process. Here "common descent" is defined in the broad sense of some process of evolution (like my models 1-5 in #24 above) in which each successive major or minor stage is based on the previous. This is opposed to some model in which each apparent step is not really an incremental step but a separate creation from scratch.magnan_{December 23, 2007
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