Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

I keep having to remind myself that science is self-correcting …

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I have often been wearied by legends in their own lunchroom huffing that science differs from other endeavours because it is “self-correcting.”

To which I reply: Aw come off it, fellas. Any system that does not go extinct is self-correcting – after it collapses on its hind end. This is true of governments, businesses, churches, and not-for-profit organizations. I’ve seen enough of life to know.

Here’s a classic: At The Scientist’s NewsBlog, Bob Grant reveals (May 7, 2009) that

Scientific publishing giant Elsevier put out a total of six publications between 2000 and 2005 that were sponsored by unnamed pharmaceutical companies and looked like peer reviewed medical journals, but did not disclose sponsorship, the company has admitted.

Elsevier is conducting an “internal review” of its publishing practices after allegations came to light that the company produced a pharmaceutical company-funded publication in the early 2000s without disclosing that the “journal” was corporate sponsored

[ … ]

The allegations involve the Australasian Journal of Bone and Joint Medicine, a publication paid for by pharmaceutical company Merck that amounted to a compendium of reprinted scientific articles and one-source reviews, most of which presented data favorable to Merck’s products. The Scientist obtained two 2003 issues of the journal — which bore the imprint of Elsevier’s Excerpta Medica — neither of which carried a statement obviating Merck’s sponsorship of the publication.

The linked related stories and comments are most illuminating, and bear out my critique of “peer review” here. Let’s just say that peer review started out as a good idea, but …

(Note: There is no paywall, but you may need to register to view the story, .)

Also, today at Colliding Universes

Neutrinos: Sudbury Neutrino Observatory does the sun’s bookkeeping

Origin of life: The live cat vs. the dead cat

Cosmology: Wow. It takes guts to wage war with Stephen Hawking … he appeared in Star Trek

Universe: Arguments against flatness (plus exposing sloppy science writing)

Origin of life: Latest scenario gives RNA world a boost

Colliding Universes is my blog on competing theories about our universe.

Comments
----Diffaxial: "I happen to have time consuming professional obligations to attend to. I am amused how often discussants of a particular ilk claim by virtue of an interval of non-response that a point or refutation stands. It seems rather over-eager." Your immediate response to my refutation [at 304] was to ignore it and focus on something else. If, as you suggest, it was not your "real" response, you should have made that clear. For what it is worth, no one here believes that you will be rendered speechless by any reasoned argument however compelling that argument may be, or that you cannot fill up cyberspace in defense of postmoden irrationality however ineffective that defense may be, so you need not labor under that concern.StephenB
May 27, 2009
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beelzebub, ------"I assume you see this as analogous to the story of Jephthah’s daughter. If so, what is the explanation that will convince all of us that there is no problem here, and that everything is hunky-dory? Telling us that Jephthah didn’t burn his daughter is no good — it contradicts the clear meaning of the text, including the original Hebrew." I'm glad to see that you embrace literalism, beelzebub, it could be considered "dogmatic" even. You don't seem to be one "open" to interpretation, even though you claim to be the most open-minded. Still, to take the text literally, means that you have a problem with Jephthah, not God. God didn't command it, nor condone it, literally. Let's be consistent in our literalism, shall we? Do you also see the literal text where God sacrificed Himself for all of humanity?Clive Hayden
May 27, 2009
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ScottAndrews writes:
If I drummed up every scary truth and rumor I could think of about doctors (they make you take your clothes off, they stab you with needles, they cut you open with knives) and told them to someone who’d never met one, I could probably convince him never to see one, ever.
True, but he might be quite willing to see one if you explained why doctors do those things. I assume you see this as analogous to the story of Jephthah's daughter. If so, what is the explanation that will convince all of us that there is no problem here, and that everything is hunky-dory? Telling us that Jephthah didn't burn his daughter is no good -- it contradicts the clear meaning of the text, including the original Hebrew.
You’re getting a lot of bad information.
For example?beelzebub
May 27, 2009
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As per usual, once your position is refuted, you hearken back to your well-rehearsed strawman about MY principles of right reason. So it is with postmodern atheists.
I happen to have time consuming professional obligations to attend to. I am amused how often discussants of a particular ilk claim by virtue of an interval of non-response that a point or refutation stands. It seems rather over-eager. But watch this space.Diffaxial
May 27, 2009
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Beelzebub, If I drummed up every scary truth and rumor I could think of about doctors (they make you take your clothes off, they stab you with needles, they cut you open with knives) and told them to someone who'd never met one, I could probably convince him never to see one, ever. But I've been to a few in my life and experienced the benefits. You're getting a lot of bad information. Maybe that's what you want. I don't know. This forum contains awesome information on the scientific exploration of intelligent design, but the Bible is a subject only diminished by public debate. I don't know if you're looking for answers or are open to them or just having fun, but there are no answers here.ScottAndrews
May 27, 2009
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---Diffaxial: "You’ve repeatedly stated that rejection of your argument is inherently irrational, and denotes an irrational person. Therefore your definition of a “rational person” is, in essence, “a person who agrees with my position.” It isn't my argument. I didn't invent the principles of right reason, nor did I conceive of the metaphysical foundations for modern science. That you reject them is a commentary on your status as a reasonable person. Its called self-condemnation. I notice, by the way, that you completely ignored the substance of my post @302, which explains why quantum events are not causeless events. As per usual, once your position is refuted, you hearken back to your well-rehearsed strawman about MY principles of right reason. So it is with postmodern atheists.StephenB
May 27, 2009
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beelzebub, -----"Every faithful Muslim, Sikh, Moonie, and Scientologist in the world does exactly the same thing. If your “just give it time” ethos applies to Christianity, why doesn’t it also apply to these other belief systems?" "Just give it time" is the mantra of evolution.Clive Hayden
May 27, 2009
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Anyone who thinks that effects can occur without causes, or that a thing can both be and not be at the same time, or that something can come from nothing is irrational by choice.
Which reminds me to chuckle again over your having appropriated "all rational people...since the beginning of time" into your name-drop list in order to bolster your argument by means of the fallacy argumentum ad populum. You've repeatedly stated that rejection of your argument is inherently irrational, and denotes an irrational person. Therefore your definition of a "rational person" is, in essence, "a person who agrees with my position." So your assertion boils down to "all people who agree with me, and all people who have ever agreed with me, agree with me." Even your fallacies (argumentum ad populum) have fallacies (another friggin' tautology!!).Diffaxial
May 27, 2009
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Scott, You can persuade yourself to believe anything (and to continue believing it) if you get in the habit of writing off every discrepancy as something that you just don't understand yet, something that will be resolved if you just give it time. Every faithful Muslim, Sikh, Moonie, and Scientologist in the world does exactly the same thing. If your "just give it time" ethos applies to Christianity, why doesn't it also apply to these other belief systems?
The account of Jephthah’s daughter is just that - it’s a way out. It’s an examination of those who read it.
Vjtorley accepts that Jephthah burned his daughter. Do you think that he's looking for "a way out"? Is there something suspect about his faith since he doesn't try to doctor the story in the way that you do? Are you this dismissive of everyone who disagrees with you?beelzebub
May 27, 2009
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-----Diffaxial: “It cannot be “irrational” to assert that a claim about the self-evidence of effects and their causes is not universal after all, in light of decades of stable findings in physics that are interpretable otherwise. Indeed, at this point in history “irrationality” attaches to denying those completely secure findings.” Anyone who thinks that effects can occur without causes, or that a thing can both be and not be at the same time, or that something can come from nothing is irrational by choice. It has nothing to do with intelligence, but it has everything to do with one’s capacity to draw valid conclusions about the real world. ----A key observation that will never go away vis results in quantum physics is that the verbal descriptions and pictorial representations of the physical world we derive from experience with macroscopic objects (and perhaps even from sensory systems and conceptual categories adapted to coping with macroscopic objects) are simply NOT APPLICABLE to quantum events. The metaphysical foundations for science have nothing to do with “verbal descriptions” and “macroscopic objects.” They are the self-evident truths through which verbal descriptions and macroscopic events are understood. You are conflating metaphysical truths with physical realities that can be observed and measured, an error, by the way, that stems from rejecting the metaphysical foundations themselves. ----“Truisms such as “every effect has a cause” and “you can’t be two places at one time” [he simply DON’T WORK at that level. In other words, these heretofore perfectly serviceable macroscopic conceptual tools are of no use at the quantum level. It doesn’t follow that the macroscopic world will suddenly become a Daliesque cartoon of dripping clocks, self-raining roads and walls leaping out of the void - after all, we continue to live in a macroscopic world at the level of which statistical averaging of quantum events renders them imperceptible to ordinary experience.” No one has here said anything one way or the other about being “in two places at the same time,” so that is one strawman that you can throw out right away. With regard to the self-evident truths that undergird science, they not only work, they are essential to understanding anything at all about what may or may not be going on. If an event requires certain physically NECESSARY conditions to occur, but if those conditions are not SUFFICIENT for its occurrence, and, if under the circumstances, the event occurs, then that event is [A] unpredictable, [B] spontaneous, and [C] Not uncaused. In any quantum event, physically NECESSARY conditions exist that are not SUFFICIENT to make that event occur, meaning that the conditions cannot GUANRANTEE the event. So, when a particle appears in a quantum vacuum, it is spontaneous but not uncaused because it has many necessary conditions. To be uncaused, it must have NO NECESSARY OR SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS whatsoever. In other words, something cannot come from nothing. All of the principles of right reason illuminate and confirm one other. The proposition that a thing cannot be and not be is related to the principle that an effect cannot occur without a cause, which in turn, is related to the principle that something cannot come from nothing. This is the big problem of our age. We approach scientific paradoxes as if they were somehow divorced from reason itself, as if we were rational and the universe we are investigating is not rational. It isn’t that complicated: [A] We have rational minds, [B] We live in a rational universe, and [C] there is a correspondence between the two. If we do not understand this vital self-evident truth, we cannot reason in the abstract.StephenB
May 27, 2009
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vjtorley, I've long since replied to your Jephthah post (more than 9 hours ago), but my comment is languishing in the moderation queue. When it appears, it will be way back here. Regarding your post above on dogma, I would note that the advantages you claim for dogma are not unique to dogma. Provisional beliefs do the job just as well (more on this later when I respond to your post in detail). The one thing that distinguishes dogmatic belief from provisional belief -- its absolute refusal to question and correct itself -- is entirely negative, as far as I can see. As discussed earlier in this thread, such absolutism would only be advantageous in cases where the dogma was known, without the slightest glimmer of doubt, to be absolutely true. In such cases, dogmatism would protect the truth from corruption. Because we are fallible humans, there are no such cases. Dogma is a very bad idea.beelzebub
May 27, 2009
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Returning to matters epistemological: Beelzebub (#255)
My comment (#210): If the hypothesis of anthropogenic global warming being a significant and potentially deadly influence on climate turns out to be mistaken, you can be absolutely sure that it will not die a clean death by Popperian falsification. Rather, the AGW hypothesis will mutate in its death throes, and its scientific refutation will therefore be messy and drawn-out. Your comment (#255): True, and that is how it should be, as long as the “mutated” versions are live possibilities. Truth is not obligated to fit neatly into our preconceived frameworks. It may be that one of the “mutated” hypotheses is actually correct. My comment (#210): The point I want to make is that the absence of dogma is actually hindering the public’s search for truth, as the claims and counter-claims continue to fly. Your comment (#255): What a strange argument. I would say just the opposite: that the public is best served when disputants modify their positions in response to new evidence rather than digging in their heels dogmatically.
You made some valid points in your remarks above. However, the point I wish to reiterate is that a scientific theory which is not tied to any solid claims that it is willing to stake its reputation on, runs the risk of being too slippery to falsify. A theory needs its central dogmas; otherwise it is not a proper theory at all. What worries me about both neo-Darwinian evolution and anthropogenic global warming is that both hypotheses are far too flexible, in their ability to accommodate countervailing evidence. Darwinism is no longer tied to a mechanism - evolutionists are even willing to consider epigenetic inheritance , which would have been called Lamarckianism when I was growing up. And the family tree of life has gone, it seems. Each gene now has its own family tree. Anthropogenic global warming is a pretty slippery customer too. Just ask yourself: supposing for argument's sake that it were wrong, what kind of measurements, over what period of time, would be needed to discredit it as a hypothesis? The result of all this "accommodation" is that both theories have become virtually immune to falsification, except by bizarre lines of evidence. Sure, the sudden discovery of fossil rabbits in pre-Cambrian strata around the world (J. S. Haldane), or for that matter the remains of a crashed UFO with an alien blueprint for every life-form on Earth today, would overthrow Darwinism. And sure, a sudden drop of 5 degrees in global temperatures would suffice to overturn the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis. But most scientific hypotheses are much more straightforwardly testable than this. If proponents of Einstein's theory of relativity demanded such outlandish refutations before abandoning their positions, people in other the scientific disciplines would laugh at them. What needs to be done? I would suggest that instead of trying to keep a cluster of hypotheses under the big tent of neo-Darwinism, biologists should be prepared to "let a hundred flowers bloom," to cite Mao Zedong out of context. Indeed, open warfare between these rival schools of thought is highly desirable: it'll sharpen scientists' wits and give them something solid to attack - rival theories which actually contain disprovable dogmas. And among these many schools of biological thought, ID could also flourish - although it too would have to diversify into several schools, in furious competition with with each other. As for AGW: a theory which simply predicts a global temperature rise over the next 100 years isn't really a theory. It's far too broad to merit that appellation. Instead, what is needed is a detailed, falsifiable model listing all the parameters that are hypothesized to influence the Earth's climate, together with the values they are supposed to have. Of course, there may be several such AGW models, but that's fine, so long as they "nail their flags to the mast" and say what they're committed to, and what would overthrow them. I would argue that open rivalry between these different models, with their warring dogmas, is the best way forward for science. And what about religion? You complain that too many dogmas are unfalsifiable. Nonsense. I'm sure I could think of about 50 ways in which Christianity could conceivably be falsified by scientists, philosophers and/or historians over the next 100 years, and probably more if I tried. So far, however, Christianity has done remarkably well. Hinduism, however, would be much harder to falsify - precisely because it has so few dogmas. (For instance, the discovery that animals pre-date human beings hasn't resulted in any mass defections - in any case, I imagine Hindus could postulate life on other planets to circumvent the problems arising for their doctrine of reincarnation.) To really discredit Hinduism, you'd have to render the idea of reincarnation untenable - perhaps by showing that it presupposes a very extreme form of dualism, which is incompatible with the findings of neuroscience. But I imagine it would take decades of research before scientists could confidently assert this. Anyway, the point I wanted to get across was: dogmas are not always a bad thing. They can be stultifying; but they can also be intellectually fruitful, in their own way. The proposed elimination of all dogmas is a drastic step, fraught with peril; if implemented, it would render clear thinking impossible.vjtorley
May 27, 2009
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Hi Kfocus,
pardon, but I think we need to zoom in a bit on that. For, are you certain that “I don’t have any beliefs that I am 100% certain of”?
That's a good question, and the answer is no. It might be more accurate for me to say I'm not aware of any beliefs I'm 100% certain of, and that statement again is not meant to express certainty. I do provisionally accept the laws of non-contradiction, excluded middle, and identity as being useful, but again I can't say they are universally true. I've read that some parts of QM are inconsistent with some of these laws, for example, so I think there's reason to doubt them.herb
May 27, 2009
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A quick typo correction to post #295: The paragraph
1. Non-human animals exhibit nociception (sensitivity to noxious stimuli) but lack subjective awareness altogether. In other words, the fawn doesn’t reacts to the heat of the fire but doesn’t suffer the pain of being burned alive. (Very much a minority view.)
should read as follows:
1. Non-human animals exhibit nociception (sensitivity to noxious stimuli) but lack subjective awareness altogether. In other words, the fawn reacts to the heat of the fire but doesn’t suffer the pain of being burned alive. (Very much a minority view.)
That is to say, the first "doesn't" in the paragraph I originally typed was not meant to be there.vjtorley
May 27, 2009
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You may think that you examine the evidence, but it examines you. Beelzebub: What’s your justification in saying that, apart from your feeling of discomfort at confronting the horrible story of Jephthah’s daughter?
Jesus once said that his followers must eat his flesh and drink his blood. Many were so shocked by his speech that they left him. The meaning seemed plain enough. Eat flesh. Drink blood. Disgusting. The end. In their minds, they were making an easy decision based on evidence. Other disciples, based on what they knew of Jesus' teachings, weren't so quick. They still wanted to know what he meant, but they weren't in such a hurry to jump ship. As it turns out, Jesus' words were entirely symbolic. By speaking as he did, Jesus revealed what was in the various disciples' hearts. Those who wanted to leave had their easy excuse. Could there be any doubt as to what reaction his words would provoke? Does something like that just slip out? The account of Jephthah's daughter is just that - it's a way out. It's an examination of those who read it.ScottAndrews
May 27, 2009
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Beelzebub (#255) On the subject of animal suffering, you wrote:
But to think that a fawn burning to death in a forest fire deserves to suffer and die seems as bizarre as claiming that all of those Indonesian infants deserved to drown when the tsunami hit Banda Aceh.
I agree. The problem you raise is a genuine one. Before I continue, I should like to point out that in Jewish tradition, the Noachide code condemns cruelty to animals; while Christians have the word of their Savior that God marks the fall of a sparrow (Matthew 10:29). Christians are therefore forbidden to think that God is heartless or unfair. Here is a list of resolutions that Christian writers of various stripes have put forward in the past: 1. Non-human animals exhibit nociception (sensitivity to noxious stimuli) but lack subjective awareness altogether. In other words, the fawn doesn't reacts to the heat of the fire but doesn't suffer the pain of being burned alive. (Very much a minority view.) 2. Non-human animals do suffer, but their subjective awareness is merely in the present moment, as they have no autobiographical memory and hence no enduring sense of suffering over time. In contemporary philosophical terminology, they are not "subjects of a life." Or as neurologists would put it: non-human animals possess primary consciousness but lack higher-order consciousness. They suffer but have no sense of self. Consequently, their suffering is infinitely less odious to them than ours is to us. Because this suffering is so fleeting and transitory, and so utterly insignificant compared to the suffering of creatures who are "subjects of a life", God is not obliged to prevent it at all costs, even if that means resorting to extraordinary means (miracles). Consequently, God is not necessarily unjust if He sometimes allows non-human animals to suffer. 3. Non-human animals do suffer, and they may even have a rudimentary sense of self, but they lack the ability to reflect on their suffering, either because they have no "theory of mind" (awareness of other selves) or because they are unable to have the higher-order intentional states required for such philosophical ruminations (e.g. beliefs about beliefs). Although they experience pain, they feel no existential angst along the lines of: "Why is this happening to me? Why, God, Why?" In other words, the spiritual component of their distress is wholly absent. On this account, God does not have an absolute obligation to prevent or alleviate pain and suffering which lacks a spiritual component. Consequently, He does not wrong non-human animals when He allows them to suffer. 4. Non-human animals do suffer, and their suffering matters to God - so much so that He has prepared some sort of afterlife for them, but this afterlife does not include the Beatific Vision, of which they are naturally incapable. (A novel, 20th century view, popularized by the convert and ex-atheist C. S. Lewis.) 5. Non-human animals do suffer, and their suffering matters to God - but as they are by nature incapable of surviving death (unlike human beings, who are capable of performing non-bodily acts), God makes it up to them in their final moments, by allowing them to enjoy some sort of terminal state of bliss which wipes the moral slate clean, as it were. Hindus would add another option: 6. Non-human animals were moral agents in a previous life, so any suffering they now endure is deserved. I agree with you that option 6 is highly implausible. Human beings (who are, as far as we know, the only moral agents on this planet) are evolutionary Johnny-come-latelies. To say that the fawn sinned in a previous life as a huiman being is incompatible with the fact that animal suffering has been going on for tens of millions of years, at least. Descartes favored option 1, but as far as I am aware, none of the Christian Fathers of the Church did so. Nor did Jewish commentators; indeed, the Noachide code expressly prohibits cruelty to animals, so clearly it is part of Jewish belief that animals do suffer. I should point out, however, that from a scientific standpoint, it is surprisingly difficult to prove Descartes wrong - although the article Blindsight in Man and Monkey" by Petra Stoerig and Alan Cowey at http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/120/3/535 makes it appear very likely that monkeys do indeed possess subjective awareness. However, even today there are still a few philosophers and neurologists who maintain that animals lack subjective awareness. I should add that people in a persistent vegetative state are capable of an impressive repertoire of reflexive and nociceptive responses, as Professor James Rose notes in his widely cited online paper, The Neurobehavioral Nature of Fishes and the Question of Awareness and Pain , which I would strongly recommend that you read. (By the way, Rose contends that some mammals are capable of suffering pain, but fish are not. However, Rose adds that fish are capable of learning and can engage in a variety of behavioral repertoires. And if the notion of something lacking subjective awareness but nevertheless capable of learning strikes you as counter-intuitive, you'll just have to read Rose's paper.) Professor Rose also marshals neurological evidence showing that the cognitive-evaluative dimensions of pain are very much linked to frontal lobe structures in the brain - in particular the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate gyrus. The findings add to the plausibility of theological options 2 and 3 (see below). The view that animals lack an autobiographical memory remains a very respectable one in the field of animal research. There is strong evidence that some birds (e.g. scrub jays) can recall certain episodes from the past (e.g. where they stored some food, several months ago); but it does not follow from this fact that they have a sense of self, let alone an ability to engage in mental time-travel (e.g. what were you doing in 1986?) For memory researchers, a capacity for episodic memory does not equate to having a "This is your life" autobiographical memory. However, science has not spoken its last word here. Further research may suggest that some animals keep a kernel of biographical information in their heads, throughout their lives. Given that the present state of research into higher-order consciousness in animals is still in it infancy, it behooves us to keep an open mind. The notion that non-human animals experience any kind of spiritual distress is even more doubtful. As this lecture on Dr. Moti Nissani's Web page shows, there is laboratory evidence suggesting that non-human animals lack a theory of mind, although the research remains heavily controverted. But even the discover that non-human animals have an ability to empathize with other animals would not necessarily establish that they have a spiritual dimension to their lives. But let's get back to God. Even if non-human animals lack a sense of self, or a theory of mind, or a spiritual dimension in their lives, does it follow that He is entitled to let them suffer, rather than continually intervening to save them from pain? Most people living in the 21st century would answer with an emphatic "No! That's unjust!" while most people living in the time of Aquinas would have answered the same question with an equally emphatic "Of course He is! What's your problem?" Who is right here? I happen to be living in the 21st century, but I don't see that as a reason for giving undue weight to its intellectual prejudices. That's why I continually try to step out of my own time: the way we see things now might turn out to be totally wrong. I should also warn you against the dangers of anthropomorphism. What would it be like to be a conscious fawn, but lack a sense of self, or a theory of mind? We might picture Bambi screaming as the flames consume its flesh, and we might suppose that the flames feel about as painful for Bambi as they do for us. We might be tempted to retort: "Never mind whether Bambi has any high-falutin' second-order intentional states or cogitations on the meaning of life. A pain is still a pain, and a scream of agony is still a scream, whether it issue from the mouth of a fawn or a child. It's not fair, and God is a monster for allowing it!" But Professor Rose's paper (cited above) shows that this way of thinking about suffering will not do. Our sophisticated brains DO enhance the way in which we suffer, and the suffering of non-human animals is likely to be orders of magnitude less than what we would experience, when placed in a comparative situation. Before we go on, let me ask you, Beelzebub: do you maintain that it would have been better if God had not created human beings, if the only way of doing so was to make a world where some non-human animals suffered unmerited, unrecompensed pain? I'd just like to know where you stand on this moral question. (We can argue later about whether an omnipotent Being could have placed humans in a world with people but no non-human animals.) Finally, I'll say something briefly about options 4 and 5. Option 5 looks especially unconvincing to me; it wouldn't achieve its purpose unless the animal were sophisticated enough to realize that it was being recompensed for the pain its suffered, and if it were that smart, it would be surely capable of moral agency, like us. So that leaves 4. Option 4 raises problems in relation to individual identity if we imagine the afterlife purely as a resurrection (would a resurrected animal be the same individual as the individual whose atoms it was remade from?) If on the other hand we envisage animals as having immortal souls, this invites the question: on what grounds? Does subjective awareness require a disembodied soul? Descartes would say yes; Aristotle and Aquinas (and the Christian Fathers who wrote on the matter) would not. Or perhaps having a sense of self, or an ability to empathize, is a non-bodily capacity. It is plausible that some mammals and birds have these capacities. I should add that C. S. Lewis endorsed option 4. This was a theological innovation; but it is still perfectly compatible with the long-standing theological tradition that only humans can enjoy the Beatific Vision. The correct solution might turn out to be a combination of options 1, 2 and 3 for some animals, and option 4 for others. But it would be unwise to be too dogmatic here, precisely because there are no dogmas on the fate of animals at the present time. Enough of my theological rambling. Here's a link to a Christian writer who used to be an atheist, on the subject of the fate of dead birds: http://www.conversiondiary.com/2008/05/going-to-be-with-jesus.html . Her Web site is well worth having a look at. The final point that I want to leave you with is that we simply do not know enough at present about animal awareness to treat the existence of unmerited animal suffering as a good argument (let alone a decisive one) for denying the existence of an infinite and omnibenevolent God. Animal suffering is one area where it definitely pays to keep an open mind.vjtorley
May 27, 2009
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Orasmus @ 278:
Diffaxial, this statement seems an appeal to ignorance.
StephenB @ 280:
Hundreds of things APPEAR not to have a cause, which means, of course, that we do not yet know what that cause is.
Cling to that. But you will have to assent to three things: 1) Physics has been presenting your counter example for seven or eight decades, and, the severe consternation it has caused in some quarters notwithstanding, no one has been able to make it "go away" by finding hidden factors or other unknowns to explain the otherwise irreducibly random and uncaused nature of some events at that level. 2) If the current state of understanding of these matters in physics holds, your entire argument collapses, as you have repeatedly stated that even a single counter example renders rationality impossible. 3) It cannot be "irrational" to assert that a claim about the self-evidence of effects and their causes is not universal after all, in light of decades of stable findings in physics that are interpretable otherwise. Indeed, at this point in history "irrationality" attaches to denying those completely secure findings. A key observation that will never go away vis results in quantum physics is that the verbal descriptions and pictorial representations of the physical world we derive from experience with macroscopic objects (and perhaps even from sensory systems and conceptual categories adapted to coping with macroscopic objects) are simply NOT APPLICABLE to quantum events. Much of the struggle over the interpretation of these physical and mathematical facts arises from to struggle to translate those findings into macroscopic language. What seems most clear is that such macroscopically derived verbal formula are simply obsolete and inapplicable at the quantum level: these fundamental, empirically completely secure empirical realities at the heart of matter and energy are simply not expressible in the language of macroscopic objects, events, and the causal relaionships between them. Truisms such as "every effect has a cause" and "you can't be two places at one time" simply DON'T WORK at that level. In other words, these heretofore perfectly serviceable macroscopic conceptual tools are are of no use at the quantum level. It doesn't follow that the macroscopic world will suddenly become a Daliesque cartoon of dripping clocks, self-raining roads and walls leaping out of the void - after all, we continue to live in a macroscopic world at the level of which statistical averaging of quantum events renders them imperceptible to ordinary experience. What does follow is that the claim that these verbal generalizations can be extended everywhere, at every level, is false.Diffaxial
May 27, 2009
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Footnote on Jepthah: Here is a case where human responsibility to be prudent and to humbly acknowledge foolishness and correct oneself are aptly illustrated by painfully pointed example in the Bible. (Plainly, J should not have sworn foolishly. Having done so, he should have seen that he was proposing in the end to do that which was contrary to the Law . . . as in why "every man did what was right in his own eyes" is NOT a commendatory historical judgement on the time of the Judges [or of our own prone-ness to relativism]. And, of course it is possible that what did in the end happen is the girl was given up to perpetual virginity as a servant of the tabernacle rather than killed.) I also find it illustrative that those who are so quick to denounce unbending core principles are here implicitly appealing to just such. Even, while all around us, we have a situation where in the US alone since 1973, 45 - 50 MILLION innocent unborn children have been sacrificed on the altar of "right to choose." (I have seen numbers that suggest the global number since the mid 80's may be as high as 2 BILLIONS. I hope, desperately, that these figures are wrong.) So, I think a bit of looking in the mirror would be helpful for those who want to divert the thread rto camp out on Jepthah. (And, BTW, observe how the case of Abraham and Isaac, marks a point of clear correction and progress in religion. When we come to Jepthah, he is obviously held up as an example of what NOT to do. And, it is worth noting that in a later situation, when Israel was defeating a neighbouring pagan nation, the king of that nation publicly sacrificed his own son. In horror, the army of Israel went home.) Sounds like openness to correction to me. And, progress . . . GEM of TKIkairosfocus
May 27, 2009
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Hi Herb: I see in 243:
. . . I don’t have any beliefs that I am 100% certain of. So I consider all of my beliefs open to question.
pardon, but I think we need to zoom in a bit on that. For, are you certain that "I don’t have any beliefs that I am 100% certain of"? Putting it another way: you have here made an affirmation of knowing your state of mind, to try to say all your beliefs are less than certain. In so doing, you seem to report in effect a certainty: the state of affairs in my mind IS that "I don’t have any beliefs that I am 100% certain of." Now, do you believe -- accept as so -- that "I don’t have any beliefs that I am 100% certain of"? If so -- and that is the import of your words, this is a belief in your mind. Also, do you mean that the state "I don’t have any beliefs that I am 100% certain of" does not also include the state: "I have beliefs that I am 100% certain of"? [If so, you assume the laws of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, as well as identity.] So, you have a self-referential belief, that it seems you hold to accurately speak of the state of affairs in your mind. But, if that is so, then it seems that you have a bit more certainty in your beliefs than you think. Perhaps, instead, you mean that your overall set of beliefs about the world has in it significant elements of uncertainty, and that you are open to being corrected on points of error. The first is so for all of us, and the second, hopefully so. (Recall, undeniable and self-evident truth no 1: error exists. So, there is truth, but we may be mistaken about it. Thus, we need to be humble enough to face the possibility of error; but that does not include that we must accept absurdities in trying to be humble about what we believe and how open we are to correction. E.g. Algebra teachers know full well that errors are possible, but sometimes the calculation and its underlying reason are done correctly.The principles of correctness in reasoning are premised on self-evident truths that once we understand them we will see they are not just so but must be so on pain of absurdities if we try to deny them. Absurdities that we do not have to dig deep to discover -- they come out as soon as we use common sense to play around a bit with what it means to "understand.") Hope I have been helpful. GEM of TKI PS: Coming back to the original focus for a moment, let us note what Mrs O'Leary had to say:
I have often been wearied by legends in their own lunchroom huffing that science differs from other endeavours because it is “self-correcting.” To which I reply: Aw come off it, fellas. Any system that does not go extinct is self-correcting - after it collapses on its hind end. This is true of governments, businesses, churches, and not-for-profit organizations. I’ve seen enough of life to know.
So the real problem is with pride and power games that make science as well as other institutions hard to correct. Recognising that error exists is an undeniable truth is a good step towards correcting that problem. And, as has been pointed out multiple times above -- with enough instances to show that it is so on the ground -- science is by no means uniquely self-correcting; even by comparison with that much despised idea, "religion." [Nice, vague term, nuh . . . ] In fact, in our time, the real problem is in part that science is currently largely in the grips of ideologues who are quite resistant to much needed correction. For instance, do you think that Mr Lewontin of the US NAS was really open to correction when he wrote this in the NY Review of Books in 1997:
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door . . .
kairosfocus
May 27, 2009
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Onlookers (and BZ et al): Re BZ, 283: The slice of the cake that -- sadly but instructively -- has in it all the telling ingredients, again. Let us therefore put in a few corrective notes: ______________ kairosfocus wrote: I believe that CERTAIN universal claims are self evident and/or undeniable on pain of self referential absurdity or vicious infinite regress; and, as such are not provisional. a --> Observe, this is in a context where BZ still refuses to address the case in point I have shown: Error exists, which to try to deny only ends up instantiating. From 111, May 23rd, yet again:
Let’s start with truth claim no 1, courtesy Josiah Royce: “Error exists.” Let’s call it E, for short. This happens to be an undeniably true claim, as, to try to deny it ends up implicitly affirming it. (Not-E means that E is false, i.e. E would be an error. But, that would instantiate an example of just what E affirms. So, (a) truth exists (as what we may be in error about), and (b) it is in some cases knowable beyond reasonable dispute. Similarly, the core principles of right reason are undeniably true on pain of reduction to self-referential absurdities. So also, for instance, while our knowledge of many truths is indeed provisional, we may only embark on the voyage of knowledge and reasoned communication about knowledge by implicitly accepting such core principles as firm and unalterable guiding stars. (For instance to attempt to deny or dismiss the principle of non-contradiction — even by reference to Mr Schroedinger’s poor cat — requires us to affirm that certain things are so, implying that their opposites are NOT so. So, one is in the position of having to implicitly assume what one explicitly seeks to deny. Selective hyperskepticism, reduced to absurdity.
b --> So, there are demonstrable truths that we can understand in light of our experience of the world as minded creatures, and that are deniable only on pain of immediate absurdity. That is, we have here a self-evident truth. (And, this truth is a particularly humbling one -- far from being "infallible" we are vulnerable to error; but of course self-evident principles of right reason can help us identify and correct at least some of those errors.) c --> Observe carefully how BZ NEVER addresses on the merits this case of a correctly reasoned out instance of an undeniably so, self-evident truth. One that is presented with the steps of reasoning highlighted so we can see for ourselves. Claim is stated, which turns out to be crucially self-referential. Its denial as attempted actually ends up affirming it by providing an instance. So, the claim is undeniably true on pain of immediate absurdity, i.e. it is self evident . . . and it plainly is not words about words but about real world experiences: the reality of being in error, and where that points. I [BZ] responded: You are making the tacit assumption that we can reason infallibly, at least in some instances, and that our conclusions of “self-referential absurdity” cannot be doubted. You are also tacitly assuming that the world absolutely must be intelligible. d --> notice the substitution of "infallibility" for correctness, despite my having pointed out the issue and the distinction above, including the example of a partly correct Algebra assignment. KF inexplicably called my reply an “ad hominem laced strawman.” e --> Think about how you have substituted reasoning "infallibly" for reasoning "correctly": strawman misrepresentation. f --> Add the context of recent debates and controversies over the term "infallible" and the subtle ad hominem at once surfaces He [i.e. the undersigned] then replied: …to be able to reason CORRECTLY…does not at all entail that one is infallible in reasoning. KF, I haven’t claimed that it does. g --> BZ has here -- AGAIN, despite correction adn relevant counter-example -- substituted infallibility for correctness: infallibility means that one is not prone to error at all -- precisely what "error exists" denies. Correctness means that on evidence you have got it right in a particular relevant case. (Sometimes you do get your algebra right, including your Boolean Algebra . . . ) I pointed out that You are making the tacit assumption that we can reason infallibly, at least in some instances, and that our conclusions of “self-referential absurdity” cannot be doubted. h --> Again, BZ here insists on putting pejoratively loaded words in my mouth that do not belong there, while refusing to address the actual evidential case in point that would show the CORRECTNESS of my reasoning IN A SPECIFIC CASE. i --> One that BTW directly entails that reasoning will not be correct in all cases, so that we need reliable principles of reasoning to tell the correct from eh incorrect to a sufficient degree that we may act with wisdom, not mere trial and error. j --> Self-evidently true first principles of such right reasoning -- as I drew out above following Josiah Royce et al -- provide precisely the tools we need: error exists, so truth exists, and we may be able to know the difference in certain relevant cases as shown. So also, in exploring how that happens we see that A and NOT-A cannot be true at the same time and in the same sense, and that something is going to be A or not-A, not both, once A is distinctly recognisable (at minimum on case in point and family resemblance); etc. _______________ In short, we now see that BZ's "provisionality" of his beliefs is -- sadly -- in fact a hollow claim. In practice --as shown at length above, he has rejected well-founded corrections. Even on pain of absurdity. Let us learn from this case, where rejection of first principles of right reason and knowledge lead us. GEM of TKIkairosfocus
May 27, 2009
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vj, First, I appreciate your willingness to acknowledge that the story of Jephthah's daughter poses a genuine problem for the believer. Though I disagree with your solution to the problem, I applaud your honesty in facing it squarely, unlike others on this thread who have sought to minimize it or rationalize it out of existence. You write:
Anyway, the upshot is that the vast majority of Christian commentators condemned Jephthah for his vow. Some, such as Ambrose, went further and said he should never have kept it...
To me, the question of whether Jephthah's action was moral is secondary. After all, we know that humans can do the wrong thing. A more important question, as you acknowledge in your comment, concerns God's behavior in this sad episode. As for Jephthah, I think we agree that his intentions were good. If he failed, it was largely a failure of understanding, not of character. He made a stupid vow and then compounded his error by following through on it. Regarding Chrysostom's idea that God intended Jephthah's experience to be a "cautionary tale", I would agree with Thomson that this is "startling" -- and highly unsatisfactory. It paints God as being willing to allow the brutal killing of an innocent girl merely for didactic purposes that could easily have been effected in a less cruel fashion.
However, if you wish to argue that God was bound to intervene here, Beelzebub, then logic compels you to argue the same for every other case where human lives were lost as a result of people’s misguided religious beliefs.
I agree, and I do make that argument. God has a lot to answer for, assuming that he exists.
I can only conclude that God’s failure to enlighten us in these instances is a consequence of the Fall. The lines of communication...have been broken...for the most part, God lets us wallow in whatever error we’ve dreamed up. Why? I can only suppose that Divine intervention, if practiced regularly, would prove too messy - too Deus ex machina.
He must be an extremely fastidious God to value tidiness over morality.
I should add that since religious error is ultimately Satanic in origin...
I would argue that its origin is ultimately Divine, since God knew before he created Satan that all of this would happen. He created Satan nevertheless, which makes him responsible for the consequences.
...any demand that God rebut all the pernicious religious errors that we fall into is indeed tantamount to expecting God to intervene to stop Satan. That’s presumption on our part, surely.
Why? Is it really too much to ask of a supposedly benevolent God that he quash evil, particularly when my namesake is supposed to be purely evil? What harm would it do to deny Satan's free will? A completely off-topic aside: When I read your posts, I try to "hear" them in a voice with an Australian accent, since I know from your linked web page that you are Australian. It doesn't always work, however, because the "default" voices I "hear" have American and British accents (cue jokes from the peanut gallery about hearing voices in my head). Out of curiosity, when you read comments at UD, what sort of accent do you "hear" them in, if any at all? Good night, all.beelzebub
May 27, 2009
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VJTorley, I would add that God is more interested in the salvation of our souls, rather than the preservation of our physical bodies. It seems atheist take the preservation of the body as the highest good, since they do not believe in a soul. This is where the conflict arises. As I'm sure you know, Christ said (paraphrasing): It is better to enter the kingdom of God missing a leg, than to enter Gahiana, body intact. So God is not worried about our bodies in the least. It is central to what He wished to convey to us; that we are more than the sum of our bodies. So much more. Beelzebub, walking toward the edge of a vast ocean, put his toes in the water but declined to take a swim because he could not decide if he is willing to risk the vast unknown of the deep, until such time that he knows the totality of what is contained in it. Yet Christ tells us in numerous ways that it is He that knows the Ocean since it is He that is the Ocean. That if we imitate His ways, we could not fear the ocean or get lost in it. One great upshot here, though. Beelz will take the best seat in the house, once he comes around to taking a swim. Heaven awaits to loudly applaud his courage.Oramus
May 26, 2009
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Beelzebub (#287) Well spotted. You're quite right on the quote.vjtorley
May 26, 2009
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Vivid: Quoting William Craig: “The quantum vacuum ( void) is not what most people envision when they think of a vacuum (void), that is absolutely nothing. On the contrary, it’s a sea of fluctuating energy, an arena of violent activity that has a rich physical structure and can be described by physical laws.” I didn’t say that the quantum void was completely unknown. I said that it was not nothing, which is exactly what William Craig is saying. I was making the distinction between nothing and the unknown, not the distinction between the partly unknown and completely unknown. Much about quantum mechanics qualifies as “unknown,” but not everything. So, much so, that skeptics allude to that part which is unknown and call it nothing, which is my point. Still, we agree that something cannot come from nothing, which is the critical issue.StephenB
May 26, 2009
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vjtorley, I hope that I can continue this discussion, but my comments are being held in moderation and two of them were just deleted altogether from the "Faith and Evolution" thread for pointing out errors in the video at the new website. We'll see how it goes. Before I comment on the substance of your post, I should point out an error at a key spot in your Thomson excerpt:
As Chrysostom allowed this sacrifice to go ahead as a cautionary tale, lest anyone in the future vow to take a life in the expectation...
Obviously, Chrysostom didn't allow the sacrifice to go ahead; it was God. The passage should read:
As Chrysostom sees it, God allowed this sacrifice to go ahead as a cautionary tale, lest anyone in the future vow to take a life in the expectation...
beelzebub
May 26, 2009
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And something else to consider with regard to Jephthah: Judges is a history. A scribe chose to leave in something unflattering about a hero that he did not have too. Does that make the history more or less reliable? And this, btw, would also apply to the records regarding Noah, Aaron, Moses, Samson, David, Solomon and numerous other Hebrew leaders.tribune7
May 26, 2009
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And with regard to oaths, let's not forget Matt 5:33-35tribune7
May 26, 2009
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Hi Beelzebub Well, there seems to have been quite a lively discussion of Jephthah during the last few hours. Readers might be interested to know that there is a very good book called "Writing the Wrongs" by John Lee Thomson, which spends about 80 pages covering the way in which Christian commentators explained the story of Jephthah, down through the ages. About half the book (including most of the chapter on Jephthah) can be viewed online at http://books.google.com/books?id=ra-One2dQ6QC&pg=PA118&lpg=PA118&dq=Ambrose+Jephthah&source=bl&ots=sRMJC0RYFF&sig=YzDqY62EE91rf67vmh5NCH_kB0o&hl=en&ei=tKIcSuX1AoaCkQWpplU&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPA117,M1 . (To locate the book, I just did a Google search by typing in the words Ambrose and Jephthah.) Anyway, the upshot is that the vast majority of Christian commentators condemned Jephthah for his vow. Some, such as Ambrose, went further and said he should never have kept it:
First of all, what needs was there to swear so lightly, and to vow so confidently something whose outcome he could not know? Second, what was the point of fulfilling such a sad oath to the Lord God, so as to pay off his vow with a bloody funeral? (Apologia Prophetae David 4.16 [PL 14:899]).
Elsewhere, in his first book of The Duties of Clergy, Ambrose writes that although clergy are bound to faithfully keep their obligations, "it is sometimes contrary to duty to fulfil a promise, or to keep an oath." As an example, he cites Herod's foolish promise to the daughter of Herodias, which cost the John the Baptist his head. Another example is Jephthah, who would have done better to make no promise at all, than to fulfil it in the death of his daughter" (De Oficiis Ministrorum, 1.50.254 [PL 16:108]). The author of "Writing the Wrongs" (John Lee Thomson) goes on to point out that Ambrose's treatment of Jephthah's vow in his other writings is at times casuistical, and not fully consistent with what he wrote in the above-cited passages. Nevertheless, Ambrose is one early example of a Christian Father who tried to interpret a troubling passage of Scripture in an intelligent manner. Another example is St. John Chrysostom, who addressed head-on the question you raised, Beelzebub: why didn't God stop the sacrifice, by telling Jephthah not to go ahead with it? I'll quote from Thomson here (p. 117):
...[A]ddressing the problems created by rash oaths, Chrysostom's fourteenth homily discussed several biblical stories, including Herod's promise to the daughter of Herodias, Saul's vow that ensnared Jonathan, and Jephthah's vow. For Chrysostom, there is at work in such utterances a "malignant demon," but it is equally true that "God did not forbid" the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter. Moreover, he is acutely aware of how the tale provokes scandal: "I know, indeed, that many unbelievers impugn us of cruelty and inhumanity on account of this sacrifice" (Homiliae de statuis ad populum Antiochenum 14.3 [PG 49:147, NPNF 9:434]).Chrysostom's concession here must not be slighted: for whatever else it may represent, his ensuing explanation is surely an attempt to soften the dissonance among his own hearers over the apparent cruelty of Jephthah and, perhaps, God. As Chrysostom allowed this sacrifice to go ahead as a cautionary tale, lest anyone in the future vow to take a life in the expectation that God would intervene as occurred in the case of Isaac. Viewed in this light, the daughter's sacrifice illustrates God's care and benevolence (kEdemonias kai philanthropOpias) for the human race. Startling as that may seem, Chrysostom confirms his case with an argument from silence, "for after this sacrifice, no-one vowed such a vow unto God" (Hom. de statuis 14.3 [PG 49:147, NPNF 9:434]).
Now, I'd like to make some general comments. First of all, Beelzebub, the issue you raise is a genuine problem, and it's far greater than the problem of suffering: for here we have someone keeping a rash vow under the mistaken impression that he is morally obligated to do so. Some greater good can be achieved by allowing some kinds of suffering to occur; and even in cases where suffering serves no purpose and is Satanic in origin, God might still be obliged not to intervene to prevent it, insofar as He is still bound to respect to some degree the moral freedom of His fallen angels, whose evil "sphere of influence" includes the Earth. But error is a different matter: it is intrinsically evil, and God's preventing it does not seem to limit the freedom of fallen angels. To compound the matter, Jephthah's error is specifically religious: it arises from the mistaken premise that vows to God must be kept, no matter what - an error that we can certainly forgive Jephthah for falling into, and which God was surely bound to correct, you might think. After all, who else could? So why didn't God do so? However, if you wish to argue that God was bound to intervene here, Beelzebub, then logic compels you to argue the same for every other case where human lives were lost as a result of people's misguided religious beliefs. For example, the parents whose child dies because they took her to a faith healer instead of a doctor; or the monarch who wages war on the people of a neighboring kingdom because he considers them infidels who must be slaughtered; or the misguided Bible-believing doctor who performs hundreds of abortions over his career, because his personal reading of certain Biblical passages, whose context he fails to appreciate, convinces him that the fetus is not a human being. Why doesn't God intervene in all these cases and say: "NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO! STOP! DON'T DO IT!" I can only conclude that God's failure to enlighten us in these instances is a consequence of the Fall. The lines of communication that once existed between God and the first human beings, who talked to God "face to face," have been broken. From time to time God sends messages to the human race, but they are extremely rare, and for the most part, God lets us wallow in whatever error we've dreamed up. Why? I can only suppose that Divine intervention, if practiced regularly, would prove too messy - too Deus ex machina. God does of course work some miracles, but we should never count on them. I should add that since religious error is ultimately Satanic in origin (Satan is called the father of lies by Jesus), any demand that God rebut all the pernicious religious errors that we fall into is indeed tantamount to expecting God to intervene to stop Satan. That's presumption on our part, surely. The good news for Christians is that God has already sent His Son, Jesus Christ, to redeem the human race. Jews have cause to rejoice as well, for they know that the Messiah is coming. We know that the worst is over now, and that history is in its final phase, however long this phase may turn out to be. Error and confusion abound in this world at the moment, but one day, we shall see God as He really is. In the meantime, we should also remember that God knows our human frailties better than we do, and He shall not judge us harshly in those cases where we are deceived into error through no moral fault of our own.vjtorley
May 26, 2009
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"No, it has not. It has shown that something can come from the “unknown,” Actually the quantum void is not completely unknown. In fact the quantum void is actually something. To quote William Craig. "The quantum vacuum ( void) is not what most people envision when they think of a vacuum (void), that is absolutely nothing. On the contrary, it’s a sea of fluctuating energy, an arena of violent activity that has a rich physical structure and can be described by physical laws." Vividvividbleau
May 26, 2009
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kairosfocus wrote:
I believe that CERTAIN universal claims are self evident and/or undeniable on pain of self referential absurdity or vicious infinite regress; and, as such are not provisional.
I responded:
You are making the tacit assumption that we can reason infallibly, at least in some instances, and that our conclusions of “self-referential absurdity” cannot be doubted. You are also tacitly assuming that the world absolutely must be intelligible.
KF inexplicably called my reply an "ad hominem laced strawman." He then replied:
...to be able to reason CORRECTLY...does not at all entail that one is infallible in reasoning.
KF, I haven't claimed that it does. I pointed out that
You are making the tacit assumption that we can reason infallibly, at least in some instances, and that our conclusions of “self-referential absurdity” cannot be doubted.
KF continues:
Secondly, the self referential absurdity that results from rejecting the claim “Error exists” was DEMONSTRATED...
And as I explained, that demonstration is only as valid as the logic comprising it. Since we are fallible human beings, we cannot state with absolute confidence that Royce's argument is correct. It certainly appears correct, and I'd be willing to bet more than a few beers on it, but it cannot be a certainty unless the logic on which it is based is absolutely correct, with no possibility of error. Such certainty is out of the reach of fallible humans (including you, kairosfocus).
Has BZ ever paused and shown that this argument [the "error exists" argument] is an error?
Of course not. I think it's right, and I have never said otherwise. It's just that I hold that belief provisionally, as any sensible person would. It might be wrong. We're fallible, after all.beelzebub
May 26, 2009
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