A Question for Joe Felsenstein (and Everyone Else)

_{Cornelius Hunter

January 2, 2010

Intelligent Design}

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Joe Felsenstein, and most other evolutionists, tell us that science must be restricted to law-like causes and explanations. In a word, they require the scientific method to be restricted to naturalism. While this methodological naturalism seems like a reasonable way to do science, it is an incomplete instruction. There remains the question of what to do when methodological naturalism doesn’t work. Read more

Comments

@70 to seversky should read: " Also, you cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, you declare that methodological naturalism is the required method for science. On the other hand, you question the idea that [any] scientific authority has ever said soStephenB_{January 3, 2010
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@71 should read, "We don’t really need those examples, however, because any scientist who searches for natural causes without insisting that are no other kinds of causes, would violate the principle of methodological naturalism."StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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----mikev6: "Sure. I’m not differing on definitions – I’d like a specific example of science research using a non-naturalistic component or argument." The first and most noticeable example would be the science of intelligent design. Another example, very far removed from the first, would be the Catholic Church's practice of using medical science to confirm reports of miraculous healings attributed to saints during the canonization process. We don't really need those examples, however, because any who searches for natural causes without insisting that are not other kinds of causes, would violate the principle of methodological naturalism. In other words, the entire history of science from Newton to Boyle to Einstein would violate the principle of methodological naturalism, because none of these men declared that no other kinds of causes exist. To simply search for natural causes is not to practice methodological naturalism because methodological naturalism goes beyond that threshold by intruding itself as a rule that forbids any other approach.StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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----seversky: "You have failed to produce any decree from a supreme scientific authority by which all scientists are commanded to exclude any consideration of supernatural causation on pain of being excommunicated from the body scientific in the 1980s or any other decade." How can I fail to produce that which I had not yet been asked to produce. You can begin with Eugenie Scott and work your way forward to the Kansas Educational system. Also, you cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, you declare that methodological naturalism is the required method for science. On the other hand, you question the idea that no scientific authority has ever said so.StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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----serversky: "But if you look at the work of, say, Galileo or Copernicus or Kepler or Newton or Boyle or Darwin or Maxwell you will not find any invocations of supernatural causes. They may have held religious beliefs but they practiced strictly naturalistic science." For these men, science was "primarily" about natural causes because, among other things, they were confronting the problem of superstition, which tends to attribute all actions to miraculous events. On the other hand, they never indicated, nor would they have presumed to suggest, that science is "exclusively" about natural causes. That is because only the scientist knows which problems he is trying to solve, so only the scientist can decide on which methods he/she should use. More recently, scientists have been trying to solve the problem of information, which means they cannot limit themselves to natural causes. It is no one's place to tell them that they cannot do that in the name of science.StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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Oops. Wow. My post at 48 was a mistake. Everything prior to "The first strategy..." was entirely unintended. My apologies. Mike, Natural Law does not explain the existence of the singularity (even though we may unpack the events that followed). Yet, we have no problem with accepting the theory.Upright BiPed_{January 3, 2010
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mikv6 -- I’d like a specific example of science research using a non-naturalistic component or argument. Since we are not arguing definitions and metaphysics is defined as science any ontological argument would fit the bill. And since you want something specific, here's Godel's effort.tribune7_{January 3, 2010
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StephenB @ 61
How about the example of every scientific enterprise from the beginning of time until 1980, when methodological naturalism was arbitrarily established solely as a means of discrediting intelligent design.
Authorship of the term "methodological naturalism" (MN) is attributed to Paul De Vries who, at the time, was teaching at Wheaton College, a conservative Christian institution. Is that in question? You have failed to produce any decree from a supreme scientific authority by which all scientists are commanded to exclude any consideration of supernatural causation on pain of being excommunicated from the body scientific in the 1980s or any other decade. We have found historians and philosophers of science who have testified that MN was practiced by natural philosophers and scientists, albeit not under that name, going back at least to the medieval period. You have cited some of the great scientists of the past who proclaimed - or, at least, paid lip service to - strong religious beliefs. This is not in dispute though, and, in fact, it would probably be true to say that most people in past centuries who practiced what we now called science held religious beliefs of one sort or another. But if you look at the work of, say, Galileo or Copernicus or Kepler or Newton or Boyle or Darwin or Maxwell you will not find any invocations of supernatural causes. They may have held religious beliefs but they practiced strictly naturalistic science. Accusing the scientific establishment of having created MN as a means of discrediting Intelligent Design sounds too much like sour grapes. If ID has failed to win acceptance in academia it is because, by and large, it has failed to practice the science that it preaches. Most of it consists of pointing out the more speculative parts of evolutionary theory, where evidence is sparse or non-existent, and neo-Paleyist "I can't believe it's not butter" arguments from design and incredulity. But even if all the above claims were conceded, there is still nothing currently being proposed that comes close to being able to supplant the theory of evolution. All that is on offer are expressions of disbelief in the explanatory power of evolution, hotly-disputed probability estimates and information metrics, an unproven protocol for testing for the presence of design and an invincible refusal, probably for good legal reasons, to speculate on, let alone investigate, the nature of any non-human designer. As Paul Nelson wrote in Touchstone magazine in 2004:
Easily the biggest challenge facing the ID community is to develop a full-fledged theory of biological design. We don’t have such a theory right now, and that’s a problem. Without a theory, it’s very hard to know where to direct your research focus. Right now, we’ve got a bag of powerful intuitions, and a handful of notions such as ‘irreducible complexity’ and ‘specified complexity’-but, as yet, no general theory of biological design.
Seversky_{January 3, 2010
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tribune7/StephenB: Sure. I'm not differing on definitions - I'd like a specific example of science research using a non-naturalistic component or argument. I'd like to understand how one should operate in this broader science. I don't recall any grand change in scientific methodology around 1980 - perhaps you could provide some specifics?mikev6_{January 3, 2010
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----mike ev6: "This discussion would be more effective if we had some specific examples of a form of science effectively going beyond methodological naturalism." How about the example of every scientific enterprise from the beginning of time until 1980, when methodological naturalism was arbitrarily established solely as a means of discrediting intelligent design. "The biggest hurdle I see in accepting an extension to MN in science is determining how one can form a continuing line of investigation based on things we can’t measure or evaluate." It isn't a case of "extending" from methodological naturalism to science but rather a reverse case contracting and constricting science into the arbitrary rule methodological naturalismStephenB_{January 3, 2010
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mikev6--The biggest hurdle I see in accepting an extension to MN in science Science should not be synonymous with MN. The first definitions for the word mean the "state of knowing" or "a department of systematized knowledge as an object of study" and Merriam-Webster Online even uses "the science of theology" as a example. The Encyclopedia Britannica refers to metaphysics as "The Science of First Principles." What you are doing is basically asking for an extension of MN in MN -- not science -- which is pointless. MN is fine as it is. It just can't answer everything.tribune7_{January 3, 2010
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This discussion would be more effective if we had some specific examples of a form of science effectively going beyond methodological naturalism. The biggest hurdle I see in accepting an extension to MN in science is determining how one can form a continuing line of investigation based on things we can't measure or evaluate. Surely Cornelius or others have developed a method to allow science to proceed effectively under an extended paradigm? Do we have results from this new science? It would certainly help me accept this new definition more readily.mikev6_{January 3, 2010
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----Graham1f: "To StephenB: I use the term ’supernatural’ in its dictionary meaning, ie: non-natural, I dont intend any religious connection at all." I have already explained why that definition will not do. According to your definition of supernatural, which characterizes gods, souls, and immaterial minds as supernatural, one of the following must be true: [a] If I have a soul, one faculty of which is an immaterial mind, then the paragraph that I just wrote had a "supernatural cause," placing it in the same category as a miracle from heaven. [b] If I have no soul or mind, meaning if I have only a brain, then the paragraph I just wrote had a "natural" cause, which puts it in the same category as a valcano eruption. The only way out of this insanity for purposes of discussing science is to abandon terms like "natural" and "supernatural," and use the terms, "natural cause" [law/ chance] and "non-natural cause" [human agency or any other kind of agency]. Thus, the paragraph I just wrote is, by definition [not by argument (please learn the difference)] a non-natural cause, and a valcano eruption is a natural cause. Thus, for the materialist Darwinist, all causes are, by definition, natural causes and for ID, not all causes are natural causes, meaning that some are, by definition non-natural. That is a very simple, very tidy, and very truthful way of expressing what both sides believe, and the language used facilitates a rational discussion.StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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----Cabal: "What other methods for arriving at ‘truth’ about the manifest world do we have? I don’t know of any." Since the scientist is the only one who knows which question he/she is trying to answer, only the scientist can choose the proper method for answering it. What is so hard about that?StephenB_{January 3, 2010
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There might be an invisible pink unicorn in the room with each and every one of us right now, except that not only is it invisible but it cannot be touched, heard, tasted or smelled. It neither emits nor absorbs radiation of any kind and does not interact with matter at any level. It is completely inaccessible to us. Graham, why would anyone believe in an invisible pink unicorn? Why do most people believe in God? God is accessible to us through reason, through emotion, just not via meth-nat. If you depend on meth-nat to find God you will never find Him. That doesn't mean He doesn't exist.tribune7_{January 3, 2010
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Graham @ 30 - “In science, if a phenomenon has observable effects – in other words, it is part of the observable Universe – then it can be studied using the scientific method. If it has no observable effects then we have no reason to think it exists at all, so there is nothing to study.” That rules out dark matter and dark energy as well as some subatomic particles that scientists aren’t sure exist but think they might (the Higgs-Boson, for example). So those physicists aren’t doing real science according to you. “We can imagine or suppose anything. There might be an invisible pink unicorn in the room with each and every one of us right now, except that not only is it invisible but it cannot be touched, heard, tasted or smelled. It neither emits nor absorbs radiation of any kind and does not interact with matter at any level. It is completely inaccessible to us. Even if it can be said to exist in any sense, it is simply irrelevant since it might as well not exist for all the effect it has.” On a personal note, I have had it with atheists/agnostics/whomever using the invisible pink unicorn argument. It is beyond stupid and proves nothing. “People here are fond of the aphorism about following the evidence wherever it might lead. But what if there is no evidence? Surely the sensible course then is to put the matter aside until there is some evidence, some reason to think the soul exists, for example. Until then, our time and other resources are better spent elsewhere.” For a long time there was no evidence that other planets rotated around the sun or that the Earth wasn’t the center of the universe, yet early astronomers such as Copernicus and Galileo believed it did. Eventually, evidence was found. Your methodology would have stopped both of those esteemed scientists cold. So much for the Renaissance!Barb_{January 3, 2010
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Cabel, and recognizing that such a thing as "truth" exists is a philosophical axiom without which meth-nat would not work.tribune7_{January 3, 2010
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Cabal-- What other methods for arriving at ‘truth’ about the manifest world do we have? Logic flowing from axioms and even instinct would be superior in many circumstances to meth-nat at arriving at truth. For instance: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights is certainly not meth-nat but is far superior to anything cooked up via meth-nat for relating the governed with the governors. And when a hiring an employee or saying a particular thing to your girlfriend at particular time, you would hopefully trust your gut than try meth-nat. Obviously, instinct and logic following axioms are much inferior to meth nat in things like engineering. BTW, you would not use meth-nat for the "manifest" world since the word means "readily perceived by the senses" and "easily understood by the mind". :-) Meth-nat shines in understanding the not-so-apparent things about the physical world.tribune7_{January 3, 2010
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Tribune7,
The problem isn’t methodological naturalism but the claim that it is the arbiter of truth.
What other methods for arriving at 'truth' about the manifest world do we have? I don't know of any. I don't for example find philosophy, be it full-blown or just an amateur variety usable in that context.Cabal_{January 3, 2010
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----Graham: "As for the rest of the grading, referring to Human actions as ‘non natural’, seems weird, but then you are assuming (if I understand it) that our will to act comes from a non-material ‘mind’. It isn't weird if the word "natural" means law and chance and nothing else. ---"Im afraid this is where it all gets a bit theological for me. It suggests that you have already decided that the ‘mind’ exists, and thats another thing I am frequently chastised for: sweeping initial assumptions. Could you cite some evidence for this ‘mind’ ?" For the third time, I am not, at this juncture, arguing for the existence of a human mind. I am distinguishing the IDEA of a human mind or soul, both of which are immaterial by definition, from the IDEA of God, which is also immaterial by definition. You are placing both IDEAS in the same category by calling each "supernatural."StephenB_{January 2, 2010
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I think we are about to get into duelling experts. Ill go will Bertrand Russel (who denied the existence of a mind). I could cut/paste great slabs of stuff but I think that is enough.Graham1_{January 2, 2010
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----Graham: "StephenB: You start with the assumption that we have a ‘non material mind’ (whatever that is)." Good grief. Can you not read? I stated no assumptions. I defined a series of terms that may help Darwinists like yourself, who place human souls, immaterial minds, and gods in the same supernatural category, to think more clearly. Has it not yet occurred to you that, by your terms, the act of an ancient hunter who uses his immaterial mind to design a spear qualifies as a "supernatural" cause? ----"If that is your starting point, then all the rest follows." It isn't my starting point. I am simply responding to your comment. ----"So, I think your gods, your intelligent designer, your soul (that transcends the natural world!), etc all fall exactly into this definition." Yes, I know, I know. For you, God and my soul are both supernatural entities. That makes absolutely no sense. Thus, I am trying to help you out of your intellectual confusion by introducing categories that will allow you to make reasonable distinctions. ----"But havent I been chewed out for making similar starting assumptions that colour everything that follows ? Do you have some evidence for the existence of this ‘non material mind’ ?" I am not arguing for the existence of a non-material mind. I am placing the idea of a non-material mind in a specific category so you can distinguish between it and God.StephenB_{January 2, 2010
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Graham, "It suggests that you have already decided that the ‘mind’ exists, and thats another thing I am frequently chastised for: sweeping initial assumptions" Do you think the mind does not exists? David Chalmers:
The first is the "neurobiological theory of consciousness" outlined by Crick and Koch (1990; see also Crick 1994). This theory centers on certain 35-75 hertz neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex; Crick and Koch hypothesize that these oscillations are the basis of consciousness. This is partly because the oscillations seem to be correlated with awareness in a number of different modalities - within the visual and olfactory systems, for example - and also because they suggest a mechanism by which the binding of information contents might be achieved. Binding is the process whereby separately represented pieces of information about a single entity are brought together to be used by later processing, as when information about the color and shape of a perceived object is integrated from separate visual pathways. Following others (e.g., Eckhorn et al 1988), Crick and Koch hypothesize that binding may be achieved by the synchronized oscillations of neuronal groups representing the relevant contents. When two pieces of information are to be bound together, the relevant neural groups will oscillate with the same frequency and phase. The details of how this binding might be achieved are still poorly understood, but suppose that they can be worked out. What might the resulting theory explain? Clearly it might explain the binding of information contents, and perhaps it might yield a more general account of the integration of information in the brain. Crick and Koch also suggest that these oscillations activate the mechanisms of working memory, so that there may be an account of this and perhaps other forms of memory in the distance. The theory might eventually lead to a general account of how perceived information is bound and stored in memory, for use by later processing. Such a theory would be valuable, but it would tell us nothing about why the relevant contents are experienced. Crick and Koch suggest that these oscillations are the neural correlates of experience. This claim is arguable - does not binding also take place in the processing of unconscious information? - but even if it is accepted, the explanatory question remains: Why do the oscillations give rise to experience? The only basis for an explanatory connection is the role they play in binding and storage, but the question of why binding and storage should themselves be accompanied by experience is never addressed. If we do not know why binding and storage should give rise to experience, telling a story about the oscillations cannot help us. Conversely, if we knew why binding and storage gave rise to experience, the neurophysiological details would be just the icing on the cake. Crick and Koch's theory gains its purchase by assuming a connection between binding and experience, and so can do nothing to explain that link. I do not think that Crick and Koch are ultimately claiming to address the hard problem, although some have interpreted them otherwise. A published interview with Koch gives a clear statement of the limitations on the theory's ambitions.
Well, let's first forget about the really difficult aspects, like subjective feelings, for they may not have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, of smelling a rose - there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level, of explaining molecules and neurons, and the subjective level. Let's focus on things that are easier to study - like visual awareness. You're now talking to me, but you're not looking at me, you're looking at the cappuccino, and so you are aware of it. You can say, `It's a cup and there's some liquid in it.' If I give it to you, you'll move your arm and you'll take it - you'll respond in a meaningful manner. That's what I call awareness." ("What is Consciousness", Discover, November 1992, p. 96.)
The second example is an approach at the level of cognitive psychology. This is Baars' global workspace theory of consciousness, presented in his book A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. According to this theory, the contents of consciousness are contained in a global workspace, a central processor used to mediate communication between a host of specialized nonconscious processors. When these specialized processors need to broadcast information to the rest of the system, they do so by sending this information to the workspace, which acts as a kind of communal blackboard for the rest of the system, accessible to all the other processors. Baars uses this model to address many aspects of human cognition, and to explain a number of contrasts between conscious and unconscious cognitive functioning. Ultimately, however, it is a theory of cognitive accessibility, explaining how it is that certain information contents are widely accessible within a system, as well as a theory of informational integration and reportability. The theory shows promise as a theory of awareness, the functional correlate of conscious experience, but an explanation of experience itself is not on offer. One might suppose that according to this theory, the contents of experience are precisely the contents of the workspace. But even if this is so, nothing internal to the theory explains why the information within the global workspace is experienced. The best the theory can do is to say that the information is experienced because it is globally accessible. But now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered. Almost all work taking a cognitive or neuroscientific approach to consciousness in recent years could be subjected to a similar critique. The "Neural Darwinism" model of Edelman (1989), for instance, addresses questions about perceptual awareness and the self-concept, but says nothing about why there should also be experience. The "multiple drafts" model of Dennett (1991) is largely directed at explaining the reportability of certain mental contents. The "intermediate level" theory of Jackendoff (1988) provides an account of some computational processes that underlie consciousness, but Jackendoff stresses that the question of how these "project" into conscious experience remains mysterious. Researchers using these methods are often inexplicit about their attitudes to the problem of conscious experience, although sometimes they take a clear stand. Even among those who are clear about it, attitudes differ widely. In placing this sort of work with respect to the problem of experience, a number of different strategies are available. It would be useful if these strategic choices were more often made explicit. The first strategy is simply to explain something else. Some researchers are explicit that the problem of experience is too difficult for now, and perhaps even outside the domain of science altogether. These researchers instead choose to address one of the more tractable problems such as reportability or the self-concept. Although I have called these problems the "easy" problems, they are among the most interesting unsolved problems in cognitive science, so this work is certainly worthwhile. The worst that can be said of this choice is that in the context of research on consciousness it is relatively unambitious, and the work can sometimes be misinterpreted. The second choice is to take a harder line and deny the phenomenon. (Variations on this approach are taken by Allport 1988, Dennett 1991, and Wilkes 1988.) According to this line, once we have explained the functions such as accessibility, reportability, and the like, there is no further phenomenon called "experience" to explain. Some explicitly deny the phenomenon, holding for example that what is not externally verifiable cannot be real. Others achieve the same effect by allowing that experience exists, but only if we equate "experience" with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. These approaches lead to a simpler theory, but are ultimately unsatisfactory. Experience is the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives, and indeed is perhaps the key explanandum in the science of the mind. Because of this status as an explanandum, experience cannot be discarded like the vital spirit when a new theory comes along. Rather, it is the central fact that any theory of consciousness must explain. A theory that denies the phenomenon "solves" the problem by ducking the question. In a third option, some researchers claim to be explaining experience in the full sense. These researchers (unlike those above) wish to take experience very seriously; they lay out their functional model or theory, and claim that it explains the full subjective quality of experience (e.g. Flohr 1992, Humphrey 1992). The relevant step in the explanation is usually passed over quickly, however, and usually ends up looking something like magic. After some details about information processing are given, experience suddenly enters the picture, but it is left obscure how these processes should suddenly give rise to experience. Perhaps it is simply taken for granted that it does, but then we have an incomplete explanation and a version of the fifth strategy below. A fourth, more promising approach appeals to these methods to explain the structure of experience. For example, it is arguable that an account of the discriminations made by the visual system can account for the structural relations between different color experiences, as well as for the geometric structure of the visual field (see e.g., Clark 1992 and Hardin 1992). In general, certain facts about structures found in processing will correspond to and arguably explain facts about the structure of experience. This strategy is plausible but limited. At best, it takes the existence of experience for granted and accounts for some facts about its structure, providing a sort of nonreductive explanation of the structural aspects of experience (I will say more on this later). This is useful for many purposes, but it tells us nothing about why there should be experience in the first place. A fifth and reasonable strategy is to isolate the substrate of experience. After all, almost everyone allows that experience arises one way or another from brain processes, and it makes sense to identify the sort of process from which it arises. Crick and Koch put their work forward as isolating the neural correlate of consciousness, for example, and Edelman (1989) and Jackendoff (1988) make similar claims. Justification of these claims requires a careful theoretical analysis, especially as experience is not directly observable in experimental contexts, but when applied judiciously this strategy can shed indirect light on the problem of experience. Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly incomplete. For a satisfactory theory, we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience; we need an account of why and how. A full theory of consciousness must build an explanatory bridge.
Upright BiPed_{January 2, 2010
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To StephenB: I use the term 'supernatural' in its dictionary meaning, ie: non-natural, I dont intend any religious connection at all. Seversky described it well at #30. As for the rest of the grading, referring to Human actions as 'non natural', seems weird, but then you are assuming (if I understand it) that our will to act comes from a non-material 'mind'. Im afraid this is where it all gets a bit theological for me. It suggests that you have already decided that the 'mind' exists, and thats another thing I am frequently chastised for: sweeping initial assumptions. Could you cite some evidence for this 'mind' ?Graham1_{January 2, 2010
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---Graham: "Im frequently chastised for introducing religion. Are you sure you want to proceed with this ?"' That's right. Darwinists introduce religion by using the term "supernatural." Given that intrusion, I am simply listing all the possibilities using that inferior natural/supernatural dichotomy, making explicit that which you introduced and left unclear and unexplained. On the other hand, I would prefer, and do ask, that Darwinists use the proper categories, namely law, chance, and agency. Since I know that they will not honor that request or respect ID's own definitions, I am proposing a new language to communicate with them on a semi-rational basis since they refuse to communicate on a rational basis, using the law, chance, agency formulation. See how that works?StephenB_{January 2, 2010
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On second thought, I think that list @40 needs to be modified. Naturally, I would prefer that Darwinists simply use ID terms to avoid confusion. In that case, we would have three categories: Law, chance, and agency. On the other hand, if they insist on alluding to the natural/supernatural dichotomy, then I recommend the following categories, which are, nevertheless, inferior to the ID formulations: Non Natural Causes: ----Divine ----Superhuman ----Human Natural Causes: ----Law ----ChanceStephenB_{January 2, 2010
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Graham: "Im frequently chastised for introducing religion. Are you sure you want to proceed with this" Please read a book. It may help you understand your unfettered run of illogical statements. May I suggest one by a non-ID proponent who is a agnostic of Jewish heritage who says he cannot bring himself to pray to a God? David Berlinski The Delvils DelusionUpright BiPed_{January 2, 2010
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Graham: "Jeez, give it a rest. OK ?" Welcome to the exasperation that ID proponents feel at your behest. I believe this would be the kettle calling the pot black. This exchange captures a sense of responsibility that no one here truly expects you to live up to... Now, going back to the conversation at hand: So you have nothing to support your repeated claim that ID tries to study things that have no evidence. It will now be for you to stop making the claim. Do you plan on doing so?Upright BiPed_{January 2, 2010
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Tp StephenB: Sorry, I didnt read all of your post. It just got better and better. Divine Cause—-[God] Im frequently chastised for introducing religion. Are you sure you want to proceed with this ?Graham1_{January 2, 2010
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Upright Biped: Jeez, give it a rest. OK ? StephenB: You start with the assumption that we have a 'non material mind' (whatever that is). If that is your starting point, then all the rest follows. Hell, ID is just fine, the soul, gods, angels, they all fall into place. But havent I been chewed out for making similar starting assumptions that colour everything that follows ? Do you have some evidence for the existence of this 'non material mind' ?Graham1_{January 2, 2010
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