Naturalism is a priori evolutionary materialism, so it both begs the question and self-refutes

_{kairosfocus

October 19, 2010

Academic Freedom, Atheism, Darwinism, Design inference, Education, Evolution, Intelligent Design, Multiverse, Philosophy, Science}

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The thesis expressed in the title of this “opening bat” post is plainly controversial, and doubtless will be hotly contested and/or pointedly ignored. However, when all is said and done, it will be quite evident that it has the merit that it just happens to be both true and well-warranted.

So, let us begin.

Noted Harvard evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin inadvertently lets the cat out of the bag in his well-known January 1997 New York Review of Books article, “Billions and Billions of Demons”:

. . . to put a correct view of the universe into people’s heads we must first get an incorrect view out . . . the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth . . . .

It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that

we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. [Emphases added.]

No wonder, a few months later, noted Intelligent Design thinker Philip Johnson aptly rebutted, in First Things:

For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes thereafter. [Emphasis original] We might more accurately term them “materialists employing science.” And if materialism is true, then some materialistic theory of evolution has to be true simply as a matter of logical deduction, regardless of the evidence. That theory will necessarily be at least roughly like neo-Darwinism, in that it will have to involve some combination of random changes and law-like processes capable of producing complicated organisms that (in Dawkins’ words) “give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”

. . . . The debate about creation and evolution is not deadlocked . . . Biblical literalism is not the issue. The issue is whether materialism and rationality are the same thing. Darwinism is based on an a priori commitment to materialism, not on a philosophically neutral assessment of the evidence. Separate the philosophy from the science, and the proud tower collapses. [Emphasis added.] [The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism, First Things, 77 (Nov. 1997), pp. 22 – 25.]

The matter is actually as simple as that.

In the end, that’s why there is so much heat and smoke rather than light in the controversy over Evolution, Creation and Design. For, much is at stake institutionally, educationally and culturally, and yet it turns on something so simple and obviously fallacious as aggressive materialist ideology-driven begging of worldview questions presented under the false colours of science.

Now, them’s fighting words, so let us justify them by citing what the US National Academy of Science wrote in the 2008 edition of their long-running pamphlet, Science, Evolution and Creationism:

In science, explanations must be based on naturally occurring phenomena. Natural causes are, in principle, reproducible and therefore can be checked independently by others. If explanations are based on purported forces that are outside of nature, scientists have no way of either confirming or disproving those explanations. Any scientific explanation has to be testable — there must be possible observational consequences that could support the idea but also ones that could refute it. Unless a proposed explanation is framed in a way that some observational evidence could potentially count against it, that explanation cannot be subjected to scientific testing. [Science, Evolution and Creationism, 2008, p. 10 Emphases added.]

Observe that ever so subtly loaded imposition: science “must” explain by natural causes. That is, by matter, energy, space, time, their spontaneous interactions on chance and mechanical necessity, thence what plausibly derives from that on the evolutionary materialist narrative, including life and intelligence.

Immediately, we should ask: just what is “natural”? And, right after that: why is it contrasted to “supernatural” (instead of say, “artificial”)? [More . . . ]

Comments

JAD, It is not too of a stretch then to argue, as I do, that the word naturalism in the term metaphysical naturalism is being used in an equivocal non-metaphysical way. I do not disagree that one can understand a particular meaning of the word 'naturalism' that strips it of metaphysical connotation. But you can't be saying that a word which has an equivocal meaning can not confuse, or cannot be employed with the intention to confuse. That a Christian came up with the term does not speak to my objection - people are entirely capable of making moves or coming up with ideas that, while well-intended, take on a life of their own. Dumb moves are possible. I'll use a loaded example: "Teabaggers". It has an innocent, equivocal meaning when used to describe Tea Party supporters. Maybe it even originated with some kindly old lady, herself a Tea Party member, who thought the name was cute - you have the Tea Party, and the members of the party are the teabaggers. Do you think Tea Party members shouldn't object to being called teabaggers, on the grounds that it has an innocent equivocal meaning? If you think Tea Party members should be suspicious of people calling them teabaggers - that maybe their intention is not that of the kindly old lady - then hopefully you'll see some of my point here. Words and meanings are important, and can be employed deceptively. In fact, I think it's very common and something we should be alert to. And MN, as most people would understand it, as many people would choose to implicitly present it, is wrong. A misnomer. The possibility of an innocent reading helps little.nullasalus_{October 21, 2010
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nullasalus: “Ask yourself this: Do you think many naturalists would object to the limits of science being described as ‘methodological theism’, even if it was qualified that it does not entail metaphysical theism, and how all it meant was that the universe is rational and thus can be studied and explored and understood as if it were a comprehensible artifact? The limits would be the same, the ‘lack of metaphysical commitment’ would be the same. But I’d bet you quite a number of them would put up one hell of a fight, because of the label alone.” I would like to make a couple of minor points. First I want to point out to you that you used the word ‘naturalist’ above to refer to someone who holds philosophically to a naturalistic world view. But is that the way the word naturalist is always used? Look it up in the dictionary you’ll find it defined like this: 1 : one that advocates or practices naturalism 2 : a student of natural history; especially : a field biologist http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/naturalist In other words naturalist has an equivocal meaning. One has metaphysical overtones the other does not. It is not too of a stretch then to argue, as I do, that the word naturalism in the term metaphysical naturalism is being used in an equivocal non-metaphysical way. Clearly it was to De Vries who coined the term in the first place. I don’ t think an evangelical Christian philosopher at Wheaton College was trying to advance metaphysical naturalism, overtly or covertly. You then brought up ‘methodological theism.’ Curiously, Nancy Murphy, another evangelical philosopher, coined the term methodological atheism which she define as follows. "There is what we might call methodological atheism, which is by definition common to all natural science. This is simply the principle that scientific explanations are to be in terms of natural (not supernatural) entities and processes. ... (Nancey Murphy, 1993) http://www.asa3.org/ASA/education/origins/mn-lh.htm On the surface it appears that her definition is equivalent to what others mean by MN. However, I can’t think of an equivocal meaning of the word atheism. So in my mind Murphy is saying something completely different. That we have to metaphysically pretend to be atheists to do science. So I think that the connotative use of MA is totally different from MN. But maybe that is just me.john_a_designer_{October 21, 2010
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kairofocus: “I am pointing out that there is an agenda out there, backed up by clever and ruthless folks with a fair amount of money and access to mikes and presses that often will not even let the likes of a Behe publish a letter of correction.” Let me cut to the chase here. I don’t think it is tactically wise to get into debates over the definition of methodological naturalism. Do you really think that anyone, beside ID’ists who already agree with you, really cares? Do you really think you can persuade people on the other side with these kind of arguments? In my view the only thing that they care about is using the debate over MN as a diversionary tactic. Sorry to break the news to you, but you’ve been suckered into taking the bait. I think a better tactic, from our side, (and I am on your side) would be to point out who originally coined the term how it was originally being used. Then turn the tables. Point out that what they are actually trying to do is justify their particular metaphysical belief system using the findings of science and that they are really being disingenuous in the way they use the term MN. On the other hand, it is not illegitimate for them to have metaphysical beliefs based on their interpretation of scientific evidence, anymore than it is for you or me to have to beliefs based on our interpretation of the evidence. The debate then becomes as to whom, based on what we presently know scientifically, has the better explanation. As a matter of fact, I think Phil Johnson has some great critiques of materialism in his writings. And, I find myself largely in agreement with him there. But, on the other hand, I don’t accept ID as science. I think that is where, several decades ago, the ID movement (at least the Discovery Institute brand) led, or misled, by Johnson and others got itself off track, and now, unfortunately, due to it’s own doing, has gotten itself boxed in. My belief is that we should argue that methodologically that empirical science needs to be metaphysically minimalist. If an atheist, Hindu and Christian chemist run the very same experiment, are they going to get different results based on their different beliefs? The answer I think should be obvious. On the other hand, if they all think about the universe from a cosmological perspective I think most of us would agree that they would probably come to different beliefs based on a different understanding and interpretation of the evidence. Is that top down interpretation of the evidence science or philosophy? I would argue that it is the latter. I would add, however, that this is a particular place where we need to bring back and use the term "natural philosophy." Once again the debate is about what is the better philosophical/theological interpretation and explanation. I think that is where theists and ID’ists can win the debate, because theism and ID, from at least what I understand, are a better explanations. Of course, that is why I am on your side.john_a_designer_{October 21, 2010
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BA: You are a genuine treasure-trove of research and helpful, provocative links and excerpts. Sometimes, we are tempted to take it for granted, but such an exercise is actually very valuable. (Without librarians, where would we be?) And the linked is indeed quite a video, nigh on 42 minutes of substance. Food for thought. Back to my ongoing constitutional crisis . . . do pray. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 21, 2010
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kf, this Dr. Don Johnson video is relevant to your thread: Is Undirected Naturalism Sufficient? http://vimeo.com/11827337bornagain77_{October 21, 2010
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PS: Onlookers, observe UD Weak Argument Correctives, No's 17 and 18 : _____________________ >> 17] Methodological naturalism is the rule of science Methodological naturalism is simply a quite recently imposed “rule” that (a) defines science as a search for natural causes of observed phenomena AND (b) forbids the researcher to consider any other explanation, regardless of what the evidence may indicate. In keeping with that principle, it begs the question and roundly declares that (c) any research that finds evidence of design in nature is invalid and that (d) any methods employed toward that end are non-scientific. For instance, in a pamphlet published in 2008, the US National Academy of Sciences declared: In science, explanations must be based on naturally occurring phenomena. Natural causes are, in principle, reproducible and therefore can be checked independently by others. If explanations are based on purported forces that are outside of nature, scientists have no way of either confirming or disproving those explanations. [Science, Evolution and Creationism, p. 10. Emphases added.] The resort to loaded language should cue us that there is more than mere objective science going on here! A second clue is a basic fact: the very NAS scientists themselves provide instances of a different alternative to forces tracing to chance and/or blind mechanical necessity. For, they are intelligent, creative agents who act into the empirical world in ways that leave empirically detectable and testable traces. Moreover, the claim or assumption that all such intelligences “must” in the end trace to chance and/or necessity acting within a materialistic cosmos is a debatable philosophical view on the remote and unobserved past history of our cosmos. It is not at all an established scientific “fact” on the level of the direct, repeatable observations that have led us to the conclusion that Earth and the other planets orbit the Sun. In short, the NAS would have been better advised to study the contrast: natural vs artificial (or, intelligent) causes, than to issue loaded language over natural vs supernatural ones Notwithstanding, many Darwinist members of the guild of scholars have instituted or supported the question-begging rule of “methodological naturalism,” ever since the 1980’s. So, if an ID scientist finds and tries to explain functionally specified complex information in a DNA molecule in light of its only known cause: intelligence, supporters of methodological naturalism will throw the evidence out or insist that it be re-interpreted as the product of processes tracing to chance and/or necessity; regardless of how implausible or improbable the explanations may be. Further, if the ID scientist dares to challenge this politically correct rule, he will then be disfranchised from the scientific community and all his work will be discredited and dismissed. Obviously, this is grossly unfair censorship. Worse, it is massively destructive to the historic and proper role of science as an unfettered (but intellectually and ethically responsible) search for the truth about our world in light of the evidence of observation and experience. 18] Methodological naturalism is a centuries-old, traditional rule for science In an attempt to rationalize the recently imposed “rule” of methodological naturalism, some Darwinist academics have resorted to rewriting history. As the ‘revised” story goes, Newton and other greats of the founding era of Modern Science subscribed to the arbitrary standard of ruling out design in principle. Thus, one gathers, ID cannot be science because it violates the “traditional” and “well-established” criteria for science. However, as anyone familiar with the real history of science knows – e.g. cf. Newton’s General Scholium to his great scientific work, Principia — this proposition is at best a gross and irresponsible error, or even an outright deception. For, most scientists of the founding era were arguing on behalf of the proposition that God, as a super-rational being, does not act frivolously, unpredictably, and without purpose. For such men, and for their time, searching for “natural causes” was a testimony to the belief that the Christian God, unlike anthropomorphized Greek gods, did not throw capricious temper tantrums and toss lightning bolts out of the sky. In other words, the issue was not natural causes vs. design; (they were all design thinkers) it was orderly and intelligible natural processes vs. chaos. That directly contradicts Lewontin’s dismissive assertion that “[t]o appeal to an omnipotent deity is to allow that at any moment the regularities of nature may be ruptured, that miracles may happen.” Indeed, the theologians and philosophers will remind us that for miracles to stand out as sign-posts of more than the ordinary being at work, they require that nature as a whole works in an orderly, intelligible and predictable way. So, for the founders of Modern Science, science (as a delimited field of study within a wider domain, i.e., “natural philosophy” and “natural history”) was primarily about discovering the underlying principles, forces and circumstances that drive observed natural phenomena. But, as Newton so aptly illustrates, it was simply not in their minds to insist dogmatically that only “natural” causes — i.e. blind mechanical necessity and even more blind chance – exist or may be resorted to in accounting for the nature and functions of our world. They made a provisional judgment based on the best information available, but they would never have dared to presume that they knew enough to close off all other options. Further, in their estimation, the foundational scientists were “thinking God’s thoughts after him.” Obviously, they could hardly have believed in Methodological Naturalism while, at the same time, believing that God, as Creator, purposely left clues about his handiwork so that his creatures could interpret them as evidence of his existence and plan for the orderly conduct of the world that are also accessible to us to use for our betterment. Even apart from their religious inspiration, they understood that only the individual scientist knows what he is researching and why, so it is s/he who must in the first instance decide which methods are reasonable, responsible, and appropriate for the task Indeed, it was their love of truth and the disinterested search for it that made them great. They were always ready to challenge rigid conventions and seek new answers. More importantly, they were wise enough to know that someone new could come along and make their ideas seem old, just as they had made the ideas of their predecessors seem old. Now, in our day, a new idea has indeed come along, and it is embodied in the information found in a DNA molecule. It is beyond ridiculous, then, to suggest that men like Francis Bacon, Galileo, Sir Isaac Newton, Faraday, Maxwell or Lord Kelvin — all of whom were in part motivated by religion and whose religion gave meaning to their science — would ignore or dismiss such evidence of design because of its possible religious implications. >> _____________________ No. 19 is also relevant.kairosfocus_{October 21, 2010
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When it comes to methodological naturalism, JAD, first, pardon: I am not at all targetting you in specific. I am pointing out that there is an agenda out there, backed up by clever and ruthless folks with a fair amount of money and access to mikes and presses that often will not even let the likes of a Behe publish a letter of correction. (Rick Trebino of Georgia Tech did an expose on the 123 steps to try to publish a corrective paper in a field of optics where he was right and his critics had made simple errors; HT: Climate Audit. Peer review, today, is largely bankrupt once the power games come into play.) What I am pointing out is that we havfe an ideologically polarised environment, in which an aggressive agenda of evolutionary materialism as the defining essence of origins science is being pushed. In that context, the separation of duties, where the a priori assumption of such materialism is disguised under the sheep's clothing that "science can only explain by natural causes" needs to be exposed for what it is. Namely, a hidden agenda. For in fact, it is easy to show -- just look up the use of ANOVA in experiment design on control and treatment cases by blocks -- that in science we routinely investigate the impacts of chance, mechanical necessity and art/ design/ intentional configuration. And, ANOVA is precisely a well-accepted technique for identifying and separating out the impacts of chance, necessity and intelligent interventions aka treatments. So, the rhetoric of contrasting natural vs supernatural is tendentious and red herringly distractive, led on to ad hominem laced strawmen -- spooky, demons, Christofascists, war against science, etc -- ignited to cloud, polarise, and poison the atmosphere. Ever since Plato in the Laws Bk X [have you had a look at my intro-summary for the IOSE?] in 360 BC, it has been well known that the relevant contrast for empirical investigation is natural vs artificial. Indeed, the term was originated as such in the 1980s by a Wheaton scholar [Wheaton being notoriously an Evangelical school]. The agenda that he term now describes was NOT invented by a Wheaton Scholar in the 1980's. Nope, by 1981-82, it was being imposed by a certain Judge Overton in Arkansas, when he defined science tendentiously and based on what he had been taught by evolutionary materialism advocates at the Arkansas Scopes II trial, i.e. that science must explain by natural causes. (So, now we know why on cultural context a Wheaton scholar in 1983, was discussing the agenda and giving it a descriptive label.) Timelines are often very revealing on causal patterns. And the willful omission of the antecedent context is quite revealing on the agenda at work, too. Notice how evo mat advocates will cite Wheaton, but will not cite Overton on Ruse's counsel:
1. It is guided by natural law; 2. It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; 3. It is testable against the empirical world; 4. Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word; and 5. It is falsifiable
In fact, on what we could call natural history sciences [those relevant to origins] only point 4 stands up to a moment's serious scrutiny. For instance, such sciences are guided by the process of inference to best causal explanation on plausibly observed PROCESSES, plausible INITIAL CONDITIONS and FORCES and RATES seen to act in the present, not necessarily by "natural law." Thus, they explain on such parameters, not primarily natural law. Given that we are here reconstructing a remote, unobserved plausible past, we cannot observe and test models empirically against the real world of the past. And, Popper himself highlighted that falsifiability of such theories or models is more of an aspiration than a fact. Point 2 is particularly telling. For, here, we see that there is an imposition that explanation deemed scientific HAS to be EXPLANATORY by NATURAL LAW (i.e. chance plus necessity, and by implication of the context, without intelligent guidance or configuration). In short, by 1981-2, the reigning orthodoxy had imposed methodological naturalism censored by evolutionary materialist a priorism on origins science studies and education. Just, by some accident, a brief window had opened up and some Creationists had had a proposal to teach comparative models in schools, so that a generic scientific creationism could be allowed to speak as an option for students, not least by way of pointing out the explanatory holes in the reigning paradigm. We cannot have that, and so the Creationist context was used to suppress on grounds of separation of church and state. But since evolutionary materialism -- the functional equivalent of a religion, BTW -- is NOT theistic, it does not SEEM to be a similar imposition. But, it manifestly is. It is often argues that methodological naturalism makes no explicit metaphysical commitments. Indeed, and by design. Most people find it very hard to see when something is done implicitly. In this case, observe that by a priori censoring out a whole class of possible causes relevant to natural history, namely, art or design, and by plastering the Scarlet S-word -"supernatural" -- across such possibilities, the field is decisively tipped. But, inference to best explanation only works right when ALL reasonable alternative explanations are allowed to sit to the table and address the comparative difficulties on factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory elegance. So, once we see the a priori Lewontinian imposition of evolutionary materialism, we are right back to the title of this post:
"Naturalism is a priori evolutionary materialism, so it both begs the question and self-refutes"
Anyone want to take up the second half, from part II of the post? GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 21, 2010
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Okay folks: Thanks for some very thought-provoking onward commentary. (I must now confess that my mind is a bit distracted by the onward development of a constitutional crisis that I have to address when I put on a different hat later this morning.) My overall impression is that it is clear that there is an agenda to impose an anti-supernaturalist view on our civilisation, in the name of science. Science, because this institution has high prestige as a major gateway to knowledge and powerful applications, also to securing an empirically well-warranted understanding of our cosmos, from hydrogen to humans. Indeed, we observe that in Lewontin's declaration in the original post, it is seen as a legitimate goal that the general public comes to see science as "the only begetter of truth." This is of course a sophomoric blunder: a philosophical truth claim is being made that is self-referential and implies that non-scientific approaches cannot arrive at truth. Q: But, how many people are equipped to spot that blunder, right off? A: all too few, and probably shrinking in an age where logic, first principles of right reason, epistemology and science are at a discount and/or are matters of acquired and very unusual taste. But equally, in an era where science has great prestige, such nonsense can easily have great rhetorical -- persuasive/plausibility -- impact. And, manifestly it does. So, when we begin to talk about the limitations of science and its knowledge claims, let us understand that a lot of people are lost right there. For, our education and mass media hidden -- and, not so hidden -- persuaders have indoctrinated many into the suitably ""scientific" mindset that if it's not science it's not knowledge, and that what science says is for all practical purposes true. Indeed, to many, it seems appropriate to declare that highly speculative and assumption-burdened reconstructions of the remote past as we imagine it happened [for we certainly cannot observe the actual remote past], are as much "fact" as the observation that a dropped guava falls at 9.8 m/s^2 near our earth's surface. In that context, methodological naturalism has devastating and manipulative impact, as JDH, Bantay, StephenB and Frost -- as well as Nullasalus have all highlighted, from somewhat different angles. Especially, we must recognise a point that philosopher of science Imre Lakatos (read the Google preview of an appreciation here, and look him up on Wikipedia, a most under-appreciated intellectual force of C20) spotlighted. Namely, that research programmes have stoutly defended cores that are deeply riddled with worldview level commitments, and which are guarded by an armour-belt of auxiliary hypotheses, models, techniques, bodies of lore and of accepted facts [all of these overlap] etc. When such a programme becomes the dominant paradigm of an era, it tends to be buttressed not only by the "consensus" of that dominant school -- notice, the institutional relativism and implicit appeal to the orthodoxy of a reigning Magisterium -- but also by allied centres of power. here, in education, mass media, the courtroom and even legislatures. In short, to deny evolutionary materialism in our day is fraught with hazard for one's reputation, career prospects, and credibility in happs of power and influence. One is liable to be held up to ridicule and to have one's words twisted into ad hominem-laced strawman caricatures, the better to present you as "ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked." Indeed, one is liable to he held guilty of engaging in a "Christo-fascist" [a term dripping with the inference to Nazism -- which is actually an ideology of the LEFT, as "National Socialism" implies -- that I have personally been subjected to], right-wing Jihad or holy war against "Science." Resemblance to all too much of what passes for public and Internet discussion of "science" is NOT coincidental. It is in that toxic, trifecta fallacy shaped, Alinski-ite Rules for Radicals propaganda-polarised atmosphere that we have to assess the claims of methodological naturalism, and those of ever so many who would label themselves "Naturalists." Lakatos was once taken by the chekists for being too intellectually honest to salute and blindly follow orders of his Russian Masters, and interrogated, then gaoled for three years. He often said of this experience, that "the strain of interrogation proved too much - for one of his interrogators." Alas, the balance of institutional power did not align well with the balance of the merits, and it was Lakatos who went to gaol. He was "expelled" for raising inconvenient questions and sticking to the premise that policy should make objective sense. (FCO, if you are monitoring this,the resemblance to current events and issues on the Montserrat Constitution, sadly, is not coincidental.) In such a thought-police atmosphere, the prudent man tries to quietly conform, and not draw unwelcome attention. So, even if his actual view is at logical sixes and sevens with the evo mat reigning orthodoxy, he will try to make it look close enough that he will not be an immediate focus of attention of the NCSE et al. After all, there are bigger fish to fry out there. Null, I believe that a lot of the fuzziness about "naturalism" that SEP summarises and you give examples of is not objectively warranted, but is shaped by the rhetorical and power game atmosphere that rules the intellectual roost at this time. (The very similar case on climate change issues, and on wider environmental questions, is very comparable.) So, I would separate the fuzziness from the objectively warranted conclusions. Yes, a lot of things are being described as "naturalistic" views, and a lot of folks are getting away with that for the moment. No prizes for guessing why. [ . . . ]kairosfocus_{October 21, 2010
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Frost122585, They are happy to use Kant when it suits them and throw out his adherence to the principle of real “experience” when it suits them too. A very good point, and it's another manifestation of this all-too-common inconsistency.nullasalus_{October 20, 2010
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The difference between materialism and naturalism is that materialism requires a material cause and effect explanation. Materialism is a limited perspective on the nature of reality and it has for a very long time bumped heads with metaphysics. Kant's critique of pure reason was supposed to be a synthesis of the physical (materialistic) view of nature and the metaphysical view of nature (that mind gives existence to reality). Kant attempted to reconcile the conflict by saying the mind leaning on experience and intuition transcendentally realizes that it is part of a material reality. For Kant reality begins with the mind matter interface (experience) and ends with a proper understanding of the manifold through pure reason. While somewhat useful, his critique leaves many questions unanswered. Yet his critique was a look at reason through a naturalistic (not super naturalistic) approach. The question then is what defines supernaturalistic? Supernaturalistic is where a naturalistic explanation is applied to a scenario where it is proposed to account for or do things GREATER than it has ever been none to account for in experience. That is why materialists hate using mind as a causative explanation for the origin of the specified complexity of the universe. While materialists would agree that intelligent minds can design constructs of great complexity and organize matter into constructs similar to the universe as a whole (ie cities, video games with real world simulated environments etc) - the task of organizing an actual universe has never been demonstrable by any "yet know" intelligence. Yet, the objection to super-naturalism is not one of logical necessity since the proposition of a mind or minds account for the universe is only a matter of plausibility as it pertains to the level of magnitude of the mind in question. This is where Kant comes back into the situation. Kant said to just say "a mind did it" was unreasonable not because it was false but because it was not useful. To the materialist the notion of a supreme intelligence or mind is useless and perhaps hurtful to the progress fo science. Yet as Stephen Meyer points out this is not an argument against ID as a naturalistic explanation of specified complexity in the universe- for Meyer uses the naturalistic device of Darwin himself to support the ID inference and hypothesis. The only presently acting causes of specified complexity that we know of are minds and intelligent causes. It is through this realization that the ID inference is not merely a possible consideration but a necessary one. Whether the prowess of the intelligence responsible for the universes origin and structure should be described as "super" is beside the point. Certainly the big bang should not be excluded from cosmological science simply because it was a "super" event of magnitudes that we have never verified "could" happen by our own very limited experience as earthlings. And so the final question is does the ID inference tell us anything scientifically useful about the world? It certainly opens up the possibility that our understanding of how form comes into being maybe more complex than our current materialist approaches can appreciate and investigate. But the question can also be asked to a materialist whether it is truly useful to accept the notion that single "big bang" began the universe? If it started with a bang than that is it and it does not take us any further nor does it open the door to further outside the box thinking. Of course now we have materialists that predict a beginning "before" the beginning- with prematter and pertime and other totally nonsensical purely speculative anti-phenomena. They are happy to use Kant when it suits them and throw out his adherence to the principle of real "experience" when it suits them too. Bottom line is that the naturalsitic approach dcoes not begin nor end with explanations limited to mechanical descriptions of actions of matter. Whether an explanation is super or not should be beside the point.Frost122585_{October 20, 2010
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JAD, However, in my opinion the term methodological divests naturalism of its metaphysical meaning. In other words, when we say the science limited MN we are saying science is limited to the methodological study of natural causes. So, at least to me, naturalism used in this context means natural causes. I admit, I believe words are important - and I see the 'naturalism' in 'methodological naturalism' as shoved in there to associate naturalism with science, without warrant. Like I said, I agree with the idea that science has limits by its very nature. But those limits are not "naturalistic" in any way, shape, or form - and I have seen too many people, scientists included, utterly mangle what "science shows" to calm down about this. Ask yourself this: Do you think many naturalists would object to the limits of science being described as 'methodological theism', even if it was qualified that it does not entail metaphysical theism, and how all it meant was that the universe is rational and thus can be studied and explored and understood as if it were a comprehensible artifact? The limits would be the same, the 'lack of metaphysical commitment' would be the same. But I'd bet you quite a number of them would put up one hell of a fight, because of the label alone. On the other, I am not an advocate for MN. Terms acquire meaning by what people collectively choose by custom and habit to invest them with. I was really arguing that MN has a number of different meanings. I see where you're coming from. I used to come from a similar position, really. In the end I had to change - too much at stake, too many problems present. True, at this point we can’t provide much of an hypothesis. But it is also my argument that we can’t, in principle, rule out the possibility that Cambrian explosion (CE) is the result of natural causes acting alone. I don't think it's 'at this point'. The key claims of naturalism could never be known by science - namely, that the CE happened unguided, unintended, etc. Even if mechanisms or events are discovered which could lead to such an 'explosion' in nature, etc. I think, though I'm not certain, we're on the same page here too. I'm just fierce on tight definitions and meanings in these contexts. Darwin himself thought it posed problems for his theory. The problems have not gone away as he hoped but have only gotten worse. I believe that ID is a reasonable explanation because the history of life is riddled with these kinds of discontinuity problems. See, my own view is that ID (again, not as a science, but the belief in design) is reasonable, even supreme, not because it has utility in explaining those problem areas, but because it has utility in explaining the known areas. The universe, in aspect after aspect, has all the makings of a rational product, a thing behaving like a design, rife with intention and formal/final causes. Yes, perhaps we can have reason to suspect specific intervention at this or that point, or specific kinds of design. But design isn't hiding in the problems of the Cambrian alone. The universe is positively rife with it.nullasalus_{October 20, 2010
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StephenB, Still, as Nullasalus rightly points out, there are some who say that naturalism is a much broader concept than that. Is it? Does the term naturalism also apply to reductionist world views that do not purport to be atheistic? Well, my point wasn't that there are naturalists who are "not atheistic" - that's a whole other ballgame. My point was only that there are many naturalists who reject materialism, and that 'naturalism' nowadays is a wild card. But yes, here are people who believe in things that in any other age would have been called gods and supernatural (the simulation hypothesis, Gribbin's universe-creating civilizations hypotheses, etc) and still call themselves naturalists (even materialists!) - and I see no other naturalists disputing this. My point of citing the SEP entry was to show how widespread this extraordinarily loose version of 'naturalism' is. Well, I think, we should pause a bit here. Since the strategic aim of methodological naturalism is to rule out any discussion about design, we do well to ask ourselves if all forms of Eastern mysticism are compatible with naturalism in that context. But that's the thing: Naturalism does not rule these things out. Oh, you'd think so wouldn't you? But then why does Nick Bostrom call the simulation hypothesis "naturalist", even "materialist" and no one bats an eye? Why does John Gribbin openly speculate that our universe was designed and that - even better - *the majority of universes in the hypothesized multiverse* are designed, and seems to think that this is all entirely naturalistic? Why does no one start yelling 'that's not naturalism!' when Sir Martin Rees entertains the possibility our universe is simulated, or when Max Tegmark hypothesizes that the universe 'is math' (and his hypothesis would open the door to simulations, created universes, etc by necessity)? Or when David Lewis speculates all possible worlds are actual, gods and all? Was Francis Crick 'not a naturalist' when he argued for directed panspermia? That list can go on. And each and every one of those ideas are presented as naturalistic possibilities, despite them being variously A) Non-materialist and B) Design hypotheses, among other things. Are they really naturalistic? Or are they supernatural? If it's ceded they are naturalistic, then you see the problem with giving much of a definition to naturalism - it is open to some pretty fanciful stuff, including solipsism and last thursdayism. If it's argued that they are, despite the views of their proponents and the treatment by their colleagues, supernaturalists after all... then be alert: Naturalists are passing off supernatural hypotheses and ideas *as naturalism*. Either response should be eye-opening in this discussion. When the epiphenomenalist speaks of a “mind” that emerges from matter and is, at the same time, grounded in matter, for example, he is, in spite of his protests to the contrary, really speaking of a brain, not a mind. A mind is, by definition, a non-material faculty. More tangential, but I want to comment on this briefly: When someone attributes to the brain (and thus, 'mere matter') qualities that matter does not have (intentionality, subjectivity, etc), one of two things is going on. Either they're confused or kidding themselves and thus they're eliminating the qualities in question, or they're confused and kidding themselves and aren't materialists after all. When a man has two ideas that add up to an inconsistency, he can break either way - there may be fewer materialists around than we think. Maybe fewer atheists than we think as well.nullasalus_{October 20, 2010
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Nullasalus: “Just to stress something: I accept an approach to science that does recognize limits, and which puts the design question beyond science. But I absolutely no longer accept “methodological naturalism”, and I regard referring to such limited science as “methodological naturalism” a grave mistake for a number of reasons. One of which is that ‘naturalism’ is compatible with a wide variety of explanations and possibilities – very wide – which go beyond the limits of science. Another, that non-naturalists can happily accept many of the findings, even theories, of science. “Methodological naturalism” is an utter misnomer.” >I am sorry I must have remembered (or misremembered. Is that a word?) something you said some time ago, or I was confusing you with someone else. >However, after reading what you have just written I think the problem is with the meaning we invest MN with. To me the key word is methodological. You seem to be hung up on the word naturalism which obviously has philosophical/metaphysical overtones. However, in my opinion the term methodological divests naturalism of its metaphysical meaning. In other words, when we say the science limited MN we are saying science is limited to the methodological study of natural causes. So, at least to me, naturalism used in this context means natural causes. >On the other, I am not an advocate for MN. Terms acquire meaning by what people collectively choose by custom and habit to invest them with. I was really arguing that MN has a number of different meanings. The ASA, a Christian fellowship of scientists, for example has a number of papers which discuss/ debate the meaning of MN. http://www.asa3.org/ ‘According to Ronald Numbers, [the term methodological naturalism] was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a Wheaton College philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."‘ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy) >So,clearly at least at the beginning the term was not used by materialists as a stalking horse. Indeed, it appears the term was used originally in an accommodating way. Once again, it’s been used in a number of different ways over time. nullasalus:“How would you prove, for either the Cambrian explosion or even vastly more mundane and less mysterious events, that the causes were wholly natural (here meaning ‘utterly unguided, not borne of intention, direction, or guidance’)? The same can’t be done. At most you can get a kind of limited, scientific narrative.” >True, at this point we can’t provide much of an hypothesis. But it is also my argument that we can’t, in principle, rule out the possibility that Cambrian explosion (CE) is the result of natural causes acting alone. Did life exist and evolve before the CE? Is it reasonable to assume that there is a causal connection of some kind of between evolving CE life and life before the CE? Now what do we know about intelligence before and after the CE? If some kind of intelligent agency was responsible for the changes during the CE, how were those changes effected? Were the different phyla created instantaneously ex nihilo or did th designer meddle with the genetics? >By the way, my argument about the Cambrian explosion has never been that it supports ID, but that it is very difficult to reconcile with Darwinian or neo-Darwinian evolution. Darwin himself thought it posed problems for his theory. The problems have not gone away as he hoped but have only gotten worse. I believe that ID is a reasonable explanation because the history of life is riddled with these kinds of discontinuity problems. Obviously if things like natural selection (NS + RV) genetic drift etc. are insufficient to explain the evolution of life here, there must be something else. ID could tentatively be that something else. However, how could an ID scientific explanation be pursued? >If someone has a clue how to do ID research on the Cambrian explosion pleas speak up (or, forever hold your peace). Just joking, we’re not getting married here.john_a_designer_{October 20, 2010
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I think that both kairosfocus and nullasalus have made some very interesting points on the relationship between materialism and naturalism. Here is my take on it. If we compare the traditional definition of materialism with the traditional definition of naturalism, there would not seem to be much difference between the two, except for the following emphasis: materialism would focus on a metaphysical view of reality, while naturalism would focus on the way that metaphysical reality behaves. Put another way, naturalism could be described as materialism in action. In that context, each term serves a function. Materialism rules out non-material realities, such as mind, soul, and goodness, while Naturalism rules out Supernatural realities, such as a transcendent, creator God and, of course, angels. Materialism says that no spiritual world exists that could be the effect of a creator God; Naturalism says no God exists that could have created the spirit world in the first place—same point, different emphasis. Still, as Nullasalus rightly points out, there are some who say that naturalism is a much broader concept than that. Is it? Does the term naturalism also apply to reductionist world views that do not purport to be atheistic? Should it include Pantheism, Panetheism, Panpsychism, or any other Eastern-type world view that posits either a solely immanent God or a spiritualized nature? Could we, as some thinkers do, characterize New Age Pantheism as a kind of naturalism because its proponents agree with Materialist Darwinists on the point that “nature is all there is?” Isn’t it the case that when New Agers trivialize God by making him organic with the universe, they are, in their own way, accomplishing the same thing as Darwinists by not allowing a Divine [transcendent] foot in the door?” If that is the case, does this fact not show that naturalism should be defined to include both Pantheism and Darwinism? Well, I think, we should pause a bit here. Since the strategic aim of methodological naturalism is to rule out any discussion about design, we do well to ask ourselves if all forms of Eastern mysticism are compatible with naturalism in that context. Clearly, the answer is no. All we need to do is compare the world view of someone like Allen MacNeill, for example, who integrates Eastern thought with anti-design Darwinism with someone like Deepak Chopra, who synthesizes Eastern spirituality with a decidedly non-Darwinian, pro-design philosophy. If some forms of Eastern thought allow for the design hypothesis, and if naturalism does, by definition, rule out intelligent design, then surely we cannot characterize Eastern thought as “naturalistic,” even if it shares a reductionist world view with the Darwinists. In this context, we haven’t even mentioned that fact that Buddhist/Darwinists, [I can’t think of a better word at the moment] straddle two incompatible worlds. Unlike the Deepak Chopras of the world, who embrace idealism and disdain materialism, these mystic Darwinists want both the benefits of pseudo “spirituality” that comes from Taoism AND the freedom from real spirituality that comes from Darwinism’s relentless naturalism. I will not attempt to describe the ways in which they twist the language to justify this logically impossible combination. In keeping with that point, I hold that we should not honor the definitions of those who consciously misuse words in order to obfuscate and cause confusion. In fact, the term “materialism” can be manipulated just as easily as the term “naturalism,” often in such a way that the communicator seems to embrace two simultaneous world views. When the epiphenomenalist speaks of a “mind” that emerges from matter and is, at the same time, grounded in matter, for example, he is, in spite of his protests to the contrary, really speaking of a brain, not a mind. A mind is, by definition, a non-material faculty. If it doesn’t mean that, then it doesn’t mean anything. Yet the savvy materialist, insofar as he embraces epiphenomenalism, hopes to reduce everything to matter even as he creates the illusion that he is open to something more, such as a mind—an entity that, for him, is different enough from a brain to be called by another name, but not different enough to be, in fact, a real mind. In truth, the epiphenomenalist, like so many others in the materialist camp, seeks to have it both ways. When it comes to science, though, we cannot allow its gatekeepers to play with words in this same disingenuous way. Most assuredly, we have to pay attention to the fact that Darwinists, demand AND GET, precise methodological definitions from their adversaries, even as they exempt themselves from that very same standard. For the ID scientist, a natural cause is defined as non-agency cause, characterized as law, chance, or a combination of the two. For the Darwinist, a natural cause has no meaning; it could be anything at all, and often does. At the same time, these same Darwinists, who insist that scientists must study “nature” as if nature is all there is, and who are prepared to discredit, slander, and disfranchise ID on the grounds that it does not meet that dubious standard, cannot even define the operative word that informs their demands. Surely, it is situations like that for which the word “outrageous” was conceived. I submit, therefore, that the words naturalism and materialism are two different ways of saying the same thing,—a secularist, reductionist, anti-Theism that rules out design apriori. If that is what Eugenie Scott, PZ Myers, Richard Dawkins, William Provine, Gaylord Simpson, the National Academy of Science, and all the other heavy hitters means by naturalism, then that is the definition we ought to use.StephenB_{October 20, 2010
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JAD, Of course you no doubt already know about theists like Stephen Barr and null-asalus who accept MN in a strictly defined way. Just to stress something: I accept an approach to science that does recognize limits, and which puts the design question beyond science. But I absolutely no longer accept "methodological naturalism", and I regard referring to such limited science as "methodological naturalism" a grave mistake for a number of reasons. One of which is that 'naturalism' is compatible with a wide variety of explanations and possibilities - very wide - which go beyond the limits of science. Another, that non-naturalists can happily accept many of the findings, even theories, of science. "Methodological naturalism" is an utter misnomer. >For example, is the Cambrian explosion the result of some of intelligent intervention? Has that ever been proven? How would you prove it? Is it impossible that there is a natural explanation? How would you prove, for either the Cambrian explosion or even vastly more mundane and less mysterious events, that the causes were wholly natural (here meaning 'utterly unguided, not borne of intention, direction, or guidance')? The same can't be done. At most you can get a kind of limited, scientific narrative. Now, I know this is where a defender of MN would say "Ah, that's true. But it's just *methodological* naturalism! We're not making a metaphysical commitment! Our model treats nature as if its utterly unguided and random and without purpose or intervention, but we're not saying reality is like that! We simply don't logically need to refer to those things to explain the data - the utterly unguided can do the job!" But we don't need to tack on 'utterly unguided' or 'without purpose or intervention' either. They add nothing to the science, and nothing that the science can hope to demonstrate. They are superfluous, and shall forever remain so. Science only needs the models, even probablistic models, which - as far as science is concerned - are statements about the limits of our knowledge, not about what we know (or worse, must assume) about reality. Pardon this slight derail with my MN talk, but my views on MN changed over the past couple years, and I felt the need to clarify a little.nullasalus_{October 20, 2010
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kairofocus:“Unfortunately, the point of evolutionary materialism as an ideological agenda propped up by ideologised scientific research programmes is precisely to try to explain “everything.” For such materialists, reality itself is constrained to matter, energy, space, time and their interactions under scientific laws and forces of chance and mechanical necessity.” >I agree with that. But the top-down metaphysical interpretation that you draw from scientific bottom-up evidence are not themselves science. They are not science from a naturalistic perspective nor are they science from an ID’ist perspective. “In that context, methodological naturalism serves as a stalking horse, a blind that hides the ideological agenda.” >That is psychoanalyzing other peoples motives. For example methodological naturalism, albeit in a very restrictive sense. I am not advancing materialism or any form of naturalism. >My view is very simply that science limited. Because some people misuse MN doesn’t invalidate it. Why not criticize them for misusing the concept rather condemning people, like me, who don’t. “And, to push that agenda, the a priori materialists routinely distort what design thought actually does: they present he matter as a contrast between natural and supernatural explanation, to the detriment of the latter.” >I have no problem with you criticizing people who do that, but how is that my problem? “So, the effect of methodological naturalism on origins science, is to bias the outcome by censoring out ahead of time the possibility that empirically reliable sings might point to art as the best explanation for say the digitally coded, funcitonally specific complex information in cell based life, or the fine-tuned balance that sets our observed cosmos at an operating point that enables C-chemistry cell based life.” >Once again that is their abuse of science and scientific methodology not mine. Both naturalistic and ID explanations for the moment are metaphysical explanations. But there is an asymmetry here: only naturalistic explanations can be the result when we trace a chain of natural cause back in time. Clearly there are discontinuties in these causal chains, and it is completely possible that some of dicontinuities can be explained as some kind of intelligent intervention, but does it follow from that, that all discontinuities are the result of an intelligent intervention? >For example, is the Cambrian explosion the result of some of intelligent intervention? Has that ever been proven? How would you prove it? Is it impossible that there is a natural explanation? I would argue that MN does not dictate an answer here. In my opinion MN (despite the way the term is abused by others) is simply a tautology: MN simply follows natural causation as far as it goes, without necessarily ruling out other kinds of causation. By the way, there are people not sympathetic with ID, who along with me, hold that view. Of course you no doubt already know about theists like Stephen Barr and null-asalus who accept MN in a strictly defined way.john_a_designer_{October 20, 2010
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CY: You are perfectly right, so far as you go. This is a case of "ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked." (In these cases, mostly ignorant. Smell is a perceptually sensed chemical response to particular patterns of chemicals. And someone who does not know the relevant telecomms may wonder how a signal can be sent from the moon.) But this serves admirably to set up an ad hominem laced strawman to be burned to provide cover for the absurdity of a priori materialist censorship on science of origins. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 20, 2010
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KF, I was a little confused by Lewontin's (or was it Sagan's) quote. It seems that what is construed as absurd is actually rational - The woman watching TV made a category error, and that is all. Secondly, there is a very rational explanation for the cheese with regard to particle physics. I can't help but think that this is done in order to smuggle in what is actually patently absurd into scientific theory and to use what may only appear to be absurd as an excuse for the smuggle.CannuckianYankee_{October 20, 2010
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actually kf, though you are right, as usual, that for all practicle purposes the debate is limited to atoms fro materialists/naturalists, at least one materialist/naturalist has actually tried to access the 'quantum world' to resolve the insurmountable problems they face in Darwinism: The Biological Big Bang model for the major transitions in evolution - Eugene V Koonin - Background: "Major transitions in biological evolution show the same pattern of sudden emergence of diverse forms at a new level of complexity. The relationships between major groups within an emergent new class of biological entities are hard to decipher and do not seem to fit the tree pattern that, following Darwin's original proposal, remains the dominant description of biological evolution. The cases in point include the origin of complex RNA molecules and protein folds; major groups of viruses; archaea and bacteria, and the principal lineages within each of these prokaryotic domains; eukaryotic supergroups; and animal phyla. In each of these pivotal nexuses in life's history, the principal "types" seem to appear rapidly and fully equipped with the signature features of the respective new level of biological organization. No intermediate "grades" or intermediate forms between different types are detectable; http://www.biology-direct.com/content/2/1/21 Biological Big Bangs - Origin Of Life and Cambrian - Dr. Fazale Rana - video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4284466 It should be noted that Dr. Koonin tries to account for the origination of the massive amounts of functional information, required for the Cambrian Explosion, and other 'explosions', by trying to access an 'unelucidated and undirected' mechanism of Quantum Mechanics called 'Many Worlds'. Besides Dr. Koonin ignoring the fact that Quantum Events, on a whole, are strictly restricted to the transcendent universal laws/constants of the universe, including and especially the second law of thermodynamics, for as far back in time in the universe as we can 'observe', it is also fair to note, in criticism to Dr. Koonin’s scenario, that appealing to the undirected infinite probabilistic resource, of the quantum mechanics of the Many Worlds scenario, actually greatly increases the amount of totally chaotic information one would expect to see generated 'randomly' in the fossil record. In fact the Many Worlds scenario actually greatly increases the likelihood we would witness total chaos surrounding us as the following points out: Quantum mechanics Excerpt: The Everett many-worlds interpretation, formulated in 1956, holds that all the possibilities described by quantum theory simultaneously occur in a multiverse composed of mostly independent parallel universes.[39] This is not accomplished by introducing some new axiom to quantum mechanics, but on the contrary by removing the axiom of the collapse of the wave packet: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics Perhaps some may say Everett’s Many Worlds in not absurd, if so,, then in some other parallel universe, where Elvis happens to now be president of the United states, they actually do think that the Many Worlds conjecture is absurd,, and that type of 'flexible thinking' I find to be completely absurd!!! And that one 'Elvis' example from Many Worlds is just small potatoes to the levels of absurdity that we could draw out if Many Worlds were actually true. Dr. Bruce Gordon - The Absurdity Of The Multiverse & Materialism - video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/5318486/ The Absurdity Of The Many Worlds Hypothesis - William Lane Craig - Last 5 minutes of this video http://www.metacafe.com/watch/4784630 Though Eugene Koonin is correct to recognize that the infinite probabilistic resource found in ‘Quantum Mechanics’ does not absolutely preclude the sudden appearance of massive amounts of functional information in the fossil record, he is very incorrect to disregard the ‘Logos’ of John 1:1 needed to correctly specify the ‘precisely controlled mechanism of implementation’ for the massive amounts of complex functional and specified information witnessed abruptly and mysteriously appearing in the ancient genomes of these ancient fossils. i.e. He must sufficiently account for the ’cause’ for the ‘effect’ he wants to explain. And as I have noted previously, Stephen Meyer clearly points out that the only known cause now in operation, sufficient to explain the generation of massive amounts of functional 'digital' information, is intelligence: Stephen C. Meyer – What is the origin of the digital information found in DNA? – August 2010 - video http://www.evolutionnews.org/2010/08/stephen_meyer_on_intelligent_d037271.htmlbornagain77_{October 20, 2010
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F/N: When it comes to what energy is, I am back at an updated form of my 4th form definition sheet: if something can be made to carry out work, it is or contains energy. Work, being the process by which ordered motion is imposed on bodies by forces acting on them. WHAT ENERGY IS BEYOND THAT SEEMS TO VARY, AND AT QUANTUM LEVEL, THE WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY THING BEGINS TO APPLY, e.g. consider what photons and phonons are. And of course electron-positron pair production from gamma photons of was it 1.12 MeV and up shows that energy can be transmuted into massive particles.kairosfocus_{October 20, 2010
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Nullasalus: Taking a break after losing and reconstructing about an hour's worth of work. I am not so much interested in what people say by way of labelling, as in the substantial structure of their thought, especially the hard core skeleton that frames the thought. The naturalists' priority on adhering to "science" in a world where origins science is dominated by [totalising] evolutionary materialist [meta-]narratives, is enough to see that we are here looking at a hard core of a paradigm, similar to Lakatos' thought. That sort of hard core is defended stoutly, and sometimes by any means, fair or foul. It is that hard core that I am speaking to. And, when it comes to what mater is, the relevant forms are made up of atoms, their components and related species, interacting energetically; and of course in some cases transforming to energy. What sub atomic particles and their quark-level components are, is another cycle on the old reduction of composites to elements story, but it does not have particular relevance to what stars, galaxies, planets, and C-chemistry life forms are made of, and how they come to be. (Dark matter and dark energy debates are largely irrelevant to our concerns!) So long as our naturalists are playing the totalising evolutionary materialistic narrative game, they are in that paradigm, and the above concerns apply. When it comes to panpsychism, they are plainly more pantheists or the like than naturalists, though they seem to be trying to be in the big tent, which is where the cultural power is. BTW, anybody interested in commenting on the last 1/2 of the post, i.e. p. 2? GEM of TKI PS: MEv6, welcome to the thread. While the inference to design is a bit off topic, the issue is that science at its best is truth seeking. Once an evo mat metanarrative is imposed as a reigning orthodoxy, tha tis compromised. Especially when it is backed up by power games, as it is. In fact, it is routine in scientific work and related fields to infer on empirical evidence to chance, mechanical necessity and intelligence as causal factors. Knowing what is accident, what is necessity and what is intelligently directed is important in a great many fields, and the praxis is well established. I suggest -- and I think I have done so before -- you look at ANOVA and experiment design on control and treatment groups for starters to see just how important this stuff is in science. PPS: Bantay, welcome. you have made a very good point. PPPS: JDH, keep that good stuff coming. Draw out your thought a bit more. DV, overnight I will look at it.kairosfocus_{October 20, 2010
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As an aside, it strikes me as odd that some of the most intelligent minds of the world are committed to proving that they are not.JDH_{October 20, 2010
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My question is this. Are the theory of materialism or the theory of naturalism things(entities) or not? Since we are sitting here discussing them they appear to me to be entities. Since they are real entities we can discuss their origins. The follow up question is, "Did any intelligent agent create these things ( theory of materialism, theory of naturalism )?" If they were created by some intelligent agent which exists outside of materialism, and outside of naturalism, then the theory of materialism or naturalism is disproved since it asserts that only materialism or naturalism exists. If they were NOT created by some intelligent agent which exists outside of materialism, and outside of naturalism and only came about by unguided processes, why in the world should I choose to believe them over any other theory? I don't see any way for the advocate of materialism to climb out of this contradiction. As soon as he advocates his position, he has lost.JDH_{October 20, 2010
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How interesting. On one hand we have scientists who consider [materialistic] science itself to be the standard of truth...many of whom also appeal to unobserved, untestable ideas like Naturalism, or the Multiverse, or anything naturalistic, no matter how much faith it requires. On the other hand, we have other scientists of equal intellectual merit claiming that after observation and and consideration of the effects intelligent agents leave behind as evidence of design activity, that we are reasonable to consider that some features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an inference of design. Though I am open to where the evidence leads, even if it is a naturalistic explanation, I think only one of the two groups of scientists above are seeking a truthful, accurate explanation. It seems to me that science is worthless if truth is not the standard by which the natural world is explained.Bantay_{October 20, 2010
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nullasus you state:,
I’m not sure how much it helps, only because what ‘matter’ is – by my understanding – remains under debate even in scientific contexts, certainly in an ultimate sense. Matter, ultimately, used to be something like ‘tiny colorless odorless marbles’. I’ve seen suggestions ranging from the ‘strings’ of string theory to (in some platonic way, I assume) ‘math’ in Max Tegmark’s ultimate ensemble to information to an infinity of splittables to who knows what else.
with quantum teleportation of 'matter',,, Ions have been teleported successfully for the first time by two independent research groups Excerpt: In fact, copying isn’t quite the right word for it. In order to reproduce the quantum state of one atom in a second atom, the original has to be destroyed. This is unavoidable – it is enforced by the laws of quantum mechanics, which stipulate that you can’t ‘clone’ a quantum state. In principle, however, the ‘copy’ can be indistinguishable from the original (that was destroyed),,, Atom takes a quantum leap – 2009 Excerpt: Ytterbium ions have been ‘teleported’ over a distance of a metre.,,, “What you’re moving is information, not the actual atoms,” says Chris Monroe, from the Joint Quantum Institute at the University of Maryland in College Park and an author of the paper. But as two particles of the same type differ only in their quantum states, the transfer of quantum information is equivalent to moving the first particle to the location of the second. ,,, thus nullasus, whatever people may debate is the foundation of 'matter', ‘strings’, maths. infinity of splittables, the point really is moot for the entirety of 'matter',('strings’, maths. infinity of splittables or whatever else may be in a atom) is reducible, in its entirety to transcendent information. Their simply is not anything else left to reduce to!!!bornagain77_{October 20, 2010
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As far as I know, extensions of science beyond the natural have only been used to explain events not otherwise explainable by 'naturalist' science. I'm not aware of any concrete results that resulted from these explanations. Am I missing something? At a pragmatic level, what else changes in a science that includes "non-natural" explanations? Do we still question? Do we strive for repeatability? Are random controlled studies still valid?mikev6_{October 20, 2010
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kairosfocus, Appreciated, and welcomed [I know how much effort and risk goes into making a comment in a controversial situation] Well, not so much in my case. I've little to risk, and the effort's a pleasure. I'm just some guy discussing something on the internet. It will help to cite Wiki as linked on materialism: I'm not sure how much it helps, only because what 'matter' is - by my understanding - remains under debate even in scientific contexts, certainly in an ultimate sense. Matter, ultimately, used to be something like 'tiny colorless odorless marbles'. I've seen suggestions ranging from the 'strings' of string theory to (in some platonic way, I assume) 'math' in Max Tegmark's ultimate ensemble to information to an infinity of splittables to who knows what else. I'm not trying to split hairs here just to do so. But materialism isn't what it used to be (good thing too, I suppose, since what it used to be is now widely regarded as false.) And part of my reason for objecting to the identification of naturalism with materialism (even evolutionary materialism) is because it suggests that naturalism has more to it than it really does. Even this doesn't really help much: I actually thought a fair bit about that “is,” and concluded that once the evolutionary materialist paradigm for origins is accepted and given the imprimatur of “science,” it is definitive of all species of naturalisms, as opposed to the “spooky,” “demonic” etc “supernaturalism” that “naturalists” reject. So nothing 'spooky'? Nothing 'supernatural'? But the problem here remains what it was in the SEP article: What's this "supernatural"? What is it, particularly, when the "natural" won't even be defined in the SEP of all places? Even in the odd cases where there is the argument that the world is a software simulation, that narrative is a key defining characteristic. I would agree that those who offer up simulation arguments tend not to notice that their position is in direct conflict with Darwinism, but I don't think that narrative works in that case. Simulationists could allow for direct intervention of the programmer in the universe, after all. (Bostrom himself cites such an example as one which would provide additional evidence for concluding we live in a simulation.) This is either a claim about the nature of the physical cosmos, or it is a modified form of pantheism [or panentheism], which is not a naturalistic view. Why isn't it? There are panpsychists who claim they are naturalists. There are philosophers and even scientists who explicitly reject materialism and claim they are naturalists. And while I am aware of other philosophers challenging their position, I can't recall one who ever claimed their positions made them 'non-naturalists'. (Actually, I can recall one. Alex Rosenberg, who argued that anyone who believes in intentionality - aboutness - is not a real naturalist. I also recall other self-described naturalists squaring off with him over that.) The SEP explicitly avoids settling this question and outright notes that lots of 'naturalists' call themselves such because the name is popular - and the head of the Center for Naturalism has repeatedly shown up on sites, insisting that naturalism does not mandate materialism. Let me be clear here: I'm not denying that evolution is wielded as a political and cultural club in many ways. Nor am I denying that defenders of evolution often are motivated heavily by metaphysics, or try to pass off their metaphysics as science. I agree with all of that. What I'm saying is that 'naturalism' is demonstrably not materialism (at least if we go by many prominent self-described naturalists and what they believe or consider naturalistic), and what's more, 'naturalists' are not afraid of relying on anything 'spooky'. Brute facts are spooky. Multiverses are spooky, violations of causality are spooky, quantum physics is spooky, neutral monism is spooky, strong emergence is spooky, panpsychism is spooky - the list goes on. Self-described naturalists will in fact dive for and conditionally entertain just about any idea, no matter how "spooky", so long as it can be envisioned and rhetorically employed in opposition to what they dislike: Particular religions. (Not even "all religions" - merely specific ones.) I don't want to come across as defending naturalism either by insisting that naturalism is not materialism. Quite the opposite: Naturalism is mush. Clay. It hardly means anything anymore, and in the hands of a self-described "naturalist" the definition changes to whatever is most convenient for him. I think it is far too forgiving of naturalism to regard the position or idea as having much more to it than that. For the self-described naturalist, "science" must explain things with absolutely any concept, idea, theory or imagined possibility available, so long as it stays hostile to or, at the very least, dead silent towards specific religions. That's what I contend, and I think a survey of just about every self-described naturalist will reveal that to approach the lowest common denominator, even moreso than materialism.nullasalus_{October 20, 2010
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Nullasalus: I hear your thought. Appreciated, and welcomed [I know how much effort and risk goes into making a comment in a controversial situation], but I think I must still respectfully disagree. In particular, I am not talking about narrowest reductive or eliminativist materialism or physicalism as such but the "scientific" worldview-level claim and origins narrative that may be aptly described as evolutionary materialism. It will help to cite Wiki as linked on materialism:
In philosophy, the theory of materialism holds that the only thing that exists is matter; that all things are composed of material and all phenomena (including consciousness) are the result of material interactions. In other words, matter is the only substance.
I am modifying this with "evolutionary" to bring to bear the origins science narrative from hydrogen to humans, and to point out that there is a commitment to avoid "spooky" entities beyond matter. As for neutral monism, it comes down to an extension of the relativity-inspired idea that we have matter-energy as interconvertible per E = m*c^2. (NB: I actually thought a fair bit about that "is," and concluded that once the evolutionary materialist paradigm for origins is accepted and given the imprimatur of "science," it is definitive of all species of naturalisms, as opposed to the "spooky," "demonic" etc "supernaturalism" that "naturalists" reject. For, it is the "scientific" evolutionary materialistic account of origins that provides the plausibility, authority and cultural credibility for naturalistic views and sets the context in which things like life, consciousness and intelligence are held to have "emerged." It also gives the hard core "scientific" framework on which the wider ideas and claimed emergent properties, or entities or whatever are anchored. Therefore, I believe the "is" is warranted, once the "evolutionary" modifier is understood more broadly than simply biological evolution. And that I have always explicitly argued: the familiar origins science narrative from hydrogen to humans by cosmological, solar system, chemical, biological and socio-cultural evolution.) In short, there is a specific and central reason why I use a significant descriptive modifier to "materialism," i.e. evolutionary. This opens up room for that "scientific" emergentism that often distinguishes many "naturalists" from physicalists in the reductionistic or eliminativistic sense. (Here, notice how the common core as observed by SEP is acceptance of "science," which on origins means evolutionary materialism, from hydrogen to humans.) How one elaborates that evolutionary emergentism or contextualises it may vary indeed, but the common skeletal framework so far as I can see is the "scientific" evolutionary materialism. That core "scientific" worldview narrative, presented with all the august authority of institutional science, asserts that the world emerged by spontaneous processes, from hydrogen to humans, and is fundamentally constituted by matter, energy, space, time and interactions that are based on chance and necessity. Without external initiation, sustaining or intervention. What is, up to and including he human mind and spirit, are held to have emerged spontaneously from that process. Or, so it is held. (Indeed, I observe how remarkably often it is claimed, or simply assumed -- without empirical evidence -- that a suitably sophisticated computer with sufficiently complex looping software will spontaneously emerge into consciousness. Thus, spirit emerges from matter, on software that writes itself through chemical and biological evolution rooted in chance and necessity!) Even in the odd cases where there is the argument that the world is a software simulation, that narrative is a key defining characteristic. So far as I can make out, those "naturalists" who are sympathetic to the design view tend to believe that design is immanent in the natural world, so that the front-loading if you will is a part of the underlying cosmic order. Life -- DNA, RNA, executing machinery and all -- is somehow written into physics and chemistry. And, I presume, such are held to be brute -- albeit as yet not fully identified -- givens (laws, forces, materials etc) of the physical world. (I stand to be corrected on that, as I gather there are atheists out there who pray!!) When it comes to panpsychism,SEP observes a bit coyly: "Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe." Wiki is a bit more forthcoming:
"the view that all parts of matter involve mind, or the more holistic view that the whole Universe is an organism that possesses a mind . . . . Panpsychism claims that everything is sentient and that there are either many separate minds, or one single mind that unites everything that is."
This is either a claim about the nature of the physical cosmos, or it is a modified form of pantheism [or panentheism], which is not a naturalistic view. But, merely repackaging pantheism or its kissing cousins to make it more palatable in an evolutionary materialistic age does not change it into naturalism. That common core evolutionary materialism, is also precisely the key vulnerability [question-begging, self-refuting], and that is why I join those who strip off the superstructure and go for the framing skeleton. Thus, with all due respect this is not a red herring issue, nor -- anticipating another possible objection -- is it a strawman distortion. We can go further. For, that vulnerability also extends to the implication of basing a worldview on ises that cannot ground oughtness, i.e. amorality. (I think there is a recent UD thread which discusses that.) Coming back on topic, I believe it is therefore fair and reasonable comment to hold that -- despite denials, subtle distinctions, sub-species or deflections -- "Naturalism is a priori evolutionary materialism, so it both begs the question and self-refutes." Of course, you (or others) may be able to show me in material error, and if so I would be happy to adjust my view. GEM of TKIkairosfocus_{October 20, 2010
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kairosfocus, I disagree: Naturalism is not materialism. And I can cite quite a number of self-described naturalists who are not materialists: David Chalmers and many of those who join him in rejecting materialism. Galen Strawson - unless you join him in calling panpsychism materialism. Bertrand Russell - unless you consider neutral monism materialism. That list can go on. You yourself quote the SEP entry where, explicitly, no attempt is made to rigidly define naturalism. Indeed, there's another telling quote from that same entry: So understood, ‘naturalism’ is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers. The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject ‘supernatural’ entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the ‘human spirit’. Even so, this entry will not aim to pin down any more informative definition of ‘naturalism’. It would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret ‘naturalism’ differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident. For better or worse, ‘naturalism’ is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as ‘non-naturalists’.[1] This inevitably leads to a divergence in understanding the requirements of ‘naturalism’. Those philosophers with relatively weak naturalist commitments are inclined to understand ‘naturalism’ in a unrestrictive way, in order not to disqualify themselves as ‘naturalists’, while those who uphold stronger naturalist doctrines are happy to set the bar for ‘naturalism’ higher.[2] The intentional vagueness of the opening should be striking: So many philosophers want to be considered 'naturalist', so they loosen the definition as needed. Indeed, the one thing that unites them is accepting science (not even as the exclusive method of gaining knowledge) and rejecting things that are supernatural and 'spooky', without any attempt to define supernatural - its own can of worms. At the same time, some naturalists - really, some materialists as well - openly assert ID theories: John Gribbin and Nick Bostrom come to mind (Bostrom advances the simulation argument, but rejects the simulation hypothesis. But it's important to note that according to Bostrom, the hypothesis is materialistic!), as do others. Bostrom explicitly calls the simulation argument and simulation hypothesis naturalistic and materialistic. Gribbin, I strongly believe, would say the same. You'll also note that in that same SEP entry, naturalism has morphed repeatedly over the years - at certain times it rejected 'action at a distance', then when the concept came to have utility, it accepted it. It stuck to a cartesian material view, then a newtonian, and now a quantum physical view that still has to be pieced together. My humble suggestion is this: Materialism is a red herring, as is naturalism. Words like 'natural' and 'supernatural' get thrown around, a lot of bluffing about 'naturalism' comes to pass, but at the end of the day the targets in question are particular religions and particular religious beliefs. Rather like how "Darwinism" can go through all manner of changes, 'natural selection' can even be discarded as the principle mechanism for diversity or the origination of novel traits, but for some people it's very important to call it all "Darwinism" anyway. One last note: Even when it comes to 'matter and energy', questions must be asked: What is matter? What is energy? As far as I know, scientists still are trying to puzzle out what matter ultimately is. As for energy, a quote: It is important to realize that in physics today, we have no knowledge of what energy is. We do not have a picture that energy comes in little blobs of a definite amount. It is not that way. However, there are formulas for calculating some numerical quantity and when we add it together it gives "28"—always the same number. It is an abstract thing in that it does not tell us the mechanisms or the reasons for the various formulas. A pat on the back to whoever can guess the source of that quote without googling.nullasalus_{October 20, 2010
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JDH: Some very provocative thoughts. Why not elaborate them a bit more? I gotta go now . . . Gkairosfocus_{October 19, 2010
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