Uncommon Descent Serving The Intelligent Design Community

Repeat after me: “this has nothing to do with my views on religion”

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[[This blast from the past was originally published here at UD 25oct06. With EXPELLED coming out so soon and given Dawkins’s prominent role in it, I thought it worth moving to the top of the stack (blogs have the data structure of a push-down stack). –WmAD]]

Last night Richard Dawkins did a reading from his new book, The God Delusion, at a bookstore in DC. After the reading he fielded questions. A friend of mine was in the front and got to be the first to go. He asked Dawkins if he thought he was being inconsistent by being a determinist while taking credit for writing his book. The answer so shocked my questioner friend that he typed out a transcript of what was said, which is pasted below. He recorded the audio on his laptop and has as an MP3, just in case someone wishes to dispute his recollection of this event. I post it here with my friend’s permission.

Richard Dawkins at Politics and Prose speaking on The God Delusion
Question and Answer

Questioner: Dr. Dawkins thank you for your comments. The thing I have appreciated most about your comments is your consistency in the things I’ve seen you written. One of the areas that I wanted to ask you about and the places where I think there is an inconsistency and I hoped you would clarify it is that in what I’ve read you seem to take a position of a strong determinist who says that what we see around us is the product of physical laws playing themselves out but on the other hand it would seem that you would do things like taking credit for writing this book and things like that. But it would seem, and this isn’t to be funny, that the consistent position would be that necessarily the authoring of this book from the initial condition of the big bang it was set that this would be the product of what we see today. I would take it that that would be the consistent position but I wanted to know what you thought about that.

Dawkins: The philosophical question of determinism is a very difficult question. It’s not one I discuss in this book, indeed in any other book that I’ve ever talked about. Now an extreme determinist, as the questioner says, might say that everything we do, everything we think, everything that we write, has been determined from the beginning of time in which case the very idea of taking credit for anything doesn’t seem to make any sense. Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism. What I do know is that what it feels like to me, and I think to all of us, we don’t feel determined. We feel like blaming people for what they do or giving people the credit for what they do. We feel like admiring people for what they do. None of us ever actually as a matter of fact says, “Oh well he couldn’t help doing it, he was determined by his molecules.” Maybe we should … I sometimes … Um … You probably remember many of you would have seen Fawlty Towers. The episode where Basil where his car won’t start and he gives it fair warning, counts up to three, and then gets out of the car and picks up a tree branch and thrashes it within an edge of his life. Maybe that’s what we all ought to… Maybe the way we laugh at Basil Fawlty, we ought to laugh in the same way at people who blame humans. I mean when we punish people for doing the most horrible murders, maybe the attitude we should take is “Oh they were just determined by their molecules.” It’s stupid to punish them. What we should do is say “This unit has a faulty motherboard which needs to be replaced.” I can’t bring myself to do that. I actually do respond in an emotional way and I blame people, I give people credit, or I might be more charitable and say this individual who has committed murders or child abuse of whatever it is was really abused in his own childhood. And so again I might take a …

Questioner: But do you personally see that as an inconsistency in your views?

Dawkins: I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

Questioner: Thank you.

Comments
Here’s a couple: Gen 18:21. Yahweh has to go down and see if the sin is as bad as the outcry indicates. Actually doesn't that means that Yahweh already had a form of knowledge about it? I don't really know. Yet it seems to me that many people fail to admit to rather vast ontological distinctions. They point out contradictions based on rather myopic forms of knowledge, on their own terms, limited by knowledge of their own state of being.mynym
April 13, 2008
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Of course, you could also point out if you were truly free you would not be limited by the finite number of choices in any particular situation, or the physical bonds of the physical universe or the limited knowledge the organ in your head carries... and blah blah blah...Stone
April 13, 2008
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I don’t see how an adherent to classical theology is any more consistent. After all, since God created ex nihilo, ultimately God is responsible for The God Delusion. It seems to me that is the case only if one assumes that God does not have transcendent knowledge with respect to time. A short story may illustrate a few points... The Art of Knowledge Once upon a time there was an Artist who could draw other artists into his pictures, some to draw some things for him and even some who drew some for themselves too. So he drew an apprentice in his image. His new student asked him about a piece of art that he was working on, "What is it going to be?" "It’s a picture about good and evil, right and wrong." "How can you draw a picture about wrong that is right?" "Whatever I draw is right, even that which I let look wrong to those I draw to observe it so. It's something in the lighting and my drawing, you see. I will not explain further until the picture is complete. Come close little one, so that I may ask you a question. Now, why do you suppose I would draw you to ask me annoying questions when I'm trying to work?" "Well, I suppose...I, uh, eh, I don't know why! But it seems to me that you must know all about your own art. Say, why don't you just draw me to stop it? Huh, huh?" The Artist turned to look at the little fellow staring up at him from his side, sighed, then said, "What you're drawing me to do is going to hurt you more than it hurts me." "Uh, wait a minute..." the little fellow looked back at the painting, "I suppose I can wait until the picture is complete." "Very well, and besides the answer does not exist yet in any language that you can understand. You see, I've not drawn you to understand it yet. But perhaps you can think of it in this way as I work, making a picture about good and evil consists of drawing the line someplace." As the artist spoke he drew a line, as he did the little beings that he had drawn into his picture murmured among themselves, "Why are things this way, rather than that? I can think of things my way and want them to be so, so why should they not be my way?" The student commented, "Say, they are a little like me in that way! So I suppose their next question about what will be would be why don't you just take their will away?" "Only I know, as I know all of my own art. Yet I would think that some of the answers about the will would be rather obvious, if you will." "It seems an odd decision to me." "Yes, I knew you would say that." "Ah, but what if I knew you knew? See how my knowledge increases to approach your own!" The Master Artist just glanced at the little fellow and kept working on the picture. So his student asked, "Well...can you draw me to have some of your knowledge?" and the Artist answered, "For now you do not even have the symbols, imagery in your head or the language to think many of my type of thoughts, so some of the best truths about my art and this picture must and will remain ineffable and paradoxical to you. That is my will. If you are willing to learn how my will must be done in all of my pictures then I will naturally draw you to have more knowledge of my own nature." "Naturally....that seems logical to me." "Yes, of course, I knew it would. After all, I just drew you to think so." The little fellow just sighed at that, and thought that he might have heard the Artist chuckle as he did.mynym
April 13, 2008
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If I were Dawkins, I would have said taking credit for things is just a formality. I would have also taken a chance to hack at judaism/christianity by pointing out the obvious contradiction of an all knowing God and Free will. Since freedom is absolute and boundless, and since God is all knowing, there cannot be free will as we are not free to do anything outside of his knowledge. Oddly though, unlike Dawkins, I'm not an atheist... I must say though, trying to hang someone over what they said on the spot is kind of silly.... Not that Dawkins has ever been a very kind fellow...Stone
April 13, 2008
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Those who believe in a transcendent creator with full foreknowledge do not face the difficulty that Dawkins faces due to his determinism. In response to the concern of jaredL, et al, about foreknowledge vs. free will, a common error is to confuse logical necessity and implication (e.g. if A, then B) with a particular causal relationship. If an event happens (e.g. a coin flip, Dawkins chooses to write a book, etc.), then God can be expected to know this. This knowledge does not itself cause or determine the event. Even a completely random and undetermined event (if such happens) could be known. This is so even if the knower is not bound by our space-time. (Necessarily, whatever has created our space-time, that creator is not bound within it.) We call God's knowledge "fore"-knowledge because (from our standpoint) such knowledge may be divulged back into space-time before the event. Our reasoning slips up because, as creatures bound by time, we suppose according to our usual experience that if A precedes B in time and the two are causally connected, then the causation must go from A to B. In normal experience, so long as the causal chain is bound within space-time, that may work fine. But if there exists a creator of our space-time, those assumptions break down. A report of an event could arrive back within time even before the event has taken place. In short, the fact that God sees a choice (and knows it and can report on it) does not imply that it was not a true choice, or that there was no opportunity to choose otherwise. If a different choice had been made, then God would have seen that instead. In jarodL's list, #3 is true only if the known event was actually chosen. #4's assumption of a fixed past (in the sense of not possibly being influenced causally by future events) is false. Complete "fore"-knowledge by a god would imply determinism and conflict with real choice only if one is supposing a time bound deity. There is no necessary conflict in the case of the transcendent creator of space-time.ericB
January 1, 2007
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jpark320: "Can you support this mike1962? I’m just wondering if you think only a couple of verses point to His limited knowledge, or that after a comprehensive look at all the verses dealing with God and His knowledge that it seems like He is limited." Here's a couple: Gen 18:21. Yahweh has to go down and see if the sin is as bad as the outcry indicates. Jer 3:7 Yahweh thought that Israel would return to him, but they didn't. And there are several more. I'm not interested in a Bible study here though. Original statement was essential to indicate I have no problem with a deity with some limits with respect to freewill.mike1962
October 28, 2006
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Mr Dembski.. Good day to you sir. I imagine that maybe you check out the comments before posting. That's cool. I invite you to check out my profile, and in particular, my blog that I have listed there. It's a combination pro-id blog, Darwinist evolution blog and Theistic blog all in one. I am a layman, have acquired a small library of pro-ID books, some of them yours. I must admit, I struggle with some of them. Perhaps if I read one at a time, that would help. Usually I read 3, just to help put things together. I flunked most of my highschool math and science classes, and lost interest in science altogether until ID became a popular topic. Thanx to you and other ID proponents, my interest in science is reinvigorated. Science is exciting now! There is new life in what was once a dead and meaningless science. In the course of making my blog, I have used some of your material, and I hope you don't sue me for that. I am in the process of going back and attributing sources, giving credit where credit is due. I ask sir, if you would check out my blog for accuracy, and leave a comment in whatever post you find necessary to provide constructive criticism on. I have set the comment fields to be 'public' and 'anonymous'. My goal is to provide an accurate ID apologetic, from a scientific and philosophical perspective, which I find happens to support the Theistic perspective. If you have time, could you check it out? It also has some very nice illustrations. One post in particular to check out is called "First Life - The Evolutionist Dilemma" I just want to make sure I am accurate in my conclusions. I don't know anybody else to ask for an honest critique. I'm the only IDer on the Opera blog network. Casey Luskin has already critiqued it, at least a couple posts, and provided some constructive criticism on avoiding and countering fallacious arguments. I need help on the more technical ID issues, like how to apply the filter to events or objects that are biological, and also cosmological. Also, I hope more ID/evo debates will be available online. They are truly fascinating, and quite helpful to me, and countless others I'm sure. thanx so much for your time in reading this. God bless you, and your research. Sincerely, Mike Bradley http://my.opera.com/bantay/blogBantay
October 27, 2006
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It sounds to be that he's not taking any position on it at all, so where's the contradiction? "Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism." One can easily imagine a scenario with the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics where a different kind of determinism is taking place where every possible outcome of your decisions is taking place in some meta-universe. Does this release you from responsibility for those actions in this universe? I don't see why it would. You're still here, *apparently* making all those choices.Ellis
October 27, 2006
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If that is your fate Jared ;)! Go for philosophy :)! Indeed free will is a theodicy problem, but as you can see, even Dawkins has problems explaining it the other way around. To some questions there is no answer, just as I am agnostic on the problem of how life started! Faith can bridge this problem, be it materialistic or theistic faith. There is no empirical proof for evolution, and in my opinion, there is little empirical proof of ID on the problem of origin (ID is trying to reverse engineer biological structures as I understand it, correct me if I am wrong), yet it will not answer the question where we are coming from! It will remain a philosophical question, yet the evidence (my personally collected evidence) points me into the direction of a designer, creator (call it whichever you want), which answers the question "Where am I coming from!" on the grounds of personal faith! We all come to the crossroads in the time of our lives. If you have to many unknowns in an equation you cannot solve it, but partly. For the rest, you have to believe the answer is 42!tb
October 27, 2006
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Rude, The only reason I haven't been banned, I think, is because I don't engage in misrepresenting either ID or the theology of its primary proponents, and my posts (hopefully) are somewhat substantial, even if they don't get responded to in this context. Maybe I ought to skip the math PhD and go for philosophy....jared
October 26, 2006
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When materialist physics moved in that direction (with randomness only rescued by Bohr & Schrödinger et al), Darwinism deified chance. Natural Selection may get all the credit, but it’s in no way predictive and hence deterministic. Should the materialists move to a deterministic evolution then they’ll be dumping Darwin in favor of Denton. Maybe what Dawkins senses is that free will is neither chance nor necessity nor any combination thereof, and so he’d better be careful taking a stand for or against. Argue for it and Darwinism is doomed, argue against it and, well, why argue. As for Jared L above . . . hmm . . . uh . . . it’s WmAD’s site and though we may disagree with him theologically (I’m sure I do) let’s remember that ID does not insist, as do so many creationists, that the theology is inseparable from the science. It’s a Big Tent really—one that even I (heretic that I am) can fully support. When ID triumphs this will not translate into a return to the Church-State union of Old Europe—providing, of course, that we’re all still on board. So all you Albigensian, Calvinist, Catholic, Pelagian, Protestant, Jewish, Arian, Trinitarian, Binitarian, Unitarian, Mooney, Mormon and moderate Muslim men and women unite! Unite, that is, behind ID, so that when it wins we’ll all have a part in the free-for-all that follows.Rude
October 26, 2006
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so, Dawkins *might* be a strict determinist? So, he may have no choice but to spend his life fighting strongly for the "common good", (erasure of religion, etc) essentially because he has no choice in the matter, and despite the fact that the "common good" is a totally meaningless term, since everything's already predetermined? Oh?es58
October 26, 2006
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The problem of free will is more of a problem dealing with causation than anything else. It seems improbable that something which is caused, like electrons firing in my brain, cause me to raise my arm. However, the question becomes what caused those electrons to fire? Did prior electrons firing cause them or did I, as in myself, cause them to fire? As for the problem dealing with God and his omiscience, you must understand that classical theism understands God in relation to his will. For example, what people imply is that God, knowing that I will sin tomorrow, is the very necessity of my sinning. However, knowledge does not necessitate any form of cause to my sinning. My choice was the cause that made me sin, not God's knowledge of such said sinning. Further more, I would contend that this view fails to understand that God's omscience has two outlets. First is his actual knowledge of what will happen determined by his Sovoreign will and Second is his will of what could happen depending on our choices wich is not determined in any sense other than God has a will for us to live a certain way. The problem then lie in misunderstanding that what God wills cannot be changed and what he does not will can. For example, God has perfect knowledge about who I am and what I will be doing tomorrow at the specific time in which I will sin, time x. However, he also has knowledge of the potential in me to choose not to sin tomorrow at time x. The problem of my choice being determined is only a problem, if in fact God's knowledge is shown to mean his actual knowledge, Sovoreign will, compared to his general will. In other words the potential for my sin to be determined exists but is not required and thus, I do still infact have free will with regard to the choices I am given. I was not able to choose where I was born or to whom. I was not able to choose what kind of childhood I would have and such. But, I can control how I reacted to say, having a alcoholic mother when I was young, and say a temptation that is presented to me. Understanding the problem this way reveals our own situation, that what we really do have control over is soley ourselves. Now it does not remove God's Sovoreign will but nothing could and if you pose naturalism the problem only gets worse because you are then the victim of nothing more than chance. However, in classic theism I can at least truth that God's goodness is what is helping establish his Sovoreign will with regard to my purpose. Hope this Helps all of you, Ricardorpf_ID
October 26, 2006
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Jpark320, between the Quantum Physics paper and the discussion of The Freedom of the Will, I intended a beat change, so to speak. The free will material was not directed at you specifically, but to the group generally. I'm glad you enjoy Edwards as much as I do.Designed Jacob
October 26, 2006
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@ Designed Jacob - #35 I love Jonathan Edwards and actually have that book and agree whole heartedly with him (Good choice by the way). Since I identify myself so much with his position, was there something I said that made you think I opposed this view - just curious someone would recommend to me a book which very views I try to defend! (I really appreciate it though and I downloaded the pdf you link, really thx alot) @ Nightlight #47 Thanks for your cordial reply (I think I may have been in a bad mood - please forgive me if I displayed hostility in my response). I will look into this issue. I think I misunderstood what you meant when you said science has no basis for thought. Being in medical school and my understanding of the brain and cognition made my frown at that, but I see now what you are getting at. I mainly disagreed with your analogy that since things on a quantum level are indeterminant that determinism is now an antiquated question that should have been left in the 19th century. @ kairos #37 Yes, I agree with you that things on the quantum level can effect macroscopic events (i heard that computer chips have to take quantum effects right?). I was only trying to say that just because things on the quantum level or indeterminant it need not neccessarily be so on the macroscopic level. My main point was that we dont really understand what is going so perfectly that we can conclude that the freewill and determinism debate is over. Good point though (esp. since i agree 8) )jpark320
October 26, 2006
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#45 "As luck would have it, the present fundamental physics is non-deterministic. Hence, determinism is not only a weak position, but also a scientifically wrong to the best of present knowledge. " Some time ago I read with great interest a past interview of Popper concerning his thoughts about determinism dating about 1950. He strongly argued against the reality of determinism and not only for what concerns mind and free will but more essentially for what concerns physical world. He argued that also the classical phisics (typically viewed as deterministic) had not at all deterministic grounds. He also cited a discussion before WWII he had had with many English intellectuals about th reality of determinism. Significantly Bertrand Russell did admit that Popper had argued very well about the fundamental indeterminism of the reality. Sorry not to be able to provide a link in English about this very intersting issue.kairos
October 26, 2006
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Hey, let's not get sidetracked. At issue here is the fact that in order to hold a position as Dawkins, we have to live with a gross inconsistency--adherence to determinism in order to explain our selfish genes, along with rejection of determinism in order to adhere to a notion of free will. The point is, such an inconsistency is insupportable, unless you base your argument not on logic but on ideology, which is what one invariably does when arguing for Darwinism. And, at the extreme risk of getting sidetracked, myself: for those of you interested in how quantum physics gives the lie to determinism, allow me to recommend Dr. Amit Goswami's fascinating treatment of the subject, _The Self-Aware Universe: How Consciousness Creates the Material World_.TerryL
October 26, 2006
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May I have permission to post Dawkins' comments on my Pleonast blog? I will give credit as to where I found this information.Berly_K09
October 26, 2006
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To #32. (jpark320): "Unless of course, with natural science, you can show that our thoughts (freewill if you, uh, will) are controlled at a level where quantum indetermination is significant - if you can please feel free to share." There is no "thought" construct in natural science (the laws of matter-energy transformation). Hence you can't even ask a scientific question, such as "What is it like to be particular arrangement of atoms that makes you?", let alone answer it. Therefore all one can do at present is speculate and toy with heuristic models. My preference is a form of panpsychism, similar to Leibniz's monads, with a little addition of my own on how such scheme starting with elemental "mind stuff" could give rise to the "mind stuff" at our level (and beyond, such as "mind stuff" at the level of social organism, captured in traditional religions as the 'god of people'). This addition addresses the "combination problem" of traditional panpsychism, described as: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#5 ------------- "combination problem," which was first raised by William James, who in the following passage argues that panpsychism will still face its own problem of emergence: Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence . Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it (1890/1950, p. 160, original emphasis). This is a powerful objection since if panpsychism must allow for the emergence of states of consciousness then what prevents an emergence doctrine which avoids the implausible and indiscriminate broadcasting of mental characteristics throughout the world? ------------------ My speculative model is sketched in the usenet post: http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/e03d101dc097e17c The networks background & references are here: http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/623400a8de95db21 where the network harmonization giving rise to Leibniz's monads as a limit, the perfect harmonization: http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/2c5884a907f10c22nightlight
October 26, 2006
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Clarification of ambiguity in #42: "...also rejects the ‘mind stuff’ as being an illusion. " What was meant is: "...also rejects the ‘mind stuff’, labeling it as an illusion. "nightlight
October 26, 2006
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To #35 (kairos): "However as a matter of fact atheists have very often used determinism as a way to discard God, as the famous phase that Laplace is supposed to have been spoken to Napoleon shows very well." Interestingly, the same school of "thought" based on 19th century physics (e.g. Dennett "Consciousness Explained" book or http://www.google.com/search?num=100&hl=en&lr=&safe=off&q=dennett+consciousness+illusion&btnG=Search ) also rejects the 'mind stuff' as being an illusion. Yet, the existence of the 'mind stuff' is not merely self-evident, but it is the most, if not the sole, self-evident fact altogether. Due to Ockham's razor, determinism is a weak position to take if one wishes to argue for existence of 'free will', 'mind stuff' and God. As luck would have it, the present fundamental physics is non-deterministic. Hence, determinism is not only a weak position, but also a scientifically wrong to the best of present knowledge.nightlight
October 26, 2006
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To #34 (kairos): "Probably nightlight was more speaking about the mere possibility of indeterminism in the natural world although at the end there is a reference to its direct implications to free will. This last point cannot be (at least now) solved because of the huge amount of complexity embedded in the human brain. Instead the first point is very interesting and not only from a theoretical point of view." Yes, there is no presently a scientific model of 'mind stuff', hence the present natural science can't say anything about 'free will' (which is an element of 'mind stuff'). The only potential implication is that any future scientific model of 'free will' would have non-deterministic evolution (or its phase). Contrary to both, Dawkins and his critics above, though, the present fundamental physics is indeed non-deterministic theory, exactly as needed to model the 'free will' some day.nightlight
October 26, 2006
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There are MANY inconsistencies in Dawkins' world view, and this is just another. He uses "science" and "logic" and "reason" but he fails to explain how is it that his atheistic worldview justifies such abstract imaterial universal concepts. Dr Greg Bahsen showed that clearly in his debate with Dr Stein, some years back.Mats
October 26, 2006
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To #33 (Lurker): "Funny how that non-deterministic relation allows us humans to do things with determination, accuracy, and purpose - when we choose to do it that way." ---- If you toss coin 100 times, you can fairly accurately produce result that is not 100 tails. In other words, probabilities of some events may be close to 0 or to 1, which for all practical purposes will appears as deterministic events. On the other hand, when you freely decide whether to blink at this instant, the probabilities of events 'blink' and 'non-blink' may be 30% vs 70% or some such. To #33: "How do you suppose we can control this non-deterministic relationship and turn quantum indeterminancy into quantum determinancy *cough* *cough* at will?" One coherent model for propagating/amplifying 'subjective decisions' of elemental quantum objects into 'subjective decisions' of a large collection of such quantum objects making up you or me, is panpsychism (see links in previous post).nightlight
October 26, 2006
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Ooops, there were some typos above. This tiny reply entry box (apparently hardwired to 7 rows x 30 columns), doesn't let one read easily over the typed text. The typing area ought to be changed to 30+ rows by 72+ columns. Errata: "Stanford Enc. of phylosophy" --> "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:" "similar to Lebniz’s monads" --> "similar to Leibniz’s monads"nightlight
October 26, 2006
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To #36 (Reed Orak): "I sure don't feel like my decisions are the result of quantum probabilities any more than I feel like they are the result of chemical reactions." They are not result of QFT probabilities. Rather, the probabilities are a different perspective, an "outside" view, on the statistical properties of such decisions. Consider for example, a psychologist measuring your IQ. While you're working through the test, would you feel that your mental process of solving are "result of" the IQ Gaussian curve? The Gaussian curve merely captures one aspect or property of a 'large' number of such mental processes. But it has nothing to do with 'what is it like to think through and solve test problems'. Similarly, the QFT probabilities for possible events regarding quantum object don't tell you what is it like for the quantum object itself to 'decide' which result to select. As to how one might get from 'what is it like' of elemental object to 'what is it like' for a large collections of elemental objects, such as those making you or me, one logically coherent possibility is panpsychism: Stanford Enc. of Phylosophy: PANPSYCHISM http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ My variant, which is similar to Lebniz's monads, is sketched in a usenet post: http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/e03d101dc097e17c Link pages to related posts: https://uncommondescent.com/index.php/archives/1357#comment-49652 http://groups.google.com/group/talk.origins/msg/505e0620c272c339nightlight
October 26, 2006
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I don't know about you, but I sure don't feel like my decisions are the result of quantum probabilities any more than I feel like they are the result of chemical reactions.Reed Orak
October 26, 2006
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Addendum: I think that free will is real and can be present in both a deterministic and an indeterministic world. However as a matter of fact atheists have very often used determinism as a way to discard God, as the famous phase that Laplace is supposed to have been spoken to Napoleon shows very well.kairos
October 26, 2006
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jpark320 and Lurker Probably nightlight was more speaking about the mere possibility of indeterminism in the natural world although at the end there is a reference to its direct implications to free will. This last point cannot be (at least now) solved because of the huge amount of complexity embedded in the human brain. Instead the first point is very interesting and not only from a theoretical point of view. "not to mention the fact that Newtonian calculations work really well in real life (ie like Baseball - Go Cards!) that we can determine stuff w/ almost 100% fidelity." But ot is not always true that microscopic events do not dramatically change the behavior at a macroscopic level. Please consider this simple conceptual experiment. A light source is able to emit a single photon towards a target but according to quantum mechanics the photon could be detected with the same probability by two different sensors put a bit apart on the target. Detection by sensor 1 will get on all the lights in the Yankees stadium in NY, whereas detection by sensor 2 will do the same in The L.A. Coliseum. Here we have a single and trivial quantum microscopic event that yields one between two huge macrosopic effects. In conclusion; if quantum ineterminism is actual and not simply a consequence of our investigations bound, this COULD possibly have consequences in macroscopic events.kairos
October 26, 2006
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nightlight, Funny how that non-deterministic relation allows us humans to do things with determination, accuracy, and purpose - when we choose to do it that way. How do you suppose we can control this non-deterministic relationship and turn quantum indeterminancy into quantum determinancy *cough* *cough* at will?Lurker
October 25, 2006
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